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AIR WAR COLLEGE
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EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

by

Sabi I. Sabev
Lieutenant Colonel

BULGARIA

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Prof. Daniel Hughes

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
APRIL 1994
INTRODUCTION

Each of the three great conflicts of the 20th century – World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, has changed the international system. Each at its end has been accompanied by the hope for a collective security system in order to prevent future conflicts. The Gulf War has reinforced these hopes to such extent that the collective security as a viable concept has been incorporated into the 1992 National Military Strategy document of the United States (US).

The Cold War lasted 40 years. Today we are on the threshold of a new world order. The revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the subsequent unification of Germany disrupted the postwar security order in Europe. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union has caused drastic changes in the region. In the East, the Commonwealth of Independent States has emerged as a loose superstructure but with a highly uncertain future. In the West, we see more gradual adaptation to the new European situation.

The end of the Cold War has inspired European public opinion to call for the redesigning of Europe's security structure and has raised questions about the future relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The new situation in Europe has increased the importance of economic and diplomatic tools in the security realm while the military elements have been reduced in importance. NATO's original goals have been achieved and now the Alliance is changing in order to survive. Through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the organization takes on new functions in the confidence and security building process in post-Cold War Europe. The end of the Cold War, however, has inspired a serious discussion for the prospects of building a collective European security system without military alliances and dividing lines between nations or groups of nations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the current political and geostrategic environment in post-Cold Europe, the rising instability and threats to European security, and the necessity for a new collective security system. Significant attention will be paid to the role of the existing security organizations – the United Nations (UN), the CSCE, the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU), the NACC and NATO, in providing peace and stability in Europe. Different concepts for a new European security
system will be compared in order to assess to what extent they are able to respond to the new realities in Europe. Finally, a distinct view will be suggested in terms of an architecture of the European security system based on the interaction between several sub-regional security structures and the CSCE as a framework of overall collective security system in Europe. Thus, providing a two-level security arrangements should provide an equal security for each state in the region.

I. THE NEW POLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE

The end of the Cold War has disrupted the bipolar European system based on two political and military alliances. A new multipolar power system has emerged which seems to be very similar to the pre-World War II one. However, the new multipolarity, as Stephen J. Cimbala has pointed out, is distinguished from the previous one by several new characteristics (1964-165).

First, the existence of nuclear weapons and the threat of their proliferation increases the vulnerability of the existing balance of power. Second, the new multipolar system cannot rely on war to maintain the future balance of power because of the existence of the nuclear weapons. Third, Europe after the Cold War is not the only center of gravity of the world politics and the only center maintaining the global balance of power. Forth, the importance of the military power today is decreasing. Other nonmilitary aspects of power have gained supremacy in the emerging multipolarity - state supported trade, finance, capital, investments, etc. Finally, the character of the relationship between states and international organizations has changed. After the Cold War, the UN, CSCE, EU and WEU, NACC and NATO began to play a significant role in reducing the tensions and the risk of war in Europe.

Repolarization of the European politics and the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, nevertheless, are sources of potential threats to peace and stability in the region. The deep economic and political instability, and the resurgent nationalism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, have generated a series of conflicts and bloody wars in former Yugoslavia and the Transcaucasus republics.

The breakup of the former USSR, in December 1991, and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was the most significant event in the world politics at the end of 1991. It initiated a confused and even violent
process of national self-determination and state-formation in the ex-Soviet republics. From the very beginning considerable turmoil has emerged in the relations both between Russia and the newly independent states, and among the new states themselves.

Relations between the two most important members of the CIS, Russia and Ukraine, for the first two years have been tense and unstable. Currently, two issues - the confrontation over the status of Crimea and the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, continue to be major obstacles in the relationship between the two countries.

Russia continues to maintain troops in many of the countries on its borders and is suspected of playing a destabilizing role, with a final goal of bringing them back into the Russian orbit. Meanwhile, Russia has begun to call for international recognition of its right to conduct peacekeeping operations throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. Some of the ex-Soviet republics, notably the Baltic states, Moldova and Ukraine, have opposed such a move, suspecting that Russia is striving for the role of regional policeman, and thus promoting its own national interests. The suspicions of these countries increase with the nationalistic statements of some Russian politicians. Recently the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, insisted that the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and the Baltic region had to be brought back into Russia's orbit. Meanwhile Russia has made clear its intention to protect the rights, honor, life and property of Russian citizens living outside its boundaries, who currently number over 25 million people (2110-12).

Developments in the Transcaucasus republics are dominated by political turmoil, inter ethnic and territorial conflicts accompanied by economic collapse. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh effects the whole of the domestic politics, foreign policies and the disintegrated economies of Azerbaijan and Armenia. In Georgia the Abkhaz forces, after series of attacks, have consolidated their control over the entire territory of Abkhazia (2155-57).

At the beginning of 1993, all the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan signed the CIS Charter and accepted the creation of a CIS economic union as an escape from economic collapse. There was, however, friction between Russia and these states over the issue of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), an intergovernmental association including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, the five Central Asian states, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. This
organization is widely seen as an initial step toward the creation of a Muslim common market. Russia has warned the Central Asian states that they will have to choose between the ECO and CIS.

