MUSCULAR PEACEKEEPING: AMERICA'S POLICY IN EVOLVING UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS.

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## Abstract

The end of the Cold War has removed deadlock within the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council increasing the number and scope of peacekeeping mandates. Historically organized to diplomatically resolve conflicts, the U.N. is ill equipped to plan, execute, and support these more prevalent "muscular peacekeeping" missions which require the threat or use of greater military force. While the United States (U.S.) has supported these "assertive multinational" peacekeeping mandates in the Security Council, U.S. policy for mission approval and troop participation has not been officially stated. Drafting of the long awaited Presidential Decision Directive #13 (PDD #13) provides an insight into how Administration, Congress, and Military concerns must be balanced when framing policy which might place U.S. service personnel at risk.

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The end of the Cold War has removed deadlock within the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council increasing the number and scope of peacekeeping mandates. Historically organized to diplomatically resolve conflicts, the U.N. is ill equipped to plan, execute, and support these more prevalent "muscular peacekeeping" missions which require the threat or use of greater military force. While the United States (U.S.) has supported these "assertive multilateral" peacekeeping mandates in the Security Council, U.S. policy for mission approval and troop participation has not been officially stated. Drafting of the long awaited Presidential Decision Directive #13 (PDD #13) provides an insight into how Administration, Congress, and Military concerns must be balanced when framing policy which might place U.S. service personnel at risk.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of United Nations Peacekeeping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World's Sole Superpower Searching for a New Objective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of a Policy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid Peace-Enforcement</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Input to Foreign/Military Policy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement Precipitates Closure</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Approval of U.N. Peacekeeping Mandates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Peacekeeping Environment</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Control of the Security Council and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems Involved with U.S. Participation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grounds for U.S. Participation</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of United Nations Peacekeeping Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. History of Diplomacy not Force</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building an Effective U.N. Military Capability</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
Introduction

"Of even greater influence on the decision to make peace is the consciousness of all the effort that has already been made and of the efforts yet to come. Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow."
Clausewitz, On War, pg 92

"Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes that come from kindness are the very worst."
Clausewitz, On War, pg 75

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has permitted passage of numerous peacekeeping and other security measures through the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council. The result of this removal of the Cold War dead-lock in the Security Council is increased reliance by the United States (U.S.) and her allies on the U.N. as not only a diplomatic forum for discussion of issues surrounding conflicts, but also the center for multilateral economic, humanitarian, and military actions if necessary to resolve conflicts.

This unfettering of the U.N. has had an enormous impact on the number and size of Security Council mandated peace keeping operations. Today more than 70,000 troops are deployed throughout the world in seventeen (17) U.N. peacekeeping missions. The cost for this level of involvement annually exceeds $3 billion. Additionally, the traditional roles of U.N.
peacekeepers have expanded. New missions assigned to peacekeepers include: supporting victims of war, including protection of safe havens; supervising elections and transfers of power; creating secure environments for the delivery and distribution of relief supplies; and documenting evidence for possible war crimes prosecutions.

This research paper concentrates upon this expansion of U.N. peacekeeping sometimes termed "muscular peacekeeping" or "assertive multilateralism" and the difficulties the Clinton administration has had in balancing political and strategic concerns in framing U.S. policy in this area, Presidential Decision Directive 13 (PDD 13).

Expansion of United Nations Peacekeeping

The United Nations is moving toward accepting responsibility for reestablishing security and order in failed nations, particularly when human rights violations are blatant and regional stability is threatened. The Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his June 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, surmised that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed; it's theory was never matched by reality." During the Jan 1992 U.N. Security Council Summit, the Bush administration encouraged the Secretary-General in proposing this reduction in the historic principal of national sovereignty. The U.N. charter provides sufficient mandate for the Secretary-General's position. The procedures for the "pacific settlement
of disputes" is found in Chapter VI (peace keeping). The ability to counter "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" are found in Chapter VII (peace-enforcement).

