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**FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE:
CONSIDERATIONS AND EFFECTS**

by

Paula, H. Bond

Commander, U.S. Navy

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Paula H Bond

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Euphemisms such as "the operation was a success but the patient died" graphically portray a valid concern regarding the aftermath of a conflict. The conflicts surfacing among lesser nations within which the U.S. is most likely to become involved today are complicated by weak or fractionalized governments, deficient economies and strong nationalist movements. These increase the complexity and time in effecting a lasting recovery. The true measurement of victory lies in successfully stabilizing and nurturing the country to renewed self-sufficiency as defined by the desired strategic end state.

The transition from conflict to peace is generally phased from a predominantly military operation to the assumption of government by civilian authority. The operational commander has historically been charged with effecting the initial phase, which will lay the foundation for the speed and success of the overall recovery and reflect upon the credibility of the United States. In that this transition is merely another step in achieving the political objective it cannot be divorced from the conflict itself, and planning should begin with and be incorporated into that of the actual conflict. Actions taken during the conflict impact upon the ability to achieve the desired end state. The operational commander is forced to balance their cost versus benefit in planning. Creation at the command and staff level of a post-conflict task force as an element within the conflict organization will provide him with the

added insight into possible consequences of these actions and provide a command structure readily available to effect this phase.

This study will draw from aftermath accounts to develop post-conflict considerations. The relevance for future applications will differ, but those that do apply should be considered in determining the task force composition and provide the groundwork for initial assessments of impacts on conflict and transition planning.

The "threat" we face today is a world unraveling at the seams. Many problems hold little promise of resolution by an external actor and will require extensive financial and material support to effect a lasting recovery. The process of envisioning the post-conflict condition of a country should be the first step at the strategic level and may shape both the decision to intervene militarily and the conduct of the resolution itself. Our vision of the future must not be lost in the emotionalism of today, but instead be based on a realistic assessment of the consequences of our actions. Given an achievable strategic end state, it becomes the responsibility of the operational commander to determine the best means of laying the foundation for attaining that goal.

CHAPTER II

POST CONFLICT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Previous conflicts provide a wealth of information that, when balanced with the reality of the individual conflict and its actors, serves to establish a baseline from which to construct post-conflict planning and management. The commander should be aware that international law mandates provisions be made for the recovery of the vanquished nation as well.¹ This chapter will discuss the responsibilities that the military most often assumes in preparing the way for peace. Victory will be measured by attainment of the desire end state. A conflict well fought and "won" can be lost to mismanagement of the recovery.

SECURITY

Threats to security do not end at the moment a ceasefire is declared. The period which follows can be even more dangerous due to the sudden change in Rules of Engagement, sustained resistance and the time necessary to effect a change in the human mindset conditioned by hostilities and offensive military action.

New Rules of Engagement (ROE), frequently shaped by statesmen anxious to limit the possibility of actions that may impact on negotiations, are generally directed at the time of the ceasefire and modify the employment of firepower.² Their issuance often implies an unrealistic reduction in danger. Operation Desert Storm accounts disclosed hostile engagements with enemy forces between the ceasefire and corresponding ROE change on 28 February and the peace agreement

on 3 March 1991. The threat to the combatants turned peacekeepers continued to remain high due to frequent encounters with mines, booby traps and hostile forces in the course of securing Kuwait.³

Our experience with ROE in the Gulf War was mostly positive, relying more heavily on the judgement of the commander guided by the expertise provided by judge advocates.⁴ Careful study of Desert Storm ROE may provide viable application for the future. Post-hostility ROE will be an immediate concern and have a tremendous effect on all sides of the conflict, making them an important variable in the post-conflict planning phase.