The major concern of the most European countries is the stable democratic development of Russia. The increased political turmoil there in the second half of 1993 resulted in the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet (the Parliament) of Russia, on 21 September, by President Boris Yeltsin's order. The people's deputies opposed to the president's decree and riots began in Moscow at the beginning of October. Imposing a state of emergency in the capital, Yeltsin ordered the security forces to expel the people's deputies from the Parliament building and the Mayor's building. The security forces brutally suppressed the resistance of the deputies and their supporters by firing on the Parliament's building with tanks. The composition of the new Parliament of Russia, elected in December 1993, presupposes that Yeltsin will have a hard time in his cooperation with the new legislature, facing a strong opposition from some parliamentary factions (2:24-25).

In sum, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has left behind high instability in the ex-Soviet republics, significant and unbalanced military forces and weapons among nations experiencing a wave of virulent nationalism, which has generated and probably will continue to generate a series of conflicts among them.

The development of East-Central European states in the last three years was not accompanied by significant interstate conflicts or tensions, and they are widely recognized as the most successful former communist countries in their transition to democracy and market economies. Since 1988, however, increasing disorder and ethnic tensions have emerged within these states. The internal turmoil in Czechoslovakia has resulted in the dissolution of that country. Historical ethnic disputes about the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Serbia have complicated the relations between Hungary and these countries. The development of Poland in the last two years has been accompanied by political turmoil and instability.

The greatest European concerns today, however, are the Balkans. For centuries the Balkans have been known as an area of turmoil, political instability, and conflicts. In the 19th century, the nations of this region with the help of Russia, repulsed the Ottoman tyranny, but the new nation-states, formed under the dictates of the Western powers, fell into irreconcilable
contradictions and conflicts. The explosion of nationalism throughout the region and the intervention of the Great Powers earned the Balkans the reputation of a powder keg of Europe.

The Cold War dampened the tensest conflicts in the area but they did not disappeared; rather they were held in check by European bipolarity. Thus, the Cold War provided, to some extent, stability and predictability of the security relations in the Balkans, which were divided into military blocks, with Yugoslavia nonaligned.

The end of the Cold War upset this balance. An upsurge of nationalism and ethnic conflicts erupted throughout the region. This has been most visible in Yugoslavia where old antagonisms between Croats and Serbs have resurfaced with a vengeance and contributed to the disintegration of the federal state and to the bloody war between Serbia and the newly independent states.

In Bulgaria, the status of the Turkish minority has become a tense domestic issue. Tensions between Greece and Turkey have resurfaced over the treatment of the Turkish minority in Greece. In Romania, anti-Hungarian demonstrations broke out, in March 1990.

As a result, the Balkans have once again emerged as a primary zone of European instability and conflicts. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the continuing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina have intensified the instability in the region. There is a danger that the war could spread over other Balkan countries. Despite the deployment of United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the agreement recently signed between the two countries to form a loose federation, the war between the Serbs and the united forces of Croats and Bosniavs continues.

Several factors have contributed to the resurgence of instability in the Balkans. One of the most important factors is the incomplete transition to democracy in some of the Balkan states. The political transformation in the former socialist countries in this region is marked by considerable turmoil, a lack of strong democratic traditions and institutions, and an absence of strong civil society. All these states were under some form of autocratic or military rule during the interwar period. For the next 45 years they were under communist rule. As a result these nations never developed norms, institutions and political processes associated with democracy. That is why the process of democratization in these ex-socialist countries was more chaotic than the same process in Central Europe.
A second factor is the resurgent nationalism which had always been a strong force in the Balkans. Nationalism has come to fill the political and ideological void left by the erosion of communism. Throughout the region, politicians have sought to strengthen their legitimacy by appealing to extreme nationalism. Numerous leaders, groups, parties, and movements have emerged with strongly nationalistic agendas. The most visible examples are the Serbian and Croatian leaders Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman respectively. There was also an upsurge of nationalism in Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Slovenia.

The third factor is the impact of the Yugoslav crisis. The most serious threat in the region today is posed by the war in Croatia and especially by the bloody conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After more than two years of extremely high violence and bloodshed, it is hard to imagine that the three major ethnic groups—Muslims, Serbs, and Croats—will reach a political solution that will be satisfactory to all parties. Another potential threat in former Yugoslavia is Kosovo, whose population is 90 percent Albanian. In 1990, the Serbian parliament ordered the Kosovo parliament closed, thus abolishing the self-governing status of this autonomous region. Thousands of Albanians have been dismissed from their jobs for political reasons. This has strengthened Albanian nationalism and will for resistance in Kosovo. In 1991, widespread protests occurred against Serbia, followed by a referendum confirming a new constitution that proclaimed republican status of Kosovo. The Serbian parliament, however, rejected the legality of this act. Today, many people in Kosovo increasingly see the unification with Albania as the best way to escape from Serbian dominance. Furthermore, Albania has begun to give the Albanian population in Kosovo more diplomatic, moral, and material support. In July 1991, the Albanian parliament passed a resolution warning that genocide in Kosovo would turn into fight for the existence of the Albanian people. Thus, the unrest in Kosovo could provoke Serbian actions leading to an open conflict with Albania.

