POLAND IN NATO? A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICYMAKING PROCESS

by

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June, 1994

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# ABSTRACT

The opportunity for nations such as Poland to enter NATO is of vital concern for their security. Indeed, the problem of inclusion into the Western alliance is the key issue for the majority of former Warsaw Pact members. After the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, these countries are no longer members of a security alliance. Yet, with the end of the Cold War, Poland confronts significant new security risks -- making the need to join an alliance such as NATO all the more important. The United States plays a key role in determining whether Poland will be invited into NATO. What will guide that decision? What lessons can be learned about U.S. decisionmaking from the creation of the Partnership for Peace, and what are the implications for possible Polish entrance into NATO? This thesis is based on interviews with U.S. policymakers on NATO expansion. The history of that policy, especially the creation of the Partnership for Peace, offers a case study for drawing broader conclusions about the U.S. policymaking process. This thesis outlines that history and argues that bureaucratic politics theories of U.S. policymaking are inadequate to explain the issue of NATO expansion. With the end of the Cold War, and scrambling of previous institutional interests within the U.S. government, those interests provide only limited help in accounting for the policymaking process that led to the Partnership for Peace. The fear of hostile Russian reaction to NATO expansion provides much of the rationale for U.S. opposition to inviting nations such as Poland into the alliance. However, significant disagreements persist over this issue, both within and between key U.S. policymaking organizations. The fragmentation of power in the U.S. decisionmaking process -- and the attendant need for compromise between actors -- also played a decisive role in the genesis of Partnership for Peace. This same multiplicity of interests and fragmentation of power offers Poland the opportunity to press its case from a variety of useful perspectives.

# SUBJECT TERMS

Partnership for Peace, NATO Expansion, Visegrad Triangle
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June, 1994

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to recognize the cooperation of the individuals who kindly consented to interviews for this thesis. Their contribution to the research effort was essential.

I would also like to express my appreciation to Lt. Colonel Jeffrey A. Larsen of the US Air Force Academy, whose assistance made the interviews possible, and Professor John E. Keller of the Defense Resource Management Institute, whose input and constructive criticism contributed greatly to the quality of the thesis.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my advisors, Professors Paul Stockton and Kim Wincup. Their knowledge, dedication, and patience have provided me with an example to emulate in the years to come.
I. INTRODUCTION

The opportunity for nations such as Poland to enter NATO is of vital concern for their security. Indeed, the problem of inclusion into the Western alliance is the key issue for the majority of former Warsaw Pact members. After the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, these countries are no longer members of a security alliance. Yet, with the end of the Cold War, Poland is confronting significant new security risks -- making the need to join an alliance such as NATO all the more important. The United States will play a key role in determining whether Poland will be invited into NATO. What will guide that US decision? What lessons can be learned about US decisionmaking from the creation of the Partnership for Peace, and what are the implications for possible Polish entrance into NATO?

This thesis argues that existing bureaucratic politics theories of US foreign policymaking are inadequate to explain the issue of NATO expansion. With the end of the Cold War, and scrambling of previous institutional interests within the US government, those interests provide only limited help in explaining the policymaking process that led to the Partnership for Peace. The fear of hostile Russian reaction to NATO expansion provides much of the rationale for US opposition to inviting nations such as Poland into the alliance. However, significant disagreements persist over this
issue (both within and between key US policymaking actors), presenting Poland with the opportunity to press its case from a variety of useful perspectives.

A. THE DILEMMA OF NATO EXPANSION

NATO membership would reinforce Polish security and help Poland join in the progress toward a more united Europe. With a dynamically developing economy, almost entirely homogeneous population (ethnic Poles account for over 95 per cent of the total), and no border disputes with its neighbors, Poland would seem to be a reliable candidate for NATO membership. NATO membership might also reinforce the internal political evolution of Poland in a way that strengthens and solidifies its relationship with the West. However, Russian policy -- and the effect that it has on US decisionmaking -- has created a serious problem for NATO expansion. In 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent a letter to the leaders of the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom opposing any expansion of NATO to include East-Central European countries. He emphasized that such a move would be considered by Moscow as a threat to Russian security concerns. Yeltsin argued:

The main threat to Europe is now posed not by the East-West confrontation, but by inter-ethnic conflicts of a new generation. A quantitative increase of NATO will hardly resolve the task of countering them effectively. [...] it is important to take into account how our public opinion may react to such a step. Not only the opposition, but the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of neo-isolation of the country as opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space.' (Emphasis added)

1 Copy of the letter received during interview in the Pentagon.
This stand confronted United States policymakers with a stark dilemma: invite Poland to join NATO and risk alienating Russia, or accede to Russian sensitivities at the cost of Polish preferences (with all the broader security implications that such a move would have in East-Central Europe).

Western countries have always been reluctant to expand their security alliance eastward; according to Adam Daniel Rotfeld, "they are guided by the illusory belief that the effective way of preserving the West's security is isolation and separation from perturbations and problems in the Central-Eastern part of Europe." However, this reluctance rests on a truism rather than truth. Leaving East-Central European countries in a peculiar "grey" zone will not necessarily serve Europe's security. On the contrary, such a status has historically encouraged eventual aggressors. From the Polish perspective, NATO membership offers Poland -- and the West as the whole -- the best possible basis on which to cement a post-Cold War peace.

But things seem different from the perspective of many US policymakers. How valuable to US security would it be to "... move the Berlin Wall a couple hundred kilometers eastward"? Indeed, given the hostility that such a move might provoke in Moscow, and the way Russian extremists might attempt to capitalize on this hostility, some policymakers view NATO expansion as counterproductive to US interests. But

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3 General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking on January 3, 1994 to European journalists on the question of expanding NATO membership.

4 This argument is very convenient for the Russian authorities, which have skillfully used it also in the context of Bosnia's conflict. Talking about a Zhirinovsky's violent reaction for the NATO strikes against the Serbs, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, a foreign-policy expert and deputy in the Russian Parliament complained: "Why should the Americans play in the hands of Russian extremist forces
others -- including legislators such as Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) -- believe that the time has long since come to invite Poland to join the organization.

How does the United States resolve such a policy dilemma? A considerable body of literature has emerged in political science on "bureaucratic politics:" in particular, on the role that institutional interests and bargaining relationships play in shaping policy outputs. Governments do not always behave in a "rational" way -- they are often driven by partisan political concerns, domestic problems, or other considerations divorced from foreign policy priorities. Moreover, even when foreign policy considerations play a dominant role in decisionmaking, the structure and internal procedures of the US government can affect the policymaking process. But the bureaucratic politics school has also been criticized for paying too much attention to such institutional factors. Indeed, the purpose of this thesis is not only to examine the problem of US policymaking on NATO expansion, but also to test and evaluate the explanatory power of bureaucratic politics theories in this case.

B. ORDER OF THESIS

Chapter II outlines the theories of US foreign policy formulation that will be examined in the context of the NATO expansion issue.

Chapter III offers an overview of the issue of NATO enlargement. It describes particular steps on the road of strengthening ties between the Western alliance and its former adversaries, countries which until 1991 were members of the Warsaw Pact. The like this?". See Newsweek, April 25, 1994: "Trial by Unfriendly Fire" (p.23).
chapter also discusses the significance of the Visegrad Triangle,¹ German views on the issue of NATO expansion, and the evolution of Poland's viewpoint on joining the organization.

Chapter IV examines the way in which the United States has dealt with the NATO enlargement issue. It analyzes the premises that have driven the US policy on NATO expansion, and examines how the Partnership for Peace initiative was created. Because this is the first account of P/FP creation, the author relied primarily upon interviews he himself conducted.

Chapter V discusses the conclusions of the study, and offers a prediction of how US policy toward NATO expansion is likely to evolve in the future.

