Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti (U)

Donald E. Schulz
Gabriel Marcella

Strategic Studies Institute
US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5053

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The authors analyze the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Haiti and for democracy and socioeconomic development there. They suggest the crisis is a zero-sum game in which the contending forces may well be fundamentally incompatible. The authors describe different courses of action and the steps that the United States might take to implement them. None of the choices are attractive, and none of them can guarantee success. Moreover, even if President Jean-Bertrand Aristide can be restored to office, the outlook for democracy and socio-economic development will be highly problematic. Such changes would require a wholesale transformation of the political culture, a process which would take at least a generation to accomplish, if indeed at all. They would also require substantial long-term aid from the international community and the United States.
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Donald E. Schulz
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Donald E. Schulz  
Strategic Studies Institute

and

Gabriel Marcella  
Department of National Security and Strategy

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FOREWORD

Few foreign policy issues have been more frustrating to the U.S. Government during the past year than the Haitian crisis. Thus, this report could not be more timely. The title is suggestive. The authors describe different courses of action and the steps that the United States might take to implement them. None of the choices are attractive and none of them can guarantee success. However, because the situation facing the Haitian people continues to worsen, the sooner we come to terms with that situation the better. Drs. Schulz and Marcella have made a major contribution to that process through their careful delineation of the "irreconcilable" elements in the Haitian "equation," their careful analysis of the various options available to U.S. policymakers, and the course of action which they have recommended.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report in the hope that it may facilitate a resolution of this vexing problem through greater dialogue and debate.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
OF THE AUTHORS

DONALD E. SCHULZ is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He has coedited books on Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Central America and the Caribbean and Political Participation in Communist Systems and has forthcoming volumes on The United States, Honduras and the Crisis in Central America (coauthor) and Cuba and the Future (editor). His articles have appeared in Foreign Policy, Orbis, the Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs and Small Wars and Insurgencies, as well as such media outlets as Newsweek, The Washington Post, and the Christian Science Monitor.

GABRIEL MARCELLA is Director of Third World Studies with the Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. He holds a Ph.D. degree in History from the University of Notre Dame. He has taught at Notre Dame, Temple, and St. Joseph’s Universities, and served as International Affairs Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Panama, 1987-89. He has written extensively on strategy, low-intensity conflict, and Latin American policy. His publications have appeared in the Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Estudios Internacionales, Inter-American Economic Affairs, North-South Analysis, Parameters, Air University Review, and in various edited volumes. His most recent writing, Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin America, will be published in 1994. In addition, he has served on policy study commissions dealing with Caribbean security, Central American recovery and development, international terrorism, and U.S. interests in Latin America.
SUMMARY

This study examines the socioeconomic and political dimensions of the Haitian crisis and the attempts by the United States and the international community to resolve that crisis. The authors assess the prospects for restoring the deposed Haitian president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the difficulties that will attend any effort to promote sustained political and economic development. Specific criticisms are made of U.S./international community policy, options are evaluated, and recommendations are set forth. Among the major conclusions and recommendations are the following:

Lessons and Implications.

- International sanctions have been a failure. They have further devastated the Haitian economy without restoring President Aristide. The Organization of American States (OAS) and U.N. embargoes have accelerated environmental damage, contributing to near-famine conditions in some areas and causing (in conjunction with other factors) extreme hardship for ordinary Haitians while only belatedly touching the elite. Indeed, many of the latter have grown richer through smuggling and drug-running operations.

- U.S. policy has been marked by confusing actions that have sent the wrong signals and are interpreted by Haitians as indecisive. Haitian leaders have concluded that Washington can be manipulated and outmaneuvered. Consequently, they have sought to stretch out negotiations and prolong the crisis expecting that the United States and the international community will back down rather than inflict unacceptable suffering on ordinary Haitians.

- The July 1993 Governors Island Agreement to restore Aristide was inherently unworkable. By
providing for the lifting of sanctions before Aristide returned and at a time when General Cédras, Colonel François and their allies still occupied key positions of power, the accord enabled the latter to obtain short-term relief while they restocked supplies and protected foreign financial holdings in preparation for the longer struggle to come. Moreover, the agreement had no enforcement mechanism beyond the threat to reimpose sanctions. The foreign military and police that were in the process of being introduced were trainers, engineers, and observers rather than peacekeepers or peace-enforcers. They were lightly armed and operated under inadequate rules of engagement. Nor was there any provision for purging the Haitian military and police of corrupt or abusive elements. Under such circumstances, it was unlikely that “training” would have much effect. Indeed, the signals that were sent were interpreted to mean that the international community was not serious and that the accord could be sabotaged with minimum risk or cost.

- In Haiti, the international community has been dealing mainly with thugs rather than military officers. And what thugs understand is power. One has to use it in a way that will be credible, keeping in mind that a failure to apply leverage will be interpreted as weakness and will encourage further recalcitrant behavior.

- The United States and the international community cannot create democracy in Haiti. Only Haitians can do that. But for that to happen, there would have to be a transformation of the political culture. The restoration of Aristide would only be the first step. Far more difficult would be the creation of professional military and police forces that would be reasonably competent and subordinate to civilian control. Equally important would be the construction of an effective and fair judicial system. This would
require a substantial, ongoing U.S. and international effort. U.N. peace-enforcers would have to be introduced to provide political stability and security for all sides. Haitian troops and police would have to be vetted and human rights offenders removed. U.S. and other foreign sponsors would have to provide much of the human infrastructure that would assure that humanitarian and development aid would be used effectively. A major, long-term educational and training program would be necessary to enable Haitians to acquire the skills and values that would gradually enable them to replace foreign personnel.

- Even if such a program were launched, there are no guarantees that it would succeed. Cultures are hard to change, and one must be prepared for considerably less than optimum results. In addition, some Haitians will resent a large-scale, indefinite foreign presence, no matter how well-intentioned. If international forces should become involved in Haitian domestic politics—as seems likely—the stage would be set for a nationalistic backlash.

- Nevertheless, to do much less would constrain the prospects for success. The current crisis can be alleviated through a massive, short-term humanitarian effort. But unless the international community—and especially the United States—is willing to stay the course, one must expect Haiti to again descend into chaos or tyranny once the foreigners pull out.

Policy Options.

- Some version of the Governors Island Agreement, which would provide for foreign military and police observers, trainers, and engineers, but not peacekeepers. While this may be the most probable course of action, its prospects for success are not good. Even if Aristide can be restored—no sure thing—without a substantial number of international peace-enforcers and a strong, reliable security
force, his longevity could not be expected to be
great. Assassination is a possibility, and it might
plunge the country into massive violence.

- A second option, military intervention, is often
dismissed as "unthinkable." It should not be, for
there are circumstances that might produce such a
scenario. The possibilities here range from a
full-scale occupation (for which the will does not
presently exist) to a limited intervention (much more
likely). In either case, the international commitment
would have to be ongoing to be successful. The
temptation will be to try to do the job "on the cheap."
The smaller the commitment and the shorter the
duration, the greater the chance of failure. On the
other hand, a "success" is problematic in any event.
A limited commitment would minimize the risks and
costs.

- Another variant of the military option is a
nonpermissive humanitarian intervention. The
problem is that unless the basic causes of the crisis
are eliminated, it is likely to reemerge once the
peace-enforcers leave. A real solution would require
an extended foreign presence and the disarming of
those elements responsible for the crisis. The pitfalls
of such an operation are evident in the U.N.
operation in Somalia.

- Still another possibility is a nonmilitary humanitarian
option (permissive humanitarian intervention). The
international community is already engaged in such
an effort through nongovernmental organizations.
This might be expanded even as sanctions are
tightened. If successful, a permissive intervention
would ameliorate the immediate humanitarian crisis.
But it would not address the larger political problem
or long-range socioeconomic needs. The Haitian
military, moreover, might well refuse to allow such
deliveries, or might seize or siphon off these
resources. Only if the expanded operation were to
be accompanied by substantial concessions would the military be likely to cooperate.

- Finally is the option of disengagement. The international community could accept defeat and lift the sanctions on the grounds that they are unacceptably destructive. This would do nothing to address the fundamental problems of the society. It would consign the vast majority of Haitians to oppression and poverty and deprive them of hope for the future. Pressures to emigrate would continue. The United States would be faced with a choice of indefinitely continuing forcible repatriation, with all its objectionable moral overtones and economic costs, or suspending it and inviting a sharp increase in boat people. At the same time, there would be significant political costs to such a policy change. Critics would denounce it as a sell-out of democracy and a capitulation to thuggery. The credibility of the Clinton administration, the United States, and the United Nations would be damaged.

Recommendations.

- This is a terrible menu of options. For that reason, the United States and the international community have taken the least painful course of action. But that tactic has now come up against the limitations of reality, and hard choices have to be made. Rather than trying more of the same (which no longer seems feasible, given the humanitarian implications) or disengagement (which would abandon the Haitian people to their tormentors) or invasion (which has little political support), the United States and the international community should get serious about sanctions.

- A worldwide U.N. embargo, enforced by warships of the United States and other interested nations, should be placed on all trade and aid except for food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods
and services. Sanctions should be targeted much more heavily on Haitian military and civilian elites than in the past. This means striking not only at the very top of the armed forces, but at the officer corps as a whole. Such measures (for instance, the seizure of foreign financial assets, the denial of visas, and the restriction of air traffic) should also be applied more broadly against the economic elite. The object is to create and aggravate divisions and provide the motivation for dissidents to challenge the power and policies of the current leadership.

Such moves would send the Haitian military and its allies a powerful message and go a long way toward restoring the credibility of the United States and the international community. They might bring the Haitian military into line fairly quickly, since they would coincide with the depletion of the country's fuel reserves. But then again, nothing is guaranteed. In any case, they would accelerate an already serious humanitarian crisis. To avert a disaster on the ground, therefore, humanitarian aid should be rapidly expanded:

- A "humanitarian corridor" should be opened to ensure that the most essential human needs are met and guard against the misuse of aid.

- Should the Haitian military refuse to allow this, it should be put on notice that obstructionism and violence will not be tolerated. The United States and the international community must be prepared to back this up by stationing a sizable contingent of appropriately armed U.N. guards to protect the operation. Haitian military leaders should be told that (1) they will be held personally responsible for any violence, (2) that perpetrators of such actions will be subject to prosecution under international laws dealing with the gross violation of human rights, and (3) that should a
full-scale intervention be required, the Haitian armed forces would be dissolved.

Such a strategy contains very real risks and costs. It would not end Haiti's problems or U.S. and other foreign involvement in them. The country would need massive development aid for the foreseeable future. Some peacekeeping presence would almost certainly be necessary. But this course at least offers the hope that the country's grave socioeconomic and political ills might be seriously addressed. Under such circumstances, it might be possible to reduce human rights abuses and normalize migration. (The latter being by far the most important national interest that the United States has in Haiti.) If successful, the strategy would enable the United States to reclaim the moral high ground and restore some of its currently tattered reputation as a Great Power. It would also replace a policy of indecision with one of consistency, while allowing the U.S. Government to fulfill its obligations to those Haitians whom it encouraged to risk their lives and who now feel abandoned.
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Violent deaths are natural deaths here. He died of his environment.

Graham Greene
*The Comedians*

Misery in another country is prosperity in Haiti.

Anonymous Haitian

On October 11, 1993 the U.S.S. *Harlan County* carrying 193 U.S. and 25 Canadian troops, approached the dock in Port-au-Prince. The contingent was an advance force in a 1,267-man U.N. military and police mission that was intended to train the Haitian police and army and rebuild the country’s decimated infrastructure in accordance with the agreement signed on Governors Island, New York, the previous July. As the ship drew near the landing, it was met by a chanting, armed crowd of about a hundred people. Several small craft blocked the dock so that the vessel could not unload. When the U.S. chargé d'affaires arrived, the crowd gathered around her car and those of other diplomats. Screaming "We are going to turn this into another Somalia!", the protestors rocked and banged on the vehicles, as uniformed police stood by. Meanwhile, a larger crowd of several hundred people, shouting "Burn all foreigners!" and carrying the red and black flag of the former dictatorship of François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, set up barricades along some of the capital’s roadways. As the diplomats fled, armed thugs began firing into the air, setting off a panic. Others, riding in the backs of pickup trucks, careened wildly through the streets. Terrified pedestrians, changing direction with each new burst of gunfire, quickly emptied the commercial quarter.

The following day, the Pentagon ordered the *Harlan County* to leave Haitian waters. On October 13, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to reimpose the oil and arms
embargo that had been lifted in August. Thus ended another round in the seemingly interminable negotiations and maneuvers designed to resolve the Haitian crisis.

The withdrawal of the Harlan County dealt a devastating blow to the international community’s efforts to restore deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The move underscored U.S. irresolution and the weakness of its commitment to the Haitian leader and encouraged the Haitian armed forces to continue their defiance. At the same time, U.S. reluctance to impose a full-scale embargo and other stringent sanctions only reinforced the military’s conviction that it could wait out the enemy—that the international community did not have the stomach to inflict indefinite suffering on the Haitian people. By year’s end, the crisis seemed as far removed from a resolution as ever, and U.S./U.N./OAS policy was in a shambles.

