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Advisor: Colonel Bryant Shaw

MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA
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ABSTRACT

TITLE: Foreign Command of US Forces in Combined Theater Operations

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The Clinton administration has raised several signals that it intends to adopt a policy of allowing United States combat forces to be placed under the command of a foreign officer in multinational actions. With the significant draw down of US military forces over the past several years, the United States must review its commitments to multinational organizations and military actions which stem from those commitments. The United States is renewing its commitments to international organizations because they are currently the best choice for controlling the violence between states. Due to this renewed commitment the US is forced to examine whether that commitment extends to allowing foreign command over US forces.

In any coalition or joint operation there are significant challenges to overcome. When the US considers placing US forces under foreign command these challenges must be faced directly. The Persian Gulf War provides an excellent combined combat experience from which to examine these challenges in four primary but related areas. These areas are unity of command, cultural and religious differences, interoperability, and politics. Command is possible in each of these areas through a variety of formal and informal relationships. Finally, our examination of command relationships in the Persian Gulf War serves to highlight fundamental questions the United States must analyze before assigning forces to foreign command. These questions stem from the areas of the political objectives to be achieved, the mission, qualifications of the proposed commander, interoperability, and setting forth the successful end point to an operation. These factors serve as guideposts for evaluating any possible decision to assign US forces to a foreign commander.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel David G. Ehrhart (B.S., Civil Engineering, US. Air Force Academy; M.B.A., University of Utah; J.D., Creighton University School of Law) has been interested in combined command relationships since he was stationed at Soesterberg Air Base in The Netherlands where he served as the Staff Judge Advocate and chief legal advisor to the US Country Representative to The Netherlands. His past assignments also included service as a prosecutor, defense counsel, and government contract litigant. Most recently he was the Staff Judge Advocate for the 49th Fighter Wing at Holloman AFB, NM. Lt. Col. Ehrhart is currently attending the Air War College, class of 1994.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

War is a special activity, different and separate from any other pursued by man.¹

-Carl von Clausewitz

The gravest decision a government makes is when it sends its young men and young women into combat.²

-Congressman Lee Hamilton
Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee

Placing United States forces under foreign command catalyzes anxiety among Americans. Congressman Hamilton aptly underscores the importance of the decision and quite possibly strikes at the heart of this anxiety. The US, however, is at a crossroads in its development of an effective, budget conscious national security policy. The Clinton administration has sought to play a more participative role in international organizations, like the United Nations, hoping to lessen the financial burden on the US in multinational actions.³ This has raised what Congressman Hamilton refers to as the "threshold question" of foreign command over US forces.⁴ Although members of congress and others have been vocal in their objections to this proposal,⁵ the administration has continued to move forward on a Presidential Decision Directive to make this policy.⁶ Why is it in the interest of the United States to consider this possibility? If we are to consider placing US combat forces under foreign command, what problems does this pose at the war fighting level? Finally, what factors should the United States consider when evaluating the prudence of contributing US forces to a multinational action commanded by a foreign officer?

This paper will first examine the "multinational factor" in this debate. The issues of foreign command impact on our basic concepts of controlling violence, our desire to participate in international organizations, and issues concerning US global leadership. It is important, therefore, to understand our evolutionary thought in this area and why it is important to national security.
How we view our commitment to international organizations and to multinational actions determines our approach to the foreign command issue.

Next, this paper will examine the challenges of coalition command. Command relationships are at the heart of effective coalition operations. Those relationships can be formal or informal and how a commander operates in both areas can mean the difference between ultimate success or disastrous failure. Our coalition combat experience in the Persian Gulf War will serve as the backdrop from which to study these command relationships in the areas of unity of command, cultural and religious differences, interoperability, and politics. Although there are certainly other areas of command worthy of study, I have chosen these because they are central to the issues that influence our decision-making on the foreign command issue. Additionally, while I have chosen to consider each area separately, they certainly overlap each other. Unity of command and cultural and religious differences are parts of the broader definition of interoperability. Similarly, politics influences every area of military operations. Each of these areas are subsets of the overall command function and are further interwoven into the fabric of formal and informal relationships which provides the glue to coalition cohesiveness and mission accomplishment. The paper concludes with several questions to consider before a decision to put US forces under foreign command is made. These questions or factors derive from the challenges of combined operations and serve as possible guideposts for our national security decision makers.
CHAPTER II

THE MULTINATIONAL FACTOR

The rise of regional and internal conflicts poses difficult issues: What obligations does the international community have to such conflicts? What US role is consistent with our interests?  

- Anthony Lake  
  National Security Advisor

Anthony Lake raises the critical questions which bring us into the forum of seriously examining United States commitment to international organizations and multilateral actions -- the multinational factor. Before serious debate can begin on any of the many issues surrounding foreign command of US forces, we must understand the rationale behind our interest in multinational actions and evaluate whether that rationale still makes sense today. Intuitively, if we do not care about our participation in international organizations as they relate to controlling violence between states, then the foreign command issue is moot. Although burden sharing plays a role, finances alone would not create enough incentive for the United States to participate. If anything, finances would argue against it. It is important, therefore, to understand our evolutionary thought in this area and why it is important to our national interests.

The Evolution Of Controlling Violence

Once Chamberlain had a speech memorized from Shakespeare and gave it proudly, the old man [his father] listening but not looking, and Chamberlain remembered it still: "What a piece of work is man... in action how like an angel!" And the old man grinning, had scratched his head and then said stiffly, "Well, boy, if he's an angel, he's sure a murderin' angel." And Chamberlain had gone on to school to make an oration on the subject: Man, the Killer Angel.  

-Michael Shaara  
The Killer Angels, 1974
The study of human nature throughout recorded history is a fascinating paradox between desires for war and desires for peace. Oliver Wendell Holmes forecast that as "long as man dwells upon the globe, his destiny is battle." Whether men and women are more like Joshua Chamberlain's "killer angels" or "craving for peace" as in the Greek comedies of Aristophanes, the dichotomy has led many to seek to use international organizations to mediate the often contentious and warlike relations between nations.

This evolution began with the recognition that while wars need to be fought, they should only be fought for certain reasons and under certain standards of decency. Over time, there arose theories on what was and was not a "just" war. Initially codified in Christian thinking by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Acquinas in the fifth and thirteenth centuries, their theories agreed that for a war to be just three conditions were necessary: 1) an authorization of the ruler within whose competence it lies to declare war; 2) a just cause -- that those who are attacked merit such treatment; and 3) a right intention on the part of the belligerents, either achieving some good object or of avoiding some evil.

In the 17th Century the universal Church gave way to the rise of a new secular order in society. There is extensive literature on the rise of this secular order and its affect on an international system of laws to regulate disputes among states. The wars during the time frame leading up to this period were unbridled in their cruelty. In Clausewitzian terms, one could have described them as pure or absolute wars. The reaction of the people against these wars prompted the development of states for protection against these atrocities. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 after the Thirty Years War based the new world order on the sovereignty of states over the sovereignty of peoples. Interstate rivalries and bitter wars brought to the fore the state as the political entity with the recognition of the need for a system of law to regulate the dealings of the new states with one another in peace and war. Thus grew the roots of the separation of church and state and the issue of using the state to control violence. During the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the reaction against war in Europe saw the first plans for setting up organizations between states aimed at peace and disarmament, international
armies, and periodic meetings between great powers to set a pattern of international collaboration for peace. 17

After World War I, the world saw the first attempt to systematically organize peace and reduce armaments on a worldwide scale. Led by President Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations was created. Although lofty in purpose, the League failed in its goal to avoid war because it required more of its members than they were willing to give and the most powerful potential supporter, the United States, did not join. 18

The world community was initially more successful with the United Nations after World War II. Although giving the UN Security Council unprecedented power and responsibility 19 for an international organization, the Cold War which followed permitted it to be only minimally effective in controlling violence. 20 The demise of the Soviet Union and the post-Cold War era which followed seemed to spark new life into the United Nations. Under the leadership of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN became the centerpiece for resolution of many global conflicts. 21 The UN finds itself at a defining moment in its existence. Although freed from the paralysis of the Cold War, it remains a product of its member states. Whether this is a new beginning for the UN or the beginning of the end remains to be seen.