This period of heightened tensions and sporadic fighting subsequent to a ceasefire agreement is common and its length will vary dependent on communications lines to forces and the desire to resist and "fight on" by individual groups. The "peace" can become less discernible from hostility, when the conflict has provided fertile ground for an insurgency, such as Mao Tse Tung in China in World War II. Operation Just Cause in Panama presented its own security dilemmas as the forces assumed a policing role faced with general chaos in downtown Panama City, caused by looting, vigilantism and firefights lasting several days. Although the security problem was anticipated, planners failed to include measures to counter this threat in OPLANS.⁵

Operation Provide Comfort, a consequence of Operation Desert Storm, is reflective of an additional future security requirement that may surface. Violence rooted in nationalism is surfacing within territories. In the wake of a conflict an immediate concern may be

the security of a group, much like the Kurds in Iraq.⁶ Notable characteristics of this operation are that it fell into another CINC's Area of Operations, required the commitment of additional forces, had its own ROE, and although billed as a peacekeeping mission looked more like a lesson in offensive maneuver.⁷

Shaping a secure environment in which to begin recovery may be complex. The panoply of factors is not limited to those in existence at the commencement of the conflict, but may evolve and expand over time. Therefore, the ability to predict and respond effectively is an important consideration in post-conflict planning.

GOVERNMENT

The ability of a people to survive is deeply rooted in the strength and legitimacy of its government. In the absence of leadership and direction in the aftermath of a conflict, competitors will rush to fill the void. The results may be further instability and will prolong, if not doom, post-conflict recovery. Careful evaluation by the operational commander of the new or surviving government or lack thereof is critical. The resultant requirements that face the operational commander may entail political challenges for which he may have been poorly prepared.

General Douglas MacArthur was placed in a dual command role as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and the United States Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE) during the post-World War II occupation of Japan. A stated objective was to bring about the establishment of a democratic and peaceful government and as SCAP he exercised direct control over the existing Japanese government

retained in power by the Allies. General MacArthur's oversight responsibilities of ensuring Japanese compliance with SCAP directives were not assumed by a regional civil affairs team until 1949.⁸

Operation Just Cause (Panama 1989) was conducted to depose the Noriega dictatorship and install the democratically elected coalition headed by Endara. Panama had been under a military dictatorship for 21 years⁹ and the newly inaugurated government consisted of three people: one president and two vice presidents. Operation Promote Liberty, the post-conflict follow-on, commenced on 20 December 1989 and fell initially under Brigadier General Gann, J-5 of USSOUTHCOM, as Commander Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF). Brigadier General Gann was placed under the operational control of Mr John Bushnell, the U.S. Charge' d'affaires, and tasked with assisting a new Panamanian government, no small feat considering that it would have to be built from the top down. Once order was restored the US Military Support Group (MSG)-Panama was activated in its place on 17 January 1990 to assume what had become mainly a civil military operation.¹⁰ Operation Promote Liberty provides ample fertile ground for studying military involvement in governmental affairs.

The relatively brief commitment of USCENTCOM in Task Force Freedom dubbed the emergency response phase can in part be attributed to the existence of a recognized government. The exiled Emir of Kuwait established the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP), a working government committee, in anticipation of extensive damage. Assistance was officially requested of the US in establishing this program.¹¹ The Kuwait Task Force (KTF) was established in December

1990 and worked closely with representatives of the Kuwait government to formulate and effect a plan for Kuwait's restoration and reconstruction.¹² The ability to return quickly the recognized government to power and facilitate a stable recovery was a major factor in the rapid pace at which they were able to effect a return to peace.

The commitment and time required to stabilize a country is inversely proportional to the strength and legitimacy of the government (ie, the weaker the government the greater the required commitment and the longer the transition). The operational commander must consider this in his post-hostilities planning and be prepared for any eventuality. The rising tide of violence in many countries today exists among rival factions with little governmental structure or experience. Intervention in these conflicts guarantees that it will require extended efforts in nation assistance.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENT

Conflicts come with a high price tag. They disrupt the lives of people and the economic stability of the country. The damage that results may extend to other nations in the form of environmental disaster. The span of what are considered necessary services for everyday life has grown with increasing dependence on high technology. It is these same services, such as electricity, communications and government buildings, that are frequently damaged or destroyed. Their restoration and reconstruction become an immediate priority following the hostilities.

