WORLD VIEW
The 1994 Strategic Assessment
From the Strategic Studies Institute

Edited by

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World View: The 1994 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute (U)

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The Strategic Studies Institute prepares annual strategic assessments which form the basis of its study program. These assessments seem especially crucial this year as the strategic situation throughout the world is far more complex and fraught with danger than many realize. The dramatically altered world of the post-cold war period is not the peaceful and tranquil scene many longed for and thought had arrived. In this dynamic international setting, the technical revolution is propelling many nations from the industrial age into the information age. The implications for military force structures and strategies are as enormous as they are uncertain. This monograph provides a world view and lists eight major determinants which in 1994 will dominantly influence U.S. interests, national military strategy and the Army's posture.
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WORLD VIEW:
The 1994 Strategic Assessment
From the Strategic Studies Institute

Followed by

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SSI

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U.S. Army War College
FOREWORD

Every year the analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute prepare current strategic assessments for their particular areas of interest. These assessments are the bedrock of the annual SSI Study Program.

This year's assessments seem especially crucial as the strategic situation throughout the world is far more complex and fraught with danger than many may realize. The dramatically altered world of the post-cold war period is not the peaceful and tranquil scene many had longed for and thought had, indeed, arrived. From the Danube eastward along the southern boundaries of what used to be the Soviet Union, ethnic conflict is rampant. Russia remains very much an enigma wrapped in a riddle, but, as always, Russian national interests are paramount in Kremlin thinking.

While there are those in the Middle East who earnestly seek peace, there are others who are determined to support old hatreds and the policies that issued from them. In the Far East, North Korea has resisted U.N. demands to inspect its nuclear production facilities, China is modernizing its military forces, and Japan continues to seek new markets.

In this dynamic international setting, a technological revolution is propelling many nations, the United States being foremost among them, from the industrial age into the information age. The implications for military force structures and strategies are as enormous as they are uncertain.

The Strategic Studies Institute offers this "world view" assessment in the hope that it will be of value to those charged with understanding the current and future strategic environment.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
Introduction.

Each January the regional analysts at the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assess global trends that are most likely to determine the state of the world through the next decade. From these assessments study proposals are devised which focus on those issues and trends impacting on the requirements for maintaining America’s Army as a strategic force during the coming years.

In 1994, the analysts at SSI believe eight major determinants will dominantly influence U.S. interests, national military strategy, and the Army’s posture:

- Fiscal constraints, domestic issues, and a growing linkage between domestic and transregional economics will drive U.S. priorities. These trends will push defense resources down, demand economies of force, and perpetuate the ongoing debate over roles and missions.

- U.N. peace operations will become increasingly important for U.S. policy planners. The implications for the armed forces, including the Army, will be significant.

- Small states are gaining unprecedented strategic military capabilities as the world transitions from the industrial age to the information age. Furthermore, the diffusion of political, economic, technical and military power in this multipolar world poses a challenge to the Army as it restructures itself from a cold war army.

- Throughout the world, ethnic and religious nationalism are replacing ideology as social forces most likely to promote violence and regional instability. These forces will increase pressures on collective security institutions,
and may require redefinition of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. In turn, these pressures will require U.S. leadership and collective engagement.

- Russia remains in turmoil. Political instability there and throughout the states of the former Soviet Union increases. The challenges attending the turmoil throughout this vast area are only heightened by the issues of nuclear proliferation.

- On February 28, 1994, NATO F-16 fighters engaged in the first hostile action in the history of the Alliance when they shot down four Serbian fighter-bombers which had violated the no-fly zone over Bosnia. The instability in the Balkans joins that of lands to the east in posing what is possibly the greatest threat to European peace.

- Peace in the Middle East is threatened by many groups unsatisfied with the progress in resolving the differences between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). As usual, very little seems sure in the region. The United States will continue the leading external role as guarantor of regional stability.

- In Asia, North Korea’s potential to become a nuclear power poses the greatest threat to regional security. Economic accommodation among the major regional players, the United States, Japan, and South Korea will continue to focus the attention of Washington planners.

The world of 1994 is very different from the world of 5 or 6 years ago. It is far less predictable and more violent than anyone anticipated when President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev took steps to end the cold war. Defending and promoting U.S. interests remain national priorities even as new opportunities to foster those interests, and new challenges that threaten them, appear at unexpected and irregular intervals. The uncertainties of the next few years will continue to challenge both national leaders and Army senior leadership.
Regional Challenges, Global Issues.