¹ The regional cooperation between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary, started in 1990 to coordinate their eventual "return to Europe".
II. THEORIES OF US FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

Political scientists have long argued over the relative importance of domestic and international influences on US foreign policy. In principle, US policy on issues such as NATO expansion ought to be highly sensitive to shifts in the European security environment and other international factors. In practice, many scholars in the bureaucratic politics school emphasize the role of domestic factors in shaping US foreign policy. From this bureaucratic politics perspective, the policy making process is affected by institutional interests, ethnic lobbyists and electoral concerns, and not just by events abroad. Indeed, international events may play a distinctly secondary role:

Conventional analyses of foreign policy usually assume that the actions of other nations are the major stimuli for foreign policy decisions in the United States. We contend that they are only one source of stimulation, and not even the more frequent source. Most decisions are responses to domestic pressures, and the actions of other nations often figure merely as devices for argument.⁶

There is a general view in the United States that it is improper that domestic political considerations would influence foreign policy decisions, particularly those related to national security. Because of this, participants of policy making process frequently deny that they take domestic politics into account. However, proponents of the bureaucratic politics theory argue that "domestic political considerations and personal interests are an inescapable part of the decision process, especially at the White House

level". Moreover, domestic political considerations are especially likely to influence the decision process when large ethnic blocks of voters attempt to make their voices heard, in the White House but most especially in Congress. The existence of about 10 million US citizens of Polish descent suggests that on the issue of NATO expansion, domestic political concerns would be expected to play a highly significant role.

Many students of US foreign policy also argue that the nature of foreign policy making process helps determine the content of American foreign policy. In particular, scholars of bureaucratic politics school, such as Morton H. Halperin, argue that institutional preferences play an essential role in US foreign policy formulation. According to this argument, the position that a person occupies in the bureaucracy often helps determine the position he takes on an issue. Put most bluntly, where a person stands on an issue depends on where he sits. The reason for this behavior is that a person's perception of a problem (and of possible solutions to it) reflects institutionally-grounded preferences and perspectives. According to Halperin,

Each participant, depending on where he sits, will see a somewhat different face of an issue, because his perception of the issue will be heavily shaded by his particular concerns. What is primarily a budget issue to one participant will be an issue of relations with a foreign government to a second and of relations with Congress to a third. 

Halperin argues that organizations involved in foreign policymaking process seek to have influence in order to pursue their specific missions. From this perspective, we might expect the Department of Defense to seek influence over NATO expansion because

\textit{Ibid}, p.16.
the outcome of that issue -- in a very real sense -- will affect the ability of the Department
to provide for US and allied security. However, in taking a position on a specific issue,
organizations will also keep in mind the need to retain or expand their influence within
the policymaking process. Who are the key participants in US decisions concerning
NATO expansion? What policymaking roles do they play, and what are their bargaining
relationships?

A. PARTICIPANTS OF US FOREIGN POLICYMAKING PROCESS

There are four main actors responsible for US foreign policy formulation: the
President with the National Security Council (NSC), the State Department, the
Department of Defense, and Congress. However, the level of involvement in policy
making process differs among these respective participants and significantly depends on a
character of particular foreign policy matter.

1. The President and the NSC

The President, being the principal decision maker on important foreign policy
issues, is surrounded by the supporting staff with which he consults:

The president is, of course, constitutionally charged with conducting foreign policy,
but he does not actually make it on most issues because he does not know enough
and often does not much care. If an issue is not important enough, he leaves it to
subordinates.9

Institution, Stanford University, 1990, p.6.
The National Security Council is the main advisory body to the President in national security issues related to foreign policy. Its actual significance is determined by the President's interest in independently conducting foreign policy. If he prefers to rely on the Secretary of State (or other State Department official), the position of the NSC in US foreign policymaking process is less influential. However, even when the NSC does not take the lead on a given issue, it can still have an important effect in terms of coordinating the interagency process by which other actors (including the Departments of State and Defense) attempt to shape policy.

The role of the NSC in driving Clinton Administration policy on NATO expansion seems to be rather limited. In September 1993, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake took a public role in explaining issues concerning "democratic enlargement." Lake argued that the United States needed to enlarge the area of democracy abroad to replace the policy of "containing" communism. In this context, Lake made it clear that the Administration would resist "isolationist" temptations. However, Lake did not discuss whether NATO expansion should be an integral part of that enlargement policy. Has the NSC played a more significant role behind the scenes, perhaps through the interagency process? Does the NSC have an institutional interests in the sense understood by the bureaucratic politics school? To what extent does the larger doctrine of enlargement drive the more specific policies on NATO expansion?

2. The State Department

The Department of State has played a decisive role in the NATO expansion issue within the Clinton Administration. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, former Ambassador at Large to the countries that once formed the Soviet Union, is one of President Clinton's most trusted foreign policy advisers. Talbott has taken the lead in dealing with the interest of Poland and other former Warsaw Pact nations to join NATO, and played a key role in devising the Partnership for Peace. Talbott has been especially sensitive to the opposition of President Yeltsin to expanding NATO. Indeed, some critics have dubbed this policy the "Yeltsin-only" approach. However, important questions remain about Talbott's role and policy preferences. To what extent are his views consistent with (and perhaps driven by) the institutional interests of the State Department? Or, in contrast to bureaucratic theories of foreign policy, do such institutionally-derived preferences play a relatively small role in this case? What role did the Department of State play in the creation of the Partnership for Peace? And finally, what does that role suggest for the prospects for NATO expansion in the future?

3. The Department of Defense

The Defense Department is responsible for more than operating and maintaining US military forces; it also can contribute to the formulation of US foreign policy, especially in issues concerning security organizations such as NATO. Depending on the preferences of the President, the Secretary of Defense may play a leading role in foreign

policy formulation as it involves security issues. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and, on occasion, the armed services themselves) may also contribute to US decisionmaking on NATO and other organizations. According to Halperin,

Law and custom dictate that the Cabinet officers involved in foreign policy issues will almost always include both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense... [...] The Joint Chiefs of Staff are consulted particularly on military budget issues and matters concerning the possible use of force.12

The Department of Defense has special interests at stake in the issue of NATO expansion. Some analysts argue that because of the practical problems involved in incorporating former Warsaw Pact nations into NATO, including the issues of equipment compatibility, command and control integration, and related difficulties, the Pentagon should be expected to have institutional reluctance to expand the alliance.13 But with the continued political turmoil in the former Soviet Union, how has the Department's view evolved of the relative costs and benefits of NATO expansion? Moreover, within the Pentagon, significant differences of opinion often emerge between the Joint Chiefs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other decisionmaking participants. How have these disagreements played out in terms of NATO expansion?

4. Congress

Under the US Constitution, Congress has some powerful forces of leverage over foreign policy. Although the President has some unique authorities, including the power

11 See, for instance, Time, November 15, 1993: "Should NATO Move East?" by Bruce W. Nelan.
to negotiate treaties, Congress retains an array of formal and informal powers that can make it an important player on issues such as NATO expansion. According to Halperin,

Some congressmen and senators are senior participants in the sense that they are routinely contacted by the President for advice and support. These legislators are most often chairmen of high-ranking members of the congressional committees with direct responsibility for national security affairs (e.g. Armed Forces, Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Atomic Energy), and they have discretionary power over the federal budget.\(^\text{14}\)

The latter power -- that of the purse-- is the most potent source of Congressional influence over foreign affairs. However, Congress can also influence policy in other ways, by generating *anticipated reactions* in the executive branch; through *procedural innovations* (i.e., legislative changes in the way foreign policy is made and executed); and by *framing opinion*, i.e. changing the climate of opinion surrounding the foreign policy decision.\(^\text{15}\)

However, while Congress has great potential power over issues such as NATO expansion, the question remains as to whether Congress will decide to use that power. Why would members of Congress care enough about this issue to spend time on it? One possibility is that in congressional districts with large numbers of voters of Polish ancestry, legislators might seek to gain votes by pressing to invite Poland to join NATO. Hughes and other political scientists emphasize the role that such re-election oriented concerns can play in motivating congressional behavior on foreign policy, and that

\(^{14}\) Ibid, p.19.

Congress is more susceptible to ethnic pressure groups than the executive branch. But how significant a role has Congress actually played in NATO expansion? To what extent have voters of Polish descent been able to pressure legislators into pushing for NATO to include Poland?

B. CREATING A DECISION

One of the key features of the American policymaking process is that no single actor can dictate policy on most issues; power and authority is widely shared, and numerous organizations have the opportunity to claim a decisionmaking role. Hence, organizations must bargain with each other in order to "cut a deal" that most closely corresponds to their own preferences.

[...] perhaps the most active game in Washington is seeking to determine who has influence with the President on what issues.