Macedonia is the next potential trouble spot in the former Yugoslavia. In September 1991, Macedonia voted to declare its independence. Serbia, however, continues to oppose to Macedonia's decision and expressed concerns about the rights of the Serbian minority in this country, an issue which could become explosive, just as it was in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The independent status of Macedonia has revived the age-old Macedonian question. Bulgaria
first recognized the new Macedonia but, considering the majority of the people living in this country to be ethnic Bulgarians, refuses to recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian nation. The Bulgarian diplomatic recognition of the new state has caused considerable concern in Greece and Serbia, each of them opposed strongly to the emergence of an independent Macedonia. The Macedonian question is a deeply emotional issue in Greece, which fears that an independent Macedonia would raise territorial claims to some areas along the Greek-Macedonian border. Therefore, Greece has used its veto in the EU to block the recognition of the new state, demanding that Macedonia to renounce all territorial claims against Greece, and to abandon the use of the name "Macedonia", considered by Greeks to be a part of their national heritage.

A real threat for a potential new conflict in the Balkans is that Serbia might invade Macedonia, under the pretext of protecting the rights of the Serbian minority. If this occurred, Macedonia might turn to Bulgaria for support and the latter could be drawn into a conflict against its will. Greece, which support Serbia, might also be dragged in and the conflict could escalate into a full-scale Balkan war. Today, this scenario seems unlikely because of the deployment of UNPROFOR's units, including a US unit in Macedonia, but it still has a significant potential to occur under particular circumstances.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia has provided new opportunities for Turkey to expand its influence in the region, especially in the Muslim areas, and to play more active diplomatic and political role on the Balkans. Furthermore, it is a major military power in the region. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia have sought to strengthen their ties with Turkey to secure Turkish support for their causes. Turkey is also the most active advocate of military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the "Muslim issue" has become an increasingly troublesome factor in the Balkans, and with the significant expansion of the Turkish influence in the region, Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia have begun to oppose strongly the attempts of Turkey to support the political organizations of Muslim minorities in their countries. Hence, any effort by Turkey to expand its influence in the region or to promote itself as a protector of the Muslim minorities in these three countries might encourage them to form anti-Turkish alliance which could increase the threat of conflict in the Balkans.
Greek-Turkish relations, especially their conflicts over Cyprus and the Aegean, present another potential source of confrontation. The Turkish Cypriot republic, recognized only by Turkey, might be recognized by some of the newly independent Central Asian republics thus further irritating Greek-Turkish bilateral relations. The firm Greek stance over the status of the Aegean keeps relations between the two countries tense.

The relations of Romania with its neighboring countries are characterized by mutual distrust and sometimes friction. For instance, issues relating to the large Magyar minority in Transylvania continue to delay the conclusion of bilateral treaty between Hungary and Romania. Bulgaria and Ukraine suspect Romania of aspirations to restore its pre-World War II borders, stressing the Romanian claims to Bukonina (Ukraine), Bessarabia (Moldova), and southern Dobrudja (Bulgaria).

Every state in Eastern Europe either has substantial minorities within it or has many numbers of its main nationality who are minorities abroad, and who claim to experience discrimination. The existence of many nationalistic groups and parties in most East-European countries, and many inherited unresolved territorial or minority issues, cause mutual suspicions among them, undermining the process of confidence building and cooperation in Europe.

II. EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS

Today, the major risks and challenges to the security and stability in Europe evolve from the uncertainty and instability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. Minority problems in the countries of this region, if unresolved, can easily increase the interstate tensions, creating a threat for "balkanization" of Europe. In other words, there is a substantial probability that traditional, historic conflicts between the countries in the region will flare up. The most impressive confirmation of this probability is the current situation in former Yugoslavia.

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe created a sense of military vulnerability among the former Soviet allies. The Central European states, additionally, are in a specific geostrategic position between the NATO countries and the barely formed group of states which replaced the Soviet Union. In similar position is also Bulgaria, faced with two NATO countries southwards, and burning
Yugoslavia westwards. To cope with the new security environment, the former Warsaw Pact states had to restructure their military postures from a single-dimension model, designed to act against only one threat, to a multidimensional model designed to counter potential threats from any direction. All these countries have developed new military doctrines of circle defense to be ready to repulse an attack from each direction.

To enhance their security in the short and long term, the former Soviet allies have tried to find other alternatives. One of the simplest solutions was to apply for NATO membership. Such an approach is understandable, but this simple solution could easily lead to a less secure and stable Europe. The consequences of such a step might be a new division of Europe, shifting the confrontation line to the western frontier of the former Soviet Union. Such change would create a new security environment for Russia, and would play an extremely negative role in the evolving democratic process in Russia, strengthening Russian opposition to Europe and undermining the entire security and confidence building process in Europe.