When American strategists first grappled with the end of the cold war, they became obsessed with the notion of "regionalism." This was an overdue adjustment in strategic perspective. During the superpower struggle, we had been forced to overlook regional problems and concentrate on the global threat from the Soviet Union. American strategists considered regional conflict simply the cold war in miniature, fought by proxies in obscure and confusing places. With the demise of the Soviet Union it was clear that this perspective was obsolete, so strategic thinkers focused on regional variegation. To an extent, this was healthy. Taken to extremes, it led to a view of the world just as skewed as the rigid globalism of the previous 45 years.

Now the rush toward regional thinking has slowed somewhat. A more balanced perspective seems to be emerging. We are again recognizing that similarities and linkages between security problems around the world are as significant as their differences. It was not the Soviet Union or the various communist initiatives throughout the world that linked regional security problems, but deeper, more significant, and persistent connections. The strategists of the next decade, then, must balance regional sensitivities with awareness of the implicit connectivity in security problems. They must recognize that these are not regional problems, rather they are global issues.

Global security issues derive from three forms of connectivity. The first is economic. Today, there is truly a world economy. Markets are global while capital, technology, information, and labor move fluidly across national borders. This simple fact carries profound security implications. For example, in the modern era, states are held responsible for the economic well-being of their citizens. But many states,
especially small ones, do not fully control their own destiny in the global economy. Political, economic, or military decisions made far away can affect the economies of small states, destabilize them, and create security problems. This vulnerability to outside decisions exists for even the more developed nations since unwise economic policies in the Third World often generate economic refugees who, in turn, spawn security problems for developed nations. Economic connectivity has other security implications. For many nations, arms sales are seen as a cure for domestic economic problems. Thus, the inability of a nation like Russia to compete globally in commodities other than arms leads to intense pressure to sell weapons. This, in turn, can intensify regional security problems. Regional security problems are, indeed, shaped by global economic issues.

A second form of global connectivity is informational. Today, instantaneous and immense global communication erodes the ability of states to control what their citizens (or those of other nations) hear, read, see, know and believe. How does this affect security? One obvious way is by stoking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Global communication ended the great powers' monopoly on the knowledge needed to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. Today, only the lack of access to nuclear fuel and some necessary tools prevents uncontrolled proliferation. Even this impediment is rapidly eroding. Informational connectivity also serves to focus world attention on regional conflict. There are no isolated events in the world; no state is free from the prying eyes of global public opinion. This increased access, in turn, augments the potential importance of global organizations such as the United Nations and of the international media. Global public opinion has become a factor all strategists must consider. Finally, informational connectivity sparks contagion. As groups in one part of the world successfully challenge stability, global communication makes possible the almost simultaneous rise of "copy cats" in other areas. Exerting some form of control on global information flows is, therefore, becoming an element of national security strategy.
The third key form of connectivity is ecological. All citizens of the world share a need for air and water. Everyone is subject to the weather and the effects of natural disasters like earthquakes. This creates the potential for ecological terrorism, even ecological warfare. This is certainly nothing new. Roman soldiers plowed the site of Carthage with salt. Poisoning wells and other water sources has been a part of total warfare for thousands of years. But today the ability of virtually any state, or even a small band of like-minded individuals, to create immense ecological damage far surpasses the capacity of ancient armies to devastate the territory of their enemies. Ecological disasters can also structure the movement of people, producing refugees who, in turn, create international security problems. Furthermore, the potential ecological effects of a truly major war, whether nuclear winter or some other catastrophe perhaps issuing from biological warfare, globalizes concern with preventing major conflict.

Over the next few years, the following trends and issues will be evident:

- With a few exceptions, there is a decline in resources being devoted to military forces. As states move from the industrial age to the information age, it may be possible to field smaller but highly lethal military forces. Therefore, the trend to declined defense spending may be deceptive.

- Nuclear proliferation and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction are important elements of national security strategy. The definition of what constitutes a weapon of mass destruction may change as it becomes evident that relatively old and unsophisticated artillery pieces and mortars, if used long enough, can reduce modern cities to rubble. The destruction in Beruit and in Sarajevo was caused by relatively unsophisticated weapons used over long periods of time.

- Military power plays an increasingly vital role in post-combat conflict resolution.
In lieu of substantial reform, a resurgent United Nations may have reached the limits of its effectiveness in the maintenance of peace and security.

As the transition to the information age accelerates, technologies are proliferating. The advanced nations are already grappling with what is known as the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Indeed, the information component of national security strategy is increasing in importance.

