Which Coalition for Cooperative Security

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: Which coalition for cooperative security?

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On the 24th of October 1995, the United Nations (UN) will celebrate its fiftieth anniversary. Its initial aim of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war" has still not been attained. The Charter envisioned the combination of the nations' efforts to accomplish their goals, and indeed many types of coalitions, under the UN auspices or not, have been tried to promote international security.

This paper argues that it is now time to put into practice all the provisions made in the UN Charter in order "to unite [their] strength to maintain international peace and security". Two reasons are advanced for such a bold move. First, not only does the changing strategic environment offer possibility for change, but the new environment requires such unity to deal with the new problems. And second, among the numerous collective arrangements that have been experienced since the creation of the UN, a UN command and control is the only structure which can produce synergy of political and military resources.
Colonel Pascal Vinchon, French Air Force, has been interested in international security affairs and coalition building since he witnessed the evolution of populace and journalists' feelings in Chad during Desert Storm. As an international officer at the Air War College (Class of 1993), Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, he had the opportunity to share impressions with his American colleagues and the other international officers from thirty different nations while Restore Hope began in Somalia, and the chaos worsened in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

He is a graduate of the French Air Force Academy and of the French Air Command and Staff Program. Commissioned as a pilot in the French Air Force in 1973, his flying experience includes tactical and fighter aviation comprising more than three thousand flying hours. He participated in various operational and headquarters exercises, both with NATO air forces and also with the former Live Oak tripartite alliance that provided security arrangements for Berlin. He flew 45 missions over theaters of operations with the French forces offering stability presence in Mauritania and Chad.

He commanded airmen in a fighter squadron and a tactical group.
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WHICH COALITION FOR COOPERATIVE SECURITY?

Introduction

"The last four years have seen the creation of more new UN peace-keeping operations than had been undertaken in the previous 43 years of the organization's history." (1:244) They also have witnessed, under UN auspices, the participation of very diverse coalitions in such different operations than Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, and Restore Hope. Meanwhile, the notion of a redefined security has won significant credibility thanks to the signature of the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the beginning of the intrusive inspections that it provides for.

These new trends in international politics have been naturally accompanied by an expansion of new concepts, which have culminated with the "Agenda for peace" proposals of UN Secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali and subsequent commentaries. These ideas fall mainly into two broad categories. The first envisions the new environment as an incentive to enact all the provisions made in the UN's Charter, in order, as its preamble states, "to ensure [...] that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest." The second is based on the theories of power and sovereignty in international political science and describes the Charter as too utopian. Thus, those who advocate this position opt for ad hoc coalitions when national interests are at stake.

This paper takes a pragmatic and forward-looking approach in order to demonstrate that the only logical arrangement for future
cooperative security is through UN strategic direction. First it argues that cooperative security is not only a possibility but also a necessity in today's strategic environment. Next, it compares the different military arrangements that have been used in the past to enforce, make, keep, or build peace. As a result of this comparison a proposed solution is offered. It concludes that a command and control configuration that flows from the UN, rather than from a single nation, a politico/military alliance, or a regional organization, offers political leverage that largely overcomes the military disadvantages of this type of alliance.
CHAPTER I

WHY COOPERATIVE SECURITY?

Collective security has never stopped evolving.

The idea of collective security is not a new concept. "[This] proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by one nation against another will be met by the combined strength of all other nations" (2:4) can be found in treaties and papers from strategic thinkers as far back as the XVII century (2:5). The notion since has evolved adaptively to the political environments.

The first practical move toward collective security was made by Woodrow Wilson. After the dramatic destruction and casualties caused by WWI, he was able to promote, in contrast to the existing balance-of-power scheme (2:8; 3:496), his belief that was later described as "an open system not directed against any power designed to preserve the integrity of an anonymous victim of an anonymous aggressor" (2:1). Unfortunately, such a step was too far reaching to accommodate the prevailing principles of sovereignty and nationalism. "The result was a League of Nations which vaguely institutionalized the idea of collective security, but lacked adequate provisions for its implementation" (2:10).

Thus during WWII, the drafters of the UN Charter were not unreasonably thinking in terms of a collective security system which would deter or, failing that, punish future aggression on the lines of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and Hitler's assaults on Czechoslovakia, Poland and much of the rest of Europe (4:199).
The past experience and the gap between relative powers drove the founding fathers to modify the institution "in three fundamental respects: (i) in defining the functions of the organs concerned, (ii) in defining the obligations of Member-States, and (iii) in restricting the unanimity of decisions to the Big Five" (2:43).

