NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

DIRECT TRAINING AND MILITARY-TO-MILITARY
CONTACT PROGRAMS:
THE CINCS PEACETIME ENABLERS

BY ROBERT J. KASPER, JR.
CAPT(S), JASC, USNR

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in
partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of
Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and
are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the
Department of the Navy.

Robert J. Kasper, Jr.
June 17, 1994

Paper directed by Captain D. Watson
Chairman, Department of Military Operations
Col. Dan Keirsey, Faculty Research Advisor

Approved by:

Faculty Research Advisor Date

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED
1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

2. Security Classification Authority:

3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:

4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

5. Name of Performing Organization: Joint Military Operations Department

6. Office Symbol: 1C

7. Address: Naval War College, 686 Cushing Rd., Newport, RI 02841-5010

8. Title (Include Security Classification): DIRECT TRAINING AND MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACT PROGRAMS: THE CINCS PEACETIME ENABLERS (U)

9. Personal Authors: Robert J. Kaspar, Jr., CAPT(S). JAGC, USNR

10. Type of Report: Final

11. Date of Report: June 16, 1994

12. Page Count: 35

13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: DIRECT TRAINING; MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS; SECURITY ASSISTANCE; IMET; E-IMET; OPERATIONAL CONTROL & EVALUATION; PROMOTING PEACE & BUILDING DEMOCRACY

15. Abstract: In the current international environment U.S. contact with and direct training of international military students should rightly assume new importance as a relatively inexpensive, yet potentially crucial means of national interest projection. In order for these programs to be an effective peacetime enabler for the Unified Commander there must be much closer coordination between DOD and the State Department, within DOD between the Unified Commanders and DSAA, and operationally within each Unified Commander's area of responsibility.

The military program provided to each country receiving assistance should be prepared by the CINC, in coordination with the regional ambassadors, and centrally monitored within DOD by DSAA. The goal should be to eliminate duplication of training efforts and other educational programs and to ensure that the composite DOD program provided to each country is both appropriate and carefully planned and evaluated. In addition the CINC need to develop a mechanism similar to USPACOM's "Cooperative Engagement Matrix" to track whether the CINC's operational goals and objectives for each country are being met. The Unified Commander also needs to address three additional issues which are particularly critical to the successful implementation of the "soft" training programs for "promoting peace" and "building democracy" - measuring the effectiveness of the training, coordination of program efforts within the CINC's staff and with the joint staff, and coordination of the training provided by the CINC with the military exercises initiated by the component commanders.

This paper discusses the legislative and historical background of these programs and suggests changes in program implementation and several operational initiatives that will help the Unified Commander ensure that these programs continue to be an effective enabler of American military influence and leverage.

16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unclassified</th>
<th>Same As Rpt</th>
<th>DTIC Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

18. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

19. Name of Responsible Individual: Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

20. Telephone: (401) 841-3414/4120

21. Office Symbol: 1C

Security Classification of This Page: UNCLASSIFIED
Abstract of
DIRECT TRAINING AND MILITARY-TO MILITARY CONTACT PROGRAMS: THE CINCS PEACETIME ENABLERS

In the current international environment U.S. contact with and direct training of international military students should rightly assume new importance as a relatively inexpensive, yet potentially crucial means of national interest projection. In order for these programs to be an effective peacetime enabler for the Unified Commander there must be much closer coordination between DOD and the State Department, within DOD between the Unified Commanders and DSAA, and operationally within each Unified Commander's area of responsibility.

The military program provided to each country receiving assistance should be prepared by the CINC, in coordination with the regional ambassadors, and centrally monitored within DOD by DSAA. The goal should be to eliminate duplication of training efforts and other educational programs and to ensure that the composite DOD program provided to each country is both appropriate and carefully planned and evaluated. In addition, the CINCs need to develop a mechanism similar to USPACOM's "Cooperative Engagement Matrix" to track whether the CINC's operational goals and objectives for each country are being met. The Unified Commander also needs to address three additional issues which are particularly critical to the successful implementation of the "soft" training programs for "promoting peace" and "building democracy" - measuring the effectiveness of the training, coordination of program efforts within the CINC's staff and with the joint staff, and coordination of the training provided by the CINC with the military exercises initiated by the component commanders.
Preface

From February to September, 1992, I was recalled to active duty to head up the Naval Justice School's initial efforts to formulate and develop military justice and human rights training for the E-IMET program. I was responsible for the development of the phased training program and the human rights course for U.S. trainers. In addition, I planned and participated in the initial training team efforts in Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea and Guatemala. Thus, a large part of the information contained in this paper regarding the development of the course of instruction and the "flaws" exposed in the current delivery system for "security assistance" are derived from personal experience.

I also would be extremely remiss if I did not acknowledge the assistance I received from Captain Guy Abbate, my replacement at NJS, Mrs. Rita Verry, Security Assistance Training Program Manager, Navy IPO, Prof. R. "Jack" Grunawalt, Ocean Law and Policy, NWC, and CDRs Mark E. Rosen and Jose A. Raffucci, Jr., Dept. of the Navy, Judge Advocate General, International Law, who provided a constant source of support, encouragement and guidance for my research efforts. I would also like to acknowledge CDR Charles "Juno" Jamison, USPACOM/J4, LtCol Jim Fondren, USPACOM/J4, CDR Keith Baker, JCS/J5, LtCol J. E. Thigpen, JCS/UN Division J5, and Mr. Warren Olson, Deputy Director, Programs Division, DSAA, for their willingness to meet with or talk over the telephone to an unknown student researcher from the War College and for their open and frank discussion of current issues in implementing direct training and military contact programs.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. PRESENT PROGRAMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. IMET AND E-IMET</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. TITLE 10 PROGRAMS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES IN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We have no eternal allies—nor perpetual friends.
We do have interests, both eternal and perpetual.
And those it is our duty to follow.