"Failed states," nations which have experienced a complete breakdown of their political, economic, and social systems, pose a range of national security problems. Somalia and Haiti are examples of nations which are dysfunctional.

Ideology is no longer the prime motivator in relations between nation states. Nationalism based on ethnicity and religion now drive international intercourse. These driving forces will prove far more powerful than either "liberty, equality and fraternity" or "the triumph of the proletariat."

Finally, continued global economic integration affects every dimension of security.
EUROPE
Thomas-Durell Young

Regional Assessment.

As 1994 unfolds, the outlines of a European security environment ought to become a little clearer. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire continues and conflict has yet to spill over its previous Imperial borders. Democratic institutions continue to develop in the former-Soviet Union, however at a very slow pace and not without some setbacks along the way. Considerable instability and conflict surround Russian borders and Russian efforts to cope with violence are not always comforting to other Europeans.

The Yugoslav conflict now hovers between a possible settlement or continued fighting. Tensions are rising in Macedonia. The conflict in the Balkans holds the potential to spread, engulfing Albania, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey as ethnic minorities and irredentist groups assert themselves, often violently.

Instability in Eastern and Southwestern Europe reverberates throughout Central Europe. The Visegrad countries continue to struggle to find their niche between Russia and Western Europe. Not content with their status as orphans of the end of the cold war, they continue to press for association in Western/Transatlantic organizations to legitimize their disassociation from the east. Their efforts have met with mixed success.

Western Europe struggles. Germany will hold 19 elections in 1994 and the Presidential election in France will be held in April 1995. Consequently, resolution of difficult issues in European economic, security and political affairs is being deferred. Despite ratification of the Maastrict Treaty, further integration is proceeding slowly and not without acrimonious debate. Germany continues to struggle with the burdens of unification and Europe has yet fully to come to terms with a united Germany. The crisis in the Italian governing structure
continues unabated and shows no sign of early resolution. Indeed, the survival of the "state" is under increasing assault.

Ethnicity and concomitant nationalism have reemerged as powerful political forces in Europe following the end of the cold war. This is a two-fold problem: ethnic conflict and the ensuing results of such conflict to include emigration to developed European countries with already stretched thin social welfare systems and post-war high unemployment.

Look for the following trends and issues to alter and illuminate the European scene in the foreseeable future:

- Russia will continue on its very difficult path toward democratic institutions and a market economy. Expect fits, starts and an occasional setback. Keep in mind that Russia will always pursue its national interests whether under a communist, democratic or some other form of government.

- The conflict in Yugoslavia will continue. Exhaustion may prove violence's only limiting factor. Should the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina stabilize, renewed violence between Serbia and Croatia is likely. The situation in Kosovo will continue to hold the potential for broadening the conflict beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia.

- In Western Europe, integration under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty will proceed. The pace, however, will be slower than initially anticipated. Tensions between European security organizations also will remain as France sorts out its relations with NATO.

- NATO, for its part, will continue to implement the New Strategic Concept while assessing changes in the strategic environment. This will undoubtedly include review of command and control arrangements and force structures, as military force levels, particularly in Central Europe, decline. Simultaneously, throughout Europe resource constraints for defense spending will grow tighter.
Regional Assessments.

In the Middle East, the areas of vital concern for the United States are twofold: the economics of making peace and the rise of extremism.

The decline in oil prices and the overabundance of petroleum on the world market will exacerbate the economic situation throughout the region. A diminishing pool of available capital will adversely affect relations between the more wealthy Arab nations and the poorer ones. This could have strategic implications for the United States, as well as for the ongoing peacemaking process within the region, because nations like Syria depend on Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for financial support. While Lebanon is trying to rebuild after its long and bloody civil war, some of the more radical elements operating there are unwilling to accept any decrease in funding from the Gulf states. Increased attacks on Israel by these groups will invite the kind of retaliation which always holds the potential for derailing peace talks with Syria.

The House of Saud will have to make difficult choices in whom to support simply because it cannot afford to fund every group or country seeking its help. Those groups or states which feel slighted are, in many cases, capable of actions potentially detrimental to the peace process to which President Hafez Assad committed Syria during his mid-January meeting with President Bill Clinton.

Among the more prominent religiously-oriented groups, the impulse toward extremism seems to be growing. These include Hizbulla, the Shiite Lebanese and Iranian-backed "Party of God," and the Hamas, the most prominent Palestinian group to take up the cause in the wake of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) efforts to reach an accommodation with Israel. These groups could wreck the peace efforts being made
by Israel, the PLO and Syria. In Egypt a plethora of radical factions harbor the potential to destabilize the government.