United States Interests

How we perceive this emerging world has a great impact on how we view our national interest and, therefore, the role international organizations might play in achieving it. The United States must decide what role it will play. Some have suggested that the reason the UN was created at all and sustained through the Cold War was due to a lingering desire for isolationism on the part of the US. 22 President Clinton campaigned on a pledge to spread the costs of defending US interests by relying more extensively on United Nations operations. 23 We find ourselves once again facing the struggle between domestic budget concerns and a desire for isolationism on one hand and our global leadership role to promote world stability and peace on the other. Some would argue correctly that as long as the leadership of the international organization consists of
member states with which the United States has considerable common interests, institutions, like the UN, "can be useful in promoting policies that benefit both Americans and the larger international community." Further, in a world of transnational interdependence, international disorder will affect the majority of Americans living in the United States. It is therefore clearly within the interest of the United States to work for a more orderly world. The evolution of world order to the present, then, impacts both how we approach achieving our national interests and how we respond to and participate in international organizations. The policy of the Clinton administration though is one of "assertive multilateralism." Therefore, for the foreseeable future, the US will remain engaged in international organizations and alliances. It must be remembered though that in the formation of alliances, there must necessarily be a compromise of national interests for the common purpose. For the commander of a multinational armed force and the troops involved, these compromises become particularly difficult.
CHAPTER III

THE CHALLENGES OF FOREIGN COMMAND

Coalition command is possible through a series of formal and informal relationships which focus on the mission to be accomplished. These formal and informal command relationships weave through the important areas of unity of command, cultural and religious differences, interoperability, and politics. These areas create significant challenges for the commander of a multinational force which impact both on the subordinate commanders from different nations and on the mission. These challenges can best be observed at the theater commander level. Although there are many ways to approach this study, it is instructive to examine these issues in the context of a recent combined combat experience. For that reason, this chapter will look at the coalition effort in the Persian Gulf War. Although the Gulf War involved overall United States leadership, we can examine the problems created in foreign command relationships and then apply them to the factors the US should consider before placing US forces under the command of a foreign officer.

Before going further, it is important to note the similarities in lessons learned between joint\textsuperscript{27} and combined\textsuperscript{28} commands. The issues discussed here regarding combined warfare are only a shade different from the problems associated with joint operations. Although beyond the scope of this paper, the same analysis presented here in each of these command areas could, with minor exceptions, be applied to our continuing struggle to operate as a more effective "joint" fighting force.

The Persian Gulf Coalition

*War is no mere pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts.*\textsuperscript{29}

-Carl von Clausewitz
The facts which set the stage for the Persian Gulf Coalition are well known and bear only summarized treatment here. On 2 August 1990 Iraqi forces marched into Kuwait and began occupation. The unabashed aggression by which Saddam Hussein took Kuwait was particularly significant and took the world by surprise. Also important to the world community was the fact that Hussein now controlled 20% of the world's oil supply and threatened another 20%. On August 5th the President characterized the invasion as "naked aggression" and clearly set forth US policy objectives. At the invitation of Saudi Arabia, the US then deployed forces to the Persian Gulf to defend Saudi Arabia from attack. Thereafter, the US strongly influenced the United Nations (UN) and mobilized the world community against Iraq. For the first time since 1950 the UN Security Council was able to authorize the use of force to repel an act of aggression. The result was arguably the greatest coalition in the history of warfare, not only because of what it accomplished but because of its diversity. Although President Bush's new world order never materialized as such, the coalition that he and Secretary of State, James Baker, created began a new era of international cooperation. The reality of this cooperation was put to the test on the ground in Saudi Arabia. As large deployments of troops, equipment and supplies from many countries began arriving in Saudi Arabia, the problems of commanding such a diverse group became readily apparent.

**Unity of Command**

_For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort._

- Army Field Manual 100-5

Core to any discussion of combined or joint operations is the very central issue of the command structure. Certainly, this issue alone is at the heart of the debate about placing US troops under foreign command. "Command", however, encompasses an entire field of academic thought and study by itself and a discussion of all command issues would travel beyond the scope.
of this paper. Therefore, this section will focus on the age old principle of war, unity of command. Does unity of command actually exist in coalition operations? If not, what are the parameters which make command possible in a multinational operation? Finally, what lessons concerning unity of command can we learn from the Persian Gulf War and apply to the debate on foreign command of US troops?

Unity of command and unity of effort is often difficult to achieve in joint operations among the various services within the United States. It is much more difficult, yet no less important, in military operations involving coalition forces. Command and Control of coalition operations is crucial to massing combat power toward a common objective. Each country that contributes troops to a coalition action normally sends those soldiers, sailors, or airmen in units complete with commanders. Depending on the size of the force, each country will most likely send an overall Commander-in-Chief (CINC) to command that country's national components. That CINC will be accountable to his or her country's national command authority. By its very nature, this mingling of different forces from different countries brings "command" challenges. The politics and military implications of these challenges, which will be discussed below, have a significant impact on not only the operation as a whole but on command at each level.

The Human Factor

Is there a field of human affairs where personal relations do not count, where the sparks they strike do not leap across all political considerations? The personalities of statesmen and soldiers are such important factors that in war above all it is vital not to underrate them.

-Carl von Clausewitz

The single most important element of a cohesive coalition at the theater level is what I will refer to as the human factor. This includes all the components which comprise our personalities, communications and interpersonal skills. It comprises taking stock of the politics involved in each situation and understanding the formal and informal structures at work in the coalition. It is the
most important factor because it is the thread which weaves through the entire coalition at all levels of command and binds it together.

In the creation of the command structure mutual respect, outstanding relationships (even friendships), sensitivity to the political needs of each other and constant maintenance of all the above are key to success. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower has noted:

Allied commands depend on mutual confidence. How is mutual confidence developed? You don't command it....By development of common understanding of the problems, by approaching these things on the widest possible basis with respect to each other's opinions, and above all, through the development of friendships, this confidence is gained in families and in Allied Staffs. 35

Desert Storm serves as a model of effective "relationship building" which resulted in an effective command structure. This can best be seen by looking briefly at the senior leadership in the Gulf. Lt Gen Prince Khalid Bin Sultan had an outstanding relationship with the other senior leaders in the Gulf. In fact, before Khalid was formally chosen to be the CINC of the Saudi forces and later over the Joint Forces Command for Arab/Islamic forces, Lt Gen Chuck Horner, who was theater commander at the time, and Lt Gen Sir Peter de la Billiere, the commander of all British forces in the Gulf, lobbied independently for Khalid's selection. 36 Gen de la Billiere states that the selection of Khalid was important because the British knew how to work with him and Khalid knew the British and their methods. He further believed that to have brought in a new person at that stage would have "upset the equilibrium of personalities which we had taken such trouble to establish." 37 It is important to note that Gen de la Billiere had an excellent relationship with Gen Schwarzkopf and trusted him. In fact, both praised each other in their subsequent accounts of the war. 38 Schwarzkopf commented that he trusted de la Billiere's intelligence and judgment so much that he asked his advice even on the most sensitive of issues. 39 Gen de la Billiere admired Schwarzkopf because Schwarzkopf understood the middle east, was a brilliant strategist and tactician, and had great political awareness. 40 The British general also had great praise for Lt Gen Chuck Horner calling his professional ability phenomenal and his air campaign a masterpiece. 41
The writings are effusive with similar comments among various leaders from different countries involved in the coalition. The import of these testimonials is that the senior leaders of these countries developed a personal relationship and a mutual degree of trust that made things work.

What course of action needs to be taken if one of the commanders from one of the countries doesn't have the personality necessary to successfully operate in the coalition? In the Gulf, Gen Homer had difficulty working with the senior air officer from one of the coalition countries. Gen Homer relates that he was the only one he had difficulty working with because he was not forthcoming and was very difficult. The result was that the country involved quietly ushered him out of the theater of operations and replaced the individual. The lesson to be applied is that the equilibrium of personalities is so important that the United States needs to be willing to pull commanders who do not fit in.

The importance of the human factor can not be overstated. It provides the fundamental machinery which allows the coalition to operate successfully. It also recognizes the importance and the distinctions between formal and informal structures and the delicate interplay between them. The formal structure is that which is on paper and, possibly, what has been agreed to by political authorities. It provides the "permission" to operate and the conditions under which that operation can take place. It is the informal arrangements, however, that make the coalition operate. The successful relationships highlighted above created a working atmosphere that stimulated accomplishments that might not have been possible within the framework of the more formal chain of command structure. This can range from issues concerned with devising war strategy and sharing intelligence, to the placement of combat troops, to simpler issues of where to hold conferences and who might attend. This dichotomy between the formal and informal structures creates a dilemma. Commanders must be able to effectively and comfortably operate in both these worlds.