But once more, the strategic environment at the end of the war prevented the fledgling organization from totally enacting its charter. In particular, chapter VII of the Charter envisages two different kinds of security arrangements: centralized measures of collective security taken under Articles 39-42 and a decentralized process of collective self defense, under Article 51 (2:42). The latter has been very robust and effective, particularly in bringing NATO into being. But the former was implemented only once, in 1950 to defend South Korea. However the UN remained confronted with the need to control other conflicts. Consequently, with Dag Hammarskjold's "preventive diplomacy" peacekeeping was invented. It was created as one of the noncoercive means of dispute settlement, covered in Articles 33-38 of the Charter (3:516-527). The current increasing demands for UN interventions under the auspices of the Security Council are proving the effectiveness of this tool. However it does not meet current trends.

The paradigm that emerges from the end of the Cold War offers new challenges to collective actions. First, the conflicts tend to take unprecedented forms. Second, the international system is evolving toward a more diffuse form of power.

Struggles are becoming wilder and less controllable. Martin
Van Creveld, an Israeli professor, envisioned two years ago that "the place of the state will be taken by warmaking organizations of a different type" (5:192). Unfortunately, examples are nowadays plentiful in Africa, former Yugoslavia, and many republics of the past-USSR. Van Creveld further concluded that "armed conflicts will have more in common with the struggles of primitive tribes than with large conventional war" (5:212). Images from Liberia, Somalia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina tend to confirm the validity of his thesis. Finally, he argued that "there appears every prospect that religious attitudes, beliefs, and fanatizcisms will play a larger role in the motivation of armed conflict than it has" (5:214). The increasing violence in India, the Balkans, and the Middle East is already blatantly proving that. The problem is that, as Brigadier A.J. Wilson, who has commanded UN force in Cyprus put it:

"The military role of peacekeeping forces is best suited to those situations where the disputing parties are politically sophisticated, conscious of world opinion, and generally anxious of avoiding further conflict." (5:252)

Thus, should any military action be taken, it cannot follow the present procedure. A quicker response must be found because "it has been demonstrated that the earlier the conflict control procedure can start the greater chance there is of avoiding an armed clash" (7:252).

So far, immediate actions were the apanage of the Big Five seeking the preservation of their national interests. But Joseph Nye argues that nowadays "the ability of any great power to control its environment and to achieve what it wants often is not as great as traditional power indicators suggest" (8:187). The American
defeat in Vietnam, the Soviet blow in Afghanistan, and the French inability to impose stability in Chad are potent examples of this diminution of military power. Inability to resolve international trade issues and illegal drug problems show also that this decrease of relative power extends to all the political arena. Reasons for that can be found in the economic interdependence, the involvement of transnational actors, the growing nationalism in weak states, and the speed of communications (3:182).

These trends, associated with the end of the deadlock in the Security Council, provide new opportunities to promote coalitions. The military advantages of alliances are fairly well-recognized.

- The typical international relations test says that historically coalitions and alliances have been created for the following reasons:
  * Provide sufficient power to resist or carry out aggression.
  * Make it hard to potential adversaries or alignment of powers as a form of interdependence.
  * Transfer economic gains to focal conflicts (3:1).

Additionally, coalition are now winning international and domestic favors. "Today there is a need for political and public legitimacy which coalitions/alliances help create" (3:3). Furthermore, public opinion in Western nations sees in collective actions an argument to pursue the decrease of the defense budget. President Bush summed it up on the 21st of January 1992, during his address to the UN security council: "for perhaps the first time since that hopeful moment in San Francisco, we can look at our Charter as a living, breathing document" (10:7). In fact, adapting and strengthening collective security is not only a possibility, it is a necessity.

The need for cooperative security.

This requirement is explicit in the newly-promoted wording of
"cooperative security" (11:3; 12:100). It better expresses the need for global participation, while it clearly shows the differences with the past process of collective self defense. The urgency of a more effective system comes from the spread of high-technology weapons and global interdependence.

"The increasing lethality and potentially indiscriminate effects of modern weapons of war demand that security be redefined" (11:10). Not only are modern conflicts becoming less controllable, but they are fought by irresponsible and seemingly irrational leaders and warriors who may sometimes be equipped with weapons of mass destruction. The way Saddam Hussein targeted deliberately Israel and Saudi civilian populations is probably a precursor of future warfare if the world community is not capable of meeting this threat.