Henry, Lord Palmerston

I. INTRODUCTION

As the United States "downsizes" its military and increasingly perceives its own security
to be linked with broader measures of international stability and security than the containment
of Soviet expansion, the need for low-cost, effective means of international military
influence and leverage will expand. In this new, post-Cold War environment, U.S. security
assistance training programs (recast for Fiscal Year 1995 as Department of Defense [DOD]
and State Department "direct training" programs for "promoting peace" and "building
democracy") and military-to-military contact programs have assumed greater importance
and have received increased executive and legislative scrutiny. The Clinton administration's
emphasis on providing United States economic, military and diplomatic support to a perceived


3 In accordance with the Clinton administration's proposed "Peace, Prosperity and Democracy Act of 1994," HR 3765, DOD and State Department budget presentation documents for FY95 have recast "security assistance" under the rubric of programs for "promoting peace" and "building democracy." See Dept. of State & Dept. of Defense, Congressional Presentation for Promoting Peace, Fiscal Year 1995 and Congressional Presentation for Building Democracy, Fiscal Year 1995.

"worldwide march toward democracy" has generated an increased emphasis within DOD on programs designed to aid in this process.\(^5\) Since the Fiscal Year 1993 budget, Congressional focus in providing funding for these DOD programs has been and is to promote initiatives aimed at: 1) the establishment of democratic institutions, 2) civilian control of the military, 3) accountable defense resource management, and 4) the establishment of effective judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including the observance of internationally recognized human rights.\(^6\)

Unified Commanders\(^7\) have historically viewed "security assistance" and military-to-military contact programs as a key pillar in the implementation of their regional peacetime strategies. In their assessment, these programs are powerful and cost-effective tools for shaping the strategic environment in their region. These programs allow the CINCs to remain engaged with foreign military leaders and to expand their forces forward presence footprint in this era of declining resources.\(^8\)

U.S. foreign policy experts have consistently maintained that American training of and assistance to foreign militaries is an extremely useful, if not critical, instrument of our national security policy.\(^9\) It has been assumed that U.S. training and military assistance

\(^5\) Clinton, supra; See also, William J. Clinton, September 27, 1993, speech to the United Nations, articulating a policy of "cooperative engagement."

\(^6\) P.L. 101-513 Debate, supra.

\(^7\) In this paper the term Unified Commander and CINC will be used to interchangeably denote the Commander in Chiefs of the 5 unified commands with geographic areas of responsibility.


\(^9\) The Security Assistance Program began primarily in response to the Soviet threat. Its purpose was to provide military and economic assistance to nations friendly to United
advances American foreign policy objectives by providing political leverage in recipient nations, encouraging organizational and behavioral changes in host country militaries and promoting the development of democratic institutions. This assistance is also perceived to be a cost-effective means of achieving these goals, since it does not involve the commitment of large U.S. military forces or require the maintenance of overseas installations.

Security assistance programs, in the past, have largely been used to assist foreign governments in purchasing U.S. weapons systems and in providing technical training in the use and maintenance of those weapons. Out of the approximately $7.5 billion in security assistance appropriated to 116 countries in fiscal year 1993, only $425 million was provided under the auspices of the International Military Education and Training program (IMET). In addition, military training provided under these Title 20 security assistance programs has not been closely coordinated with similar training sponsored by the Unified Commanders who


10 The IMET and expanded IMET (E-IMET) programs are codified in Title 20 of the United States Code and are referred to hereafter as the "Title 20" programs. In the past, more than 80% of the entire security assistance program, which included the Foreign Military Financing Program, the Foreign Military Sales Program, the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), and the Economic Support Fund, has been spent on six countries - Egypt, Israel, Greece, Turkey, the Philippines and Portugal. [GAO\NSIAD-92-248, supra pp. 16-17.] For example, in FY 93 these six countries received $6.2 billion (including $358.2 million of concessional loans) or 83 percent, of the total $7.5 billion in Security Assistance funding. These figures do not include direct military sales to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other FMS cash customers. Recently added to this list of major recipients are the former communist bloc and Soviet republics.
control Title 10 CINC initiative funds and various programs sponsored under the military-to-military contacts program.

Recently, the Clinton administration has proposed a complete overhaul of the Title 20 foreign assistance programs to redirect this foreign aid to foster such broad policy objectives as promoting peace, building democracy, encouraging free trade and combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation rather than to promote weapons sales and technical training. Included in that proposal is the repeal of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 \(^{14}\) and the amendments and country-specific provisions that have been added to it.\(^ {15}\) Earlier, the Clinton

---

11 Both CINC initiative funds and Military-to-Military Contacts Program monies are authorized under Title 10 of the United States Code. These programs are referred to hereafter as the "Title 10" programs.

12 10 U.S.C. Section 166a. This program supports a host of military-to-military contact programs, but has recently been focused on promoting democracy and improved observance of human rights. DOD's budget request for FY 95 includes $46.3 million for support of this program, which represents a 460 percent increase over the $10 million authorized and appropriated in FY 94. See Military to Military Contacts and Comparable Activities, DOD draft report, version 1.1 as of January 27, 1994.

13 For example the so-called "Nunn-Lugar" program set forth in the Defense appropriations Act for fiscal year 1993, Public Law 102-396, provides $15 million for military-to-military contacts with the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union.


15 John M. Goshko & Thomas W. Lippman, "Foreign Aid Shift Sought By Clinton," The Washington Post, Saturday, November 27, 1993, Section A, page 1. Under this proposal aid for Egypt and Israel (which absorbed 67.5% of the allocated FY 93 security assistance dollars) would be protected and plans to finance Russia's move toward a free market economy would be preserved; See proposed "Peace, Prosperity and Democracy Act of 1994," H.R. 3765; See also GAO\NSIAD-92-248, supra pp. 17-18 in which an unnamed State Department official speculated that if a Middle East peace is negotiated, the level of aid provided to Egypt and Israel will be more difficult to justify.
administration had announced plans to reorganize the Department of Defense, creating within
the office of the undersecretary of policy a new post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Democracy and Human Rights. The administration's nomination for that position was
eventually withdrawn and the creation of the Assistant Secretariat position abandoned.

There appears to be agreement both in the White House and on Capitol Hill that the
time for restructuring the foreign aid program has come; but, as yet, there is no consensus on
the direction which that restructuring should take. In the current international environment --
in which rapid changes are resulting in dramatic reappraisals of security assistance priorities
and military expenditures and force structure -- U.S. contact with and training of
international military students should rightly assume new importance as a relatively
inexpensive, yet potentially crucial means of future national interest projection. However, the
role of the U.S. military in training students in such areas as human rights, civil–military
relations and effective judicial systems does not, at first blush, appear to conform to the
traditional purpose and orientation of military training. If such training is to be an effective
instrument of American influence and leverage, DOD needs to be able to assure both the
President and Congress that the programs being offered meet both the needs of the
international students and the goals and objectives of the United States.