Why do the informal structures succeed where the formal structures often seem ineffective? One possible explanation rests with an examination of the formal chain-of-command or wiring diagram itself. In the traditional military paradigm, the formal organizational charts are
created and displayed because knowledge of relationships between elements in the structure is essential to understanding the role of the organization. In a coalition, however, knowledge of these relationships is far more complex and can not truly be depicted by drawing straight lines between positions on a chart. More importantly, attempting to codify (other than in the most general manner) the formal relationships could be potentially destructive to effective command in the coalition. According to General Horner, the problem with any kind of command chart is that in the arena of foreign relations, it is human nature to interpret various subliminal communications from the display. For example, the questions immediately begin with who's superior to whom? This inevitably leads to problems back home for the commanders involved because whoever is lower on the chart obviously doesn't play a great role for that country in the coalition operation and it appears they are subservient to other nations. In fact, in Desert Storm, it was the press that routinely wanted the coalition leadership to draw up a wiring diagram. Again, it is a desire to simplify a very complex set of relationships. Therefore, the relationships that appeared to work the best in the Gulf War were the more informal arrangements.

This is not to say that the formal relationships between members of a coalition are not important. In the interplay between formal and informal relationships one must also recognize the value inherent in the agreements which formalize the process. Different countries have different strategic and political objectives for entering the war and for the peace which follows. Therefore, for the countries involved, the formal arrangements may have a political utility which far outweighs its military importance. A coalition commander cannot afford to ignore these political differences.

**Command Structure**

*Generally, management of many is the same as management of a few. It is a matter of organization.*

Sun Tzu
In the Gulf War initially, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command, commanded the Americans and Lt Gen Prince Khalid Bin Sultan commanded Saudi forces. They generally ran Desert Shield by coordinating daily on the strategy for that day and solving problems as they arose. Although Iraq attacked Kuwait on the 2nd of August and US deployments started three days later, it was not until November 2nd that formal command and control was established. In a meeting between Secretary of State, James Baker, and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the two agreed on the following:

Command and control: should military operations commence, a joint command as currently exists will continue; however, the commander of the US forces will have final approval authority for all military operations.

This then, set up the formal command structure. However, as mentioned above, this immediately caused problems. The new arrangement which basically placed Schwarzkopf over Khalid troubled the Prince. Schwarzkopf told Khalid privately, though, that he would not do anything with which the Prince disagreed. Again, the informal arrangement took precedence. These two had an outstanding relationship. Nevertheless, it would have been severely strained had Khalid been forced to come under the operational control of Schwarzkopf. Not surprisingly, this is common among coalition leadership. The problem is that it immediately sacrifices the bedrock principle of warfare: unity of command. Schwarzkopf himself realized that he was violating this principle but believed that for the alliance to have a prayer he needed this system. As a general rule, coalition command structures require the principle of unity of command to be violated. This will certainly be true in coalitions as diverse as the one in Desert Storm but more achievable in operations involving standing alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

But was unity of command really sacrificed? General Chuck Horner suggests that the complexity of unity of command issues is directly proportional to the function of the particular service involved. For example, in naval operations, unity of command had less of an impact because Admiral Stan Arthur divided up areas and tasks and coordinated all their efforts. The US Navy assumed control of forces in the Northern Persian Gulf closest to where the most action
would take place. The British, French, Dutch, and Italians divided the Southern Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz into five patrol zones.52

In air operations on the other hand, unity of effort is the key.53 The air effort was integrated under Gen Horner in his capacity as the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC).54 This centralized planning and decision-making forced a high degree of coordination of joint and combined air operations.55 General Horner relates that each day they would list out the targets and this would create a natural fallout in terms of the type of aircraft and weapons needed.56 Therefore, the appropriate squadron from the appropriate country and service would be tasked in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) to carry out the mission.57 Unity of effort was achieved through the ATO and tactical control of sorties was exercised by the JFACC. Execution of air operations was decentralized58 but there were some elements of unity of command involved. For example, once an aircraft was airborne it came under the command and control system of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The AWACS aircraft were operated by the United States and the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). Therefore, based on current intelligence data, a Navy controller on an Air Force AWACS might divert a British Tornado from target A to target B.59

There were some limitations imposed by various national command authorities but, according to General Horner, it never really became a problem. Due to the overwhelming availability of air power, the US was able to cover anything that other countries may not have politically wanted to accomplish.60 Therefore, one possible reason that these national restrictions never became a problem was that General Horner possessed all the assets he needed. Of particular importance to this exploration of foreign command issues is whether combined air operations could work as well with less resources and much less air power?61 One Rand study concluded that Gen Horner's problems were specialized and he had time to solve them. But they further note that his genius was in gaining and exercising the minimum amount of control he needed to get the job done and in creating conditions that allowed the services and the air forces of other countries to work effectively together.52

14
Unity of command issues are the toughest in land warfare. General Horner, during the early stages of Desert Shield and while he was CINCCENT Forward, saw this problem early on. He wanted to establish a method to insure effective coordination between forces. Therefore, he and General John Yeosock set up an organization from the very start to handle those problems. This organization was called the Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center (C3IC). The purpose of the C3IC was to facilitate the combined planning process and improve the day-to-day integration of coalition operations. It served as the link between the two major command structures which had developed -- the western forces under Schwarzkopf and the Arab/Islamic forces under Khalid. According to Gen Horner, the C3IC, while recognizing the sovereignty of national forces, also recognized the need for all forces to work together toward a common purpose. Throughout Desert Storm, it also served as the focal point for the exchange of intelligence between the Saudis and US forces at the national, theater, and tactical levels. In practice, the C3IC was crucial to the success of Desert Storm. It not only had the effect of providing a mechanism to work out the many details between the two command structures, it provided another avenue to develop close personal relationships between the Americans and the Saudis working at all levels. These informal relationships were essential to accomplish any number of tasks which required an interface with the Saudi government. It helped speed the flow of information and expedite approval processes. Clearly, for the Army, this did not amount to unity of command. But, as pointed out earlier, this was not going to be possible and the C3IC did serve to establish and maintain this one portion of unity of effort.

The British Perspective on Foreign Command

The British, under the command of Lt Gen Sir Peter de la Billiere, were cleared early on to put their forces under US command. Although the British Army initially deployed only a Brigade, Gen de la Billiere pursued authorization to increase it to a Division. In addition to the political desire not to let the British forces appear small, he had a more practical "foreign command" reason in mind. Whereas a Brigade would have to fight under an American Division
and therefore follow the Division plan, a British Division would be able to have greater autonomy and follow its own plan to cover an area of ground.\textsuperscript{69} His desire to do this underscores a desire by most countries who place their troops under foreign command. They want to maintain as much freedom as possible. Equally important is the desire to maintain national unit integrity at the highest practical echelon. Again, political expediency, not necessarily military necessity will often dictate military operations.

Responsibilities to national authorities can also be a problem. Gen de la Billiere knew that after the transfer of command of his forces to the operational control of the Americans that he alone would be responsible to the British government and people for British forces at the end of the day. Therefore, he retained what he called the "yellow card" -- the power to veto the use of British forces or take back command.\textsuperscript{70} This is yet another example of an informal arrangement which effected the coalition. It raises, of course, another contentious issue with regard to multinational action and command problems. Whether publicly stated or not, every country ultimately can (and possibly will) use this "yellow card." The United States is no exception. The question though that begs to be answered is: how is a military commander expected to plan and execute an action if the real possibility exists that one set of forces might be pulled from the fight at the last moment or pulled out when the going gets tough? The answer is that before the fight begins, the political portion of this action at the very highest levels of each of the governments involved must be resolved.

**Lessons To Apply To Foreign Command**

Unity of command, for all practical purposes, does not exist in coalition operations. Command is possible through a variety of formal and informal relationships which focus on the objective to be accomplished. The Persian Gulf War served to reinforce the basic tenets that General Eisenhower taught us from World War II. Understanding, respect, and trust create the climate that allows the type of mutual confidence necessary to command the forces of coalition partners. Our view of unity of command must be taken in its greater context of unity of effort and
be sensitive to warfare’s ultimately political dimensions. Unity of command issues can also be viewed in terms of their impact on specific missions and the nature of the Service performing the mission.

