Economic forecasts for the period 1995-2000 describe increasing mandatory payments (interest on the US debt, entitlements and the like) funded by a relatively flat revenue base, resulting in a further reduction of US discretionary spending. Discretionary spending is that portion of the budget available to Congress to be applied to new programs and annually funded programs, such as the defense appropriation. In recent history, a squeeze on discretionary spending has meant a reduction in resources for the military services. Consequently, a further reduction of force structure beyond the Bottom-Up Review force is likely. Future reductions in combination with previous reductions taken to achieve the force levels mandated by the Bottom-Up Review represent a change of historically significant magnitude. Previous reductions of this magnitude have resulted in a hollow force. Analyses done and positions taken to-date by the various services and the Department of Defense have not, in the opinion of the author, left the services in sufficient command of their destinies. This paper is an analysis of the perceived weaknesses and a prescription for regaining the initiative in the future structure decisions of the force.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to stay within the lines to meet optical scanning requirements.

Block 1: **Title**: Leave blank.

Block 2: **Report Date**: Full publication date including day, month, and year. If available (e.g., 1 Jan 88): Must be at least the year.

Block 3: **Type of Report and Dates Covered**: State whether report is final, final, etc. If applicable, enter volume report dates (e.g., 10 Jun 87-30 Jun 88).

Block 4: **Identifying Number**: A line is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is divided into more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include substitute for the specific volume. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5: **Abstract**: Include contract and grant numbers, may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

- C = Contract
- G = Grant
- PE = Program
- PR = Project
- TA = Task
- WU = Work Unit
- Accession No.

Block 6: **Author(s) Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or connected with the content of the report.** If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7: **Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)** Self-explanatory.

Block 8: **Performing Organization Report Number(s)** rh the entire government report number(s) assigned to the organization performing the report.

Block 9: **Sponsor(s) OR/MA Agency Name(s) and Address(es)** Self-explanatory.

Block 10: **Monitor or Monitoring Agency Name(s):** Self-explanatory.

Block 11: **Abstract**: Enter information that will be published in a report. To be printed in a report, it must be presented in a statement that is not a report superseded or supplements the entire report.

Block 12a: **Distribution/Availability Statement**: Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g., NOFORN, REL, ITAR).

- **DOD**: See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."
- **DOE**: See authorities.
- **NASA**: See Handbook NHB 2200.2.
- **NTIS**: Leave blank.

Block 12b: **Distribution Code**

- **DOD**: Leave blank.
- **DOE**: Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.
- **NASA**: Leave blank.
- **NTIS**: Leave blank.

Block 13: **Abstract**: Include a brief (Maximum 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14: **Subject Terms**: Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15: **Number of Pages**: Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16: **Price Code**: Enter appropriate price code (NTIS only).

Blocks 17-19: **Security Classifications**: Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20: **Limitation of Abstract**: This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either U/L (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.
USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

AVOIDING DESERT TWO:
RIGHTSIZING THE US MILITARY OF THE YEAR 2000

by

Lieutenant Colonel Earl C. Howell
United States Army

Colonel Robert C. Coon
Project Adviser

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
ABSTRACT

Economic forecasts for the period 1995-2000 describe increasing mandatory payments (interest on the US debt, entitlements and the like) funded by a relatively flat revenue base, resulting in a further reduction of US discretionary spending. Discretionary spending is that portion of the budget available to Congress to be applied to new programs and annually funded programs, such as the defense appropriation. In recent history, a squeeze on discretionary spending has meant a reduction in resources for the military services. Consequently, a further reduction of force structure beyond the Bottom-Up Review force is likely. Future reductions in combination with previous reductions taken to achieve the force levels mandated by the Bottom-Up Review represent a change of historically significant magnitude. Previous reductions of this magnitude have resulted in a hollow force. Analyses done and positions taken to-date by the various services and the Department of Defense have not, in the opinion of the author, left the services in sufficient command of their destinies. This paper is an analysis of the perceived weaknesses and a prescription for regaining the initiative in the future structure decisions of the force.
INTRODUCTION

As has been the case after each great war, the United States is now reducing the size of our national military force. To the expectation of a Peace Dividend in the wake of the collapse of Communism and the urgency of the domestic agenda must now be added the effect of fundamental changes in the structure and capacity of the US budget. Hence, now more than ever, the planning and resourcing of the Services must be undertaken in a clear, deliberate, and effective fashion. Our nation may yet again return to a period characterized by rising standards of living for its citizens and expanding opportunities for its government programs. In the meantime the risks and uncertainties of a new world disorder make it critical that the United States retains at all times the finest economically sustainable force. But now, well into the downsizing effort, the final form and size of the military are still unknown, the premises of our programs are in question and the central issue of the utility of our force in the expanding continuum of roles and missions is as yet unclear. Discretionary funds, that portion of the US budget remaining after mandatory payments for such items as interest on the debt and entitlements, are increasingly called upon to fund domestic programs. In the continuing fight for discretionary funds the size of our military budget, both in absolute dollars and relative to that of our allies and potential enemies, is destined to be a source of constant debate. To date, defense leadership (civilian and military) have concluded a review of roles and missions and a threat assessment, the result of which is a force built upon a premise of fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (read Desert Storm). This position has been challenged both as to its premises as well as to the ability of the resulting force to accomplish the stated mission. If Congress determines that the guidance provided by defense leadership is weak,
they may, as was the case in the aftermath of Desert One, choose to direct by legislative mandate, the downsizing effort. While it is possible that by chance an oversized military may have within it the appropriate elements of a fighting force, it is almost certain that an intentionally small force will not. Consequently, military leadership, knowledgeable in the needs and abilities of our force must more effectively help to shape the coming debate if they are to influence the outcome. What follows is an examination of the shortfall and a prescription for change.