Another danger of present struggles is their propensity to spread over international borders. Refugees fleeing the violence generally increase social tensions in their asylum country where frequently the same fragile religious and ethnic fabrics already exist. But this is not the only reason for contagion. Also, all the nations of the world have become interdependent. "Technology and all sorts of other forces do not pay much heed to national borders" (13:313). Thus the media, the economic ties, the different traffics and crimes associated with modern fighting, may soon enhance internal disorder. As Secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali points out: "there is no longer such thing as someone else's problem; the globalization of economies and communications deepens
our interdependence" (12:96).

The basic idea is now at sea together in an open boat and should act accordingly. It is some ways that is a depressing thought, it also means that a somewhat cynical view of the world society is probably the most realistic one. It is no longer a luxury; it is a necessity (12:96).

This chapter has underline the point that violence itself, and not just its escalating potential, should be a cause for world concern. All the nations must work in a cooperative way to meet this urgent challenge. Today's world problems require a coordinated global response involving economic, political, and military tools. Our past experience with military coalitions provides sufficient background to help us distinguish which arrangements obtain the best synergy of political and military resources.
CHAPTER II

NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

As soon as traditional peacekeeping cannot be performed, ad hoc multinational forces under the national command authority of a single nation have become the rule. They have been used in Korea from 1950 to 1953, in Lebanon in 1982, and recently for operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Restore Hope. In a study about institutional alternatives to UN peacekeeping, Professor Diehl concludes: "multinational operations may be a good alternative when one (or both) of the protagonists prefers (or insists on) such an arrangement to relying on a UN operation" (14:227). This paper argues that directing a multinational force from a national capital city entails, despite military and domestic advantages, political handicaps that endangers the concept of cooperative security.

Military and domestic advantages.

National command and control are excellent conditions to get clear direction, efficient resources, operational responsiveness, and public support at home.

Numerous assessments of past instances point out how such an arrangement offers "the unambiguous command structure needed for large field operations" (16:74). Even in the Gulf, where a double chain of command was agreed upon, the relationships remained clear and the procedures efficient, as demonstrated by the decisive victory.
A consequence of this arrangement has been to produce operational responsiveness. Confronted with an unforeseen strategic upheaval, the military commander does not need to wait for the decision to come from a committee. This flexibility is vital for the conduct of combat operations as well as for a rapid deployment such as Desert Shield. In fact, history may be recurring. Already in 1950 the same structure had allowed UN to take an "expeditious action to resist aggression. Only the United States had troops deployed in South Korea capable of taking quick military action" (16:74).

Readiness is not the only consequence of the mighty armed forces generally associated with this arrangement. Indeed "it is primarily the great powers who possess the capability to transport forces and supply them for extended periods" (3:528). The point about logistics is the more important, for mobility assets may be placed at a coalition's disposal without the Great Power committing other forces, such as what happened three times in Zaire (in 1965, 1977, and 1981). Compared with UN forces "multinational peacekeeping operations have a smoother time with logistics and supply. These advantages are apparent, however, only after the force is initially organized" (14:223), and we will come back to that point later.

National direction is also more conducive to obtaining and
retaining domestic public support. On the one hand, as previously stated, "legitimacy at home, necessary for credible and sustainable military intervention, increasingly depends on at least the appearance of multilateral support" (3:530). But on the other hand, western electors, US especially, fear UN intervention because of national pride and obsession of being driven to a needless conflict. Thus taking charge seems to be the only way to gain domestic agreement.

"Nationalism is a stronger and more determined political force than supra-nationalism, and there is little or no chance that this state of affairs will be substantially altered in the foreseeable future" (17:111) Professor Rostow writes in arguing against raising UN Charter Article 43 from the dead. However, strong links are tying France and Germany less than fifty years after WWII, and both nations have agreed to some loss of sovereignty through the Maastricht Treaty. It proves that political leaders can be visionary and lead nations toward more integration.

Additionally, the military commander of UN operations is traditionally from the nation with the biggest participation. That should comfort enemies of cooperative security. Yet some writers think that "the larger and more sophisticated the contingent provided, the less likely the contributing country will be willing to place it under non-national command" (16:80). French and English forces under a US commander in the Gulf prove the contrary.

The last concern is deeply rooted in our western societies.
may become committed to battles it otherwise could avoid or that we may find ourselves on the "wrong" side in a conflict (20:13).