Since the President has the most dominant voice on foreign policy issues, the main challenge for participants of policymaking process is to get an issue to the President and to convince him to decide in one's favor. Although the majority of issues is recommended to the President by the National Security Council staff, there are few personalities within the Administration who have the direct access to the President. Indeed, a personal relationship with the President is the single most important determinant of the influence.

Some observers of the American foreign policy arena argue that President Clinton has been ambiguous on the NATO question, partly because Poland still insists on joining and has a potential political lobby in the United States. See The Washington Post, November 18, 1993: "Ghost of Yalta" by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak.

of any senior official. In reality, such personalities often play a decisive role in US foreign policy formulation:

Presidents typically confront an issue on a very general and theoretical level without much discussion of the details of the best way to implement a decision. When he has not spent time on details and has not looked into the possible problems buried in one kind of decision or another, the President prefers to express only a general desire to move in a particular direction and leave it to a battle among his subordinates to fill out the details.18 (Emphasis added)

Moreover, the power of the President's principal advisers is derived from the fact that these personalities, unlike members of Congress, do not have to take their prospects for reelection into account in arriving at a stand. Such privileged position ensures them a considerable independence in dealing even with controversial foreign policy issues. However, the nature of the bargaining process on NATO expansion offers an interesting case study in executive decisionmaking. In particular, how did the battle between Clinton subordinates result in the Partnership for Peace?

A second bureaucratic politics issue exists on topics such as NATO expansion: the need to innovate. In contrast to the Cold War era, where decisions could often be guided by an underlying agreement on the need to contain communism, bureaucracies in the post-Cold War era face the need to develop new policies with few clear-cut underpinnings. This runs counter to the nature of bureaucracies. According to proponents of the bureaucratic politics theory, the most characteristic feature of bureaucratic system is its attachment to "eternal" procedures:

18 Ibid, p.236.
The bureaucratic system is basically inert; it moves only when pushed hard and persistently. The majority of bureaucrats prefer to maintain the status quo, and only small group is, at any one time, advocating change.¹⁹

However, bureaucratic politics theory suggests some premises that can potentially lead participants of policy making process to seek a new strategy:

- Dramatic changes in the actions of other nations;
- Changes in technology (emergence of a new technology);
- Changes in the shared images of the society or bureaucracy;

(Since the society is apparently more susceptible to changes in shared opinion, these changes can drive the bureaucracy to adjust its hitherto policy to new requirements. However, sometimes the changing domestic mood can serve to consolidate conservative bureaucratic stands on particular foreign policy issues.)

- Routine events;

(A number of routine events require the American government, or in some cases the President personally, to state in public or to foreign governments a definite position on a particular issue. Such routine events provide at least an opportunity for participants to get an issue to the President and to press for a new decision.²⁰)

How did the issue of NATO expansion get onto the front burner? According to a senior Administration official, the State Department became seriously interested in NATO enlargement issue only in the initial phase of its "bureaucratic cycle" preparing NATO summit. However, the way different organizations responded to the need for policy change is a key subject of this thesis.

¹⁹ **Ibid,** p.99.
²⁰ **Ibid,** p.103.
III. EXPANDING NATO: A KEY POLICY DILEMMA

A. IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE

Immediately after fundamental democratic transformations began in East-Central Europe,\textsuperscript{21} the countries of that region started to seek expanded relations with the West. Initially, their main goal was closer cooperation with the European Community (EC). Then, driven by their national security concerns, East-Central European countries began to flirt with NATO. This interest in NATO was driven by the perception that a security vacuum existed in the region: after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, East-Central Europe became a kind of "no-man's land". Considering this potentially dangerous situation, East-Central European countries sought to reorient their foreign policies toward the Western alliance. After the two-stage demise of the Warsaw Pact in spring 1991 (military structure) and summer 1991 (political structure), joining NATO became a key issue for the majority of countries in the region. They have since tried to win not only declarative but also real security guarantees from the Western alliance.

NATO, however, has been reluctant to provide any concrete security guarantees. NATO's standpoint has been summarized by Lord Carrington, NATO's former Secretary General:

\textsuperscript{21} The notion "East-Central Europe" is being used as a kind of compromise between two options: "Eastern Europe", prevailing in Western bibliography, and "Central Europe", generally preferred by countries of the region. The succession (first East, then Central) results from my personal conviction that a geographical location is, in this particular case, a secondary factor in comparison with a historical legacy of the respective countries.
First, this would lead to considerable disquiet by the Russians... Second, a number of existing NATO members would not be very happy to guarantee the so-called integrity of Poland and some of the other countries.22 (Emphasis added)

This chapter gives an historical overview of the issue of NATO enlargement up till the announcement of the United States Partnership for Peace initiative. It describes the steps on the road of gradual strengthening relations between East-Central European countries and NATO. It also discusses the main role played in this process by the Visegrad Triangle's countries; other countries of the region, such as Bulgaria and Romania, have always been prudently behind Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

The chapter presents also an evolution of the Polish standpoint on NATO enlargement.

B. INITIAL CONTACTS

The first political contact between NATO and East-Central European countries took place in 1988, when a delegation of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), the consultative parliamentary body of the alliance, visited Hungary. Next year in May, a similar delegation paid a visit to Poland. These two visits bore fruit in October 1989, when the NAA subcommittee on Eastern Europe organized a meeting between the assembly and legislators from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. By December 1989, the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels symbolically marked the end of the Cold War.

Profiting from that favorable political climate, East-Central European countries became more active in their efforts to expand relations with Western Europe. Initially,

Hungary took the lead in this process. As the first from the Warsaw Pact countries, Hungary raised the question of neutrality and emphasized a need for the reform of the Pact. The proposed reform was aimed at changing the nature of the Warsaw Pact, from the military to the political aspects.

At the beginning of 1990, Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn officially mentioned a possibility for his country to seek NATO membership. In June 1990, during a meeting held in Copenhagen with US Secretary of State James Baker and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced that the Warsaw Pact would soon propose a new relationship between the two alliances.\(^\text{23}\)

One month later, NATO responded favorably to the Soviet initiative. In the declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5-6 July 1990, the Western alliance offered a twenty-three-point peace package to the Warsaw Pact countries. The fourth paragraph of that declaration described a new NATO policy toward its adversaries:

We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.\(^\text{24}\) (Emphasis added)


\(^{24}\) "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance", NATO Review, No.4 (August) 1990, p.32.
Representatives of the six members of the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet Union, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) were invited not only to visit the Brussels headquarters, but also to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO.

Despite a distrustful reaction of the top Soviet military leadership, the three East-Central European countries, encouraged by Shevardnadze, soon took advantage of the opportunity. In July 1990, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall came to NATO headquarters, and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner visited Czecho-Slovakia and Poland (September), and then paid a revisit to Hungary (November).

The next significant step on the road to strengthening relations between the former adversaries was the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which took place in Paris, on 19-21 November 1990. At the beginning of the summit, leaders of the seventeen NATO and the five Warsaw Pact states (without Romania) signed a joint declaration that finally confirmed a qualitatively new character of relations between the two alliances:

The signatories solemnly declare that, in the new era of European relations which is beginning, they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship. (Emphasis added)

Another fundamental result of the summit was the conclusion by all thirty four CSCE countries of a Charter of Paris for a New Europe (known also as the Charter for a United Europe), described as "a landmark in European history, giving a new impetus to the spread of democracy, freedom and unity across the continent".

16 "North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique", ibid, p. 22.
C. THE DEMISE OF THE WARSAW PACT

During the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee on 6 June 1990, Hungarian Prime minister Jozsef Antall announced his country's intention to withdraw from the military structure of the alliance by the end of 1991. He also suggested that the obsolete security system should be replaced by negotiated bilateral security treaties with pact members as well as other European countries. Indeed, the remoteness of military conflict in Europe and the breakup of old ideological divisions made membership in the Warsaw Pact a formality.

A few months earlier, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary signed (in February and March 1990, respectively) bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union, concerning a withdrawal of all Soviet troops from these countries by the end of June 1991. Poland, because of its critical importance to the Soviet position in East-Central Europe (especially in the context of German reunification) could not move so rapidly. Poland began to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory only by the end of 1991, just after a border treaty with Germany had been signed.