The United States must consider these issues of unity of command and unity of effort before allowing troops to be placed under foreign command. The human factor in establishing what Gen de la Billiere refers to as the equilibrium of personalities is crucial in obtaining any military objective. The commander of the Coalition forces must have the personality to work with all the nations involved but must be comfortable operating both the formal and informal command arrangements. Therefore, the United States must be involved in making sure the right foreign commander is selected for the job and must insure that the United States commanders also possess the right personalities to do the job. The political objectives and commitments at the international level must also be fully worked out in advance. In the final analysis, the military objective to be achieved should and must be the focus and the Commander must lead the coalition, in its entirety, to that objective while also being aware of the political context of the actions taken.

Cultural and Religious Differences

Our understanding of the importance of informal relationships can be further strengthened by considering the cultural and religious sensitivities of the coalition. The division of command between Schwarzkopf and Khalid generally illuminated and perhaps was at least in part caused by the cultural differences between their two countries. Those differences were primarily influenced by the Islamic religion which has many restrictions conflicting with western traditions and freedoms. In Saudi Arabia there is a high profile of Islam in politics, society, and personal life through religious observances, dress, and values. Also important is the fact that "Islam is a faith and a way of life where political and religious authorities are inseparable."71 With the advent of the Gulf War and the Saudi decision to allow deployment of massive numbers of US and western troops, a major problem emerged for the Government charged with the protection of the Islamic
holy land. In an area of the world where coups are common for violating religious tenets, this "mix" with the west was of great concern to Saudi leaders. General Khalid cogently points out that it was important that the deployment of coalition forces into Saudi Arabia not be perceived by either the Saudi people or other Muslims as an encroachment on Islam, its holy place, or its values. It was of great importance that the Islamic principles, customs, and traditions be respected. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, King Fahd received complaints from radical elements whose political agenda was to undermine the king by pointing to the harm done by allowing the people to mix with westerners. These problems ranged from proper attire and conduct by women, to restrictions on alcohol and diet, to non-Islamic religious services. General Schwarzkopf and General Khalid understood these concerns and took great pains to minimize them. The outstanding working relationship between Khalid and Schwarzkopf made all the difference in solving these problems.

Another cultural difference having an influence on military effectiveness both at lower and higher levels of command interface is the role of "relationships." The American military places a premium on the effectiveness of leadership in an organization. Whether a leader has a "personal relationship" is unimportant (and some would argue, discouraged). The important element is respect, sharing information up and down the chain of command, and obediently following lawful orders. Although these are certainly part of the Saudi military paradigm, the Saudis also place a premium on information and on knowing a person. This knowledge then leads to trust and a working relationship. This is certainly not a criticism of this method of doing business. In fact, General Khalid, writing for a British defense journal, infers criticism of the way the west does business by communicating through memos. He believes one of the factors that helped keep the Arab coalition together was their strong tradition of oral communication. They believed in discussing problems and working them out face to face. It should be noted that in many countries information is power and is controlled in ways westerners do not understand. Each country comes to the fight with its own traditions, culture, and transactional methods. I highlight this area because how personal relationships and trust factors develop when countries are "mixed"
to fight a war must be understood. This was not only an important factor in command relationships but for coordination relationships at lower levels.

Although the language difference was potentially significant, English was widely spoken by Saudi officers and helped take the edge off this factor. In fact, Prince Khalid had been educated at Sandhurst, the British military academy, and had attended Air War College at Maxwell AFB. He also held a Masters degree in Political Science from Auburn University.  

The lesson to be learned is that troops and commanders must be knowledgeable of the culture and religions of their fellow coalition members and respect both their personal practice of it and its impact on the integrity of the force. More importantly, the senior US officer must keep in daily contact with the foreign commander and insure a good communicative relationship exists.

Interoperability  

The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.  

-Joint Publication 1-02  

Interoperability is part of the more formal structure of the relationship between combined forces and can significantly affect how the force accomplishes its mission. Basically, interoperability is concerned with the ability of different fighting forces to integrate and operate effectively together. This can include the obvious elements which require interoperability such as equipment, logistics, and communication; but can also apply to more difficult issues of command, doctrine, language, and conflicts of laws and treaties. Several examples from the Gulf War help to illustrate the interoperability issues that affected the abilities of the forces to act together.

The first example is in the area of doctrine. Forces from different countries who seek to integrate into a coalition operation must seek a common doctrine. Operational plans are cut with a certain doctrine in mind be it land, air, or sea forces. These forces train and operate with that
doctrine at the core of their business. Group Captain Alan Threadgould, the British commander of Reece Detachment at Dhahran during Desert Storm, relates that the differences in doctrine in the Persian Gulf War were significant. Col Mohammed Al-Ayeesh, Director for Operations and Plans for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) during Desert Storm, agrees. As an example, the British and Saudi Tornados were designed to operate at low level with an electronic warfare system based on a target-specific threat rather than an area threat. The weapons were designed to be released at low level and the radar system was designed to operate at low level. When the Tornados shifted to operate at a medium level, they were now much more vulnerable to surface-to-air missile threats then they were at lower levels. This required them to be outfitted with additional equipment and become part of an American force package. The British and Saudis were very successful at adapting to this environment even though it required their Tornados to operate in a manner for which they were not optimally designed. This example, however, raises the specter of how doctrinal differences are resolved in a coalition action. In the Gulf War, the umbrella doctrine for the war was US doctrine because the US had the leadership. Therefore, to a certain degree, the solution of an interoperability problem is to figure out how an ally can change their doctrine to fit ours. If the situation is reversed will this same model apply? Will the US be forced to conform to a foreign commander's view of how the operation should be conducted based on his country's doctrine? General Robert W. RisCassi, the former Commander in Chief of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea-US Combined Forces Command, may have a better suggestion. He argues that a coalition must find a "common" doctrine. He suggests that following the four tenets of agility, initiative, depth and synchronization would create the firmest basis for conducting coalition operations. The principles of war would then be used to "intellectually Massage the elements of an operation to understand its risks and strengths." This approach has the benefit of universal application since the majority of it is intellectually logical. Finally, this would lend itself more readily to advance training and education in the area of coalition doctrine.
Desert Storm also demonstrated that when two countries come to the war with the same equipment and similar training on that equipment, they integrate fairly rapidly. An example of good interoperability was the use by the Egyptians of American-made tanks. They not only were well trained but had extensively exercised with the US in previous years. The Saudi Air Force integrated well with the US Air Force because, again, the US had sold them much of their equipment and they had been trained by us. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is another good example. General Horner relates that we had previously exercised with the Royal Saudi Air Force with their AWACS. The Saudis purchased the AWACS from us under the FMS program and although they had a different encoding system, it was compatible with the US equipment. The result was that the US was able to enter the country of Saudi Arabia under the protection of the RSAF. It worked because we had been doing it for ten years. The only real problem here was that secure communications were not compatible and therefore imposed a limitation on the operation.

On the other hand there were significant interoperability problems with the Saudi army. Since their doctrine only provided for local operations, they had not practiced the art of supplying and sustaining field operations. The Saudi army purchased American-made tanks but it took them time to effectively integrate with this equipment into the operational plan. One small example pointed to by Gen Schwarzkopf was when a Saudi Arabian battalion commander complained that the US had sold them defective M-60 tanks. Upon sending US maintenance experts out to find out what the problem was, they learned that the Saudis were not changing out the dirty air filters. When the Saudi would see the engine hot light go on, instead of changing the filter, he simply parked the tank and left it. This problem is not unusual when using new equipment but this occurred in September of 1990 while preparing for war. This problem and ones like it were easily solved as training and equipment orientation were completed and the forces gradually became more integrated.

Another important area requiring interoperability is in the area of Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I). C4I can be the key to combined operations.
While he was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communications and Intelligence, Duane P. Andrews proposed that our objective must be to provide commanders the capability to pull from the defense infrastructure, in a timely manner, all the essential information they need to accomplish their mission. Although Mr. Andrews was speaking of joint efforts, his comment applies equally to combined operations. This will be more important in the future because information technology is becoming more and more complex. The communication and information problems encountered in the Gulf War are legend and included inabilities to communicate between services, inadequate equipment to receive the lengthy air tasking order daily, classification problems, multilingual problems, sharing intelligence and many more. Interoperability in the C4I area is absolutely critical to future operations where US forces are under the command of a foreign officer.