The current National Military Strategy specifically mentions international military
education and training and military–to–military contact programs as essential components of
the U.S. military policy of engagement. As increased emphasis is placed on these "soft"

16 Michael R. Gordon, "Aspin Overhauls Pentagon to Bolster
section A, p. 17.

17 Jim Wolf, "Law Group Urges Probe of Pentagon Nominee,"
military training and familiarization programs, the need to carefully coordinate their implementation and to monitor their results becomes imperative. In order for these programs to be an effective peacetime enabler for the Unified Commander, there must be much closer coordination between DOD and the State Department, within DOD between the Unified Commanders and DSAA, and operationally within each Unified Commander's area of responsibility (AOR).

In this paper, I will discuss the legal basis for and initial implementation of these programs and the proposed legislative changes. I will then provide suggested changes within DOD that will aid in the efficient delivery and evaluation of these programs and set forth operational initiatives that will provide the Unified Commander with effective methods to coordinate and monitor these programs within his or her AOR.

II. PRESENT PROGRAMS.

A. IMET AND E-IMET

The IMET portion of security assistance is a grant program that allows military personnel from allied and friendly foreign nations to attend U.S. military schools and for U.S. forces to provide training at overseas sites with mobile education and training teams. Since 1950, the IMET program and its predecessor programs have trained over 500,000 military personnel.

---

18 22 U.S.C. Sections 2347-2347d. The IMET program was established to facilitate relationships between the U.S. military and foreign military leaders by providing professional education and training to selected foreign officers. In FY 93, 122 countries received IMET funding totalling $42.5 million. Because of changes in the focus of the IMET program, countries such as Cambodia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Turkmenistan and Albania have been included in the program to facilitate U.S. support for democracy and the rule of law. Source: DSAA report dtd 28 OCT 93.
foreign officers and enlisted personnel in areas ranging from professional military education to basic technical skills.19

In fiscal year 1991, the scope and purposes of the IMET Program were expanded to include funding for training civilian officials who work with foreign defense establishments and to earmark not less than $1 million of appropriated funds to provide training in: (1) defense resource management; (2) basic democratic principals including civilian control of the military; and (3) military justice systems and human rights.20 In fiscal year 1993, Congress opened the program for participation by "national legislators who are responsible for the oversight and the management of the military."21


"...developing, initiating, conducting and evaluating courses and other programs for training foreign civilian and military officials in managing and administering foreign military establishments and budgets, and for training foreign military and civilian officials in creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct, including observance of internationally recognized human rights... [civilian personnel] shall include foreign government personnel of ministries other than ministries of defense if the military education and training would (i) contribute to responsible defense resource management, (ii) foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, or (iii) improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights."

The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), has the overall responsibility within the Department of Defense for implementing the program.\textsuperscript{22} In an effort to meet the new congressional objectives, DSAA tasked the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, to determine which courses, if any, already available at Department of Defense training facilities could be considered as meeting the E-IMET criteria.\textsuperscript{23} It also designated the Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI), Monterey, California, to develop and administer a mobile education team for the resource management aspects of the program, and the Naval Justice School, Newport, Rhode Island (NJS), as "the [DOD] agency to develop a course on military justice systems, respect for civilian control of the military, and techniques to implement systems which contribute to respect for internationally recognized human rights, as well as course modules on this subject for inclusion in other Expanded IMET course offerings."\textsuperscript{24} Both of these Navy teaching institutions immediately set about developing specific courses to address these criteria.

DRMI was already providing stateside training focused on enhancing the understanding, competence, and capabilities of U.S. and foreign military and civilian personnel in the


\textsuperscript{24} Msg.291623Z JUL 91 fm SECDEF to AIG7814; Memo I-003315/91 dtd 27 AUG 91 fm Act Dir, DSAA re EIMET.
development, operation and maintenance of public sector management systems. Its existing 4-week graduate level course was easily modified into a two-week course capable of being taught overseas by a mobil education team. During fiscal years 1992 and 1993, DRMI teams taught in over 14 countries located in Central and South America, Africa, Central Europe and the Pacific. For example, three courses have been offered in Honduras, with the first team instructing civilian and military personnel now serving as professors in Honduras' National Defense College. This college was established with U.S. aid, at the request of the Honduran Congress, to train civilians in defense resource management and presented a perfect opportunity to provide E-IMET training.

By the end of calendar year 1992, NJS had: (1) developed a three-phase executive course on human rights, civilian control of the military, and military justice systems; (2) developed a 3-day course to train U.S. military educators and program coordinators how to train U.S. military personnel on human rights; and (3) produced an Expanded Informational

25 Countries receiving training include Honduras (four times), Argentina (three times), Botswana (regional conference), Czechoslovakia, Hungary (twice), Poland, Chile, Bulgaria, Ghana, Zimbabwe (regional conference), Sri Lanka, Czech Republic, Senegal (regional conference), and Lithuania (regional conference). Overall, 552 military and 255 civilian personnel have received instruction as of December, 1993. Source: Telephone conversation with Mary Anders, DRMI, January 21, 1994.

26 GAO/NSIAD-92-248, supra page 22.

27 The three-day, human rights trainers' course was developed at the request of numerous commands that were tasked with training Americans to go overseas as part of the Security Assistance program. Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command has a specific requirement that servicemembers ordered to its operational area receive this training prior to leaving the U.S. and it is clearly desirable for all personnel who are required to spend time in a foreign country. This course was taught in December, 1992 and April, 1993, at NJS and in June, 1993 at Little Creek, Virginia. [See USSOUTHCOM Human Rights Policy (Policy Memo #5-91); An ongoing program of human rights training emphasizing reporting requirements has also been implemented by
Program Handbook on U.S. constitutional rights and responsibilities and U.S. history for use in conjunction with Informational Program\textsuperscript{28} activities for international students training in the U.S. In addition, numerous presentations on these subjects had been delivered both in CONUS and at conferences overseas.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28} DOD Directive 5410.17, "An Informational Program for Foreign Military Trainees in the United States," March 1, 1985. This directive requires that all international students attending a formal military course be exposed to a DOD-managed Informational Program designed to assist them in acquiring an understanding of U.S. society, institutions and values, including an awareness of the U.S. military's role in a democratic society and an appreciation of our respect for internationally recognized human rights.