Each former Warsaw Pact state has its own specific security concerns which primarily reflect its relations with its neighboring countries. Poland, for instance, several years ago had one neighboring country eastwards. Today, Poland has four independent neighbors on its eastern frontier - Russia (Kaliningrad), Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. The new realities have complicated Poland’s security planning. The primary eastern security concern of Poland is the Kaliningrad area. Russians comprise the majority of the population in this region, but in recent years the German population began to increase due to immigration of many Germans from Russia. Poland fears that if the German population predominates over Russians, this might cause problems with Germany. Poland’s perception is that Kaliningrad must remain Russian in order to prevent a new German encirclement of Poland. Another concern, however, is the increased concentration of Russian troops in the region as a result of their withdrawal from Germany. Kaliningrad has become a huge armed camp with greater combat power than that of the Polish armed forces. Poland hopes that this is a temporary situation caused by the shortage of housing for Russian soldiers and their families.

Lithuania is Poland’s second major security concern. It is caused by Lithuania’s treatment of the Polish minority, which constitutes almost 1 percent of the Lithuanian population. In September, 1991, the Lithuanian parliament
dissolved the local councils in two Polish-dominated regions, accusing them of supporting the August coup attempt in Moscow. The Polish communities reacted angrily and organized demonstrations in Vilnius. Today, there is no imminent threat of conflict between the two countries, but if local violence between the Polish communities and the Lithuanian authorities occurred, a dangerous reaction could develop, possibly leading to armed intervention by Poland (4:20).

The emergence of a unified and powerful Germany has enhanced Poland's concerns about Silesia. Many Silesians still have hopes for unification with Germany or insist on a special political status for Silesia under EU supervision. Despite the improved relations between the countries, the Poles continue to fear German revisionism and in conflict situation could easily overreact. In 1988, Poland faced westward only East Germany with its 400,000 troops. Today, the country has to stretch its armed forces (200,000) against an array of over one million troops of its seven neighbors, which complicate to high extent the Polish security planning (4:21).

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia at the beginning of 1993, created a new security environment for the two countries. The Czech security concerns reflect mainly the dispute with German concerning the expulsion of almost 3.5 million Germans (Czech citizens) from Czechoslovakia after World War II. Today, several strong Sudeten German organisations are strongly pressing the Czech government to restore the citizenship of these people and their property rights, at least in the form of compensations. The Czech republic, for its part, has raised the question of German reparations to Czech victims of the Nazi occupation (1939-1945). Up to 1990, Germany has paid less than 0.1 percent of the total amount of the reparations, required under the Paris treaty of 1946. Obviously, these issues have great potential to disturb the relations between the two countries (5:9-14).

Slovakia's relations with the Czech republic, after their peaceful divorce, are slightly clouded by some border issues and by the division of the federal property. The only country with which Slovakia had disturbed relations in 1993 was Hungary. The Hungarian minority living in Slovakia, which constitutes almost 11 percent of its population, opposed strongly any split of the federal state. Accusing Slovakia of violating the rights of Magyar minority, Hungary almost blocked Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe. The
mutual distrust between the two countries probably will impede the development of good neighborly relations (2:90).

Hungary's security concerns stem mainly from disputes with neighboring countries regarding the Hungarian minorities, and from the Yugoslav crisis. Ethnic tensions between Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania in 1990, have irritated the relations between two states. Budapest has repeatedly criticized Romania for violating the rights of ethnic Hungarians. The organization of ethnic Magyars in Romania, the Hungarian Democratic Movement, continues to insist upon greater cultural and educational autonomy, but it faces a hostile reaction from the local Romanian population in Transylvania. Hungary is concerned that the ethnic problems of the large Magyar minority in Transylvania (more than 2 million) could develop into a major conflict with Romania, if not eased.

The Yugoslav crisis is another major Hungarian security concern. Hungary has already taken in more than 40,000 refugees, mainly from the Magyar minority in Serbia (Voivodina). The danger that the war in Yugoslavia might escalate into a broader Balkan conflict involving Hungary threatens the Hungarian government. Moreover, the armed forces of the country are not well equipped to repulse a massive aggression.

Romania has two major security concerns of a predominantly internal character. First, there is a potential for deterioration of the situation in Transylvania, where the large and well organized Magyar minority could press for autonomous status, a step which might provoke a local conflict. Second, Romania realizes that, in case of conflict in Moldova, the country could be drawn in resulting in a clash with Russian 14th Army, still deployed in Moldova. To cope with the new security challenges, Romania has not cut the size of its military to the same degree as Bulgaria or Hungary. But Romania's main approach to its security is multifaceted - development of regional and multilateral ties with the EU, WEU, NATO, the states in the basin of the River Danube, and other organizations (6:33).

Bulgaria's current security concerns reflect the continuing crisis in former Yugoslavia, the existing military imbalances in the Balkans, and the nationalism/expansionism in the region. The most imminent security concern to Bulgaria is the likelihood of expansion of the Yugoslav conflict to Macedonia. In such a case the country will have to take in a great numbers of refugees, and might be drawn in the conflict against its will. The deployment of
additional UNPROFOR units in Macedonia, the localizing and the rapid settlement of the conflict is in the security interest of Bulgaria, and the country firmly supports all international initiatives directed to termination of the fighting and the opening of peaceful negotiations.