ON THE WAY TO DESERT TWO

The Role of the US Military is Shifting and Uncertain

The end of the Cold War brought the demise of ‘balance of power’ military structuring in the traditional sense. Gone is our ability to be certain about the size of our enemies’ forces and their deployment and so too it appears, our ability to create and defend our military budget. We have shifted from a threat-based analysis to a capabilities based analysis of military needs, but we are forced to do so against a shifting backdrop of international security issues. The loss of our superpower ‘partner’ means that regional rivalries, held in check for years, can now bubble to the surface. We as the ‘policeman for the world’ are expected to respond to these crises; and, in the absence of the Soviet threat there is little reason (so goes the thrust of international feeling) beyond a consideration of our own self interest to keep us from doing so.¹
As the hot spots multiply, so has the lexicon used to refer to these traditional sub-theater engagements of military force. Humanitarian Assistance, Peace-making and Peace-keeping are terms used to describe our involvement abroad. The argument rages as to whether these roles are new and unfettered by any tested operational structure and experience or a continuation of our previous experiences in such places as Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. Recent experiences in Somalia and discussions of employment of US forces in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia have called to question the effectiveness and efficiency of our forces in these employment’s Critics argue that US military involvement in peace keeping and humanitarian activities is altogether misplaced. At best, there is a divided confidence in our having the appropriate structure and expertise for properly pursuing these missions.

The cost of practically every aspect of our military force is increasing. As new weapons systems acquire a near surgical precision and an enhanced lethality the cost rises dramatically. In consequence, the military men and women who maintain and employ these weapons require additional training and support structures to be effective.

The cost of accomplishing any one of our missions is increasing. The cost of trying to accomplish them all is greater than our economy appears willing to bear. The US Military is at a crossroads. As was the case at the end of World War II we are faced with a requirement not merely to demobilize in light of a reduced threat, but to respond effectively to a host of expanded roles and missions in an increasing variety of environments, at home and abroad, at a level of cost deemed to be ‘acceptable’ in light of domestic needs. The answers are not obvious and the debate is apt to be both protracted and bitter. Of vital concern is the role the US Military will play in shaping this coming debate. As General Malin Craig stated in his last
report as Army Chief of Staff (1939), "What transpires on prospective battlefields is influenced vitally years before in councils of the staff and in the legislative halls of Congress." War and commerce, long recognized as paired elements of foreign policy, make poor bedfellows in the US domestic debate on military resourcing.

While recent history demonstrates the ability of the United States to field an invincible fighting force, changes afoot in the attitudes and national pocketbook of the US make changes in the way we fight our wars inevitable. Just as there is an ebb and flow to all things, so too has the attitude of the country begun to swing from the honorable intent to promote democracy everywhere to a more modest, albeit affordable, goal of reducing domestic problems at home. Certainly the dissatisfaction voiced by the American public with the outcomes in Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia have not suggested a clear capability to be successful in this field and considerable pressure at home for domestic fixes limits our appetite for further experiment.

Economics as a Driver in the National Debate

The United States is the largest, most durable and most stable economy in the world. Consequently, a consideration of the economic effect of this or that proposed policy is to some degree second nature. Now however we are entering a period where the economics of every proposed policy will become central if not deterministic to the outcome of the debate.

The public manifestation of this new concern for our economy is clear in an analysis of our recent Presidential election, in which a challenger defeated an incumbent on the twin promises of improvement in the national economy and a focus on the domestic (largely
economic) agenda. Similarly, the amount of discussion in advance of the Gulf War regarding the method of its financing is more reminiscent of medieval siege financing than twentieth century foreign policy.

The underlying performance of the economy is, if anything, more problematic. Our standard of living in absolute terms is stagnant. Paul Krugman in the introduction to The Age of Diminished Expectations writes, "...the typical American family and the typical American worker earned little if any more in real terms in 1988 than they did in the late 1970s." Productivity which grew at an annual rate of 2.8% in the 50's and 60's slowed, since 1970, to 1.2%. Japan meanwhile has increased productivity annually by 7% since the end of the Second World War. Similarly, West Germany has outperformed the US in the post War years. While Post War reconstruction certainly accounts for much of the early gain, it does not explain the experience of the late 70's and 80's.