\textsuperscript{29} In addition, the NJS staff has offered to work with any U.S. military educational institution to design specific modules of training on human rights, civilian control of the military in a democracy and military judicial systems to meet the needs of the institution focusing either on teaching U.S. or international students. Such modules have already been designed for the Army JAG School in conjunction with a USSOUTHCOM funded initiative with the Peruvian military \cite{Addicott_Warner_1993} Significant assistance was rendered by NJS to the development of the teaching materials utilized in the Army's Peruvian program. Similar modular development has been discussed with the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management for many of their courses. During FY 1993, NJS developed a five-day course on Human Rights and Military Operations for line officers of any military force. This course is targeted for both international and U.S. officers and is designed to teach not only the basics of human rights, but also how these considerations fit into the planning and conduct of military operations. The course includes consideration of such fundamental concerns as Rules of Engagement, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the role of a military justice system in the accomplishment of military objectives.
The centerpiece of the NJS effort has been the five-day, three-phase, executive training program. By early 1994, the multiphased program had been completed in eight countries and similar seminars had been presented to the international students at the Air War College, the Air Command and Staff College and the Navy Hydrographic School. The unique features of this course are its phased development, the heavy utilization of small group

---

30 Recent efforts to better coordinate the military-to-military contacts program and IMET/E-IMET training programs have resulted in the execution of an agreement delineating the scope and purposes of each program. Military-to-military monies will be used for conferences and seminars to develop contact with and improve communication with the foreign militaries, while IMET\E-IMET funds will be used to implement programs for direct training of foreign militaries and, in the case of E-IMET, senior civilian and legislative representatives.

31 Those countries include Sri Lanka (twice), Papua New Guinea (twice), Guatemala, Senegal, Madagascar, Rwanda (twice), Philippines and Bolivia. Seminars in progress include Sierra Leone, Lithuania, Ukraine, Latvia, Honduras, Hungary and Zimbabwe. Additional countries scheduled for training in FY 94 include Niger and Columbia. Overall, 343 military and 156 civilian students have received this training. The number of courses actually taught would have been greater if funds had not been withheld by Congress from Peru, El Salvador and Guatemala.

32 In the first phase of the NJS's three-phase program, a survey team of two to three joint service instructors visits the host country to meet with military, governmental and non-governmental personnel and organizations in order to assess the present status of human rights and civilian control of the military in the host country, and to evaluate its military justice system in practice. The initial survey is followed by a visit by four to six representatives of the host country (again with proper State Department and DOD approval) to a CONUS based site where they are given the opportunity to observe the U.S. military and civilian criminal justice system both being taught to U.S. students and, in action, through visits to local military and civilian courts and detention centers. In addition, the proposed curriculum for that nation, developed from the information gathered in the initial survey, is fully discussed and refined with the visiting representatives so that it is host-country specific. Frequently, one or more of the host country representatives is tasked with preparing one-hour segments for Phase III of the seminar, usually dealing with that country's military and civilian justice system. By the time the host country representatives leave the U.S., it is intended that they will have come to regard the seminar program as at least
discussion problems,\textsuperscript{33} and the ability of the NJS staff to make the seminar host-country specific.\textsuperscript{34}

In developing the curricula for this course of instruction, the NJS staff quickly realized that the typical "off the shelf, one course fits all" approach to military technical training would not meet the objectives set by Congress and that, in fact, any effort to "preach human rights" to the high level civilian and military members attending this course would, at best, fall on deaf ears. By using a phased approach in the course development, the teaching team is better able to understand both how the host country's legal system actually works and the problems being faced by the host country's military in the field. Further, by fully discussing and refining the course content with the host country's representatives and inviting them to partially their own creation. In Phase III, a joint service team of three to four instructors returns to the host country to present the seminar to 40-60 relatively senior military and civilian government officials.

\textsuperscript{33} Another of the unique features of the course is that the class is divided into three to four heterogeneous discussion groups which are tasked to solve numerous hypothetical problems and role-playing situations specifically founded on the host nation's present circumstances. These discussion problems, which are assigned following blocks of informational lecture, provide all participants the opportunity to relate the concepts taught to actual "real time" situations and to participate in the problem solution. Each group then presents its solution for general group discussion when the class is reunited in the problem "wrap-up." The discussion group method of learning, although heretofore typically unused as a military teaching technique in most host nations, is quickly appreciated and fully exploited by the participants.

\textsuperscript{34} See Appendix A for examples of the curriculum for the Executive Training Program as taught in Bolivia and the Philippines. Although all three seminars obviously emphasized the key course concepts of civilian control of the military, effective military judicial systems and the application of human rights concepts to the military, each course of instruction was structured to concentrate upon the unique problems being confronted by that country's military forces and judicial structure.
give presentations on their judicial system during the seminar, the course becomes host-
country specific and is "owned" by that country.

The Executive Training Program and follow-on "train-the-trainer" courses of
instruction35 have been favorably received by the students, the sponsoring agency or host
country, and the Ambassador and Unified Commander.36 While there will always be some
reluctance to receiving instruction in these subject areas, it is the ability of the mobile
education teams, such as those from DRMI and NJS, to tailor their training to the specific
country concerns that overcomes the initial resistance. Furthermore, particularly in Third
World countries, this training is often seized upon by the host nation as a means to create a
dialogue within their military and civilian leadership concerning fundamental issues of human
existence and the role that the military plays in their society. For example, the presence of
the Sri Lankan Security Police in the seminar served as the first instance in which there had
been any coordinated training between the military and the Security Police, despite the fact
that the Security Police were technically responsible for investigating alleged human rights

35 See Appendix B for an example of the follow-on "train the trainer" program presented in Sri Lanka. The NJS training
team spent two days conducting a survey of the existing teaching materials available in country. The next three days, which are
reflected in Appendix B, were spent training over 40 military personnel selected by the Sri Lankan government in how to teach
our core curriculum. The following week, the team assisted the Sri Lankan trainers in developing their own teaching materials
for use in follow-on "in-country" training and in conducting mock classroom situations for the Sri Lankans to try out their new
course materials.