To understand the United Nations conflict resolution options, a familiarity with existing terminology is required. **Peacemaking** generally means using mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or diplomatic initiatives to peacefully resolve conflict. **Peacekeeping** traditionally involves using military personnel as monitors/observers under restricted rules of engagement once a cease-fire has been negotiated. **Peace-enforcement** involves the use of military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression by a member state. **Peace-building** is rebuilding institutions and infrastructure within a country to create conditions conducive to peace. A new category **Protective engagement** involves using military measures, essentially defensive, to provide safe havens or a secure environment for humanitarian operations. All alternatives but the primarily diplomatic peacemaking require some degree of military force.

It is this broad spectrum of possible peacekeeping operations with their varying levels of diplomatic, humanitarian, and military components that complicates the matter not only for the U.N. but specifically for the U.S. Government.
CHAPTER II
The World's Sole Superpower Searching for a New Objective

The end of the Cold War, accentuated by the lopsided U.S. led coalition victory over Iraq in the Gulf War, has resulted in America enjoying unprecedented world hegemony. General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated "We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to plan for." For the past three years the U.S. has been taking advantage of this reduced threat environment by rapidly "right sizing" its military force. In concert with these force reductions a debate has ensued over the focus of America's national strategy and foreign policy.

U.S. foreign policy has recently shifted from one centered on maintaining a world-wide military balance to one of increasing economic orientation. This new U.S. strategy is committed to remaining the preeminent military power in the world designed to act as a regional balancer when our or allies interests are involved. One overarching element of the U.S. military strategy is the continued reliance upon multilateral vice unilateral responses to world conflict. President Bush established what is now called the "Iraq paradigm." That is diplomatically building a broad based military coalition of nations to act on behalf of a U.N. mandate to resolve conflicts.

The Clinton administration has whole-heartedly embraced this method of maintaining the peace through what U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Madeline Albright, frequently terms "assertive multilateralism." Then Secretary of Defense Aspin's sponsored
Bottom-up Review asserts that while the U.S. will maintain the ability to act unilaterally we recognize that building a coalition of democracies will be central to our national strategy in future conflicts.

Candidate Clinton in 1992 had supported an even more forceful response to Bosnian Serb aggression in the former Yugoslavia, including bombing. President Clinton and his foreign policy and defense team have learned some difficult lessons in attempting to apply this assertive multilateral approach during their first 15 months in office. The administration found it difficult to forge agreement among NATO allies with respect to U.N. mandates in Bosnia. They also discovered the painful repercussions of broadening the essentially humanitarian U.N. backed mission in Somalia beyond the military resources available. It is during this same period that the seminal document, Presidential Decision Directive #13 (PDD 13) outlining U.S. policy on multilateral peace operations, has been in formulation.

Working groups representing the National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Joint Staff examined both the origins and execution of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Their objective was three-fold. First, the administration needed a sound rationale for approving new Security Council peacekeeping proposals and renewing existing operations. Second, the grounds for committing U.S. troops to specific U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) required firm broad-
based support. Lastly, if U.S. troops were going to be involved, the U.N. peacekeeping organization would require reshaping into a larger and more efficient (militarized) branch.

While PDD 13 is a classified document numerous administration officials have encouraged sufficient public debate on these three critical elements of the policy to understand the dynamics surrounding it's evolution. Each of these areas will be discussed in greater detail.

Evolution of a Policy

Quickly after taking office in January 1993, then Secretary of Defense Aspin established the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping. The ex-Nixon era defense policy advisor (principle drafter of "The Pentagon Papers") later turned liberal (D.C. American Civil Liberties Union, director) Mr. Morton H. Halperin was nominated for Senate approval. Throughout 1993 Mr. Halperin directed PDD 13's birth. After a very rough year as a nominee which saw the continuing Bosnia problem, an embarrassment in Haiti, and the 3 October fiasco in Somalia (death of 26 U.S. service men), Mr. Halperin's chief supporter, Secretary Aspin, resigned. On 9 January 1994 Mr. Halperin withdrew his name from consideration.