The causes of such a slowing of our economy are multiple and include at minimum: an increasing budgetary burden, a reduced savings and investment rate, unwillingness to accept the domestic realities of appropriate economic fixes, a slowness in upgrading the capabilities of our workforce, a foreshortened investment fixation with the next quarter's performance not the next decade's, as well as a host of others. The solutions, like the causes, are multiple, complex and if implemented, will require a generation to take full effect.

In the meantime, the US military will be competing for ever scarcer dollars in a world of seemingly endless national defense needs.
Defense - A Discretionary Element of the US Budget

A recent speaker, in remarks to the US Army War College Class, underscored the bleak position of the current US military budget. He observed that, "Our military budget in the late 80's was $375 B. The current assumption is that cuts are yet to come from an already reduced budget of $275 B. - A specious argument." Even assuming that the military could weather the debate over a peace dividend, the current national budget trends offer little alternative to belt tightening by the end of the decade, if not sooner. Specifically, we face an increasing squeeze between revenues and expenditures with discretionary spending the likely loser. Revenues, historically limited to 19 - 19.5% of GDP, will be balanced by entitlements reaching 14% of GDP by 1999 and net interest of 3.5% of GDP. Thus 2 - 2.5% remains to provide for domestic discretionary spending, which in the Carter years ran 5% and now is 4.5%. A spending cut will be required and the bulk of the long term decline in discretionary spending over time will likely be been borne by defense.

The Rise of Coalition Warfare

One could reasonably argue that the promotion of democracy lacks the substantive form required of a "real" vital interest of the US. Presumably then, when real interests are challenged, we will respond in a committed fashion as was done in Desert Shield/ Desert Storm and prevail. With reductions in force structure thus far, and those envisioned as well as those likely to come, there is simply no longer the massive standing military force sufficiently
large as to be certain of prevailing in all encounters. Short of a situation both justifying a limited to general call-up and providing the time to effectively do so, we will need help.

Historically, neither our differences with Mexico (other than with Texas) nor Canada (subsequent to the Colonial period) have risen to the level of intensive armed conflict. In fact the majority of our wars have been, and are likely to be, fought in distant lands. The majority of our deployments overseas have been in concert with the forces of an alliance or coalition with which we share interests. While there are potential instances where our vital interests may not coincide with those of any other nation, this is a remote case. More likely, in future deployments, we will be pursuing a course of action wherein the vital interests of the United States and those of other nations and alliances coincide. Consequently, like World War I and II and Desert Storm, the conflict will likely be prosecuted by a coalition force. Yet, rather than embracing the coalition as a fact of future warfare, we are continuing to frame the issue as a question of leadership, persisting in the fiction that only US officers can and should lead US troops. Should not the question be how can the United States military establishment better prepare to participate in coming coalition efforts?

Resourcing the Military
Historical Detractors from the Quality of the Debate

The credibility of the positions taken by the Defense Department is undercut by a continuing failure to address structural and procedural problems in military resourcing. This is compounded by the analytical perspective and presentational style of the services.

First, the services frame their world view in a historical context. While effective as a first approximation of need, it is bound to appear lacking in initiative and insight. Louisiana
Meunvers, the Department of the Army program designed to test new ideas, simulations and lessons learned, evokes by its name a pre-World War II army concept. Indeed, the report of the initial year of the project, Louisiana maneuvers - the First Year, focuses, in part, on the derivative exercise GHQx 93 and lists as lessons learned: 1. Total Army asset visibility is essential, 2. Timely access to reserve component units and individuals is required, 3. Dual apportionment of forces requires precise planning, and 4. Access to current readiness information is necessary. Given the availability of this information from the Gulf War and the four-star and army staff involvement in their production, these findings are not evocative of an aggressive, innovative organization. Second, budgeting for the services is an exercise in incrementalism. While this is an understandable analytical takeoff point, this approach in combination with the above cited historical focus leaves the services constantly asserting support for the status quo or something close to it. Originality in thought and analysis is lost in a portrayal too clearly linked to the past. The best effort to date to establish a capability based force plan, the Bottom-Up Review, elaborated an intent to fight two near simultaneous major regional conflicts and win. This effort now appears to be an analysis driven by a conclusion rather than the other way round. Why, for instance, two major regional conflicts, and not three or one? Why do we believe the ten division force capable of victory in two theaters given the deployed force structure in Desert Storm? What is the value of a plan hinged upon the cooperation of our enemies in achieving near-simultaneous timing of conflict? Underscoring the relative hollowness of the plan were recent comments by the Secretary of Defense William J. Perry," When we reach the BUR levels, the overall force structure will have come down about 30 percent from its peak in the 80's." In the same statement the
Secretary states that the savings have been invested in readiness, O&M funding has been increased, service OPTEMPO requests are fully funded and recruiting budget levels are being maintained. The picture is largely one of business as usual. Moreover, if, notwithstanding history, the rationale for two near simultaneous regional conflicts is accepted, there is little substantive development of the resulting force-need projection other than reference to “detailed analyses of possible future MRCs, coupled with military judgment as to the outcomes, suggest that the following forces will be adequate to execute the strategy outlined for a single MRC.” This is a less than compelling portrayal of thorough and multidiscipline analysis in light of the extensive technical force-on-force analysis currently being undertaken in the private sector.