Initially, Western countries resisted the idea of quick dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. They feared it would cause a potentially dangerous imbalance of a previously stable regional system. Instead, the West advocated the reform of the Eastern alliance, rather than its dissolution. However, because Poland, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia demanded the Warsaw Pact's termination, the destruction of that alliance was inevitable.
The final decision was taken on 25 February 1991 in Budapest, during a meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The six remaining members (of the original eight) agreed to dissolve the Pact's military structure on 1 April. The symbolic signing on 1 July of the protocol on the dissolution in Prague--the city that was stricken in 1968 by the hand of the Warsaw Pact--cut the last of the political ties among countries in the Soviet postwar orbit. By the end of June 1991, the Soviet-led trade bloc, COMECON, also stopped functioning.

D. THE VISEGRAD TRIANGLE

The triangular cooperation between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary has played a significant role in their efforts to broaden relations with West European organizations. The first mention of the possibility of creating such a regional group was made by Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in September 1989, when he announced Poland's interest in expanding and strengthening ties with Prague and Budapest. There have been two main premises that justified the idea of trilateral cooperation: common interests and common realities. The three East-Central European countries, being at a similar level of development, have also faced similar problems. They have pursued the same objectives: membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO. An additional factor favorable to cooperation has been a sense of sympathy and shared values and goals among Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian democratic opposition figures (e.g Walesa, Havel, Antall, respectively), who assumed power after 1988.
The first practical step to strengthen relations among the three countries was a "summit" held in March 1990 in Bratislava, at the initiative of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel. During this inaugural trilateral consultation, the sides agreed to coordinate their moves to dismantle both the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). In order to ease the rising Soviet mistrust of this cooperative initiative, the participants of the Bratislava meeting argued that the dismantled Warsaw Pact would not be replaced by a new military bloc of the three states. Military ties between the respective countries were to rely mainly on separate bilateral agreements.

Such defence agreements were signed in January 1991 by Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, and then by Poland with Czecho-Slovakia (February 1991) and with Hungary (March 1991). These agreements stemmed from the meeting of deputy defence ministers from the three countries held in September 1990 in Zakopane, Poland. The main purpose of the agreements was to help restructure the respective armed forces in such areas as information, organization and training, military exercises, and cooperation between arms industries.27

On 15 February 1991, the Presidents of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia and the Prime Minister of Hungary met in Visegrad, not far from Budapest. The selected place of meeting was symbolic -- in 1335 the kings of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary met in Visegrad to discuss cooperation among their kingdoms. Indeed, the summit meeting of

1991 can be considered as an attempt of "renaissance of ancient, long-forgotten political ties at the roots of which are the real geographical and historical properties and the specifics of various regions in Europe". According to the intentions of the Visegrad meeting's participants, the "triangle" was supposed to facilitate a more direct association of their respective countries with Western Europe. The initial and positive measures pursued under its auspices included:

- Consultations on matters pertaining to access to the European Community;
- Consultations on the subject of relations with NATO;
- Elaboration of an agreed and negative stand in respect of Soviet demands to incorporate the above mentioned "anti-alliance clause" in bilateral treaties.

The states of the Visegrad Triangle emphasized its exclusively consultative character, a kind of "loose political club".

The main concern of the second Visegrad Triangle summit, which took place in Cracow on 6 October 1991, was the security situation in East-Central Europe. The three states' leaders, concerned by the recent attempt of military coup in Moscow (August 1991), issued a joint declaration expressing their intention to establish close and institutionalized cooperation with NATO. The response from the Western alliance was quick and favorable. Only 10 weeks later, on 20 December 1991, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for consultations with

\[29\] Ibid, p.11.
\[30\] The idea of "institutionalized cooperation" with the Atlantic Alliance by means of an international agreement was suggested by US Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the US-German proposal of 2 October 1991.
governments from East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union, including also the three newly independent Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Throughout 1992, regular military consultations and meetings of defence ministers as well as military chiefs of staff of the Visegrad Triangle were held. The aggregation of these three nations involved a significant military force. At the beginning of 1993, just after the split of Czecho-Slovakia, the four armed forces constituted quantitatively (manpower) in comparison approximately 40 percent of Russia's and 20 percent of NATO's conventional forces.31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>2,667,000</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>4,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,298,000</td>
<td>8,767</td>
<td>4,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>273,000</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>1,331</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
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The split of Czecho-Slovakia can be considered as "the beginning of the end" of the Visegrad Triangle. Throughout 1993, the Czech Republic seemed to gradually lose its interest in closer military relations with its former partners from the Warsaw Pact. Czech leaders began to emphasize that each of the Visegrad countries should separately seek possible membership in NATO.

31 See The Economist, 25 December 1993 - 7 January 1994: "The world sends NATO back to the drawing board".
E. STRENGTHENING TIES WITH NATO

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact gave a new impetus for East-Central European countries to expand their relations with NATO. The first example was President Vaclav Havel's visit to NATO headquarters on 21 March 1991, which coincided with the end of the Warsaw Pact's military structure. In his address to the NATO Council, President Havel presented the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic viewpoint on future membership in the Western alliance:

We realize that, for a number of different reasons, our country cannot become a regular member of the NATO for the time being. At the same time, however, we believe that an alliance of countries united by the ideals of freedom and democracy should not be forever closed to neighbouring countries that are pursuing the same goals.\(^2\)

Just after the final self-liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, on 3 July 1991, President Lech Walesa of Poland became the second East-Central European state leader to visit Brussels headquarters. He also emphasized his country's vital interest in a closer cooperation with NATO, but used the notion of "partnership": "What we want is a partnership with the Alliance and we assume that working together will be further continued and developed".\(^3\)

The NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner responded to the above pleas politely but did not agree to them. NATO, engaged in the Gulf War and trying not to


\(^3\) "President Walesa visits NATO headquarters", NATO Review, No.4 (August) 1991, p.34. On Walesa's visit see also Rzeczpospolita, 4 July 1991.

25
antagonize the Soviet Union, was reluctant to clearly declare its position. In the meantime, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen on 6-7 June 1991, issued a statement called the "Partnership With the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe". In this document, NAC furthered the process of strengthening ties with its former adversaries by agreeing to use NATO to intensify military contacts with the East.

The abortive August 1991 military coup in Moscow prompted the United States and Germany to urge their allies to take off the peculiar "anathema" placed heavily, so far, on NATO's possible involvement in East-Central Europe.\footnote{See Washington Post, 4 October 1991, "NATO Seeks New Identity in Europe" by William Drozdiak.} This idea was accepted during the NATO Rome Summit on 7-8 November 1991. According to the Secretary General Woerner: "One of the principal achievements of the Rome Summit was to raise the liaison relationship to a new qualitative level in recognition of the democratic progress made by the nations of Central and Eastern Europe".\footnote{Manfred Woerner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit", NATO Review, No.6 (December) 1991, pp.4/5.} This aim was to be reached by the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (December). NATO foreign and defence ministers decided to meet twice a year with their counterparts from East European countries and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

By the end of the same year, Russian President Boris Yeltsin told a newly established North Atlantic Cooperation Council that Russia might consider requesting
membership in NATO. Yeltsin regarded Russia's possible membership in the Western alliance as a "long-term political aim" designed to help create an international security system stretching around the world "from Vancouver to Vladivostok."

It is not a question of five or six years but significantly more when there are no nuclear weapons. By that time, the weapons will have been destroyed, and integration will have been completed not just in Europe but beyond its borders.

1992 brought a gradual shift from dialogue to the creation of more concrete political and military cooperation between NATO and its "consultative partners" from East-Central Europe. During the Warsaw conference held in March, Secretary General Woerner and Norwegian General Vigleik Eide, the head of NATO's Military Command, met with representatives of the Visegrad Triangle countries. Both sides emphasized a dynamic character of bilateral relations and discussed their further development, especially in the aspect of military exchanges. NATO declared to expand its assistance in training officers from East European countries in Western military academies and schools (a process that had already been started in 1990). However, the question of an eventual NATO membership for the three Visegrad countries was not addressed.