Yet, no one should have been surprised by the collapse of the Governors Island Agreement. Indeed, it had been foretold by many veteran observers of the Haitian scene. Only those with a vested interest in believing had continued to confidently predict that the accord would be carried out and Aristide restored. Even had Aristide been returned to office, the future of Haitian democracy would have remained extremely tenuous. The fears and hatreds that permeated the political culture made his survival problematic. Nor could one be sure that the president and/or his followers would not themselves destroy the nascent democracy if they got the chance.

Moreover, beyond the problems of “restoring” democracy, were the tasks of economic and social “reconstruction.” In his joint press conference with Aristide in March, President Bill Clinton had pledged the United States to participate in a 5-year multilateral, $1 billion development program to “rebuild the Haitian economy” and “restore conditions of prosperity.” U.S. Government agencies would be enlisted, along with foreign governments, international organizations (including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank) and various private groups, to repair Haiti’s tattered political, social, and economic structures. In the words of one senior U.S. official: “We need to work on the court system and
the administration of justice, on an independent legislature, on labor unions. And, most importantly, we have to professionalize the Haitian armed forces and teach them to respect civilian authority.²

But how does one "restore" a prosperity that has never existed?³ Or "rebuild" an economy that has long been the most underdeveloped and poverty-stricken in the Western Hemisphere? And how does one teach Haitian soldiers, reared in an authoritarian, corrupt, and violent culture, the virtues of human rights, democracy, tolerance, and the rule of law? For that matter, how do you teach such values to the civilians?

Listening to some of the rhetoric emanating from Washington, one gets a sense of déjà vu. U.S. policy, it seems, is still bound by the same chains of culture and ignorance that have so long plagued our relations with this troubled land. It is as though we have no historical memory. Whether one is speaking of economic development or democracy, the problem is less one of "rebuilding" or "restoring" than of starting from scratch. Lest it be forgotten, the last time the United States became deeply involved in Haiti, it did not reemerge for 19 years. And when it did, the country quickly relapsed into dictatorship. About all that was reaped were the interminable hatreds of a nationalistic backlash.⁴

The Socioeconomic Dimensions of the Crisis.

The heart of the dilemma confronting the United States and the international community is that there is almost nothing to build on. Haiti's human and material resources are either in such short supply or have been so degraded by poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, violence, corruption, overpopulation, rapid urbanization, deforestation, and soil erosion as to raise serious questions about its continued survival as a society and an independent nation-state.

To take just a few of the most telling indicators: Even before the current crisis, Haiti had the lowest per capita income ($360) and life expectancy (48 years), and the highest infant mortality (124 per 1,000) and illiteracy (63-90 percent, depending on the criteria employed) rates in the Western Hemisphere. At least
70 percent of the children suffered from malnutrition, and about 33 percent were seriously malnourished. (Extreme malnutrition made Haiti the only country in the region with high incidence of kwashiorkor and marasmus.) With only 810 doctors and even fewer nurses to serve a population of over 6 million people, Haitians could not even begin to cope with their severe health problems. To the traditional afflictions of tuberculosis (affecting 10 percent of the population), malaria, salmonellosis, venereal disease, and the endemic illnesses associated with malnutrition has recently been added the modern-day version of the plague: the AIDS virus. Currently, it is estimated that as much as 9 percent of the population may be HIV positive.\(^5\)

Then, there is the problem of overpopulation. With perhaps as many as 700 people per square kilometer of arable land, Haiti has one of the highest ratios of population density in the world. The rate of urban growth is equally imposing: Between 1971 and 1992, the population of metropolitan Port-au-Prince almost tripled, from about half a million to almost a million and a half.\(^6\) So crowded are the slums and so wretched the housing conditions that people often have to sleep in shifts, with one group sleeping for a few hours, then being replaced by another. (This gives the impression that slum dwellers never sleep. In fact, it is just that at least half of them are always awake.) In the most crowded areas, people frequently sleep upright: One person leans against the wall with his head in his arms, another leans against him, and so on, sometimes as many as three or four in a row.\(^7\)

Overpopulation, of course, has ecological consequences: Deforestation and soil erosion are quite literally destroying Haiti physically. Too many people are working too little land, and they are doing so in a destructive manner. Farmers do not have the luxury of allowing their lands to lie fallow. Consequently, the soil is overworked, loses its nutrients, becomes barren, and eventually turns into dust. On top of this, peasants, lacking the money to purchase kerosene and other imported fuels, depend on wood for their home energy needs. They get it by collecting brambles, brush, saplings, and other forest products for firewood and charcoal. They also sell these products for cash to purchase food and materials. This steady encroachment on
already partially barren slopes is the primary cause of deforestation. As matters now stand, less than 7 percent of Haiti is covered by forest. Most trees have long ago been cut, and seedlings are not given a chance to grow. The upshot is further erosion. Tropical rains sweep the topsoil off the deforested hills leaving gullies and ravines. Some 20 percent of the country's topsoil may already have been lost, with much of it washed into the sea. Aerial photos of Hispaniola show a sharp contrast between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, with the former appearing brown and barren in comparison to the lush vegetation just across the border. Only 11 percent of Haiti's land is now considered arable. At an estimated loss of one percent of the arable land a year, the country risks mass starvation by early next century. By then, according to some estimates, there will be no more water. Haiti will be well on the way to becoming a desert. 8

During the past 28 months, this bleak panorama has gotten considerably worse. Widespread repression and the impact of the OAS and U.N. embargoes have combined to decimate the Haitian socioeconomic structure. Unemployment has soared, as labor-intensive export assembly industries have fled the country. 9 Deforestation has accelerated. (The unavailability of butane gas has led to an increasing reliance on charcoal.) Repression has all but destroyed a once flourishing civil society. Grassroots organizations of all kinds have been targeted. Several hundred thousand urban residents have fled to the countryside, while many rural dwellers (mostly males) have gone into hiding. Altogether, some 400,000 to 500,000 people may have been displaced. Rural development projects have been destroyed; crops have gone unplanted. The result, in some areas, has been near-famine conditions. Only the presence of international nongovernmental organizations, which have provided food for well over half a million Haitians daily, has prevented massive starvation. 10

The point is that while a billion dollars may seem like a lot of money, it is but a drop in the bucket when compared to the magnitude of the problems faced. Haiti is among the 25 poorest countries in the world. The public health crisis alone is staggering. Will it now be the responsibility of the international
community (or the United States) to take on Haiti’s AIDS epidemic?

Complicating the problem further is the fact that there are no strong institutions and few bases on which such structures might be assembled. A professional class does not exist in Haiti in the same sense that most countries have a substantial corps of well-trained managers and technocrats, dedicated to the public good. (This is not to say that there are no such personnel. But as in any nation having Haiti’s illiteracy rate, they are relatively few in number; moreover, most of them have now left the country.) Any government will be talent-thin. There will be ministers without ministries (only payrolls). And what competence there is will be largely neutralized by pervasive corruption. It will be years before enough Haitians can be trained and/or lured back from abroad to run the government and the economy in a reasonably competent manner. And that will be the easy part. Much more difficult will be the task of instilling the values of honesty and professionalism that would give Haiti’s politicians, administrators, policemen, and military officers the will to place the public interest above their own personal profit. For that to happen, there would have to be a wholesale cultural revolution.

Without such changes, no amount of aid will ultimately be enough. One cannot simply pour money into Haiti and assume that its problems will be solved. This is the proverbial bottomless pit. The country has no capacity for absorbing large-scale foreign aid. Without close foreign supervision—amounting to at least a partial suspension of national sovereignty—the assistance will rapidly find its way into the pockets of Haitian elites (old or new). Nor can one expect to be able to just go in and set up an infrastructure and leave it. Roads and buildings have to be maintained. If the United States and other foreign donors are not willing to stay and perform such tasks, while training the Haitians to take over in the longer run, then international efforts will be largely wasted.
The Politics of Incompatibility: Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Messianic Impulse.

Those who wish to transform Haiti socially and economically must think in terms of decades, rather than years, for such change will require more than one generation to accomplish. Furthermore, it will take place within a political context that, to put it mildly, is not likely to be conducive to socioeconomic development. Under the best of circumstances, democracy is the product of a long and difficult process. Rarely is this course unilinear. There will be setbacks—periods of stagnation and reversal, as well as periods of progress. Nor is there anything inevitable about the result. The election that brought the Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power was only the beginning of the process. It should not be surprising that such alien institutions and practices would encounter trouble in a political culture marked by authoritarianism, demagogy, intolerance, suspicion, intrigue, violence, corruption, and class hatred. Nor should one expect democracy to flourish, even if Aristide is restored, for he, too, is a product of that culture.1

Let us be clear. Father Aristide is a man of some virtue. He is intelligent and courageous, a charismatic leader who apparently continues to enjoy the support of the vast majority of Haitians. He may also be the first president in Haitian history who genuinely cares about his people.2 But his commitment to democracy is suspect, and he is not above using violence to pursue his aims. As president, he showed "little interest in establishing a rule of law or abiding, himself, within constitutional restraints." Rather, he governed as a "populist demagogue, appealing directly to Haiti's impoverished masses through fiery orations that inflamed class resentment and at times condoned mob violence."3

This point deserves to be stressed. Aristide is a revolutionary, and his politics are those of messianism and class struggle. He perceives himself as "the crystallization of popular demands, justice and respect," and in turn is viewed by his followers as "a prophet, a sacred person, who will deliver people from evil."4 To him, democracy means the "direct"
democracy of mass action, rather than the "representative" democracy of parliamentary debate and compromise. The increasingly open confrontation between the proponents of these two very different notions of democracy seriously undermined the nascent constitutional experiment and pushed many of the president's natural allies into the opposition camp.

Nor did his tendency to surround himself with trusted cronies from his Lavalas (Flood) political movement help matters. Rather than choosing his advisors on the basis of competence or the need to forge political alliances and a broad political consensus, Aristide relied on an inner circle of "friends," chosen for their personal connections or ideological affinity. This was a sectarian group, intolerant of criticism and impervious to advice. Again, the effect was to alienate many of those, especially from the middle-class left of intellectuals, politicians, and unionists, who had supported him in the past and had expected to share in the spoils of victory. Parliamentarians who were members of the National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD), the coalition which had sponsored Aristide's candidacy, resented being passed over in the competition for jobs and influence. And they were further alienated when the president proceeded to replace Supreme Court justices and make other decisions without consulting Congress.

By August 1991, barely six months into Aristide's term in office, relations between the Executive and Legislative branches had deteriorated to the point where the president's supporters were openly threatening congressmen with "Père Lebrun." And Aristide, through his public pronouncements, seemed to be encouraging it.

"Père Lebrun"—also called "necklacing"—is the practice of throwing a gasoline-soaked tire around the neck of your enemy and setting it afire. In late July, a large crowd had gathered around a courthouse where the notorious former leader of the Tontons Macoutes, Roger Lafontant, was being tried for an unsuccessful coup attempt. The protestors chanted and called for a life sentence, though the particular crime of which Lafontant was accused carried a maximum penalty of 15 years.
Some of the demonstrators carried tires on their heads. The threat was not terribly subtle.

A few days after the verdict (Lafontant had been given the life term), Aristide gave a pep talk to his followers. "For 24 hours," he said, "Père Lebrun" had become "a good firm bed":

The Justice Ministry inside the courthouse had the law in its hands, the people had their cushion outside. The people had their little matches in their hands. They had gas nearby.... If it had not gone well, would the people have used 'Père Lebrun?' [Audience yells: 'Yes.' ]

There had been incidents of mob violence and intimidation before. Following Lafontant's coup attempt the previous January, Aristide supporters had gone on a rampage against the conservative, anti-Aristide hierarchy of the Catholic Church. A mob had burned down the capital's old cathedral and destroyed the homes of the archbishop and the papal nuncio. The latter had been stripped naked and barely escaped with his life. Subsequently Aristide, in a radio speech, had seemed to endorse such behavior.

By early August, however, the conflict between pro- and anti-Aristide forces was rapidly moving towards a climax. A pattern of intimidation was becoming established; incidents were becoming more frequent and more blatant. Haitian legislators were by now debating whether to issue a vote of no confidence against Aristide's prime minister, René Préval. During these sessions, pro-Aristide demonstrators filled the public galleries. Some openly threatened to lynch the opposition. On August 6, a deputy was assaulted and beaten. The following day, a crowd stoned the home of another. On August 13, a mob of some 2,000 people surrounded the parliament building, screaming threats of "Père Lebrun" if the legislators voted to censure the prime minister. Two deputies were attacked, one of whom was badly hurt. A mob torched the headquarters of the Autonomous Federation of Haitian Workers (CATH), then moved on to loot the offices of the Confederation of Democratic Unity. Burning barricades were set up in various parts of the city. Public transportation was
halted; business came to a standstill. Parliament adjourned without issuing a vote on Préval.