The following trends and issues will prove viable for the near-term future:

- Iraq and Iran will continue their rapprochement to effect a united front against the United States.

- Turkey's problems with the Kurds will increase if the Turkish army pursues a repressive policy in southeastern Turkey.

- Also, as far as the Kurdish issue is concerned, those Kurds in Iraq will grow increasingly restive. With no sign that the West is willing to support their demands for a separate state, Kurdish leaders will become more and more alienated from the United States and Europe. Kurdish leaders may decide to reopen negotiations with Baghdad.

- Syria could supplant the PLO as the main Arab player in the peace process. Both the Syrians and the Israelis are maneuvering for advantage prior to going further in their peace initiatives.

- In Lebanon and in the occupied territories, the religiously-oriented militias are moving to take over the resistance movement from the Palestine Liberation Organization. It is unlikely that substantive progress will result from the PLO's "breakthrough" with Israel. The reduction in real power enjoyed by the PLO may make the militias the significant actors in the area.

- While the official Egyptian position is that extremism is waning, nevertheless, violence there will escalate. The greatest challenge for President Hosni Mubarak, however, may be his relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He may resist making further economic concessions and that could complicate his relationship with Washington. Egypt might be a trouble spot for the next few years.
Regional Assessment.

*East Asia and the Western Pacific.* East Asia and the Western Pacific remains a region of high economic growth and relative stability, except for the Korean peninsula. The most critical near-term regional security issue for the United States, South Korea and Japan is North Korea. Pyongyang has already tested a missile capable of reaching Japan and is probably developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, with 70 percent of its conventional forces deployed along or close to the demilitarized zone (DMZ), North Korea poses a serious conventional military threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and to U.S. forces stationed in South Korea.

The most impressive economic record of the past few years belongs to China, where economic growth rates have reached very impressive levels—11 percent in 1992. The next most impressive engines of regional growth are Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. The "miracle economies" of the 1980s, those of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, continue to prosper. Vietnam and Laos languish in the economic doldrums fostered by their Marxist/Leninist regimes, but the potential for economic growth in Vietnam, at least, is great. In spite of the recession in Japan, the region is the United States' most valuable market for exports, and an important source of foreign investments in the United States.

Although there are other disputes in the region, most involving territorial claims by China and its neighbors, apart from the Korean peninsula the major security concern among the regional powers is that the United States will reduce its military presence significantly, and that China and/or Japan will project themselves into the void caused by the U.S. withdrawal. This apprehension persists despite repeated assertions by U.S. leaders that America will remain engaged militarily, and in other ways, in East Asia and the Western Pacific. It is one
of the stimuli supporting expansion of regional security consultation, focusing thus far on the annual Post Ministerial Conference of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the new ASEAN Security Forum, which will include all of the major actors in the region. The United States supports the emphasis on multilateral security cooperation and consultation within the region.

South Asia. In comparison to East Asia and the Western Pacific, South Asia’s economic growth has been modest. India and Pakistan are implementing economic reforms which suggest promise, but all nations of the region have suffered from natural disasters and political instability, and South Asia as a whole has not experienced increasing prosperity. India-Pakistan relations remain the most troubling of the area, involving the potential for nuclear conflict and a seemingly intractable dispute over Kashmir. There is concern among all its neighbors that India, which has expanded the force projection capability of its armed forces and appears determined to control the Indian Ocean, will attempt to assert hegemony over the entire region.

The following trends and issues will operate in the region into the foreseeable future.

• Relations between the United States and the nations of East Asia and the Western Pacific will increase in importance because of the region’s growing economic strength. That the United States is a Pacific power will become increasingly evident both in North America and throughout the Pacific region.

• China is modernizing its economy and its military forces. The recent purchase of SU-27 Flanker aircraft from Russia is a case in point. As the Chinese armed forces acquire modern and technologically sophisticated hardware, China will be increasingly capable of force projection throughout the region.

• As China rearms, so will Taiwan. Soon Taiwan will begin receiving some 150 ex-U.S. F-16A fighter-bombers. Production of the less sophisticated Indigenous Defense
Fighter (IDF) will proceed, especially in the wake of the French decision not to sell Taiwan 60 sophisticated Mirage 2000 fighters.