Hybrid Peace-Enforcement

In drafting this important U.S. policy statement the 1993 Halperin document has matured based upon these real world events. Many in congress believe that in early draft forms PRD 13
(Presidential Review Determination which would become PDD 13 upon approval) departed from established U.S. military art concepts and doctrine. The Weinberger doctrine and Powell corollary of overwhelming force requiring shock, disruption, and total defeat of opponents in support of clearly defined, vital U.S. interests might not be easily assimilated into existing notions of U.N. traditional peacekeeping. But, traditional U.N. peacekeeping missions had always relied upon a previous cease-fire in which all belligerents recognized U.N. troops neutrality and approved of their mission. Many 1993 approved Security Council peacekeeping mandates (Clinton era) particularly in Somalia and Bosnia increased the level of violence into which U.N. peacekeepers would be injected.

These situations falling between Chapter VI peacekeeping and VII peace enforcement have been termed chapter VI and a half missions or muscular peacekeeping. This new breed of U.N. peace operation necessitated adjustment to PDD #13's factors effecting U.S. approval of PKO resolutions and those impacting the participation of U.S. troops.

**Congressional Input to Foreign/Military Policy**

During February and March 1994 a series of House and Senate briefings took place with the goal of achieving broad based support for the policy in advance of Presidential approval. While many in Congress applauded the need to formulate U.S. peace operations policy, there were serious concerns surrounding PDD #13. The primary Congressional concern over PDD #13 was that it
would be used to encourage more U.N. peacekeeping operations irrespective of whether the operations were in America's national security interest. Secretary view PDD #13 as the stepping off point for the administrations long touted "assertive multilateralism."

Suggested congressional modifications to PDD #13 included:

- the necessity to directly link U.N. peace operations to U.S. vital interests;
- the assurance that approved missions were clear with achievable objectives and sensible, identifiable end points;
- insistence that chapter VII peace enforcement operations target situations which were significant threats to security and peace;
- and that the consequences of inaction by the international community in each situation would be unacceptable to the U.S.

On a whole these modifications were minor and contributed to rebuilding bipartisan support for PDD #13 lost after the 3 October deaths of 26 U.S. servicemen in Somalia.

Disagreement Precipitates Closure

In late March 1994 the prospects for Presidential approval of PDD #13 were high. Unfortunately, the document was confounded by the situation which it might first be implemented, Bosnia. The Bosnian Serb offense in Gorazde produced conflicting administration positions on the applicability of NATO and U.N. actions from the Secretary of Defense, reenforced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the National Security Advisor Mr. Anthony Lake. The very fundamental differences between military leaders and Clinton administration over U.S. principles of peace-enforcement operations came to a head. Within three days the
Pentagon and the Clinton administration through Mr. Lake had apparently reached agreement on the shape, character and command structure of any U.S. troop commitment to peace operations.

Mr. Lake's speech of 7 April 1994 at Johns Hopkins University operationalized PDD #13 by stating that if U.S. troops are committed in Bosnia "we must bring our forces to bear in sufficient mass to get the job done.... they will go in strong.... they will be part of a NATO force, not a U.N. force." "They will establish a commanding presence with the numbers, equipment and robust rules of engagement they need to defend themselves and accomplish their mission."