The Kuwait emergency recovery phase offers a comprehensive

example of the immediate baseline requirements. Planning had begun during Desert Shield in the State Department, but responsibility for initiating the post-conflict program remained with USCENTCOM. This was handled by creation of Task Force Freedom under ARCENT with Brigadier General R. S. Frix in command.¹³ Initial damage assessment teams were deployed in country within two hours of suspension of the offensive. These forward teams encountered significant security threats, including ordnance, mines, and booby traps; they were also confronted by surrendering enemy POWs.¹⁴

The first mission for the engineering teams on entry into Kuwait was to restore water, electricity, health and sanitation. Most of these services and facilities, including hospitals, had been destroyed or rendered ineffective by Iraq.¹⁵ In addition to these requirements and in conjunction with the assigned Civil Affairs units and Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO), emergency response included medical supplies, public services and security, transportation, logistics and repair of public buildings.¹⁶ Task Force Freedom was quick to make contact and established a close working relationship with the US Embassy. Their mutually supportive efforts were instrumental in facilitating rapid restoration and reconstruction.¹⁷

The environmental impact of the "Gulf War" cannot be ignored and has affected the entire Gulf region with India being one of the hardest hit.¹⁸ The damage incurred from the air sorties alone was several times greater than the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima in World War II.¹⁹ Burning oil wells and oil seepage into the sea were

cause for additional concern. The burning oil wells presented a health hazard, reduced visibility limiting air operations, and atmospheric damage was caused by the dense smoke. It was estimated that as many as 800 oil wells were deliberately ignited by retreating Iraqis and a total of 4 to 6 million barrels of oil burned each day.²⁰ A request for international assistance was made and a coalition force of civilian firms comprising 80% of the world's oil well firefighting capacity snuffed out the last fire on 6 November 1991.²¹

The impact extends far beyond the immediate effects mentioned to the world's agriculture, marine, animal and atmospheric environments. "Green house" effect, pollution, ecocycle interruption or decimation, and extinction of zoological species are terms used to describe the resultant collateral damage caused by weapons and destructive forces employed in conflicts. The prospect of environmental devastation resulting from an extended conflict employing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is both real and frightening. With greater international emphasis on environmental issues, the execution of military actions in future conflicts will necessarily be scrutinized and weighed against possible consequences.

HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS

The hostilities and their disruption of basic services reduce or may render completely dysfunctional the ability of the populace to satisfy even the most basic of needs. Many are displaced and return to ruins without the means to recover their previous standard of living. Recovery will by necessity have to address these basic

requirements and build from there.

At the end of World War II Germany was divided into four areas of responsibility among the Allied Commanders. Initial post-war efforts centered on humanitarian and emergency needs. Food shortages and transportation difficulties forced rationing at a target of 1550 calories a day, which was not always possible to meet. The outcome was mass malnutrition and an increase in diseases. Large scale destruction of housing created another immediate requirement for shelter which continued to expand with the repatriation of dislocated peoples.²²

Operation Provide Comfort tasked with providing a safe haven for the Kurdish refugees from Iraqi aggression was a consequence of Desert Storm. This coalition effort was formulated by UN Security Resolution 688 adopted on 5 April 1991. In force by the second week of April, military forces were employed in the initial air drops and ground operations prior to the introduction of various UN and world humanitarian assistance agencies.²³ Because no friendly forces controlled the territory, initial operations under the control of EUCOM employed a MEU(SOC), Special Operations Forces, Army units, Navy assets and coalition forces.²⁴ To the forces establishing a security zone in this region the intensity of the hostilities more closely fit into low intensity conflict vice simple humanitarian assistance.