The government eventually moved to halt the violence and restore order, but the message had been understood: To oppose Aristide was to court mob retaliation. In the weeks that followed, political party members attempting to hold meetings were threatened with necklacing, effectively bringing party operations to a near halt.20

On September 27, at a rally of his supporters at the National Palace, Aristide launched a bitter attack on the Haitian bourgeoisie and the Tontons Macoutes (former members of the Duvalier regimes' dread paramilitary militia). Urging the former to invest in the economy "so more people can get jobs," he warned that:

If you do not do so, I feel sorry for you. Really I do. [Laughter from the crowd.] It will not be my fault because this money you have is not really yours. You acquired it through criminal activity. You made it by plundering, by embezzling.... You made it under oppressive regimes.... I give you one last chance. I ask you to take this chance, because you will not have two or three more chances, only one. Otherwise, it will not be good for you.

If I speak to you this way, it is because I gave you a seven-month deadline for making amends. This seven-month deadline expires today. [Applause.] If I speak to you this way, it does not mean that I am unaware of my power to unleash public vindication, in the name of justice, against all these thieves, in an attempt to recover from them what is not theirs.... As I told you, the deadline expires today. The...ball is at your feet. If you want to shoot, go ahead. [Applause.]

As members of the crowd brandished tires and machetes, Aristide turned his attention to the Tontons:

You are watching all Macoute activities throughout the country.... If we catch one, do not fail to give him what he deserves. What a nice tool! What a nice instrument! [Loud cheers from the crowd.] What a nice device! [Crowd cheers.] It is a pretty one. It is elegant, attractive, splendidous, graceful, and dazzling. It smells good. Wherever you go, you feel like smelling it. [Crowd cheers!]21
Two days later, in Les Cayes, a pro-Aristide mob necklaced the Reverend Sylvio Claude, the head of Haiti's Christian Democratic Party. The Reverend Claude, who had been a prisoner under Papa Doc and was one of the country's foremost defenders of human rights, had made the mistake of criticizing the president. His burnt body was torn to pieces by people who later went through the city displaying his remains. A justice of the peace, who was making an on-the-scene report of the incident, was also burned to death.22

About the same time, a coalition of military officers, former Tontons Macoutes, and reactionary businessmen launched a bloody coup. The government was overthrown. Only because of last-ditch U.S., French, and Venezuelan appeals was Aristide able to come away with his life.23

The point is that, contrary to the assertions of some of Aristide's U.S. supporters,24 the president's enemies have ample reason to fear his return. Notwithstanding his recent appeals for nonviolence (which, after all, are a requisite for U.S. and international support), many of his followers—and perhaps Aristide himself—might very well be tempted to exact revenge should they be restored to power.

Again, this is an intolerant society. Political and class conflicts are so bitter that, no matter who is on top at any particular moment, violence and terror are never far from the surface. One recalls the fate of President Vilbrun-Guillaume Sam, who in 1915 was hacked to death by his enemies, then ripped apart by an enraged mob. Given such historical precedents and his own political record, it should not be surprising that Aristide's promises of amnesty are simply not believed. It is by no means clear that he could control his followers, even if he wanted to, and some of his enemies do not believe that he wants to. They point to the fact that at the time of his ouster he was creating his own presidential police, a move which they liken to "Papa Doc" Duvalier's founding of the dreaded Tontons.

Yet, for all the fears of class warfare that he has generated, Aristide's total record was mixed. During his months in office, he displayed more moderation and flexibility than the
preceding paragraphs suggest, especially in his relations with the United States and international lending agencies (which he had often in the past accused of working in concert with the Haitian elite to keep the country mired in poverty). If there were instances in which he seemed to condone or encourage human rights abuses, he also took measures to discourage such practices. The overall level of violence dropped conspicuously during his tenure. (Indeed, it seems almost minor compared to what has happened since.) Claims that he was creating a new Tonton Macoute in the form of his personal security guard appear to have been greatly exaggerated, if not part of a deliberate attempt by his enemies to sow fear in the military in the hope of sparking a coup.25 His recent willingness to support a political amnesty for the military and to appeal to his followers to refrain from violence is a promising sign, though it must always be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.

In perspective, Aristide may not be a very good bet, but he is the only Haitian leader who can command legitimacy in the form of widespread popular support; it is difficult to imagine a lasting resolution of the crisis that excludes him and those he represents.

The Politics of Incompatibility: The Military and Other MREs.

Aristide and his followers are integral parts of the Haitian political equation. But are they, or can they be made, compatible with the other parts—in particular, the military, the oligarchs, and the attachés? Haiti has long been ruled by a shifting coalition of groups whose record of rapaciousness and brutality is as sordid as that of any ruling class in the world. A U.S. Embassy official once dubbed them MREs—morally repugnant elites. In the days of "Papa Doc," it was said that the torture chambers of the Dessalines Barracks were painted brown so that blood would not mar the walls.26 Since the September 1991 coup, they have killed roughly 2,000 to 3,500 people.27

This power structure is by no means conflict-free. Indeed, the Haitian political class often seems perpetually frozen in
irreconcilable schisms. The military is riven with factional strife. Officers struggle over power and spoils. Loyalties are based on opportunism rather than ideology; they can shift quickly, depending on who is on top or moving up and who is losing in the game of musical chairs that has been Haitian politics since the fall of the Duvalier dynasty.

To take the most obvious points of conflict: There has been rivalry between the army and the Port-au-Prince police; between various commands and commanders (most notably, the CINC, General Raoul Cédras, and the Chief of Police, Colonel Joseph Michel François); between high and lower-level officers; between the commissioned officer corps and the noncoms and enlistees (the ti-soldats, or "little soldiers"); between the military institution and the Duvalierists (who had subordinated it to the Tontons and reduced it to a marginal role under Papa Doc); and between the military and its traditional allies in the oligarchy.

Nor is this all. There are conflicts between different factions of the oligarchy—the feudal landlords, or gwandon; the traditional export (agriculture)-import (manufactured goods) elite; and the more recently developed assembly-export sector. When one adds to all this the legion of section chiefs (rural bosses, essentially combining military intelligence, police, political and judicial functions), attachés (hired guns, loosely associated with the apparatus of repression, who do much of the killing and thuggery), and various other zenglendos (a term describing anyone with a gun, often used interchangeably with Macoute and attaché), one is left with the sense of a power structure that is not only extremely violent, but which has no real center. The only thing that binds these diverse elements together is their hatred and fear of Aristide and "the mob."

Thus, even if it were possible to obtain the cooperation or acquiescence of certain individuals or groups (most notably, General Cédras, who is thought to be a relative moderate), it is extremely improbable that this could be parlayed into a broad consensus on such issues as Aristide's return, the professionalization of the armed forces, and the creation of a separate civilian police. The perceived threats are too great, both personally and institutionally. On one level, military
officers worry about physical survival. Many are convinced that Aristide and his supporters have already drawn up hit lists. On another level, they fear that any move to professionalize the armed forces would cost them their careers, since a renovated structure would have to be purged of corrupt and abusive elements and sharply reduced in size.

Beyond this, there is the threat to the institution itself: Plans to create an independent police force would deprive the military of its primary traditional mission—maintaining internal order. (As matters currently stand, the police are part of the armed forces.) And those new missions being discussed—coastal patrolling, guarding borders, building roads—do not look particularly attractive. Nor, given Haiti’s historical experience, can the military be happy about the prospect of having to deal with another armed institution, under civilian control, which would become a competitor for resources and, most likely, power. By the same token, any attempt to create a "new" police would constitute a direct threat to Colonel François and the Metropolitan Police. Not surprisingly, they are even more intransigent on these issues than the army.

Then, there is the question of booty. Currently, the military receives about 40 percent of the national budget. In recent years, moreover, it has taken over many state-owned enterprises. The public sector has been especially infiltrated by the proxies of the Port-au-Prince police chief, Colonel François, who are thought to control the telephone company, the port, the electricity company and many basic imports, including cement and flour. Officers routinely use their positions for economic gain, supplementing their regular salaries by extorting bribes and favors, engaging in contraband, receiving free land and labor, and so on.

Any government that threatened these sources of wealth would risk a coup. But the problem is complicated by the fact that members of the high command are from the new-money upper class. While some of the older, more established oligarchs might be willing to take their money and relocate, this is much more difficult for the nouveau riche, who have everything they own tied up in Haiti. The issue is further compounded since much of this new money has been acquired
through the contraband and drug operations that have flourished since the OAS embargo was first imposed in October 1991. Narcotics bring in tens of millions of dollars a year. This bonanza has not been limited to the high command. Discipline has so disintegrated that officers down to the rank of captain have become economic powers in their own right. These younger officers have only begun to taste the riches that can be obtained through these activities, and they are not willing to give them up.33

For the ti-soldats and attachés, too, the international community's plan to "restore democracy" and "professionalize" the military and police represents more of a threat than an opportunity. There has been talk in the State Department about the need to offer something to the common soldiers to make Aristide's return palatable. The idea is to provide them with better living conditions, the opportunity for a real career, and other benefits.34 But whether these inducements will be enough may be doubted. If the army is cut by half and a new police force created, many of these people will lose their jobs. This is especially true of the attachés whose ranks now number in the thousands and whose services would presumably no longer be required.

Moreover, the lower-ranking elements in the apparatus of repression are even more anti-Aristide than their commanders. It is they, more than anyone else, who have had to bear the brunt of Père Lebrun. Some have seen their comrades torched by angry mobs. They believe that Aristide has already given the orders to kill them.35 Whereas officers can always flee into exile if things get too hot, the enlistees and hired guns are not so fortunate. Their ultimate nightmare is to be deserted—left alone to face the mob.

Given the intensity of these fears, it is by no means clear that the high command would be able to control lower-ranking officers, enlistees, and attachés should Aristide be restored.36 In recent years, the noncoms and rank and file have shown a tendency to act on their own. They were at least partially responsible for the coup of September 1988,37 and they could very well move again. Haitian commanders are acutely aware of the danger posed by their own "masses" (who could turn on
them as well as on the president). Since last July, Colonel François and his colleagues have sought to placate the enlistees by assuring them that Aristide will not be allowed to return. The Governors Island Agreement, it is being said, was merely a tactical ploy designed to obtain a lifting of international sanctions.38

One other group that must be mentioned is the oligarchy. The military’s civilian counterpart in the ruling class consists of a handful of wealthy, mostly mulatto families—including the Mevs, the Brandts, the Bigios, the Acras, and the Madsens—who rose to wealth and influence under the Duvaliers through the acquisition of monopolies on such commodities as rice, sugar, steel, and cooking oil. For years, these groups enjoyed duty-free imports and paid no taxes. Their labor costs were almost nil. They bled the countryside through excessive taxation and unfair terms of trade.39 Only recently has their economic domination been challenged by newer groups, the most recent being the contraband and drug smugglers (both military and civilian) who have flourished since the imposition of the OAS embargo. These new arrivals have cut into the traditional oligarchy’s markets and created intra-elite strains that became very significant politically once the OAS sanctions were reinforced in 1993 by more potent U.N. measures.40 Nevertheless, the fact remains that the old elites risk losing their privileged position, and perhaps much more, if Aristide returns. The State Department wants to see their monopolies broken.41

The point is that the Haitian power elite is a multiheaded monster. In addition to the power centers located within the armed forces, there are a dozen or so outside the military, based mainly in the drug/contraband/Duvalierist complex. Over the past year, the latter have grown in number and size as extreme right-wing exiles have returned to the country and begun organizing their own private armies. (Hence, one reason for the proliferation of attachés.) This has complicated the situation considerably. Whereas institutions like the army and police are easy to identify, these “occult groups” are shadowy, amorphous entities, and are extremely difficult to deal with.42
What seems to be emerging looks more like a warlord system than a centralized repressive apparatus.

To return to the central issue: Can these seemingly irreconcilable antagonists be reconciled? The instinctive answer is "no." The two sides have little in common. The contending social forces which they represent are divided by wealth, race, and language (the upper-class, mulatto socioeconomic elite speaks French and the lower-class black masses, Creole); they only partially share the same culture and history. This is class conflict in its most unadulterated form: a zero-sum game, in which one side loses when the other wins. (Or at least that is the perception. In Haiti, the state was developed as a fundamentally predatory organism. It is not an accident that the Creole word \textit{leta} means both "state" and "bully."\textsuperscript{443}) Under such circumstances, the military and its allies worry that their power, wealth, and lives will be endangered should Aristide be restored. Aristide fears that he will be in constant danger of a coup or assassination unless he can purge the Army and police and bring them under his control. And both sides have ample reason to be afraid.

The bottom line is that a restoration of the Haitian president would have to be accompanied by the introduction of an international peacekeeping force, capable of providing security for both sides. Without that, Aristide’s return would be an open invitation to assassination, an act which in turn could well spark massive violence.