In Mr. Lake's comments one can observe the influence of operational art concerns shaping the application of a political policy. The American brand of peacekeeping it seems will include clear objectives, sufficient mass of forces, acting with unity of command in an environment of relative self-security. Images of Belgium peacekeepers returning from Rwanda shredding their blue U.N. berets in disgust, while accompanying the remains of their 10 comrades hacked to death by machetes reinforce the appropriateness Mr. Lakes announced latest evolutionary step in PDD #13.
CHAPTER III

United States Approval of U.N. Peacekeeping Mandates

The Peacekeeping Environment

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in the fall of 1993 estimated that some 44 million people world-wide were displaced from their homes by violence or persecution. Many experts in the international relief business estimate that there are over 1.2 billion vulnerable people who may require some form of external humanitarian assistance. U.S. military planners and congressional supporters are concerned that the overwhelming amount of global human suffering coupled with an administration with a Peace Corps mentality might result in the dissipation of our diminishing military assets. Equally, conservative strategic planners do not generally embrace Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff’s isolationist "Tarnoff Doctrine", that "the United States lacks the resources to lead as it did during the Cold War and would require new rules of engagement in the world." In drafting PDD #13 the Clinton administration has been forced to walk a fine line between interventionism and isolationism.

The administrations use of the U.N. Security Council as a source of applying military force, albeit foreign forces, in global conflicts has enhanced U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali concept of "expanded peace-keeping." The Secretary Generals comments that at times "there is no other way to advance the cause of peace without putting brave lives at risk"2 concerns
U.S. lawmakers. Many in Congress see Ms. Albright's "assertive multilateral" approach within the U.N. as a subjugation of U.S. foreign policy to the U.N..

Congress, not entirely satisfied with U.N. peacekeeping and this administration's apparent proclivity for it, has failed to appropriate funds to pay all of the 31.7 percent U.S. assessment for U.N. peacekeeping operations. PDD #13 seeks to reduce the U.S. assessment to the standard U.N. level of 25 percent. This lowered assessment level will no doubt please Congress. But, consultation prior to administration approval of peacekeeping mandates and oversight of ongoing missions is really what Congress is after.

U.S. Control of the Security Council and Peacekeeping

PDD #13 places principal importance on the tests applied to each proposed U.N. peacekeeping mandate. While the U.S. might not participate with troops on the ground in every operation we will pay 25 percent of the cost of each mission. The U.S. can control Security Council approval of peacekeeping mandates primarily through leading debate and, though not desired, through the use of our veto. PDD #13 guidelines for the U.S. delegation at the U.N. to approve peacekeeping missions as stated by Ms. Albright are not dogmatic. Her view is that they are flexible criteria for encouraging world action in the face of conflict or humanitarian need.

PDD #13 factors which would affect U.S. approval of U.N. peacekeeping operations apparently include:
• Operations must be linked to vital U.S. interests that generate multilateral support for action.
• Missions target a threat to international peace and security ie international aggression, humanitarian disaster, or gross human rights violations
• Missions objectives are clearly defined and the size of force is sufficient for the expected level of intensity.
• Operation endpoints are established (exit strategy)
• For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping missions a cease-fire is in place.
• Troops and financial support are available for the proposed operation.

It is in the final criteria that congressional opponents of U.N. peacekeeping operations hope to hold the administration policy hostage. Senator Byrd of West Virginia recently proposed legislation which restricts U.S. support of U.N. PKO to only that level financed through the regular budget process. This step would not permit the administration to reprogram other appropriated (DoD) in year funds to pay for ambitious or inefficient U.N. peace operations. It is doubtful that Senator Byrds proposal will become law, but it is an indication of congressional fiscal concern over the swelling costs of U.N. peace operations.
CHAPTER IV

U.S. Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operation

Problems Involved with U.S. Participation

The assignment of U.S. military forces to U.N. peace operations is fraught with difficulty. One of the first U.N. commanders in Bosnia, Canadian General McKenzie commented that he would prefer not to have American troops on the ground in the former Yugoslavia because, "they would be excellent targets for all sides in the conflict." He concluded that, "a belligerent would not get much (world reaction) out of killing a Canadian or Belgium peacekeeper but if a U.S. soldier was killed your face would be on the cover of Time magazine." Surrendering command of U.S. forces to a foreign U.N. commander during peacekeeping operations is an additional congressional and administration stumbling block. PDD #13 proposes very strict criteria for introduction of American military force into U.N. mandated PKOs.