Manolas, supra Appendix K; GAO/NSIAD-92-248, supra pages 23-25; Msg 221215Z OCT 92 fm USCINCPAC to SECDEF; Ltr fm Senator
Claiborne Pell to CO, NJS, dtd January 15, 1993; Msg 131835Z NOV 93 fm USCINCPAC to NAVJUSTSCOL; Msg 011252Z FEB 94 fm AMEMBASSY
KIGALI to NAVJUSTSCOL.
violations arising out of the Sri Lankan civil war. In Papua New Guinea, the government
defense establishment is very small. Therefore, unlike the United States, most civilian
employees are replaced based on the most recent election and do not interact on a frequent
basis with their military counterparts. This training presented a rare opportunity for civilian
administrators and judicial members to interact with military officers.

Both DRMI and NJS realized that their programs had to be closely coordinated with the
cognizant Unified Commander and the in-country office of the U.S. Security Assistance
Organization, as well as with the desk officer for the host country at the U.S. State
Department and the in-country State Department team in order to stand any chance of
success. However, in attempting to work within the existing system it soon became apparent
that there were several operational shortcomings. For example, in EUCOM there appeared to
be little or no coordination between the CINC's J-5 and J-4, leading to the cancellation of a
NJS training initiative in the Baltic states. In SOUTHCOM the breakdown occurred between
DSAA and the CINC's staff, resulting in the CINC being "surprised" by unexpected training
initiatives in Guatemala. In almost every instance there appeared to be poor coordination
between the Ambassador's country plan and the CINC's military plan for that country.
Frequently there appeared to be duplicative training efforts within the various service
components and almost no established method to deconflict the various programs being
offered or to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the training. Thus, despite the CINCs
frequently stated need for these Title 20 programs and their acknowledged history of success,

---

37 SAMM, supra paras. 30,002.C.8, 30,002.C.10--C.12.
the fiscal year 1994 budget contained a fifty percent cut in funding\textsuperscript{38} which will have had a detrimental impact on the amount of training that is conducted.\textsuperscript{39}

**B. TITLE 10 PROGRAMS**

Each of the various Unified Commanders controls a separate discretionary training budget for use within his area of responsibility, which is not subject to DSAA control or review, and which the CINCs are free to utilize in fostering military-to-military contacts. The monies allocated to this CINC discretionary fund exceed, in aggregate, the total monies allocated by DSAA to E-IMET and, as proposed for Fiscal Year 1995, will be more than

\textsuperscript{38} The FY 94 IMET allocation was reduced to \$21.25 million from FY 93 funding of \$42.5 million. However, proposed funding for "direct training" in FY 95 has been increased to \$26.35 million of which \$850,000 is earmarked for peacekeeping. Source: DSAA, report dated 28 OCT 93 and Dept. of State and Dept. of Defense, Congressional Presentation for Promoting Peace, Fiscal Year 1995.

\textsuperscript{39} Although \$4.0 million of the FY 94 IMET budget has been tentatively allocated to E-IMET programs, over 20 courses have been identified as qualifying for E-IMET funding, including the National Defense University. (See, Dept. of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Expanded IMET Initiative Handbook, March, 1994 (Revision 2)) Thus, the newly created programs specifically geared to meeting the E-IMET requirements, such as the Program on Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey and the Executive Training Program developed by the Naval Justice School may not receive funding priority by in-country Security Assistance teams presented with the current smorgasbord of possible course options. In addition, the overall IMET budget reduction coupled with the earmarking of funds for E-IMET has had the unintended consequence of forcing the security assistance officers to choose between "hard" technical and professional courses and "soft" programs such as human rights and civil-military relations. This has resulted in a request from SOUTHCOM that the courses identified as qualifying for E-IMET funding be expanded to include all of the senior professional military education courses. (See, Msg 121320Z APR 94 fm USCINCSO SCJ5 to SECEDEF//DSAA-PLANS-PMG/RSA-IA, expressing the opinion that DSAA's "earmarking" funds for E-IMET programs is cutting into already limited training dollars and that DSAA is "force-feeding" the current E-IMET programs to the host nations.)
double the entire Fiscal Year 1994 IMET budget. Recently, these funds have been utilized to promote ad hoc democratization and military justice programs, with little apparent coordination within DOD for the type and quality of programs delivered.

Another Title 10 program allows the DOD to pay the travel, subsistence and similar personal expenses of military personnel from developing countries in conjunction with their attendance at bilateral or regional conferences. Pursuant to this statutory authority, seminars have recently been conducted on topics which include democratization, civilian control of the military and the Law of War.

In addition, since fiscal year 1993, the DOD Appropriations Act has included funding for the demilitarization of the countries of the former Soviet Union. For example, the fiscal year 1993 budget provided $15 million for military-to-military contacts with these countries and the proposed fiscal year 1995 budget includes an additional $4.5 million.

See ftn 9, supra.

For example, these funds have been expended to send a team of EUCOM military attorneys into Eastern Europe to give presentations on the U.S. military justice system and to deploy a military lawyer to Albania for six months where she assisted in drafting a new Albanian Constitution and in developing basic regulations to establish a military justice system. Source: LCDR Beverly R. Dart, "After-action report regarding TAD assignment to Military Liaison Team (MLT) Albania from July to December 1993," dated 3FEB94.


See Public Law 102-396. The goals of this "Nunn-Lugar" program have been to promote: 1) civilian-military relations appropriate to democratic societies; 2) openness and transparency in defense establishments, policy, doctrine, forces, budgets and programs; and 3) cooperation, education, advice and training in areas of shared security interests. Source: Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense dated March 15, 1993.
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

The Clinton administration has recently put forward a wide variety of proposals for specific legislative and regulatory changes in this area. The common objective is to transform security assistance into a more effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Part of the discussion draft of the "Peace, Prosperity and Democracy Act of 1994" would allow the Secretary of State to decide whether the aid package for any country should include military assistance and specifies that the Secretary of State would direct policy for all U.S. international aid programs. This proposal largely abandons foreign assistance programs conceived during the Cold War and gives the President broad flexibility to promote the administration's foreign policy objectives of "promoting sustainable development..., promoting democracy..., promoting peace..., providing humanitarian assistance...[and] advancing diplomacy."\(^4\)\(^5\)

If this "discussion draft" is enacted it may necessitate profound changes in security assistance administration and, as a result, will be fiercely resisted both because of the sweeping organizational changes that it may require and because of legitimate congressional concern that the proposal provides for less congressional oversight and concentrates too much discretionary authority in the White House and the State Department.\(^6\) The President has yet to focus on this legislative initiative, and his reticence, in light of other more pressing issues, is understandable. What is perhaps most significant is that the proposed bill represents

---


\(^6\) In addition, the bill ends grant aid earmarks for countries such as Israel which have historically received favored treatment. See ftn 9, *supra*. 

