NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: AN INTERAGENCY IMPERATIVE

by

Warren Lowman
Major, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Army.

Signature:  
17 June 1994

Paper directed by
J. Dan Keirsey, Colonel, U.S. Army
Tasker Howard Bliss Military Chair of Strategy and Tactics and
Thomas D. Stouffer, Colonel, USMC
Chairman, Planning and Decision Making Division

94-15265
The need for interagency coordination of activities in operations other than war is examined at the operational level of conflict. The OOTW paradigm integrates the military, political, economic, and informational instruments of national power. While the military option is not the primary choice, the military establishment is usually the principal facilitator of that policy. A consistent theme from analyses of conflicts, the American military has recently been involved in, and of ongoing operations is the command and control, planning, and execution shortfall at the operational level where strategic aims are linked to tactical plans, the matching of ends and means. The absence of an interagency forum and process continues to perpetuate the inability to effectively integrate and coordinate interagency requirements in an ever more ambiguous environment for conducting military operations. In the absence of interagency leadership below the NCA, the Department of Defense and CINCS' must assume responsibility for the interagency process.
Abstract of
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: AN INTERAGENCY IMPERATIVE

The need for interagency coordination of activities in operations other than war is examined at the operational level of conflict. The OOTW paradigm integrates the military, political, economic, and informational instruments of national power. While the military option is not the primary choice, the military establishment is usually the principal facilitator of that policy. A consistent theme from analyses of conflicts the American military has recently been involved in, and of on-going operations is the command and control, planning, and execution shortfall at the operational level where strategic aims are linked to tactical plans, the matching of ends and means. The absence of an interagency forum and process continues to perpetuate the inability to effectively integrate and coordinate interagency requirements in an ever more ambiguous environment for conducting military operations. In the absence of interagency leadership below the NCA, the Department of Defense and CINCs' must assume responsibility for the interagency process. The interagency shortfall is addressed by formalizing processes at the DOD and combatant command levels within the deliberate and crisis action planning parameters of the joint operation planning and execution system.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I  INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Paradigm</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CINCs' Challenge</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into the Void: Department of Defense Leadership</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Interagency Model at the Operational Level</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"We train as a team, fight as a team, and win as a team."
-- General Colin L. Powell

The New Paradigm. Since World War II, successive generations of American military leaders have extolled the virtue of joint warfare. Each conflict's after action reviews, lessons learned, and a plethora of academic analyses, point to the decided advantage jointness gives military operations. The military refined its organization, doctrine, and procedures to systemically and instinctively maximize joint capabilities. Operations other than war (OOTW) offer a similar challenge to our perspective about "fighting" conflicts and integrating available capabilities into a cohesive, responsive and effective "force" for the commander. The new paradigm for military operations in OOTW will require an equally committed effort. Doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, and our military attitudes must be reoriented toward an interagency approach to conflict on the modern "battlefield."

To appreciate the nature of OOTW it's necessary to understand what that environment is not, namely war. The U.S. Army's Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, makes a distinction between the military's role in war and OOTW:

In an environment of joint and combined operations, the [military] will also operate with other agencies of the US government...not only when the military is the prime strategic
option--as it is in war--but when other agencies are the preferred option and the military provides forces.

War, by definition then, is more than the traditional paradigm of a mobilized nation supporting the commitment of conventional military power against an enemy threatening vital security interests. Conditions of war exist when the National Command Authority (NCA) employs the military option as the primary means of conflict resolution. The likelihood of waging conventional war is remote. It's on the ambiguous "battlefield" of OOTW the national security apparatus will maneuver in the post cold war era.

The OOTW environment the military confronts isn't new and unfamiliar. Doctrine and manuals in use still refer to many of the activities included under the umbrella of OOTW in the former terms of low-intensity conflict. 2 Our doctrine addresses the military's role and requirements in OOTW (LIC):

National defense policies are a component of national security strategy, which is the overall plan for the use of the political, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power to ensure US security. The [OOTW] strategies that support these policies must coordinate the use of a variety of policy instruments among and within US Government agencies.

The CINCs' Challenges. Operations other than war pose unique considerations for the Commander in Chief (CINC) at the operational level, the link between strategic designs to secure national security interests and the tactical considerations of appropriate objectives, battles and force structure to shape the battlefield to achieve those ends. In an era of diminishing resources, yet growing requirements, the CINC must increasingly rely on assets outside established military purviews to accomplish the mission.
These non-traditional resources reflect operational requirements as the CINCs' missions extend outside traditional military bounds.