- With the Chinese rearming and North Korea seemingly more truculent, regional stability will remain dependent on U.S. engagement. This will include maintaining a credible military presence. On the political scene, continued emphasis will be placed on multinational security consultations and collaboration in East Asia and the Pacific.

- The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will increase for the next 10 years or more.

- As India increases its military capability, it will be able to influence security relations in East Asia and the Western Pacific as well as in South Asia.

- The economic miracle in South Korea will continue. Assuming the absence of conflict or unification, the disparity between prosperity in South Korea and poverty in the communist North will become ever greater.
RUSSIA AND EURASIA

Stephen J. Blank

Regional Assessment.

Events in 1993, such as Yugoslavia’s unrelenting wars, ethnic conflicts all along Russia’s southern periphery, coups and counter-coups in Russia, the Ukraine’s political and economic paralysis, the lack of a political resolution of the Baltic issue, Russia’s efforts to reintegrate its former empire even though it is beset with serious political, constitutional and economic problems at home all point to one conclusion: the state system from Germany’s eastern border to the Pacific Ocean is unstable and profoundly insecure. No viable security architecture or functioning institution has arisen that can provide legitimacy and security throughout this expanse of territory. And as wars rage in the former Yugoslavia and on Russia’s periphery, or states like Russia experience profound uncertainty and unrest due to malfunctioning economies and governments, continuing unrest and the prospect of even wider wars or more of them remains acute. Thus, Central and Eastern European security in 1994 and beyond cannot be taken for granted; quite the opposite.

Central and Eastern European states have pursued security integration with both NATO and the European Union (EU, or the successor to the EC) to no avail. Furthermore, they cannot collaborate regionally, as was hoped, in pursuit of the common good. Rather, there are growing signs of unilateral pursuits of security and prosperity by states, a trend that will only intensify the vacuum in the area. At the same time, this analyst believes that Russia is pursuing an increasingly overt strategy, employing both economic and military pressure (including overt and covert operations) that also utilizes “peacekeeping operations” to restore Russian hegemony over the former USSR. This Pax Russica, or Russian “Monroe Doctrine,” is intensifying distrust about Russia’s aims, even under Boris Yeltsin, throughout Europe and Turkey.
At the same time, Russia's Pacific or Asian politics still appear to gravitate towards an alliance (their word) with China and cooperation with South Korea, the logic of which points to difficult if peaceful relations with Japan. However, this short-circuits economic aid to Russia, especially in the Asian parts of Russia, and materially affects the structure of overall relations in Northeast Asia.

Finally, and most disturbing for any future Russian democracy, are signs of an inability to realize viable democratic institutions and make them work. These signs are quite visible in Yeltsin's post-coup decrees and in the process of election and of party formation that is now taking place. But perhaps the most important question is the nature and degree of civilian control over the armed forces. Despite complacency or optimism on the part of numerous analysts that the armed forces have been " politicized" and that this is a good thing, there are too many signs of less than perfect control over the military and of increasing acceptance of its political role and of submission to its agenda, e.g. the reintegration of the empire.

The following trends and issues are at work:

- Clearly, neither in economics or in terms of political institutions are many of the post-Soviet states able to make progress towards viability, let alone democracy. In economics, this is particularly visible in energy affairs, where they depend on Russia and are being forced to pay the price. Politically, this economic failure leads to intensification of ethnic animosities and violence, and then to wars or the prospect of wars.

- Western Europe and the United States are still resisting Central Europe's membership in the EU and NATO despite those states' constant pressure on them. Though surrogates for membership like the Aspin initiative of October 1993 have been advanced, they are regarded as much delaying tactics as anything else. Thorough analysis of the arguments on both sides are needed lest the present vacuum in the region grow further.
Another reason can be found in the implications of Yugoslavia’s wars for European security, which are essentially threefold: The security of the Balkan region is once again up for grabs and evidently outside the sustained interest of the Western Alliance. As long as war and its legacy of bitterness and hatred continue, other states and territories will be drawn into either political and ethnic rivalry for local primacy or into actual fighting, with every likelihood of further ethnic unrest and spreading warfare. The second consequence is equally profound and related to the first one. Yugoslavia has decisively divided the Western Alliance. Its most critical impact is that there is little, if any, consensus between the United States and its allies, and among those allies themselves, on threat assessment in Central Europe, or a response to it. In effect, the regional actors are on their own. Accordingly, membership in NATO may ultimately be irrelevant to the threats that can be construed against these states because the NATO allies evidently cannot, or will not, agree on the nature of those threats or on actions against them. This leads to the third related lesson or consequence of these wars, namely that other nationalist demagogues and aggressors will be encouraged to incite them in the absence of any strong Western response.