And along the same idea former Secretary of State James Baker said in an address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations:

"Obviously we can hardly extract the future of democracy or American interests exclusively to multilateral institutions, nor should we. Of course the United States reserves the right to act alone, which at times may be the only way to truly lead or serve our national interests (19:322)."

Both arguments are fallacious. No forces have been, neither could be committed by UN without a national agreement, which can subsequently be withdrawn at any moment. As Representant Toricelli (D) says:

"Americans need not fear a loss of sovereignty if such a force is created. Since all proposals for a UN force tie its use to a vote of the Security Council, where the US exercises an absolute veto, the US need never commit UN troops to a purpose in which we do not believe (18:19)."

Moreover the question is not to entrust national survival to the UN Security council.

In conclusion, national direction has definite advantages: an efficient chain of command, responsiveness, and domestic favor. The latter can evolve because its real foundation rests in national pride.

Operational and strategic disadvantages.

However, ad hoc coalitions under a national direction entails operational and strategic disadvantages.

The authors of "The challenges of combined operations" judge: "there are at least nine areas where operational-level problems are bound to arise in any coalition or alliance" (9:6). They are more severe regarding ad hoc coalitions. First, intelligence drives issues of secrecy and interoperability. "In NATO, even after 40
years, sharing intelligence is an area that is still sensitive" (9:7). Next, language, culture, and sensitivities must not be undervalued, especially when some decisions may have political or religious relevance. Differences in doctrine and training are more serious concerns for the operational ability of the coalition. Moreover, equipment interoperability and logistics cannot be managed, conversely to the other issues, by appropriate dialogue and methods. "This is such an intractable problem that the standard solution among allies is to make logistics purely a national responsibility" (9:9). As said before, these questions are particularly relevant at the outset of any involvement.

The ninth area is the most important because it has strategic consequences. It deals with the goals that members are individually working toward. Numerous examples in history show that goals may differ at the beginning of the military action, or change along it. The most recent instance is the disquiet of France after the US cruise missile attack on a weapons plant near Baghdad on January 19, 1993 (39:3). But objectives are even more significant when the coalition is acting under UN auspices. "The state that is in command may have from the outset an interpretation of UN goals different from that of other security council members, or its aims may become more expensive in the core of the operation" (16:76). The Korean and the Kuwaiti conflicts are significant illustrations. General MacArthur, commander of UN forces in Korea never reported to the Security Council (16:73). And in the Gulf, "none of the twelve Security Council resolutions called for eliminating Iraq's
war making capability" (16:76). All these problems restrain the coalition aptitude to conduct military operations and the last one may even endanger its survivability. But national direction means even more dramatic consequences.

It may jeopardize the future of cooperative security itself, when this is, as we explained, a necessity. Indeed, "the major danger is that the entire undertaking will be identified with the country or the countries actually involved in military action rather than with the United Nations" (16:76). Such identification can be for better or worse. "Operation Restore Hope is seen there [in Somalia] as a US initiative, not a UN action. Many Somalis, in fact, associate the UN with failure" (21:20). Conversely we may see UN assimilated, like during its first decade (2:367), more to an American institution than a world organization. Or like in the 1960s we could notice that "the developing nations see peacekeeping as a neo-colonial device for extending the interests of the big powers" (7:214). Stationed in Chad during Desert Storm, the author witnessed the populace and media's mood shifting from support for collective action defending a weak country from aggression, to favor for a Southern state resisting to overwhelming forces. "The deployment of peacekeeping troops under the UN flag is psychologically different from deploying troops in a foreign land under a national flag" (14:225). Perception can be sometimes more important than reality.

Especially if reality demonstrates that the commitment of troops is less cooperative than it appears. "The Security Council
has no means of controlling when, how, or in what degree the collective measures are applied" (16:76). Additionally, "some states are constitutionally prohibited from contributing troops to non-UN organizations" (14:224) or to NATO.

Could the world community find a solution to these operational and strategic problems by entrusting the strategic direction of cooperative actions to military or political alliances?
CHAPTER III

DIRECTION FROM A POLITICAL OR A MILITARY ALLIANCE

The solution to most operational problems.

A pragmatic alternative to ad hoc coalitions and national direction is to aim only at solving the difficulties associated with this system while keeping its advantages. To maintain clear command and control arrangements, responsiveness, and domestic favor, the answer seems to rest with the security and economic alliances that have evolved in the international system after WWII. Examples of them are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western Europe Union (WEU), or the European Communities (EC).