Billed as the military's "most complicated humanitarian assistance logistic effort since the Berlin Airlift" Provide Comfort has also been lauded by relief organizations as the most

comprehensive and advanced.²⁵ As in other humanitarian efforts US Army Civil Affairs units (reservists) were the main providers in cooperative measures with coalition partners. The major focus was on food stockpiling and distribution. UN agencies provided dietary requirements and food came from the coalition military, UN, CARE International and other relief agencies. The first CARE representatives on site to begin assuming control of the operations arrived in early May. The rapid transition of the food distribution process was credited to a concept of reverse planning, focusing on having a system in place that could be directly assumed by a civilian agency.²⁶

It is important to note that unilateral operations such as Promote Liberty (Panama 1990) do not draw from coalition partners and may require a U.S. military commitment for extended periods of time. Although the State Department will frequently be the lead agency and has assets available in the form of USAID and the Peace Corps, the manpower commitment may well be absorbed by the military. In Panama the CMOTF was augmented by reservists from civil affairs units in accomplishing this task.²⁷

Baseline requirements since World War II have not changed: food, shelter, water, public services, medical and security. Although military forces will initially be involved in providing these services, many civilian organizations in existence today are capable of expeditiously assuming these duties. The requirement for today's commander beyond meeting the immediate needs will be in preparing the way for these agencies both in preliminary planning and at the

conclusion of hostilities.

ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR

The majority of issues regarding Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) focus on humanitarian and security requirements. Procedures for prisoner return will customarily be negotiated with the peace settlement. However, the period prior to their repatriation may present the greatest challenge.

Prior to the Gulf war ceasefire on 28 February 1991, 887 EPWs had been taken. This total grew exponentially to 19,171 over the next five days and was sustained at this level through 7 March. The number was overwhelming and unexpected; it exceeded the immediate capabilities of the holding facilities in the areas of shelter, logistics and security.²⁸ Additionally the massive surrender of Iraqi forces placed incoming recovery teams in the untenable position of having no guidance or capability to provide for them.²⁹

Handling EPWs may require special language skills and country experts to supplement security forces. Administrative and dedicated humanitarian assistance support will further increase personnel requirements. The perceived quality of care of EPWs is an issue that will be critically judged by the international community and because of the unpredictability of the magnitude of the operation and the potential for disaster, close attention and constant monitoring is of paramount importance.

MEDIA

The impact of the media presence on the forces in the field and their influence on the future across a broad spectrum is large. Today's media corps is much more aggressive and willing to accept greater personal risk. The difficulty in determining a consistent policy for handling the press is compounded by the differences in standards and requirements between multinational press corps. Desert Storm accounts of personnel maintaining security for the peace negotiations indicated numerous media attempts to deceive and evade these forces. The reflections of these units were not limited to negative encounters, but also told of being provided a phone call home at the media's expense.³⁰ The leadership succeeded in providing clear direction regarding media requests, but the guidance was not uniform among the Services and failed in some cases to establish a positive working relationship.

The most constructive policy would recognize and incorporate provisions for the media into the planning for future operations.³¹ The military has come to understand its role and will realize a more beneficial relationship with the media through continued training and consideration of their requests in operational planning. Many questions remain unresolved, such as acceptable numbers and security, and will add to the increasing complexity of military operations.

COALITIONS

The current global threat is perceived by many as coming from competing ethnic and political factions within nations. The possibility of spreading beyond national borders and the severity of

the human devastation has drawn the attention of neighbors and sympathetic observers. Economics and politics guarantee that the US will seldom act alone. Operation Desert Storm and the UN forces employed in the Bosnian crisis are evidence of this trend. An operational commander engaging in coalition operations will need to add a few extra items for consideration to the list. The most basic will be agreement on common goals and objectives. It is evident that the success of the mission will be dependent on a unity of effort directed toward a common goal. Differences in doctrine, training, equipment, and culture will need to be determined and considered.³²

Coalition command structure will also need to be established. Three command relationships have been developed: parallel, lead nation and a combination of the two. Desert Storm was an example of parallel, in which each participating nation retained control of its deployed forces. Coalition decisions were made through common agreement between the senior military and political leadership. In the "lead nation" relationship command is by agreement assumed by the nation providing the largest number of forces and greatest resources.³³

The added complexity of acting in consonance with other coalition forces will have been resolved in most cases prior to the post-conflict stage. Where the operational commander may find the greatest challenge will be in cases such as Operation Provide Comfort, where forces merge for the first time with little advanced preparation.