Turning to Russia, we find numerous ethnic and other conflicts along its southern periphery, not to mention possibilities of further strife, especially in the Ukraine. The Russian army is now deeply engaged in these wars. Their operations bear watching, not only for their operational and tactical content, but also for what can be learned about Russia’s approach to peacemaking. They are also crucial from a strategic-political standpoint because they apparently are the means by which Russia is restoring its hegemonical influence over these areas.

This imperial restoration or reintegration through peacemaking and the use of economic coercion suggests that, with all its troubles, Russia has devised a relatively coherent national security strategy aimed at
restoration throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Since a military doctrine has been formally accepted recently, Russia's overall national security strategy merits critical analysis to determine whether there is a clear concept or strategy governing policy.
Regional Assessment.

Threats to peace, stability, progressive growth, and democracy in Latin America issue from political extremes and deeply rooted economic, social, and political problems. U.S. national interests in the region will continue to be the promotion of democracy, human rights, economic well-being, and the curtailment of the drug trade and illegal migration to the United States. While most countries in Latin America may be expected to continue the process of democratization, many are under increasing pressure from the resurgence of an authoritarian alternative, especially in those cases where elected governments have failed to meet popular expectations.

A rapidly expanding population and its attendant socio-economic problems create conditions which promote emigration, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, and coups d'etat. U.S. assistance in reinforcing democratic institutions and building strong economies is the best defense against the authoritarian alternative in the region.

In the Andean Ridge countries of Bolivia, Peru, Columbia, and Ecuador, thousands of Latin American farmers have entered the lucrative coca growing business and its related and even more lucrative cocaine processing activities. Venezuela has recently become a preferred embarkation point for illegal drug shipments to the United States and Europe. Both it and Brazil may soon become significant producers, as well as way stations. There has been an increase in poppy crops of both Mexico and Guatemala. The opium poppy has also been introduced to South America, Columbia in particular. Unless a suitable alternative is found, these farmers may well provide the raw materials that support insurgents and/or drug trafficking cartels. The probability is very high that even with U.S. training, equipment, and advisors, Latin American governments will not be able to make more than very limited
progress against the supply side of the drug trade. Equally disturbing has been the recent increase in the use of illegal drugs in Latin America.

Continued economic underdevelopment and wide gaps between rich and poor have resulted in significant illegal migration of Latin Americans to the United States, most through Mexico. To these economic refugees must be added those who claim to be fleeing political persecution. Some estimates go as high as 7 million per year. While Central American migration is down, Haitian migration has increased and may well grow much worse in the next year. In addition, the current crisis in Cuba provides the potential for a new "Mariel boatlift" if the country explodes.

The policy answer to most of these concerns is in nurturing democracy, economic opportunity and a viable counterdrug strategy. Some of these issues are addressed in former President George Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Andean Drug Strategy. How to turn policy into strategy and executable programs is the real challenge for the United States.

The trends and issues to anticipate and explore in the foreseeable future are:

- As the Latin American nations continue the process of democratization, there is a risk that authoritarian movements will grow where selected governments do not meet popular expectations. Democratization has probably reached, if not passed, its apex, with the future dependent on economic growth, reduced population growth, and enhanced civilian control over military institutions.

- Threats to democratic governments will increase during the next 5 years. These threats stem from rampant overpopulation, socioeconomic inequalities, poverty, weak economies, and an authoritarian political culture—elements that will be exploited by the military, unreconstructed Marxist movements, drug cartels, and radical politicians from the left and the right.

20
In Peru the Shining Path guerrillas will continue to fade, but in Columbia the insurgency problem will grow worse.

The production and trafficking in illicit drugs will expand throughout Latin America, particularly in the Andean region; Central America; Brazil; Paraguay; and possibly Mexico. In general, however, the United States will not intensify its counterdrug efforts.

The United States will continue to support democratization but will probably become less interventionist in its approach to the internal affairs of its southern neighbors.
Regional Assessment.

U.S. involvement in Africa will continue to be governed by humanitarian interests, chief among them being democratic reform. The shift in U.S. foreign policy emphasis to humanitarian interests has affected some results on the continent. In Kenya, multiparty democracy, although by no means perfect, has been established, allowing the Moi regime to retain power while technically satisfying most of the requirements of donor nations. Other countries such as Malawi, where Parliament has abolished the life presidency and is moving forward to establish multiparty democracy; Mozambique, where the potential for multiparty elections and an end to the civil war are real and plausible; and South Africa, which is holding elections to establish a multiracial, interim government; are examples of success in the democratic reform movement.