\textbf{Paved with Good Intentions: The Tragic Course of U.S. and International Policy.}

Good intentions are not enough. One must have clearly defined and realistic goals, the means of attaining them, and the will to persist. Unfortunately, these qualities have been largely absent from the international community’s policy to date. By any standard, international sanctions have been a disaster. They have further devastated the Haitian economy without establishing democracy. The OAS and U.N. embargoes have accelerated environmental damage, contributing to near-famine conditions in some areas and
causing (in conjunction with other factors) untold hardship for the common people, while only inconveniencing the military leadership and the elite. Indeed, many officers and oligarchs have grown richer through smuggling, drug-running, and other forms of corruption.\textsuperscript{44}

Truth is sometimes a difficult thing to accept. But we are at a moment of truth in U.S. policy toward Haiti. Unfortunately, much of the responsibility for failure must be laid at the door of the United States. From the very beginning of the crisis, U.S. policy was marked by a seeming incomprehension of both Haitian and international realities, a flight from leadership, and a reluctance to take measures that might have convinced the Haitian power elite of our seriousness of purpose. The result was that all the wrong signals were sent. Haitian leaders came to the conclusion that the United States and its international allies could be manipulated and outmaneuvered. And they were right.

Part of the problem lay in the U.S. desire to avoid the responsibility and blame for dealing with the problem unilaterally. The United States had been subjected to considerable criticism for Operation JUST CAUSE. Thus, still desiring to promote democracy in the hemisphere, the Bush administration had launched a concerted diplomatic effort to turn the OAS into an instrument for dealing with future crises.\textsuperscript{45} The culmination of this campaign was the "Santiago Commitment to Democracy"—the June 1991 OAS commitment to act in the event that a democratically elected government were to be overthrown anywhere in the Americas.

Achieving an inter-American consensus with regard to the collective defense of democracy was a remarkable feat, and clearly it was a move in the right direction, but the problem was with its enforcement. The OAS had neither the resources nor the will to fulfill such an ambitious commitment. The organization had no enforcement arm; moreover, it was largely composed of countries with long histories of concern about foreign intervention in their own internal affairs. Experience suggested that it might play a useful mediational role, but that anything more would require strong leadership on the part of the United States. Lacking that, OAS multilateralism would be
a prescription for half-way measures, producing half-way, grossly inappropriate results.

Part of the problem was that OAS sanctions, never compulsory for nonmembers of that organization, were not even binding on its members. Consequently, enforcement was lax. Reluctant to alienate foreign friends and allies over Haiti, the Bush administration always stopped well short of demanding that the embargo be respected. Proposals to dramatically escalate the pressure on the regime through a blockade were rejected as unworkable or unwise. Such a move would have strained U.S. relations with the Europeans at a time when Washington needed their cooperation in dealing with the more important problems of economic dislocation and turmoil in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The upshot was that at least a dozen countries in Europe, Africa, and Latin America (with the Dominican Republic being the most notorious culprit) routinely ignored the sanctions. Crucial supplies continued to reach Haiti, enabling the regime to obtain oil and other necessities, and allowing the rich to maintain their accustomed lifestyles.  

It was difficult to escape the impression that the Bush administration was not all that serious about restoring Aristide. Government spokesmen made little effort to disguise their distaste for the Haitian president. At the same time, threats to seize the foreign assets of wealthy Haitians involved in the coup were never acted upon. Indeed, special exemptions to the existing sanctions were made to allow U.S. businessmen with export-assembly factories on the island to continue operations. For humanitarian reasons, controls were relaxed on some goods (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides) being shipped to Port-au-Prince from the United States. For most of its final year in office, the Bush administration took a passive stance on Haiti, issuing mechanical statements not reflected in political initiatives, while letting the OAS take the lead in the interminable and ineffective diplomatic efforts that were underway. This was especially the case after President Bush effectively defused the refugee crisis by having the Coast Guard intercept and return fleeing Haitians to their homeland without giving them a chance to appeal for asylum. Not until
the refugee threat was resurrected following the electoral victory of Governor Bill Clinton did Haiti again become a priority item in the U.S. policy agenda. And even then, the American effort sometimes appeared to be aimed at wooing the most reactionary elements in Haiti.\textsuperscript{50} 

To be sure, Aristide was himself partly to blame for this lack of U.S. enthusiasm. His own questionable human rights record made it imperative that the United States make its position known on these matters. (Clearly, he could not be restored if he was determined to incite mob violence, and he had to be made to understand that. By the same token, a message had to be sent to his foes in Haiti that they would not be endangered by his return.) Beyond this, the rigidity which characterized the Haitian military's negotiating position also marked his own behavior. Thus, an OAS-mediated agreement in February 1992 collapsed when he reneged on its amnesty provision almost immediately after having signed the accord.\textsuperscript{51} Needless to say, such behavior endeared him to neither the international mediators nor the Bush administration. Indeed, from this point his relations with the latter went steadily downhill. 

The problem was that U.S. vacillation and passivity not only alienated Aristide (who continued to believe that the United States had ample economic leverage to force the regime to capitulate, if only it had the will), but—more importantly—it undermined U.S. credibility with the Haitian military. Consequently, when the Bush administration and the incoming Clinton team began to ratchet up the pressure for a settlement in late 1992, General Cédras and his colleagues could not be sure how seriously to take them. In December, the United Nations joined the negotiations, warning Cédras that the international community might tighten the embargo and impose a blockade on oil supplies if an agreement to restore Aristide was not reached soon. The question was whether the international community and especially the new, untested American president would be willing to follow up such threats with action. Cédras decided to find out. 

The months since then have witnessed a concerted effort by the Haitian regime to drag out the negotiations and, in the process, test the mettle of the Clinton administration, the
United Nations, and the Organization of American States. In early February 1993, in a blatant act of bad faith, Haitian authorities rejected previously agreed-upon plans for the deployment of hundreds of international human rights observers. The Haitians demanded a long list of conditions that they knew would be unacceptable. Among other things, they demanded the immediate lifting of the embargo, the effective recognition of the military-backed government of Prime Minister Marc Bazin, and numerous restrictions on the international observers. From the moment of his arrival in the country, U.N. mediator Dante Caputo was hounded by demonstrators and showered with insults by the Haitian negotiators, who denounced him as an "imperialist" and a "dirty foreigner." Eventually, Caputo had to be escorted to the airport through an angry mob. In response Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with Aristide for a few minutes in a symbolic show of support and issued a "stem warning." A tightening of sanctions, he suggested, would be considered down the road.52

But the breakdown in negotiations was only temporary. As pressure for a return to civilian rule was renewed, General Cédras agreed to allow international observers to enter the country. In mid-March, President Clinton pledged a "much more aggressive effort" to restore Aristide and promised to help "rebuild" the Haitian economy. When both Caputo and the Clinton administration's special advisor on Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, told the Haitian military rulers that they would have to go, it once again seemed like a settlement might be reached. In early April, Cédras agreed in principle to resign in return for guarantees of amnesty and safety for himself, his family, and the other members of the high command. Subsequently, Aristide agreed to extend a political amnesty to military officers and to refrain from initiating criminal actions against them. As an additional guarantee, he pledged not to oppose any effort by the Haitian parliament to grant a broader amnesty.53

This was where matters stood when Dante Caputo returned to Haiti in mid-April, for the fifth time in four months, amid high hopes that a "definitive solution" to the crisis could at last be reached. But again he was destined to be disappointed. After
delivering a written summary of the terms to the Haitian leaders, Caputo was forced to wait for the next day and a half for an answer. And when it came, it was negative. The proposal was rejected outright. "Some very bad things were said," the U.N. envoy later remarked, but he declined to give any details.54

By now it was abundantly clear that the Haitians were toying with Caputo. In the words of one diplomat close to the negotiations: "They have decided to say, 'We are staying.... If you want us, come and get us.' This, however, is not the way things work with this effort, and they may soon find that they have a very high price to pay for their decision." Highly selective sanctions ("something like microsurgery") would soon be announced to step up the pressure. Meanwhile, a few things would be tried right away.55

The problem, again, was that Cédras and the high command simply did not trust Aristide; moreover, they did not believe that the United Nations and United States would follow through on their threats. Pressure on the Clinton administration to take stronger action to resolve the refugee problem had lessened as a result of the president's decision to continue his predecessor's policy of forcible repatriation. The obvious reluctance of Washington and its allies to intervene militarily or even to substantially tighten the embargo (thus inflicting even more punishment on the Haitian people and perhaps destroying the economy beyond repair) gave hope to the Haitian rulers that, when push came to shove, their foreign adversaries would back off.

Meanwhile, General Cédras and his colleagues sought to stretch out the process and deprive the international community of any pretext for increasing economic sanctions or intervening by force: Within a matter of days after having rebuffed the settlement, the Haitians indicated that they wanted to continue the negotiations. This apparent turnaround was received at the State Department as evidence that international pressure was working and that the military was desperately seeking a way out.56
To many Haitians, however, it seemed like the Clinton administration was unwilling to use anything more than the threat of economic sanctions. In the words of one authoritative State Department source: "We are preparing to tighten them, but there is no need to do that yet. The military is negotiating. If we tighten the sanctions now, it would ruin everything." Increasingly, indeed, it seemed that the United States was relying on carrots, rather than sticks. Diplomats talked about the need to provide an "attractive exit" for the military. When asked about the problem of corruption and how Haiti could absorb all the aid that would flow into the country in the event of a settlement, some professed indifference: "We aren't all that concerned if some of this is diverted into the pockets of the military and the elite. They need a stake if we are to get their cooperation."

Governors Island: The Making of a Fiasco.

But carrots alone were not enough. Only the imposition of sanctions—real sanctions—would get the Haitian military to bargain seriously. As this became clearer, the United Nations increased the pressure: On June 16, in a resolution that was binding on all U.N. members, the Security Council voted to impose a ban on all petroleum and arms sales to Haiti and ordered a freeze on the foreign financial assets of top officials and businessmen. On June 23, the sanctions took effect. Four days later, General Cédras and President Aristide met separately with U.N. and U.S. mediators on Governors Island, New York, and began to hammer out a compromise.

On July 3, the two sides signed an agreement outlining a series of steps culminating in Aristide's restoration. Following the president's nomination of a prime minister and the latter's confirmation by parliament, international sanctions would be suspended and foreign aid resumed. Amnesty would be granted to those who had been involved in the September 1991 coup. Towards the end of the transition, General Cédras would retire. Other key members of the high command would be transferred to less sensitive posts. The president would appoint a new military commander, who would select a new General
Staff. Finally, on October 30, Aristide would return to his homeland.69

Unfortunately, the Governors Island Agreement was fatally flawed. Aristide accepted it only reluctantly, under pressure from U.N. and U.S. mediators. Indeed, it had been presented to him as something of a fait accompli: Cédras had already signed it and was on the way back to Haiti, leaving Aristide with the choice of either rejecting the accord—in which case the negotiations would end and the embargo would be lifted—or acquiescing to it.60

The agreement has been examined in detail elsewhere,61 and only a few of its most serious shortcomings need be noted here. One major flaw was the provision to lift the embargo and resume economic aid before Aristide’s return, at a time when General Cédras, Colonel François and their allies still occupied their positions of power. Aristide had wanted to postpone the negotiations until the full impact of the embargo could take effect. He wanted the army cowed when it came to the bargaining table. The United States, the U.N. and the OAS, however, insisted that the talks be held almost immediately upon the imposition of sanctions. Under these circumstances, the regime’s only real goals appear to have been (1) to get the measures lifted before they seriously hurt the military; and (2) to buy time by taking advantage of the resumption of oil shipments to restock supplies and protect foreign financial holdings in preparation for a possible longer siege to come.

Equally serious, the agreement had no enforcement mechanism beyond the threat of renewed sanctions in the event of noncompliance. While there was a provision for the introduction of international military and police personnel, their numbers would be inadequate to cope with the magnitude of the problems faced. Moreover, these were trainers and engineers rather than peace-enforcers. Foreign soldiers were to be lightly armed at best, and under strict orders not to intervene if they encountered human rights abuses or other violence. International observers were to be just that—observers. In the words of one official, the U.N. mission had “a narrow mandate to be there and rub off on the police
and the army, who magically by osmosis are supposed to behave themselves....

Along these same lines, there was no provision for purging the Haitian military and police of corrupt or abusive elements. Only Cédras was to be retired, and he was to receive a pension. Though the Clinton administration pledged that no human rights offenders would receive U.S. training, it had no practical plans to vet participants. (Indeed, Lawrence Pezzullo, the administration's special envoy on Haiti, had told Congress that it should be up to the Haitians to decide whether or not to rid the army of abusive members.) Lacking the will to instill accountability in the armed forces and the police, it was unlikely that mere "training" would have much effect. In the words of one observer: "No message from the head of a classroom, no matter how eloquently delivered, will prevail over the lesson of impunity that is shouted each day that those responsible for murder and torture retain their official positions."