These are not new considerations for the CINCs. Joint Pub 3-0 outlines the responsibility for interagency relationships:

As senior military commanders within their AORs, CINCs determine the other US departments and agencies with which to interface and the actions, planning, and operations required of their forces in support of, or being supported by, those agencies. CINCs establish working relationships with all US diplomatic missions in their AORs, as well as their supporting country teams.

This paper addresses shortcomings at the operational level in linking strategic goals with tactical plans. These shortcomings are a matter of command, planning, and execution. Given the multidimensional dynamics of OOTW, the problem is developing an effective approach to planning and execution that integrates the CINC's military role with other political, economic, and informational instruments into a comprehensive operational plan.

Using examples from a range of recent OOTW activities, this paper will analyze existing organizational structures and procedures, and propose modifications to address the command and control, planning, and execution challenges the CINC faces. This paper focuses on the interagency challenge in the former context of low-intensity conflict. I've exchanged the use of LIC with OOTW in source references as a means of continuity in doctrine and thought as the conceptual differences between war and OOTW continue to evolve. This paper focuses on those activities where the NCA employs the use of force, the threat of force, and the military as an enforcing instrument of policy.
To the "soldier in the foxhole" the difference between war and OOTW is ambiguous at best. Tactical operators pray strategic decision makers earnestly consider this reality before committing military might vested in the training, discipline, and spirit of each soldier, marine, sailor, and airman who goes into harm's way. Tactical players on the "battlefield" look to the operational commander to provide continuity. Leaders owe subordinates the full advantages of integrated and coordinated capabilities, planning, and execution. In OOTW, that obligation moves beyond jointness and becomes an interagency imperative.
CHAPTER II

THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT

Into the Void: Department of Defense Leadership.

Operations other than war, like war itself, are prosecuted under the guide of basic principles. The principle most often violated is unity of effort. The commander of Task Force (TF) Mountain, Operation Restore Hope, appreciated his dilemma:

 Restore Hope was more complex than normal joint and combined operations. Not only did all services participate, but we were joined by more than 20 coalition countries.... Additionally, 49 different humanitarian agencies -- NGOs [non-governmental organizations] with worldwide commitments, were key players, creating requirements for liaison, coordination and cooperation.... Coordination would not be easy and cooperation would not be automatic.

Ambassadors Edwin G. Corr and David C. Miller, Jr. criticize OOTW activities for a lack of leadership, "The problem is that overall responsibility...does not belong to any one agency, there is no continuous center of authority, and it is very difficult to sustain an integrated effort." The question is why does this leadership void exist? Part of the answer is institutionalized rivalries between agencies with conflicting priorities and competition for resources:

(T)he long-existing turf battles have been exacerbated by a shrinking budget [and] a desire to find "living space" in a rapidly changing national security agenda. This competition is likely to intensify even further as the departments and agencies seek to redefine their roles to meet yet-to-be determined security requirements of the new world order.

(T)his escalating bureaucratic infighting...will lessen the ability of the United States to meet the...challenges that it faces.... What are required now are imagination, vision, and long-term planning, not bureaucratic fragmentation.
The leadership problem is especially acute at the operational level. The military may not be the primary instrument of choice in OOTW, but it will usually be the facilitator of that instrument. CINCs must have responsibility for interagency leadership at the operational level for three reasons: the CINC is trained and experienced in linking strategic goals with tactical objectives; combatant commands are structurally organized to facilitate interagency coordination; and, the CINC is responsible, by legal mandate and moral authority, for those who will ultimately enter harm’s way to achieve America’s strategic aims.

The Department of Defense successfully struggled through the difficulties of conceptualizing and applying the tenets of war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict, to include OOTW. Other U.S. agencies have not, they rarely operate at each level simultaneously. One analysis of Operation Promote Liberty in Panama concluded, "(C)ivilian agencies of the U.S. Government...have no concept of the [requirements] that constitute modern military strategy bringing together the ends, ways, and means to support and defend the national interest."9 The State Department correctly takes the lead in formulating strategic policy; USAID and DEA, for example, correctly take the lead in implementing specific programs to address specific conditions in a country or region. Linking policy and programs, tactics if you will, is the more difficult part of the equation.

The military is best positioned, by recent experiences across the spectrum of conflict and by virtue of professional education
standards, to take the lead in interagency requirements. The military experienced a tremendous learning curve in the doctrinal, organizational, and attitudinal challenges of conducting joint warfare. Each service's intermediate and senior level education institutions include joint operations in their curriculums. Those lessons and skills are easily transferred to the interagency arena and military officers are better prepared for managing interagency actions than their contemporaries in other government agencies.