As is often the case in Africa, where it is one step forward, it may also be two steps back. The strategically important oil-producing country of Nigeria, which was supposed to move to multiparty democracy through free and fair elections in 1993, has now regressed into the familiar pattern of military leadership. In the other oil-producing country, Angola, long a chessboard for East-West cold war maneuvering, civil war has returned. The poorly funded national elections to create multiparty government that would unite the warring factions of Unita and MPLA government failed miserably. The losing party, Jonas Savimbi's Unita, reinitiated the guerrilla war with such success that the United States is now providing support to the MPLA forces. In Zaire, President Mobutu clings tenuously to power and has foiled efforts to establish a multiparty democracy that he at one time proclaimed to be imminent. It is noteworthy that Nigeria, Angola, and Zaire are strategically important to the United States for their minerals, size, and regional influence.
The most significant issue for the United States in 1994 will continue to be Somalia. When the Clinton administration changed the objective of U.S. participation from one of supporting the humanitarian delivery of food to nationbuilding, with the requirement of bringing warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed to bay, it changed the nature of U.S. peacekeeping operations in a way that has many implications for the future. First, it has been viewed by developing world leaders as a litmus test of the willingness of the United States to stay the course. When the Pakistanis lost 22 men, its resolve remained unchanged and Pakistan's participation in UNOSOM operations continued. When the United States incurred nearly 20 casualties, criticism in Congress and from the American people caused the administration to change its stated policy and seek a peaceful solution to the conflict with Aideed, largely on his terms. Second, Somalia brought to a head the difficulties in coordinating U.S. and U.N. interests in international peacekeeping operations and severely compromised what initially appeared to be a productive relationship. Third, if U.S. participation results in a peaceful Somalia, then the administration may support other peacekeeping operations. If, however, civil war and starvation return, opposition to further peacekeeping efforts will increase dramatically. Finally, Somalia proves the need for African solutions to African problems, and calls into question the future participation of U.S. forces in peacekeeping efforts that do not reflect what is regionally possible.

Somalia is not the only African country in which U.S. forces may be called to serve. The civil war and starvation in the Sudan may yet command the attention of the administration. The U.N. effort to bring peace to war torn Mozambique has met with success and a U.N. task force, UNOMOZ, has been established. The U.N. leadership is seeking significant U.S. participation for this effort in the monitoring, military construction, and nation assistance roles. Liberia, which has historical ethnic ties to the United States, continues to be plagued by civil unrest and any potentially successful resolution could require the participation of U.S. forces in some manner. In Zaire, the United States has a history of providing logistical support to French forces attempting to evacuate
Europeans in time of violent conflict. Events in Zaire possibly could become so difficult in the coming year that such cooperative military ventures with the French may be required. It is likely that U.S. support to the Angolan government may escalate beyond providing intelligence data if a peace accord is established.

In 1994, the country of South Africa will elect its first multiethnic government and relinquish white rule. Because of its strategic importance and salience to U.S. domestic politics, events that unfold in South Africa will have significant ramifications for the United States. Long thought to be a resilient, economically and culturally strong country able to absorb the social unrest associated with the transition to multi-ethnic rule, South Africa in 1993 demonstrated a disturbing potential for uncontrolled ethnic violence and the inability of existing police and defense forces to contain it. The African National Congress, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, was thought to be able to maintain the allegiance of the unemployed black youth of the South African urban areas and unify the country. However, the assassination of Chris Hanni, head of the South African Communist party and the ANC’s military wing, removed from the ANC its primary link to this body of disenfranchised youth. The result has been a resurgence in the popularity of radical black ethnic parties such as the Pan African Congress and an exacerbation of the difficulties associated with negotiating the new form of government. The potential for ethnic violence and disruptive behavior from the radical white right and the Zulu nation, neither of which are currently willing participants in the new transitional governmental election process, to undermine any future government’s ability to run the country is also substantial. The situation is particularly important for the United States because of South Africa’s strategic minerals production, its control of the Cape route around which flows some 40 percent of U.S. petroleum imports, its nuclear capability, and the importance of the South African economy to the future economic and political stability of the entire region.

Whither Africa in the coming decade? The following trends should focus our attention.
• Expect democratic reform to continue. It is eagerly supported by most of the African elite. With fits and starts, democratization can be expected to continue as long as Western donors, lending institutions, and governments continue to tie financial aid to reform.