Despite their different goals and arrangements, they all offer to their members the necessary legality, credibility and popularity to obtain public support. Particularly, the "New Strategic Concept" of NATO, announced at the Rome Meeting of November 1991 and signed since by all the members including France, stresses the alliance's mission in crisis management (23:930). Also the WEU declaration of Petersberg in June 1992 provides the foundation for conflict control and peacekeeping. Presently, only NATO offers through its Military Committee and its international military staff working with SHAPE the required clear chain of command. Moreover NATO's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) allows the decision makers to react promptly. However, WEU has settled on October 1, 1992 a planning cell close to the Secretary-General at Brussels. It prepares also
the earmarking of forces for rapid commitment to deal with crises. Lastly the EC, if it "should make decisions about military action, it could ask the WEU to take responsibility for operations" (24:27).

Providing the same advantages as those of a national command, collective arrangements can also solve most of the operational constraints. Training and doctrine are now very similar in all the NATO forces, which helps to lessen language difficulties. Interoperability of equipment, specially communications and ammunition, has been constantly improved. Finally, fifty years of common interests have diluted most of the differences in culture or sensibility. But certainly most important, NATO and WEU are affording to their members the institutions to prepare common goals and strategy.

Most certainly, problems remain. We have already remarked on the difficulties with logistics and intelligence. WEU, beyond its fledgling staff, would have extreme trouble obtaining its own intelligence (24:27), or deploying forces rapidly. Space and strategic airlift programs could in the future solve these limitations; nonetheless political limitations would be more difficult for the Europeans to address.

Strategic problems are not solved.

They enter into two categories. Planning on the systematic use of these alliances raises expectations that they would respond like sovereign entities. Second, promoting political alliances is often done for parochial interests instead of international acceptance.
Advocates of collective arrangements exalt their operational effectiveness but forget that their initial goal was not cooperative security. Thus the participation of every member is not acquired. NATO moved, first from its collective self defense task to include a broader machinery providing for political as well as military consultation for policing disputes among its members (25:55). More recently, "Oslo meeting formally recognized NATO's special responsibility for the peace of the entire Euro-Atlantic region" (17:120). However its members still debate on the "out-of-area" issues (26:14). Furthermore, despite the new strategic concept, the Bundestag is still debating the participation of German crews in the surveillance of the former Yugoslavia airspace by NATO AWACS.

Additionally, members have often differing views or interests. A good illustration is the intellectual debate about the respective role of EC, WEU, and NATO (26:22-24). Unfortunately, it is also one of the reasons for the competing solutions to the Yugoslavian question. "A purely European solution for the problem, even if it were available, would tend to divide Europe from the United States and Canada, a development which is our supreme national interest to prevent" (17:121) says professor Rostow. France promotes WEU in order to support its proposal for a European Security force. "As to the EC, so far it has been reluctant to use military forces, other than as observers, to intervene" (26:14).

Dealing with the kind of threat currently emerging, formal alliances must not only manage their members' participation, but
they may find also requirements for integrating other participants. General John Shalikashvili, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, made this striking statement in a recent interview:

“That argues for using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization command-and-control structure for the former Yugoslavia. Whatever structure we get together, it must have the flexibility to allow participation of non-NATO forces. But the mandate must come from the United Nations.”

Such arrangements are very likely to spoil the operational pros that promote formal alliances.

Last, existing coalitions will not automatically be better accepted than all-hom ones. The inclusion of Muslim and Slavic national representation in peacekeeping forces placed in the former Yugoslavia reflects General Shalikashvili’s point. We must not forget that every formal alliance most often appears to be dominated either by the US, or by the former colonial states, or by the rich North. In 1963 NATO peacekeeping forces in Cyprus were categorically opposed by Archbishop Makarios “feeling that a more impartial peace force could be established by the United Nations” (25:56). And in 1965 CENTO demonstrates its hazards and incapacity to settle Pakistan-Indian war (25:56).

So far we have considered only European arrangements because of NATO’s efficiency and the intellectual dynamism that is being applied to the diverse and still-evolving EC institutions. Duplicating these arrangements all around the world will not be an easy task, as proven by the failures of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). And ANZUS can be implemented only if a direct threat to Australia or New Zealand exists. Thus it appears that relying on
formal coalitions to address the necessity for cooperative security provides improvements in limited occasions and only at the operational level. Would some other regional arrangements derive better consequences?
CHAPTER IV

A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION TAKES CHARGE

New opportunities.