The second consideration for giving the CINC interagency responsibility is the existing organizational structure that supports contingency planning and on-going activities. The chain of command and coordination requirements, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the NCA are institutionalized and clearly outlined by statute. Formal and informal relationships between the CINCs and the regional diplomatic missions and country teams within their area of responsibility vary. Still, the existing channels of communication work routinely and effectively. That network can be easily expanded to integrate, coordinate, and support interagency activities from the combatant commander to forces "on the ground."

The challenge will not be managing the increased support and coordination requirements; there are sufficient technical capabilities to support interagency operations. The challenge will be for agencies outside DOD to decentralize their operations, to avoid the "stovepipe" method of control, to allow theater representatives the requisite freedom of action to be proactive and decisive in the absence of adequate guidance.
Combatant commands are trained, equipped, and experienced in OOTW activities. The U.S. European Command's (EUCOM) success in providing relief for the Kurdish refugees at the Turkish/Iraqi border following the Gulf War illustrates this capacity. EUCOM "took the point" in balancing operations to secure the refugees from Saddam with the sensitive political considerations of Turkish sovereignty and the Kurdish separatist movement. At the same time, EUCOM coordinated humanitarian relief efforts directed at the immediate need for food, medicine and shelter.

The third reason for giving the CINC authority for directing interagency activities is the possibility that escalation may lead to the primacy of the military instrument. Often the answer for decision makers and opinion shapers to an evolving political schism is to "send in the military." The operational commander is best prepared to anticipate and plan for the consequences of a failed policy. It's the military commander, dispassionately assessing his tactical situation, with due consideration for the strategic goals, who attempts to influence the battlefield to his advantage should force be the final means to the end. The military instrument is too lethal and the lives of young Americans too precious to be employed without the commander's full ability to empower that force for victory. In today's environment where inordinate numbers of American casualties are simply unacceptable, there is no logical choice but to allow the commander maximum flexibility in coordinating the instruments of national power on the battlefield.

Interagency planning and executing OOTW activities is
especially critical to the question of conflict termination and the
exit strategy. The military must necessarily take the lead in
addressing the problem. The transition from military to civilian
control of an operation will be disjointed unless that change of
command is planned and coordinated. Operations Promote Liberty in
Panama and Desert Shield in Kuwait illustrate this point:

(U)nity of effort among the several U.S....agencies was
ragged at best. Foremost among the reasons was that
throughout the planning process, none of the agencies that
would have to participate in the restoration of Panama were
permitted to know of the existence of [the Promote Liberty
Plan].

When the short ground war [in the KTO] ended abruptly,
the United States had no comprehensive, cohesive plan...which
compromised all the federal agencies involved and provided a
mechanism...to communicate and coordinate with each
other....Other federal agencies might have been used more
effectively if they had been included in the early planning
process.

The Defense Department must boldly and resolutely fill the
leadership void of OOTW. The challenge is clear, "The central
problem of political management needs to be addressed at the
operational level." The need for DOD leadership is uniformly
recognized, "(O)nly within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
are the required management capability and will to manage
effectively [an OOTW] program." We in the military must demand
as much, our training and experience will allow no less, our
comrades and subordinates will measure that resolve on the vaguely
defined "battlefields" of OOTW.

An Interagency Model at the Operational Level.

There is a systemic problem in interagency coordination. As
recent as 1991, the National Security Council (NSC) reviewed
procedures and structures to examine how the government formulates, coordinates, resources, and implements strategy and policy towards countries threatened by or engaged in low-intensity conflicts. The review concluded existing interagency coordinating arrangements are inadequate to respond to unusual and urgent requirements for economic, developmental, informational, and military assistance, either in anticipation of a growing conflict or over a sustained period. The problem is twofold: no interagency forum exists to address generic issues, irrespective of geographic location; and, no interagency forum exists below the level of the NSC Deputies Committee that could identify and provide functional expertise and ensure a coordinated flow of resources to country teams for country or region specific programs, especially in times of crises.

Interagency integration at the operational level enhances the synergistic effect of the instruments of national power. A basic element of that synergism is defining a clear end state, knowing what constitutes victory before the "battle" is joined. Victory is often subtle, especially when multiple agencies may have varying measures of evaluating success. The experience of the Restore Hope TF Commander points to the value of an interagency forum:

End state definitions and end state conditions are necessary, but not sufficient for operational planning for OOTW. The final set of information that the operational commander needs is the measures of effectiveness for the conditions...[that] allow the commander to assess progress toward establishing the conditions essential to reaching the end state. Operational and tactical commanders need to know the non-military features of the conditions and how to measure them in order to take them into consideration as they plan for, conduct, and evaluate the effectiveness of operations.