If the doctrine and strategy are too different from our own in the particular mission to be accomplished, the US must reconsider whether we should participate at all, much less subject our troops to foreign leadership. If we are to avoid the trial and error approach to interoperability which so often occupies coalition time during the war, then we must wrestle with these problems in peacetime. We would be well counseled to adopt Gen RisCassi's prescription to create a commonly shared "coalition" doctrine. This includes training, education, and doctrine sharing. It further requires information sharing and a coordinated approach to the buying of equipment whether it be missile loaders or hand-held radios. Interoperability is a matter of degree. Perfect interoperability will never exist. To come to this practical conclusion, one must go only so far as the US armed forces and examine the interoperability problems between our own services. If the interoperability is low then there must be more time to prepare for the mission. If it is high then this becomes less of an issue and the forces can provide a quicker and more integrated response.
Politics

*The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war and into the subsequent peace.*

-Carl von Clausewitz

Clausewitz tells us that war is the instrument of policy by other (or additional) means. 

This frequently quoted maxim is as true on the international level as it is on the national. It can become increasingly more complex, however. Once again, the Commander must skillfully operate in both worlds of formal and informal relationships. Not only must the commander deal with the policies of his own nation in accomplishing the mission, but must contend with the stated (formal) and unstated (informal) policies of each member state of the coalition. They will not always be the same and in some cases may even be diametrically opposed.

Further, of course, the Commander must deal with the formally stated policies and objectives of the "Coalition". If an existing alliance is already in effect such as NATO, then that governing body may be setting the policy. In the United Nations this becomes even more difficult because of the sheer size of the organization. Yet as mentioned in Chapter II, it will most likely be through a multinational action that the United States will fight its next war. When we talk of politics then, and the policies which guide coalition forces we find ourselves on very uneven ground. Illustrative of the dilemma is the issue of whether these international organizations or *ad hoc* coalitions have "political" responsibility in the sense that Clausewitz defined it for war making activity. Former National Security Advisor, General Brent Scowcroft, suggests that they do not. He reasons that organizations like the UN are not states and do not have the attributes of a state. Gen Scowcroft's primary concern is that if the UN commits troops to combat operations and something goes wrong, there is no ultimate responsibility. If the United States commits troops to combat and something goes wrong, the President is ultimately politically responsible for those forces. Gen Scowcroft suggests that this is a very different type of responsibility. Some
disagree and go so far as to advocate for a volunteer UN force. Even if there existed an
organized UN dedicated force, however, national forces would also be involved in a conflict of
any magnitude. Important to this discussion, then, is the fact that each country brings its own
politics to the battlefield and views the war through the lens of its own policy objectives. In other
words, Clausewitz would remind the Commander that entering the Coalition was an extension of
that Nation's policy. The Commander of the multinational force must understand what each
Nation's policy objectives are and how they will affect the operational plan.

Of all the differences to overcome, political agendas had the greatest impact on the actions
taken in the Gulf War and from the very start the political dimension took center stage.
Absolutely critical was the political commitment to the goals enunciated by President Bush. Even with those commitments made by coalition partners, national politics continued to enter
every phase of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Some examples of politics affecting the mission
and therefore operational planning and execution will help illustrate the challenges which face
coalition forces.

Particularly critical were the workings of national politics on operational planning. For example, Gen Schwarzkopf was very sensitive in the ground phase of the campaign to a desire
that Saudi forces actually liberate Kuwait. He incorporated this into the plan. As for the United
Kingdom, Schwarzkopf originally wanted the British Desert Rats (1st Armored Division) to
attack with Gen Walt Boomer into Kuwait. When he briefed Lt Gen Sir Peter de la Billiere on the
plan, de la Billiere remarked that "British voters would object to seeing their boys relegated to the
supporting attack" and could Schwarzkopf reassign his force to the main attack with VII Corps.
Schwarzkopf made the change.

The Egyptians were important to the coalition because they were the key to Arab
participation in Desert Storm and, after the US, had the largest ground attack force. More
importantly, their two armored divisions were well trained, outfitted with modern American
equipment and had been exercising with Central Command forces for years. During the ground
campaign, the Egyptians spent most of the first day making their breaches along the barrier line at
the border. Although Schwarzkopf recognized them as tough, methodical fighters, he believed their slowness was due more to politics than terrain; since the idea of attacking fellow Arabs was so controversial in Egypt, he suspected the commanders might have been ordered by Cairo to keep casualties to a minimum. Once again command and control across national lines must take into account and be prepared for individual national interests which may affect missions even at the tactical level.

The Syrians presented another problem. Recent US relations with Syria had bred distrust both because they had traditionally been a Soviet client and had sponsored terrorism against the US. As a result, they were the only major coalition partner that Schwarzkopf did not personally consult in planning Desert Storm. He did not trust them to come through when the shooting started. In fact, on January 30, 1990 the Syrians informed Khalid that they would not attack Kuwait. This represented a possible crack in the coalition and jeopardized the offensive plan since "without the support of Syrian tanks, the Egyptians attacking into Kuwait would be badly outgunned." The eventual solution was to have the Syrians held in reserve and only fight if the Egyptians ran into trouble (thereby coming to the aid of fellow Arabs). This idea sold but once again the plan was weakened by one member's politics. It also serves to raise questions about what a foreign commander is to do if a force under his operational control refuses to fight in accordance with the plan. In Desert Storm this problem was raised and solved nearly two months before the ground war began. How is this problem solved on the eve of battle or during the fight? If US troops serving under foreign command are the ones left unsupported in the battle because another country chooses not to fight, how do we respond?

French politics played an especially interesting role in the issue of placing French troops under the operational control of the United Nations. The French were in a unique position as Iraq's leading western ally and second only to the Soviet Union in providing Iraq with arms. This included the Mirage F1 fighter aircraft, Exocet anti-ship missiles, and advanced electronic gear for radar systems and equipment to increase the range and accuracy of Scud missiles.
Initially President Francois Mitterand was more concerned with remaining independent from the US than with Iraqi aggression. As a result, he started his own diplomatic moves and declared France would not become part of the multinational force proposed by Bush. Once again however, it was a political mistake by Saddam Hussein that forced the French to reconsider their posture. When Saddam demanded the closure of foreign embassies in Kuwait, the French embassy, as were the others, was surrounded and cut off from water and electricity. In addition, however, the Iraqis invaded the French ambassador's residence and kidnapped four French citizens. The French were now willing to commit forces.

Nevertheless, they wanted to report to no one and defend their own sector. The Saudis rejected this. The French minister of defense, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, was still anxious to keep France's relationship with Baghdad intact and did not want French forces to be under the operational control of the United States. This created a great deal of uncertainty about whether French forces could be counted on and once again this inhibited operational planning. Eventually French forces were put under the operational control of the US but political volatility about where they would and would not fly and what they would and would not do continued to plague the French contribution. From a purely political point of view, French participation was crucial to showing unity in the coalition effort. Their impact on command and control and on operational planning underscores the politics which influences the moves each foreign commander makes.

In the reverse situation where the decisions are being made by a commander foreign to the US, should the US assert its political influence on the commander to change an operational plan so that US troops might get something they want but which may not be in the best interest of the specific mission involved? Altruistically the answer would be no because the mission should be accomplished in the manner the commander believes is best. Practically, Desert Storm illustrates that each country has its own national policy and its commitment to the coalition extends only that far and will effect how it actually integrates into the command structure. The United States would be no different.
The political dimension of combined warfare naturally results in complex formal and informal relationships. Even though the overall coalition may have clearly stated goals and objectives, each country comes to the battle with its own national interests and its own reasons for joining the fight. Clausewitz simplifies the relation between the military aim and the political objective. The object of war, he states, is to impose our will on the enemy, with the means of the maximum force available, with the aim of rendering him powerless. This assumes that the military aim and the political objective can be identified. When several or more nations come together this is not always obvious. In Desert Shield, President Bush clearly set forth the political objectives. But not all countries shared the same interests or objectives. The commander must be aware of those commitments which in reality are only symbolic in nature. He must also be aware of the stated and unstated political aims of the other countries and evaluate their impact on the operational plan. This will allow him to effectively take this into consideration and use his informal relationships to insure the mission is properly carried out.
CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS

What lessons should we take from our experience in the Gulf War which we can apply to future situations where the US might be under the operational control of a foreign commander? Although the Gulf War serves as an example of an extremely diverse but successful coalition, the facts also show that one nation, the United States, was in control. What are the future challenges facing the United States in deployments which could possibly involve putting our combat forces under the command of a foreign officer? How does this help analyze whether the United States should contribute combat forces to a war fighting coalition or peacekeeping operation and put them under the operational control of a foreign commander? The examination of the issues surrounding unity of command, cultural and religious differences, interoperability, and politics reveals fundamental questions the United States should definitively answer before considering the assignment of forces to a foreign commander.\(^1\)

What are the political objectives? Our discussion on politics underscores the absolute requirement that the national leaders agree on the objective of the action to be undertaken. President Bush clearly set forth the political objectives in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They served as the basic ingredient for forming the coalition. For the multinational commander of theater level operations, the political objectives serve as the formal benchmark against which all other actions take place. If US forces are to be sent in as subordinate units, the political objectives will serve to add cohesion to their role in the operation. If the political objectives are not clear, we should not have considered participating in the action in the first instance, much less consider placing our forces under foreign command.