In order to solve the problem of international support, regional arrangements are often proposed. Both concepts, regionalism and universalism, were incorporated in the UN Charter (28:95). Its Article 52 says that: "such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes [...] before referring them to the Security Council". Moreover, Article 53 states: "the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority". Indeed regional institutions offer new openings for greater support, early warning, and better effectiveness.

Many examples in recent history and present events demonstrate that the support for regional organization given by the disputants, by domestic public opinion, and by the international community is often greater than for UN involvement or any other multinational commitment. "In general, states and their peoples will have a preference for localizing conflict rather than expanding the conflict to the global arena" (14:213). This feeling is frequently shared also by out-of-area countries. Calls for a European solution in former Yugoslavia today resemble the ones for an African solution in Liberia three years ago. Solutions are sometimes found faster because of this greater consensus.
The OAS (Organization of American States) does have the advantage of being a more homogeneous organization and is therefore free of some problems that exist within the United Nations - such as the disagreements among the great powers, especially between the two superpowers, and those caused by the differing interests of the various regional groupings and the nonaligned group that exist within the United Nations system. (5:121)

When such a consensus can be found it allows the organization to respond rapidly. Because of the direct interests at stake, the very cooperative process offers opportunities for immediate missions of observation, and for preventive diplomatic measures. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is presently involved in all these actions in Macedonia, Kosovo, Sandzak, Vojvodina, Georgia, and the new Central Asian republics (23:915).

Regional agencies are also capable of better effectiveness. For example, the OAS has been very successful in employing the techniques of pacific settlement, mediation, and when needed, economic sanctions or peacekeeping, such as in Guatemala in 1954 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965 (7:57-58). In fact, "regional organizations may be more concerned with resolving the underlying conflict because the implications are much greater for the states in the area" (14:214).

However, all the actions successfully undertaken by regional arrangements lay at a lower level than those we expected to conduct in cooperative military operations. Regional institutions bring less advantages to the military table.

Operational and strategic limitations.

Churchill stressed the regional principle because he believed the experience of the League of Nations had demonstrated that "it was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who could be expected to apply
Because of the dramatic changes in the international system since the end of WWII, regional institutions are no longer the best fitted for cooperative actions. They often lack the political and military resources to implement a successful strategy.

The first political resource needed in an interdependent world is global support. Now, "the vague and equivocal character of the terms 'regional arrangements or agencies' have given rise to contentious argument in the United Nations" (28:100). For example, can the League of Arab States be considered a credible partner to solve the conflicts in the Middle East? Regions are not defined clearly enough to provide regional institutions with more than a role on a case by case basis.

Even when a regional institution has won the agreement of the disputants it is often difficult for its forces to remain unbiased. The Arab force in Lebanon in the midst of the 1976 civil war can hardly be called a true peacekeeping troop (28:211). "Experience has demonstrated that it is usually better for peace-keepers to be states located at some distance from the host country. Near neighbors often have too much direct interest in the outcome of a dispute" (25:91).

In fact, the first problem with regional forces often rests in the decision to commit them. Generally, the consensus in regional institutions is not gained as easily as at first it may appear. Furthermore, unanimity is the rule. For instance:

"... has severe limitations; there are two features, neither of which is likely to disappear soon, that present major obstacles to any future reliance on STS:"

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its consensus decision rule for all substantive issues and the very diverse interests of its members. (24:26)

Professor Paul Diehl even makes the point that "the most common threat to peace for regions - internal threats - are exactly those least likely to generate consensus" (14:212). Arthur Cox reports interviews of ambassadors to the UN from Latin American countries prefer that any regional actions should first await the UN: "we would always prefer UN intervention to US intervention" (25:61-62).

This natural fear of regional leaders may explain why the most frequently involved institution is the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which does not have such disparity of power. But the OAU's interventions reveal another limitation of regionalism: the maladjustment between goals and means.

Regional arrangements have no formal institution able to draft a strategy and to control the military operations. They have not even sometimes the political and military resources to affect favorably the situation. "Regional organizations do not have the political influence, moral suasion, or means of coercion to convince external powers to cooperate in a peacekeeping operation" (14:217). OAU was effectively unable to impede Libya from intervening in the Chadian internal struggles. Furthermore, regional organizations does not have any mechanism to find earmarked troops. NATO and WEU affirmed their readiness to support peacekeeping activities under the CSCE auspices, but on a case-by-case basis. "One of the fundamental barriers to the creation of an OAS standing force is the fear of domination by the United States" (25:139). Additionally, the League of Arab States or the OAU for
example, experience military resource constraints to deal with serious threats. Their small military are not sufficiently advanced technologically and trained to deter their most powerful member or neighbor (25:69; 14:215).