17
a shift by this administration from a program to a goal orientation for U.S. "security assistance" funding.

IV. SUGGESTED CHANGES IN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

The executive and legislative branches can take a number of immediate steps that will put the United States on the road to an national security policy that more fully integrates these "soft" foreign assistance programs. First and foremost, the President needs to clearly articulate his national security policy and ensure that the Secretary of Defence is capable of carrying out his vision. If military assistance is part of the strategy to implement that policy, [and it is hard to imagine that some form of military security assistance will not be part of the program adopted] then the recent trend toward a disproportionate cutting of the funding for such programs must be reversed. This is particularly true for military education and direct training programs focused on the Expanded IMET criteria.47

A mechanism also needs to be found to coordinate the widely disparate U.S. foreign security assistance efforts.48 A central "clearing house" for this training must be established

47 Recent 50% cuts in IMET funding for countries outside of Eastern Europe and the CIS, coupled with the "fencing" of additional remaining monies for E-IMET, has had the unintended result of forcing the in-country security assistance teams to "push" a course on Human Rights and Military Justice over technical and professional military training that the host country needs to maintain the readiness of its armed forces. These pressures may create an insurmountable barrier to the teaching or implementation of the concepts covered in the 5-day executive seminar.

both within DOD and between DOD and the State Department. An attempt to implement such a position within DOD was an integral part of the proposal for the creation of the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Human Rights. Although establishment of that position was subsequently abandoned by the administration, the need still remains for a person or organization to be empowered to monitor, manage and coordinate the various Title 20 programs administered by DSAA, the Title 10 programs administered by the Unified Commanders and any "new" initiatives such as those formerly promoted under this administration's "Global Cooperative Initiatives," (which included funding for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping and the promotion of democracy).\textsuperscript{49} As competition for scarce training resources increases, the need for careful coordination of effort within DOD through the establishment of a "clearing house" to work with the CINCs in planning each country's training schedule becomes imperative. In particular, there is a growing need for one central point in DOD both for congressional liaison and to establish appropriate criteria to validate the academic and military usefulness of the numerous courses presently being touted to the CINCs as "democracy" or "human rights" training. The person in this position should also be empowered to coordinate DOD training initiatives with his or her counterpart at State.

A further recommendation would be to create a similar position at the State Department to preside over the other U.S. international aid programs both in the Agency for International

\textsuperscript{49} One of the new policy initiatives recently studied by DOD was the consolidation of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping and the promotion of democracy under the budgetary heading "Global Cooperative Initiatives." See Department of the Navy, "FY 1995 OSD/OMB Budget Review, Routing Information Sheet," dtd 29 NOV 1993 10:49:20.53. This initiative has apparently been abandoned by the Clinton administration.
Development and in related agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank.

Congress needs to be urged to reassess the growing number of restrictions, limitations and prohibitions that are attached to U.S. assistance programs. The restrictions, often imposed in response to allegations of human rights abuses, have the catch-22 effect of denying human rights, democratization and resource management training to the countries that historically are the most in need of, and theoretically could benefit the most from receiving such training.

Congress also needs to scale back on the increasing number of reporting requirements which are encumbering the administration of the security assistance programs. Although Congress appears to be generally pleased with DOD's implementation of the E-IMET program, it has consistently required additional reports regarding the program's implementation and "criteria for evaluating human rights training programs." These reporting requirements are in addition to the detailed annual human rights report required by section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The U.S. State Department's Annual Report on Human Rights, prepared in compliance with this statutory requirement, is a widely


51 For example, funding for a proposed second Executive Seminar in Guatemala was withheld and then withdrawn due to congressional resistance to providing any training to the Guatemalan military. See also ftns 22 and 26, supra.


53 Ibid., p. 147. 
publicized and respected document that provides a country-by-country analysis of this subject. However, the question is not just how many human rights violations were reported in a given country, but whether those reports were valid and, if valid, whether they were properly investigated and appropriately prosecuted. Congress needs to adopt a long range approach in their evaluation of this training, and to continue to encourage the implementation of the Expanded IMET criteria by endorsing and fully funding the new Expanded IMET courses within the context of the proposed Peace, Prosperity and Democracy Act.

V. OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES

Recently U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) has implemented a planning matrix to better manage the various "military outreach programs" within its region. The matrix is designed to show past as well as projected military activities, divided into seven categories, for each of the 40 countries in the USPACOM's area of responsibility. The categories include high level visits, multilateral conferences, exchanges, direct training, joint and combined exercises, bilateral activities (ex. port calls), and other miscellaneous operations and provide the CINC with an historical data base of prior activity with a particular country or country group as well as a planning mechanism and predictive tool.

The implementation of the matrix has proved to be beneficial by enabling the Unified Commander greater unity of effort and economy of force in his forward presence mission. In particular the "cooperative engagement" matrix enables the CINC: 1) to immediately access an historical data base of prior activity with a given country, 2) to ensure a balanced approach

to support his or her regional strategy, and 3) to highlight elevated U.S. military involvement within the region. For example, comparing U.S. forward presence activities with South Korea and Japan, USCINCPAC is able to see that, although the number of contact and training programs are nearly equivalent, in the most critical areas of joint and combined exercises and bilateral programs, South Korea clearly leads Japan. This is exactly what the CINC would expect in correlation to his assessment of the perceived threat to U.S. interests. The matrix also highlights countries that are running out of Title 20 monies and enables the CINC's staff to augment U.S. presence in these countries with other programs. In addition, this computerized report is being utilized to track whether the CINC's operational goals and objectives for each country are being met.