Third, the services have not sorted out traditional roles and missions. In a statement of position immortalized in the recent roles and missions debate, the services support multiple separate air forces, navies and infantry formations. The contentious “rice bowl” nature of the issue is realized but the requirement remains for the issue to be effectively and forcefully addressed. Even were the reasons for separate identities of the forces accepted, the services give the appearance of unwillingness to cooperate in the matter of equipment acquisition as appears clear from the proliferation of aircraft types both in service and on the drawing boards.

Fourth, the services have not convincingly demonstrated the application of the current force to the full continuum of conflict. While embracing the intent of the evolving crisis oriented peace keeping and humanitarian assistance missions, nevertheless the Department of Defense and the Services have failed to create doctrine, operational concepts, or structure in
support of the tasks at hand. Instead, at least in so far as the Army is concerned, these missions are referred to as "traditional Army capability."\textsuperscript{16}

Finally, the services' portrayal of financial needs, the budget, is provided in an unengaging presentational format.\textsuperscript{17} The document is poorly related to our underlying national economic framework. Little economic analysis of the net effect of military spending on job creation and economic vitality is highlighted. No clear reference is established between nascent technology and the role military funding may play in its development. No useful appreciation of the enhanced lethality of new systems is provided. Little explanation of the policies and procedures used to husband the funds entrusted to the defense department are provided. In short, the type of substantive information which would be expected of a major corporation's chief executive officer is largely missing or as a practical matter, hidden.

Case in Point: The Bottom-Up Review

Let's revisit the BUR as an example of the effectiveness of positions taken by the services in support of military resourcing. Our requirement to fight and win two "nearly simultaneous" regional conflicts has created the need for two corps equivalents which, with the doctrine of power projection has resulted in an army of 10 divisions. In attempting to preserve this force structure and simultaneously pursuing acquisition programs of dubious value\textsuperscript{18}, we place at risk those programs for modernization and new weapons that hold the most promise for improving the lethality of a fighting force. These programs invariably have a long lead time and in the near term, given the typical spending pattern for out year procurement, offer little immediate savings. Insofar as the plan does not provide the requisite
savings then we may be fighting to preserve force structure with the immediate result of
destroying programs and developments and with the long term result of revisiting structure cuts
to achieve the needed reductions.

In filling the void with the Base Force concept we have created an unengaging and
untenable position. No constituency, beyond the defense department itself, has emerged to
endorse the 10 division force or the self-imposed objective of winning two 'near simultaneous'
major regional conflicts. While the military could wait for the enunciation of clear guidance
for defense planning, in the near-term none appears forthcoming and the debate rages on to
our disadvantage.

Implications for Military Resourcing Beyond the 90’s

The senior leadership of the United States Military represents or should represent the
clearest source of advice on the needs of the services into and beyond 2000. As we move into
this period under the burden of constrained economic resources, decisions regarding the
allocation of resources among competing national needs will be made. Absent an aggressive
well-structured engaging portrayal of the needs of the services by the services themselves,
Congress, under the burden of exercising its control of the purse strings, will make those
decisions as best as it can. The potential problems are many.

Finding the Services request unappealing or lacking in credibility, Congress may elect
to pursue an analysis founded on its sense of the numbers or solely on the needs and interests
of their constituencies, consequently framing the debate in a way unrelated to underlying
reality. As an example, pork-barrel considerations and a re-visit to the base closure issue could
result in a force long on constituent appeal and short on combat power. Certainly, this is always the potential before Congress, but less so when the programs presented are complete, forward reaching, responsive to developing world realities and presented in a credible way.

Congress may elect to resolve for the Services the roles and missions debate, even as they are now conditioning willingness to engage internationally on an understanding of end state. In both cases the initiative for the development of both the structural and the operational doctrine should rest with the Services.

Congress, in solving a current year budget question, is unlikely to be reluctant to cut in a wholesale fashion the parts of a less than carefully structured and integrated plan. Congress fully understands and expects that plans as presented can be cut. The resulting damage may fall upon personnel, equipment procurement, technology development, base structure, or future mobilization capability.

A Likely Scenario

The battle for resources will be framed as a choice between defense spending in a world viewed as less immediately threatening and support for ever increasing near-term needs of constituents. Notwithstanding the great outpouring of national pride in our military following Desert Storm, the domestic agenda has again taken center stage. The BUR will be perceived by Congress as the services attempt to preserve funding, not as a cogent and applicable assessment of future trends. Failure of the services to frame the debate and provide clear and useful military advice will be ascribed to the ‘Desert One’ Disease - the inability of the services to manage themselves, a problem the Congress sees themselves, in the wake of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as both responsible for and capable of solving. The lack of a clear and immediate threat suggests that military spending will be reduced incrementally as the competition for resources is exacerbated by time. While we argue for a larger base force than is forthcoming we are clearly not directing coming cuts. As we are not directing the cuts, and as they are coming over time they are unlikely to be part of a planned and cohesive strategy. Consequently, when needed, our force will not be as ready as possible even given the dollars available. If further force cuts are accompanied by an insistence by the services that they be borne equally by active and reserve components, we may have structurally precluded our ability to reconstitute the force in an effective and efficient manner. Our services are led by some of the most professionally competent and intellectually capable individuals in history. It is the approach used by the defense department to secure resources for our future that is flawed not our military. This scenario is avoidable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I propose we adopt a different approach, one intended to result in a capable fighting force structured by professionals and advantaged by continuing weapons and material development, structured to have a decisive battlefield advantage and tasked with reasonable requirements.