The existing military imbalances in the region, especially between Bulgaria and its two southern neighbors Greece and Turkey, create some unresolved problems for Bulgarian defense planning. The large field army deployed on the European territory of Turkey is unacceptable for Bulgaria, because it places the latter in an unfavorable security position. To counter these disadvantages, Bulgaria has undertaken many steps to develop the military cooperation with its neighboring countries, especially with Greece and Turkey. The Bulgarian leadership believes that the military cooperation between the three countries is a key to regional security.

In former Yugoslavia, due to continuing conflict, the security concerns for the most of countries involved are highly active, even threatening the existence of the state, as is the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia. The major security threat for Serbia and Montenegro is the likelihood of international military intervention in order to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In such a case, the two countries could feel compelled to intervene in order to protect the Bosnian Serbs, thus escalating the conflict and possibly resulting in attacks against them.

For Slovenia and Macedonia, major security objectives are to prevent an expansion of the conflict to their territories and to build their new armed forces, thus enhancing their readiness to defend their countries.

Albania's capacities to meet threats, from either domestic upheaval or from Serbia, are limited. The country is highly concerned about the possibility of conflict in Kosovo or Macedonia, where the Albanians are respectively 90% and 25% of the population. The Albanian government has urged Italy to maintain a limited military presence in the country due to the tense situation in the Balkans. Military agreements have been signed with the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Austria (2:105).

Enduring problems between Greece and Turkey continue to challenge the security in region. The Cyprus issue, the differences over the Aegean, and the increasing tendency of Turkey to act as a protector of the Turkish and Muslim minorities in the Balkans, could become a catalyst for more serious conflict between the two countries. The emergence of Macedonia as an
independent state has generated new concerns for the Greek government. Recently, Greece imposed an economic embargo to Macedonia and it is likely the relations between the two states to aggravate still more.

The security problems of the former Soviet republics are very complex and multifaceted. With the creation of the CIS in December 1991, the question arose - what type of security system should be established to meet the new security challenges facing this new entity. After long debates over two versions - unified armed forces and NATO model forces, finally the second version was adopted as a model for creation of a new collective security system, based on voluntary association and intended to meet the security needs of all CIS member states.

The Treaty on Collective Security, signed in Tashkent in May 1992 by six states (Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), was the key document authorizing the formation of the new CIS security system. The treaty remained open for other CIS member states, providing a basis for development of CIS defensive alliance. Shortly thereafter, CIS Joint High Command was established with major responsibilities including maintenance and operational control and control of the strategic forces, prevention of local conflicts arising on the borders of the CIS, and analysis of the world’s military-political situation (1:118-121). In June 1993, however, as a result of disagreements over the independant status of the CIS commander of chief, the CIS Joint High Command was abolished and replaced by Joint Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation, thus dismantling the CIS joint Armed Forces (2:20).

Today, all CIS states are faced difficult problems in stabilizing and restructuring their armed forces. Russia has assumed the control over all nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, but the country is experiencing difficulty in maintaining the morale of its undermanned and under funded armed forces. The continuing conflicts among some of the CIS member states are also security concerns of Russia. Russia also strongly opposed any expansion of NATO eastwards, indicating that such a step would have negative consequences for the European security and stability.
III. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS

Today, several international organizations contribute to peace, stability and cooperation in Europe. The UN, during the Cold War, did not play a significant role for the European security. Yugoslavia is the first crisis in post-Cold War Europe that the UN has been asked to manage. Europeans initially believed that their own regional institutions could cope with this kind of crisis but they failed to prevent or stop the war in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav precedent has shown that the UN will be more important in post-Cold War Europe.

As a global security organization the UN, however, is overburdened, trying to reduce the tensions, to prevent or stop the conflicts all over the world. It is also under-funded and unable to undertake larger peacemaking operations. Its organization is not highly effective due to the character of its decision making. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council, including six permanent member states (the US, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union/Russia, and China), have the power to decide if and when a military action is needed. But each member state also has a veto power, and could block any preventive actions by the organization. Since the Cold War, the Security Council members have proved to be more cooperative, but the interests of each member state always could prevail over collective decision-making. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the UN is still unable to stop the war, despite a series of successful humanitarian operations (8/121-122).

The creation of the CSCE contributed much to the success of the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989. Even the West had not at the beginning placed so much emphasis on the CSCE as a process.

At the June 1991 meeting of the Council of Ministers and especially at the Helsinki summit meeting of July 1992, the participants strengthened the collective security function of the CSCE, removing the consensus requirement for calling emergency meetings. Several mechanisms have been established to encourage early consultations on emerging crises. Investigation and rapporteur missions have been authorized and used in former Yugoslavia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, and other states. The Helsinki Document of 1992 adopted a decision that the CSCE can request the EU, NATO, the WEU and the CIS to support peacekeeping operations or missions in the CSCE region (9/314-315).
The CSCE is the only post-Cold War international security organization. When the Cold War system began to collapse there was considerable interest in the CSCE, particularly among the governments that were situated along the fault lines of divided Europe. The campaign to build up the CSCE, however, was smothered by the American ambivalence, because the US saw the CSCE as a threat to NATO. France was reticent because it preferred to sponsor the EC as a cornerstone of the new European order. As a result of such an approach, the CSCE has acquired a minimal institutional identity over the last two years and has not contributed significantly to the resolution of European security problems. This is most apparent in the case of former Yugoslavia and in the conflicts between some of the former Soviet republics. These security issues could have been an ideal opportunities for the CSCE, if fully institutionalized, to begin to establish itself as a valuable part of the European security system, because its competence extends to such issues as the validation of borders, conflict prevention, confidence and security building, and the protection of human rights. At the same time when the CSCE was demonstrating its inability to cope with these problems, NATO was beginning to adjust its geographical and functional identities in ways that made the CSCE look dispensable.