• Chronic health problems will continue to undermine the already thin African elite and threaten the ability of emerging democracies to manage their difficult economic and political problems. The HIV virus continues its explosive spread. This disease is complemented by a resurgence of tuberculosis and the ever-present malaria which, itself, claims over a million African lives annually.

• Africa will continue to suffer economically. A depressed world economy will keep raw materials low in price, making it difficult for countries to pay off their high external debt. This and structural adjustment will complicate most governments' efforts to maintain their legitimacy with populations that are facing growing environmental problems and an inability to feed themselves.

• The chief cause of Africa's poverty and suffering, extremely high population growth rates that average well above 3 percent per year, will continue unabated.

• Congress continues its efforts to cut the African Security Assistance Program. This program maintains the military-to-military contact that supports such strategic interests as overflight agreements, basing, and influence with governments that control strategic lines of communication. However, by providing $30 million for the Security Assistance Program Biodiversity and Conservation effort, Congress has demonstrated that it is willing to fund environmental security assistance to African nations. This willingness provides a window of opportunity for maintaining these important military-to-military contacts.
• Although Eritrea successfully became independent from Ethiopia during 1993, there is little chance that other African countries will mount a strong effort to redraw the political boundaries artificially imposed by colonial powers during the 1884-85 Berlin Conference. Thus, one must expect continued ethnic violence as newly formed democracies wrestle with the requirement to prove their legitimacy to multiple groups of ethnically distinct constituents.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FUTURE

Charles W. Taylor

A large number of potential future world environments can emerge from the world’s societies as they exist today. All will bring new challenges; a few will include surprises. As the elements of national power pressure the leadership of large and small nations to achieve new status in the world’s societies, so will they pressure each nation’s people to seek a new awareness of global presence.

Political, economic, sociological, scientific and technological trends and events will rebound in heavy activity on a global scale. Increasingly over the next 30 years or more the concepts and realities of peace and war, rich and poor, love and hate, life and death will confront all nations, especially the emerging free and independent nations, and will weigh heavily on those chosen for leadership; less on those who will have seized the power of leadership. These nations seek new self-identities; destinies of their own. They will attempt to do so in world situations that are dominated increasingly by global and regional economic powers and less in a world dominated by political ideological and military forces.

The strategic political and economic environments of the world will become more complex over the next several decades. At no time in the past or present, however, have world leaders ever perceived these environments as immutable. World leaders today and those of the future are unlikely to change their ways and very likely will continue to create change as they attempt to manage the future. Some will be aware of their responsibilities in making change, others will be unaware. Some will recognize the holistic character of their changes; others will not have noticed the global impact.

Changes in the strategic global environment have created and will continue to create, new situations for the U.S. Army. These changes and the leadership decisions addressing them, e.g., continued reduction in force or increasing needs for joint
operations, will have to be reassessed. Other changes affecting warfighting that will demand assessment likely will include:

- An Army reduced in size and compelled to closer operations with the other services.
- A smaller Army will employ emerging technologies to develop force multipliers.
- New technologies will make new missions possible.
- New missions will drive the development of appropriate strategies.
- The innovative application of new technologies will open as yet unthought of opportunities for America’s Army.

Change over the next three or more decades will continue to impact America’s Army as it will all modern organizations. Greater demand by government and industry for long-range planners will compete with the Army’s need for creating a new Army rather than restructuring the old; and for understanding how to use a reduction in force and the prospects of an austere future fighting force to build a more perfect and successful fighting force. When, over the long term, has the Army been unable to plan successfully for foreseeable or long-range eventualities, and when has it been successful in that kind of planning? Who plans best: business, industry, academia, government, the Army, the other services and how do they do long-range planning?

**Future Trends and Issues.**

- The U.S. military forces very likely will continue to be reduced in numbers well into the long-range future.
- The active U.S. Army will be reduced in numbers significantly over the next 15 to 20 years.
- Increasingly, new and emerging technologies will open up new missions for America’s Army.
• New technologies will absorb larger pieces of proportionally smaller budgets in each of the services, encouraging a major restructuring of U.S. military forces.

• The concept and the strategy of overwhelming force will increasingly fall into disuse as public support declines, budgetary restrictions increase, and as manpower reductions continue through 2004.

• The increasing intentional or unintentional worldwide transfer of civilian and military technologies will encourage the U.S. military to create new warfighting strategies that will use as yet (1994) undiscovered or unapplied technology.
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