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18 Ibid.
F. TIME OF EXPECTATION

Throughout the rest of 1992, in the face of intensifying armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the question of NATO enlargement became a secondary issue for most NATO powers. However, the interest of former Warsaw Pact members in joining NATO persisted. In December 1992, Albanian President Sali Berisha unexpectedly made the first formal request by an East European leader for membership in NATO. His request, submitted during visit to Brussels headquarters, was politely turned down.30

Other former Warsaw Pact members stepped up their efforts to secure NATO membership in the beginning of 1993. The West, however, remained reluctant to revise its basic policy of expanding neither formal security guarantees nor a membership of its alliance. On 29 March 1993 in Brussels, defence ministers and representatives from East European countries met with their NATO's counterparts to "review the progress made in dialogue, co-operation and partnership in defence-related matters".40

However, a decisive chain of events began in August 1993. During his first visit to Poland, Russian President Boris Yeltsin seemed to approve Polish attempts to join the Western alliance. The Russian-Polish joint declaration signed at the end of the visit stated:

The presidents touched on the matter of Poland's intention to join NATO. President L. Walesa set forth Poland's well-known position on this issue, which met with understanding from President B. N. Yeltsin. In the long term, such a decision taken by a sovereign Poland in the interests of overall European integration does not go


"Statement issued at the meeting of Defence Ministers at NATO headquarters, Brussels, 29 March 1993", NATO Review, No.2 (April) 1993, p.34.
against the interest of other states, including the interest of Russia.41 (Emphasis added)

Only one month later, just before he dissolved Parliament, President Yeltsin made a U-turn on his policies toward East-Central Europe. Reportedly under pressure from his armed forces, Russian President sent a letter to the leaders of the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom opposing any expansion of NATO to include East-Central European countries. He emphasized that such a move would be considered in Moscow as a threat to Russia's security concerns.42 The tone of the letter was not threatening, but Yeltsin argued that any expansion of NATO that did not include Russia would undermine European security.43 Warning against a possible unfavorable reaction of the Russian public opinion for an eventual NATO eastward expansion, he stated:

[And generally,] we favor a situation where the relations between our country and NATO would be by several degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe. NATO-Russia rapprochement, including through their interaction in the peace-making area, should proceed on a faster track. The East Europeans, too, could be involved in this process.44

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has made it clear that Moscow opposes NATO membership for East-Central European countries. He also announced that

"East-Central Europe has never ceased to be an area of interest for Russia".45

41 ITAR-TASS, 25 August 1993. On Yeltsin's visit to Poland see also The New York Times, 26 August 1993: "Yeltsin 'Understands' Polish Bid for a Role in NATO" by Jane Perlez.
42 See The Guardian, 21 October 1993: "Back in the arms of Boris" by Ion Traynor.
44 Copy of the letter received during interview in the Pentagon.
G. THE POLISH RATIONALE

Initially, the Polish approach to the issue of eventual NATO membership was, in contrast to Hungarian initiatives, more cautious. On 19 February 1991, one year after the Hungarian Foreign Minister's suggestion of possible future NATO membership,⁴⁶ the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw issued a statement announcing that Poland had no intention of joining NATO. Yet, merely one week later the Polish Senate Foreign Affairs Committee stated that Poland should seek to expand its links with the Western alliance.

Four months later, during his visit to Brussels headquarters, President Walesa confirmed Poland's intention to expand its relations with NATO.⁴⁷ In the face of rising fears of provoking Moscow, he clearly addressed the Polish view concerning its Eastern neighbor:

In our policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union we emphasize elements that link us together. We are working hard to have genuine friends on our Eastern border. I am convinced that it is in our general interest. We are not interested in the isolation of the Soviet Union. Just the reverse. We are virtually interested in its becoming an integral part of the New Europe. Without USSR participation it is impossible to have a lasting solution to the issue of peace and security on our continent.⁴⁸ (Emphasis added)

This emphasis on trying not to antagonize the Soviet Union (and then Russia) has been characteristic of the Polish policy toward a possible NATO membership. In his interview for The Observer in August 1992, the then Polish Defence Minister Janusz

⁴⁶ See p.18.
⁴⁷ See p.25.
⁴⁸ "President Walesa visits NATO headquarters", NATO Review, No.4 (August) 1991, p.35.
Onyszkievicz emphasized that Poland was not seriously threatened and should not provoke Russia and Ukraine by feverish seeking NATO membership:

These loud appeals for us to join NATO are foolish, amateurish and counterproductive. NATO has made it quite clear that it is not even considering extending its membership. There are good reasons for this and they should be enough for us. It is stupid and below a certain level of dignity to kick at a door that is firmly closed.49

Talking about increasing NATO's commitments which would eventually lead to the integration of East-Central European countries with the Western alliance, the then Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka also emphasized that: "Good relations with all surrounding countries are among the top priorities of Polish foreign policy".50

In spite of different speculation following the electoral victory of left-wing parties in September 1993, the present government respects the chairman of the victorious Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (and now also Vice-Premier) Aleksander Kwasniewski's pre-electoral programmatic declaration stating the immutable character of the Polish policy toward a possible membership in NATO: "We would continue the present government's drive for membership of NATO and the European Community -- 'A question of to be or not to be for Poland'.51

After Yeltsin's U-turn on his policy toward NATO enlargement,52 the Polish side adjusted its argumentation on the possible membership in the Western Pact. A good

49 Nicholas Bethell, "Much ado about plots", The Observer, 16 August 1992.
50 Hanna Suchocka (Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland), "Poland's European perspective", NATO Review, No. 3 (June) 1993, p. 4.
51 The Observer, 15 September 1993.
52 See p. 29.
example of such "modified rationale" can be the former Defense Minister Janusz
Onyszkiewicz's explanation of the East-Central European countries' primary motivation
to join NATO:

It's not to defend against a Russian attack. We see that as a virtual impossibility. The key reason we want to be in NATO is to secure our own democracies. We need to keep down in our countries the very same kind of nationalists Yeltsin's contending with, the same kind that have destroyed Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{53} (Emphasis added)

Indeed, although Poland has been the only post-communist country without internal
disturbances (mainly ethnic), an eventual membership in NATO would obviously strengthen the elites who support democracy and capitalism.

The above argument is one of the two main premises of the Polish quest for NATO membership. The second premise is a fear of re-born Russian nationalism and its possible consequences: "[The West] ... is not optimistic about Russia, and is playing into Russia's hands ... not seeing the signals of imperial thinking",\textsuperscript{54} said the Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski. During his visit to Washington in December 1993, Minister Olechowski tried to seek not for a specific date of Poland's membership in NATO, but rather for a "concrete perspective". He asked: "I need a road map -- that the end of road is NATO."\textsuperscript{55} The answer was -- the Partnership for Peace. Talking about the Poland's reaction to this controversial American initiative (some critics dubbed it the "eternal holding room"), Olechowski stated in Washington in January 1994:

\textsuperscript{54} See \textit{The New York Times}, 12 December 1993: "NATO Commitment Sought by Poland" by Jane Perlez.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}
The Polish government has recently accepted the basic tenets of the US-sponsored and NATO-proposed Partnership for Peace. PjP quite clearly increases our security. It confirms the US commitment to Europe which, in our view, is a *sine qua non* of the continent's security and stability. It opens the Alliance to the East and thus makes our hopes to join the Western security structures more achievable.\(^6\)

H. THE GERMAN STANDPOINT

Two Western countries are especially important for Poland: the United States, as the leader of the Western world, and the Federal Republic of Germany, as the dominant state in Western Europe and one with special interests in Poland. Because Germany borders on Poland and the Czech Republic, is obviously interested in expanding and strengthening its relations with the countries of East-Central Europe. The relations with Poland, mainly because of Poland's geo-strategic position but also because of the common tragic past, play a particular role in this process.

The main German concern is to maintain a stability and security in its neighboring countries. Following the symptomatic Konrad Adenauer's statement: "Only the awareness that the freedom of the Europe cannot be divided will give the vision of Europe the necessary impetus", Germany tries to prevent a potentially dangerous security vacuum in East-Central Europe. Because of this, the German standpoint on the issue of NATO enlargement has been the most favorable among Western countries. German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe, in particular, has always played a supportive role in the Visegrad countries' attempts to join NATO:

\(^6\) Text of the address received from the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington, D.C., p. 1.
I cannot see one good reason for denying future members of the European Union membership in NATO. The Atlantic Alliance must not become a "closed shop". [...] Our aim must be to fill the security policy vacuum to the East of NATO and to enhance stability throughout the region.  