The EC has also began to interfere in the responsibilities of the CSCE, establishing standards for recognition of new states and involving itself directly in the Yugoslav crisis. As a result of this doubling of functions, some countries have began to lose interest in the CSCE.

The role of NATO in post-Cold War Europe is unclear. Although NATO's past contribution to regional security cannot be denied, its future relationship to any new European security system remains to be defined.

Important steps toward redefinition of NATO's new roles in post-Cold War Europe took place in 1990 and 1991. The London Declaration of NATO, issued in July 1990, called for an action program in several areas: establishing a new relationship with the states of Eastern and Central Europe; developing a new military strategy; strengthening the CSCE; resolution to continue the arms control process beyond the CFE agreement, and encouraging the European defense identity (WEU) in the form of European pillar of NATO (1168). In fulfillment of these recommendations, in November 1991, NATO published its new Strategic Concept and created the NACC as a forum for confidence building and consultation between NATO's states and the former Warsaw Pact.
countries. In 1992, NATO reviewed its peacekeeping responsibilities and declared its readiness to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN security Council.

Today, NATO is enjoying wide popularity. NATO’s Air Force units, under UN auspices have imposed a non-fly regime over Bosnia-Herzegovina and their readiness to strike the Serbian heavy guns and tanks around Sarajevo forced the Serbian units to lift the siege of the city. Most East-European countries have applied for membership in the Alliance because over the last four decades NATO has evolved into a community of states with common democratic values and fundamentally compatible national interests.

What is the future of NATO? The proponents of the Alliance advocate the preservation, expansion and strengthening the organization which, however, does not correspond to the new realities in Europe.

The WEU is the main competitor of NATO in shaping the post-Cold War order in Europe. The Union was formed in 1954 as a forum for most of the West European countries. Its goal was to facilitate and limit the rearmament of West Germany, and to bring the country into NATO. Once formed, the WEU transferred all its responsibilities for defense planning to NATO. Since 1987, however, the Union has gained considerable respect and influence as a forum for European consultation and coordination. It serves as an institutional framework within which the EU governments will coordinate their defense policies in the future. The WEU has entered the peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations by dispatching a fleet to the Adriatic to participate in the UN-mandated blockade against the former Yugoslavia. After the formation of Franco-German military corps in 1993, the WEU will be ready, by 1995, to conduct peacekeeping operations.

The role of the CIS in providing collective security and stability, and in peacekeeping missions or operations within CIS area was recognized by the Helsinki Document of 1992. Shortly after its formation, the federation faced serious internal problems: armed conflicts, territorial disputes, the uncertain status of the Russian forces outside the country, unconstitutional troop formations, etc., which constituted the main threats to the Commonwealth. To counter these threats, CIS peacekeeping forces have been planned, including units specifically allocated by each member state that would come under the CIS joint command in time of crisis. Meanwhile, some of the former Soviet military contingents, still based in the newly independent states have been
engaged in peacekeeping activities. Today, CIS units, mainly in the form of Russian troops are engaged peacekeeping operations not only within CIS area, but also in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Obviously, the CIS could assume the responsibilities for keeping the stability and peace in the member states and peacekeeping operations in Europe, thus contributing to the European security.

IV. THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY

After the Cold War, the focus of European concerns about stability in the region shifted toward Eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Soviet Union. The instability in this vast region affects European security and requires Western Europe, the United States, Russia, and the other states in Europe to redefine the parameters of their security needs.

Collective security is not a new idea. The term has been resurrected and revised three times this century — after World War I and II, and after the Cold War. The attempts of the world community to establish a reliable collective security system reflect the hopes of the nations to build a world in which there will be no more war. Today, after the end of the Cold War, enthusiasm for collective security has emerged again. Whether collective security can work in Europe is a critical issue in the contemporary debate over how to respond to the new strategic environment in the region. In this debate there are many interpretations of what collective security is and how it would work in Europe. Opponents of collective security usually point out the failure of the League of Nations to prevent aggression during the 1930s, the marginal significance of the UN during the Cold War, and the divergent national interests of the states. They believe that the balance of power, maintained by military alliances, or reliable self-defense capabilities can deter aggression. Indeed, the alliances' system prevented a new world war in the last four decades, but could not prevent a series of regional or local conflicts.

Proponents of collective security believe that the preconditions necessary for a collective security organization already exist in Europe and that such an organization is both viable and desirable. They argue that collective security provides several advantages for maintaining a more stable and secure international environment (8125-136).
First, collective security more effectively deters and resists aggressor states by the formation a strong and preponderant coalition. It also reduces the uncertainties among states and facilitates the identification of aggressor states. Second, collective security can strengthen and deepen cooperative relations among states through institutionalization of its structures, providing more transparency in their relations and an effective negotiating forum. Finally, collective security organizations can ease the security dilemmas of member states through fostering trust and confidence, building predominantly defensive military postures, and a set of shared values and interests.