SUMMARY

The considerations covered in this chapter were intended to provide a comprehensive overview from which to develop a baseline for post-conflict planning. The complexity of the operations involved defy traditional military application and will require dedicated efforts to attain the correct civilian and military mix for mission accomplishment. International law dictates that similar provisions be afforded the vanquished and the liberated. The enormity of that responsibility necessitates that a dedicated task force be assembled to anticipate and be prepared to respond to requirements generated both before and during the course of the conflict.

CHAPTER III

POST-CONFLICT PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

The CINC is tasked with post-conflict planning for his area of operations. However logical this may seem, it is an area that is easily forgotten in deliberate planning or neglected amid the daily crises of a conflict. Conflict and its aftermath do not occur as divisible operations, but are strategically unified through a common political objective and tactically interactive. They should be planned and managed, keeping their interdependence in mind. The post-conflict stage is unique in that it demands a non-traditional military solution, requiring the commander to find a suitable balance that will maximize both civil and military resources. This chapter will address key concepts regarding post-conflict planning and management.

Planning and management should be conducted under the CINC and must be interactive with the conflict planning beginning with deliberate planning efforts and through the conflict itself. Post-conflict operations will normally be retained under the same operational commander and assets and military commitments that come with coordinating the recovery will to a large degree be extracted from those already assigned and may impact on his overall area commitments. Additionally post-conflict planners will need to consider critical requirements generated out of the conflict as it progresses, ie destruction of electrical and water facilities. This overall operation from conflict through recovery is best placed under

one commander to ensure unity of effort.

Operation Promote Liberty suffered from a lack of coordination, having been planned in a vacuum with minimal interaction external to the planning cell. The results were felt on the streets of Panama City in the form of relatively unchecked looting and general chaos allowed by the revised focus of US forces outside the city. Security, a major concern for post-conflict planners, who initially rely heavily on combat troops in place, was not adequately considered in this case. The movement of support forces also suffered from a lack of coordinated logistics planning as they were preempted by non-critical forces or material causing unnecessary delays in their arrival in Panama.³⁴

Not unlike the conflict itself it is critical that an understanding of the desired end state be developed. Rarely will tasking define an end state with which to direct deliberate planning. Therefore, the first requirement of the planner is to draw from the lessons of the past tempered by reality and seasoned by U.S. political direction to arrive at a vision for the country in the aftermath. This process is critical in that the OPLAN will be developed from this insight. This vision should be tested against the concept of operations to ensure that 1) the objectives of both conflict and aftermath are in agreement on the end state and 2) the conflict does not in itself preclude achievement of the ultimate goal.

Although planning resides within the CINC's staff, it is important that command responsibility be assigned early on to allow

sufficient review with respect to capabilities and cohesion with conflict planning and to incorporate anticipated component elements in the process. Task Force Freedom, Figure 1³⁵, although not directly modeled after The Military Support Group, Figure 2³⁶, shows some distinct similarities in general component employment and provides insight into the type of forces that are typical of this stage.

Two component task forces were created within Task Force Freedom: Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) and Support Command Task Force (SCTF).³⁷ The CCATF primarily functioned in a humanitarian assistance capacity and was composed of 550 professionals, who possessed public service skills. The SCTF provided the engineering, logistics, communications, psyop and policing capabilities of an Army Area Support Group.³⁸ Totalling 3650 at its peak the majority of personnel were from the Reserve Corps. Task Force Freedom eventually expanded to a combined task force with the addition of French, Canadian, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti personnel.³⁹ The Military Support Group established for the restoration of Panama employed a similar combination of civil affairs and combat support and service support elements.