What is the mission? Is it peacekeeping or peace enforcement? Is it against drug lords or war lords? What are the objectives of the mission? Are they clearly set forth by the combined commander for the coalition and does the US agree with them? Do they clearly accomplish US
policy objectives? Are our forces properly trained for the specific mission involved? In the Gulf War, the entire mission was guided by the US. It was a traditional military mission for which we were trained. The United States has committed forces into nontraditional missions and this trend seems to be growing in spite of defense cuts. Our forces need to be properly trained for the specific mission to be accomplished. Additionally, is the mission likely to involve heavy combat where the risks are high. If so, we would be more likely to commit the forces and resources necessary such that US command leadership would result. More importantly, we need to insure that we make a conscious decision to continue to commit our forces if the mission starts to change or evolve. If the contribution of our troops was based in part on the mission to be accomplished, then we must continually reassess not only the progress in attaining the mission but whether the mission objectives need to be adjusted. If they start to adjust on their own or the United Nations (or whatever alliance we are a part of) unilaterally changes the mission, then we must reassess US participation to insure that the adjusted mission continues to meet US national interests.

Who is the proposed coalition commander? What is the commander's experience? If the mission is a peacekeeping mission, does the commander possess the skills necessary to effectively handle the sizable political responsibility as well as the military requirements? What is the commander's education and training? Does the commander speak English? What is the commander's attitude and experience with Americans? As Clausewitz would ask, what is the genius of the commander? In the gulf, if Lt Gen Prince Khalid was the overall commander, his command of the English language, western education (in both the UK and US), and graduation from Air War College would have been viewed favorably. Further, what country does the commander represent? How similar are political values and culture to our own? The fact that they are dissimilar does not mean we don't participate. It means we must be aware of the differences and factor them into our decision making process. What is the trust factor? Do we have alliance or coalition experience with this country? I believe Lt Gen de la Billiere was able to achieve an important change to the operational plan because the US and Great Britain had a long
history of successful alliances in war and peace. The converse would be Libya where the trust factor was low or non-existent between the countries. France, a country that is similar by terms of western culture, trusted the US but due to its own political relationships with Iraq and its age old gaullic policies, had to overcome significant obstacles to accept operational control by the US. I suggest that the country-to-country trust factor must be high at the national, state, and defense levels between the US and the country whose commander would command our forces. The political inference is that as the multinational force is being created the US must be significantly involved in the choice of which country will take the lead or serve as the executive authority and therefore provide the overall commander.116

How well can we integrate with a particular coalition? This factor is concerned with the interoperability issues mentioned previously. If the doctrine and strategy are too different from our own in the particular mission to be accomplished, the US must reconsider whether we should participate at all. As we discussed earlier, interoperability is a matter of degree. If the interoperability is low then there must be more time to prepare for the mission. Do we have the time necessary? If the interoperability problem is one involving a conflict of laws then the US should carefully study the laws involved to insure our troops are not directed to do something which is legal under the lead country's laws, but illegal in accordance with US law. Should we decide to participate in a conflict where this possibility exists we must make clear to the foreign commander that we will not violate US law, explain where conflicts may exist, and have judge advocates in the field to advise the US commander.

Another interoperability concern is language. What will the language of the coalition be?117 The majority of American troops and commanders only speak English. If the country in charge of the coalition selects a different language it presents a problem for US participation. Even if the foreign commander speaks English, that will not be the language spoken in staff meetings and during negotiations, planning, and relationship building. It also means that other members of the coalition may not send commanders who speak English but rather, and appropriately so, commanders who speak the language of the coalition. The implication is the US
should send a commander who speaks the coalition language. But will the match between language and abilities produce the best person for the job? Alternatively, the commander could always have an interpreter along. This in my view would also be unacceptable. Although, this seems to work in diplomacy, it would not work where crucial communication and quick reactions are necessary during a crisis.

What is the end point? Is there a clearly defined point that we will recognize when we get there and know that the mission has been accomplished? The US in the last decade has realized that this is a critical question in any operation. We cannot allow the country to get involved in conflicts if we can't clearly see how to get out of them successfully. This naturally leads to the corollary question. What is the likelihood of success? Sun Tzu put it best over two thousand years ago: "He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious."

All of these questions must be carefully examined and answered before the United States sends its forces to serve under the command of a foreign officer. The future will most likely provide a multitude of challenges to assess each of these questions. The answers will vary in each situation and we should not develop rigid formulas which determine whether and how we should participate in a multinational action. On the issue of command structure, the United States must remain flexible with the goal accomplishing the mission in the best way possible. If that means the possibility of placing US forces under a foreign commander, these questions should provide a guide for evaluating that decision.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

The United States (US) is currently considering a policy of allowing the assignment of US combat troops to the operational control of a foreign commander. This has far reaching effects for the United States and its commitments to international organizations and multinational actions in warfare in the future. Since World War II, the US has commanded the multinational operations in which we were participating because we were the global leader in providing resources. As the US seeks to reduce its defense budget and hence, its force structure, the Clinton administration has sought to shift a great deal of this burden to the United Nations and other international organizations.

In a world of transnational interdependence, international disorder will affect the majority of Americans living in the United States. There is general agreement, therefore, that it is within the interest of the United States to work for a more orderly world. Our reasons to stay committed now to international organizations is the same as when international organizations started to evolve. The post Westphalian rise of nation-states and the centuries of wars which followed gave rise to a desire to control violence between states. Therefore our commitment to international organizations and, hence, to multinational military actions stem from this basic desire to control violence and work towards a stable, peaceful world order. This, then, forces us to consider the possibility that in military actions US forces could be assigned to a foreign commander.

Coalitions have always brought unique relationships to the battlefield. How these relations are conducted has a significant influence on theater command and operations. The Persian Gulf War aided our understanding of these relationships in the areas of unity of command, cultural and religious differences, interoperability, and politics. Unity of command, for all practical purposes, does not exist in coalition operations. Command is possible through a variety
of formal and informal relationships which focus on the objectives to be accomplished.
Understanding, respect, and trust create the climate that allows the type of mutual confidence necessary to command the forces of coalition partners. Unity of command issues can also be viewed in terms of their impact on specific missions and the nature of the Service performing the mission. Our view of unity of command must be taken in its greater context of unity of effort and be sensitive to warfare's ultimately political dimensions.

In cultural and religious areas, commanders and troops alike must be knowledgeable of and sensitive to the differences that might effect integration and mission accomplishment. Interoperability will always be a problem and must be overcome as quickly as possible. Doctrine, education, training, C4I, and equipment must find common ground for the coalition to operate effectively. The best way, as shown in the gulf with the Egyptian army and the Saudi Air Force, is to use similar equipment and continually conduct combined exercises during peacetime. Political differences will continually plague combined operations. The lesson from the gulf is that these differences can have a critical effect on operational planning and execution and political leaders must agree on the mission to be accomplished.

Our examination of command relationships in the Persian Gulf War served to highlight fundamental questions the United States must analyze before assigning forces to foreign command. These questions stemmed from the areas of the political objectives to be achieved, mission definition, qualifications of the proposed commander, interoperability, and setting forth the successful end point to an operation. These factors serve as guideposts for evaluating any possible decision to assign US forces to a foreign commander.