At the time, this was not widely understood in the United States. Editorial writers competed with one another to heap praise on the Clinton administration for its foreign policy victory. Haitians, however, were more skeptical. They had reason to be. The weeks that followed the Governors Island Agreement witnessed the worst wave of politically related violence since the aftermath of the September 1991 coup. Between early July and mid-September, hundreds of people disappeared. In Port-au-Prince alone, there were over 100 killings. Pro-Aristide activists were repeatedly intimidated, beaten and arrested, sometimes in full view of international monitors. The poorer districts of the capital were subjected to nightly raids, where residents were intimidated by wild sprees of automatic weapons fire and leaders of grass-roots organizations were targeted for assassination. By early September, bullet-ridden corpses had become a common sight along the city's roadways.

By now it was abundantly clear that the military had no intention of abiding by the Governors Island Agreement. It was systematically destroying Aristide's political support network, with a view to creating an ungovernable situation and making the president's restoration impossible. During these weeks,
some of the most notorious Duvalierists returned to the country, where they began to form political groups and organize attachés, often in league with the powerful commander of the Metropolitan Military District, Colonel François, and the Chief of Staff, General Biamby. François, in particular, was rapidly emerging as the regime's most powerful figure, with control over the Army's heavy weapons unit (including armored personnel carriers), command of the 1,500-man Port-au-Prince police force, and his own private army of attachés. His position on Aristide's return was uncompromising: "When my life is in danger, I am capable of anything."

In September and October, he proved it. On September 8, dozens of municipal employees, armed with guns, clubs and knives, ran amok outside City Hall after Mayor Evans Paul, an Aristide ally, reclaimed the post he had lost after the September 1991 coup. Five people were killed and 31 wounded. Three days later, plain-clothes police assassinated Antoine Izmery, a prominent Aristide financial supporter, after he had organized a Mass commemorating those who had been killed during an attack on St. Jean Bosco Church 5 years earlier. By mid-month, the government of Aristide's prime minister, Robert Malval, was under a full-scale siege. The minister of information dared not go to his office because of threats against his life; the finance minister was besieged in her office by armed civilians; gun-toting demonstrators broke up the foreign minister's swearing-in ceremony; under threat of death, the government prosecutor investigating the violence resigned. Even the National Assembly was forced to postpone its sessions because the legislators were afraid to convene.

In the face of this spiralling terror and chaos, the international community seemed paralyzed. Aristide's calls for a reimposition of sanctions fell on deaf ears. Preparations for his return proceeded slowly. Only on September 23 did the U.N. Security Council authorize the sending of 1,267 police and military personnel, and only in early October did the first sizable contingents of American and Canadian troops begin arriving. By then, however, there were only a few weeks left before Aristide's scheduled return, not nearly enough time to obtain
meaningful results from any training that might be imparted to the Haitian security forces.

On October 3, moreover, 18 U.S. Army peacekeepers were killed and several score wounded in Somalia. The incident traumatized the U.S. public and Congress, intensifying fears of further involvement in U.N. peacekeeping operations. By now, also, the Pentagon was leery of becoming involved in Haiti. According to press reports, Secretary of Defense Aspin and DOD planners sensed, quite correctly, that the small, lightly armed international force that was scheduled to go into the country would be incapable of preventing violence. Indeed, it might well become a magnet for it. American troops would be placed in harm's way, with only handguns to defend themselves and highly restrictive rules of engagement. This was a prescription for disaster and led to an unseemly spate of public bickering between the State and Defense Departments.6

Once again, all the wrong signals were being sent. Haitian leaders watched in fascination as U.S. Congressmen debated the deployment of American soldiers on Sunday news programs. They could not fail to notice that many representatives opposed sending any troops at all. The message was unmistakable, and so were its implications: The United States was weak and irresolute. If the Americans could be persuaded that Haiti was "another Somalia," the Clinton administration would be forced to back down.

Nor was this conclusion discouraged by the statements of certain Western spokesmen during these weeks. Thus, one senior official proclaimed that, in case of trouble, U.N. police and soldiers had been instructed to "run the other way." Up until the very end, U.N. military representatives continued to optimistically profess their "confidence" that the Haitian armed forces would "provide the security that they promised." When asked why, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, he was so sure of this, the deputy commander of the mission praised the "professionalism" of the Haitians.66 Such proclamations did nothing to bolster confidence in either the competence or steadfastness of the United Nations. On the contrary, they gave the impression that the international community was
whistling in the dark, closing its eyes to frightening realities that it did not have the courage to face. In the end, this only fostered further violence.

By now the streets of Port-au-Prince were in the hands of recently reconstituted Duvalierist forces, operating with the support of the police and the *attachés*, who enforced their calls for armed strikes with ruthless violence. Mayor Evens Paul and human rights activist Jean-Claude Bajeux were being hunted by assassins. Prime Minister Malval, along with many in his government, had been reduced to working out of his home for fear of venturing to the office. Pro-Aristide legislators were going into hiding or fleeing to the United States.

The climax of the drama came on October 11, when the *U.S.S. Harlan County* was prevented from docking by an angry mob. The subsequent decision to withdraw the ship from Haitian waters was taken without consultation with or even notification of the United Nations, President Aristide or Prime Minister Malval. It left the impression that the United States had cut and run; worse, that it had been frightened away by a few hundred unruly thugs. The Haitian military and its supporters were ecstatic. Diplomats, human rights observers and other foreigners still in the country were alarmed, fearing that the withdrawal might spark a wave of xenophobic violence as well as endanger those Haitians who had cooperated with them. U.N. and Haitian government officials were outraged. In the words of one U.N. observer: "The United States has been using the U.N. as a fig leaf to carry out its policy, but obviously has no respect for the institution."6

Nor, in the short run, did things get any better. On October 13, at the urging of the United States, the U.N. Security Council reimposed sanctions. The next day, President Clinton, seeking to send a "clear signal" to the Haitian military, warned that the United States was "very concerned" about the safety of Prime Minister Malval and the members of his government. The message was broadcast over Haitian radio. Less than 2 hours later, he was given a response: Malval’s minister of justice, Guy Malary, was gunned down in the streets of Port-au-Prince.68
On October 16—one day after Cédras was supposed to have resigned in preparation for Aristide's restoration—the United Nations imposed a naval blockade on Haiti. U.S. warships immediately began moving into position to enforce it; other countries soon joined the action. By now, however, the United States and the international community were locked in a credibility trap largely of their own making. No matter how committed they might be in their own minds to the restoration of Aristide, they were no longer taken that seriously by the Haitian military. In the words of one diplomat: "The Harlan County changed the whole psychology. It showed a lack of resolve that flipped the process around in a second."69

The U.S. retreat had strongly reinforced the Haitian armed forces' intransigence by demonstrating in the most dramatic possible manner Washington's evident unwillingness to intervene militarily. Nor, apparently, was it ready to impose much harsher sanctions than those that the United Nations had already levied on oil and arms. A French move to expand the embargo was rejected on the grounds that it would create undue hardship for the Haitian people. Instead, the United States tried a more selective approach, freezing the assets of 41 individuals and 34 organizations said to be obstructing the restoration of democracy and urging other countries to do the same. Even some U.S. officials, however, conceded that such measures would have limited effect, since the targeted Haitians had ample time to relocate or hide many of their assets.70 As the weeks passed, fuel continued to trickle in from across the Dominican border. Members of the elite continued to travel to Miami to stock up on consumer goods. In the short run, at least, there were few signs that they were suffering much more than inconvenience.71

By this time, moreover, the Washington policy community had become so deeply divided over Haiti that a coherent policy seemed all but impossible. In October, the CIA publicly joined the fight. At the request of Senator Jesse Helms and the House Intelligence Committee, briefings were held in which agency analysts portrayed Aristide as psychologically unstable,
drug-addicted, and prone to violence. While legitimate doubts existed about the Haitian president, this testimony put the worst possible interpretation on the fragmentary evidence available. Indeed, much of this "information" was based on materials and testimony provided by Aristide's enemies. Subsequently, investigators from The Miami Herald were able to seriously undermine, if not disprove, some of the most damaging charges (in particular, the claim that Aristide had undergone psychiatric treatment in a Canadian hospital).

Meanwhile, other reports were surfacing: Some of the very officers who had overthrown Aristide and were still in power—including General Cédras—had been paid CIA informants prior to the coup. In the mid-1980s, the agency had formed a Haitian intelligence service that had become involved in political terror and drug trafficking. Even after September 1991, some Haitian officers had continued to receive U.S. military training. Notwithstanding allegations that top commanders were involved in drug trafficking, U.S. law enforcement agencies were still providing the Haitian military with intelligence on narcotics trafficking. These revelations raised doubts as to the reliability of the CIA's intelligence and the propriety of its political activities both in Haiti and the United States. They suggested that the hopes that Washington placed on retraining the Haitian military and police were unrealistic. Most important, however, they called into question the steadfastness of the U.S. commitment. In the words of one observer:

... There is a long record of closeness between U.S. military and intelligence agencies and Haitians who have turned out to be the country's tyrants and plunderers. That history makes [Haitians] wonder whether the American Government is really committed to the return of President Aristide... or whether verbal support is merely a cover under which key figures in Washington are working against his return.

Nor was U.S. credibility aided by growing indications of the Clinton administration's disenchantment with Aristide. These weeks witnessed a concerted effort to pressure the Haitian president to broaden his government by bringing in opposition elements, including moderate military leaders. When Aristide,
fearing that such concessions would reduce him to the status of a figurehead, resisted, administration sources began to openly complain about his rigidity and unwillingness to compromise. These criticisms became especially loud in mid-December after Aristide vetoed a plan for a national reconciliation conference that had been proposed by Prime Minister Malval, with U.S. support. Subsequently, Malval resigned, venting his frustration by accusing Aristide of having ego problems and “playing with our lives, playing with the future of Haiti.”

U.S./U.N. policy now seemed perilously close to collapse. Malval had been a stabilizing force. A moderate who could command respect from at least some elements on both the right and the left, he had been one of the keys to U.S. efforts to build a political center in Haiti. Now he was going, and it was not clear who or what would replace him. At the same time, relations with Aristide had become increasingly tense. There was growing fear that the Haitian president might go public with his criticisms of U.S. policy. With diplomatic efforts stalled and relief agencies predicting that starvation might soon break out, administration officials saw themselves heading toward another public relations disaster. Accordingly, they let it be known that they were relaxing the drive to restore Haitian democracy while they rethought their options.

In turn, this led to public expressions of alarm that the United States was abandoning Haiti. On December 22, the Clinton administration sought to alleviate these fears by reconfirming its commitment: Haitian military leaders were told that the embargo would be expanded unless they stepped down by January 15. But such threats no longer carried much persuasive force. There had been too many such warnings, followed by too little action, in the past. General Cédras and his colleagues had concluded that they could wait out the enemy. To all appearances, the United States and its allies had neither the resolution for military intervention nor the will to inflict massive suffering on the Haitian people. The gamble was that, in the end, the international community would back off. Meanwhile, the military continued the task, already well underway, of developing a network of political organizations
that would enable it to consolidate its power for years to come. 78

Lessons and Implications.

With the collapse of the Governors Island Agreement, the protagonists seemed to be back on Square One. Yet, this was something of an illusion. Much had changed over the preceding 2 years, and not for the better. U.S./U.N./OAS policy was undergoing a funnel effect, with the options diminishing as time went on. As moderate means of persuasion were found wanting and discarded, it seemed that the United States and its allies might soon be faced with the very choices they most wanted to avoid.

Before such decisions are made, it is advisable to step back and reconsider where we are going and with what consequences. The United States and the international community still have several options, but unless we understand the lessons of our recent experience with Haiti, we will not be able to properly evaluate them.

The first thing that must be said is that one must be realistic. This may be a banal observation. Yet, considering the extraordinary absence of realism in U.S./U.N./OAS policy so far, it requires special emphasis. The United States and the international community have suffered from an inability to fashion an effective Haiti policy in the absence of strong U.S. leadership. We have seriously misread the Haitian military and its allies, ascribing to them a degree of reasonableness and flexibility that does not exist. Thus, rather than using our bargaining leverage firmly, we have resorted to incremental pressures that have stretched out the crisis and inflicted far more damage (mostly on innocent people) than would have been the case had an effective embargo been imposed from the beginning.

In short, in Haiti we have been dealing not with military officers (which implies a degree of professionalism) but mainly with thugs. 79 And what thugs understand is power. One has to use it in a way that will be credible, always keeping in mind that a failure to apply leverage that is so obviously available will be
interpreted as weakness and will simply encourage further recalcitrant behavior.

Secondly, Haiti is not a graduate seminar on political development. The international community cannot "create" democracy there on the basis of certain preconceived social science theories. Only Haitians can democratize Haiti. But for that to happen, there would have to be a wholesale transformation of the political culture. The restoration of Aristide would be only the first step. Much more difficult would be the creation of professional military and/or police forces that would be reasonably competent and honest and subordinate to civilian control. Equally important, moreover, would be the construction of an effective and fair judicial system. All this would require a substantial, ongoing U.S. and international effort.