Although, by the time of the announcement of the Partnership for Peace, Bonn officials dutifully became more cautious, Germany remains the main ally for the East-Central European countries seeking for NATO membership. Commenting on this American initiative, Mr. Ruhe explained the German rationale: "If we do not export stability, we will import instability".  

57 Volker Ruhe, "Europe and the Alliance: key factors for peace and stability", NATO Review, No.3 (June) 1993, p.15.  
IV. THE POLITICS OF US POLICYMAKING

A. US ROLE IN THE POST-COLD WAR NATO

Despite the end of Cold War, NATO has remained a key issue for the United States, in the context of their relations with Europe. The Atlantic Alliance still provides the most direct channel to inject US interests into European policymaking:

Despite the waning of the cold war, the United States has major political and economic interests in Europe. The US role in NATO gives us significant indirect leverage in addressing such issues as the Persian Gulf crisis and trade disputes. Without a military presence, we would have no voice in Europe."9

Indeed, the Bush Administration as well as the Clinton Administration have emphasized a broad US consensus that the United States must remain a European power. In this context, an "informal" leadership in NATO remains a vital US interest.

In 1991, the United States opposed the French desire to gradually diminish NATO's role in the defense of Europe. Declaring the US "full support" for the concept of European integration, former Secretary of State James A. Baker emphasized:

It is clear to us that one of our key goals must be to insure that NATO remains the principle venue for our consultations and the forum for agreement on all policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members.50

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The present Administration has also declared its deep concern in European security and NATO, which plays the most significant role with this respect. On the eve of the NATO summit in January this year, in his address about American foreign policy, President Clinton told a group of young people in Brussels:

The core of our security remains with Europe. That is why America's commitment to Europe's safety and stability remains as strong as ever. That is why I urged NATO to convene this week's summit. It is why I am committed to keeping roughly 100,000 American troops stationed in Europe, consistent with the expressed desires of our allies here. It is not habit, but security and partnership that justifies this continuing commitment by the United States. [...] Only NATO has the military forces, the integrated command, the broad legitimacy and the habits of cooperation that are essential to draw in new participants and respond to new challenges. (Emphasis added)

B. THE EVOLUTION OF US VIEWPOINT ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

Although at the very beginning United States policy toward NATO enlargement was rather skeptical [Ref. 4], some American officials have perceived the significance of NATO's possible role in strengthening stability and security in Eastern Europe. The US Ambassador to NATO, William H. Taft stated in July 1991 that:

[NATO is a security anchor in Western Europe] so that Eastern Europe can develop its potential with the least threat of instability disorder and intimidation. NATO cannot guarantee Eastern European stability, but its absence would be destabilizing in the extreme.

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The abortive August 1991 military coup in Moscow appeared to be a turning-point that prompted the United States to consider a possibility of eventual security guarantees for East European countries. Such future guarantees were to be granted through the medium of NATO:

In the longer term, NATO should develop formal security links with Eastern European democracies. Our goal should be their full integration into NATO. We will never build a common transatlantic home if NATO forces Eastern Europeans to live outside its protective wall. (Emphasis added)

The Bush Administration, generally favorable to a future NATO expansion to East-Central Europe, considered two elements: first, when East-Central Europeans would be ready for membership, second, what effect on Russia it would have [Ref.7]. This peculiar "Russian syndrome" has always played a significant role in the context of an eventual NATO enlargement. However, for the Pentagon such an aspect has been less important than for other US institutions responsible for national security [Ref.14]:

Having defended its cold war borders so successfully, NATO needs to look East and extend Europe's security environment in response to the shift of political gravity on the continent. It is now logical for NATO to strengthen stability and security beyond its borders, to those states which are rapidly expanding relations with NATO allies in the political and economic arenas. By bringing in the East, NATO offers the opportunity for a broader European security, and serves as a catalyst for fostering democratic values across the continent. This is the best possible protection of the peace we have won. (Emphasis added)

By the end of 1992, former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that the Visegrad countries should eventually become NATO members, and the US officials told the then visiting Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz that Washington supported Poland's bid to join NATO.\(^6\) When asked about the current US policy toward a possible NATO enlargement, the senior Pentagon official of the previous Administration said: "I would be more forthcoming" [Ref.7].

The presidential election of 1992 postponed a debate on the question of NATO enlargement for the next few months.

C. THE MUTABLE CHARACTER OF CURRENT US FOREIGN POLICY

Countries that have been seeking for NATO membership and have tried to gain the United States support in this respect find the current Washington political environment difficult. After the end of Cold War, US foreign policy has been in the time of transition, "much more so than foreign policies of other Western countries" a senior Administration official said.\(^6\) After the fall of communism, President Bush introduced the notion of "New World Order" but did not have enough time to precisely define it. The new President won the election based on his ambitious domestic agenda, which has focused on economic as well as social problems. In the election of 1992, foreign policy was not a controversial issue. However, according to interviews with a senior Administration


\(^{6}\) He also added: "We don't have fixed views, our institutions are trying to adjust their roles to new challenges".
official, the White House has generally focused on domestic affairs but "almost out of necessity" has payed increasing attention to foreign policy issues (particularly Russia, NAFTA, GATT, and Japan).

From the very beginning, the Clinton Administration has been preoccupied with domestic issues, according to its motto: "We recognize that only an America that is strong at home can act as an effective partner abroad". With regard to foreign policy, President Clinton has identified three pillars upon which US "total diplomacy" must rest:

First, elevating global economic growth as a primary foreign policy goal; Second, updating [our] forces and security arrangements to meet new threats, and; Third, organizing [our] foreign policy to help promote the spread of democracy and free markets abroad.

Indeed, the economic factor seems to be the most essential aspect of current American foreign policy. Such a tendency, according to the senior Administration official, is well illustrated by the character of the United States assistance for Russia. "While the Bush Administration supported Gorbachev for stability and used the notion of security architecture," he said, "the Clinton Administration supports Yeltsin to expand reforms, and shows less attachment to the old structure, having no idea how a new structure should look like". However, the both Administrations have emphasized that for

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68 Ibid, The notion of "total diplomacy" as a diplomacy that views domestic and foreign issues as inseparable, was introduced by Dean Acheson (Secretary of State, 1949-52).
69 Ibid.
Europe, unlike for Asia, the model of reforms should include two factors: democracy and free market reforms.

In his first address to the North Atlantic Council in February 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher emphasized the significance of economic factor for US foreign policy:

The states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, need our help. These countries are trying to develop into free market democracies. Assisting them is not charity; it is essential to our common security.\(^7\) (Emphasis added)

How does this economic emphasis affect US policy on NATO expansion? A senior Pentagon official, talking about US rationale toward NATO enlargement, said "economy is the main factor".\(^8\) But a second issue is also critical: that of the negative response of Russia to NATO expansion, and the emphasis by some (but not all) US policymakers on the need to avoid antagonizing Yeltsin and his rivals. When asked about the "Russian syndrome", the same official replied: "It's not a driver, but it's very important factor." It is understandable that a powerful and politically unstable Russia has remained the major challenge for the United States. In a recent article, suggestively entitled *Don't Threaten Us*, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote:

\[\ldots\] pragmatic politicians in Russia and the West have proceeded on two premises. First, Russia is destined to be a great power, not a junior one. Under Communist or nationalist regimes, it would be an aggressive and threatening power, while under democratic rule it would be peaceful and prosperous. But in either case it would be a great power. Second, partnerships like ours cannot negate a firm, even aggressive, policy of defending one's own national interests. Although this may

\(^7\) *Ibid*, p.120.
\(^8\) He commented: "It would be better for Poland to become, first of all, a member of European Union", but he added "it's also more difficult".
result in occasional disputes, the context must remain one of compromise rather than confrontation. How naive to expect powers as great as Russia and the US always to be in harmony.\textsuperscript{72} (Emphasis added)

Moreover, Russia still remains the only power capable of destroying America by a nuclear strike. This potential threat is essential, especially from the military point of view: "Bosnia and Iraq may be important, but the real security [of the Atlantic Alliance] will be determined by what happens in Russia."\textsuperscript{73}

The Administration's Russia strategists, headed by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, have been preoccupied with the need to promote progress toward a democratic, economically revitalized Russia.\textsuperscript{74} In this context, the US-sponsored and NATO-proposed Partnership for Peace initiative is considered by its critics as a recipe to keep the Russians happy and the East Europeans hoping.

D. CREATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

1. Latent "Isolationist" Temptation?

The Clinton Administration has perceived a need for adjusting US forces and security arrangements to the new, post-Cold War reality. Talking about a new role for NATO, Secretary Christopher declared:

\textsuperscript{73} Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, the then NATO's Supreme Commander and Chief of US Forces in Europe: "NATO Commander Says GIs Feel Strain of Drawdown" by William Drozdiak, \textit{The Washington Post}, March 28, 1993.
\textsuperscript{74} In East-Central European countries that have a long and complicated history of their relations with neighboring Russia, there is an opinion that experts at Russia can generally be divided into two categories: First, experts at Russia's literature, and second, experts at Russia's history. While the first group tends to look at Russian affairs from the perspective of great Russia's culture, the second group simply analyzes lessons from Russia's past (even very recent, though).
We must also continue our efforts to develop cooperative security arrangements with the nations of the former Warsaw Pact. By enhancing their security, we reinforce our own. There can be no better way to establish a new and secure Europe than to have soldiers from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and the other new democracies work with NATO to address their most pressing security problems. (Emphasis added)

As the senior Administration official observed, there is "sympathy for a concept of new European security system" within US Government. With regard to NATO enlargement, however, a conflict has still existed between a will to help (particularly the Visegrad countries) and a fear of undesirable effect in two aspects: practical (pragmatic) as well as Russian [Ref.14].

Another negative factor has been a belief that Congress would not approve a new foreign security commitment (i.e. security guarantees for eventual new NATO members). Indeed, "a lot of law-makers are reluctant to deal with [the issue of NATO enlargement], because they are afraid of public opinion" [Ref.10]. Not only State Department, but also some NATO members (e.g. Great Britain) tend to hide behind the US Congress unwillingness [Ref.14]. However, support for NATO expansion has emerged from the growing belief that the NATO-established North Atlantic Cooperation Council (December 1991), a forum for consultations with East European countries (a consultative process without structure and staff), has not proved to be satisfactory. Simon Lunn, 76

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75 Warren Christopher, Secretary of State: "NATO and US Foreign Policy", US Department of State Dispatch, Vol.4, No.9, March 1, 1993, p.120.
76 Opponents of NATO expansion to East-Central European countries, have been raising two negative possible results of an eventual admission: 1. expanding number of NATO members would make even more difficult to reach consensus ("consensus building is a fundamental part of NATO" [Ref.15])-- not to create a second CSCE (the strongest proponents of this factor are Brits); 2. "Russian syndrome" -- not giving arguments for Russian nationalists.
deputy secretary general of the North Atlantic Assembly, NATO's link with legislators of member states, observed:

[The NACC] is too broad, too diluted to meet the concerns of Eastern states that want to escape from Russia's shadow. They still feel they have been left on the outside, and they want to become full members of the club.77

2. Creative Role of the Pentagon

During a first few months of 1993, the issue of NATO enlargement remained in a deadlock. However, the Pentagon, which realized that US government was not willing to expand NATO in the near future, began to consider an alternative solution. The main creativity came from the Bureau of Regional Security Affairs headed by Charles Freeman, Assistant Secretary of Defense. His proposal reflected a combination of two potentially conflicting objectives: "to give membership and not to create a new line of division in Europe," said senior Pentagon official directly involved in this process. There was also emphasis that eventual new NATO’s members should be contributors, not only consumers, of security. Initially, the idea of "associate membership" in NATO was considered. Although such an arrangement would not provide explicit security guarantees under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, it would give the clear prospect of future membership and provide time for 'associate members' to adapt their armed forces to meet NATO standards. In May 1993, however, because of unwillingness to create different categories of candidates, the Pentagon working-team gave up the idea of associate membership.

77 See The Washington Post, September 1, 1993: "NATO Balks At Opening Pact To E.Europe" by William Drozdiak.
According to the senior Pentagon official, "by July we had written what was actually the [future] Partnership for Peace". That draft of proposal emphasized, first of all, the need to avoid new divisions in European security system and to create a chance for future NATO membership. Although the proposal designed by the Bureau of Regional Security Affairs did not contain precise obligations to be fulfilled by candidate-states, it pointed out that such requirements like democratic civilian control over armed forces, transparency of defense budgets, compatible (with NATO standards) force structure, common military exercises and interoperability, arms standardization, would be the essential factors in the context of an eventual NATO membership. These requirements were summarized by the Bureau's head Mr. Freeman (and then restated by Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski):

[We understand that] Partnership for Peace is to make you look and walk and quack like a duck. Once you've done this, and eventually arrived at the situation where you do walk and quack like a duck, then other ducks should say 'Yes, you are a duck, so we accept you'.

3. "Vox populi"

Although the question of NATO enlargement has been considered politically "inconvenient," because of executive branch fears that such enlargement would be unpopular with Congress and US voters, East-Central European countries have received a significant support in their campaign to join the Western alliance from Sen. Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, "the most influential Republican voice on foreign policy". Mr. Lugar,

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79 See The Washington Post, September 6, 1993: "Open the Ranks To Eastern Europe" by
a member of the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence committees and co-chairman of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, appealed, in the context of calamitous European and American failure in the former Yugoslavia, for a "New NATO" that would assume responsibilities beyond its existing borders:

The choice is not between the current NATO and a new NATO but rather between a new NATO or no NATO. [...] NATO membership must be extended to eastern and central European countries. But who should be in, and when? Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are currently staunch Atlanticists; bringing them in would strengthen the alliance and Western interests. While full membership could be attained incrementally, the current security problems suggest an acceleration of any timetable. But there is no reason why it must be simultaneous for the eastern and central European countries. There are good reasons for maintaining a flexible approach. Some countries such as Poland may be ready for NATO membership sooner than others; the reverse may be true for membership in European Community, where the Czech Republic may be ready for accession sooner than Poland.

During his visit to Warsaw in August 1993, Sen. Lugar declared:

I'm in favor of associate membership of NATO for Poland right away. The Poles believe the orientation of the country is to the West in terms of the economy and militarily, and this is a logical and good time to do it.

There has been no similarly clear voice from congressional opponents of NATO enlargement.

Michael Mandelbaum.


See The New York Times, August 26, 1993: "Yeltsin ' Understands' Polish Bid for a Role in NATO" by Jane Perlez.
4. Decisive Role of the State Department

The second institution responsible for formulating national security policy, the Department of State, remained passive with regard to the issue of NATO enlargement until late summer, 1993. In August, Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared that NATO expansion "is not now on the agenda." Soon after, a working-team responsible for preparation for NATO summit was created. According to the senior Administration official, that team was "to give President something optimistic to say [during the summit], to move things step forward". A significant number of senior State Department officials were favorable to the idea of conditional (incremental) NATO membership for East-Central European countries.

President Yeltsin's letter from September 1993, appeared to be a good argument for opponents as well as for adherents of the idea of NATO enlargement. "This is a normal art of use in bureaucracy," a State Department official said, "while some treated the letter as a confirmation of their fear of possible Russia's reaction, others argued that Russia could not be given the privilege of vetoing NATO expansion".

Reportedly under influence of the letter, Strobe Talbott, the then Ambassador at Large to the countries of former Soviet Union, wrote a confidential memorandum for President and Secretary of State. In his memo, the Administration's chief Russia strategist argued that an eventual NATO eastward expansion would be perceived in

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Russia as a move against her and would significantly impede Russian reforms. During a consultation held in Department of State on October 18, 1993, Mr. Talbott persuaded Secretary Christopher of his rationale, and soon after he also convinced President Clinton.

In a deadlock created by Mr. Talbott's intervention, Gen. Shalikashvili, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, took the lead and presented the proposal designed in the Pentagon. On October 20, 1993, during a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Travemuende (Germany), the United States announced an idea to offer limited military "partnership" to any European country interested in NATO membership. Such an idea, called Partnership for Peace, was to be formally proposed by President Clinton at the NATO summit meeting in January 1994.

E. EMERGENCE OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE – REMARKS

From the practical point of view, the Partnership for Peace (called P4P in East-Central Europe) is just a multilateral version of hitherto prevailing bilateral cooperation between NATO and respective East European countries. US creators of P4P combined (and proposed further extension) existing bilateral relations, "partly because they were good, but also because they helped to avoid NATO enlargement" according to the senior Administration official, into an uniform NATO proposal.