Consequently, this paper will conclude with Paul Diehl: "there are serious limitations to regional peacekeeping operations, which will undoubtedly have difficulty with organizing, directing, and conducting a mission with the efficiency and impartiality of the United Nations" (14:218)
The solution to most political problems.

So far we have demonstrated that ad hoc coalitions, a formal alliance, a regional institution face political bridle that hinder their ability to conduct the kind of cooperative actions required by today's interdependent world. Conversely, a UN coalition profits political leverages because of its acceptability and its ability for global settlement.

Giving the strategic direction of a military operation to UN is not new. Since 1956 and the Secretary-General Hammarskjold's initiative to control the Suez crisis, UN has been involved in more than twenty peacekeeping missions. Because of this experience and its capability to supervise elections, to conduct rehabilitation and relief campaigns, UN is competent in finding conflict termination. Effectively, UN can rely on organizations such as the World Health organization or the Food and Agriculture organization. Also, the coalition itself can address the entire spectrum of peacebuilding like presently in Cambodia.

UN coalition is also globally acceptable. An American officer arguing for US participation in peacekeeping forces described the domestic and international points of view as follow.
What is true for US is correct also for any other nation or institution. However, past examples in peacekeeping, and prospects for larger military operations let analysts doubtful on the UN operational aptitude. Since 1964, the UNFICYP has been keeping peace in Cyprus, without any chance of favorable outcome. And the UNIFIL in South Lebanon and the UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia are powerless in front of consistent and deliberate breaches to the cease-fire. The vicious circle that ties the lack of confidence in the UN and its deficiencies not only can, but must now be broken by the responsible nations convinced of the world interdependence.

Operational problems can be solved.

The UN forces are disabled because of their poor planning, their unresponsive chain of command, and all the problems caused generally by ad hoc coalitions. Some solutions have been proposed.

"Drawing up mandates for UN field forces is inherently more complicated than sending troops off to war" (29:131). Indeed, far more than enemy and friendly forces must be taken into account. The authoritative body of any UN intervention is the Security Council. The Secretary-general is in charge of the day-to-day conduct of the operation within the terms of the mandate. He may delegate control and supervision to an under secretary or a civil servant in the field (30:140-144; 7:43). To this end, the Secretary-general is assisted by a military adviser and a small staff. Three different services deal with military operations. The Peacekeeping Operation Bureau makes the political preparation and the military planning.
The FODI (Forward Operation Division) drafts the budget and support logistically the force. Last, the Commercial Services Division executes the markets and contracts submitted by the FODI. But these divisions are not hierarchically tied (21:3). This is not the only problem with such a chain of command.

First, "the diplomats who sit on the Security council have a political role to play, and neither the time nor the expertise to conduct the necessary parallel military operational discussions" (21:389). Provision is made in the Article 47 of the UN Charter to establish "a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council". The author argues that it is time to bring into being this institution composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. They could play the role the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs plays for the US National Command Authority. Indeed, UN military operations planning can be seen as Crisis Action Planning in the US Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

Currently the procedure runs from the Security Council to the Secretary-general. And

the translation of politically initiated objectives and operational orders to practical military objectives is not always easy - and is not made any less complex by the often ambiguously worded resolutions that emerge from the Security Council (21:402)

What is suggested here is to follow the pragmatic American approach with the Secretary-general's staff doing the job of a Unified Command headquarter. It would have to report significant events to the Security Council and procure an assessment including possible actions. After advise by the Military Staff Committee (MSC), the
Security Council may decide to develop one of the proposed courses of action. Then the MSC would define objectives and constraints, and direct the Secretary-general to prepare the operation. His staff would then develop multiple courses of action, addressing mission, forces, and concept of operation. After advice by the MSC, the Security Council would select a course of action, accordingly draft the resolution, and when needed authorize the deployment of forces. The original selection of forces could be made by the Secretary-general's staff as it is currently done, but must be approved by the MSC.

"The existing small staff of experts in the Secretary-general's office cannot be considered adequate for handling crises when a UN operation of magnitude is organized and sent into the field" (7:254). Many propositions have been made in order to strengthen it. One suggests that NATO should offer its Integrated Military Staff as a base for an MSC operational staff (15:389). Another recommends to provide the Secretary-general "with adequate military staff including logistics and other specialist cells" (29:139). Even President Bush in his address before the UN General Assembly on September 21, 1992 urged: "we will need to develop planning, crisis management, and intelligence capabilities for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations" (32:722).