Collective security must be distinguished from collective defense. Both collective security and collective defense have the ultimate objective of maintaining or restoring the status quo, but use different strategies and processes. There are three fundamental differences between collective security and collective defense. The first is how each system views aggression. Collective security requires all member states to counter any aggression, whereas collective defense requires action only when one or more countries within an alliance are directly threatened. Hence, collective defense is designed to augment the national defense and national interests of each state. The second difference is that collective defense presupposes defined enemies, whereas collective security does not. Finally, collective defense presupposes also the existence of treaties and military alliances or pacts. Collective security is defined in general and universal agreements with no specified enemy.

In theory, collective security means establishment of organizational structures and legal firm commitments to guarantee that aggression by one state against any other would be resisted by decisive collective action of all other members. Aggression is deterred by the credible promise of overwhelming collective resistance which presupposes collective military arrangements secured by treaty. Collective security includes activities, sanctioned by the UN or the CSCE, ranging from peacekeeping operations to active military intervention or sanctions short of war.

Defining the characteristics of a real (not ideal) collective security, James E. Goodby has underlined that collective security cannot overcome several realities (9:304-307). First, it cannot neglect the distribution of military power in the international system because the relations between the Great Powers or the largest states will continue to be affected by their military power.
although in lesser extent than in the Cold War period. Second, collective security could be global in scope and regional or subregional, as the states so choose. Third, collective security need not be dedicated necessarily to maintain the status quo. Frontiers can be changed but peacefully and by agreement. Finally, collective security could cover not only relations between states but could also address internal affairs. The CSCE, for instance, has included in its agenda the individual human rights.

The principles of sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs are firmly established guidance in the international relations. The Final Act of the CSCE, however, has provided a basis for the international community to address internal matters, to deal with the rights of individuals within states. The protection of the Kurds in Northern Iraq and of the population of Somalia are examples of interventions, undertaken by the international community, in internal affairs of these states to protect people from their own government or local authorities. Thus, the human and minority rights, and the survival of the population have been declared as matters of international concerns, despite the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. That is why collective security should embrace a collective response, even intervention, in case of violations of the international norms in the relations between people or states.

To undertake a collective action for enforcement international norms, would be very difficult decision for member states of collective security system. The decision will never be automatic. Some criteria are needed to determine when an intervention in the form of military operation is inevitable. When the dispute is internal issue (civil war, anarchy, genocide against the population, etc.), then the intervention becomes much more complex. While the interventions of the UN in Cambodia, Kuwait, and Somalia were easy cases, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Transcaucasus republics pose higher risk for international community.

James E. Goodby suggests four criteria for engagement in collective military operations (9:310). First, when there is serious threat for expansion of the conflict intervention should be undertaken sooner than later. Former Yugoslavia is a tragic example of misjudgment of this criteria. If the UN, the CSCE or the WEU had undertaken intervention during the early stages of the conflict, its peaceful settlement might have been achieved earlier. Second, when the effect of the conflict will exert a significant impact on international norms then intervention is inevitable. The international response to Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait was an example of precise judgment of this criteria. The third criteria refers to moral considerations. If war crimes or crimes against humanity are committed during the conflict, intervention is also necessary. Fourth, when the survival of democratic government is seriously threatened, intervention should be undertaken. "If all four of these criteria can be answered affirmatively, the case for collective security military operation is a powerful one" - concludes Goodby (9:311). Additional criteria could be defined but Goodby's ones fully justify collective military intervention against aggressor state or in case of violation of the international norms.

What should the future European security system look like? Since the end of the Cold War many versions have been suggested. Richard H. Ullman recommends creation of a new European Security Organization (ESO), linking together NATO's states and former Warsaw Pact countries. He believes that ESO could evolve from the CSCE and WEU, and suggests a multinational monitoring and verification agency to be formed as a central part of the new security organization, using the deployed space satellite systems of the US and Russia (1042,63). Another option, according Ullman, is the transformation of NATO into ESO, which would require the governments and publics of non-NATO countries to share and commit themselves to the democratic values the Alliance proclaims (1046).

Douglas Clarke suggests a chart of the new European security architecture which includes all economic, political, and military organization in the region: CSCE, Council of Europe, NACC, NATO, EU, WEU, CIS, Nordic Council, Central European Initiative, EFTA, Baltic Council, and Economic Cooperation Organization (11:126). Obviously, this architecture, overburdened with interlocking and overlapping relations cannot serve as a framework of the new European security system.