As the then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin told the Atlantic Council of the United States in December 1993:

It's important to note that there are two things partnership would not provide: the NATO security guarantee and automatic membership at some future time. First, the
security guarantee. Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty requires each member to regard an attack on one as an attack on all. The Article Five guarantee would not be extended to partners. The next big question, of course, is whether joining the partnership is a ticket into NATO. It is not. Partners for peace would not automatically become eligible for membership in NATO. They don't even have to want to join NATO.\textsuperscript{84} (Emphasis added)

Although \textit{P4P} can undoubtedly be considered as a step forward in the context of NATO enlargement, its "loose" formula is symptomatic of its conflicting goals. As a senior US diplomat laconically observed:

The \textit{Partnership for Peace} proposal was a very skillful compromise between people who said we should do nothing to offend the Russians and people who said we should let the Eastern Europeans in now. [...] \textit{The beauty of the proposal is that it's a frame on whose canvas we can paint whatever we need.}\textsuperscript{85} (Emphasis added)

Indeed, \textit{P4P} is a "vehicle that faces two ways" the senior Administration official remarked, "it's very important for American political thinking".

The creation of \textit{P4P} is a good example of bargaining character of the US foreign policymaking process. This process is driven by the wide distribution of power, and the need for individuals and organizations with conflicting preferences to compromise with each other. The drive for agreement among competing actors determined the final solution to the conflict over NATO expansion. "Politics is the art of possible," one State Department official said in justifying the \textit{Partnership for Peace}. And perhaps such compromises are all that can be expected in the immediate post-Cold War era, when US interests are subject to such widely differing interpretations within the Administration.

\textsuperscript{84} Les Aspin, 'NATO's Partners for Peace', \textit{Defense Issues}, Vol.8, No.69, p.2.

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indeed, considering the lack of an overarching, coherent doctrine for US foreign policy, the *Partnership for Peace* seems to be a recipe to postpone the "troublesome" question of NATO enlargement.
V. CONCLUSION

A. THE NATURE OF THE US FOREIGN POLICYMAKING PROCESS

The way in which the United States has dealt with the problem of NATO enlargement conflicts with the notion that domestic factors dominate decisionmaking on many foreign policy issues, especially where ethnic interests may be at stake. There are over ten million US voters of Polish descent. Yet, I found no evidence that ethnic lobbying groups played a significant role in decisionmaking on the Partnership for Peace. For example, the Polish American Congress conducted an all-out effort to protest against Administration policies on NATO expansion, resulting in some hundred thousands letters sent by its members to the White House. But that lobbying did nothing to divert the Administration from its policy, and there are no signs that the political effectiveness of this lobbying toward the White House is on the rise.

From the bureaucratic politics perspective, one important feature of US policymaking stands out in the case of NATO expansion: the fragmented nature of power in American government, and the way that the need for compromise drives the output of the policymaking process. However, this drive toward compromise was reinforced by the lack of a coherent, underlying agreement on post-Cold War US policy in Europe -- in particular, on the seemingly incompatible goals of strengthening Polish security and

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On January 6, 1994, in Milwaukee, Vice-President Al Gore (replacing the absent President Clinton -- his mother’s funeral) met representatives of ethnic groups from East-Central Europe (this community consists of about 22 million Americans) to explain to them the Administration’s policy toward countries of that region.
avoiding conflict with Russia. The emergence of a wider consensus on the fundamentals of US policy would mute the bureaucratic infighting (and need for compromise) on more specific issues such as NATO expansion.

The most significant divergence of this case from bureaucratic theory lies in the latter's emphasis on institutionally-driven preferences. In the case of NATO expansion, my interviews suggested that differences of opinion did not seem to reflect narrow institutional interests, and conflicts within institutions were at least as common as conflicts between institutions. But this lack of institutionally-based conflict has allowed a handful of individuals to press their own personal policy preferences. Indeed, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has found surprisingly little resistance within the Administration to conducting his "Russia-first" policy.

Adherents of a quick NATO membership for East-Central European countries come mainly from outside the current Administration. Because of this, their direct influence on creating US foreign policy in this respect is significantly limited. However, using the media, they have attempted to shape public opinion and create a more favorable political climate for the NATO expansion issue. Sen. Richard Lugar has explicitly criticized the current line of US foreign policy:

The Administration seemed to classify Western Europe as a vital interest while East-Central Europe and the Balkans were not. They appeared to be using a

Interestingly enough, the current US foreign policy toward East-Central Europe is similar to that after World War I and WWII, which used to treat countries of the region (especially Poland) as an object rather than a subject in the interplay between the West and Russia. Now like then, the United States (and, generally, the West) seem to agree that East-Central European countries belong to Russia's "organic" security zone ("A chicken is not a bird and Poland is not abroad", says the Russian proverb). Accusations of a "new Yalta" are obviously exaggerated, but the general tendency is anxiously similar. Hopefully a result will be different.

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definition of vital interests that was a function of geography and nuclear weapons. Their rhetoric was about democracy and shared values, but their policies did not necessarily reflect this.

Nevertheless, the Administration has consequently resisted any domestic pressures to change its standpoint on NATO enlargement. The official United States policy toward NATO enlargement reflects a general unwillingness on the part of the West to expand its security alliance eastward. Unless members of Congress perceive greater political and policy incentives to increase the heat on the White House, and use the power of the purse or other instruments of power to force a policy change, the Administration will be able to persist in its preferred path of appeasing the Russians.

B. LESSONS FOR POLAND

As Poland continues to press for NATO membership, there are some lessons that can be learned from the way in which the United States dealt with the problem of NATO enlargement over the past four years. First, Poland should consequently continue developing multi-sided cooperation with the West, paying particular attention to its economic aspect. Many of my interview subjects stressed the importance of economic ties and other elements of cooperation in facilitating tighter security links. Closer ties with the European Union (EU) contribute to, and full membership would significantly accelerate, Poland's membership in the Western alliance. With Europe's fastest-growing economy in 1993 (at a real rate of 4%), Poland has already formally applied for EU

membership. This would provide another means of creating support in Congress and also in the US business community.

Another lesson -- and one already very familiar in Poland -- is that Poland's position in the West results directly from her position in the East. Given the preoccupation of key Clinton Administration officials with the need to avoid antagonizing Russia, the Polish government should make every effort to ensure that Russia understands that Polish membership in NATO would not pose a security threat. Moreover, Polish officials should work with Administration policymakers to investigate ways to meet Polish NATO objectives in a manner consistent with the evolution of larger Administration strategies on foreign policy (and with the need to encourage progress in Russia). During his visit to Washington in December 1993, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski stated:

We do not want to create new lines in Europe. Rather, we want to overcome those which result from the cold war. We need fresh thinking on security and a genuine new quest for viable forms of cooperation, tuned to the aspirations and needs of individual states, however big or small.89

This approach seems extraordinarily promising, not just on substantive grounds but because of the nature of the US policymaking process.

But prospects for near-term progress on Polish membership seem dim. American sensitivity to Russian concerns may strengthen the position of Russian nationalists and gives them an additional trump, by showing that the only world's super-power

89 Text of the address received from the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington, D.C. (p.11).
acknowledges their potential influence on official Russia's polic3 Moreover, according to an opinion expressed by Russian military leaders, an eventual Polish membership in NATO "is not an issue of our security, but of our pride" [Ref.8]. Such considerations could be difficult to overcome, but there are steps that can be taken to improve these prospects.

The troublesome problem of NATO eastward expansion seems to confirm that,

... there are indeed lessons to be learned from the Cold War, though not the same ones for the East and the West. ... from the East they require more wisdom, from the West more faith...90

90 Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War, Columbia University Press, 1979, p.313.
APPENDIX. NATO'S "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE"
PRESS COMMUNIQUE N-3(94)2
For immediate release
10 January 1994

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: INVITATION

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 10-11 January 1994

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and longstanding partnership among the North American and European Allies, are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite the other states participating in the NACC and other CBCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by
promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.
1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10th/11th January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.

2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:

(a) facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;

(b) ensuring democratic control of defence forces;

(c) maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;

(d) the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
(e) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership’s objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.

6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:

- those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;
- they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;
- they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;
- those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;
- building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;
they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.

7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:

- develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;

- promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.

8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
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