Although the Gulf War served as an example of a diverse coalition working together to achieve victory, it will most likely not be the model for the future. In the gulf, the coalition had approximately six months to root out and solve problems. Conflicts of the future will not have this benefit of time. If the US puts troops under foreign command then our political leadership has a greater responsibility to analyze the fundamental questions posed and insure there is agreement between countries on the strategy, objectives, tactics, and rules of engagement.
Troops and commanders alike must be knowledgeable and sensitive to the differences among coalition partners and eliminate them or integrate them as quickly as possible. The likelihood of placing US combat troops under the operational control of a foreign commander in a high risk or large combat operation in the near future is remote. In the longer run, however, our commitments to the multinational organizations and alliances we belong to may have a significant impact on how we choose to participate in military actions. In any event, the military mission to be accomplished is of paramount importance. If we are to quickly and successfully accomplish this mission with minimum loss of lives, we must be deliberate in our decision making on whether we will lead the operation, participate without granting operational control of US forces, or assign our forces to the operational control of a foreign commander.
NOTES


4 There are many possible situations where American forces could be placed under the command of a foreign officer. This paper is focused on those areas where combat is involved. Therefore, I recognize that the challenges and considerations raised here might not apply in other situations -- for example, a United Nations humanitarian mission (mission creep in Somalia excluded) or a benign peacekeeping operation.

Additionally, this focus is on combat forces as opposed to non combat forces, such as logistics or engineering troops. Finally, some might raise the issue of the constitutional authority of the president to allow foreign command over US forces, as former Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, did during his confirmation hearings. Doherty, "United Nations Newfound Muscle Relieves, Worries Washington," pp. 526-27. My discussion centers on the issue of placing US forces under the operational control of a foreign officer. The president would, most likely, never abrogate his constitutional duties as Commander in Chief. UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright has stated that while US forces can be placed temporarily under the operational control of a UN commander, "the president will never relinquish command authority over US forces." Jim Abrams, "Albright Lays Down Rules for Future Peacekeeping Missions," The Associated Press, October 20, 1993. The Clinton administration's proposed peacekeeping policy insists that the "US chain of command remain intact, even if Americans are under the operational control of a foreign


6 Daniel Williams, "Clinton Peacekeeping Policy to Set Limits on Use of US Troops," *Washington Post*, February 6, 1994, p. 24. It appears the agency with primary responsibility is the Department of State and, more specifically, the US Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Madeleine Albright. Based on the congressional response, it was the opinion of former National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, in an interview with the author on 25 October 1993, that this directive was a dead issue. It appears from recent news reports, however, that this may not be true -- at least from a policy perspective. Ibid.

7 As used here, coalition refers to two or more nations who have agreed to cooperate to achieve a military objective. This does not necessarily mean that the outcome will produce maximum satisfaction for all the countries involved. Each participant is motivated towards this cooperation because each believes that together they can achieve an outcome which would be preferable to that which would result if each were to act alone. See Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelly, and Michael Leiserson, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 7.

8 This paper does not specifically address how other powerful nations view placing their forces under the command of a foreign commander. This would be another useful and interesting monograph. Different countries have a variety of responses to this issue. Take, for example, the other four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Great Britain was willing to give the United States operational control of its forces in Desert Storm but retained their own chain of command. France initially avoided this issue in the Gulf War preferring to cover their own sector under their own commander. They later reluctantly gave the US tactical control of French forces. It is not clear whether these nations would allow foreign command by another country if that country was not so dominating in forces (as the US was in Desert Storm). Great Britain and France are discussed in more detail in the text below. China would, most likely, not be willing to place forces under the command of a foreign officer. Senior Colonel (Brigadier General) Zhang Liantai, from China's Ministry of Defense, in an interview with the author, stated that China would support a UN action but would maintain national control of its forces. China believes in peace and independence for all nations and therefore is not a member of any alliances and would never, therefore, put together a coalition. Interview with Senior Colonel Zhang Liantai, Foreign Affairs Bureau, Ministry of National Defense, People's Republic of China, Beijing, China, 18 February 1994. Historically, there is also precedent
for this. During World War II, when President Roosevelt wanted a four power high command, he had to make China a separate theater from Southeast Asia because "it was agreed that the Chinese would never consent to a foreign command." Ruth B. Russell and Jeannette E. Muther, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution 1958), p. 55, footnote 27. China's UN participation in peacekeeping operations such as the use of its forces to clear mines and do construction in Cambodia, has always been done under Chinese command. Interview with SRC Zhang. Finally, with the recent break up of the Soviet Union, Russia's future willingness to be under foreign command is much more difficult to read. The Russians, however, have historically been as uncompromising as Americans when it comes to foreign command. See Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, "After the Cold War: New Approaches to Combined Operations," Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, US Army Combined Arms Command, March 1992, p. 19.


17 Ibid., p. 17. What was really happening was nationalism but many were not satisfied with the performance of states in the management of violence.


19 Ibid.

20 The Cold War saw the world order shift slightly into a bipolar, superpower dominated structure. The post-Westphalian sovereignty of states remained but was now influenced by the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since both were permanent members of the Security Council with veto power over its actions, the effectiveness of the UN as a collective security organization significantly weakened. The result was that the United Nations entered a period of benign peacekeeping operations.
and, in less than a decade, the United States entered into a multitude of selective security alliances. It wasn't until the end of the Cold War more than 40 years later that the United Nations would again become a potentially influential organization in keeping the peace.

With regard to my statement that the UN entered a period of "benign" peacekeeping operations, many would argue that these operations were anything but benign. They were, however, far weaker in scope than the late forties vision of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. With the advent of the Cold War, Secretary General U-Thant recognized this was impractical and UN peacekeeping operations evolved into a non-coercive process. With the trouble the UN had in the Congo in the 1964-65 time frame, peacekeeping became even less active. Jordan, American National Security, pp. 520-21.


22 Ibid., p. 4.


25 Nye, "What New World Order?", p. 94.


31 Report to Congress, p. xix.

32 A sampling of the topical literature would include C. Kenneth Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1990) and Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1985). Van Creveld notes in his conclusion that "command cannot be understood in isolation. The available data processing technology and the nature of armaments in use; tactics and strategy; organizational structure and manpower systems; training, discipline, and what one might call the ethos of war; the political construction of states and the social makeup of armies—all these things and many more impinge on command in war and are in turn affected by it." Ibid., p. 261.


34 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 94.


37 Gen de la Billiere, *Storm Command*, p. 88 (emphasis added). General de la Billiere was impressed with Khalid from the moment of their first meeting. For the British, Khalid's Sandhurst training helped. Ibid., pp. 36-37.


40 Gen de la Billiere, *Storm Command*, p. 41.

41 Ibid., p. 43.

42 Interview with General Horner. General Horner desired not to embarrass this officer or his country by using his name and I have honored that desire here.

43 There certainly existed line and bar charts depicting the command structure in the Gulf. Report to Congress, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, Appendix K, pp. 543-59. The important point is that these charts do not truly depict the real relationships that existed.

44 Interview with Gen Horner.

45 Ibid.


47 Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, p. 434.

48 Ibid., pp. 434-35.

49 Ibid., p. 362.

50 Interview with Gen Horner.

51 Ibid. I suggest this may only be relevant to the Gulf War. In a coalition operation which involves combating a powerful navy with coordinated attacks by the coalition Navy, a command structure similar to that devised by the army might be needed.


This coordination was possible because of the very nature of the system that was set up. If any of the participants wanted tanker support or air defense suppression, if it wanted to avoid having its aircraft endangered by friendly fire, if it wanted to participate in the decision-making about which targets would be hit, and if it wanted to be a player in the air attack plan, then it had to participate with the JFACC as well as fly the air attack plan as set out incrementally in the daily Air Tasking Orders (ATOs). Ibid. p. 92.

For example, General Horner states that it was therefore natural for French Jaguars to go against targets in Kuwait. Due to their payload and range, they really couldn't have gone to any other place. It was also natural for American F-117s to go to Baghdad because they were the only aircraft that could survive in that kind of defense environment. Interview with Gen Horner. According to Lt Col Dave Deptula, one of the air campaign planners in Col John Warden's Checkmate and in Gen Horner's Black Hole, the best weapon system to achieve the desired effect was selected without regard to branch of service or country of origin. James P. Coyne, "Plan of Attack," Air Force Magazine, April, 1992, p. 45.