It is not the will or intent of Congress to be punitive toward the military or cavalier in their responsibility to raise and equip a standing army and provide for the common defense. More likely the actions will be the result of a void created by the failure of the military to fashion useful and responsive structures for the times. At least this will be the perception of
the Congress. We will in the end have a smaller force. Whether that force is as effective as it could be will be determined in large part by our ability to seize the initiative and guide the debate. Congressional testimony suggested that the military's force structure projections had been one revolution behind. We must now steal the revolution.

Regaining the Initiative

While the competition for resources impacts every sector equally at the outset, at the heart of the matter are certain aspects of perception and behavior by the Defense Department that make the likely outcome even less acceptable. Although no course of action offers a guarantee of success, it is the belief of the writer that certain actions undertaken by the military would have substantive impact upon the ability of the military to regain the initiative in the struggle for resources. This paper offers a partial prescription for action.

Assumptions for the Base Force

The United States should abandon the concept of fighting two 'near simultaneous' regional conflicts, adopting instead the strategy of fighting sequentially. First, as General Powell stated in the initial presentation of the Bottom Up Review, it is highly unlikely two such regional conflicts would occur simultaneously. Second, it is unclear that our adoption of a strategy to fight our wars sequentially would diminish the deterrence of our standing force. Deterrence, in the post nuclear world, is a function of capability and will to fight. Desert Storm was a convincing portrayal of our capacity to fight and win. Post conflict simulations indicate that the coalition forces enjoyed an overwhelming force advantage. The lions' share
of the credit is due the US sea, air, and land force components. Similarly, in the wake of Desert Storm, no one should question our will to fight and those who do are not likely to believe our appetite for conflict is lessened by the prospect of two simultaneous engagements. Our policy must be to commit US troops to conflict only upon the resolve of the will of the nation to fight and win. This means that consideration of the force necessary to prevail in the conflict must be made, a suitable force raised and equipped, and a capable fighting force deployed to the theater of war. The percentage of the population who have experience of wars of the length of World War II and Vietnam is rapidly dwindling. The current conceptualization of war may be that of a one hundred hour, low casualty undertaking. In fact, we must be prepared for extended duration conflicts with the attendant casualties that result. In this light neither the force here suggested nor the BUR force is capable of withstanding two extended major regional conflicts. We must be prepared, both intellectually and structurally, to engage the economic resources and civilian manpower of the nation. Neither the propensity for nor the potential to wage war can be allowed to stand apart from the national will.

Reduce the active force to six divisions plus two round-up divisions of one active brigade each. This represents the corps equivalent required for a major regional conflict plus additional forces in reserve. It is consistent with sequential engagement. It preserves a core combat capability and provides both manpower and ultimately material savings.

Bring to fruition General Abrams vision of a Total Army. Develop an effective plan for the utilization of the reserve component forces. Provide training and readiness focus on immediate combat reserve call-up capability. Develop first tier call-up capability (combat effective in 60 days) equivalent to six brigades. Develop second tier call-up capability (combat
effective in 120 days) of a further six brigades. The first tier forces will be based with, train with and ultimately, upon call-up, assemble on the round-out divisions. This potential wartime relationship creates the structure and shared interest necessary to achieve high readiness goals in the reserve component forces. If this reserve force is to be a meaningful addition to the combat equation, it must be available. Consequently, the services must seek expanded access to the reserve component at both the individual soldier and unit level. Second tier forces will provide round-up, replacement or reserve capability for a deployed force.

Streamline the Total Army. Create a single federal reserve force. Provide for limited availability of non-first tier forces to the resident state for domestic missions. Eliminate duplication of command channels, multiple interest groups, regional voting blocs, conflicting regulations, and varying readiness patterns. The reserve forces must be prepared to perform their wartime role, and as importantly, must be perceived as a credible wartime partner by their active component counterparts. Consequently, the distinctions between the components, in terms of training, regulations, and readiness must be abolished.

Shift additional combat support and combat service support elements to the active force. This can be accomplished by an increase of the active component combat support and combat service support structure by a division equivalent, and an equivalent reduction of the reserve component combat support and combat service support structure by a division equivalent. This will provide additional combat support and combat service support structure to support reserve component training and limited domestic missions.

Restructure US basing policy with the following objectives: Achieve division basing at effective deployment sites for air and sea movement. This will call to issue the utility of, for
example, Ft. Riley, Kansas. Consolidate training bases to achieve concentration of trainees, trainers and support staff. The Air War University is a useful template. Retain those large posts which afford maneuver room for large training elements. Immediately publish the base closing memoranda with a 5-7 year plan. Spread the base closing shock, closing costs and clean-up costs over time. Do not accept the argument that it is too expensive to close the posts now. The future year dollar cost will ultimately come due at a time when they can be ill afforded. Get approval now and lock in future savings now.