It should be noted that neither civil affairs nor combat components have sufficient expertise to handle the scope of the civil military requirements independently. The most constructive planning will develop a comprehensive JTF with both types of units. Due to the preponderance of Army forces, Task Force Freedom was organized




FIGURE 1. TASK FORCE FREEDOM




FIGURE 2. MILITARY SUPPORT GROUP-PANAMA COMMAND STRUCTURE

under ARCENT which was a CENTCOM component command.⁴⁰ An additional advantage to the development of the Task Force under a major component is that it serves as a constant reminder of the follow-on requirements and is available to provide insight into the possible effects of actions taken during the conflict.

A vast majority of civil affairs expertise resides within the Army Reserve. Both Operation Promote Liberty and Task Force Freedom relied on their support and integrated them into the initial planning. The differences in the number of Reservists employed between the two, TF Freedom having a greater percentage and total number, were founded in the difficulty in effecting a Reserve recall. Although the most capable forces to conduct civil affairs, the reliance on approval to activate these forces for an extended period necessitates that the planner consider alternatives. Without authorization for full time Reserve forces the task force will be dependent on volunteers with short term availability. This presents problems in maintaining continuity and reduces the effectiveness of the organization due to the transition required for replacements to come up to speed.

The success of an effective post-conflict transition to a large degree can be influenced by dedicated interagency coordination. Deliberate planning conducted without the constraints of time imposed by an actual crisis should be able to determine possible post-conflict scenarios based on State Department background knowledge of the country and intelligence estimates. Based on these scenarios and historical cases such as Desert Storm, Operation Promote Liberty and

World War II, the planners can predict requirements in advance. Types of information that would be useful is stability of the government and relationship with the US, economic condition, and status of forces (civil and military).

Interaction with the State Department should expand as the crisis transitions from hypothetical to probable. It is at this point that cooperation will impact upon the ability to effectively transition from conflict to peace. The State Department can provide the link between the U.S. military and the country in conflict, as well as coalition partners, to identify and target specific requirements and assist in coordinating avenues of assistance (foreign and national) that may support efforts with funding and supplies and ultimately assume responsibility from the military. The execution of the post-conflict phase itself may begin under the aegis of the operational commander and gradually be relinquished to the Ambassador and the country team. In any case, the overall accomplishment of the mission and credibility of the U.S. is best served by dedicated cooperation of the two.

Interagency coordination conducted during Desert Shield by the Kuwait Task Force (KTF) in preparation for the restoration and reconstruction was superb, but had one major flaw. It established a workable relationship with both the Ambassador and the Kuwaitis and successfully managed to coordinate the necessary civil affairs elements that met the anticipated needs.⁴¹ The KTF was not without its own lessons learned in that during the initial interagency work it was not under the command of CENTCOM and neither coordinated its

efforts with the planners in Saudi Arabia nor received specific guidance or information from them. This lack of unity of effort caused a duplication of effort, a disconnect in planning orientation and presented organizational problems when the two were eventually joined.⁴² Future operations should centralize all planning efforts, while attempting to duplicate the positive example set by the KTF.

Post-conflict planning and management cannot be conducted in a vacuum and should be integrated into the development of OPLANS and Crisis Action Planning. Planning should originate and remain under the direction of the CINC to ensure unity of effort and close interaction during the conflict. Forces and requirements to effectively execute this phase must be well throughout and identified early to facilitate timely arrival. The utilization of Reserve personnel is an issue that requires special considerations. Good interagency coordination is a target well worth aiming for in terms of assessing civilian resources and developing a strong relationship with the host nation. These issues all serve to determine the duration of required assistance, the perceived legitimacy of the supported government and impact on U.S. credibility.

