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THE AIR MILITIA
AND
TOTAL FORCE POLICY

by
David G. Phillips, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel
Virginia Air Militia

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Colonel Jay A. Mengel

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
April 1993
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ABSTRACT

TITLE: The Air Militia and Total Force Policy

AUTHOR: David G. Phillips, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, ANG

The Air Militia, within the construct of the Total Force Policy, has uniquely postured the Air Force with structure and mix flexibility to better maintain an efficient and effective combat force within growing politico-economic constraints. Through the sociopolitical-military linkage of the citizen-militia, and significant resource efficiency, the Air Militia enhances Air Force structure during austere political and economic conditions as an element of United States air capability.
Lieutenant Colonel David G. Phillips, Jr. (M.B.A., Troy State University) became a member of the Air National Guard (ANG) in June of 1971. In May of 1983, he was assigned full-time as an Active Guard/Reserve (ABR) member. In 1984, he organized the ANG Attack Aircraft Supply Council and served as chair until 1988. Such councils were later known as Weapons System Supply Councils (WSSC), and included all ANG units by weapons system. He served on the ANG Budget Committee from 1986 to 1988 and chaired the equipment requirements section from 1987 to 1988. From 1985 to 1988, he also served as the A-7 Aircraft Weapons System Support Table of Allowance (WSSTA-293) Monitor for the ANG Readiness Center.

Colonel Phillips has deployed with the 192 Fighter Group in support of NATO exercises in Norway, England, and West Germany. He also deployed with the 192nd on three rotations to Howard AFB, Panama in support of canal air defense operations (Coronet Cove).

Colonel Phillips is a resident graduate of the Squadron Officer's School, class of 1979; a resident graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, class of 1989; and, hopefully, a resident graduate of the Air War College, class of 1993.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In putting this project together, I was assisted by a number of very professional people. These people assisted in the effort by reading, editing and commenting on the rough drafts as well as providing technical assistance. I owe a great debt to them for their patience, assistance and willingness to give of their time. They include Dr. Terilyn Phillips, my wife and sanity check; Colonel Jay Mangel, U.S. Air Force, technical advisor; Colonel Jim Kay, U.S. Army, reader; Dr. Sandy Cochran, historian.

To each of these who contributed and assisted in making this effort possible, thanks.

D.B. Phillips, Jr.
THE AIR MILITIA
AND
TOTAL FORCE POLICY

In the early 1970's, military strategists began to rethink the structure and mix of the United States military and the role of reserve component forces. Historically, United States national military strategy was implemented largely through reserve forces. The militia defended the Colonial American Republic as volunteer regiments characterized the nineteenth century. Only since the end of World War II and communism, have large standing or active component forces dominated the United State's peacetime military force structure.

Twenty years of Total Force Policy, relative to the Air Militia, has provided the Air Force a unique advantage for twenty-first Century structuring. A review of Air Militia highlights during the twenty year history of Total Force Policy (1973 - 1993), coupled with an examination of the unique capabilities provided by the Air Militia, supports the hypothesis that the United States Air Force is more cost efficient and politically viable, without diminished combat effectiveness, structured under the Total Force concept.

HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS

Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, set the stage for total force structuring when he called for an increase in "the readiness, reliability, and timely responsiveness of the combat
and combat-support units of the Guard and Reserve."1 Three years later Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, directed the Total Force concept be applicable to the three military departments. Secretary Schlesinger believed the central purpose of the Defense Department was to build and maintain necessary forces to deter war and defend national interests. Integral to accomplishing this central purpose was the development of the Total Force concept. Secretary Schlesinger stated, "Total Force is no longer a concept - it is now the Total Force Policy."2 The integration of the active and reserve components into a homogeneous force was the task of the Total Force Policy. The integration of forces included the following elements of the active and reserve components:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active Component</th>
<th>Reserve Component</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Air Force Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air National Guard (Militia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Army National Guard (Militia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>Navy Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marine Reserve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Total Force Policy framed a new partnership between the Air Force and the Air Militia, emphasizing mission, mobilization, and modernization. These three themes became the central focus over the next two decades. The Total Force Policy was fully embraced by the Air Force and the Air Militia.