Assess force modernization and acquisition needs in light of reduction of forces. Create a captive production capability in those few defense critical areas (i.e. tank turret manufacture). Focus and rationalize acquisition of defense specific purchases, ‘civilianizing’ purchasing where possible (i.e. use commercially available products where possible). Assess new technology programs under common criteria for determining how new systems and material will improve lethality of the force. Rank order all programs thereby providing a clear funding preference for lethality enhancing technology.

The New Base Force

This new force will have certain characteristics and capabilities. The active combat strength will be significantly reduced. Combat service and combat service support capabilities in the active component will be significantly enhanced. The total army will become the ultimate player in any conflict of size or duration reflecting, appropriately, the Nation’s commitment to the conflict.
Costs will be reduced to the extent of net personnel reductions in the active and reserve components and the associated OPTEMPO costs. Similarly there will be reduced force modernization costs for the smaller force and reduced basing costs subsequent to the clean-up and disposition of the closed bases. The reduced costs of canceled acquisition and development programs will be in part offset by the continued funding and potential accelerated funding of the high-lethality development programs.

The intent is to balance the reduction in size with an overall increase in lethality of the remaining force. Additional active force structure has been added in combat support and combat service support to accomplish two ends. First, to provide for a ready deployment capability for the active force in any engagement on the continuum of conflict. This would prove critical during early stages of any conflict. Second to enable our forces to support coalition elements deployed in support of our regional activities. Funds would be available to support increased OPTEMPO for training both the active and immediate reserve forces. This will insure real readiness in our remaining forces. Certain combat brigades would be designated as the immediate follow-on reserves and training and readiness would be improved to reflect this intent.

Defense Department basing needs would be addressed through a long range base closure program. In this fashion costs and impacts are spread over a reasonable horizon and political sensitivities are reduced. Both attrition and timing support the long-term goal and the savings come on stream in the later years as a buffer against future resource problems.

Force modernization costs are rationalized and new program costs are preserved and focused on the high-lethality weapons and material.
Similarly some limitations must be recognized. This is a "one war at a time" force. Immediate reinforcement has been addressed for the safety of the force in unexpectedly long and destructive engagements, but extensive reinforcement will require several months.

**Embrace Coalition Warfare**

Alliances, founded upon written agreements, specify the commitments of the signatories and hence describe, at least in rough form, the likely participants in a conflict. Coalitions, by contrast, are an ad hoc creation whose purpose and duration are limited to the threat at hand. While coalitions, by definition, are less certain than alliances, nevertheless, we can envision a likely range of coalition partners and should promote within that designated group of nations a sense of shared military community. The obvious diplomatic benefits of having engaged in extended discussions of any type tend to be a lessening of tensions and over time a resolution of differences. And so this effort likely becomes to some degree a self-fulfilling prophecy. While much has been made of the appropriateness of US 'leadership' of coalition and alliance efforts; our efforts both internationally and within our own force must be along the lines of creating value within a partnership of nations. This can be pursued along several mutually supporting lines.

Expand and support a international fora for the discussion and development of, and training in, doctrine for coalition warfare. A school, modeled after the International Long Range Reconnaissance School in Germany, could evolve from a doctrine development center toward a teaching center. Common systems for the planning and delivery of logistics, air and fire support as well as training in command and control measures used in the employment of a
coalition force would form the foundation for the school's curriculum. Each nation could contribute from its strengths and gain improvement against weaknesses. As is the case with current exchange programs, officers selected to attend this school would form friendships and useful working relationships with officers from throughout the likely community of coalition partners.

Foster among likely coalition partners candid discussions regarding the type of forces each partner can best provide. This could be the logical extension of the interchange of ideas in a school environment such as outlined above, or could be developed in a more formal international forum. In either event, it should enable each nation to achieve some useful tailoring in national force structure and provide a matrix of functions and forces to be contributed by nation, from which voids can be addressed.

Both of the activities above, properly done, will result in a tighter coalition force, an improved appreciation for the coalition partners' needs and abilities, and more immediate operational capability.

Invest in the human assets necessary to be successful in a coalition environment. Insure that each deploying force has available the necessary liaison staffing to provide personnel to be detached to the headquarters and maneuver elements of the coalition partners.

The use of 5th Special Forces personnel in this role, in Desert Storm, enabled a fairly effective command and control structure to evolve. This, however, may be a less than optimal use of strategic strike/reconnaissance assets, or may require more manpower than is available solely from special operations forces. More properly we should have, as sub elements of the staff of the CINC, deployable cells who would be fully familiar with plans as developed in US
component commands and could be a useful bridge among partners. As was demonstrated in Desert Storm, parallel combatant commands under separate national leaderships can successfully prosecute a shared ground and air combat plan. Additionally, we should increase both military and embassy staffing of foreign area officer specialists. This type of institutional knowledge is hard won and proves invaluable. Further, the US military should foster improved cultural awareness throughout the officer corps focusing on increased language training and embassy and multinational staff assignments. This combination of knowledge, experience and relationships will help to sensitize our forces to the needs and views of our partners in advance of the conflict-induced pressure.