Some analysts believe that only NATO is capable of meeting the security challenges of post-Cold War Europe. They stress the necessity of transforming of NATO on the basis of a new political agreement between the US and Europe, a new relationship with Eastern Europe, and a different model of political and military understanding (12:31-38). To establish a new transatlantic agreement and to transform NATO, they recommend several steps: (1) transformation of NATO from an alliance based on collective defense into an alliance for projecting democracy, stability, as well as crisis management; (2) a new
understanding between the US and its European allies, harmonizing their interests; (3) Germany's strategic emancipation and its more decisive involvement in building a new security order and stability in Europe; (4) integration of Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak republics) into the EU and NATO; (5) helping to democratize Russia and strong security partnership with it; and (6) a constructive policy toward Ukraine as an important strategic buffer between Europe and Russia. This model, however, is unacceptable to Russia and the most of East-European countries because its main ideas are a new division of Europe and a buffer's role for some states that they are not willing to assume.

Important elements in the new European security structure may emerge through combination of NATO/NACC, EU/WEU, and CSCE. The CSCE may decide to conduct peacekeeping operations and task NATO or WEU to implement them. This model, however, excludes the CIS.

Today, NATO/NACC and the EU/WEU are competing for influence in Europe and on its new security structure, pursuing different goals. Great Britain is fighting for Atlantic solutions. France wants to lessen the US influence in Europe and places emphasis on the EU and European forces outside NATO's structure. In Germany there are advocates of both of these two routes, but there are also strong proponents for a collective, all-European solution. The collective arrangement has a clear advantage in that it would bring Russia into the European system on an equal footing with other states. Russia ought to be included in all-European security system as soon as possible. Otherwise, it may return as a major European security problem.

The all-European security system implies strengthening the CSCE. There are several reasons to believe that the CSCE will play much stronger role in the European security system. First, it is a non-bloc, all-European organization, favored by most of Western European countries and by the new democracies in Eastern Europe. Second, important changes have been made toward the institutionalization of the organization; creation of all-CSCE parliament, the Assembly of Europe, a permanent secretariat, a conflict prevention center, an election monitoring center, and regular meetings of the foreign ministers and the heads of state. Third, the organization plays a major role in confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). As a primary security forum, however, the CSCE still has some severe limitations, for instance, the very diverse interests of its member states. The US, CIS, the
UK, and Turkey, each sees Europe as only one part, although the most important part, of its security interests; each faces some threats and has vital interests outside of the CSCE area. Nevertheless, the CSCE is well suited to deal with most of the security problems Europe faces today.

Charles and Clifford A. Kupchan have proposed a new European security organization based on the Concert of Europe of the early 19th century. They recommend a two-level design for the CSCE as an institutional framework of a modern concert. In their view, a security group has to be established which would include the US, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Germany as permanent members, and other CSCE states as rotating members. The other states of the CSCE would focus their efforts on CSBMs, human rights, promotion of democracy, and other less controversial issues (81153–158).

Another version of a collective security system in Europe is based on the division of the region into several security zones under the aegis of CSCE. These subregional organizations can be used as first-level institutions for CSBMs, crisis prevention, and crisis resolution. Building good neighborhood, cooperation, and transparency in the relations between historically and culturally closely connected nations will enhance significantly the security and stability in the zones. The security zones might be defined as Western (Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland), Northern (Norway, Sweden, and Finland), Central (Poland, Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, Austria, and Slovenia), South-Eastern (Romania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav republics without Slovenia, Albania, Greece, and Turkey), and Eastern (CIS, Moldova, and the Baltic states).

To strengthen the role of CSCE in collective security, it is necessary to establish an European Security Council, which should include the US, as a member of the CSCE, the major European powers, and a member state from each security zone, for instance, the US, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey.

Each security zone should have a security group, composed from representatives of the member states. The countries should commit themselves firmly to the principles of collective security and stability, building confidence and cooperation in their mutual relations. To guarantee rapid response in case of crisis, each security zone should form peacekeeping rapid reaction forces, composed from military units of the member states. These forces should
conduct joint training and exercises, thus enhancing the military cooperation between the armed forces of these countries.

CONCLUSION

The end of the Cold War has terminated the division of Europe into two hostile ideological, political, and military blocs. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union has changed dramatically the European geostrategic landscape. Today, the West is more secure, but the East is unstable and insecure. The dilemma the West faces today is, whether to keep the existing status quo or to commit itself in the process of building more stable and secure Europe through creation of reliable collective security system.

This paper has advocated the evolution of Europe's present security institutions into a pan-European collective security organization of which the new East European democratic states will be equal partners. This is the only way to avoid a new division and hostility in new Europe. It is understandable that the West is inclined to keep its reliable collective defense organization NATO, but it was a product of the Cold War. Keeping NATO during the 21st century might be counterproductive for the European stability and security. The necessity to change NATO is well recognized in the West. The question is in what ways and to what extent the West is willing to change the Alliance: further expansion, transformation into all-European security organization or merger in the CSCE? The NATO summit in January 1994 postponed the response to this question. Indeed, the "Partnership for Peace" and NACC will enhance the cooperation and confidence between the former adversaries, but will not solve the security problems of the East European countries.

Today, the concept of collective security seems to prevail in the debate about the future of European security. The Maastricht Treaty also has emphasized the elements of collective security. The only organization, suitable as a framework for European collective security is the CSCE. But it needs to be much more institutionalized and empowered. The European Council, NACC and NATO, EU and WEU all could contribute significantly in shaping the CSCE as a primary all-European collective security organization.
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