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During 1973, the Air Militia formalized its primary (federal) mission of providing organized, trained, and equipped combat air units in a nonmobilized, combat-ready status for immediate federal mobilization. Its secondary (state) mission was to provide a force to assist state authorities during emergencies such as disaster relief, search and rescue, and preserving peace and order. 3

The mobilization process, transition from civilian to either state or federal active status, and training procedures were clearly outlined and formalized during this period. Units became available for federal service by call or order of the President, upon declaration of war by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law. The chart below outlines the mobilization access to the reserve component forces.

**Mobilization Access to Reserve Components**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteerism</td>
<td>Service Secretary</td>
<td>As Needed</td>
<td>As Needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call-up:</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>+90+90 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial:</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>24 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>As Needed</td>
<td>As Needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full:</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Existing Forces</td>
<td>Duration + 6 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>New Force Structure</td>
<td>Duration + 6 Months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*expected to change in 1993 to 180+180 days.*

---

Air Militia units, for mobilization and training, were assigned to active component Air Force major commands that established performance standards, advised units on training activities, and evaluated them for compliance. Units, upon federal mobilization, augmented the organizational structure of their respective "gaining" command. All Air Militia members, by federal statute, were to participate, annually, in a minimum of twelve, two-day unit training assemblies (UTA's) and fifteen days consecutive field training to ensure units and individuals were trained and available for immediate federal service. In 1973, Air Militia personnel totaled about 90,000 men and women, serving in all fifty states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.4

During the period 1974 through 1976, following the end of United States' participation in the Vietnam War and with intensified emphasis placed on reserve components, the Air Militia began a modernization and integration program with the Air Force. Eight tactical fighter units converted to modern A-7D Corsair II aircraft. Two other units received the EB-57 and converted to a Defensive Systems Evaluation (DSE) mission for the Aerospace Defense Command. Four units received the KC-135 Stratotanker marking the first association with the Strategic Air Command as a gaining command.5

4 Ibid.

In 1977 through 1980, the Air Militia emphasized recruiting, retention, and resource conservation while maintaining high federal mobilization readiness and continuing force modernization. During this period, a 100 percent pass rate on federal Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI's) was achieved while expanding peacetime support to active component. C-130 units participated in the rotational commitment to the United States Southern Command, providing in-theater airlift support. The Air Militia was then providing 100 percent of the Air Force's defense system evaluation capability. In addition to the continuing air defense alert mission by fighter units, tanker units were performing continuous air refueling alert missions.

Aircraft modernization continued with units converting to A-7D's, F-4C's, C130-B's and KC-135's replaced all former KC-97's. The F-105B, used in the Wild Weasel mission, and new production A-10's and C-130H's were added. Nonflying units were also modernizing with Tactical Control units receiving the TPS-43 radars and Combat Communications Groups receiving additional TRAC-97 radios.6

The decade of the 1980's brought increased missions, readiness, and modernization resulting in an interdependent partnership with the active component. The following chart outlines the percentage of force capability maintained by the Air Militia in 1980.

---

**1980 Air Militia Force Contribution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Type</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Force Type</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interceptor</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Support</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Air Refueling</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue/Recovery</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Special Ops</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total force partnership would significantly contribute to the Air Force’s structuring advantage in the 1990’s. Air Militia units became integral parts of the Air Force’s newly formed Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). RDF deployments included A-7’s to Cairo, Egypt, providing tactical air support for operation Bright Star, and KC-135 tankers to the United Kingdom, performing alert missions. C-130 and A-7 units began continuous rotational commitments in Panama, providing airlift and close air support. F-106 and F-4 air defense units performed vital federal alert missions along the coasts of the continental United States, Hawaii, and at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Combat engineering and communication units deployed more than 1200 people to exercises in Europe, Korea, and Honduras. Tactical air control units deployed to Norway, Italy, and Denmark. Civil engineering units sent teams to Europe, Korea, and the Arctic Circle, while medical units supported such exercises as Reforeger, Team Spirit, Bright Star, and Logex.7