Sound policy must be founded on a realistic appraisal of the situation. The Governors Island Agreement was based on the extraordinary notion that all that would be necessary to maintain peace was a small, lightly armed international force that would be under strict orders not to become involved if violence broke out between rival Haitian factions. Given the depth of the hatred and fear that separates the Aristide forces from their enemies, this was not realistic. Within a few months, moreover, this international force was to transform the Haitian military and police into professional organizations which would respect human rights and democracy and submit to civilian control—all without being purged of the corrupt and violent elements that had done so much to create the Haitian crisis in the first place. In a way, Aristide may have been fortunate that the agreement collapsed. To have returned to office under such circumstances would have been an open invitation to assassination.

The implication, of course, is that a substantial peace-enforcement/peacekeeping mission would have to be introduced to provide political stability and security for all sides. Haitian troops and police would have to be vetted and human rights offenders removed. These forces would have to be retrained and resocialized—no easy task when the subjects do not want that training. Clearly, it would take years—perhaps
generations—before the process could be completed. (If, indeed, it could be successfully completed at all.)

A related point is that U.S. and other foreign sponsors would have to provide most of the human infrastructure that would assure that humanitarian and development aid would be used effectively. One cannot simply give money and other resources to the Haitians and expect that they will be used efficiently or for the purposes intended. This means that a substantial international presence would be required for the indefinite future. Beyond the tasks of administering aid, providing medical care, building roads and schools, planting trees and so on, there would have to be a major, ongoing educational and training program to enable Haitians to acquire the skills and values that would gradually enable them to replace foreign personnel.

Obviously, this would not be a "quick and easy" operation. Nor are there any guarantees that it would succeed in its most ambitious objectives. Political cultures are notoriously difficult to change, and one must be prepared for considerably less than optimum results. Haitians will not suddenly begin behaving like we want them to behave. The old values, habits, hatreds, and fears will endure. At the same time, one should anticipate that some Haitians will resent a large-scale, indefinite foreign presence (military or civilian) as an infringement on sovereignty. Whatever the benefits, that presence will offend nationalistic pride. If, in addition, the international forces should become heavily involved in Haitian domestic politics—as seems inevitable—the stage would be set for a serious backlash.

Yet, to do much less would seriously constrain the prospects for success. The current crisis can be alleviated through a massive, short-term humanitarian effort. But unless the international community—and especially the United States—is willing to stay the course, one must expect Haiti to once again descend into chaos or tyranny after the foreigners pull out.

But is the international community willing to make such a commitment? Probably not. The Haitian crisis comes at a time
of declining resources and multiplying commitments. The U.S. Congress and public are likely to especially resist such appeals. The end of the cold war has raised expectations of a "peace dividend." The military is rapidly downsizing; its budget is being slashed. The United States is already committed to one peace-enforcement operation (in Somalia) that has gone sour. Bosnia still looms on the horizon. If one adds the continuing potential threat from Iraq, the need for a massive economic commitment to Russia, the turmoil in Angola, Cambodia and parts of the former Soviet Union, and possible explosions in Cuba and elsewhere, one has to wonder how many crises the United Nations and the United States can handle simultaneously. The resources and the will of the American people must be considered.

This brings us to another question: What are our limitations? This is critically important in an era of "New World Disorder." One cannot intervene everywhere. If we try and fail, it may discredit the whole notion of peacekeeping. After its recent experience in Somalia, the United States is particularly vulnerable on this point. An intervention in Haiti—especially if it ended badly, as it well might—could so sour the U.S. public and its political leaders that they would reject peacekeeping (or peace-enforcement or humanitarian) missions even when they were clearly in the interests of U.S. and international security.

Along these same lines, one of the greatest pitfalls in the Haitian crisis is the temptation to fall prey to zealotry. It is natural to feel moral outrage over what is happening in that country. Unfortunately, anger is not a reliable guide for making foreign policy. Especially when combined with ideology, it tends to distort perceptions and cloud judgment. Moreover, there is a danger of personalizing the conflict to the point where one becomes convinced that there is "no choice" but to take certain actions. The definition of the situation is extremely important: If the Haitian hardliners continue to defy the international community, U.N. and U.S. leaders may conclude—if they have not already done so—that they cannot back down. Their reputations and credibility (not to mention their self-concepts) are at stake. Evil must not be allowed to go unpunished.
But the problem is that Haitian reality is not quite as
clear-cut as Father Aristide's partisans like to claim. And it is
not General Cédras and Colonel François who are bearing the
brunt of the embargo. Ordinary Haitians are doing that, and
they are paying a high price. Some human rights, medical and
religious sources have estimated that 10,000 people may have
perished from malnutrition and disease as a result of the OAS
embargo and other factors. A recent report by public health
experts at Harvard University paints an even gloomier picture,
concluding that up to 20,000 children may have died due to
Haiti's multidimensional political, economic, and social crisis
and the international sanctions that are exacerbating it. While
such estimates are more conjecture than anything—no one
really knows how many "silent deaths" have occurred—they are
not implausible. Even a much more conservative toll—on the
order of several thousand, for instance—would indicate that a
lot of suffering is being inflicted.

The United States should avoid the temptation to punish
other peoples for the sins of their leaders. It has sometimes
been argued that in the past this has happened with regard to
such countries as Nicaragua, Panama, Iraq, and Cuba. Is it
now Haiti's turn? If the U.N. embargo is tightened, destroying
what is left of the economy and severely restricting the
shipment of food and medical supplies to the countryside,
social pain will further accelerate. If General Cédras, Colonel
François and their supporters can hang on long enough, there
is likely to be an enormous human tragedy. At that point, the
will of the American public, Congress and even the Clinton
administration to continue the sanctions, with all their attendant
suffering, may well evaporate, leaving only two unpalatable
options: capitulation or invasion. Again, the strategy of the
Haitian military seems to be based on a gamble that the United
States and its allies will not have the stomach for the latter.

One final point. Earlier we noted the devastating impact of
the crisis—including the international embargoes—on Haitian
civil society. These are precisely the groups and individuals
most crucial to Haiti's future. If democracy and socioeconomic
development have any chance at all, it will be because ordinary
Haitians can be organized and educated to participate
constructively in the political, economic and social life of their country. The longer the crisis continues and the more desperate the situation becomes, the less likely these elements are to survive in a form that can be harnessed to meet Haiti's development needs.

As this is being written, there are unmistakable signs that the political center of gravity has shifted towards the extreme right. The reemergence of thousands of Tontons Macoutes in the form of the *attachés* and Duvalierist groups such as the Haitian Front for Advancement and Progress bode ill for the future. In this highly fluid and volatile situation, one of the greatest challenges facing the international community will be to avoid making an admittedly awful situation even worse. The evidence presented in the preceding pages suggests that, to date, U.S./international policy has been largely counterproductive: it has had precisely the opposite effect from what was intended. Put another way, we began with the most laudable of intentions only to become part of the problem. The question now may be less how to bring about an idealized solution (democracy, economic development, social justice) than how to limit the damage already done and still growing.

**No Easy Choices.**

It is within this context that one must evaluate the options that the United States and the international community now face. Current policy essentially represents a temporary, tactical retreat. Economic sanctions have been reimposed to force the Haitian military back to the bargaining table. But this does not tell us much about the end state being sought or the means by which it might be attained once an agreement is in hand.

There are several obvious options. One would be to stick with some version of the *Gouvernor Island Plan*, which would provide for the introduction of foreign military and police observers, trainers and engineers, but not heavily armed peacekeepers. Given the reticence of the United States and the United Nations to either intervene militarily or to forsake their commitment to restore President Aristide, this may well be the most probable course of action. However, because of
the strategy's inherent weaknesses—not the least of which is the lack of adequate force protection—one cannot be sanguine about its prospects for success. Indeed, one can almost anticipate the day when the Harlan County once again approaches the docks of Port-au-Prince. The same policy could well produce the same—or at least similar—results.

There are, to be sure, some things that could be done to prevent such a "repetition" of history. Economic sanctions could be maintained until General Cédras, Colonel François and their colleagues step aside (preferably retire) and Aristide returns. Unfortunately, it is by no means clear that this would solve the problem. Aristide has little visible support within the military. The new leaders could very well turn out to be just as disloyal as the current ones. (Remember that Cédras was considered a moderate.) For their part, the ti-soldats appear to be even more opposed to the president than is the officer corps. Even if Aristide can be restored, without a substantial number of international peacekeepers and a strong, reliable security force to protect him, his longevity could not be expected to be very great. Getting him back is one thing; keeping him alive and in office quite another. Assassination is a very real possibility, and it could well plunge the country into truly massive violence.

A second option is military intervention. This is often dismissed as "unthinkable" by U.S. policymakers. It shouldn't be, for it is entirely plausible. The circumstances that might lead to such a course vary: One likely precipitator would be the Aristide assassination/massive violence scenario, especially if it were to be accompanied by a new wave of boat people fleeing for their lives to the United States. Another possibility would be the outbreak of xenophobic violence, particularly if directed against U.S. citizens. A third would be a violent collapse of a peacekeeping effort that might trigger an intervention to restore order. A fourth would be a major humanitarian crisis, as might occur in the event of widespread famine. Nor, given the region's history, can one entirely discount the possibility that the United States or the United Nations might intervene proactively to punish the Haitian military, restore Aristide, or prevent the developments mentioned above. (Among other
things, one should not underestimate the racial dimension of the political debate. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the U.S. Government, sensitive to charges that its failure to act effectively is racially motivated, might be pressured into "doing something" to prevent an impending catastrophe.)

Assuming that an intervention did occur, what then? The alternatives range from a full-scale, lengthy occupation to a much smaller and more short-term action. In the case of a full-scale occupation, it is possible that Haiti might be placed under some form of international (presumably U.N.) trusteeship. The growing turmoil of the post-cold war era has once again brought to the fore the issue of "ungovernability." Certain societies, it is argued, simply lack the prerequisites of a stable nation-state, and it may be up to the international community to maintain the peace until such time as those peoples are capable of governing themselves.85

For obvious reasons, this option is unlikely to be chosen. The notion of a trusteeship is a bit too close to colonialism for the comfort of most U.N. members. In any case, few are anxious to assume the enormous burdens and responsibilities that would go with such an undertaking. As matters currently stand, the will does not exist.

Much more probable would be a limited intervention that would be less ambitious in both scale and duration. But even here, as we have seen, the obstacles would be formidable. To be successful, the international commitment would have to be ongoing. Even after the peace-enforcers withdrew, a substantial foreign presence would have to remain to train Haitian government, security and private sector personnel, and help administer foreign aid. Again, there is very little to build on. The temptation will be to do the job "on the cheap"—a modest effort on behalf of immodest objectives. The smaller the commitment and the shorter the duration, the greater will be the chance of failure. On the other hand, since a "success" is problematic in any event, a limited commitment would minimize the risks and costs. This is no small consideration.

Another variant of the military option is a nonpermissive humanitarian intervention. But again, there is a basic problem:
If all that is intended is to relieve immediate human suffering, that can be done. However, unless the basic causes of the crisis are eliminated, it is likely to reemerge once the international peace-enforcers leave. A real solution would require an extended foreign presence, accompanied by an active peace-building and nationbuilding program. Among other things, that would mean disarming those elements that are responsible for the crisis. The pitfalls of such an operation are painfully evident in the U.N. operation in Somalia.

But might not a nonmilitary humanitarian option (permissive humanitarian intervention) be possible? The United States and the international community are already engaged in such an effort through a variety of nongovernmental organizations, most notably CARE. This aid might be greatly expanded even as the sanctions are tightened. (Indeed, if the sanctions are tightened, and expansion of humanitarian aid would be necessary in order to prevent a social disaster.) The problem is that Haitian military leaders might well refuse to allow such deliveries—or they might seize or siphon off these resources (especially petroleum) for themselves. Only if such an expanded operation were to be accompanied by substantial concessions—for instance, a partial lifting of the sanctions—would the military be likely to cooperate. (One variant of this, however, might be a scenario in which the military might cooperate providing the sanctions were ineffective. This would enable it to continue to stretch out the crisis while socioeconomic conditions deteriorated even further, putting more pressure on the international community to back off down the road.)

If successful, a permissive intervention would ameliorate (though not solve) the immediate humanitarian crisis and ease the economic pressure on Haitians to flee to the United States. But it would not address the larger political problem or the long-range socioeconomic needs of the country. The Haitian military would remain in power. Indeed, one could expect General Cédras and Colonel François to claim that they had forced the United States and the United Nations to back down. They would likely come away from such a “victory” in a stronger position than ever. Moreover, no matter how hard the United
States tried to present the operation in a favorable light (a "moral victory," etc.), such assertions would have a hollow ring.

Finally, there is the option of disengagement. The international community could accept defeat and lift the sanctions on the grounds that they have become unacceptably destructive. This would "normalize" the situation in the sense that the existing political and socioeconomic structure would be allowed to remain intact. But again, this would do nothing to address any of the fundamental problems of the society. It would consign the vast majority of Haitians to oppression and poverty and deprive them of hope for the future. Pressures to emigrate would continue. (Indeed, if the U.S. policy of forcible repatriation were to be suspended, there would almost certainly be a sharp increase in the number of boat people.) Such a policy would also have significant political costs. Critics would denounce it as a sell-out of democracy and a capitulation to the worst kind of thuggery. The credibility of the United States and the United Nations would be seriously damaged, as would the political prestige of President Clinton.