CHAPTER IV

POST-CONFLICT IMPACTS

It is a well placed responsibility that engages the operational commander in restoration and reconstruction as a continuum of the conflict. If he has incorporated a post-conflict JTF into his overall operation, he will be afforded a continuous perspective on the overall accomplishment of the mission. The vision of what will remain in the aftermath can be factored into target selection, the pace of the war and protection of key areas. A critical decision in a conflict may offer no compromise to a negative impact on a post-conflict environment, but armed with the knowledge of the consequences of conflict actions, he will be better prepared to address them and can balance them against other actions in developing the groundwork for achieving the final end state.

The mere fact that the U.S. has entered a conflict identifies us with a "side." Our actions will reflect on the supported government and must carefully consider the effect on its legitimacy. The amount of force used during the conflict is directly related to post-conflict turbulence and will affect the duration of the post-conflict recovery period. This also applies to the use of force once the ceasefire is effective.⁴³ The commander must carefully consider the application of force both during the conflict and in the aftermath to avoid excessive or culturally non-acceptable measures. The transitional ROE must balance the threat while minimizing the use of force. The timing of war termination will also be affected, where

the benefits of concluding outweigh the cost to the country of continuing. The objective of entering the conflict will be lost if at the end the government on whose behalf we have acted has lost the support of its people.

Environmental concerns can be expected to play an increasing role in the decision process. Environmental disruption may extend beyond the limits of the "war zone." With the growth in understanding of the effects comes the requirement to limit any negative impacts. For the operational commander this means he will not only have to carefully consider the effects of the weapons he employs, but he will be expected to protect areas that have the potential for environmental devastation.

Operations undertaken in the course of a conflict will increasingly come under closer scrutiny as we attempt to find the precise formula that will minimize the negative effects yet end quickly. Actions employed will need to be tested for impact on the achievement of the desired end state and its absolute necessity in effecting an acceptable war termination. In fulfilling the requirement to limit operations to the bare minimum of conflict, future military leaders can expect greater challenges in justifying their actions before execution.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY

Engagement in a conflict implies that we have an understanding of not only "why" but "what" we will achieve and a reasonable expectation that we can achieve it. Political objectives are rarely met by the signing of a truce or treaty. They generally require an additional commitment to assist the nation until it is self-sufficient. Absent this few countries would be capable of effecting a recovery. In short, a defined, achievable end state should be a precursor to any conflict engagement.

Introduction of the post-conflict phase will generally default to the military by virtue of on scene presence and combat capabilities. It is the most appropriately trained and experienced in working under the austere and hostile conditions that will be encountered in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, but will find that requirements at effecting a recovery will quickly exceed the capabilities of combat troops. Augmentation or substitution with civil military and civil affairs units will be required to meet the broad range of requirements. Considerations will include security, restoration of basic facilities such as electricity, food and water, repatriation of EPWs, humanitarian assistance and establishment of the government. The handling and care that the military puts into the execution of this phase will determine both the overall success in achieving the objective as well as the duration it takes to transition from conflict to peace.

The intent in the post-conflict transition phase is to return the country to civilian rule as quickly as possible. The means employs non-traditional civil military and civil affairs units. This is best accomplished through creation of a JTF organized with the talent and expertise to conduct these operations. Post-conflict planning and conflict execution will impact upon each other and should be interactive. The CINC will likely retain responsibility for both and should consider both as phases vice separate operations.

Clausewitz's caution in his book, ON WAR, to consider the last step before taking the first can easily be applied to any conflict. If we cannot answer the question of what it is that we expect the end state to be or cannot conceive of how that might be accomplished, perhaps it would be wise to stop before we begin. Post-conflict efforts are supportive; that is they are meant to be temporary and assist the existing or nascent government. Beyond this the U.S. may find itself engaged in a permanent commitment. The wisdom of this type of commitment should be left to the political leadership; however, the military has the responsibility to evaluate not only its ability to achieve a military "victory", but its capability to convert it into a strategic end state and convey that to the NCA. It is this, as well as the added complexity of coordinating civilian and military resources and the impact the conflict itself will have on its success, that should drive the CINC to ensure planners consider the post-conflict phase carefully and incorporate it as an integral phase of an overall operation.

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