I have not attempted within the scope of this study to examine the availability-of-resources issue. It is an important area however that deserves the attention of a future monograph. In Desert Storm the United States applied overwhelming resources against the objective we were trying to achieve. Even, as Gen Horner notes, where other countries could not for one reason or another do a mission, Gen Horner didn't have a problem because his country could cover it. In days of shrinking military budgets, how do resources affect the command structure? Will the perception of the lack of resources result in countries prematurely pulling out of the coalition? As the war drags on because there are not the type of overwhelming resources available, will the public support in each of the countries gradually drain off? Will an enemy recognize this as the center of gravity of the coalition and exploit it?


Interview of Gen Horner. Gen Yeosock had extensive experience working with the Saudi Arabia National Guard and quickly assumed this responsibility. Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 558.
64 The C3IC was established on 13 August 1990. Report to Congress, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, p. 558.

65 Ibid., p. 559. General Schwarzkopf had operational control of forces from the United Kingdom and other western nations and tactical control of French forces. All of these forces remained under the ultimate command of their national command authorities. Ibid., pp. 556-57. The Saudi led Joint Forces Command (JFC) had operational control of all Arab/Islamic regional forces. In contrast to the national command authorities of the western nations, the Islamic nations authorized Saudi Arabia to exercise command of their forces. Ibid.

66 Gen Horner did not want to name this organization because he wanted it to mean anything to anybody, hence it became known as the C3IC. Gen Horner’s Vietnam experience played a role in his views about the C3IC. One of the problems he wanted to avoid was the tendency the US had in Vietnam to take on the leadership role and then get "pushy" with it. This tendency has a very adverse effect on coalition cohesiveness. It results in suspicion of our motives and eventually leads to resentment. Horner interview.

67 Ibid.

68 Gen de la Billiere, *Storm Command*, p. 82.

69 Ibid., p. 81.

70 Ibid., pp. 82-83.


72 Saudi Arabia protects the two holiest Islamic sites of Mecca and Medina. Saudi Arabia is held by some to be the guardian of "Islam" as well. Ibid., p. 6. General Prince Khalid Bin Sultan relates that one billion Muslims consider the entire Saudi Arabian Kingdom (not just Mecca and Medina) to be a holy land. Gen Khalid further emphasizes:

> You have to be a Muslim to appreciate the unprecedented courage and iron will that went into the decision to invite Western forces into Saudi territory, the Islamic world's holy of holies.


73 Ibid., p. 3.

74 Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, p. 388. General Khalid disagrees with the implication by General Schwarzkopf in *It Doesn't Take a Hero* that Saudi leaders were overly fearful

75 Major Barry A. Maxwell, "Establishing Theater Command and Control in a Coalition of Nations: Requirements for US Doctrine," US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 28 May 1992, 17, citing his interview with Major Kenneth Dombroski, US Army, Middle East Foreign Area Officer, Intelligence Desk, C3IC.


77 Pyle, Desert Storm II, October 20, 1992. See also Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, pp. 381-82.


79 Interview of Group Capt Threadgould.

80 Interview of Colonel Al-Ayeesh.

81 Interviews of Group Capt Threadgould and Colonel Al-Ayeesh.

82 If US forces are under foreign command, it must be assumed that the US has not contributed the majority of troops. Will the UN commander, then, be from the country which provides the majority of troops and/or resources? In larger actions involving war this has traditionally been the case and has a significant impact on how we solve interoperability problems.

83 General Robert W. RisCassi, "Principles for Coalition Warfare," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1993, p. 60. General RisCassi further asserts that these four tenets are not characteristically American attributes or even limited to a single service. Ibid..

84 Ibid.

85 Interview with Gen Horner, 16 December 1993.

86 Interview with Col Al-Ayeesh.

87 Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, p. 394.

88 Much more difficult in the technology area, however, are problems similar to those encountered by the French. French Jaguar bombers lacked appropriate night-fighting technologies and could only operate during daylight hours. As with the different services,
the greater the interoperability between two countries the faster they will integrate into a cohesive fighting force.


90 For a good explanation of the language and shar intelligence problems see RisCassi, "Principles for Coalition Warfare," pp. 69-70. Another example of problems in this area can be found in the very important area of identification, friend or foe (IFF). French Mirage F1-CR reconnaissance planes and C-version fighters could not be employed over Kuwait for fear of creating identification, friend or foe (IFF) problems with Iraqi Mirages. Jacquelyn K. Davis, "Reinforcing Allied Military Capabilities in a Global Alliance Strategy," in The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, eds. Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, July 1992), pp. 196-97. The IFF problem occurred with other nations as well because the IFF mode was US only or NATO only. The Gulf Coalition was able to work around them though because all aircraft had IFF systems in them so they found a common IFF level. This common level did not give the type of protection a higher NATO level would have given but it was accurate and the Iraqi's were never able to take advantage of it.

91 Clausewitz, On War, p. 605.

92 Ibid.


94 Ibid.

95 The debate on this issue has been led by Sir Brian Urquhart, former undersecretary general of the United Nations. Sir Brian argues for an international force that would be under the exclusive authority of the Security Council and under the day-to-day direction of the secretary general. Brian Urquhart, "For a Volunteer Military Force," The New York Review of Books XL, June 10, 1993, p. 3. The debate on this topic continued by a variety of respected individuals and can be found in the June 24, 1993 and July 15, 1993 issues of The New York Review of Books.

96 See note 30 above.

97 Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, p. 447.

98 Ibid., p. 449.

99 Ibid., p. 452.

100 Ibid., p. 529.
101 Ibid., pp. 455, 467-68.

102 Ibid., p. 469.


104 Ibid.


107 Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, p. 454.


109 This uncertainty contributed to Chevenement's eventual resignation. Davis, "Global Alliance Strategy," p. 195; Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, pp. 351-52. Also, the French ground forces were to be deployed in Southwestern Iraq with a brigade of the US 82nd Airborne Division, while French aircraft were to be deployed against counter force targets -- largely fixed in Kuwait. Davis, "Global Alliance Strategy," p. 195.

110 Davis, "Global Alliance Strategy," p. 195. Even after the air war began it was clear the French people supported the war and were disenchanted with the limitations put on French forces (for example, only bombing in Kuwait). It was the 24th of January before the French Air Force made its first strike beyond Kuwait. Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict*, p. 352; Salmon, "Europeans, the EC and the Gulf," p. 93. The importance is that tactical operations even after the war started as a matter of command and control of coalition forces, French politics was effecting

111 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75.

112 See note 30 above.

113 There are, of course, other questions which must be asked to decide whether to even join a multinational force. Some of these overlap the foreign command questions presented here. Other questions might include: Is US help desired? Is there a real threat to international peace and security? How much does it cost? What are the benefits? Are the resources available? What national interests are involved? Will the public support this action both in the short term and if a lengthy commitment is involved?
Many would argue that the United States should not engage in these nontraditional missions where American lives are exposed in foreign countries. Gen Brent Scowcroft argues that our service men and women are too highly trained to be used on these types of missions. More importantly, he believes that American lives are high hit targets by various groups and therefore they suffer greater political exposure than other countries. Interview of Gen Scowcroft, 25 October 1993. Senator Bob Dole has introduced legislation that would require congressional approval for the US to join a UN peacekeeping mission. "Dole Wants to Restrict Peacekeeping Missions," Washington Times, January 27, 1994, p.8. It is clear, however, that US policy is to be actively engaged in UN peacekeeping missions. Madeleine Albright, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, states that peacekeeping is a critical interest of the United States. Madeleine K. Albright, "A Strong United Nations Serves US Security Interests," US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 26, June 28, 1993, p. 463.

For example, the purpose of Operation Restore Hope was to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Somalia. Initially this was a US-led United Nations operation which was very successful. After turning command over to another UN commander the mission started to get blurred. Soon after, we found ourselves in a nasty struggle with one of the Somali war lords. Americans were now being killed and captured and the US was forced to reassess what our role in Somalia was and what the objectives were. It was also apparent that the UN had a different set of objectives than the US. The US therefore, was slow to react to this changing mission.

If the action is through the United Nations, this should be accomplished through the Security Council where the US has veto authority over any Security Council resolution.

The choice of language has not historically been a problem for the US. Again, however, this is because of the predominantly western tilt to the coalitions the US has been a part of and due to the massive resource base provided by the US. Therefore, it may be a concern in the future.

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