The DOD command structure can accommodate revisions that
address the shortcomings the NSC review identified. Interagency focus at the operational level provides continuity from the initial CINC’s assessment through the planning and execution phases, to include conflict termination with a coordinated exit strategy.

Operations other than war activities are usually responses to real-time events and promulgated within the time-sensitive constraints of crisis action planning (CAP). The Restore Hope TF Commander recognized the problem:

In OOTW, it is imperative that strategic, operational, and tactical-level commanders reach closure quickly on exactly what each is trying to accomplish. This link is currently missing from our crisis action planning process.¹¹

The interagency forum I envision coordinates and deconflicts requirements at the operational level based on the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.

Todd R. Greentree proposes a "Policy Management Support Team" (PMST) whose principle task would be to draft an interagency action plan to serve as a guide for coordinating and evaluating policies and programs. He describes the PMST as a small permanent staff, augmented with members outside the core national security agencies as specific situations require, representing regional and functional authorities while serving as liaisons between agencies and between Washington and the field to coordinate interagency decision making.¹² The PMST concept has a great deal of merit, but while Greentree emphasizes creating the "organization," it is formalizing the "process" which would be more efficient and effective, "The main failure [in OOTW] is not policy formulation, but the everyday coordination of personnel and resources from an
array of often competing agencies that frequently have predetermined agendas."

The Restore Hope TF commander highlights the utility an interagency forum offers the operational commander:

Operational planners first had to obtain and understand the political, economic, and social objectives of the operation. Only then could the military conditions that would be required to support the strategic end state be identified and a plan developed to meet them.

The question is how would an interagency policy management process structurally support the commander? The answer is twofold: formalizing interagency processes at the DOD and combatant command levels within existing staffing frameworks; and, expanding the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process.

Although this analysis focuses on the operational level, a brief discussion of the supporting PMST above the operational level is appropriate. The Joint Staff is the logical level at which to form a PMST. Brought together at DOD, this group would provide the generic type of analysis and functional expertise to formulate Greentree's guide for managing and evaluating interagency operations. The NSC Deputies Committee, as adjunct for the NCA, would provide strategic guidance to subordinate agencies.

The preferred operational level interagency forum is more accurately characterized as a policy management coordinating committee (PMCC). The PMCC would be the CINC's interagency management group and would meet both as a scheduled and as-required forum, to review, plan, coordinate, integrate, and deconflict programs and priorities. The state department political advisor...
serving on the CINC's staff would play a key role in assembling the appropriate non-traditional players. Representatives to regional organizations or members of key country teams in the AOR would be ideally positioned to serve on the PMCC.

The PMCC would play an important role in both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. We have established the need for developing and reviewing operations plans and concept summaries in an interagency forum, especially OOTW activities. The military plays a supporting role to other instruments of national power, the parameters of that role must be clearly understood.

The PMST would serve as the interagency reviewer at the joint staff level while the PMCC would have a similar mission at the operational level. As in any organization or operation, preparation is often the difference between success and failure; training, rehearsal and refinement would be necessary events for enhancing interagency capabilities. War games, or more correctly OOTW games, exercises and routine training events would be integral to the PMCC's growth as a viable, credible, and effective forum.

An important component of the interagency forum is the scope of its responsibility and authority. That question is especially significant at the operational level where command relationships and coordination responsibilities sometimes overlap. The PMCC would coordinate interagency policy and requirements between Washington and the field, and would be tasked to:

-- plan, review, and integrate interagency operations.
-- coordinate and deconflict interagency priorities and
requirements.

-- establish measures of effectiveness.

-- evaluate on-going operations.

-- resource management.

-- serve as the focal point for Ambassadors to link country requirements with regional capabilities and assets.

A decisive advantage of the interagency approach I've outlined is cost. By relying on existing staffing and management structures, there is no need for a new layer of bureaucracy. The military shouldn't consider the interagency arena as the evolutionary progression of jointness. The skills officers acquire in their joint professional education programs are easily applied in the interagency environment. It is the interagency process that is the imperative.
CHAPTER III

CONCLUSIONS

There are significant challenges in conducting OOTW with an interagency focus. We've taken the most important step to overcoming those difficulties by acknowledging the problem exists. The next step need not be tentative, but it will involve a meaningful commitment to the interagency process.

Operational effectiveness dictates DOD leadership for substantive reasons. The Department of Defense must take the lead in defining the interagency environment. The services weathered the growing pains of "jointness." The experiences of a new generation of military leaders across the spectrum of conflict has prepared them for planning and executing interagency actions in the ambiguous and dynamic environment of OOTW.