The Air Militia involvement and Air Force investment in realistic Total Force training resulted in unprecedented federal readiness as demonstrated in annual competitions. During Volant Rodeo '85, the Tactical Airlift Group from West Virginia won the best Air Force C-130 maintenance award. The Tactical Reconnaissance Group from Idaho won "Best Overall" tactical reconnaissance unit award for two consecutive years. The Air Militia set another record, during this period, with a new high of 109,400 members, meeting the programmed federal end-strength for the seventh straight year.8

Concurrent with increased federal missions and readiness, Air Militia modernization efforts increased through the 1980's, consistent with Total Force initiatives. Aging F-101 interceptors were replaced with F-4's; F-105 units converted to A-7's; new C-130H's phased out the C-7 Caribous; and A-10 fighters enhanced close air support capabilities. South Carolina's Air Tactical Fighter Group was the first unit to convert to the new F-16 Fighting Falcon. KC-135 tankers were modified with new JT3D-3B engines to provide increased operational and logistical capabilities. The Tactical Fighter Group at New Orleans, Louisiana was the first unit to receive the F-15 Eagle. The Air Militia also added the strategic airlift mission receiving the C-5A Galaxy and the C-141 Starlifter.9

8 Ibid.
Growth, modernization, integration into Air Force missions, and participation in realistic joint and unified exercises greatly enhanced the readiness of the Air Militia through the 1990’s. During Operation Just Cause (1989 & 1990), Air Militia aircraft and personnel on duty in Panama, and stateside C-141, C-5, and aerial port units, easily integrated with active component forces in combat operations to protect American lives and restore Panama’s democratic government.

On the 23rd of August 1990, President George Bush authorized the federal call-up of the Militia and Reserve components in support of Operation Desert Shield, providing a major test of the Total Force Policy. The United States deployed 545,000 men and women to the Persian Gulf region. By the end of the War, more than 245,000 reservists had been activated. Air Militia missions during both Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm included tactical fighters, aerial refueling aircraft, tactical and strategic airlifters, tactical reconnaissance, combat communications, aeromedical evacuation, civil engineering, services, mobile aerial port units, and security police.10

Beginning the 1990’s, the Air Militia reached the federally approved strength of 117,000 members and continued modernization with F-16 conversions and upgrades in the airlift and refueling missions. All A-7’s, F-4’s, with the exception of the F-4F Wild

Weasel, and OA-37's are to be phased out by the end of 1993. The Idaho unit is to retain the F-4G Wild Weasel capability. The following chart outlines the percentage of force capability maintained by the Air Militia in 1992, as compared to 1980.

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interceptor</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Support</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Air Refueling</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue/Recovery</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>Special Ops</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**UNIQUE CAPABILITIES**

Given twenty years of Total Force building, the Total Air Force today is uniquely organized with the flexibility needed to meet force structure and mix challenges of the future. The February 1992 report of the Defense Department Reserve Forces Policy Board emphasized, "The Reserve Components provide a cost-effective means for maintaining important capabilities in the Total Force."

Specifically, the nature of airpower, the citizen-militia ethic, and resource efficiency have postured the Total Air Force with the propensity for current and future success. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General


Colin Powell, characterized the Persian Gulf War application of Total Force as a "significant factor in affording flexibility." 13

AirPower

The Air Militia, through airpower capabilities, is unique among reserve components in providing a capable and available source of airpower. The reserve structure inherently restricts peacetime operations because of the limited availability of reserve members for training; the benefit afforded is in cost savings.