Nevertheless, the matrix fails to address three additional issues which are particularly critical to the successful implementation of the "soft" training programs for "promoting peace" and "building democracy" – measuring the effectiveness of the training, coordination of program effort within the CINC's staff and with the joint staff, and coordination of the training provided with the military exercises initiated by the component commanders.

Measuring the effectiveness of training in this area is extremely difficult. There is no guarantee that just because some military members receive training in civilian control of the


56 USCINCPAC sets specific goals and objectives for U.S. forward presence activities for each country within his AOR. These goals are set forth in the Pacific Command Strategy, USCINCPACINST S3050.6A. The extent to which these goals are being met or exceeded with current resources is highlighted in the matrix by color codes: green - meeting objectives; yellow - questionable; red - not meeting objectives; white - military contacts are suspended (ex. China, North Korea and Burma). Source: Telephone conversation with LtCol Fondren, supra; FAX from CDR Charles "Juno" Jamison, CINCPAC/J4, dated May 11, 1994.
military or human rights that conditions throughout the country will improve. Issues of this type require a broad spectrum of statutory changes, military instructional changes, a broad-range training effort, and a commitment to change by the entire power structure within the country.\textsuperscript{57} Measurement of success must be long range and look to evaluate trends and gradual movement versus "numbers" of programs completed or military personnel "trained" or "contacted." In addition, the CINC's staff should carefully review the course content and the proposed teaching methodology to insure that the program will be tailored to the specific needs of the host nation and will not be a "one time, off the shelf, one course fits all" approach. The best measures of a program's success are the host country's willingness to seek follow-on training in the subject area(s) addressed and the implementation of an indigenous training program through a "train the trainers" course.

The CINC's also need to carefully evaluate the method by which this "soft" training is delivered and coordinated. The service Judge Advocates have taken the lead with respect to international legal training and exchange programs through the signing of a Memorandum for International Military Legal Education and the establishment of a Joint Committee to monitor the training. The establishment of this committee was a direct outgrowth of the Naval Justice School.

\textsuperscript{57} Measures of success utilized by the Naval Justice School include: 1) an assessment of the course by the in-country team after the course is completed and 2) host country requests for follow-on training. Out of the first three countries receiving the executive seminar, each one has requested additional training. Sri Lanka requested and received an additional two week course aimed at teaching their junior officers and senior enlisted. Papua New Guinea received an additional executive training program and has recently requested assistance in redrafting their military judicial system. Guatemala has requested a second executive training program and legal training for their Naval officers, but because of Congressional resistance to funding any training for the Guatemalan military due to previously alleged human rights violations, that follow-on training has yet to be delivered.
School's E-IMET initiatives and the perceived need to monitor and coordinate the planning, programming and implementation of all military justice activities including E-IMET, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) and military-to-military contact programs funded by CINC initiative funds.

Unfortunately, this joint service coordination of training only extends to legal training sponsored by the service JAGs and does not apply to the ad hoc democratization and human rights training being offered under the sponsorship of the various Unified Commanders. In particular, courses offered by the U.S. Army Reserve's civil affairs units, while purporting to cover similar areas of subject matter expertise as those assigned to the E-IMET program (e.g. civil-military relations and the role of the military in a democracy) are not subject to any scrutiny by the State Department, DOD Training Commands or DSAA, or monitoring either prior to or after their implementation. In fact, in several cases, these courses have been offered in direct competition with and to the ultimate exclusion of DSAA approved E-IMET courses.

EUCOM recently was reprimanded for attempting to fund its E-IMET training programs with its military-to-military contact funds. In the past, EUCOM's military-to-military contact funds have been used to conduct unauthorized training rather than the approved seminars and familiarization tours.

These events highlighted both a lack of understanding of the purposes of the separate programs by the members of the CINC's staff and poor coordination between the J-4 and J-5 at the CINC staff level. In fact, these shortcomings were recognized by the CINC and EUCOM has now adopted the matrix system utilized by PACOM. EUCOM has also

---

58 Msg 251700Z FEB 94 fm SECDEF to USCINCEUR.
implemented "synchronization committees" within its joint staff to insure that both training and operations are aware of and coordinate the implementation of all ongoing initiatives within the AOR to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure a balanced approach for implementing the CINC's strategy.\textsuperscript{59}

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the planning matrix will only prove to be useful if it is also adopted by the CINC's component commanders as a management tool. The component commanders largely control the funding and implementation of joint and combined military exercises within the AOR. These individual service commanders must be convinced to use the matrix as a management tool and to carefully integrate their training exercises with the direct training and military-to-military contacts initiatives implemented by the CINC's. For unless these "hard" military exercises actually test the training received by the host nation in these "soft" areas, the necessity for these programs will continue to be questioned by the host nation and ultimately the success of these programs will be endangered.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Changes in both the international and domestic political environment have created a rare opportunity to refine, concentrate and refocus the entire security assistance program which the President, Congress and DOD cannot afford to ignore. At the very least, DOD should seize this opportunity to expand DSAA's authority as DOD's centralized joint service agency for security assistance training to include the review, validation, coordination and evaluation of

\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Commander Keith Baker, J5/JCS, supra.
the disparate international military training courses, seminars and familiarization programs presently being offered with Title 10 and Title 22 monies.

The combined military program provided to each country receiving assistance should be prepared by the CINC, in coordination with the regional ambassadors, and centrally monitored within DOD by DSAA. The goal should be to eliminate duplication of training efforts and other educational programs and to ensure that the composite DOD program provided to each country is both appropriate and carefully planned and evaluated. In addition each CINC needs to develop a mechanism similar to USPACOM's "Cooperative Engagement Matrix" to track whether the CINC's operational goals and objectives for each country are being met. The Unified Commander also needs to address three additional issues which are particularly critical to the successful implementation of the "soft" training programs for "promoting peace" and "building democracy" – measuring the effectiveness of the training, coordination of program efforts within the CINC's staff and with the joint staff, and coordination of the training provided by the CINC with the military exercises initiated by the component commanders.