PDD #13 recognizes that occasionally U.S. military personnel participation in multinational peace operations can significantly serve U.S. security goals. At times the U.S. may have to step up to the peacekeeping plate to encourage other nations participation in important missions. Additionally, PDD #13 acknowledges there are some unique capabilities, principally in logistics and support, that the U.S. military alone is capable of accomplishing during short-fused crisis PKOs. An example of this use of U.S. forces is the recent humanitarian airdrops of relief supplies into the Muslim enclaves of Bosnia.
In deciding whether or not to commit U.S. forces to a particular U.N. operation policy makers would also be aware that in some situations by withholding early U.S. support to the multilateral PKO force, later unilateral American entry might be required. In these situations U.S. PKO participation would be least costly in terms of both casualties and dollars. This burden sharing aspect of U.N. peacekeeping is popular in congress.

**Grounds for U.S. Participation**

Given that the previously discussed criteria for U.S. approval of each U.N. peace operation exists, additional considerations for the participation of U.S forces include:

- Assessment that the risk to U.S. service personnel is acceptable.
- Specific U.S. roles within the operation are clear and critical to its success (can not reasonably be accomplished by other forces).
- A separate endpoint for U.S. participation is identified.
- Public and congressional support for U.S involvement exists.
- Command and control provisions of the operation are acceptable.

For mandates tending more toward Chapter VII peace enforcement actions U.S. involvement would also be predicated on more traditional military concerns such as the commitment of sufficient mass of forces to decisively achieve planned
objectives. In these cases of increased risk to forces, U.S. troops would routinely remain under strict American operational control. During less violent U.N. missions, U.S. forces might be placed under the operational control of a foreign U.N. commander. In no case would the ultimate chain of command of U.S. military forces to the President be abrogated. When under a foreign U.N. commander, the U.S. force commander would reserve the right to refuse unlawful orders or those outside the approved U.N. mandate. The U.S. commander would also maintain the ability to report through his routine American command chain.

Based upon Mr. Lake's prescription for U.S. involvement in Bosnian peace operations, such commitments would probably be very infrequent and then conducted either unilaterally or in concert with a regional alliance. The main reason dissuading U.S. participation in "muscular peacekeeping" under traditional U.N. command and control is that in modern military terms none exists.
CHAPTER V

Improvement of United Nations Peacekeeping Capabilities

U.N. History of Diplomacy not Force

Retired Indian General Rikhye, a participant in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 1960-1962, recently commented that in its original implementation the United Nations was a body of world-wide diplomacy not military force. He observed that only recently has pressure come to create a viable military arm within the U.N. and possibly activate the long dormant Article 43, U.N. standing force. It is the absence of a modern military organization with established doctrine, planning capability, command and control mechanisms, logistics ability, and rules of engagement that must be developed before autonomous U.N. fighting forces can fulfill the Secretary General’s vision.

The U.N. organizational deference to diplomats is so prominent that under traditional U.N. practices, an field unit military commander under hostile fire must seek guidance of a U.N. Special Representative to take certain offensive measures to protect his forces. An on scene Special Representative often seeks guidance from U.N. headquarters in New York before responding to field commanders requests. Until recently the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), while it had over 70,000 troops deployed throughout the world, had no one to answer the phone after normal working hours in New York. President
Clinton pledged $10 million to the creation of a modern Situation Center for command and control within the U.N. DPKO.

**Building an Effective U.N. Military Capability**

PDD #13 supports these and other improvements in the U.N. capacity to plan and manage military operations. An important reform element endorsed by both congress and the administration is the creation of an independent office of Inspector General within the U.N.. Congress has been obstinate in paying U.S. peacekeeping assessments because they perceive the U.N. as fiscally irresponsible and inefficient. The imposition of financial oversight would go a long way in generating the congressional support needed for other PDD #13 recommended U.N. PKO improvements.