The monthly, two-day unit training assembly (UTA) and the annual 15-day field training (AFT) period present combat readiness limitations for the land and sea dimension reserves in terms of time and area. For example, the proficiency required in mass and maneuver for airland battle and carrier battle group operations cannot be effectively accomplished in a monthly weekend and two weeks annually. Combat support and combat service support functions can, however, be adequately maintained within the AFT and UTA structure.

The third dimension, airpower, does through speed, range, flexibility, and versatility, afford greater potential and accommodation for effective combat training within the UTA and AFT framework. Air Militia members can, on UTA's, AFT, or virtually anytime they are available, receive effective combat, support, or service support training. All levels of training,

13 Ibid., pp 170.
from service support to combat flying operations, are available
day to day at each Militia unit. An Air Militia pilot can "strap
in" the aircraft and fly combat training missions just about
anytime he or she is available.

The combat readiness firepower training provides was
demonstrated during the Gulf War where Air Militia units were
federally mobilized, deployed, and integrated into the fight
simultaneously with the active component air force. Whereas,
ground and sea reserve component combat units, once mobilized,
required several months training to attain required combat
proficiency. This delay for training was not necessarily a
reflection of the quality nor dedication of reserve component
ground and sea forces, but rather, resultant from the limitations
of reserve component training capability.

Citizen-Militia

The United States, in some 385 years, has more often relied
on Militia forces in national security decision making, only
mobilizing large standing military during crisis or war. In
1636, the Massachusetts Bay Colony established regiments of
citizen-militia, tasking certain members for immediate response,
designated "minutemen", and tasking certain units to be available
in several hours. Limited economic and human resources and a
strong belief that "standing armies during times of peace should
be avoided as dangerous to liberty", focused colonial Americans
on the democracy of an army of "citizen-militia."14 This

14 "Virginia Declaration of Rights", Section 17.
practice was implied in the United States' Constitution through charging Congress with the responsibility of "raising" armies when needed.

The threat of communist world domination sparked the United States/Soviet Union cold war in the mid 1950's, giving rise to the United States' departure from the citizen-militia, toward a sizable, standing military force. The impetus for this large standing force, containment of communism, largely vanished with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union returning the United States' military perspective toward the Militia structure.

Since colonial days, the citizen-militia, an extension of the civilian community, has had notable impact on the United States' national security decision making process and served in every major conflict involving the United States. Carl von Clausewitz characterizes war as a "phenomenon where its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity" composed of: 1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (the people); 2) the play of chance and probability (the Military); and 3) the element of subordination to reason (the government). Clausewitz further maintains, "these three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject, yet variable in their relationship to one another." A society's task in war, therefore, is to maintain a balance or equilibrium between these three tendencies or pillars, "like an object suspended between
three magnets. 15 The paradox of the "trinity" lies in the propensity of the pillars' relationship to change, yet maintain equilibrium. The people, the government, and the military are foundational pillars of a sovereign democracy. The most important fundamental pillar is the people who live, work, and pursue their interests within local communities - the community ethic. The government, established and maintained by the people, exists to serve the interests of the people. The military, established and maintained by the government, serves as an extension of the government. Through the community ethic, the citizen-militia, as depicted below, provides a valuable link through which these three pillars can achieve and maintain equilibrium.

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15 On War, Carl von Clausewitz, "The Consequences for Theory", pp 89.
Equilibrium, in this context, is defined as that which ultimately serves the best interest of the people and preserves the nation. Government and large standing military forces tend, over time, to institutionalize. They develop their own ethic and power structure, and ultimately lose sight of their primordial purpose of serving the community ethic. The safeguard against government institutionalization is democratic elections. Elected public servants, in theory at least, represent the interests of the community ethic. Likewise, the safeguard against military institutionalization is to draw down the large standing military, retaining only the core structure and capability necessary to accomplish the national military strategy, as augmented by the citizen-militia both in peacetime, through training rotations, and in conflict, through mobilization. The citizen-militia simultaneously serves both the community and military ethic. The primordial focus on serving the community ethic is thereby strengthened, resulting in equilibrium. This also contributes to overall trinity equilibrium. Through the citizen-militia member, the community ethic is better informed on military issues, fostering a more responsible electorate which theoretically results in the election of more responsive politicians.