In an era in which the allocation of resources for direct international military training and military contact programs is apparently in question, the effective coordination and evaluation of the Unified Commander's "security assistance" effort is imperative, if such efforts are to continue to be supported by Congress as an effective enabler of American military influence and leverage.
APPENDIX A

Curriculum for the Executive Training Program as taught in Bolivia and the Philippines.
### CURRICULUM FOR BOLIVIA PHASE III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>Monday</th>
<th>Tuesday</th>
<th>Wednesday</th>
<th>Thursday</th>
<th>Friday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800 to</td>
<td>Admin and Welcoming Remarks</td>
<td>Wrap-Up of Discussion Problem #1</td>
<td>Wrap-Up of Discussion Problem #2</td>
<td>Wrap-Up of Discussion Problem #3</td>
<td>Wrap-Up of Discussion Problem #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0850</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900 to</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Criminal Justice System</td>
<td>Universal Human Rights</td>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>Public Expectations &amp; Perceptions of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military &amp; Government Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 to</td>
<td>Functions of Government</td>
<td>Bolivian Criminal Justice System</td>
<td>Legal Protection of Human &amp; Civil Rights in the U.S.</td>
<td>Interrogations &amp; Detentions</td>
<td>Discussion groups for follow-on training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1050</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100 to</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government Ethics</td>
<td>U.S. Military Justice System System</td>
<td>Legal Protection of Human &amp; Civil Rights in Bolivia</td>
<td>Witness &amp; Victim Protection &amp; Compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Closing Ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300 to</td>
<td>A Public Defender's role in Bolivia</td>
<td>Bolivian Military Justice System</td>
<td>A Security Force's Role in a Democracy</td>
<td>Political / Internal Affairs Trials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400 to</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discussion #1</td>
<td>Discussion #2</td>
<td>Discussion #3</td>
<td>Discussion #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500 to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>Friday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0800 to</td>
<td>Admin and Welcoming Remarks</td>
<td>Wrap-up of Discussion Problem #1</td>
<td>Wrap-up of Discussion Problem #2</td>
<td>Wrap-up of Discussion Problem #3</td>
<td>Wrap-up of Discussion Problem #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0850</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900 to</td>
<td>Democratic Governments in the New World</td>
<td>U.S. Criminal Justice System</td>
<td>Legal Use of Force</td>
<td>Universal Human Rights</td>
<td>Public Expectations &amp; Perceptions of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0950</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military &amp; Gov't Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 to</td>
<td>Military's Role in a Democracy in 1994</td>
<td>U.S. Military Justice System</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
<td>Legal Protection of Human &amp; Civil</td>
<td>DISCUSSION GROUPS FOR FOLLOW-ON TRAINING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1050</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rights in the United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100 to</td>
<td>U.S. Military Organization and Command</td>
<td>Philippine Criminal Justice System</td>
<td>War Crimes Trials</td>
<td>Witness &amp; Victim Protection</td>
<td>Closing Ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1150</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300 to</td>
<td>Philippine Military Organization and Command</td>
<td>Philippine Military Justice System</td>
<td>Political / Internal Affairs Trials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400 to</td>
<td>Discussion Problem #1</td>
<td>Discussion Problem #2</td>
<td>Discussion Problem #3</td>
<td>Discussion Problem #4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500 to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1615</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

Schedule for follow-on "train the trainer" program presented in Sri Lanka.
HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING for SRI LANKA ARMED FORCES

WEDNESDAY, 4 AUGUST 1993:
(0830 - 0900) INTRODUCTION
(0900 - 1000) LESSON: HUMAN RIGHTS DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
(1000 - 1015) BREAK
(1015 - 1230) SEMINAR: WHAT RIGHTS SHOULD PEOPLE HAVE?
(1230 - 1330) LUNCH
(1330 - 1500) LESSON: HUMAN RIGHTS DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
(1500 - 1515) BREAK
(1530 - 1630) SEMINAR: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION RECOGNITION
(1630 - 1700) SEMINAR PLENARY SESSION

THURSDAY, 5 AUGUST 1993:
(0830 - 1000) LESSON: HUMAN RIGHTS IN A COMBAT SITUATION
(1000 - 1015) BREAK
(1015 - 1230) SEMINAR: HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMbat
(1230 - 1330) LUNCH
(1330 - 1500) LESSON: HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS
(1500 - 1515) BREAK
(1515 - 1630) SEMINAR: ROE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM
(1630 - 1700) SEMINAR PLENARY SESSION:

FRIDAY, 6 AUGUST 1993:
(0830 - 1000) LESSON: HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
(1000 - 1015) BREAK
(1015 - 1230) SEMINAR: ANSWERING TOUGH QUESTIONS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
(1230 - 1330) LUNCH
(1330 - 1500) SEMINAR PLENARY SESSION:
(1500 - 1515) BREAK
(1430 - 1600) PLANNING FOR TEACHING HUMAN RIGHTS TO SRI LANKANS
HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING FOR SRI LANKA ARMED FORCES

MONDAY, 9 AUGUST 1993

(0830 - 1000) Review and make changes to teaching notes and exercises in service groups:

POLICE, MOD: HUMAN RIGHTS DEFINITION
ARMY: LAW OF WAR
AIR FORCE: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
NAVY: HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT

1000 - 1015 BREAK
1015 - 1230 Continue review of materials
1230 - 1330 LUNCH
1330 - 1500 Revised materials go to senior committee
Translation begins

1500 - 1515 BREAK
1515 - 1630 Translation, preparation of materials in Sinhalese. Photocopy materials and make one set of slides.

TUESDAY, 10 AUGUST 1993:

(0830 - 1000) Students review materials.
(1000 - 1015) BREAK
(1015 - 1230) Student presentations in English to group members
(1230 - 1330) LUNCH
(1330 - 1500) Student presentations in groups
(1500 - 1515) BREAK
(1515 - 1630) Switch topics and review materials.
(1630 - 1700) Student presentations in English.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books.


Articles.


U.S. Government Documents.


Dart, Beverly R. "After-action report regarding TAD assignment to Military Liaison Team (MLT) Albania from July to December 1993," dated 3FEB94.


IMET and Mil-to-Mil Contacts and Comparable Activities Program (MMCP). Outline of agreement as of 11 March 1994.


Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense dated March 15, 1993, setting out gaols of "Nunn-Lugar" program.


Statutes.


Proposed legislation.


Speeches.


Clinton, William J. Speech delivered at the United Nations on September 27, 1993 articulating his policy of "cooperative engagement."