This is a miserable menu of options from which to choose. For that very reason, the United States and the international community have taken the easiest way out: They have avoided coming to terms with Haitian realities and the implications of their own behavior. In a very real sense, they have been trapped: They have been able to go neither forward (intervention) nor backward (disengagement) without incurring unacceptable costs. Thus, the resort to economic sanctions.

Unfortunately, sanctions have never really been applied in a concerted and rigorous manner. Rather, they have been embraced as a bromide. For both the United States and the international community (though most assuredly not for the Haitian people), this was the easiest and least painful course of action; moreover, it gave the appearance that something was being done.

But procrastination is no substitute for a coherent policy. The tactic has come up against the constraints of political reality, and real choices now have to be made. Rather than trying more of the same (which no longer seems feasible, given
the humanitarian implications) or opting for disengagement (which would abandon the Haitian people to the tender mercies of their tormentors) or invasion (for which there is little political support), it would seem advisable to do what should have been done a long time ago—namely, get serious about sanctions. The problem with the current strategy is not so much with its objectives as with its half-hearted implementation and the consequential ineffective results.

The bottom line is that a worldwide U.N. embargo, enforced by warships of the United States and other interested countries, should be placed on all trade and aid except for food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods and services. This policy, moreover, would have two corollaries: First, sanctions must be targeted much more heavily on Haitian military and civilian elites than has been the case in the past. This would mean striking not only at the top of the armed forces pyramid, but at the officer corps as a whole. There are some 900 officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the Haitian military. As long as these people are able to escape the effects of the sanctions, they will have little incentive to challenge the policies or leadership of the Cédras-François team. The objective should be to inflict as much pain as possible on the power elite in order to create and aggravate divisions and provide the motivation for change. Such sanctions should also be applied more broadly against selected economic and political elites to accelerate the growing disenchantment with the current military leadership and its policies. While some measures have already been taken, these can be broadened: Many more bank accounts and properties could be frozen or seized, both in the United States and in other member countries of the United Nations. Many more visas could be cancelled or denied. (These measures could be applied not only to the targeted military, political, and economic leaders but to their families as well.) Plane and boat traffic to and from Haiti could be severely restricted. Loopholes in the embargo could be closed. As matters stand now, many members of the elite still travel to Miami to shop, bringing home consumer goods and other items that cannot be purchased in Haiti. Exemptions to the OAS embargo have enabled companies in the assembly sector to order large quantities of goods under the guise that they are
"necessary supplies." These materials then find their way into the hands of third parties (usually the military and its friends). Such abuses must be stopped.

Such moves would send the Haitian military and its allies a powerful message and go a long way toward restoring the credibility of the United States and the international community. They would assure that it would not be poor Haitians alone who would bear the costs of the sanctions. Beyond this, pressure should be put on the Dominican Republic to choke off the cross-border trade that has been ameliorating the impact of the embargo. If necessary, economic sanctions could be applied to gain the Balaguer government's cooperation.

These measures might bring the Haitian military into line fairly quickly, since they would roughly coincide with the depletion of the country's fuel reserves. But then again, nothing is guaranteed. What can be said with certainty is that an escalation of sanctions would accelerate an already serious humanitarian crisis. To avert a disaster on the ground, therefore, a second strategic corollary is needed: Humanitarian operations should be expanded. One of the major weaknesses in the U.S./U.N./OAS policy to date has been the lack of any clear strategy for dealing with the human suffering aggravated by sanctions. In the words of one group of researchers:

The human toll over this crisis period has resulted from a myriad of factors including government mismanagement, economic and agricultural disruptions, population movements, economic sanctions, and humanitarian neglect. Yet, the extension of the crisis has not been accompanied by the articulation of a policy or plan by the United States or the international community to mitigate the suffering and to protect the lives of innocent civilians. A 'humanitarian corridor' should be opened by the international community to proactively ensure basic provisions for the Haitian people, especially the poor. The 'corridor' should have the simple but critical goal of meeting the people's requirements for water, food, medicines, and other essentials. Meeting such goals would require mobilizing NGO, UN, and key nongovernmental and public sector operations in Haiti, for childhood immunization, food distribution, and other critical public functions.
In opening such a corridor, four basic humanitarian objectives should be advanced:

1. Non-interference or exemption in the free movement of life-saving supplies, including food and medicines;

2. Protection of human security by ensuring access of the most essential human needs (water, food, shelter, clothing, and physical security) by the most vulnerable populations, especially women and children;

3. Assessment and monitoring of the human situation with impartiality and independence using early warning indicators on human survival, the quality of life, and the satisfactory nature of policy and program interventions; and

4. Maintenance of the purity of the humanitarian engagement, guarding against misuse, abuse, diversion, or other illegitimate uses of humanitarian assistance.

This is an ambitious program, and it is not without risk. The opening of a humanitarian corridor at a time when Haitian rulers are being subjected to greatly intensified economic pressure might lead to violence against the relief workers and monitors. Moreover, it is entirely possible that the military would refuse to allow such an operation. For these reasons, the Haitians must be put on notice that obstructionism and violence will not be tolerated. The United States and the international community must be prepared to back up this message with military force, if necessary, by stationing a sizable contingent (about 1,000 to 1,500) of appropriately armed and equipped U.N. guards to protect the operations. General Cédras, Colonel François and other key figures in the regime should be told that (1) they will be held personally responsible for any violence that might occur, (2) that any perpetrators of such actions will be subject to prosecution under international laws dealing with the gross violation of human rights, and (3) that should a full-scale intervention be required, the Haitian armed forces would be permanently dissolved.

This might very well do the trick. In the past, Haitian military leaders have shown that they understand that the one thing that would be most likely to trigger a massive intervention is
U.S. concern for the safety of its citizens. It is for precisely this reason that foreigners have been largely spared the violence that has ravaged Haitian society. The country’s rulers also know that they have little popular support. Indeed, the vast majority of Haitians—including Aristide and most of his supporters—would undoubtedly welcome such a humanitarian operation, especially if it were part of a larger strategy to restore their president. In this respect, Haiti and Somalia are very different. (Yet another dissimilarity is that the Somalis have a well-deserved reputation as fierce fighters. Haitian soldiers and attachés, in contrast, have shown bravery only against unarmed civilians.)

Such a strategy would not, of course, end Haiti’s problems or U.S. and international involvement in them. The country will need massive development aid for the foreseeable future. Some peacekeeping or peace-enforcement presence will also almost certainly be necessary if Aristide is to survive his term in office. But this is still probably better than the alternatives: The Haitian president’s restoration offers at least the hope that the country’s grave socioeconomic ills might at last be seriously addressed. A sizable international involvement may create dependency in the short run, but it also offers a means of restraining Aristide and holding him accountable, and that suggests that there might be some hope on the human rights front as well. Under such circumstances, it might be possible to normalize and control migration. This is by far the most important national interest that the United States has in the Haitian crisis. Failure to ameliorate the problem would leave us with the unpalatable alternatives of either (1) allowing hundreds of thousands (eventually millions) of Haitians to immigrate to the United States within a very short period of time or (2) turning forcible repatriation, with all its repugnant moral implications and heavy financial costs, into a permanent policy. Finally, if successful, the strategy outlined above would enable the United States to both reclaim the moral high ground and restore its currently tattered reputation as a Great Power. It would replace a policy of weakness with one of strength, while allowing us to fulfill our obligations to those Haitians whom we have encouraged to risk their lives and who now feel betrayed and abandoned.
But let there be no illusions. This course is fraught with serious risks and costs. Those looking for a quick and easy "foreign policy success" would be well advised to search elsewhere. No doubt some will find this hard to accept. Americans are an optimistic people; they have been conditioned to believe that every problem has a solution. But this is an illusion. In the real world, there are often no-win situations, where the choice is not between winning and losing but between different ways of losing, some more unacceptable than others. In Haiti, we are torn between the bad and the terrible. The sooner we understand this and come to terms with it, the better.

POSTSCRIPT

In the two months following the completion of this study, relations between the Clinton administration and President Aristide continued to deteriorate until they were close to the breaking point. In large part, this was the product of U.S. unwillingness to bite the bullet of economic sanctions. True, some tightening occurred. After the Haitian military ignored another ultimatum (a January 15 U.N. deadline) to step aside, the State Department prohibited Haitian officers from travelling to the United States. The Treasury Department added the names of 523 officers, along with members of their families, to the list of those with frozen assets. But after initially agreeing to seek greatly expanded U.N. sanctions that would have led to a near-total embargo (save for food and medicine), the administration once more drew back out of fear that such measures would inflict undue suffering on the Haitian people, further radicalize the far right, and devastate the economy beyond repair.

And so the syndrome continued: Half-way sanctions produced ineffective results. The Haitian military and its allies gained more time to adjust and blunt the shock of the sanctions. By February, indeed, the embargo was hemorrhaging badly as truck after truck carrying forbidden gasoline crossed the Dominican border en route to Port-au-Prince. It became clear that the Haitian leaders had been able to acquire access to
enough supplies to meet their basic needs for some time to come.94

Meanwhile, Aristide grew increasingly frustrated and resentful of the U.S. unwillingness to do what was necessary to restore him to power. Rather than raising the pressure on the military and the oligarchy, in a decisive and comprehensive manner, the United States pressured Aristide to form a broad coalition government that would include some of his political enemies. In turn the Haitian president, fearing that these moves were intended to restrict his powers and prerogatives and reduce him to the status of a figurehead, fought back. During these weeks, Aristide and his partisans began to play the "immigration card" in an effort to deflect U.S. pressure and increase their leverage on Washington. In February, following a tragedy at sea which claimed the lives of several Haitian boat people, Aristide lashed out at the U.S. policy of forcible repatriation. Comparing such actions to a "floating Berlin Wall" and questioning their legality, he threatened to revoke the 1981 agreement that allowed U.S. authorities to intercept boat people within Haitian waters. The statement caused consternation among U.S. officials who had been counting on Aristide's cooperation to prevent a massive outpouring of Haitians. Some professed to be "mystified" by his attitude. In the words of one: "Whenever something gets going that looks like it has any chance, Aristide always pulls some stunt."95

By now the Clinton administration was backing a variant of the Governors Island Plan that called for Aristide to appoint a civilian prime minister who would form a broad-based government with enough support in Parliament to approve an amnesty for the military. The amnesty, in turn, would be followed by the retirement of General Cédras and reassignment of Colonel François, the lifting of sanctions and, finally, the working out of arrangements for Aristide's return. Unfortunately, the plan lacked both deadlines and penalties for noncompliance. The open-ended timetable allowed for the possibility that international sanctions would be lifted even if Aristide were never restored. Not surprisingly, the latter viewed the proposal with extreme suspicion, regarding it as little more
than a disguised capitulation and a formula for his own indefinite exile.96

There, as of late February, matters stood. The Clinton administration declined to impose tighter sanctions unless Aristide agreed to political concessions; the latter continued to resist. In the meantime, socioeconomic conditions continued to rapidly deteriorate and violence surged. Now, however, there was a new dimension to worry about. After weeks of warning that armed resistance was in the offing, fighting broke out in the remote, mountainous region on the southwestern tip of Haiti. While the skirmish was a minor one—limited, it seems, to a few dozen guerrillas—there was no way of knowing whether this was an isolated and futile episode or the tip of an iceberg.97

In perspective, it can be said that the Haitian crisis is still evolving and taking on new dimensions. For the moment, the most significant new development is probably the ability of Haitian military and business leaders to subvert the embargo via the Dominican connection. Arrangements have clearly been made to regularize the shipment of fuel across the border at levels that can meet the basic needs of the elite for the indefinite future. If the embargo is to work, that flow must be stopped. Foreign companies that have sold or are continuing to supply fuel in violation of the U.N. sanctions must be identified and legal action taken. If there are storage facilities in the Dominican Republic—as seems likely—they must be detected and closed down. Finally, much more serious efforts must be made to patrol the Haitian-Dominican border. While the Dominican government has recently stepped up its efforts in this respect, those measures are still woefully inadequate. Accordingly, more pressure—including sanctions if necessary—should be brought to bear on the Balaguer government to get it to fulfill its obligations.

The Dominicans, of course, have a major, legitimate interest in preventing the spread of instability to their country. They are now at a point, however, where the leaky embargo itself threatens to become a destabilizing factor. If it enables the Haitian elite to continue resistance while imposing even more hardship on ordinary people and if avenues of escape by sea remain closed, there will be a growing stream of desperate
Haitians crossing the border into the Dominican Republic. And should internal war break out in Haiti, that stream could well become a flood. Then we would no longer have merely a Haitian crisis on our hands, but a crisis of all Hispaniola.
ENDNOTES


3. At least not in recent memory. Back under French rule, Saint-Domingue had been perhaps the most profitable colony in the Western world, setting international production records for both sugar and coffee. But this wealth never filtered down to the slaves who worked the plantations and who constituted almost 90 percent of the population. Subsequently, the revolution which brought independence also destroyed the country's profitable agricultural base. And while there were times earlier in this century that were far more prosperous than today, one must remember that prosperity is a relative term. What are considered good times in Haiti would be considered bad times almost anywhere else.