The citizen-militia, through the community ethic link, also evokes the national will of either support or nonsupport for the military actions as the communities across the nation mobilize their militia-citizens into federal service. During the Vietnam War, "the military saw the lack of Congressional and public
support at home as the most important missing element in the prosecution of the war." 16 This lack of national support for the Vietnam War can be argued as partly due to President Johnson's refusal to mobilize the reserve component forces.

General Creighton Abrams, following the Vietnam War, "was determined to ensure that never again would a President be able to send the Army to war without the reserves maintained for such a contingency." 17 As Army Chief of Staff, General Abrams structured the Army with certain essential support and combat support capability within the Reserves exclusively, therefore, requiring mobilization in time of conflict. Conversely, one can argue the overwhelming high national support for the Persian Gulf War was largely due to President Bush's call-up of the citizen-militia.

During the Cold War and prior to the Gulf War, force size and mix debate relative to Total Force was not very widespread. United States national security concerns were on deterring nuclear war and the spread of communism at all cost. Few really believed the reserve component forces could be counted on to provide an available and capable force contribution to this effort. The Gulf War, however, demonstrated the reserve components were not only "available and capable", but essential. The impact of a changed world threat, a reliable reserve


military, and a staggering national deficit, forced a refocusing within the national security decision making process on the domestic agenda and the economic benefits of the Total Force Policy.

Resource Efficiency

In a 1992 report for the Secretary of Defense, RAND's National Defense Research Institute stated, "One of the critical factors that must go into an assessment of the future of active and reserve component forces is the cost of such forces."18 The issue of capability at less cost is fundamental to the Total Force concept and has generated much debate. While all costs are important and have a place for consideration, some are not relevant to this issue. Total Force costs and savings should be evaluated in terms of only those costs and savings relative to the size and mix of active versus militia component forces. Indirect support capability and infrastructure costs, such as personnel support, system procurement, and national assets, are basic fixed requirements not directly varying with size or mix. Although real costs, they are not relevant in estimating the direct or incremental cost of adding or converting to Militia force structure. Relevant costs include only those directly impacted by adding or deleting a unit. For example, when an active component Air Force installation supporting a fighter wing mission is closed, a full range of facility, operational,

range of facility, operational, maintenance, and personnel costs are drawn down. An Air Militia unit gaining the fighter wing mission, generates only the direct costs of the flying operation and minimal indirect support, retaining the operational fighter capability, but at a significant cost reduction. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), an active component F-16 fighter wing based in Europe costs about three million dollars a year; whereas, a similar F-16 wing in the Air Militia costs about two million dollars a year. Figures range anywhere from twenty-five percent to seventy-five percent dependent on cost calculation methodology. The CBO calculated cost benefit of about thirty percent is most applicable, in that, its methodology considers only direct, incremental cost implications. It is important to understand that this active and reserve component relationship is not adversarial, but complementary and interdependent. Without the support of national assets and the active component infrastructure for assets, training, and evaluation, the Air Militia could not provide this cost efficient, incremental capability vital to Total Force and national military strategy.

A second issue, currently receiving much debate, is the size of the total base force; how far down can the active component force be drawn before Total Force is no longer supportable or becomes hollow? The answer to this question is not yet clear and

tends to raise further questions. President Bush proposed, in his Base Force plan, a thirty percent reduction in total strength from a 1980’s high of 2.3 million to 1.6 million by the year 1997. The active to reserve air component ratio in this proposal was about two to one, respectively. Secretary Les Aspin proposed an alternative plan (option C) that further reduced the total base force to 1.4 million by 1997, maintaining the active to reserve air component ratio of about two to one. The Bush administration and Congress constantly clashed over the question of active to reserve component mix and size. Secretary Aspin and Congress appear to believe it is better to retain capability in reserve than to lose it. This belief, however, may be, as former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney quipped, rooted in Congress’s dislike to shut down Militia facilities in their home districts. In any case, an adamant, parochial position of “proportionateness” in drawing down both active and reserve component forces without regard to the retention of capability could have grave consequences. This position, however, is not typically characteristic of the Air Force for reasons previously discussed related to the nature of airpower, and the citizen-militia ethic, as well as, resource efficiency.