Invest in the necessary infrastructure to insure success in the selected primary US coalition role. An examination of historical experience combined with discussion with likely coalition partners as described above will confirm the roles and hence type of forces and capabilities the US would be expected to contribute to a coalition. While this will vary at the margin in the event as the final form of a coalition takes shape; nevertheless, the clear elements of the foundation force can be known. The US must then move to insure primacy in these areas. Those assets, whether a system as in the case of our C3I capability or force structure as in the case of our heavy divisions, must be tailored for deployment in a coalition force. This may mean adoption of different communication protocols, the modification of our helicopter and fighting vehicles to accept a variety of fuel nozzles, a modification of our field ration menus to delete certain items, or creation of an international marking system for our rear area operations. In all cases we must both be and be perceived to be a willing coalition partner.
Drive the development of necessary doctrine to support coalition warfare in a range of deployment scenarios. Critical issues such as command and control of US troops by other nations, and rules of engagement across the spectrum of conflict must be structured so as to support our coalition participation. This will likely mean addressing contentious issues both within the military community and in our national congress. We should engage in this dialogue without delay.

Moving thoughtfully toward a meaningful partnership with a community of nations offers multiple significant benefits, not the least of which is affordable protection of our vital national interests where those interests coincide with that of our allies and potential coalition partners. Joshua Epstein argues that full consideration of the NATO forces available for the defense of Central Europe suggests considerable US unilateral savings are available beyond those envisioned in the Conventional Forces Europe II (CFE II) agreement. Similar savings, or viewed less commercially, combat leverage are similarly available through effective coalition building in other regions. In so far as we, through a reluctance to embrace the process or a unilateralist philosophy, pursue our destiny alone, then we will be faced with ever-increasing costs arrayed against a dwindling resource base.

CONCLUSIONS

The services must seize the initiative immediately and become a full participant in the coming debate. By utilizing the immediate time available, the services can be in a position to effectively shape the decision making in potentially more resource scarce periods of the not too distant future.
To regain the initiative we must create clear credibility for the Military as a resource manager and planner as well as a strategist and warfighter. Frame for policy decision the traditional questions of force structure: how many armies, navies and air forces does the US need? Make logical decisions on expensive weapons systems. The state of international conflict may only justify so much technology. Provide an understandable portrayal of the rising or shifting costs of defense. First understand and then demonstrate the relationship between technology and military effectiveness/lethality on the ground and in the air.

We must insure that there is a shared understanding with Congress as to the roles and missions of the US Military and its capabilities thereof. Delineate the structure, its cost and its utility in accomplishing the myriad missions possible on the continuum of conflict. The utility of a fleet ballistic missile submarine in the world of 1995 requires considerable explaining in light of its cost. The light infantry soldier, on the other hand, looks like a bargain. The light infantry soldier of the year 2000 however, may be high tech and expensive while the fleet ballistic missile may prove to be a relatively inexpensive deterrent. Thus neither assessment may be accurate, and each position must be established and defended by the weight of cogent, well developed analysis.

Take the initiative in the public debate. While being mindful of our responsibilities as officers, we need not be reluctant to state the facts of our positions.20 Underscore the capabilities of our forces and tie this ability to the costs of defense in a tangible, measurable way. Be proactive. Don't try to respond to criticisms of $600 toilet seats. These types of seemingly irresponsible purchases fall into one of several categories: a non-economic order
quantity resulting from out of cycle or post cycle purchases (largely unavoidable), misinformation or errors. Analyze the problem, address it and move on.

We must provide our senior leadership with staff support of sufficient education, experience and exposure to effectively represent the interests of the military to our civilian masters. Poor staff preparation and surprises are the exception in our major corporations. The standard of performance should be the same for our senior military leaders and their staffs. Learn the lesson that General Colin Powell exemplifies so clearly: a carefully considered position, well-delivered by a poised professional carries exceptional weight. Trade off graphical elegance for analytical strength.

We must manage the expectations of our civilian leadership, our Congress, and the American people by continually communicating the costs, risks and likely outcomes of our activities. The loss of American lives in Somalia was all the more painful in that it appeared to be unexpected.

The course of action outlined above is a bold departure from the current incrementalist approach. While the focus has been on land forces, a coordinated analysis of land sea and air power must be conducted so as to insure the final product is a capable joint war fighting force. The roles and missions debate is destined to be revisited, as it should. If we are aggressive we can position the settlement of the roles and missions debate like that of downsizing so as to achieve a militarily optimal result. Each of the services holds potential savings, particular needs and specific problems. Each of these problems is rightfully a part of the larger debate considering national military strategy, a debate in which the military can and should take an active part. This strategy if pursued will accomplish various ends. The writer believes that the
magnitude and variety of the changes undertaken would return the initiative to the military. It is likely that the final force would be a creature of our making. With aggressive funding of training and new programs the continued readiness of the force is preserved. The scope of the proposed changes would require Congress and the executive leadership to come to grips with the painful aspects of base closing and likewise to assess the appropriateness of the intended force size. There is danger in the possibility that the force is indeed too small to be effective, but this, in the view of the writer, is unlikely. More likely is the danger that the force will be fragmented in its use and so diluted, or that pork barrel politics will preclude achieving a satisfactory force structure. So too, the message of a smaller US military could be misinterpreted by our allies and potential coalition partners as one of emerging isolationism.