First among these suggested DPKO changes is staffing. A recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) report found that the DPKO staff consisted of 14 political officers, 9 military planners, and 15 general service workers, only 38 staff members controlling over 70,000 troops in the field.¹ This same small staff is responsible for planning and estimating future operations being considered by the Security Council. In many cases the U.N. DPKO staff members do not have required skills in planning, logistics, intelligence and other areas critical designing and fielding successful military operations. PDD #13 proposes creation of plans, operations, public affairs,
logistics, and intelligence divisions and a civilian police cell within the DPKO.

At present it does not appear that the U.S. will assign troops to the standing or standby U.N. peacekeeping force, authorized under U.N. charter article 43. Recently, commitments to the standby peacekeeping force from other member nations totaling approximately 50,000 troops was announced. PDD #13 would encourage the formation of a U.N. training cadre for these peacekeepers offering U.S. training assistance in both personnel and facilities. Appropriate numbers U.S. experts in many critical skill areas would be made available to DPKO to function as advisors. Additional U.S. experts familiar with ongoing and proposed peacekeeping missions would be required to determine mission approval and U.S. participation criteria already discussed.

With U.S. military assistance, U.N. peacekeeping reorganization should rapidly achieve efficiencies particularly in the areas of logistics, planning, command and control and intelligence. Most PPD #13 proposals for reshaping U.N. peacekeeping functions have already been discussed at working levels with the U.S. mission at the U.N., Pentagon officials and the U.N. DPKO. Presidential approval of the Decision Directive would in beltway terms get the long awaited Peacekeeping support "train out of the station."
CHAPTER VI

Conclusion

The remainder of PDD #13 mainly concerns specific U.S. funding mechanics for U.N. peacekeeping. The shared responsibility between the State and Defense Departments for funding and oversight of U.N. peace operations is laid out in the PDD. Essentially all chapter VII enforcement operations and those Chapter VI missions which U.S. forces participate will be the responsibility of DoD. Because these more muscular versions of peacekeeping often involve the threat or use of force, DoD’s military perspective is deemed critical to U.S. support and possible participation. In no way will DoD infringe upon the State Department role of conducting diplomacy through embassies and our U.N. mission.

U.N. peace operations have distinctly changed since the end of the Cold War. Recent trends point to the world community continuing to step in to diminish the magnitude of destruction and human suffering historically associated with armed conflict. In these missions U.N. forces may not be able to maintain the posture of neutrality. As seen in Bosnia, U.N. forces have been forced to protect the weaker side in the conflict. If this precedence is to continue, in which the international community imposes military forces to change the rational calculus of war to force conflict termination, significant U.N. military forces will be needed. As stated recently by U.N. Special Representative to former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi;
"We are a facilitator, a bridge, a means to cross to the other side. Of course peacemakers cannot do much until the people in the war are fairly exhausted. In Cambodia, it took 21 years, in the Middle East 45 years. But I would like to think that the intensity in Bosnia has been such that, after two years, people are ready to build anew. This war in the heart of Europe is unpardonable."

If belligerents are not rational or believe their objectives are worthy of continued fighting, kind-hearted people seeking to impose peace on them will find themselves in the middle of a dangerous business. Measures outlined in PDD #13 will begin required enhancements of U.N. peacekeeping apparatus to support these military more aggressive mandates. It also clarifies United States policy on support for and troop participation in these increasingly risky missions. Peace missions are no longer entirely diplomatic or military endeavors in the post Cold War era. They must bring the international communities humanitarian, economic, political, and at times military might to build long lasting agreements between parties in conflict.

America will be critical to this next important phase of global conflict resolution. As the premier world economic and military power we have much to contribute and perhaps even more to gain.
NOTES

Chapter I


2. Ibid., p 51.

Chapter III


Chapter V


Chapter VI

Bibliography


Letter from Benjamin A. Gilman to Anthony Lake, 14 February 1994.