6. In 1950, Port-au-Prince had 152,000 residents. By 1971, that had grown to 507,000. By the early 1990s, the population was between 1.2 and 1.5 million, or almost three times the city's carrying capacity.


9. Prior to the September 1991 coup, 145 companies, employing 35,000 workers, operated export-assembly plants in Haiti. Two years later, only 87 firms, employing 15,000 people, remained. Most of the lost companies relocated to the Dominican Republic. Harold Maass, "Haitian Premier Swears in New Cabinet," *The Miami Herald*, September 3, 1993. Some individuals place the number of lost jobs even higher. Aristide, for instance, recently referred to 30,000 export-sector jobs lost. And, of course, this covers only one sector of the economy. The Association des Industries d'Haiti estimated that 138,000 workers—almost half the formal sector labor force—were laid off in the months immediately after the coup. Some of these, however, were later hired back. Moreover, the number of employees in the public sector has increased as many have been hired for political reasons. On these matters, see Claudette Antoine Werleigh, "Haiti and the Halfhearted," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 49, No. 9, November 1993, pp. 22-23; and Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, *Sanctions in Haiti: Crisis in Humanitarian Action*, Cambridge: Harvard School of Public Health, 1993, p. 15. Aristide's estimate is from his address to the U.N. General Assembly, October 28, 1993, and may be found in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), *Daily Report: Latin America*, October 29, 1993.


Aristide: “ Elections have always been a tool in the hands of powerful countries, in the hands of the traditional bourgeoisie.” Indeed, he and his most radical partisans opposed the ratification of the 1987 constitution, as well as the election process itself, until Aristide became a presidential candidate in the autumn of 1990. Radio Metropole, September 16, 1991, in FBIS, *Daily Report,* September 19, 1991.

Admittedly, Aristide was in a difficult position. Haitian politicians tend to be rigid and irresponsible, more interested in power and spoils than anything else. Moreover, the president, who had no political party of his own, lacked a majority in Congress. But this made political flexibility and coalition-building all the more important. For a discussion of messianism and sectarianism in Aristide’s political movement, see George Packer, “Choke Hold on Haiti,” *Dissent,* Summer 1993, esp. pp. 302-304.

Père Lebrun is a major retailer of automobile tires in Haiti. His television advertisements used to show him popping his head through one of his products.


“I understand your desire to catch the powerful Macoutes today so that they do not destroy you tomorrow. This is legitimate.” Haiti Radio-Inter, January 9, 1991, in ibid., January 10, 1991. See also Danner, “Haiti on the Verge,” p. 27. In all fairness, these rhetorical excesses occurred under traumatic and highly provocative conditions. Roger Lafontant was one of Haiti’s most notorious killers. Moreover, the Roman Catholic hierarchy had long been “Haitianized.” In 1966, the Vatican had granted François Duvalier the power to approve promotions. Thus the church, in effect, became a partner of the regime. For his part, Aristide considered Archbishop Ligondé
to be "a zealous servant of Macoutism." Indeed, on January 2, just before
the Lafontant coup attempt, Ligondé had publicly raised the specter of an
Aristide dictatorship, asking his parishioners whether "socialist Bolshevism
[was] going to triumph?" In the audience were some of the most powerful
military and civilian figures in Haiti. On Aristide's troubled relations with his
superiors, see especially Danner, "The Prophet" and "The Fall of the
Prophet." The Aristide quote is from the former (p. 30), the Ligondé quote
from the latter (p. 48).


22. Madrid EFE, October 1, 1991, in Ibid., October 1, 1991; also Shea,
"Human Rights," pp. 29-30. The latter suggests that Claude’s death
preceded the coup of September 29 by several hours and may have
triggered it. But Professor Michel Laguerre tells us that the coup was already
in progress and that the killing may have been in reaction to it. The causal
relationship remains unclear.

23. Roger Lafontant was not so lucky. He was killed in prison. Later,
the penitentiary commander told U.S. authorities that he had been
personally ordered by Aristide (by phone) to kill Lafontant. The enlisted man
who actually did the killing told American officials that he was aware of the
reported order from Aristide. The latter, of course, denies the charges. See
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
"information" is suspect. The Haitian military has a very strong interest in
discrediting Aristide, and U.S. officials have no independent sources.
Moreover, these "orders" were allegedly issued at a time when Aristide was
besieged and presumably had other things in mind. Still, some U.S. officials
believe the charge.

24. Here, for instance, see the extraordinary statement of
Representative Corrine Brown that "no facts buttress the contentions" that
Aristide used "his command of violent crowds to intimidate" those who
challenged him or that the "military pushed him out because it feared he
and his followers were out to settle accounts." Letter to the Editor, The

25. See, especially, America's Watch and the National Coalition for
Haitian Refugees and Caribbean Rights, "Haiti: The Aristide Government's
Human Rights Record," Vol. 3, Issue 12, November 1, 1992. The president
had invited U.S., Swiss, and French authorities to reform the Haitian police
force and in the interim to train police guards to protect his security.

A more important factor in Aristide's overthrow, perhaps, was his
penchant for meddling with military appointments and promotions. He had
moved to shake up the high command by replacing older generals with younger officers. But then he never made those appointments permanent. One of those alienated by this tactic was Raoul Cédras, named provisional commander-in-chief in June 1991, but then left in limbo, his name never submitted to the legislature for more permanent approval. In addition, Aristide had brought back a number of officers who had been cashiered. One of these, Pierre Cherubin, was made head of the police. Most were highly unpopular with the other officers. Furthermore, when enlisted men revolted against their commanders in summer 1991, Aristide intervened on their behalf, provoking even more suspicion.


27. Human rights groups estimate that at least 2,000 people have been killed; Aristide's most recent estimate is 4,000. See his speech to the U.N. General Assembly, October 28, 1993, in FBIS, Daily Report, October 29, 1993; also Harold Maass, "Malval to Discuss New Peace Initiatives with Aristide," The Miami Herald, December 2, 1993.

28. Technically, the police are part of the military and are therefore not an independent force. In reality, however, Colonel François has been able to turn them into a political base which he has used, along with his control over certain paramilitary elements and economic resources, to establish himself as a powerful figure in his own right—perhaps even more powerful than General Cédras. For a recent article on the conflict between the two men, which also discusses the growing split between senior and junior officers, see Howard W. French, "Cracks in Haiti’s Military Widen, Aiding Efforts to Restore Aristide," The New York Times, February 7, 1994. On conflicts between various commands, see also Mendel and Stewman, Planning for Haiti, pp. 11-12.

29. Recently, of course, the military and the Duvalierists have become close collaborators, but their interests are not always identical and the potential for conflict (perhaps violent) still exists. As for the Tontons Macoutes, François Duvalier’s civilian militia was never really a coherent structure. The Macoutes were separate from the military but also overlapped with it, spied on it and ultimately, in large part, supplanted it. On the origins and evolution of the Macoutes under the Duvalier regimes, see Michel S. Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1993, pp. 110-123.

30. This is based largely on appearance and speculation. It could be that Cédras has played the role of the “good cop” to Colonel François’ “bad cop” as a tactical ploy in dealing with the international community. On the other hand, the CIA’s Brian Latell has described Cédras, in a 1992 report, as one of the most promising Haitian leaders to emerge since the overthrow of the Duvalier dynasty. See Tim Weiner, "Haiti Leaders on CIA Payroll,"


34. Conversation with Department of State Haitian Desk Officer Ed Archer, May 1993.

35. See Farah, "Standoff."

36. According to one "highly reliable" State Department source, the attaches "do not follow orders or answer to police or military. They instinctively act as they see fit." Thus, they are largely "uncontrollable." U.S. Department of State, ARA/NEA/REEARCS, December 1993, p. 2.

37. In summer 1991 enlisted men and sailors again rebelled against their commanders at several bases around Port-au-Prince. Danner, "The Fall of the Prophet," p. 50. For a discussion of the September 1988 coup, see Wilentz, The Rainy Season, p. 359ff. The ti-soldats were not initially hostile to Aristide. Indeed, their spokesmen took pains to stress that theirs was a "people's movement." Their attitude changed, however, once they began to be "necklaced."


41. Conversation with Ed Archer.

43. Trouillot, "Haiti's Nightmare," pp. 48-49.

44. See, e.g., French, "In Haiti's Army, Business is the Order of the Day" and "Drug Money Snags Haiti Peace Talks"; Farah, "Standoff Pits Defenders of Haiti's New Rich Against its Poor"; and Herbert Gold, "Haiti's New and Old Rich," The New York Times, April 3, 1993. Hard data are, of course, impossible to come by. Estimates of cocaine revenues, for instance, range from $50 million to $500 million annually. (Joseph B. Treaster, "Drug Flow Through Haiti Sharply Cut by Embargo," Ibid., November 4, 1993.) But even the lower figures are substantial, especially when they are combined with other opportunities for profit.


52. To make matters worse, only the previous week, elections had been held in an attempt to pack the Haitian legislature and bolster the legitimacy of the Bazin government. The vote was rejected as fraudulent by the United States and the United Nations. Howard W. French, "Mediation Effort In Haiti Collapses," The New York Times, February 5, 1993; Steven A. Holmes, "All Sides Get Message: Haiti Is a Top U.S. Priority," Ibid., February 6, 1993.


55. Ibid.


57. To one of the authors, May 1993.

58. To one of the authors, May 1993.


64. FBIS, Daily Report, September 27, 1993. See also French, "In Haiti's Army, Business is the Order of the Day."


72. To be sure, Aristide is high-strung and susceptible to debilitating "nervous crises" and depression which have been treated by valium and other drugs. But the CIA briefer reportedly went farther than this. In the words of one administration official familiar with the presentation: "He made it the most simplistic, one-dimensional message he could—murderer, psychopath." Steven A. Holmes, "Administration Is Fighting Itself on Haiti Policy," The New York Times, October 23, 1993.


75. Lewis, "Signals to Haiti."


78. Farah, "Haitian Military Plans Years in Power."

79. There are honorable military men in Haiti, but clearly they are not in control.


81. Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, Sanctions in Haiti. This is a highly controversial study. The authors intended this as an "order of magnitude" estimate rather than as a precise calculation. But even this is questionable. The figure is a projection based heavily on data from a single town, Maissade, where an aid group has been tracking births and deaths for several years. One cannot confidently generalize from such an unrepresentative sample to the entire country.

82. Already, indeed, the oil embargo is seriously hampering humanitarian relief activities. In mid-October when the sanctions were imposed, CARE was providing Haitians with 560,000 meals daily. By mid-January, that number had fallen to under 200,000 daily meals. Signs of malnutrition are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. See Howard W. French, "U.N. Sanctions Against Haiti Are Hampering Relief Efforts," The New York Times, January 11, 1994; and John Donnelly, "Health Workers: Haiti's 'Last Ray of Hope,'" The Miami Herald, December 24, 1993.
83. In the words of one State Department officer, "Governors island is unimplementable, but we have committed ourselves to it." To one of the authors (not for attribution).

84. Under the 1987 constitution, the president can appoint a commander-in-chief (given Senate approval) only from among those general officers on active duty. Currently, there are only three such officers besides Cédras, and none of them appears sympathetic to Aristide. While, theoretically, Cédras could promote someone more to the president's liking, under present circumstances this seems improbable.


86. See, e.g., French, "U.N. Sanctions."

87. The incentives, however, are growing. In the words of one analyst, there are maybe 100 officers "making out like bandits, with another 100 living pretty comfortably. The rest of them are having an increasingly difficult time scraping by...." French, "Cracks in Haiti's Military Widen."


90. Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, Sanctions in Haiti, p. 27.

91. There would be dissenters, of course. In addition to the ultra-right wing supporters of the military, some of the radicals in Lavalas (in the so-called "popular sector") could be expected to denounce the move. The latter, however, are largely unarmed. Lately, moreover, some of Aristide's supporters have hinted at the need for a peace enforcement operation. Even the president himself has indicated that he would welcome a military intervention (though "I cannot ask for it....I would be impeached"). See Marquis, "Aristide Hints He'd Back Raid in Haiti"; Mary McGrory, "The Trouble with Haiti," The Washington Post, January 6, 1994; and "U.S. Insists Plan to Restore Aristide Remains on Track," The Miami Herald, September 22, 1993. On the problems of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Haiti, as well as noncombatant evacuation and civil-military operations, see Mendel, "The Haiti Contingency," pp. 53-57.
92. Here one of the most important tasks will be to reverse the "brain drain." Haiti's talent is mostly abroad. Incentives will have to be provided so that many of these people will return to their homeland and contribute to national development. Otherwise, Haiti will be dependent on foreign largess for a very long time.