Once the force come into being the New York military staff, whatever its position, should not be entrusted with any executive duties, exactly like in the US chain of command. General Rikhye, former Military adviser of the Secretary-general, exhorted already
in 1967 against such "a harmful duplication" (33:5). He also stated that "staff procedures do not create a major problem" (33:14). Moreover, the experience gained within NATO and the numerous foreign military training programs conducted throughout the globe (particularly in the US senior officer schools) create a certain standardization in staff jobs that did not exist 25 years ago. Thus it is possible to develop not only a combined staff in New York but also one with the force. Hence, General Wilson after his experience as UN force commander in Cyprus advanced: "Force HQ should be built up on an international basis, with all national contingents fully and formally represented" (6:11).

The last point to consider is control. UN has no center of operations capable of managing such a task. Additionally, "the UN telecommunication system is notoriously inadequate" (7:254). Thus control cannot be centralized in New York, neither should it be with so many operations going on simultaneously. Instead, control could be decentralized toward regional arrangements. But for material reasons again this does not seem realistic. The author favors rather the current joint co-located politico military HQ, which General Wilson calls vital (6:11). This arrangement will also offer better responsiveness.

Responsiveness must be addressed at three levels: the UN Security Council, the forces to be deployed, and the forces in the field. Much time can be gained in formulating a resolution if early warning is obtained. The regional institutions are able to play an important role in this matter. An effective preparation by the
proposed staffs will also limit the discussions that can be held quickly. "An emergency session of the Security Council can be called within twenty-four hours, and a vote is possible a few hours thereafter if the major powers are in accord" (25:141).

Time may also be saved if forces are ready to deploy rapidly. The UN Charter provides in its Chapter 43 for a standing force. But as doctor Rostow concludes, "whether Article 43 is implemented or not, the states will have to maintain substantial military forces as an insurance policy..." (17:115). In a period of military downsizing, it appears unrealistic to request more funding to commit new forces. However, the ear-marking of troops has no such disadvantage. Canada, some Scandinavian states, and now France are already holding forces available on short notice at the request of the Security Council.

The last concern deals with the ability of the force to react. On that point General McCarthy, Deputy Commander in Chief US European Command, is very clear:

As the military commander closest to the crisis and most knowledgeable about its urgency, the commander must be called upon to provide the leadership, insight, and judgment essential for success without seeking approval from HQ at each step if the rep. (26:16)

It presupposes that flexibility has been offered to conduct the mission within clear constraints and rules of engagement. The role of the MSC is one more time preponderant in that domain.

There is no such solutions to the problems of logistics and global interoperability, but they are not worse than in any other type of ad-hoc coalition. Only a long process of common training will solve them.
CONCLUSION

Collective security has been an ideal for international behavior since a long time. The end of the deadlock in the UN Security council and the UN popularity offers today an opportunity for a dramatic move in the direction of a more cooperative system. The conflicts are changing in character. They are less controllable and potentially more violent. The world also is evolving. Power is less coercive when it is more needed to deal with the threat of violence spreading. Thus, wars must be addressed in a cooperative way, only coalitions can be decisive.

Ad hoc coalitions led by a state endanger the credibility of UN when it is becoming effective, approved, and needed. On the military side, such combined forces are plagued by numerous interoperability problems. Relying on military alliances solves most operational issues but does not overcome political obstacles. Regional arrangements have neither the resources, neither the strategic capabilities to provide direction for military actions. Thus UN is like cooperative security becoming necessary.

Its effectiveness can be greatly improved by implementing the Chapter 47 of its Charter. The Military Staff Committee has an important role to play in order to advise and assist the Security Council in preparing adequate strategies. Furthermore, the Secretary-general must supported by an international staff able to provide early warning and detailed planning for military intervention. Last, those responsible nations that understand the
world interdependence must hold forces available for use under the command of the Security Council.

In the Middle ages, feudal lords had to cooperate in response to a common threat. Later, nationalism has emerged from a different environment. Today, harmonization of national interests offers the opportunity for collective security. If the five permanent members of the Security Council do not take their "primary responsibility" for world peace "nationalism is bound once again to become a force for monstrous evil" (17:123).
LIST OF REFERENCES