Interagency shortfalls are most crucial at the operational level where strategic aims are linked to tactical objectives. The combatant command CINCs must take leadership in operational level interagency coordination. Combatant commands are the only formal organization structured, equipped, and staffed to handle the interagency mission. CINCs command or control the principle personnel and materiel assets that will execute most operations and activities in OOTW. Those assets are increasingly valuable and vulnerable in this time of diminishing resources. Military officers, by virtue of their professional education, experience and mission-oriented approach, are best prepared to serve in the
vanguard of interagency operations.

A comprehensive interagency process must be hierarchical for coordination purposes, but need not be a new layer of bureaucracy. The interagency model I propose takes advantage of existing organizational structures and staffs to overcome systemic problems. The NSC Deputies Committee provides the strategic guidance that initiates interagency activity. A Policy Management Support Team (PMST) at the Joint Staff Level and a Policy Management Coordinating Committee (PMCC) at the operational level provide appropriate forums in which to address interagency planning and execution requirements consistent with the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.

The PMCC offers a great deal of utility and flexibility up and down the chain of command. Responsible to the CINC, the PMCC serves as a centralized interagency forum to coordinate policy, deconflict priorities, and manage resources in an efficient and responsive manner. The PMCC's scope of responsibility and authority logically includes: planning, reviewing and integrating existing and future plans; coordinating, deconflicting, and prioritizing requirements; establishing measures of effectiveness to evaluate on-going operations; resource management; and the interagency link for the Ambassador or regional commander. In the time-sensitive nature of CAP where OOTW activities will usually be promulgated, the PMCC's ability to operate and resource across the interagency spectrum is a decided advantage for the commander.

This paper analyzed the interagency shortfalls of conducting
OOTW at the operational level and proposed essential components for meeting those challenges, foremost the need for leadership. As threats to America's national security interests become more ambiguous, so too will the battlefields on which those threats are met. The operations other than war environment is fundamentally an interagency paradigm. Future victories will only be possible by capitalizing on interagency planning and execution.
NOTES


2. Activities under OOTW include:
   -- **NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO):** Relocating threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign country or host nation.
   -- **ARMS CONTROL:** Any plan, arrangement, or process controlling the numbers, types and performance characteristics of weapons systems.
   -- **SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITIES:** Domestic emergencies, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and similar operations.
   -- **HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF:** DOD personnel, equipment and supplies to promote human welfare to reduce pain and suffering to prevent loss of life or destruction of property after natural or man-made disaster.
   -- **SECURITY ASSISTANCE:** IAW statutes, Defense materiel, military training and defense related services.
   -- **NATION ASSISTANCE:** Supports a host nation’s efforts to promote development, ideally through use of host nation resources. Interagency orchestration of all elements of national power.
   -- **SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS:** Supporting law enforcement agencies, foreign and domestic, and other U.S. agencies.
   -- **COMBATTING TERRORISM:** Peacetime antiterrorism activities and wartime counterterrorism support to the Departments of State, overseas and high seas responsibility; Transportation, responsible for aircraft in flight within U.S. territory; and the FBI, responsible agency within U.S. territory.
   -- **PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:** Supporting diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict.
   -- **PEACE ENFORCEMENT:** Intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force.
   -- **SHOW OF FORCE:** Deployments to lend credibility to the nation’s commitments, increase regional influence, and to demonstrate resolve.
   -- **SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES:** The military instrument of national power predominantly supporting political, economic, and informational objectives to assist either insurgent movements or host nation governments opposing and insurgency.
   -- **ATTACKS AND RAIDS:** Creating situations that permit seizing and maintaining political and military initiative.


5. The Principles of Operations Other Than War are:
   -- **OBJECTIVE:** Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
   -- **UNITY OF EFFORT:** Seek unity of effort toward every objective.
   -- **LEGITIMACY:** Sustain the willing acceptance by the people for the right of the government or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
   -- **PERSEVERANCE:** Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
   -- **RESTRAINT:** Apply appropriate military capability prudently.
   -- **SECURITY:** Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.


14. The NSC review occurred in 1990-91 and was led by Ambassador David Miller, then special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for African and international programs.


21. Traditional players in the national security apparatus at the operational level would include the usual members of a country team: State Dept., Defense Dept., CIA, USIA, AID, Dept. of Agriculture, and the DEA. Non-traditional players would include: Dept. of Justice (FBI), Dept. of Treasury, OMB, Dept. of Commerce, Private Sector Organizations, and NGOs.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


21


"A Word from the Chairman." Joint Force Quarterly. No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 4-5.