In addition to the efficient cost of providing combat operational air capability, each Air Militia unit also uses much of its capability in support of state mission requirements. This “dual-use” benefits both resource utility and personnel training. Under state mobilization, units provide community emergency
assistance such as disaster relief, search and rescue, and civil order. Also, in coordination with federal agencies, units provide assistance in counternarcotics operations and regional assistance efforts. In 1990, Militia forces responded to about 300 state mobilizations involving over 23,000 individual members. State cost sharing also benefits the overall resource efficiency, in that state budgets fund about twenty-five percent of the unit’s annual facility and security costs, and underwrites costs associated with state mobilizations.

THE FUTURE: 1993-2003

The last decade of the twentieth century began with global changes affecting the United States’ forty year view of the structure and mix of military forces. In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded the sovereign country of Kuwait. United Nations’ coalition forces, led by the United States, ultimately defeated the Iraqi aggression, recovering the independence of Kuwait. The United States, through leading the defeat of Iraqi aggression, reestablished political and military credibility as a dominant international power. The long carried defeatist stigma of Vietnam was replaced by victory. A year later in August 1991, an attempted Soviet military coup failed, as the Soviet Union’s political, economic, and military structure collapsed. The collapsed communist threat, the Gulf War victory, and pressing economic constraints focused the United States’ national

electorate inward as compelling economic and social interests dominated the 1992 Presidential Election. This focus resulted in a reshaping of United States' military forces and, perhaps, the American way of war.

The bipolar international system that dominated world events for nearly forty-five years was replaced with multinational and multipolar perspectives. National, ethnic, and religious interests fragment formerly homogeneous nations and alliances. Economic limitations restrain the capability and will of nations to continue the commitment of significant national resources to the international arena.

A changing international environment, national social fragmentation, and national economic constraints, have significantly altered the United States' national security decision making process. The subsequent impact on the United States' national military strategy is no less significant and continues a subject of much debate as the twenty-first century approaches. Predicting future national security needs in a changing national and international political, economic, and military environment are both arduous and abstruse. Identifying national security threats, allocating national resources to meet those threats, and determining acceptable national security risks are only a few of the intricate and challenging issues that must be incorporated into the national military strategy. A strategy where attention is increasingly focused on the Total Force construct.
While the majority of the strategic deterrence and defense forces are in the active component, the Air Militia forces provide much of the strategic bomber aerial refueling support and a majority of the continental air defense. Smaller forward presence forces of the active component can be rotationally augmented by Militia combat forces during peacetime and mobilization. Also, these augmentation combat forces can be deployed and redeployed by organic Militia airlift and tanker forces. Air Militia combat, airlift, and tanker forces also provide crisis response capability for the regional element of the national military strategy. Reconstitution, in the event of broadened or protracted global conflict, is enhanced through the availability of inactive reserves from a minimal level of training to ready trained, recently active Militia proficiency. Although much of the fiscal and structural shape of the military strategy and implementing forces are yet undetermined, it is clear the Total Force Policy embraced by the Air Force twenty years ago and now proven, with positive public and congressional support, is the framework upon which the future United States national military strategy and implementing forces should be constructed.

Since its beginning, twenty years ago, Total Force Policy, now institutionalized and proven, faces a most delicate challenge into the twenty-first century. The unique capabilities attributed the "Total Air Force" through airpower, the citizen-militia, and resource efficiency have better postured the United
States Air Force with the flexibility to provide an efficient and effective combat force in a changing economic, political, and threat environment.


"Virginia Declaration of Rights", Section 13.