We are going to become a smaller military. The only question which remains is whether we will continue to be the best military in the world or a hollow dispirited force buffeted by economic and political forces.
1. In the forward to the United States Army Posture Statement FY94, General Sullivan and Acting Secretary Of the Army Shannon Write, "It has been about four years since the Cold War ended. In the short period since, Army forces have fought two conflicts, deployed to manage two international and three domestic crises, and participated in a number of United Nations missions. Even as this Posture Statement is being written elements of an Army division and logistics task force are in Somalia, and various units are performing critical missions in locations as diverse as Kuwait, the Sinai desert, and the former Yugoslavia. It is an ironic testament of our times with the exception of the Korean Conflict and Vietnam this activity level surpasses any period of the Cold War." (Congress, Senate and House, Armed Services Committees and Subcommittees, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army - Fiscal Year 94, 103d Cong., 1st sess., March 1993, iii)

2 Alan L. Growman, "Peace-Enforcement is an Oxymoron - Its Synonym is War," Armed Forces Journal International (February 1994): 8


4. Ibid., 91

5. The significance of economics is traced by Harold Nicholson in his description of the "two main currents or tendencies" of diplomatic thought as "warrior and merchantile tendencies" (Harold Nicholson, Diplomacy, London: Oxford University Press, 1963) and Adam Watson, who states, "War and diplomacy are insuperably joined under the common heading of means by which states, in pursuit of their interests, bring their power to bear on one another as actual or prospective allies and enemies, and indeed as partners and rivals in trade and commerce." (Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States. London: Eyre Methuen, 1982) quoted in James Der Derian, On Diplomacy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987

6. The author argues that of the three determinants of economic health: productivity, income distribution and employment; the US economy is losing ground on the first two and has in place no useful public policy discussion regarding plans for improvement. (Paul Krugman, The Age of Diminished Expectations - U.S. Economic Policy in the 1990's. 4th ed.(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 1

7. Ibid., 12
8. Ibid., 14


10. Don Snider notes, "Later this argument that the administration's defense submission was consistently 'out of date' or 'one revolution behind' was recreated very effectively by Aspin during congressional consideration of the FY92 budget, as well as the FY93 budget. (Don M. Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post Cold War, 1989-1991, Professional Readings in Military Strategy Series No. Eight, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1993), 26.


12. Krepinevich states, "Insuring quick success in two simultaneous regional wars is expensive. But what are the odds of such an event occurring? Since America became an active global power following World War II, it has fought regional wars in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf. The United States committed the majority of its combat power to each of these contingencies, a point worth noting since the Soviet Union was the other major regional contingency during two of the conflicts. Yet the Soviet Union never attempted to exploit this situation by initiating aggression in another region of the world. Nor did Moscow pressure one of its client states to do so. (Andrew E. Krepinevich, "Assessing the Bottom-Up Review, "Joint Force Quarterly, January 1994), 23.


15. Speaking to the issue of aircraft acquisition, James P. Stevenson stated, "The appeal of a biservice aircraft is the potential for reduced costs. However the services seldom cooperate to that end. The Navy resisted the TFX/F111 commonality program and the Air Force ordered the Air Defense Command not to consider the F-14 in its evaluations - even after the Air Defense Command had selected the F-14 as the best solution. .....It merely illustrates the syndrome that services will support projects they initiate and actively destroy programs they did not." (James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet [Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993], 218)

16. Army Posture Statement FY 94, 5
17. Snider observes, "of the role played by the traditional decision-making process of the Pentagon, the PPBS. It was not influential because these decisions were of a planning nature whereas the PPBS is designed for the primary purpose of programming and budgeting, not planning. (Snider, 42)

18. USSOCOM is currently purchasing seven 175 foot coastal patrol craft at a cost of $20 million each. This craft is expensive to purchase, offers little to Special Operations Forces (each craft can only accommodate 9 SEAL team operators), expensive to maintain, will be restricted in its utility by dint of its status as a commissioned vessel with an assigned crew, possesses poor communications capability, is ‘under-weaponed’, and likely to provide little leverage of combat power.

19. Epstein, 84.

20. It is worthy of note that recent legislation loosening Hatch Act restraints on political activity by employees of the U.S. Government was sent to President Clinton for signature. Passing 339 to 85 in the House, the measure, while stopping short of a complete roll-back of the original law, was characterized as “a great blow for democracy. . . . Now federal employees can be full citizens” by John N. Sturdivant, president of the American Federation of Government Employees. (Kenneth J. Cooper, “Hatch Act restraints on Politics Loosened,” Washington Post, 22 September 1993, A1 and 19.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY


