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FROM TEACHING TO PRACTICE:

GENERAL WALTER KRUEGER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT OPERATIONS, 1921-1945

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
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**GENERAL WALTER KRUEGER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT OPERATIONS,
1921-1945**

by

**GEORGE B. EATON
Major, USA**

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**

March 1994

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The Naval War College deeply regrets the end of Lieutenant Colonel Krueger's tour of duty with it. It is hoped, however, that his exceptional ability will be utilized in broader fields, especially in joint planning for the Army and Navy where his unusual knowledge of both military and naval matters will prove of very great value.

Rear Admiral Harris Laning
President, Naval War College
June 1932

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

General Walter Krueger commanded the 6th Army in the Southwest Pacific Theater in World War II. As the Commander, 6th Army, he led the troops that liberated New Guinea and the Philippines and he was designated as the commander of the forces scheduled to invade Japan. Krueger's wartime accomplishments were simply a continuation of contributions made to the United States Army and Navy over a 47 year career. Yet, despite his achievements, after the war Krueger simply faded away. Krueger's lack of historical name recognition some 50 years after his greatest achievements deprives current officers and historians not only the knowledge of wartime exploits, but also of significant understanding of the development of joint operations doctrine in the years between World War I and World War II.

The current consensus among historians is that the United States Marine Corps was responsible for the development of amphibious operations. While true at the tactical level, this paper demonstrates that the Army and Naval War Colleges and the Army and Navy General Staffs and War Plans Divisions were key players in the development of doctrine at the strategic and operational level. General Walter Krueger attended both war colleges, served on the faculty of both war colleges, and served

two tours in the Army War Plans Division, including a two year stint as its Chief. He was on the Joint Board or the Joint Planning Committee for over six years. The intent of this paper is to show Krueger's personal influence in the development of joint doctrine.

The paper considers Krueger's assignment history, the war plans he developed, his ideas on unity of command and the need for inter-service understanding, and his principles of war planning. It includes a case study of the Lingayen Gulf Landing in January 1945 to demonstrate the acceptance and rejection of his key ideas. The paper focuses on Army and Navy issues and considers air issues only tangentially.

Research: Multiple primary source archives and other primary sources were used to collect data for this paper. The Naval Historical Collection at the Naval War College provided information on the curriculum at the Naval War College in the 1920s and 1930s as well as the war games and lectures Krueger prepared. The Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA provided similar information for the Army War College as well as oral interviews and other information from officers associated with Krueger. The National Archives, Modern Military Division, in Washington, D.C. yielded documents from the Army War Plans Division and the Joint Army and Navy Board. The United

States Military Academy Library's Special Collection holds the Krueger Papers. These are 41 boxes of Krueger's papers, correspondence, lectures and other archival material. Finally, the author conducted interviews with two of Krueger's war time aides, the chief of Krueger's counter-intelligence section, and Krueger's son, Walter Krueger, Jr.

The Paper: The paper begins by outlining Krueger's experiences from 1921-1938. The purpose is to establish his different experiences, his areas of expertise, and the different personal contacts he makes in the Army and Navy. Next, Krueger's impact on the writing of doctrine is explored by examining specific contributions to the writing of joint doctrine and his specific views on command issues and the development of inter-service understanding. The process is then repeated to explore his contributions to war planning and war games. Finally, a short case study is used to illuminate his impact on wartime operations.

Conclusions: The paper concludes that Walter Krueger was a key player in the operational and strategic development of joint operations doctrine and the development of the war planning process. His ideas on unity of command are doctrine today as are his methods of war planning. At two or three discrete points his

thoughts and actions were clearly and significantly translated into doctrine, plans, and war games. The paper also concludes that Army and Navy should get their fair share of the credit for developing joint amphibious doctrine at the operational and strategic level.

PREFACE

I first became acquainted with the career of General Walter Krueger when I was asked to write a short paper about him for a conference. I was quickly enthralled by his experiences and accomplishments as well as surprised that his life had not been chronicled by a full biography. I took that task for myself. This paper is one part of a larger project to make Walter Krueger a better known figure through a full biography of his professional life.

Of course, this project has had the help of many individuals and institutes. The following list is in no particular order. Many thanks to my advisor, Dr. Brad Lee-- a great teacher and strategist. The Naval War College and its Advanced Research Program made it possible for me to spend a full trimester researching and writing this paper. Thanks to Dr. John Hattendorf, LCDR J. Tim Dunigan, and Barbara Prisk. Dr. Evelyn Cherpak, Archivist at the Naval Historical Institute translated the Naval filing system of the 1920 and helped me find numerous curricular materials. Dr. Richard Sommers, Mr. David Keough, and Ms. Pam helped me at the Military History Institute and worked longer hours than required after snowstorms closed Carlisle Barracks so that I would not go home empty-handed. At the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Mitch Yokelson, Rick Peuser, and William Mahoney went the extra mile to find documents on war plans, including box by box searches in the stacks. Mr. Edward Miller advised me on where to locate certain documents, sent me one document I could not find and also provided me with copies of his own research notes on the Orange Plans. Mr. Al Aimone at the West Point Library gave me full run of the Krueger Papers.

Of special note is the support I have received from an eclectic group of people. From the History Department at West Point Colonels C. F. Brower, R. Doughty, J. Johnson, C. Kingseed, S. Wager, and K. Hamburger have all been supportive and have helped me in research and in finding outlets for the fruits of my labor. Captain Ty Smith has also been of great service. Walter Krueger, Jr. loaned me a large amount of material and led me to other people who could help me in my research. There is a grand group of World War II veterans who all worked around Krueger in the Pacific and all want his story told. Special thanks to John Crichton, Ike Kampmann, Bob Sumner and all the Alamo Scouts.

Finally, I'd like to thank my good friend Glenn Richardson for keeping track of me and worrying about me while I have been on the road, and to Chris Perkins, Jack Brown and Jeanne Lang for remembering me while I have been gone. Finally, to my poor wife Annette Zemek, who now knows without looking at me when I am thinking about Walter, and my daughters Maddy and Kaily, who think I have not been home enough, thanks for your love and proofreading.

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FROM TEACHING TO PRACTICE:
GENERAL WALTER KRUEGER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT
OPERATIONS, 1921-1945

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

9 January, 1945. The Commander, 6th Army sat aboard the U.S.S. Wasatch in Lingayen Gulf and watched the first wave of soldiers from the United States Army's 6th, 37th, 40th and 43rd Infantry Divisions storm ashore in Luzon. The campaign to liberate the main island of the Philippines, and Manila, had begun. However, before the first soldier waded ashore the Army and Navy had completed months of detailed planning, the remnants of the Japanese Navy had been driven off the convoy from Leyte, Lingayen Gulf had been swept for mines, naval gunfire had pounded the lowlands to the south and the hills to the east of the landing beaches, and the Japanese Air Force had been swept from the sky after losing at least 24 aircraft in *kamikaze* attacks alone. A joint effort had succeeded in preparing the battlefield for the Army soldiers, significantly increasing the chances of success. The first hours in establishing and holding a beachhead are critical and during the morning of 9 January 6th Army was hardly challenged. That evening the Japanese began to shell the beach with everything

from 75mm howitzers to 12" naval guns, but by then it was too late.

With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to conclude that the Lingayen Operation was one of those crowning moments; the culmination of a lifetime of work concurrent with the pinnacle of success. General Walter Krueger, just weeks shy of his 64th birthday, was commanding the largest amphibious operation of the Pacific War. Self-taught, he had risen from the rank of Private to full General. He had thought, studied, taught, developed, and trained for amphibious operations for over twenty years. The experiences of General Walter Krueger are a clear case of "from teaching to practice."

Much of the historical literature relating to the development of joint operations focuses on the United States Marine Corps. Since shortly after World War II the Marines have received almost complete credit for amphibious doctrine. The general summation of the work on amphibious operations in the inter-war period is that the Marines had the idea all worked out before 1941 and then the Army adapted to the Marine plan. This argument can be seen in Allen Millet, Isley and Crowl, and others. Recently, however, this idea of Marine supremacy in the development of amphibious operations has been challenged by William Atwater and John Greenwood. Edward

¹ Krueger, Walter, From Down Under to Nippon, (Nashville: Battery Press, 1989; reprint of the original 1952 edition), pp. 221-223; Interview, John Crichton, Krueger's wartime aide, 5 February 1994, tape recording in author's collection.

Miller in War Plan Orange has given the Army some credit for developing in the inter-war period some specific aspects of amphibious operations against Japan.² While attacking some of the basic premises of accepted Marine-crediting historiography, the above noted revisionists are lacking in the details of who was responsible on the Army side for developments in joint operations.

The contention of this paper is that, while the marines do hold the credit for thinking about the tactics of joint overseas operations, staff officers, students, and teachers in both the Army and Navy were key in developing the operational and strategic level considerations of joint operations. The process of developing joint doctrine happened concurrently at the Army War College, Navy War College, Army General Staff, and the Navy Staff. Once World War II started, much of the practical application and evolution of amphibious doctrine was in the hands of the commanders in the field. General Walter Krueger filled key positions in the schools, on the staff, and in command of a field army and was instrumental in the

² For the Marine School see Merrill L. Bartlett, ed., Assault From the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), Jeter A. Isley and Philip a Crowl, The United States Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), and Allen R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1980). For the revisionists see William F. Atwater, "United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations, 1898-1942," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 1986, and John T. Greenwood, "The U.S. Army and Amphibious Warfare During World War II," Army History, Summer 1993, pp 1-13.

development and application of joint operations from 1921 to 1945 and beyond.

This paper will consider some primary elements in the development of joint operations. One of the most important issues was the development of doctrine. Doctrine was important in that it could provide the Army and Navy a common language. In the area of doctrine this paper will focus on the development of a system of command in joint operations. Second, officers had to be developed who were cognizant and conversant in the traditions, technical language, methods, strengths and limitations of the sister services in order to implement the doctrine and think sensibly about needed changes. This process could be accelerated by developing inter-service contacts. A third key issue was the development of joint war plans that were feasible and practical. Supporting the development of these war plans was a fourth issue of the development of joint war games and exercises to test key ideas. General Krueger was involved in all of these issues. His involvement will be considered both topically and chronologically. After a short biographical sketch, his background and experiences will be explored, in order to illustrate his development of inter-service contacts, his understanding of the Navy and his forays into doctrine, war games and war planning, by considering his duties in a succession of assignments after World War I. The paper will then in one chapter address the general area of joint doctrine and inter-service cooperation and understanding. In the

subsequent chapter the issues of war plans and war games will be explored. The paper will conclude with a short case study of the Lingayen Gulf landing to illuminate the result of Krueger's efforts in each of the issues noted above.

CHAPTER II

GAINING EXPERIENCE AND MAKING CONTACTS

Biography:

Walter Krueger was born in Flatow, West Prussia on 26 January, 1881. His father died in 1884 and in 1889 Anna Hasse Krueger brought Walter and his two siblings to United States. After remarrying, to Emil Carl Schmidt, the Krueger-Schmidt family settled in Madison, Indiana. Walter attended school there and was enrolled in the Cincinnati Technical Institute in 1898 when the Spanish-American War broke out. Walter enlisted in the 2d Volunteer Infantry and served in Cuba at Santiago and Holguin before being discharged. By now he was intrigued by army life and in June 1899 Krueger enlisted in the Regular Army. He was assigned to the 12th Infantry and posted to the Philippines. Krueger fought in several engagements during the Philippine Insurrection, including the campaign to reduce the rebels in the Central Plain north of Manila near Baguio and Tarlac. After rising to the rank of Sergeant, Krueger received a commission in 1901. He was assigned to the 30th Infantry and did not return to the United States until 1904. In the meantime, he gained a familiarity with the Philippines and had met both Lt. Douglas MacArthur and Lt. George Marshall. After a tour in the United States, which included teaching at the Infantry and Cavalry School, Krueger returned to the Philippines where he was in

charge of a project to map Luzon. He himself worked in the areas to the north and east of Manila.

Krueger's career soon settled into the slow grind of the old Army. After over 15 years of service and 13 years as a commissioned officer he was assigned as an evaluator-instructor to the Pennsylvania National Guard and worked directly with the 10th Pennsylvania Infantry. He was still with this unit when World War I broke out, although he had been promoted to Captain in 1916. After the United States entered World War I Krueger inspected and activated National Guard units in Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. until he was sent to the 84th Division in August 1917.

After the war, which included two trips to France and service with the occupation troops in Germany, Krueger was assigned to the second Army War College class convened after the war. After graduation Krueger, although qualified by the College for either General Staff service or higher command, was retained as an instructor and was then attached to the Historical Division. He traveled to Berlin in early 1922 in order to study German strategy and was the first American allowed to use World War I documents in the German War Archives.

After returning to the United States Krueger began his first tour in the Army War Plans Division (AWPD) in April 1923. He remained in the Division until June 1925 when he was assigned to the Naval War College as a student in the senior class of 1926. In 1928, after washing out of Army Flight

School at the age of 47, Krueger returned to the Naval War College as an instructor. Krueger was responsible for teaching German strategy in WWI, the Army command system, and joint operations. He left Newport in 1932.

After a two year stint in command of the 6th Infantry Krueger returned to the Army War Plans Division as the Executive Officer. During this period he again served on the Joint Planning Committee, as he had in 1923-25. This time he worked with the Army Chief of Staff, Douglas MacArthur. In June 1936 he was appointed as Chief, AWPD and served on the Joint Board. It was during this four-year tour that the manual Joint Action of the Army and Navy was revised and expanded, War Plan Orange was drastically revised, the defense of Oahu was upgraded, and the Rainbow plans were begun. George Marshall succeeded him when Krueger was assigned to command a brigade in June 1938. In 1939 he commanded the 2d Infantry Division, in 1940 the VIII Corps, and in 1941 3d Army. In February 1943 he was transferred to Australia and took command of 6th Army and began the long campaigns across New Guinea and New Britain, finally reaching the Philippines.

Experience and Contacts:

In the remainder of this chapter Krueger's tours at the Army War College, Navy War College, and AWPD will be detailed in order to illustrate the gaining of practical experience and the personal contacts he developed in the Army and the Navy.

The Army War College, June 1920-October 1922:

The Army War College ceased operations during World War I and reconvened in 1919. Major Krueger attended the Class of 1921 while the College was still testing new material and the structure of the curriculum. The Class of 1921 was specially selected by the War Department in order to ensure success of the reconvened College.¹ In the Army Reorganization Bill of 4 June 1920 the War College was established as the highest school for Army officers. In addition, the Act required that "hereafter no officer of the General Staff Corps except the Chief of Staff shall be assigned as a member of the War Department General Staff" unless he had attended the course and his name was placed on the eligible list.² In the opening address to the students General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff of the Army, noted:

This legislation [Army Reorganization Act] insures that there will be added to the War Department General Staff each year . . . only officers of the highest training, and proved capacity for General Staff work. It also makes certain, that in future wars, the Department will have a selected list of officers fitted for the highest command and for General Staff duty. Each man in this class is a selected man. Your records were minutely scrutinized and no officer permitted to take the course who has not shown promise of being able to master it and on graduation have his name placed on

¹ The name Army War College was not adopted until the 1921-22 school year. From 1919 to June 1921 the school was called the General Staff College as the focus was on preparing officers for duty on the General Staff.

² Military History Institute Archives, File 155-A/1, Army War College Curricular Archives, Box 1920-21, Press Release, War Department Information Service, 1 September 1920. (Hereafter Military History Institute Archives noted as MHI.)

the list of eligibles for future advancement and great responsibility.³

Krueger had already developed a reputation for excellence in staff work.

Among the students with whom Krueger worked were Asa Singleton, S.E. Embick, Guy V. Henry, and Upton Birnie all of whom would later be colleagues on the AWPD staff. Birnie would become Commandant of the War College and Embick would become Chief, AWPD in 1935 and Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army. Among the staff and faculty were four officers who would be Chief, AWPD while Krueger was in that division.⁴ The Class of 1921 became known as "The Class That Made the War College Famous." Of the 87 members of the class 31 had made general officer by 1936.⁵

The course of instruction included lectures on Intelligence, Manpower, Economics, Politics, Operations, Training, and Strategy. The students spend two months on the subject of Command, including staff rides and preparation of historical studies.⁶ The students participated in working out problems on Operations, Training, and Intelligence, usually in

³ Ibid.

⁴ S. Heintzelman, 1923-24; H. Smith, 1925-1927; G. Simonds, 1927-31; and C. Kilbourne, 1932-35. From my notes taken at National Archives and Krueger Papers, United States Military Academy Library, Special Collections, Box 21, "List of Officers Detailed to the General Staff College, 1920-1921." (Hereafter noted as Krueger Papers.)

⁵ Ibid., Krueger's notes on his copy of the seating chart.

⁶ MHI, Army War College Curricular Archives, File 178-8, Miscellaneous No. 2, "The General Staff College," an address by Colonel H.A. Smith, Assistant Commandant, 2 September 1920, p. 5.

the Committee Method with group presentations. In the Operations block Krueger was a member of a committee on mobilization. In the Intelligence block Krueger was on a committee responsible for preparing a report on the military, economic, and political situation in Germany and another committee preparing a similar monograph on the United States.⁷

In a general orientation on the entire course Col. H. Smith, Assistant Commandant, noted that at the end of the course each officer would be recommended for "(a) Suitability for high command; (b) Suitability for War Department General Staff; (c) Special qualifications." Most officers were recommended for duty in a specific section of the General Staff (G1, G2, G3, G4, or WPD). Krueger was one of only a handful recommended for both duty in any staff section and higher command, and he was deemed sharp enough to be detailed to the General Staff College faculty for the 1921-22 school year along with Embick and Birnie.⁸ In summary, Krueger studied elements of staff work, military history, operations, war planning, strategy, and command, with special work on mobilization. There was only one naval officer in his class,

⁷ See MHI, Training, Orientation on the Course, Folder: Index to Operations Course, Files 186-15 and Intelligence, Outline of Course. See also Krueger Papers, Box 21, File: Speeches and Articles.

⁸ MHI, File 178-8, p. 9; Krueger Papers, File 4, Box 1, A.G.352.07, Brig. Gen. Preston Brown, Acting Commandant, GSC, Subject: Officers completing the General Staff College Course, 16 June 1921; Author's collection, O.D. 15058, War Department, Operations Division, 2 May 1921, Memorandum for the Commandant, GSC, Subject: Assignment upon graduation of officers now at the General Staff College.

Capt. Althouse, and two Marines, neither of whom were on any of his committees. The class did not study joint operations.

For the second year of his association with the Army War College Krueger, now a Lieutenant Colonel, focused on Operations, War Planning, and lecturing on Strategy of the World War. Other than lectures on "The Basic War Plan," Germany, and Hannibal, his activities of that period, until April 1923, are vague. A lecture schedule for the 1921-22 school year does not exist and the only lectures kept by Krueger in his own files are from January, September, and October 1922 and January and March 1923, the latter two from after he reported to AWPD. Suffice it to say that Krueger, qualified to work in any General Staff section, probably was part of the section responsible for Operations, Strategy, and Command.⁹ In addition, Krueger, after being assigned to the Historical Section, Army War College in early 1922, spent several months in Germany researching at the *Reichsarchivs* in Potsdam for material to support his lectures and writings on

⁹ MHI, File 224-28, "The Basic War Plan", Remarks delivered at the W.P.D. Conference, AWC, 12 January 1922; Krueger Papers, Box 21, File: Articles and Speeches, "Observations and Reflections on the Situation in Germany," a lecture at the Army War College, 28 September 1922 and "The Military System of the German Empire," a lecture at the Army War College, 24 October 1922; Krueger Papers, Box 22, Folder WWI Corr and Materials, "Evolution of the German War Plan of 1914," a lecture at the Army War College, January 1923; Krueger Papers, Box 21, "The Conditions of Success in War as Illustrated by Hannibal's Campaigns in Italy," a lecture at the Army War College, 20 March 1923. This lecture was later published in "Coast Artillery Journal," but the copies in the Krueger papers are undated. Although this last lecture was dated in 1923 it is clear that he also gave the lecture in 1922. See Krueger Papers, Box 21, Brig. Gen. E.F. McGlachlin, "The Art of Command, Part III," a lecture at the Army War College 17 December 1921, p. 3 where he notes that Krueger will give a lecture on Hannibal.

the Germans in World War I. Apparently, Krueger was the first American allowed in the German War Archives after the war. No doubt, his perfect German and Prussian heritage helped establish his credibility. After almost four months of research Krueger returned to the United States on 21 July 1922¹⁰ The lectures Krueger prepared on Germany were so well regarded that in mid-1923 the Chief of Staff directed that they be reproduced and distributed to all general officers, General Staff officers, and the General Service Schools.¹¹

In July 1922 AWPD requested that Krueger be assigned to that division.¹² At the time Brig. Gen. B.H. Wells, for whom Krueger had worked for a short time in World War I, was Chief, AWPD. Krueger's former contacts were working in his favor and the period of grooming for future joint duties and joint cooperation began.

Army War Plans Division, November 1922-May 1925

Lieutenant Colonel Krueger's first tour in AWPD was

¹⁰ Krueger Papers, File 1, Box 1, Letter in German dated 22 June, 1922 addressed to the Chief, German Archives thanking him for his assistance on the eve of his return to the U.S.; Krueger Papers, Box 13, Detached Service Record. This is a handwritten record kept by Krueger from 1914-1942 detailing all assignments, leaves, promotions, and temporary duties.

¹¹ National Archives, RG 165, War Plans Division, General Correspondence, 1920-42, Box 51, File 867-1. (Hereafter National Archives noted as NA.)

¹² All dates pertaining to Krueger's tours at AWPD are from National Archives, RG 165, Records of the Army War Plans Division, Subject and Name Index, Microfilmed as Series M1080, Roll 10, Subject: Krueger and from his Detached Service Record, see citation #10.

critical to the rest of his career. From 1 November, 1922 until 18 April, 1925 Krueger was involved in all aspects of war planning, joint operations doctrine, and joint exercises. It was also during this period that he first became acquainted with naval officers he would work with time and again through World War II. In December 1922 Krueger was thrown into joint exercises as the Army and Navy suddenly decided to conduct a test of the defenses in the Panama Canal Zone as part of the transit of the fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The AWPD and the Navy War Plans Division (NRPD) wanted to test the doctrine laid out in Joint Action of the Army and Navy in Coastal Defense (1920). This would be the first joint exercise since before World War I. In addition to the exercise, Krueger took over responsibility for Special Plan Blue, the mobilization plan in case of internal national emergency, for which he had special training by virtue of his committee assignments at the War College.

By April 1923 Krueger was appointed to the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board and began working in earnest on joint plans, doctrine, and operation. It was during this tour that the Joint Board decided to revise Joint Action of the Army and Navy in Coastal Defense into something more broadly oriented, and began to draft the pamphlet Joint Action of the Army and Navy (1927).

At this point a word needs to be said about the mission of the General Staff and AWPD in the 1920s and the function of the Joint Board and Joint Planning Committee. Prior to World

War I, despite the attempted reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root and the establishment of the General Staff in 1903, the War Department remained tied to the Bureau System. Under this system the chief of each Bureau, (Adjutant General, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, etc.) was, in effect, a tenured staff member. They ran their particular bureau like a fiefdom and woe to the Chief of Staff who tried to make changes or to bring the bureaus under his control. The Chief of Staff of the Army was charged with running the army in day-to-day operations and planning for contingencies, but was also the Commanding General of the Army and expected to take command of all Army forces in the field in case of war.¹³

When World War I broke out President Wilson decided to keep his Chief of Staff, General Peyton March, in Washington and designated General Pershing the commander in the field. Pershing was given such latitude that he vied with March for power and influence and, in essence, established his own army in France. When the war to end all wars was over and the occupation troops had returned from Germany, the War Department decided to try and strengthen the role of the Chief of Staff. (It probably did not hurt the effort that Pershing himself was now the Chief of Staff and wanted to ensure he would be in control again during the next war.) The laws were

¹³ Ray S. Cline, The United States Army in World War II: The War Department: Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), pp. 14-17.

rewritten to strengthen the role of the Chief and to ensure that he would be the field commander in the next war.¹⁴ After World War I the War Department adopted the French G-staff system (G1, Personnel; G2, Intelligence; G3, Operations and Training; G4, Logistics) and added a War Plans Division.¹⁵

The War Plans Division was charged with developing contingency plans for future wars. These were the "Color Plans" where each potential enemy nation was given a specific color (Britain-Red, Mexico-Green, Japan-Orange, Tan-Cuba, etc.).¹⁶ In addition, AWPDP was formed like a microcosm of the General Staff. It had its own G-staff and in time of war AWPDP was to become the nucleus of the field army staff. The Chief, AWPDP was to become the Chief of Staff of the field army, and the other planners would become the rest of the G-staff. In this manner the Chief of Staff of the Army could rapidly shift to becoming the Commander of the Field Army and he had a ready made staff, conversant with the contingency plans.¹⁷

The Joint Army and Navy Board (better known as the Joint Board) had been established in 1903 as a senior body to advise the President and the Secretaries of War and the Navy on issues involving both services. Its mandate was limited in

¹⁴ Edgar F. Raines, Jr. and David R. Campbell, The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas On the Command, Control, and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942-1985 (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), p. 2.

¹⁵ Cline, p. 20.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 31-34.

that, as originally chartered, it could only discuss matters referred to it and not initiate its own studies. Eventually, it was given the right to initiate studies and its membership became more fixed. The Chief of Staff and the CNO were members as were their assistants and the chiefs of their respective WPDs.¹⁸ It became quickly apparent that these senior officers did not have the time to adequately study problems involving joint issues and they created a Joint Planning Committee. The Committee researched issues as charged by the Joint Board and made recommendations after they had resolved issues. If the Committee could not resolve differences they stated so and presented the Board with the Army and Navy positions. By 1932 there were only three issues out of over 500 cases that had to be presented to the President for decision because the Joint Board could not come to consensus. The Committee also had the right to initiate studies. Their membership was fixed at three or more members from the respective WPDs. They met informally, keeping no minutes of their weekly meetings. Each officer serving on the Committee did so in addition to his regular duties as a member of his respective WPD.¹⁹

After his appointment to the Joint Planning Committee Krueger was given oversight on several other AWPD programs. He was responsible for the Panama Defense Program, instituted

¹⁸ Raines and Campbell, pp. 3-4.

¹⁹ NA, RG 165, Box 149, File 3740-1, Memo by Krueger, "Relations Between the Army and Navy," 27 August 1937, p. 3.

to correct deficiencies noted in the January 1923 joint exercise. He was also given responsibility for War Plan Tan (Intervention in Cuba), War Plan Brown (Intervention in the Philippines) and War Plan Orange (War with Japan). It appears that Krueger was also the point man for the use of chemical weapons, artillery developments, and the deployment of the Air Corps.²⁰

As a member of the Joint Planning Committee Krueger first met and developed relationships with naval officers that he would carry with him to the Naval War College and in his work on the General staff on the 1930s. The Naval officers included Captains Wilbur Coffey, W.S. Pye, and William Standley. In addition, Krueger would have come to the attention of senior officers such as General Pershing and General Hines, Chief of Staff, 1924-26, and General Summerall, Chief of Staff, 1926-1930.

Naval War College, June 1925- June 1926:

On 2 February 1925 Krueger requested that he be detailed to the Naval War College as a student in the Senior Class of 1926. Krueger's request and the War Department's approval was well in line with a policy adopted by the War and Navy

²⁰ NA, RG165, Records of the Army War Plans Division, Subject and Name Index, Microfilmed as Series M1080, Roll 10, Subject: Krueger, cards 2 and 3; RG165, Box 77, File 1727-2, Memo subject: Defense Projects and War Plans, 22 May 1924; RG 165, Box 85, File 2138, Safeguarding Plans and Projects, 24 July 1924. Krueger observed Billy Mitchell's bombing of the New Jersey in September 1923, and submitted a report, RG165, File 1430, 8 Sept 1923. Unfortunately, the report is missing from the files. See also, RG 165, Box 71, Files 1347-1, 1347-2, Annual Reports of the AWPDP, 1924.

Departments in 1921 or 1922. At that thime the War Department had accepted a recommendation by AWPD that it would be in the interest of both services to have officers of the Army serve on Navy staffs and vice versa. However, AWPD required that any such officers first be schooled at both the Army and Navy War Colleges. In light of that, beginning in 1923, perhaps earlier, the number of Army officers detailed to attend the Naval War College was increased and formalized. For the 1923-24 school year four Army officers were detailed. After 1924 LTC Walter Reed, who attended the 1923-24 course, was detailed as an instructor at the Naval War College. This also was in keeping with the idea of increasing cooperation and understanding between the two services. It was intended that these students, after being versed in the ways of the Navy, would eventually serve on the General Staff, preferably in the War Plans Divisions. By 1925 it had become normal that the officers detailed to attend the Naval War College had already served one tour in AWPD.²¹

A 1924 memorandum on officer career patterns noted:

"There are two reasons for the presence of Army officers at the Naval War College. One is education of the Army officer in Naval matters with a view to his employment in positions where this knowledge will be of value to the service in general. The other is to have there officers properly qualified to present the Army side of questions arising in conferences or the solution of problems."²²

²¹ NA, RG 165, 63, File 1133; Box 70, File 1329 Exchange of Officers.

²² NA, RG 165, Box 69, File 1218-1 Memorandum, Subject: Prospective of the normal career pattern..., 31 October 1924.

In the summer of 1925 Krueger met the schooling and experience requirements and his attendance would fulfill the intent of increasing cooperation between the two services. AWPD recommended approval and the War Department approved the request in March.

The curriculum at the Naval War College was similar to the Army War College in that it covered Policy, Strategy, Command, and Economics. In addition, the students at the Naval War College operated under the committee system and participated in war games and problems. However, there were two key differences from Krueger's experience as a student in 1920-21. First, the Naval War College had a more intense writing system. Second, they seriously solved a joint problem and played a joint game.²³ After looking at joint war plans and exercises from the Army point of view as a member of the Joint Planning Committee and AWPD, Krueger was now forced to view similar problems through the perspective of a naval officer.

Krueger obviously had a successful year at the Naval War College. His essay on Command was so well received that it was later used as a required reading for the correspondence course. In addition, after World War II the essay was reproduced at the Naval War College and distributed to the students. Copies were also distributed among the staff

²³ Naval Historical Collection, RG 4, #1148, Inform-
Instructions for Student Officers, June 1925. (Hereafter N
Collection is NHC.)

Department of the Army.²⁴ The essay was due in September and in October Krueger had been asked by the President, Admiral Pratt, to comment on an article, "The Naval Staff Afloat," by Capt. B.B. Wygant. In December 1925 Admiral Pratt published an article, "Naval Command and Administration," and some of his ideas were similar to the points Krueger made in the critique of Wygant's article.²⁵

Krueger completed a joint problem and participated in a joint war game, but he also completed the purely naval tactical and strategic problems getting an indoctrination in fleet tactics, logistical requirements, gunfire patterns, and training. The joint problem focused on relieving the Philippines and expected a major fleet battle between Guam and the Carolines. These aspects of planning for war in the Pacific become major recurring themes in War Plan Orange and had already been considered by Krueger during his work on the Joint Plans Committee.²⁶ Krueger apparently excelled at the

²⁴ NHC, RG 4, Publications, Item #1872 and RG 13, Theses; Krueger Papers, Box 21, "Command," September 12, 1925; Krueger Papers, Box 18, Untitled File, Letter Gen. C.D. Eddleman to Brig. Gen. C. Lehner, 11 January 1961. Eddleman wrote that the essay was to be published in the Naval War College Review, but the index to the Review does not indicate that it was.

²⁵ NHC, RG 8, Intelligence and Technical Archives, UNO, 1925-150; NHC, RG 4, #1116, Naval Command and Administration, RADM Pratt, December 1925.

²⁶ Krueger Papers, Box 21, File: NWC Correspondence 1925-26. Krueger kept all of his solutions to the tactical, strategic, and joint problems. He also kept most of the background information, intelligence summaries, and situation summaries. Many of the papers include his notes. Unfortunately, for the purpose of judging how well he did, I could not locate instructor comments on the joint or strategic problem.

tactical naval problems. His solution to the second problem contains the note "Very fine paper." Captain C.P. Snyder, Head of the Tactics Department, noted on his third problem, "Your solution is thorough, logical, and generally excellent."²⁷

During the year that he attended the Naval War College Krueger came into contact with several naval officers with whom he would work for the next decade and into the war. These included Admiral Pratt, Capt. S.W. Bryant, Comdr. M. Draemel, Capt. J. Greenslade, Comdr. H. Kimmel, Capt. F.F. Rogers, Capt. Snyder, Capt. J. Taussig, and Capt. B.B. Wygant.

Naval War College, June 1928-June 1932:

After graduation from the Naval War College Krueger broadened his joint credentials in a way that will not be further explored in this paper. He reported to Brooks Field and began flight school at the age of 46. While he was intent on becoming an aviator, his body failed him. He was washed out of the school in 1927, his evaluator being Lieutenant Claire Chennault.²⁸ In late 1927, after Krueger had been assigned to 7th Corps Area, AWPD asked him if he would like a posting as an instructor at the Naval War College. The Corps Area Commander did not want to release him, but the Chief of

²⁷ Ibid.,

²⁸ Interview, Walter Krueger, Jr., 17 January, 1994. Tape recording in author's collection; Krueger Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, several letters re Flight School.

Staff, General Summerall, overrode him and Krueger was posted to Newport.²⁹

Upon arrival at Newport Krueger was immediately immersed in joint issues. The chief project of that summer and the subsequent academic year was the development of a joint war game as a cooperative effort between the Army and Navy War Colleges. The subject was the Philippines, one that Krueger was by now well familiar; however, this iteration involved a new step-- the reconquest of Luzon. This plan, known at Newport as OP-VI, became a staple well into the 1930s and Krueger's impact on the development of Army and Navy officers is significant based on this plan alone. Of course, Krueger did not write OP-VI single-handedly, but he was the Navy War College point of contact for any queries from the officers at the Army War College working on their part of the plan.³⁰

In addition to the development of OP-VI, Krueger executed the normal duties of a member of the Department of Operations.³¹ He taught Command and Staff, Joint Operations, Army Command, Strategy, and various issues of the World War.

²⁹ NA, RG 165, Box 101, File 3148-1, Recommendation for Detail of an Instructor at the Naval War College, 31 January 1928. For Krueger's views on the situation see Krueger Papers, Box 1, Folder 4 for a packet of correspondence from Sept to Nov 1927.

³⁰ MHI, Army War College Curricular Archives, File 242-13, Letter, 11 June 1928, Pringle to Conner.

³¹ In 1928-32 the Naval War College was organized into a headquarters element consisting of the President and his Chief of Staff and two teaching departments. The Department of Operations dealt with Command, staff duties, and the tactical and strategic problems. The Department of Intelligence focused on Policy, Logistics, International Law, and International Relations.




Table 1

In addition, as the sole Army officer on the staff, he was the advisor on all Army matters during war games, and advised the Department of Intelligence as required. Table 1 is an organizational chart from the 1931-32 school year and shows his responsibilities. Both Table 1 and Table 2 show staff room assignments from 1930 to 1932. The have been included in order to show the close working conditions of Krueger and the other members of the staff and faculty. This close proximity




Table 2

must have aided in the development of close personal relationships. All floorplans are from Luce Hall .³²

Of special interest to this study was Krueger's lectures on joint operations and on command systems. Krueger's lecture on joint operations is perhaps his most interesting in view of his later accomplishments. He told his audience:

"[Based on the supremacy of the defense] it is accordingly extremely doubtful whether, under modern conditions, a joint overseas movement directed with the object of invasion against territory belonging to a first class power . . . would have a ghost of a chance of succeeding. . . . [Amphibious operations are] probably the most difficult of all operations of warfare and is perhaps more than any other dependent upon careful preparations. . . . [R]einforcements may be delayed by weather or enemy action and may, conceivably not arrive at all."³³

³² NHC, RG 4, Folders 1511, 1670, and 1703.

³³ NHC RG 14, Faculty and Staff Presentations, "Joint Army and Navy Operations," 17 March 1931, pp. 35-36.

Krueger's ideas on the proper methods of command of joint operations will be discussed in detail later.

Upon his departure from the Naval War College in June 1932 the current President, RADM Harris Laning, wrote a letter to the CNO and requested that it be forwarded to the War Department. It is worthy of quoting at length.

Lieutenant Colonel Krueger is an officer of outstanding ability. He is a thorough student of war and war operations, possesses sound judgment, and has keen initiative. These qualities have made his services invaluable to the Naval War College. His studies, lectures and comments on such matters as "Command and Staff", "Army and Navy Joint Operations", "Grand Strategy", "Strategy of the World War", etc., etc., have exerted a profound influence on the line of thought as this institution. The value of his work can hardly be overstated.

The Naval War College deeply regrets the end of Lieutenant Colonel Krueger's tour of duty with it. It is hoped, however, that his exceptional ability will be utilized in broader fields, especially in joint planning for the Army and Navy where his unusual knowledge of both military and naval matters will prove of very great value.

Perhaps of equal value to Krueger were the relationships forged at Newport. In addition to the officers he met in 1925-26 were new colleagues including Comdr. K. Hewitt, Capt. W. Van Auken, Capt. E.C. Kalbfus, Capt. I. Dortch, and Comdr. R. Spruance. Some of his students were: Comdr. F. Conger, Maj. E. Santschi (who would later work for him in 6th Army), Lt. R. Tarbuck (Wartime aide to MacArthur), Comdr. T. Kinkaid (wartime commander of 7th Fleet), and Lt. Comdr. R. Conolly.

Army War Plans Division, June 1934- June 1938:

After a two year tour in command of an Infantry regiment Krueger was again called to Washington. Brig. Gen. C. Kilbourne, then Chief, AWPB, wrote Krueger and asked him if he would come back to the division. Kilbourne specifically mentioned Krueger's experience with the Navy.³⁴ Krueger's response was swift and positive. He was soon the Executive Officer of the division and two years later he was himself chief of the division and a one star general.

During this tour of duty Krueger's key efforts can be grouped into four categories. First, he continued his work on formal doctrine for the joint action of the Army and Navy, especially in overseas operations. Second, he continued his efforts in joint war planning especially regarding Hawaii, the Philippines, the Panama Canal, and Japan. Third, Krueger continued to press for joint exercises in order to test the doctrine and plans. Finally, he continued to develop those relationships required when war finally came in 1941.

Especially in the area of command and joint war plans this was a dynamic time for the armed services. During this period it was finally realized that the Chief of Staff would not take to the field as the Commanding General and the Army began to reorganize into combat commands. In addition, the Army and Navy began to discard the old war plans against Britain, Mexico, Cuba and other benign nations and began to

³⁴ Krueger Papers, Box 1, File 1, Letter from C.E. Kilbourne dated Friday 20th, no year and second letter signed CEK, no date.

adapt the remaining plans to the true world situation, more cognizant of the threat from Germany and Japan. Krueger was on the edge of the wave for scrapping the "Color Plans" and introducing the "Rainbow Plans." He was deeply involved in the struggle between the Army and Navy over war plans in the Pacific, but brought considerable experience to bear from the viewpoints of both the Army and Navy.

Some of Krueger's old personal relationships began to bear fruit during this period. On the Joint Board with him were Admiral Standley (now CNO), RADM Taussig, and RADM Pye. Again on the Joint Planning Committee were Capt. Bryant and Capt. Coffey. In addition he was working in conjunction with General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, CNO, RADM E. King, RADM J. Richardson, and Capt. R. Ingersoll.

Having considered in some detail Krueger's experiences and personal relationships, and having noted some of the efforts made to improve inter-service understanding and cooperation, let us now turn our attention to the three main subjects where Krueger made significant contributions to the development of joint operations at the operational level. We shall consider these topics in the following order:

- 1) The development of doctrine as a common inter-service language for the command and execution of joint operations.

- 2) The development of feasible joint war plans, with emphasis on War Plan Orange.

3) The development of joint war games and exercises which tested doctrine and led to the development of inter-service contacts.

After considering Krueger's role in these three areas the paper will conclude in a case study of the Luzon operation and some comments on Krueger's continuing participation in these issues after his retirement.

CHAPTER III

JOINT DOCTRINE, 1921-1938:

In August 1946 the National War College completed a draft study entitled Joint Overseas Operations. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the study a good start towards a text on the subject, it failed to approve the text as doctrine due to "certain unresolved differences in concept between the Ground, Naval, and Air Forces."¹ The document opened by summarizing the historical development of joint doctrine. For the interwar period it simply stated:

Doctrine in the period between [the] wars was largely determined by the experience of World War I. It was generally accepted that the services had separate roles, and when employed on a common mission would be coordinated by mutual cooperation. However, the advantages of unified command in joint operations were not wholly unappreciated and the established doctrine did make provision for its application in special circumstances.²

This characterization is as bland as the Preface's "certain unresolved differences in concept" and glosses over some twenty years of inter-service struggle and cooperation to develop the best possible joint operations doctrine. Krueger was involved in this effort from at least 1921 on, interrupted only in 1927 and again in 1932-34.

¹ National War College, Joint Overseas Operations, Final Draft, Part I, Reproduced by Armed Forces Staff College (Norfolk, VA: National War College, 15 August 1946), Preface.

² Ibid., pp. 1-2.

This section of the paper will explore Krueger's role in the development of joint operations doctrine and will focus on three issues: 1) Service Missions, 2) Command and Control, and 3) Formalized Inter-service Understanding. The subject will be treated chronologically to best cover the publication of different doctrinal pamphlets, the changes to those pamphlets, and the methods of agreeing upon those changes.

The issue of doctrine is of interest for a variety of reasons. Doctrine is important because it provides a common language to officers and agencies coming from divergent experiences. It can be seen as the practical distillation of theory, or the link between theory and practice. For the Army and the Navy the development of acceptable joint operations doctrine provided a first step to understanding how the two services should operate in time of war. It provided officers of each service a window to understanding the roles, missions, experiences, capabilities, limitations, and operational concepts of their sister service. Without some established joint operations doctrine, the services would have to work through a period of chaos at the beginning of any war as they tried to find ways and means of operating together.

Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense, 1920:

The title alone of the 56 page pamphlet Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense, 1920 (JANA) indicates its publication in the immediate post-World War I period as the nation returned to a posture of isolationism. The pamphlet

contemplated joint service operations not in the offensive, but only in response to enemy attack upon the mainland of the United States, the Panama Canal, the Philippines, or Hawaii. However, despite the defensive nature of the document, it laid the base line for the eventual addition of offensive operations. The pamphlet was one of the first acts completed by the reconstituted Joint Board and was approved as Joint Board Serial 325-89 on 15 July 1920.³

The pamphlet is laid out in four sections. The first is joint action in coast defense, the second is naval action, the third is called "A positive system of coast defense," and the fourth is about planning activities. In the first section, after a statement of principle that coast defense included any actions "having for their object the repulse of a hostile attack upon any portion of the seacoast of the continental" U.S. and her possessions, the missions of the different forces were detailed. In a very Mahanian statement, the mission of the U.S. Fleet was to maintain mobility in order to defeat the enemy's main force to obtain command of the sea. Command of the sea was envisioned as required to deny the enemy the

³ NA, RG 225, Records of the Joint Board, 1903-1947, microfilmed as series M1421, 21 Rolls. Roll 1 includes a logbook of all Joint Board actions from 1903 to 1947. The approval of this pamphlet was JB 325-89, Joint Army and Navy Doctrine for Protection of Sea Ports against Attack of Naval Vessels. Joint Board proceedings were recorded using a numerical system that identified subject and chronological placement of the action. The first three numbers, all three digit beginning with "3," designate the subject. 301 is General, 303 is Coast and Harbor Defenses, 325 is War Plans, and 350 is Joint Operations and Training. The second number designates the chronological sequence, thus the higher the number the later the year of action.

ability to attack our coastal areas.⁴ The Marine Corps was seen primarily as a force to "seize and hold temporary advanced bases. . . and to defend such bases until they are relieved by the Army," but could be used in emergencies for coastal defense. The Army mission was to build and man harbor defenses and to "operate against enemy forces making attacks on the seacoast or operating in the coastal area."⁵ The first section went on to make a very detailed description of the forces required to conduct these defenses. It should be noted that the military forces detailed were in excess of the troops and units the Army had on active duty at the time.

On the subject of command and control of the forces, the pamphlet presented a relatively lockstep method of determining the method of cooperation between the two services. If enemy naval strength greatly outnumbered the friendly fleet, then the Army officer was assumed to have "paramount interest" and would "coordinate the operations of the naval forces." If the enemy fleet could be engaged, then the naval officer had paramount interest. The concept of paramount interest was not in any way defined, and it can be seen that neither service was envisioned as actually taking command of the forces of the sister service. The manual went on to state that cooperation had to be "brought to its logical focus in the offices of the

⁴ The Joint Board, Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense (Washington: Government Printing Officer, 1920), p. 5. (Hereafter, JANA, 1920).

⁵ JANA, p. 6.

Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War."⁶ The first section concluded with a discussion of the functions of the Joint Board and the Joint Planning Committee as the final authority for the coordination of plans and authorized local commanders to establish their own joint planning committees.

The second section of the manual described naval actions to defend the coast. These prescriptions were again Mahanian directing that the best course of action was to operate offensively and strike against the enemy in his home waters. The second choice was for the fleet to take up a blocking position far off American shores. Because the enemy could bypass an advanced base, or because friendly forces might not be able to repel an enemy fleet advance at sea, "the naval coast defense forces, the Army harbor defenses, and the mobile forces of the Army [were] also necessary for coast defense."⁷ This section somewhat clarified the rules for the establishment of paramount interest. The U.S. Fleet was seen as the first line of defense and only if it failed in its mission to control the seas would there be any need for cooperation between the services.

At the very end of the second section the issue of landing attacks was first mentioned, and primarily as a naval problem (vice a military problem). If the enemy was actually trying to land troops it was assumed that the enemy fleet was

⁶ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 17-19.

superior to the U.S. fleet (thus the Army had paramount interest), and the best the Navy could do was make attacks of opportunity or use aviation assets to hit the landing forces.⁸

The third section of the manual addressed Army actions in defense of the coast. After detailing the critical coastal areas of the continental U.S. the manual went on to analyze the necessary conditions required to make a coastal area suitable for an assault. It included close proximity to harbor facilities, routes of egress, and suitable sloping beaches. The pamphlet assumed that the Army had mobilized and increased its strength. It also assumed that all suitable beaches have been identified before the conflict and that defensive plans have been prepared. Finally, there was an assumed belief in the superiority of the defense and the trench warfare of World War I is cited.⁹ The bottom line was a belief that the Army could successfully defend any critical coastal areas from enemy assault.

The final few pages of the pamphlet were a summary of the roles of the Joint Board and the actions required by AWPD to institute the coastal defenses required by the new doctrine. There was no corresponding section for NRPD. The fact that there is no separate section for naval planning is indicative of the general problem of the entire manual. While some doctrine for joint army and navy action is established, such

⁸ Ibid., pp. 34-35.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 38-51, *passim*.

joint action was envisioned as occurring only if the U.S. Fleet failed in its primary mission of obtaining command of the sea. The issue of joint command was not addressed and the requirements of cooperation were dismissed with the idea that "[t]he best assurance of effective cooperation between the Army and Navy commanders within a given region will be found in cooperation in the preparation of defense plans in time of peace."¹⁰ Despite the failure to state the possibility of offensive Army operations, it is obvious that the detailed descriptions of suitable beaches for landings could be used in planning both defensive and offensive operations; however, this possible envisioning of offensive operations was countered by the stated belief in the superiority of the defense. Far from being a clear and concise doctrine, JANA was simply the first step by the Joint Board to establish an operational doctrine for joint operations.

It was not long before the ideas of JANA were both echoed and contradicted. In October 1920, at the direction of the CNO, the Office of Naval Intelligence published Conduct of an Oversea Campaign. The facts that the CNO directed publication and that the authors, Capt. H.E. Yarnell, Comdr. W.S. Pye, and Lt. Comdr. H.H. Frost, all worked in the Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations make this an authoritative pamphlet. In a partial contradiction with JANA the authors recognized that Army forces would probably be required in

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

overseas operations, both offensive and defensive. However, echoing JANA, they also stated that the senior naval officer should have the "predominating influence in the formulation of general plans for . . . cooperation until major operations by the Army are commenced."¹¹

Of greater interest is that in their discussion of peacetime preparation for war the authors recognized one of the limitations of JANA and one of the key differences between the two services.

By reason of the fact that the Navy uses ships, its situation is entirely different than that of the Army. In the first place, ships can not be preserved by storing them away like artillery or trucks; they must be manned by crews and kept in active operation. . . . In the second place, it is necessary to use the ships immediately after the declaration of war, usually even before the Army is required.¹²

Thus, the Authors recognized that the size of the military forces in JANA and the ability to easily defend friendly ports was in question so long as the Army was not mobilized before hostilities began. Yet, they went on to state that the fleet must have troops with it sufficient to seize and hold advanced bases.¹³ One wonders how they intend to coordinate the two contrary ideas. Did they expect the Army to send its regular troops on ship while it mobilized troops to defend the coast? Perhaps they expected no overseas military campaign. In

¹¹ H.H. Frost, et al, The Conduct of an Oversea Naval Campaign (Washington: Office of Naval Intelligence, p. 8.

¹² Ibid., p. 15.

¹³ Ibid., p. 23.

either case, the mission of the military force was apparently different, or at least expanded, from the principles laid down in JANA.

The Influence of JANA and the Call for Change:

How did Krueger play in this? At the beginning he was influenced by some unofficial concepts on command relationships. In 1921 the Army had nine accepted Principles of War. The Principle of Cooperation stated that all commanders should cooperate to achieve a common goal. However, Krueger seems to have believed in and taught the idea of Unity of Command as a higher ideal than cooperation. The concept of Unity of Command states that all forces working towards a common effort should be under one responsible commander.¹⁴ From at least 1922 until after World War II Krueger insisted on employing Unity of Command.

While Krueger was teaching at the Army War College the Commandant, Brig. Gen. E.F. McGlachlin, Jr., directed that the Principles of War be explained and explored. In a 17 December 1921 lecture entitled "The Art of Command" Brig. Gen. McGlachlin noted that the students would first receive a

¹⁴ John I. Alger, Department of History, United States Military Academy, The West Point Military History Series, Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Company, 1985) p. 8; see also FM 100-5, Operations, dated June 1993, p. 2-5 for the latest definitions. See also, Krueger Papers, Box 14, loose paper entitled "Principles of War" listing Cooperation as number 9; Box 21, Memo from Krueger to the Chief of Staff, NWC, subject: The so-called Nine Principles of War, 9 July 1931; NHC, RG 2, Fill 1144, Principles of War as Applicable to Naval Warfare, July 1926.

lecture on the Principles of War and Clausewitz and then a series of lectures using case studies to illuminate the points. One of those case studies was on Hannibal's campaigns in Italy, given by Krueger.¹⁵ Krueger gave that lecture at least two times and, as noted in the preceding chapter, it was published in the Coast Artillery Journal. In his lecture Krueger placed a large amount of the blame for the Roman defeat at Cannae on the fact that the Romans did not have unity of command and, as they had command on "alternate days, the evils of divided command soon became manifest." Varro was so frustrated and, subsequently, enraged at the timidity of Paulus, that he offered battle to Hannibal as soon as it was his turn to command.¹⁶ We can suppose that if asked at the time Krueger would have voiced similar concerns about the prospects of victory under the conditions of cooperation, coordination, and paramount interest as directed in JANA.

In some other scattered writings we can see that Krueger remained concerned with the issue of command. In a paper on air power he concluded that the air forces should not become a separate serve, as such a separate service would destroy unity of command and turn it into "trinity of command."¹⁷ He also

¹⁵ Krueger Papers, Box 21, BRIG. GEN. E.F. McGlachlin, Jr, "The Art of Command," in three parts delivered on 7, 12, and 17 December 1921, Part Three, p. 3.

¹⁶ Krueger Papers, Box 21, LTC Walter Krueger, "The Conditions of Success in War Illustrated by Hannibal's Campaigns in Italy," p. 12.

¹⁷ Krueger Papers, Box 15, File Japanese Plan for Defense of Kyushu, "Air Power in our National Defense" by Walter Krueger, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, pp. 6 and 49. The paper is undated, but based on

stated the current system ensured unity of command for the Army and its air corps and for the Navy and its naval aviation. He believed that having three services would create a situation "that could not be coordinated by any system yet devised."¹⁸

In 1924 Krueger was apparently asked to comment on a series of articles prepared by Capt. W.S. Pye. At that point Krueger and Pye had served together on the Joint Planning Committee and had already worked together on joint operations. In his articles Pye stated unequivocally that "there must be a definite understanding as to unity of command wherever army and navy forces are cooperating." He also stated that based on the geographic position of the U.S. "[i]t is impossible to conceive a war with a major power in which joint operations . . . will not play a major part." He implied that these operations would occur overseas.¹⁹ In these statements he countered the idea of paramount interest and the stated mission of the Army to be concerned with defense of the continental United States. Krueger's comments on the article began with the statement, "I consider this an excellent paper..." and went on to note some differences. His opinions

his rank and the fact that he added "General Staff" as opposed to "Infantry," the paper must have been written during his first tour in AWP, 1923-1925.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

¹⁹ W.S. Pye, "Joint Army and Navy Operations," published in three parts (Annapolis: United States Institute Proceedings, Dec 1924, January and February 1925), Part II, p. 4 and Part I, p. 1964. Found in Krueger Papers, Box 21.

were appreciated to the point that Pye incorporated some of Krueger's suggestions word for word.²⁰

In addition to the above examples, during the period 1922-1925 when he was assigned to AWPB, Krueger kept for his personal files many articles on joint operations. Beginning in 1925 his interest began to develop into influence.

In October 1924 the Acting Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. D.E. Nolan, recommended that the Joint Board revise JANA because the War Department had changed its concepts on the conduct of joint operations. He specifically noted that Army organizations had changed, definitions were obscure, and that Army missions were incomplete.²¹ In essence, these were the questions raised in the publications noted in the preceding paragraphs. Brig. Gen. Nolan was acting on a 15 October recommendation presented to him by Brig. Gen. LeRoy Eltinge, the current Chief, AWPB. Based on the wording of a supporting document and the comments presented by Krueger, it is apparent that Krueger was an originator of the idea.²² In February

²⁰ Krueger Papers, Box 21, "Comments on the Essay "Joint Army and Navy Operations, Part I:," dated October 14 1924. Signed by Krueger with his penciled annotation "Comments on Pye papers."

²¹ NA, RG 225, M1421, Roll 15, JB 350-240, Memo Brig. Gen. Nolan to the Joint Board, received at the Joint Board, 20 Oct 1924.

²² Krueger Papers, Box 21, packet of documents including his comments dated 1 April 1925, a 15 October memo from Brig. Gen. Eltinge to Brig. Gen. Nolan recommending the action and a supporting documents dated 16 October 1924 making some initial suggestions for changes. There are enough different comments to make impossible a clear identification of Krueger as the only originator of the proposal. Brig. Gen. Eltinge's memo contains his initials as the action officer.

1925 the Joint Planning Committee recommended the following action:

1) That the manual be revised for the reasons stated by Brig. Gen. Nolan.

2) That the manual be renamed "Joint Army and Navy Action" in order to coordinate all joint actions.

3) That the Joint Board gain the recommendations of the drafters of JANA, the service schools, the Chiefs of Branches and Bureaus, and "such other authorities as may appear as desirable."

4) That the above be asked to recommend corrections, definition changes, things to omit and add, and comments on changing the name.

This report from the Joint Planning Committee was signed by Lt. Col. Walter Krueger and Capt. W.H. Standley.²³

Based on records of both the Navy and the Army it is clear that both services gathered a broad range of comments. The Secretary of the Navy addressed a letter to twenty-one agencies or people requesting their comments, including the Naval War College and specifically Yarnell, Pye and Frost, suggesting that they worked on the original draft of JANA. The Naval War College sub-requested to at least four

²³ Ibid., memo from the Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board, Subject: Revision of pamphlet entitled "Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense," dated 7 February 1925.

people.²⁴ The Army received comments from thirty-one agencies or officers including Krueger.²⁵

It appears, although all the comments are not extant, that the majority of respondents opted for a complete revision of the pamphlet. Krueger made a series of minor comments and then recommended a complete revision. While he provided a proposed table of contents, he provided little of substance. Perhaps the joint exercises of February and March 1925 and the end of his tour of duty in AWPD restrained him. However, in his proposed Chapter VII, "Joint Army and Navy Operations in General," he listed the topics, in order, General Principles, Unity of Command, Cooperation, and, then, Paramount Interest.²⁶

The comments from the faculty of the Naval War College are more direct in the area of command. RADM Williams recommended the principle of paramount interest in defensive operations, but suggested unity of command and a joint commander for overseas expeditions. He also stated the need for adding ideas on offensive operations.²⁷ Based on Krueger's comments and those of the faculty of the Naval War

²⁴ NHC, RG 2, File A16-3 contains letter requesting input from the Secretary of the Navy, the comments of four officers on the Naval War College Staff, and the reply from C.S. Williams, President, NWC. All documents dated between 19 February and 21 July 1925

²⁵ See Krueger Papers, Box 21 and NA, RG 165, Box 79, File 1891.

²⁶ Krueger Papers, Box 21, memo from Krueger to the Adjutant General, dated 1 April 1925, p. 4.

²⁷ See Note 24.

College it is obvious that a clear definition of command relationships and the addition of offensive operations and the method of joint planning were considered key requirements for a new manual. The final product looks little like Krueger's table of contents, but contained most of the topics he recommended. The records do not clarify why, but it took until April 1927 for the Joint Board to approve Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (JAAN (1927)).²⁸

JAAN (1927) meets most of requirements of a joint doctrine in that it defines relationships, states missions, explains overseas operations, and states methods of communications between the services. It also explains the role of the Joint Board and Joint Planning Committee. The focus was more realistic than the 1920 manual in that, while coast defense garnered the most ink, overseas operations were defined and discussed before the section on coast defense. This could be an indication that the services were acknowledging that there was a greater chance of the Army's employment in overseas operations than in coast defense.

Perhaps the greatest contributions to joint doctrine were the definitions of missions and command relationships. The Army was given the wartime missions of defense of the U.S., land campaigns in hostile territory including overseas, and land operations to assist the Navy in establishing bases. The

²⁸ See NA, RG 225, M1421, Roll 1, Logbook of actions. JB 350-289 appears to be the final approval for the revision; The Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1927). Hereafter, JAAN, 1927.

Navy was given a mission of escorting and supporting the Army in overseas operations. Here was the first clear break from the policies of non-involvement, but, in the spirit of isolationism, the missions were still couched in terms of defending overseas U.S. possessions.²⁹

In Chapter II, JAAN (1927) defined paramount interest as "the force whose function and requirements are, at the time, of the greater importance." In Chapter V, JAAN (1927) stated that in determining paramount interest the local commanders had to consider the enemy's intentions. Although still not clear, this was an improvement from JANA. JAAN (1927) went on to say that the service having paramount interest was "authorized and required to designate the missions" of the forces of both services. The commander of the supporting force was "required to execute the mission assigned by the commander of the other service," but without actually yielding command of his troops. However, "the assignment of paramount interest to one service in a joint operation [did] not confer paramount interest upon that service in all subordinate operations."³⁰ In other words, the commander could change on a daily basis, just as Krueger warned against in his analysis of Hannibal's campaigns.

JAAN (1927) also addressed unity of command and stated that the President could appoint a joint commander when Army

²⁹ JAAN, 1927, pp. 2-3.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

and Navy forces had a common mission. The manual authorized the establishment of a separate joint headquarters. While given second place to paramount interest in the layout of Chapter II, the wording appears to defend unity of command as it describes its procedures. The chapter concluded by requiring joint war plans to establish, in advance, the method of coordination to be used. One wonders if the retention of paramount interest was a political compromise while the intent was to utilize unity of command in future operations through the method of directing unity of command in planning documents. All extant comments on the revision support unity of command, and the weight of support must have had serious impact. The idea of "cooperation" as a separate coordination method is dropped.³¹

Krueger on Doctrine and Command. The Naval War College Years:

Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (1927) remained the official publication governing joint operations until 1935, when Krueger was again on the AWPD, although it did undergo some minor revisions. In the meantime, Krueger spent five years at the Naval War College where, in addition to his year as a student, he lectured on joint operations and command. During his year as a student Krueger came to the attention of Admiral Pratt, as noted in Chapter 2, and came into the

³¹ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

company of the officers who had commented on the proposal to revise JANA.

Krueger's first work at Newport was his essay on Command, submitted on 12 September 1925. His earlier ideas on unity of command were echoed here, although in a more general sense than in joint operations.

The COMMAND is then the agency which occupies the position of chief authority in respect to the military forces entrusted to it, with the exclusive right or power, or both, to exercise control over those forces. It is evident that COMMAND as defined, implies UNITY. Such unity - unity of thought in Napoleon's words - is one of the prime factors of the strength of a military force and can not be assured unless the COMMAND is vested in a single individual, the commander, who is in truth the head of the force he commands.³²

The foregoing discussion on COMMAND would be incomplete without developing the fact that, although COMMAND, as already stated, implies "unity", that is, the exclusive right or power to control forces entrusted to it, something more is required in order that success may be assured, to wit, UNITY OF COMMAND, by which is meant the right or power of the COMMAND to control all the forces than can and must be made available for the purpose of attaining that success.

Although UNITY OF COMMAND, as defined above, is not an inherent attribute of COMMAND, it must be provided if success is to be assured, for history is replete with examples showing that UNITY OF COMMAND is vital to the success of any military undertaking. . . . Lack of unity of command has probably been the cause of more defeats than any other contributing factor.³³

If unity of command is of such vital importance, why then, it may well be asked, is it not applied to the army and navy of each country? The answer is simple. Armies and fleets do not, as

³² Krueger papers, Box 21, Command, by Walter Krueger, 12 September 1925, p. 2.

³³ Ibid., p. 19.

a rule, operate together, their respective spheres of activity being usually far removed from each other. When armies and fleets do operate together, however, unity of command or, at the very least, unity of strategic direction, should undoubtedly be provided.³⁴

In these passages Krueger is arguing against the 1920s Principles of War, specifically the Principle of Cooperation, and against the current doctrine of paramount interest and coordination. Krueger also believed that Command had several functions-- Organization, Doctrine and Training, Administration and Supply, Planning and Execution.³⁵ All of these ideas were in evidence in his April 1925 proposals for revising JANA.

The spirit of cooperation, if not support for the Principle of Cooperation, was intensely alive at Newport in these years as was acceptance of the need to provide common doctrine- a common language- between the two services. This can be seen in the interest in studying joint operations and conducting joint war games and in the program to provide lectures from the other services to address matters of common interest. In March 1926, while Krueger was a student, a report on joint operations by members of the Class of 1925 was published and was apparently recommended reading.³⁶ The joint

³⁴ Ibid., p. 22.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 3-7.

³⁶ NHC, RG 4, File 1130, Principles of Joint Overseas Operations With Special Reference to Cooperation Between the Army and the Navy. Submitted by a Committee of Officers of the U.S. Army, 9 May 1925, published by NWC, 3-26. The report is interesting in its comments on command. "The idea of one commander for a conjunct operations appears to be theoretically correct." The idea of paramount interest "is believed

exercise played while Krueger was a student in 1925-26 led to the publication at the Naval War College of Joint Operations Landings in Force (tentative) in October 1927. This manual was a practical guide, designed primarily to give officers playing joint war games data on how the other service operated-- its missions and requirements. According to Admiral Pringle, the manual was compiled because "much data was not available covering the procedure in such operations."³⁷ In addition, the manual encouraged the development of doctrine.

In view of the importance of cooperation in overseas expeditions, officers of each service should have a clear understanding of the problems confronting the other service and the limitations incident to the employment of the facilities of both services. The staffs of both services should study the problem jointly as a whole, leaving the details of the technical operations to be worked out as assigned.³⁸

By this time the colleges were planning for full offensive overseas operations. The tentative manual directly quoted the passage from JAAN (1927) regarding paramount

unsound because it lacks simplicity and plays hide and seek with leadership. . . . Our government has consistently relied upon the method of co-ordinate command, each service with its own independent commander. This can succeed in joint operation only if there is co-operation [sic]. The co-operation secured will depend upon . . . the personality of the two commanders." p. 9. A note on the front cover states that twenty copies were placed in the NWC library.

³⁷ NHC, RG 4, File 1287, Joint Operations Landings in Force (tentative), 4 October 1927; NHC, RG 2, File A16-3, Memo, Admiral Pringle to CNO (War Plans Division), 30 November 1927.

³⁸ Joint Operations Landings in Force (tentative), Section I, p. 3.

interest and unity of command. Perhaps in response to the Naval War College's previously noted preference for unity of command, while JAAN (1927) was quoted placing paramount interest as the preferred method, the tentative manual actually gave precedence to unity of command.³⁹

After his return to the Naval War College as a faculty member Krueger's two key lectures, for our purposes, were on the Army command system and on joint operations. The only complete draft of his lecture "Command: The Military Command System" is from the 1930-31 school year, but outlines exist for other years. It appears that for this lecture he borrowed freely from his 1925 essay on Command. Towards the end he addressed joint operations. In the main he simply quoted JAAN (1927) on the topics of paramount interest and unity of command. However, his introduction follows the line of the tentative manual and indicates his belief in the importance of doctrine. He stated that in wartime the services must cooperate and they must understand each other's functions and methods: "In a word - THEY MUST SPEAK THE SAME LANGUAGE." The capital letters are in the original text. It is interesting to note that the only other capitalized phrases in the section on joint operations is "UNITY OF COMMAND" as he discusses methods of command.⁴⁰

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 3-6, Section II, pp. 1-2, and Charts A, B, and C.

⁴⁰ Krueger Papers, Box 21, Krueger, "Command: The Military Command System," Outline of a Lecture, Naval War College, Course, 1930-1931, pp. 23, 25. Emphasis in original.

In his lectures on joint operations Krueger was more able to directly express his opinions and influence senior Navy and Army officers. In 1931 the lecture was seventy-one pages long. In the first page Krueger launched into the issue of coordination and methods of command. In the written copy of the lecture Krueger had underlined for emphasis only three passages. The first, on page two, was: "It is vital to the success of Joint Operations that the actions of the Army and Navy forces engaged therein, be so closely coordinated as to produce the most effective mutual support."⁴¹ Krueger set the tone early.

As he pressed into methods of coordination Krueger discussed "The Principle of Cooperation." According to Krueger this was when the commanders of the service forces coordinated by mutual agreement or by referring differences to their higher authorities. He noted that historically this had been the most common method of coordinating joint operations. He also noted that the British continued to use cooperation and speculated that they did so because they believed that more effective that the mistakes a commander would make under unity of command "because of his lack of familiarity with the powers and limitations of the sister service."⁴²

⁴¹ NHC, RG 14, Faculty and Staff Presentations, Lieutenant Colonel Walter Krueger, U.S.A., "Joint Army and Navy Operations," (Handwritten on the cover page is "N.W.C., March 17-1931."), p. 3.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 2-4. He later noted "the principle of paramount interest . . . is of comparatively recent origin . . ." (Ibid., p. 3). Krueger also quoted Julian Corbett's comments against unity of command. He might also note that in 1930/31 the services discarded the Principles of

In essence, Krueger was saying that effective joint operations were not possible without an understood doctrine, such as he was working on in the development of JAAN (1927), and without inter-service understanding-- both were among the reasons for exchanging officers between the services, as noted earlier. He returned to the point some pages later when, after quoting the descriptions of unity of command and paramount interest from JAAN (1927), he stated that the principles in JAAN (1927) "should suffice" but "that none of the rules prescribed is a panacea."

Whether joint operations are conducted under the principle of paramount interest, or under unity of command, not only cooperation, but intelligently loyal cooperation and mutual confidence between the two services, are imperatively necessary. Such cooperation and mutual confidence can only be assured if each service is thoroughly familiar with the approved methods of coordination and has a thorough understanding of its own functions, powers and limitations, and a proper appreciation of the functions, powers and limitations of the sister service. (Emphasis in original)⁴³

Krueger returned to this theme throughout the lecture and this is in keeping with his emphasis on unity of command. He seems to be saying that if unity of command is not to be official, then the services must develop a way to ensure intelligent cooperation.

Krueger next shifted to the different types of joint operations and he came to another theme-- the difficulty of

War because of lack of agreement (See Alger, p. 8). Krueger may have included the Principle of Cooperation in order to relate the topic to a principle already understood by the officers present.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 8.

overseas movement and operations based on the superiority of the defense. He said: "Joint Overseas Movements. . . may well be considered among the most difficult operations of war, and no nation is likely to undertake them, unless in possession of command of the sea. This, however, . . . can not be complete if the enemy has submarines and aircraft."⁴⁴

Krueger went on to discuss forced landing operations "the most difficult operations that Army and Navy Forces may be called upon to undertake."⁴⁵ He noted that strategic surprise was vital, but unlikely if the enemy had the ability to scout by air and sea; that the attacker had no base of operations or logistics; that the attacker had little artillery support as "naval gunfire is comparatively ineffective against shore targets and can not be laid closer than 2,000 yards to friendly troops"; that commanders of the friendly ground forces could do little to influence the battle until they were ashore and had established communications; and that the loss of even one troop transport could doom the entire operation.⁴⁶ Krueger then went on to discuss tactical problems with forced landing operations and different areas where the two services had to understand each others limitations.

Krueger closed as follows:

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that
under modern conditions, a forced landing,

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 34. See also p. 35 on superiority of the defense.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 40.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 42-45.

especially one of magnitude, will stand little, if any, chance to succeed, unless the attacker has command of the air and sea.

But even with such command, a forced landing is an operation of tremendous difficulty. . . . Besides, the cardinal principle that the plan for a military operation must be simple and flexible, if it is to succeed, can not be applied to a forced landing, for this must proceed according to a... complex plan which [is,]. . . at best, nothing but a compromise between the conflicting requirements of two independent services, the Army and the Navy."

It requires, moreover, the highest degree of intelligently loyal cooperation between all parts of the two services, and this is possible only if each service is thoroughly familiar with the powers and limitations of the sister service and possesses a sympathetic understanding of the problems and difficulties of that sister service, in a word, if both services talk and understand the same language.⁴⁷

Krueger returned to the familiar themes of doctrine, missions, cooperation, and coordination, which he tried to impress in all officers of both services.

After these lectures Krueger did not return to the issue of joint operations doctrine until 1934 when he returned to AWPD. It is possible that he did not feel successful in his attempts to promote inter-service understanding. In an interesting conclusion to a 1934 letter written to a fellow faculty member, Capt. W. Van Auken, Krueger wrote: "I might go on indefinitely writing down further comments, but I have not the heart to do so. I am too deeply conscious of the fact that my work at the Naval War College was, to a considerable

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 77-79.

extent, a waste of time."⁴⁸ The rest of the letter was comments on the failure of Allied strategy in World War I until the West accepted the principle of Unity of Command and unified control of operations.

Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (1935):

If he felt that he had failed at the Naval War College, Krueger later had another chance. Upon his return to AWPD in June 1934 Krueger entered into the middle of the revision of JAAN (1927) that resulted in an entire new publication in 1935. In February 1933 General Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff, proposed revising JAAN (1927) because the old manual was no longer in agreement with understandings between the services on coast defense. In specific, the command relations no longer applied because of changes in the organization of the Army. These revisions were approved in September 1935.⁴⁹

On 17 June 1935 the Joint Planning Committee sent a memorandum to the Joint Board about the ongoing revision to JAAN (1927). In this memo the Joint Planning Committee noted that in some related decisions the Joint Board had already dealt with the problems noted by MacArthur in 1933. However,

⁴⁸ Krueger Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, Krueger to Van Auken, May 1934.

⁴⁹ NA, RG 165, Box 142, File 3665, Memo from MacArthur to the Joint Board, 21 February 1933, Subject: Revision of Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.; NA, RG 225, M1421, Roll Q, Logbook of Joint Board Actions, shows JB 350-514 initiated 23 February 1933 and completed 11 September 1935. Note: The change in Army organization cited by MacArthur was a change that established four Army Headquarters with responsibility over forces within certain geographic areas of the United States.

the Joint Planning Committee stated that it did not believe that the revisions made JAAN (1927) "more clarified and usable." The Committee submitted with the memorandum a completely revised rendition of JAAN. This revision included a complete rewrite of the chapters on missions, command, coordination, and operations requiring coordination. The Committee also recommended incorporating into the manual a 1933 Joint Board publication entitled Joint Overseas Expeditions and a 1933 Joint Board publication on rules for joint exercises.

This memo noted the principles followed by the Committee in drafting the changes.

(a) That neither service restrict in any way the means and weapons used by the other service in carrying out its functions;

(b) That neither service restrict in any way the area of operations of the other service in operations against an enemy;

(c) That either service will lend the utmost assistance possible to the other service in carrying out its functions.

The memorandum was signed by Krueger.⁵⁰ After directing only one final minor revision the Joint Board approved the new JAAN (1935) on 11 September 1935.

The changes in JAAN (1935) are significant and reflect many of Krueger's ideas. For starters, the new regulation contains every item in Krueger's 1925 proposed table of

⁵⁰ NA, RG 225, Series M1421, Records of the Joint Board, Roll 16, JB 350-514, Memo Joint Planning Committee to Joint Board, 17 June 1935; The Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935 (Hereafter JAAN (1935))). The principles are a direct quote from the memo, p. 2, and from p. 7 of JAAN (1935).

contents including joint planning and regulations for joint exercises. Also, a chapter was added on coordinating air operations, a subject of great interest to Krueger since his first tour in AWPD.

In addition to the table of contents, the contents were altered to clarify all aspects of coordination between the services. The chapter on coordination directed that joint war plans would establish the method of coordination. Also, the principles of command were significantly strengthened in line with the principle of unity of command. While paramount interest remained a form of coordination, with essentially the same definition as in 1927, the concept of "limited unity of command" was introduced. Whenever one service had paramount interest, the commander having paramount interest exercised limited unity of command. Thus, some form of unity of command was always in place, no matter what type of coordination was chosen. In order to further clarify the issue, the joint war plan or the higher authority directing a joint overseas operation was required to stipulate whether unity of command or limited unity of command was to be in effect. In essence, paramount interest no longer applied to overseas operations, although it was still used in matters of coastal defense.⁵¹

Another significant change, and one that suggests that the principles detailed by Krueger in his June 1935 Joint Planning Committee memo were not always followed, is that the

⁵¹ JAAN (1935), pp. 8-11.

missions for the Marine Corps were deleted. In 1927 specific roles were given to the Marines for the initial seizure of advance bases and limited land operations required for a naval campaign. The 1935 edition specified, in the section on general functions of both services: "The Marine Corps is likewise an integral part of the sea forces."⁵² It has been suggested that MacArthur deliberately maneuvered to force the Marines out of land operations. This argument has some merit when one considers that the very first change to JAAN (1935) was to reinstate missions for the Marines. This change, recommended to the Joint Board in another memo signed by Krueger, came at the insistence of the CNO only six months after MacArthur gave up the post of Chief of Staff.⁵³

The inclusion of the manual on joint overseas operations and the rules for exercises created an all source manual for joint operations. As such, the manual now covered joint operations at all three levels of war-- strategic, operational, and tactical. In light of this, and the rewriting of the parts on unity of command, there was one glaring omission. Chapter VI covered the missions of Army and Navy units in forced landings and specified that the Navy commanded during transit to the beaches. It also stated that naval and ground commanders would be on the same ship in order to coordinate their actions. However, there was no

⁵² JAAN (1927), pp. 2-3; JAAN (1935), pp. 6-7.

⁵³ Atwater, pp. 84-85; NA, RG 225, Series M1421, Roll 16, JB 350-584.

specification as to when command shifted from the naval commander to the land commander. This is a vital matter in the conduct of forced landings and was never fully addressed in the doctrine.⁵⁴

The next major change to JAAN (1935) began in March 1938 when Admiral Leahy, then CNO, proposed a major revision of methods of coordination. Admiral Leahy stated that the provisions regarding coordination and command were unlawful and against the established policy of the Navy Department. He also stated that under the principle of paramount interest local commanders might not be able to agree on the enemy's intent as required in Chapter V of JAAN. Leahy suggested eliminating the ideas of paramount interest and limited unity of command and making mutual cooperation the general rule, with each commander retaining command of his service troops and responsible to his immediate superior in his own service. Unity of command would be authorized only for air operations, some "particular service," or if senior officers on the scene decide unity of command is imperative. In the two former cases unity of command would be directed by the joint war plans or directed by the President.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ JAAN (1935), Ch VI, paragraphs 81-84, 90-91, 95, 101, 102. See Chapter VI, Conclusions, below, for Krueger's post-war comments on this issue.

⁵⁵ NA, RG 125, Series M1421, Roll 16, JB 350-628, Memo, Admiral Leahy to General Craig, 21 March 1938. Leahy's language is confusing. By "particular service" he seems to mean something to the effect of "in a specific operation."

In an 8 April memo to the Chief of Staff Krueger vehemently disagreed with Admiral Leahy and refuted his argument point by point. It appears, based on the fact that Krueger's initials show him to be the action officer, that this refutation was written by him alone.⁵⁶ Krueger complained that Leahy's recommendations were too general to determine what exactly he wanted changed, except that Leahy wanted to do away with paramount interest and limited unity of command. Krueger foresaw that if those changes were made the Navy would have too complete power over Army forces and would demand unity of command over Army forces in all operations involving transport of Army forces overseas. He noted that defense of coastal areas would also be changed and that the Army would have no control over naval forces in defense of coastal regions once the Navy demanded control over all sea operations. He also thought that Army air forces would be subordinate to the Navy whenever they flew over the ocean.

In refuting Leahy's arguments Krueger noted that if paramount interest and limited unity of command were unlawful, then so was unity of command. In counterpoint he quoted a 1924 Judge Advocate of the Navy opinion that the President could employ the armed forces as he wished including designating a joint commander. Krueger also wondered how, if they could not be relied upon to determine enemy intentions

⁵⁶ AWPDP papers relating to JB 350-628 are found in NA, RG165, Box 97, File 2917-24. All papers prepared in AWPDP had the initials of the action officers in the upper right corner. In this case, only "WK" appear.

for the purpose of designating paramount interest, commanders could be expected to agree on cooperation. In summation, Krueger recommended that the Army should "firmly insist" on retaining paramount interest and that in overseas operations limited unity of command be exercised. He also recommended that the Army be given doctrinal paramount interest in defense of the coast and the accompanying limited unity of command over naval forces.⁵⁷

The minutes of the next meeting of the Joint Board simply noted: "There was a general discussion of the question of unity of command. Maj. Gen. Embick stated that the subject is now under further study" ⁵⁸ By 3 June Krueger had completely recanted. In another memo to the Chief of Staff he wrote:

Further careful and exhaustive study of Admiral Leahy's proposal reveals the fact that it is not necessary for the Army to insist upon the position stated in the attached AWPD Memorandum of April 8. On the contrary, the study indicates that the Army's interest in the question of command can be adequately protected by a redraft of Chapter II of "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy," which will, at the same time, almost wholly meet Admiral Leahy's proposals.

He attached a draft recommendation for a rewrite of Chapter II and suggested that it be sent to Admiral Leahy. Krueger recommended that enemy intentions, geographic location, contemplated operations, and enemy and friendly forces be

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ NA, RG 125, Series 1421, Roll 1, Minutes of the Joint Board, 20 April 1938.

considered in coordinating operations. Mutual cooperation was to be the normal method, but unity of command could be used when directed by the President, when the two service secretaries agreed, or when the commanders on the scene decide unity of command was required. He went on to recommend:

The exercise by a commander of unity of command in an operation- a. Imposes upon him the responsibility for the general conduct of the operation; and b. Vests in his the authority to control that operation, except as to the technique of operation, the administration, and the discipline of the forces to which he does not belong.⁵⁹

While the last quoted section displays Krueger consistent attempt to vest authority and responsibility in one person while keeping that commander from meddling in the prerogative of his subordinates, his reversal on paramount interest and limited unity of command, as well as his acceptance of the principle of cooperation, go against what he had taught and written for the preceding fifteen years. Why did he change? After World War II Krueger was specifically asked by the Chief of Military History, Maj. Gen. R. Stephens, to explain the reasons for the adoption of "close cooperation" in Change 2 to JAAN (1935). Maj. Gen. Stephens mentions the redraft that General Craig sent to Admiral Leahy, but, apparently without knowing that Krueger had written it. Krueger stated in his reply that he did not know what prompted the change and would

⁵⁹ NA, RG 165, File 2917-24, Memo, Krueger to General Craig, 3 June 1938.

only recommend that Maj. Gen. Stephens ask Lt. Gen. (Ret) S.D. Embick his opinion.⁶⁰

A possible explanation for Krueger's change of heart is that he realized that the revision really changed little. He expected that future joint plans would designate unity of command, thus eliminating the need for a decision on the scene. Later writings from the Navy Department suggested that the secretaries of the Army and the Navy wanted unity of command in all situations. Krueger knew that his successors at AWPD would strive to write unity of command into joint plans. Also, Krueger may have recognized that there was little threat of a major invasion of the U.S. and that cooperation would probably succeed in defensive operations. He had noted the special geographic position of the U.S. with friendly neighbors and wide ocean barriers on all sides in many previous writings and speeches. Krueger's ideas on unity of command were vindicated in December 1941 when the first blame for the debacle at Pearl Harbor was placed at the feet

⁶⁰ Krueger Papers, Box 13, File 78, Miscellany Letters, Letter from MG Stephens to Krueger, 8 March 1957 and Krueger's reply, March 17. Krueger's answer is evasive and he neither denies or acknowledges the part he played, but simply refers the matter to LT. Gen. Embick. For having prompted such a vehement initial reply his answer is interesting. Embick was a strong isolationist and believed that the U.S. should concentrate on the defense of the continent. At the same time as the discussions of the change to JAAN (1935) Embick was involved in peace groups and distributed a speech by Frederick Libby that said the Navy should have no business past the mid-Pacific "its recognized business being the defense of our soil from invasion." See Ronald Schaffer, "General Stanley D. Embick: Military Dissenter," Military Affairs, October 1973, p. 92. While Embick and Krueger remained friendly, this a [redacted] 's interpretation is that Embick supported the change and pressure [redacted] the change in Krueger's position as part of an attempt to rein the services into a more defensive oriented posture.

of the Navy for demanding upon the principle of cooperation rather than unity of command.⁶¹

No matter what the reasons for Krueger's apparent reversal, the Joint Board, at Krueger's last meeting as Chief, AWPD, approved the change to JAAN (1935). They accepted the draft written by Krueger word for word, except that paragraph 10 was longer and listed the specific actions a joint commander could undertake and explicitly restrained the joint commander from exercising administrative control over and discipline of the forces of the other service.⁶²

After being involved for some 15 years in the process of developing doctrine for joint operations Krueger must have wondered what he had accomplished. While he had been involved in the development of doctrine at the operational level, and had taught at two different service school on joint operations and command issues, the procedures for coordination of the services in joint operations remained, on the surface, unclear. However, service missions were defined, and some explicit instructions had been written and promulgated for the operational and tactical execution of joint operations. In

⁶¹ See NA, RG 165, File 2917-35 for support of this interpretation. The file includes comments from the CNO in early 1941 fighting unity of command, and Gen. Marshall's comments on how the Navy Dept blocked unity of command for Pearl until after 7 Dec. The AWPD Chief in Nov 1941, who noted that even under the principle of cooperation unity of command could be established by the service commanders, was a loyal subordinate of Krueger in 1938.

⁶² See NA, RG 125, Series M1421, Roll 1 for the minutes of the Joint Board Meeting of 27 June 1938, and the published Change 2 to JAAN (1935).

addition, Krueger knew that command issues could be further dealt with through the medium of writing joint war plans. Also, he had worked diligently at increasing inter-service understanding and cooperation and could expect that if the principle of cooperation were to be followed these efforts to pay off. Let us next explore Krueger's role in the development of joint war plans, especially War Plan Orange.

CHAPTER IV

WAR PLANS, GAMES, AND EXERCISES, 1922-1938:

When World War II was over Admiral Nimitz supposedly said that the war had turned out just as it had been gamed for thirty years at the Naval War College. Supposedly the only thing they had not anticipated was the *kamikaze*. The Army may have not been so sanguine. For those same thirty years the Army had at times argued and at times agreed with the Navy on plans for a possible war against Japan. Most of the disagreements seem to have centered over command issues, the relief of the garrison in the Philippines, and the length of time it would take the Army to mobilize and train before it was prepared to conduct operations. As noted earlier, active Army forces were small to reduce costs and in keeping with its primary mission of coastal defense.¹ In addition to the actual war plans both the Army and the Navy developed exercises for their respective war colleges and to test plans and doctrine. In several cases the two colleges cooperated in jointly developing war games.

During the entire inter-war period Krueger played a role in both planning and exercises. While teaching at the Army War College in 1921 he lectured on the war planning process.

¹ See Edward Miller, *War Plan Orange*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), *passim*. See also NA, RG 165 War Plans Division, General Correspondence, 1920-1942, Boxes 264-273 "Color Plans" and NA, RG 407 Administrative Services Division, Ops Branch, Special Projects- War Plans "Color" 1920-1945. The latter are the classified file copies of the plans.

During his first tour in AWPD he lectured at the Army War College on war plans and was responsible at different times for War Plans Blue (Mobilization), Brown (Philippines), Orange (Japan), Tan (Cuba), and White (National Emergency) and the Panama Canal Defense Project. He also helped plan two exercises to test defense plans for the Panama Canal and one for the defense of Hawaii. While at the Naval War College in 1925-26 he played a joint war game involving the defense of the Philippines. His first project as a faculty member was to develop OP-VI, a joint war game of the reconquest of the Philippines. When he returned to AWPD in 1934, as the Executive and then Chief, he had oversight over all planning, but was also personally involved in the developments of War Plan Orange. In this chapter Krueger's role in the development of war plans and exercises, especially War Plan Orange, will be explored.

Army War College, 1922:

While, as noted in Chapter II, Krueger's duties while on the faculty of the Army War College are not clear, one of his extant lectures from the period is a talk on war planning. In this lecture he advised students on what a joint war plan should contain, but made no comments on the process of joint planning.² After he was posted to AWPD Krueger returned to the Army War College on several occasions to lecture on war

² MHI, File 224-28.

planning.³ As was also noted in Chapter II, it does not appear that during his year as a student Krueger played any joint exercises.

Army War Plans Division, 1923-1925:

Immediately upon arriving at AWPD Krueger was thrust into war planning and exercises. As a part of the G3 section, he was part of a five man group responsible for preparing the Army plans, coordinating joint plans with the Navy, and formulating exercises. For joint operations the Joint Planning Committee first prepared the joint plan. Once the joint plan was approved by the Joint Board AWPD prepared the War Department plan and the strategical plan. Officers in the G3, AWPD worked in pairs so that continuity could be maintained and for the purpose of "harmony of thought." In addition, at least one member of each pair was on the Joint Planning Committee.⁴

During his first tour at AWPD Krueger was responsible for, among others, War Plan Tan (intervention in Cuba), War Plan Orange (war with Japan), and the Panama Defense Project. In addition, although there is no extant document appointing him as the responsible officer, Krueger was responsible for a 1924 briefing to the Chief of Staff for War Plan Brown (relief

³ Krueger papers, Box 21, Walter Krueger, "The Detailed Working of the War Plans Division, Its Tasks and Their Method of Execution," a lecture at AWC, 18 October 1924.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 4, 5, and 8. "Harmony of thought" may have meant, in modern vernacular, "sanity check."

of the Philippines).⁵ Based on a AWPD document, plans in effect in 1926 were: Tan, approved April 1924; Orange, Joint Plan approved Aug 1924, Army Plan approved January 1925; and Brown, approved in three pieces from December 1923 to August 1924. A 1924 document notes that the Panama Defense Project was approved in April 1924.⁶ Krueger was appointed to the Joint Planning Committee in April 1923. The details noted here are intended to convey the fact that Krueger was responsible for each of these plans at the time it was approved. Let us turn our attention to his work on the Orange Plan.

At the time Krueger was appointed to the Joint Planning Committee, that body was working on a revision of the estimate of the enemy situation for War Plan Orange. As approved by the Joint Board on 7 July 1923, the estimate made the following general conclusions:

- 1) The U.S. would have to establish a naval presence in the Western Pacific superior to Japan's;
- 2) Manila Bay would have to be held or retaken in order to achieve the above;
- 3) The U.S. would have to control all Japanese Mandated Islands; and,

⁵ NA, RG 165, Box 85, File 2138, Packet of memos from April 1923 to July 1924, all entitled "Safeguarding Plans and Projects"; Box 77, File 1727, Memo, Subject: Defense Projects and War Plans, 22 May 1924.

⁶ NA, RG 165, Box 77, File 1727-7, Memo "Present Status of War Plans," 10 April 1926; Box 71, File 1347-2, "Status of War Plans and Defense Projects," 11 December 1924.

4) The above three items would require Japan to submit. The estimate foresaw a long, offensive, and primarily maritime war. It envisioned the U.S. immediately assuming the strategic offensive.⁷

Upon approval of the estimate the Joint Planning Committee began to prepare the Joint War Plan. The first draft of the Joint War Plan provided little information other than some dates and size of forces-- the fleet would concentrate in Hawaiian waters at D+10 at a strength 25% larger than Japan's and the Army would provide 10,000 troops. This draft was written by Krueger and Comdr. W. Coffey. The draft also specified an immediate offensive against the Japanese to destroy their fleet. In the jargon of historians of War Plan Orange this was known as the "Thruster" strategy. The alternative, known as the "Cautionary" strategy, foresaw a slower advance across the Pacific and the taking of small islands as advance bases.⁸

The second draft was written solely by Krueger and is much longer (the estimate of the situation is greatly expanded) and more detailed. The discussion of war aims is very Clausewitzian as Krueger refused to state specific aims

⁷ NA, RG 225, Series M1421, Records of the Joint Board, Roll 9, JB 325-207.

⁸ NA, RG 165, Box War Plan Orange, File 2720-22. This packet of papers is a development file for the 1928 revision, but includes drafts of the 1924 version. One of the first pages is a table of contents. The first draft by Krueger and Coffey is undated, but was probably from fall 1923. It also appears to be an incomplete copy, ending abruptly on page 4; See Miller for discussion of these terms.

saying they depended on the cause of war. However, he did not believe it would be an unlimited war because he could not foresee Japan threatening the national existence of the United States. Krueger noted that while the U.S. held superiority over Japan in manpower, industry, and economics, the distances involved in the Pacific were a disadvantage to American naval operations. He expected the Japanese to seize American possessions in the Pacific, to include the Philippines, Guam, Wake, and Samoa, and then go to the strategic defensive. He concluded that the U.S. would be forced to the strategic offensive in order to maintain or regain her Western Pacific possessions and establish superior strength in the Far East. He also felt that the U.S. would have to target Japanese naval forces and economic life.⁹

Krueger's second draft restated the missions of the Army and the Navy. Navy missions were the same as in the first draft, but the Army missions were more specific. They included the 50,000 troops at D+10 plus an additional unspecified contingent at D+30. The Army would garrison the Marshalls and Carolines, recapture Guam, and conduct additional joint operations as required. Krueger also specified the command relationships required for successful operations. While he acknowledged the principle of cooperation, he believed that the operation must proceed under unity of command and proposed creation of the joint United

⁹ Ibid., 2d Draft, dated 7 November 1923, pp. 2-3.

States Asiatic Expeditionary Forces (USAEF) under one commander.¹⁰

The following points from Krueger's draft are of particular interest. First, he envisioned Japanese actions as they actually occurred in 1941-42. Second, he recognized Japanese economic vulnerability. Third, he recommended the advance across the Central Pacific as would be conducted by Nimitz in World War II. However, in 1923 it was probably unrealistic for the Army to have 50,000 troops available in Hawaii at D+10 unless mobilization had already occurred. Krueger does not address that problem. In addition, his worksheets suggest that he expected the Marines would have garrisoned the Carolines and Marshalls, but based on his estimate that the Japanese would try to take all American possessions, he seems to fail to consider that those islands would have to be retaken. Finally, he never clearly states the scope of initial operations, which one would suppose to be reinforcing the garrison in the Philippines or retaking Manila Bay. His discussion of command relationships is completely in character, as was discussed in Chapter III, and reinforces the argument in regards to his contributions to that aspect of joint operations.

Krueger's ideas can be followed in his 5th draft of the plan (the third and fourth drafts being submitted by Navy members of the Joint Planning Committee) and discussions

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 5-11.

within the planning committee can be surmised. This 5th draft, dated 28 February 1924, was much sparser than his previous effort. It divided the war into two phases. The first phase concluded when the U.S. established superior naval power in the Western Pacific, which included the reinforcement of Manila Bay and the occupation of the Japanese mandated islands. During this phase the Navy has paramount interest. The second phase was "The Subsequent Phase" when all other actions were taken and either the Army or the Navy could have paramount interest. It is apparent that Krueger's earlier suggestion of unity of command had come into opposition. He specified in his paragraph on command, in an attempt at clarification and in order to mollify the Naval planners, that CINC-USAEF would, during the initial phase, be CINC-USFleet and that during the Subsequent Phase either an Army or a Navy officer would be designated by the President as joint commander.¹¹

The evolution of the command relationships are the most glaring alteration in this document, but some other important changes were included. First, the naval forces to be gathered in Hawaii at D+10 were specified to be 50% greater than Japanese forces as opposed to the 25% stated earlier. In addition, Manila Bay was now to be reinforced. The potential reconquest operation had been dropped. Also, based on this draft the Army would prestock in the Philippines supplies and

¹¹ Ibid., 5th Draft, dated 28 February 1924, *passim*.

equipment for the initial 50,000 man contingent. The planning committee obviously changed its assumptions and now expected the Philippine garrison to maintain possession of Manila Bay until the Navy arrived with reinforcements.

It appears that while the Joint Planning Committee agreed on the phasing of the war and command relationships, the Joint Board was deadlocked on the issue. On 20 June 1924, after receiving a directive to restudy the command relationships, the Joint Planning Committee submitted to the Joint Board a defense of its war plan that stated: "[I]t was impossible for the Joint Planning Committee to arrive at the conclusion that operations on such a large scale and of such great importance could be entrusted to cooperation alone." The memo also stated that the value of the plan was in the training it would engender and the subsequent illumination of defects. The Planning Committee lost its case and on 10 July was directed to rewrite the plan based on the principle of "thorough cooperation."¹²

The last draft submitted before the Joint Board approved Joint War Plan Orange in August 1924, and in direct response to the Joint Board's 10 July directive, was written by Krueger. The new draft relied fully on the principles of cooperation and paramount interest. In addition there were now three phases-- Initial, Second, and Conditional Subsequent-- with the latter being any other actions required

¹² NA, RG 125, Series M1421, Roll 9, JB 325-228, Memo JPC to JB, dated 20 June 1924; Memo JB to JPC, dated 10 July 1924.

should the sea and air campaign against Japan's navy and economic base fail. The Navy was designated as having paramount interest in the first two phases while paramount interest would have to be determined if the third phase was required. Additional changes specified that each service would create a single command for all its forces in the theater and that a joint staff would be created for both the Army and Navy commander. The only other change being that the Army was no longer responsible for retaking Guam or providing troops to relieve the Marine garrisons in the Carolines and Marshalls. However, a more general mission of providing another 15,000 troops at D+30 for movement to Pacific locations "as are to be seized and held" had been included. This appears to be the same mission as before but more generally stated, perhaps to avoid questions of paramount interest. Krueger's draft was approved, word for word, by the Joint Board on 15 August 1924.¹³

Krueger next had to turn his attention to producing the Army Strategical Plan Orange. This plan and its annexes determined which troops would be mobilized to execute the plan, directed that equipment would be procured for storage in the Philippines, and restated the mission of the troops to be assembled at D+30 as the reconquest of Guam. However, the plan specifically stated that Manila would be reinforced

¹³ NA, RG 165, File 2720-22, Item 8, "Draft by Krueger," dated 15 July 1924, *passim*; JB 325-228, annotation on copy of Joint War Plan Orange, stating approved 15 August 1924.

before the Japanese could take it. Earlier in the plan it was anticipated that the Japanese could land three or more divisions on Luzon within eight days of declaration of war, yet the 50,000 man reinforcements were not due in Oahu until D+10. By the time they could steam to Luzon the Japanese could well have defeated the garrison there. The way around this problem was by stating that D Day was the day the war plan was to be effective, not the first day of the war. The planners had assumed there would be time to mobilize.¹⁴

Logic errors abound in the Army plan. In the same paragraph that noted the Japanese could land in eight days was also stated the expectation that the Japanese would conduct a surprise attack. It also noted how much more difficult it would be to gain naval superiority over Japan if Manila had already fallen, yet contained the above mentioned problems over mobilizing and shipping troops and had no alternative base area if Manila Bay was no longer available. It was already known that Guam could not support the entire fleet. In sum, Krueger and AWPD were assuming away the threat to Luzon and assuming that reinforcements would arrive in time. Perhaps the cover letter to the plan recommending approval sheds some light. In that memo Krueger wrote:

Although a great amount of work has been given to its preparation, it contains no doubt many small errors and inconsistencies and perhaps a few large ones. In my judgment the plan constitutes a suitable basis for development and I therefore

¹⁴ NA, RG 407, Box 69, File AG 230, Army Strategical Plan Orange, 29 January 1925.

submit it with the recommendation that it be approved.¹⁵

Perhaps, after compromising on the issue of unity of command, the Army planners were simply waiting for the next revision in order to retry their ideas. It is interesting to note that the first draft of the next revision gave the Army until D+50 to assemble now 65,000 troops at Oahu and the possibility that Manila had fallen was readdressed.¹⁶

The development of joint war plans like Orange was not Krueger's only experience in this area. He observed the joint exercise in the Panama Canal in February 1923. Based on his report, and the report of other observers, the Joint Board directed that future joint exercises would be crafted by the Joint Board. This idea was tested in January 1924, and Krueger was the action officer in developing the joint plan and served as advisor to the chief Army umpire.¹⁷ These exercises tested the plans Krueger had assisted in preparing for defense of the Canal Zone and led to a long series of recommended improvements including adding more troops, increasing ammunition stocks, and capital construction. Both of these Panama Canal exercises were joint in that both

¹⁵ NA, RG 165, Box War plan Orange, File 1991, Krueger, Memo, Subject: Army War Plan Orange, 23 January 1925. Miller, in War Plan Orange, suggests that the Army had a surge of interest in saving Manila. He also notes that Army planners soon realized the probable loss of Manila and that more time would be needed to mobilize troops. See Miller, pp. 132-149.

¹⁶ NA, RG 165, File 2720-22, Item 9, Draft, 9/23/26 (Capt. Pye).

¹⁷ NA, RG 165, Box 60, File 1004, Packet of documents relating to exercises in the Panama Canal Zone, 1922-1923; Box 73, File 1470, Packet of documents relating to joint exercises, winter 1923-1924.

services participated, but the services were acting as enemies, not operating as a joint team. Krueger served in a similar position in the Grand Joint Exercise in Hawaii in the spring of 1925, only this time the two services acted on the same side conducting a joint attack on the defenses of Oahu.¹⁸

Naval War College, 1925-26 and OP-VI, 1928-32:

Armed with this first experience in producing joint war plans Krueger reported to the Naval War College. All of his experience had been in writing plans and working on training exercises. Now, for the first time, he would begin working with the war gaming process as developed by the Naval War College. His first experience in this realm was his work on the joint exercise played by his class in March-May 1926. His 1926 solution helps to clarify the thinking that went into the 1925 revision of War Plan Orange.

The General Situation issued for the problem stated a long period of tensions between Japan and the U.S. and that both sides had already mobilized. It also stated that the main frictions were related to trade and immigration and that due to stockpiling Japan may not require sea communications for up to a year. The situation warned that Japan was capable of achieving a strategic surprise attack, but it stated that

¹⁸ NA, RG 165, Box 76, File 1678, Packet of documents relating to maneuvers in Hawaii, Spring 1925.

there was no chance of a Japanese attack against the American continent.¹⁹

Problems noted above in War Plan Orange were clear in the Naval War College game. First, alternative anchorages in the Philippines were named. Second, it was stated that the Philippine garrison could hold on for at least thirty days.²⁰ However, in his solution Krueger stated that it would take at least 10 days to assemble all forces and 23 days to steam to the Philippines. He noted that by then Manila could have already fallen. The same problem noted in War Plan Orange is the key decision Krueger outlined in his solution. Krueger emphasized the additional problems the U.S. would face if the Philippines fell and stated that the U.S. could not succeed in a naval campaign without some form of advance base in the Western Pacific. "BLUE [is] on the horns of a dilemma, for he must either move across the PACIFIC before he has superior strength available, in order to save MANILA, or wait until his forces are concentrated, and meanwhile see MANILA fall into ORANGE hands."²¹

In his analysis of courses of action Krueger stated that ORANGE was inferior to the U.S. in all areas except troop strength and would become more inferior as time went on.

¹⁹ Krueger Papers, Box 21, File NWC Course 1925-26, Joint Problem I--Class of 1926, Section 2-26(a), pp. 1-2 and Section 2-26(c), Krueger Solution, p. 22.

²⁰ Ibid., Section 2-26(d); Section 2-26(a), p. 5.

²¹ Ibid., Krueger's solution pp. 32, 12, 23.

Krueger concluded that in order to avoid giving the Japanese a tactical advantage of defending against an amphibious invasion, the U.S. Fleet had to make an immediate sortie to the Philippines and defeat the Japanese fleet before Manila fell. The rest of the troops required to retake Guam, the Marshalls, and the Carolines could be transported once the advanced base had been secured. He also refused to make plans for the deployment of Army troops from Hawaii saying future operations "will depend so largely upon the outcome of the operations of the BLUE Battlefleet, that it would be futile to predict how [they] should be executed."²²

Krueger's solution to his Joint Problem I, written about a year after concluding preparation of War Plan Orange, is useful in that it expands on the thinking that shaped that war plan including the reasons for dropping the phrase "retaking Manila," timelines for mobilization and deployment, and the defense of the U.S. and the Philippines. In addition, Krueger again outlined many of the conditions which would lead to war with Japan in 1941, foresaw Japanese operations against Oahu and the Marshalls, Marianas, and Carolines, and predicted the great difficulty in defeating Japan if the Japanese took the advanced base at Manila. However, this exercise was not particularly joint other than coordinating Navy and Army air assets. The student only had to determine the proper method of deployment. The problem Krueger developed as a faculty

²² Ibid., Krueger's solution, pp. 25 and 43, 52.

member in 1928 went on to actually address joint overseas operations.

At the time Krueger reported to Newport in 1928 as a faculty member the Presidents of the Army and Navy War Colleges had agreed to cooperate in the development of a joint overseas problem to be played at both schools. Upon his arrival at Newport Krueger was designated the point of contact for any questions from the Army War College about development of the problem. Correspondence between the two Presidents indicate that the development of the problem was not smooth. RADM Pringle set four goals for the process: developing methods of joint planning, developing appreciation of problems of coordination, testing command relationships, and testing the tentative Joint Operations Landing in Force. While Pringle focused on the staff process, Maj. Gen. W.D. Connor seemed to focus on problems he saw in command relations and in the evolution of the BLUE-ORANGE confrontation before the start point of the exercise. None-the-less, the problem was completed and played in May 1929. As the only Army faculty member at the Naval War College we can assume that Krueger played a major role in developing the Army parts of the problem, although there is little evidence of his specific contributions.²³

²³ MHI, Army War College Curricular Archives, File 242-13 is a packet of correspondence between Pringle and Connor March-August 1928. A letter of 17 April 1928 sets Pringle's goals. A letter of 11 June 1928 appoints Krueger as the NWC POC.

As completed, Operations Problem VI (OP-VI) was truly a joint problem with the students having to consider loading, transporting, and debarking Army forces in a forced landing. They also were required to determine air operations and naval gunfire support. The problems with War Plan Orange (as echoed by Connor) as to mobilization and use of troops before the fall of Manila were ignored and Manila was assumed to already be in Japanese hands. This allowed the students to concentrate on operational and tactical problems as opposed to those of a strategic nature. The mission for OP-VI was: "To capture LUZON, by joint operations beginning one December, in order to gain a base (MANILA BAY) from which further operations may be undertaken to isolate ORANGE."²⁴

The Blue estimate of the situation noted that the Army had some 55,000 troops currently in the Philippines. However, it estimated the Japanese already had 100,000 troops on Luzon and stated a requirement of 350,000 troops to retake Luzon. Blue occupied some southern Philippine islands which they planned to develop as a base area and were currently seizing other areas of the Southern Philippines.²⁵ CINC-USFleet decided he would need from April until November to build up the forces required. The Commander, Philippine Force, as a subordinate of CINC-USFleet, was given command of all Army and Navy forces in the Philippine Area and was given a series of

²⁴ NHC, RG 4, File 1438, OP-VI. 1438-A, pp. 1-4 and Annex C, p. 2.

²⁵ Ibid., OP-VI, 1438-B, Section 4, pp. 5-6; 1438-C, p. 22.

naval missions as well as military to complete before November. The naval missions included cutting Japanese lines of communication to Luzon. Military missions included establishment of air bases within range of Luzon. All command relationships were based on the principle of paramount interest.²⁶

It can be seen that the new problem went far beyond that which Krueger had played in 1926. Command relationships and mission were established so that all commanders were required to consider and execute land, air, and sea operations. The problem was realistic in that it acknowledged damage to the U.S. Fleet, difficulty in retaking Luzon, and the requirement for land based air and airfields somewhere in the Philippine Islands, preferably on Mindoro. It also foresaw the need to take a series of smaller islands to interrupt Japanese communications. These missions had not been envisioned in the initial mission to CINC-USFleet, just as they had not in War Plan Orange (1925).

The plan for the actual landings on Luzon envisioned landings in the Batangas area to establish more airfields followed by landings in Lingayen Gulf and on Bataan in order to take Manila.²⁷ The actual plans for these landings were written after consultations with Krueger and other faculty members of the Naval War College. Several letters exist

²⁶ Ibid., OP-VI, 1438-C, p. 13; 1438-D, pp. 3-4.

²⁷ Ibid., OP-VI, 1438-G, p. 9.

between Krueger and Col. DeWitt, Assistant Commandant, Army War College exchanging information. It is clear that faculty members at the Army War College saw Krueger as a driving force in the game. One letter from the Naval Officer on the Army War College Faculty stated: "The joint problem is a wonder and explains the failure of so many previous joint undertakings. Wright and Krueger have done some wonderful work. . . ."28

OP-VI was played for most of the 1930s although updated for changes in technology. However, the estimate of the Japanese situation needed little revision when war broke out in 1941. The events described in the background information occurred much as written and the process of retaking Luzon occurred much like envisioned in the plan including the airfields on Mindoro and the secondary landings at Batangas and on Bataan. In addition, the process gave Krueger greater understanding of the needs and capabilities of the Navy and for the requirements for future war planning.

Army War Plans Division, 1934-1938:

Upon his return to the AWPD in 1934 Krueger was again thrown into the process of developing joint war plans. This time, as Executive Officer, AWPD, Krueger was the senior Army officer on the Joint Planning Committee. He would later, as Chief, AWPD, have a seat on the Joint Board. As the Executive

²⁸ NHC, RG 2, Box 8, File A16-3(14), Letter from Capt. Meyers to "Gussie," 3 September 1928.

all papers produced by the division passed through his hands before going to the Chief. As the Chief, he had to approve all documents developed by the division. Thus, in these years, Krueger had oversight over all aspects of Army joint war planning. The major difference is that this time Krueger had far greater experience in naval matters.

The Joint Board had approved a new Orange Plan in 1928 and this plan remained in place, with many changes, until the mid-1930s. The plan had some of the same aspects of the previous Orange Plan of 1925 in that it envisioned an immediate offensive riposte towards the Philippines in response to Japanese aggression. OP-IV had already demonstrated that under the 1925 and 1928 Orange plans the American fleet would be severely damaged by Orange.²⁹ In addition, during the joint exercise of 1933 serious doubts were raised as to the ability of the fleet to make the passage.³⁰ Little was done to significantly change the plan until 1934 when Japan left the League of Nations and gave notice that it would abrogate arms limitations treaties in 1936. In 1932 Capt. S.W. Bryant was made chief of naval planning and in July 1933 Admiral W.H. Standley became CNO. Both of these men knew and had worked with Krueger in previous assignments. The period of the mid-1930s has been cited as "an era of harmony among the war-planning agencies. An

²⁹ NHC, RG 4, OP-VI, 1438-A, pp. 1-4.

³⁰ See Miller, pp. 168-170.

atmosphere of shared values fostered agreement on large issues and settlement of details by mutual accommodation or at least by orderly debates that yielded results all parties could accept."³¹ Perhaps the relationships Krueger had forged with these naval officers and others, as well as his knowledge of naval operations and limitations account for some of the new cooperation.

Both Bryant and Standley were Cautionaries. They believed that the Navy could not save Manila and that War Plan Orange should direct a path through the Mandated Islands before taking Truk as the main advanced base. The navy did not show their new concept to the Army until early 1935 when Stanley Embick, who was known for opposing the immediate offensive against Japan, became Chief, AWPD.³² Their opening, besides Embick's reentry to AWPD, was a memo from General MacArthur asking for a revision of the plan due to the establishment of the new Four Army Organization. Some of the operational details had to be altered to conform with changed Army command structures. Also, MacArthur wanted to add a Pacific Coast Theater to control the operations of mobilization and embarkation of troops for Hawaii.³³ By 1933

³¹ Ibid., pp. 137, 180-182.

³² Ibid., p. 182.

³³ For details on the 1935 revision see NA, RG 407, Box 69, File AG No 234, Development File Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan Orange; RG 165, Box War Plan Orange, File 2720; and NA, RG 225, Series M1421, Reel 16, Joint Board 350-546. Many of the referenced documents are in more than one of these locations. MacArthur's memo to the Joint Board is dated 18 January 1935.

the Army was ready to take a slower approach to war with Japan.³⁴

Embick soon energized AWPD to look for staging bases required before an assault on the Philippines. He was even willing to consider that the Philippines did not have to be retaken as part of the defeat of Japan.³⁵ AWPD coordinated with NWPD on the issue. Although Krueger's old colleague Bryant was gone by the spring, another friend, RADM Pye, was now Director, NWPD and Capt Coffey was back on the NWPD staff.

The Joint Planning Committee rapidly approved the Navy's plan and Krueger signed the memo to the Joint Board recommending the change. Other changes followed, but not to the general concept. In many ways the new plan was more realistic than the 1925 and 1928 plans. The forces in Manila were now only to hold the mouth of Manila Bay "as long as possible" and the Commander in Manila was told to expect no reinforcements. The initial Army force was now only 7,500 men available in San Francisco on M+12. This force would be taken from an active Army Division and did not depend on mobilization or shipment to Hawaii. The larger forces were not required until M+20 (12,000), M+60 (30,000), M+90 (50,000), and M+105 (as needed). In addition, for the first

³⁴ Miller, p. 183.

³⁵ NA, RG 165, File 2720, Memo, Embick to AWPD, 22 April 1935.

time, Plan Orange required that all forces be trained for amphibious operations.³⁶

The Joint Board approved the new, slower plan in May 1935 as a revision to the 1928 Plan with MacArthur agreeing to the tacit planned loss of the Philippines. What is interesting is that with such a significant change this War Plan was published as a revision to the 1928 plan rather than as a whole new plan. Embick, in a letter to MacArthur defended it as a change to "the initial deployment" of Army troops rather than as a material change to the concept of sending expeditionary forces to the Western Pacific. He underplayed the significance of the planned operations in the Carolines and Marshalls prior to any move to the Philippines.³⁷ In fact, the revision opened the possibility of direct attack on Japan from the bases secured in the Carolines. The new approved Orange Plan, with its "island-hopping" approach to the Philippines looked much like the war envisioned in OP-VI.

The next change to War Plan Orange began almost immediately as the Army and Navy WPD staffs worked out the details of the revision. The Army did not complete its detailed planning until the summer of 1936 and by then Krueger was Chief, AWPD.³⁸ Another revision was approved in May 1936,

³⁶ NA, RG 225, Joint Board 350-546, Memo, Joint Planning Committee to Joint Board, 23 April 1935 and attached draft of changes to War Plan Orange. This was the draft approved by the Joint Board on 9 May 1935.

³⁷ NA, RG 407, AG No 234, memo from Embick to MacArthur, 8 April 1935.


³⁸ NA, RG 165, File 2720-72, 19 June 1936.

but none of the major aspects of the plan were altered. This revision was partially the result of a joint exercise conducted in that year to test the new war plan.³⁹

At the same time as these revisions were ongoing, Krueger began to study by himself the concept of war planning, especially in case of war with Japan. In this light he produced two significant documents. The first was completed less than a week after the Joint Board approved the 1936 revision to War Plan Orange. This 100 page study evaluated Japanese courses of action in case of a Pacific war. Instead of the normal focus on Guam and the Philippines with the Japanese on the strategic offensive, Krueger thought that, despite some limited offensive operations, the Japanese would be on the strategic defensive. After establishing a defensive line, the Japanese would defend it and force the U.S. to pierce the perimeter. Krueger added the Marianas as a key part of the Japanese war effort. The Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls formed a large "T" which covered the Philippines and protected the sea lines of communication between Japan and the Dutch East Indies while threatening the flank of any fleet movement to the Philippines or directly from Hawaii to Japan. He termed this the "main line of resistance." Only after the perimeter was pierced would the Japanese be required to offer a major fleet battle. Map 1 shows Krueger's "T."⁴⁰

³⁹ See NA, RG, 225, JB 350-570.

⁴⁰ NA, RG 165, File 2720-71, Army War Plans Division War Plan Orange, 1936, dated 28 May 1936, pp. 8, 22, 25. The document was missing



Map 1

Krueger also noted that all the islands were within flying distance of each other and that many of the islands were large enough to support bomber squadrons. Krueger specifically noted the islands large enough to support bombers-- Chichijima, Maug, Saipan, Guam, Yap, Fais, Pelew, Truk, Ponape, Jaluit, Kursae, Wotje, and Eniwetok. He noted

from the NA in January 1994. Mr. Edward Miller cited it in his book War Plan Orange. He sent me a 12 page extract of the document along with some notes. It is possible that this document was developed earlier and the 28 May 1936 date was merely the date of the letter transmitting the document to the AG or Chief of Staff. Map 1 is adapted from Miller, Map 10.1, p. 118.

that if a plane flew over the Marianas chain from Japan to Yap the longest overwater flight would be 550 miles, while from Saipan to Jaluit in the Marshalls the longest overwater distance was 525 miles. Each island could support each other or could support a long-range air movement.⁴¹

Krueger went on to discuss three possible Japanese courses of action. He reiterated that each was part of a defensive strategy. Each course of action included the conquest of the Philippines, Guam, and, at least, the Aleutian Islands. Each course of action also included the requirement for the Japanese fleet to inflict heavy losses among American capital ships in order to create a more equitable situation for a major fleet engagement. The islands previously noted were to be used as air and submarine bases for raids on the American fleet. The first course of action would be the capture of Hawaii and Alaska and then the conduct of a campaign of attrition against the American fleet. The second was to occupy the Mandated Islands and Alaska and then conduct a campaign of attrition against Hawaii and the Pacific Coast. The third was the same as the second, but more directly concerned with defending the conquered assets and not on attrition of the American fleet.⁴²

Krueger thought that the first plan would be based on the hope that the American people were so pacifist that they would

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 22-23.

not support a long war for the purpose of regaining Hawaii. The Japanese would expect the U.S. to negotiate a conclusion or simply accept the loss. Krueger did not believe that Japan expected to follow this course of action but "if opportunity beckons too hard Orange will succumb and make the attempt." He believed that the Japanese would adopt the second course of action. In this case their forces would not be as dispersed as in the first and would not try to defend every Mandated Island as in the third. Krueger did not believe the Japanese would strongly defend the Marshalls but they could choose to develop the islands that had the highest military potential. The forces left in the Aleutians would threaten the American flank while discouraging an American advance through the North Pacific. This would force the U.S. to the southern route to the Western Pacific, guarded by the Marianas and Carolines. The Japanese would focus their efforts on the "T" described earlier.⁴³

The document is interesting in many lights. First, it indicates that Krueger was thinking along the same lines as his naval colleagues, not just doing as directed by Embick. Second, he again accurately foresaw many elements of the Pacific War. The islands and defenses he described are much like those in the Navy's Central Pacific campaigns of World War II. However, his description of the islands as air bases and the note that a plane could fly from one to another

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 23-29.

forecast the great limiter of advance in the Southwest Pacific-- the operating range of land based fighter aircraft. Finally, he envisioned the defensive strategy and hope for negotiation that motivated the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and their Centrifugal Offensive in 1941-1942. While not a key part of the 1936 War Plan Orange, the document illuminates Krueger's strategic thinking and points to the future.

The second key document of his tenure as Chief, AWPD came in October 1937. In the meantime Krueger had overseen some significant changes to the way the Army mobilized for war. Before 1936 mobilization plans were based on the requirements of specific war plans. Units were designated to support certain war plans. Thus, if War Plan X were executed some new units might be created before some National Guard units were mobilized and before some active units even brought up to wartime strength. The entire mobilized force could be deployed overseas before any other forces were activated or created. This method of mobilization caused some of the problems in the 1925 War Plan Orange that were noted earlier in this chapter. Also, these mobilizations flaws were part of the reason the Navy was ready for immediate action while the Army required a period of time before it was ready for deployment, as was noted in Chapter III.

In October 1936 the Army implemented the Protective Mobilization Plan. This system stated that in a major war the first mission of the armed forces had to be as a covering force for the U.S. as it geared up its war effort. In future

emergencies a balanced force would be mobilized with the mission of protecting the United States, to include Hawaii and the Panama Canal.⁴⁴

It appears that this new policy of mobilizing first to defend the U.S. and then, after ensuring domestic security, in order to undertake overseas operations was the spark for an 28 October 1937 memo that Krueger personally gave to the Chief of Staff. The memo is important enough to be quoted at length.

For some time there has been serious doubt in my mind as to the soundness of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - ORANGE (1928) as amended. This doubt has been intensified by events now taking place in the Far East. Moreover, the possibility that the plan referred to may be put into execution if the Far Eastern Situation should at any time be such as to involve us, has filled me with such grave apprehension that I feel duty bound to bring it to your attention.

The present plan offers but one course of action for the United States in case of a BLUE-ORANGE war; namely, a prompt strategic offensive against ORANGE across 7,000 miles of sea, via the Mandate Islands. No alternative course of action is provided. In other words . . . the President would be give no choice other than to discard the offensive proposed in the plan or approve it irregardless of the consequences in the light of--

- a. The issues involved;
- b. The international situation;
- c. Our domestic situation; and
- d. Our state of military and naval

preparedness; any one of which might have a material bearing on the line of action the United States should adopt.

The international situation today is changing with kaleidoscopic rapidity. No one can predict today what the alignments in Europe and Asia will be tomorrow. . . . Yet the plan, disregarding these considerations, projects a series of detailed successive operations far into the future and into a

⁴⁴ NA, RG 165, Box 93, File 2722-3, Brig. Gen. Krueger, "War Plans and War Planning" a lecture at the Army War College, 3 January 1938, pp. 1-4.

theater thousands of miles distant from the Continental United States. . . .

It is also probable that the war envisaged in the plan under discussion will involve the maximum war effort of the United States. Unless, however, our people felt that their vital interests were at stake, and this is improbable, we could scarcely expect them to support an offensive war such as that envisaged in this plan. Moreover, we are today in the midst of a profound social revolution which has gradually gained more and more in extent during the past decade. Hence, the staggering toll of such a war as that envisaged in the plan might well strain our political and social structure beyond the breaking point. In any case, what would we gain, even if we were victorious, if America were ruined in the process?

Under this [plan], practically the entire resources of the country would be committed to the support of very distant, very risky offensive operations that are primarily Naval, without due regard to the fact that such offensive operations may not suffice, or may even fail. Furthermore, the wisdom of allotting so much of our limited Regular Army, especially anti-aircraft artillery units, and units of the GHQ Air Force, to support such an offensive in a distant theater, before similar units are organized, trained, and equipped to replace them in the United States, is open to serious question. . . . Should the offensive fail or should some other unforeseen contingency arise . . . the security of United States territory might be seriously jeopardized by reason of the fact that such a large proportion of these units had been diverted to expeditionary forces.⁴⁵

This is a stunning discourse on the state of war plans in 1937. It is obvious that the Protective Mobilization Plan could not protect the U.S. if the war plan was executed in its entirety. Nor would the U.S. be in a position to fight a two front war. Based on the state of public opinion in regards to war and European intervention in 1937, Krueger was right in questioning the strength of public support. Most important,

⁴⁵ NA, RG 165, Box War Plan Orange, File 2720-104, Memo to the Chief of Staff, 28 October 1937.

the current plans failed in a cardinal principle-- always give the commander a choice and allow the commander to make a decision. Military minds had created these plans, specifically focusing on only one country at a time, ignoring competing claims on forces, and masterfully organizing technical details. Krueger, a master historian of World War I, must have seen a repeat of German war plans and wondered if the military or the civilians would be in charge.

Krueger also questioned the planned defeat Japan by primarily naval means "in spite of the fact that history does not record a single instance of any first-class military-naval power having ever been subdued primarily by such action." He recommended the creation of an entirely new plan that merely stated a readiness posture and then provided some contingency alternative courses of action. The plan had to be flexible, feasible, realistic in light of the world situation, and, "above all else, it should be in harmony with our national ideals and policy."⁴⁶ The demand for contingency plans rather than a preset series of acts is a clear development of his solution to Joint Problem I at Newport in 1926 where he stated that follow on missions could not be specified until the situation had been clarified.

The response from the Chief of Staff was almost immediate. On 3 November he sent a retyped copy of the letter, with very few changes other than deleting the

⁴⁶ Ibid.

emotional reference to social revolution, to the CNO with his own signature affixed. On 5 November the Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Embick, sent a memo to AWPD directing them to prepare for the Joint Board a memo recommending rescinding War Plan Orange and creating a new Orange Plan that provided for the defense of the U.S. and provided contingency courses of action. One wonders if Embick knew that Krueger had started the entire action. On 10 November the idea was presented to the Joint Board. At that first meeting the Joint Board agreed that War Plan Orange (1928) as amended should be immediately rescinded and directed the Joint Planning Committee to come up with a new plan and, subsequently, with contingency plans.⁴⁷

The Joint Planning Committee immediately deadlocked. They disagreed on the general concept, missions, and on operations in the Western Pacific and could not come to consensus. Krueger's old Thruster colleague, Capt. Coffey, was the senior naval member of the Committee and the Navy tried to maintain the offensive war effort. On 30 November the Committee sent two separate drafts to the Joint Board, but the Joint Board also deadlocked on the issue. On 7 December they directed the Committee to start over, this time providing very specific guidance. The result was the same. The next draft, sent to the Joint Board on 27 December, had two columns for missions, concepts and Pacific operations. One column was

⁴⁷ NA, RG 165, File 2720-104, memos of 29 October and 3, 5, 9, and 10 November 1937; RG 225, Series M1421, Roll 1, Minutes of the Joint Board, Minutes for 10 November 1937.

the Army draft, the other the Navy proposal. Again, the Joint Board could not agree. Finally, Maj. Gen. Embick and RADM Richardson were charged with drafting a new plan. They took the last Joint Planning Committee draft and, with a pencil, picked the passages they wanted, lining out the others, choosing, paragraph by paragraph, either the Army or the Navy proposal. The new plan was approved by the Joint Board on 21 February 1938.⁴⁸

The new plan was a compromise between the two services, but met the criteria established by Krueger in his memorandum of 28 October. The key assumption was that there would be a period of tension, but that Japan would strike without warning. Another assumption was that the U.S. would have enough naval superiority to operate westward of Oahu. The concept of the war was progressively severe military and economic pressure, primarily naval in nature. The joint mission was defeat of Japan, "while conserving the resources of the United States and protecting United States' territory." The Army was to defend the continent, prepare for contingencies, and support the Navy. The Navy was to defeat Japan's forces, interrupt Japan's sea communications while protecting the American and allied sea communications, and support of the Army. In the two mission statements one can

⁴⁸ NA, RG 407, Box 68, File AG No 225, Development File Joint Army and Navy War Plan Orange, 1938; RG 225, Series M1421, Roll 16, JB 350-617 and JB 350-618 (after the first Joint Board deadlock they changed the serial number); Roll 1, Minutes of the Joint Board, Minutes for 7 December 1937 and 19 January and 18 February 1938.

sense the divergence of opinion between the services. Specific missions were the defense of the West Coast and the occupation of the Aleutians, the defense of Oahu, and the defense of the Panama Canal. The Navy was authorized to operate against Japanese forces in the Western Pacific so long as secure lines of communication were maintained.⁴⁹ Command relationships were not specified.

On 22 November, during the process of developing the plan, Krueger wrote another important memorandum on war planning-- possibly as advice to his subordinates on the Joint Planning Committee. His opening comment was pure Clausewitz: "The first and most critical decision which the statesman and the highest military authority must make in connection with any war is to determine the nature of the war." He noted that political objectives, international considerations, and issues at stake must be provided. He also wrote that limited and unlimited war had to be considered and it had to be determined if the population would support unlimited war. "If unlimited war is beyond the strength of a nation, . . . then disaster will overtake the nation that engages in it." He went on to note that war plans had to be crafted to allow the nation to mobilize and then take whatever courses of action were required for the current situation. He felt there should be a mobilization plan, a concentration plan to provide the state of readiness required, and then a number of tentative

⁴⁹ NA, RG 407, Box 68, File AG No 223, Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (1938), *passim*.

operations plans. The latter plans were only to show in a general way what things could be done. He felt that the above ideas were not intended to limit plans to only defensive actions, but actually allowed the greatest freedom of action. In a direct rebuff of the Navy position he said that their proposals went beyond mobilization, concentration, defense and preparation and involved the United States in larger wars. Krueger ended the memo saying: "Let us not forget Napoleon's assertion that he never had a plan; that France and Germany each had a plan, but that beyond the respective concentrations, both failed."⁵⁰

This memo was Krueger's last great input to the war planning process before he left AWPD in June 1938. Its impact was significant. Not only had he forced a drastic revision of the plans for war with Japan, based on great personal knowledge of Japan's power, options, and likely actions as well as on the requirements of war in the Pacific, but his principles for war planning affected the rest of the color plans. In December 1937 during the revision of Orange the Japanese sank the U.S.S. Panay. Later that month the President authorized the first talks with the British Admiralty and in January 1938 the first talks were held with the Canadians. Krueger's efforts had finally forced the war planning machinery to recognize that Japan might not be the only enemy in a future war and that the U.S. could have

⁵⁰ NA, RG 165, Box War Plan Orange, File 2720-104, Memo "Some Thoughts on the Joint Basic War Plan Orange," dated 22 November 1937.

powerful allies.⁵¹ Later that year efforts began that resulted in the Rainbow Plans and future plans were based on the current international situation, not a frozen set of aging assumptions.

From the early 1920s to the late 1930s Krueger served in a procession of positions that added to his experience. In return he provided input that resulted in a War Plan Orange that was essentially unchanged until 1935. He was then active in the revision of that plan to a more cautionary approach and then the destruction of that plan in 1938. Krueger played an important role in creating the war game that trained a decade of Army and Naval officers in the methods of joint planning and landing force operations and helped continue the focus on war in the Pacific. Finally, his ideas pushed the war planning community over the edge to a method of planning based on the current situation, contingency plans, and political decisionmaking that exists today.

⁵¹ James J. Schneider, "War Plan Rainbow 5," an unpublished paper written at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 November 1987.

CHAPTER V

LUZON, 1945

Some seven years after being the catalyst that led to the drastic revision of War Plan Orange into a mobilization, defense, and contingency plan General Walter Krueger was commanding the army that was about to execute an operation that looked much like OP-VI, the war game he had helped write in 1928-29. As envisioned in War Plan Orange (1928), with its many revisions, especially those in the mid-1930s, and as explained in his own 1936 AWPD document, the United States had battled into the Western Pacific, gaining overwhelming naval and air superiority after driving through the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls. Just as warned in the earliest documents he had helped write, the task of retaking Luzon and reopening Manila Bay would be a most difficult operation. The earlier plans estimated 100,000 Japanese troops on Luzon. The actual figure in January 1945 was in excess of 225,000.

However, Walter Krueger had not come to Lingayen Gulf in Northern Luzon the way the war plans had predicted. The Japanese Central Pacific defensive perimeter had been "pierced," to use Krueger's own word, by the "primarily Naval" means laid out in War Plans Orange 1925, 1928, 1936, and 1938. Krueger, however, had come along the southern route via Australia, the Bismarcks, and New Guinea. No matter his route, in January 1945 he was about to launch the operation

that would liberate the Philippines. He was already planning the next step-- the invasion of the Japanese home islands.

In this chapter the command relationships and planning process in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), as illustrated by the assault landings at Lingayen Gulf, the opening phase of the Luzon Campaign, will be outlined in order to explore acceptance or rejection of some of the key elements of operational level doctrine and which planning for joint operations Krueger had helped forged in the 1920s and 1930s.

Command in the Southwest Pacific:

In early 1942 President Roosevelt ordered Douglas MacArthur to escape from Bataan and Corregidor and establish himself in Australia. Eventually, by order of the President, MacArthur was placed in command of SWPA and was designated the Commander-in-Chief of all forces in his theater. The provision for the President appointing a joint commander had been included in all versions of JAAN. Eventually working for MacArthur were 6th and 8th Armies, 5th Air Force, and 7th Fleet.

The creation of SWPA had not been anticipated in any of the war plans Krueger helped develop. In all those plans there was only one theater area in the Pacific. Part of the 1935 revisions had been to add a theater along the Pacific coast of the Continental U.S. and another around Hawaii, but these were envisioned as defensive measures to ease coordination. The Pacific had remained one war-fighting

theater. Once the war began, the Navy was temporarily crippled, allies were added, and the Japanese expanded the scope by operating in the Bismarcks, it became apparent that one theater would not suffice. Span of control alone was sufficient argument for the creation of additional theaters along geographic lines.

Much has been written about the decision to split the Pacific into different theaters. Many authors have focused on personalities. Roosevelt created a hero in MacArthur and could not dismiss him, yet the Pacific Ocean dictated that the war with Japan would be primarily naval. Admiral King dislike MacArthur and tried to establish supremacy of the Navy in the Pacific. Officially, the Navy wanted to maintain the system established by the pre-war plans and had the weight of decades of planning on their side. However, a careful analysis of the geography and types of operations shows a justification and perhaps a real need for more than one theater.

The war in the Central Pacific, especially the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas would be open water offensive operations and forced landings on small islands. These islands might be within fighter aircraft range of each other, but were too far apart to allow any operating time over the targets. This area called for naval aviation operating from carriers. However, to the south lay New Guinea and the Philippines. These were large land masses and their conquest would involve sustained land operations. In addition, they had the terrain to support land-based aviation. Under the

principle of paramount interest each of these areas of operations, and the types of operations they demanded, would call for a commander from a different service-- Navy in the Central Pacific and Army in New Guinea and the Philippines. In order to keep from shifting back and forth between commander, and to alleviate some of the suspected frictions of operations conducted under the guise of the principle of cooperation, it made sense to create at least two theaters and two joint Commanders-in-Chief. Paramount interest supported the decision for two theaters.

The problems that might occur in this system of theaters lay in the fact that the main areas of Japanese military resistance were in close proximity to the dividing line between the theaters. The two theater commanders would have to cooperate and the only means for coordinating operations was in Washington. The issue reached a climax in 1943 with the decision for the Twin Drives. Admiral King argued, like Krueger had in 1936, that the Marianas were the key to the Japanese defensive perimeter. Once the line was pierced the Japanese would either have to fight a decisive fleet action or would have to fall back to the home islands. King also believed that a toehold in the Marianas would threaten the Japanese lines of communications to the resource rich south.¹

¹ E.B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 279. This information and the argument over the two sources can be found in a variety of sources including Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, John Keegan, World War Two, and Stokesbury, A Short History of World War II. The more interesting point for our purposes is that King focused on the Marianas using many of the same arguments as Krueger did in his 1936 study.

On the other hand, moving into the Philippines would also cut the resource link while turning the entire Japanese flank and allowing for a transition to operations on the Asian continent. In addition, MacArthur was able to forcefully argue a moral commitment to liberate the Philippines. Combined in the two arguments were all the assumptions and beliefs of the prewar plans-- the slow drive along the Mandates, the relief/liberation of the Philippine garrison, and the need to conduct both military and economic war against Japan. Roosevelt and his military commanders finally agreed to accept both strategic plans and leave open until later the final step of invading Japan. In other words they chose to not plan so far in advance as to later limit their possible courses of action, just as Krueger had suggested in November 1937.

After the great decisions to approve the Twin Drives in the Pacific, cooperation was always achieved, if not after arguments and trading. Both Nimitz and MacArthur eventually realized that the existence of two theaters may have somewhat weakened them, but also forced the Japanese to disperse their troops. As they could not be strong everywhere, the Japanese were inherently weak somewhere. By forcing the Japanese to focus on two different enemy theaters, both driving into their defensive perimeter, the U.S. effort was able to confound the Japanese at almost every turn.

The creation of a joint theater commander was in keeping with the principles laid out in JAAN (1935). The subsequent

lack of delegation of command below the theater commander may have also been in keeping with the operational precepts of JAAN (1935), but it frustrated Krueger and went against the advice he had been offering since the early 1920s. MacArthur refused to create operational level joint commanders. At no time were any of his subordinate commanders able to command a joint operation. All planning and execution was completed based on the principle of cooperation.²

MacArthur had the authority to form a joint task force and appointed a joint commander, but he never did so. The 1938 revisions to JAAN (1935) were not clear on the issue and there is always the issue of MacArthur allowing a subordinate to gain publicity. (One would suspect that any officer in command of a joint task force would be the target of the press and would divert attention from the CINC.) However, in a step that may have violated the spirit of the revisions to JAAN (1935), MacArthur appointed Krueger as the coordination point for plans in every operation involving 6th Army. In effect, Krueger was given a superior position than the other service commanders. If an disagreement could not be resolved by the planning staffs it was first brought to Krueger. Only if he could not forge agreement was the matter taken to MacArthur.

² This arrangement was completely accord with the 1938 revision of JAAN (1935) although MacArthur could have also requested activation of provision that allowed for the appointment of joint commanders.

Krueger did not relate any instances when such a recourse was required.³

Coordination of tactical amphibious operations was conducted under the precepts of current field manuals and Chapter VI, JAAN (1935), "Joint Overseas Expeditions." This gave the naval force commander command of land forces until the landing force commander was established ashore. This occurred at each level of command from battalion through Army. However, the exchange of command was never allowed except in consultation with Krueger, the 6th Army Commander.⁴ While Krueger never was able to exercise unity of command in joint operations, he was given a great amount of control over planning and executing the joint operations.

Planning for SWPA Operations:

The normal method of planning in SWPA was that MacArthur's headquarters would issue a staff study and then operations instructions for a specific operation. The latter would specify missions for all forces in an operation. Krueger would often shape future plans by suggesting in advance the outlines of a staff study or operations instructions. Then, while he waited for GHQ to issue the

³ Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, *passim*. See also 6th Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, 4 Volumes, Volume 1, GHQ, SWPA Directives, Operations Instruction Number 73, 12 October 1944, paragraph 3.x. for an example.

⁴ JAAN (1935), Chapter 6; 6th Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, Volume I, p. 110.

appropriate documents, he would start his staff planning process.⁵ Some time later the senior commanders (Army, Navy and Air Force), usually after much detailed planning had been completed, would gather with MacArthur for a commanders conference to go over the plan. Once MacArthur approved those plans the commanders were charged with completing the detailed planning.

Krueger received Operations Instructions #73 for the Luzon Operation on 12 October, 1944 as he was preparing to depart for the Leyte operation. The target date for the operation was 20 December. Krueger was charged with presenting a coordinated briefing, including the plans of all the services, to MacArthur on 20 November. By then, the plans for the various services had been coordinated and detailed work was ongoing.

Just two days after Krueger received Operations Instructions #73 6th Army planners had a general tactical and logistical plan that met with Krueger's and MacArthur's approval. How could they have worked so fast? One reason is clearly the familiarity with the Philippines that was shared by senior members of the Army and naval staffs. The general landing areas directed by MacArthur were those that had been

⁵ Interviews with John Crichton, wartime aide to Krueger, 4 February 1994, Ike Kampmann, wartime aide to Krueger, 4 February 1994, and Walter Krueger, Jr, 17 January 1994. All three sources verified that Krueger would suggest the specifics of future operations to MacArthur and that MacArthur usually adopted the ideas

used in OP-VI at the war colleges.⁶ The Navy War College had used Philippine waters for many of their other war games in the inter-war period. In addition, many of the officers on both staffs had been posted in the Philippines and knew the terrain. Krueger had campaigned in the Lingayen Gulf area in 1901, had mapped Luzon in 1909, and had conducted detailed studies of the landing areas and the maneuver areas on Luzon as part of OP-VI. In addition, the general idea for landing at Lingayen Gulf had been known for some time, and this is probably one of the operations where Krueger influenced MacArthur in advance. Other commanders from both services had similar experience as the Army staff. Naval commanders knew of Krueger's past experience in the field of joint operations and were willing to accept his judgement. Kinkaid had been a student and the air force operators knew of Krueger's aviation experience. Krueger's ideas from his 1931 lecture at the Naval War College were put into effect during the planning process-- "intelligently loyal cooperation and mutual confidence" were apparent. As in all the joint operations in SWPA, Krueger's long experience with the Navy was paying off.

As he left for Leyte Krueger directed that members of his staff remain in New Guinea in order to be co-located with the headquarters of 5th Air Force and 7th Fleet. In this manner planning could be easily conducted. Krueger was kept informed

⁶ In a side note it should be noted that there are only three or four areas on Luzon large enough to be suitable for a major amphibious invasion. However, each of these had been included in OP-VI and Krueger was familiar with each.

by radio and courier until all planning shifted to Leyte in late November. The planning that was left to be decided was primarily shipping, but this was key. The number of troops that could be landed depended on available shipping. Troops had to concentrate after coming from as far away as eastern New Guinea. The Navy also had to provide shipping for supplies. The number of available ships could limit any operation. All of these factors were commonplace by 1945 after decades of war games in Philippine waters and two years of combat operations.

In the aviation arena, the air forces were dependant on the Army for the construction of air fields. Until they had landing strips, the navy had to provide considerable air support from their carriers. All these factors were considered and hammered out in mutual cooperation and frequent staff conferences. Finally, 6th Army Intelligence provided the Navy with all the data it had on Japanese positions, bridges, and coast defense guns so they could plan gunfire support.⁷ The flow of information between the various planning staffs was free and voluminous. In addition, 6th Army had several naval liaison officers to help expedite the flow of information and planning.⁸ While not given joint command, the delegation of coordination to Krueger ensured

⁷ See 6th Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, Volume 1, pp. 6, 8, 10-11; Krueger, Down Under to Nippon, pp. 210-216.

⁸ Interview, Mr. Ike Kampmann, 3 February 1994, tape in possession of the author.

planning worked smoothly. He summed the effort by saying: "That every problem which faced us was successfully solved is a tribute to the Army-Navy-Air Force team and the ability and cooperative spirit displayed by its members."⁹

Operations in Lingayen Gulf:

On 9 January 1945 troops of the 6th Army splashed ashore in Lingayen Gulf. They were supported during the first days by naval gunfire, naval aviation, and naval communications. The issue was never in doubt. However, much of that initial success was due to naval action in the weeks preceding the invasion. In his lectures on joint operations at the Naval War College Krueger had been pessimistic as to the success of forced landings unless the attacker had command of the sea and air superiority and the Navy could provide gunfire support until the Army could get heavy artillery ashore. In January 1945 the Navy, supported by the air forces, provided all those things.

During the movement from Leyte to Luzon the Japanese naval threat was slight. The convoys were challenged by a few Japanese destroyers and cruisers, but the enemy ships were all sunk or damaged. The air threat was very real. In only five days Japanese planes sank three U.S. ships and inflicted major damage on another fourteen. Most damage occurred from kamikaze attacks. Krueger said after the war that another day

⁹ Krueger, Down Under to Nippon, p. 217.

of attacks would have forced a change in the invasion plans. However, Third Fleet, which had been tasked with supporting the operation by attacking Formosa, was asked to help. Admiral Halsey cancelled his planned strikes and hit at the airfields on Luzon. The air forces continued their planned attacks. Despite poor weather, in one day aviation assets destroyed at least 75 Japanese aircraft on the ground and destroyed most of the Japanese airfields. By 9 January fewer than 30 operational Japanese aircraft remained on Luzon. The Japanese air threat was negated.¹⁰

On 6 January naval forces under command of VADM Oldendorff began to sweep Lingayen Gulf for mines and commenced shore bombardment. By 8 January, a full day before the landing, he was able to report that he had run out of targets. He also requested permission not to fire on target areas that were apparently full of Filipinos waving American flags.¹¹ On the 9th Oldendorff began suppression fires on the beaches and direct gunfire support of the invasion. Naval aviation, despite the loss of an escort carrier to kamikaze attacks, began close support.¹² The only snag was a last minute rumor that a mine-field blocked the approach to the beach. After the war Krueger cited what he considered a

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 221-222; 6th Army, Report of the Luzon Campaign, Volume 1, pp. 15-16; Robert Ross Smith, U.S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Triumph in the Philippines (Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1963), pp. 64-65.

¹¹ Smith, pp. 68-69.

¹² Ibid., p. 216; Krueger, Down Under to Nippon, p. 222.

gallant example of "loyal cooperation." Krueger relayed that when VADM Wilkinson was informed of the possibility of a mine-field he merely said: "If the troops have to land at Lingayen Beach, we'll go in, mines or no mines."¹³ The Navy had provided Krueger all he had asked for in cooperation and in the planning process. Sea and air threats were eliminated and the beach was prepared for assault.

This very brief look at the planning and execution of the landing at Lingayen Gulf should have served to illustrate aspects of command and war planning in practice as noted in theory in the preceding chapters. While the process did not unfold exactly as he wanted, Krueger was given enough responsibility to ensure that there was at least unity of purpose if not unity of command. His work in the interwar years on amphibious landings were played out, especially in the naval operations in early January 1945. The Navy provided the support to ensure the Japanese could not seriously threaten his landing forces. Finally, his experiences and personal contacts from before the war materially aided in the process. By working to ensure that naval and Army officers spoke "the common language" of doctrine, he, decades in advance, helped to ensure his own success on Luzon.

¹³ Krueger Papers, Box12, File 73, Krueger, "Command Responsibilities in a Joint Operation," a lecture at the Armed Forces Staff College, 18 April 1947, p. 5.

Chapter VI

Conclusions

After World War II Walter Krueger was a prized speaker for the Army War College, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. In addition, he was a valuable witness for several boards. His comments can, for our purposes, be condensed into two conclusions: 1) Unity of Command needs to be instituted and 2) Officers of the Army and Navy need to understand and be familiar with the other services in order to be competent staff officers. The following comments come from a 1947 address to the students of the Armed Forces Staff College on the topic of "Command Responsibilities in A Joint Operation" and Krueger's November or December 1948 testimony before the Truscott Board on Joint Amphibious Operations.

Staff and Planning:

Krueger told students that the planning staffs from the various service components of a joint operation had to work together in all stages of the process. Only by staying in constant contact could problems be identified and resolved. He also stated that staff officers should inculcate personal as well as professional relations with their opposites in the

other services. Only then could compromise and adjustment work smoothly.¹

Krueger went on to recite the 6th Army planning process for joint operations and insisted that unless the various service members worked closely together, and compromised as they went along, the difficulties would become too great. "All this clearly indicates the vital necessity of close and sympathetic understanding on the part of the members of each service . . . of the powers, limitations, and requirements of the other services."² On the scope of planning he restated his beliefs from 1938 that commanders should not plan in detail too far in advance, but should only provide a general indication of future intent. In this way planning time is not wasted and freedom of action is retained.³

When queried by the Truscott Board on the issue of requiring that joint staffs be formed, Krueger said that it depended on the commander, but that he would not want another bureaucratic layer interposed between commanders. He concluded that his system worked well, but that he couldn't count on that in the future. The reason for his caveat was his experience with the Navy prior to the war.⁴

¹ Krueger Papers, Box 12, File 73, Krueger, "Command Responsibilities in a Joint Operation," a lecture delivered at the Armed Forces Staff College, April 18, 1947, pp. 2, 17-18.

² Ibid., pp. 2, 4.

³ Ibid., p. 6.

⁴ Krueger Papers, Box 26, Report of the Army Advisory Committee on Joint Amphibious Operations (Truscott Board), dated 15 January, 1949.

Command:

Krueger's comments on command echo those on staffs and planning. He believed that amphibious operations should be under the control of a joint commander and suggested strongly that his belief applied at the operational and tactical levels as well as strategic. As an example, he cited a hypothetical question of what would have happened if MacArthur had not been available when a crisis arose. There would have been no one commander to make decisions. He added that in SWPA it would not have made a difference because he was experienced in naval questions and had the right personality.⁵ Again, as in the question of planning, he returned to the issue of experience and personality.

When asked by the Truscott Board to categorize amphibious operations he said that such operations should be considered land operations. Thus the command of landing operations should be in the hands of an Army commander. Krueger went so far to suggest that, because these were land operations, the Army should always assign a land commander senior in rank to the commanders of the other services. He also said that the entire operation should operate under the principle of unity of command. As he had told the class at the Armed Forces

Krueger's testimony is Annex B to Appendix C, p. C-B-10. (Hereafter Truscott Board)

⁵ Krueger, "Command Responsibilities," p. 18.

Staff College "command by mutual cooperation is inadequate in a crisis when prompt and decisive action is vital."⁶

Krueger also questioned the tactical doctrine of having the naval officer in command of all landing operations until the Army commander was established ashore. He felt that the Army commander should be in command as soon as the troops begin to disembark. He said that the common explanation for the established doctrine was the issue of communications (Navy commanders would have it while the Army's would not be established), but concluded that if questions could be communicated to the naval commander afloat, they could also be communicated to the Army officer afloat. He noted that during the war he and VADM Kinkaid had always worked well together, but he stated that in all his operations there had never been any serious problems on the landing beaches. In addition, the two officers had known each other since 1929. Krueger stated that, had been a crisis during a landing, he was not sure the system would have worked.⁷

Krueger ideas on planning and command can perhaps be summarized by the following:

In this whole business of command -- in spite of all your charts -- you still have personalities. I had been with the Navy for 13 years, and I was a senior officer. . . . [The people I dealt with] naturally felt constantly that I knew a great deal about naval difficulties, limitations, etc. I

⁶ Truscott Board, pp. C-B-6, 7, 10; Krueger, "Command Responsibilities," p. 18.

⁷ Krueger, "Command Responsibilities," pp. 20-21; Truscott Board, pp. C-B-9, 12.

always sympathetically considered their objections, so when they raised an objection we were able to work out any impasse.

It worked so well, in fact, that erroneous conclusions may be drawn from it. . . . In the last analysis, it is a matter of personalities.⁸

CONCLUSIONS:

General Walter Krueger may have made the same statement about the conclusions of this paper as he did about his experiences in the Pacific. "It worked so well, in fact, that erroneous conclusions may be drawn from it. . . . In the last analysis, it is a matter of personalities." However, that does not change the fact of his contributions to the development of joint operations doctrine, war planning, and ideas on the development of officers for joint planning and operations. His contributions are clear; his ideas not always accepted, but stated and considered. Often he bucked too many traditions, such as the issue of unity of command, but he persisted in his beliefs.

Walter Krueger's experience demonstrates that the development of joint amphibious operations was not simply a Marine Corps affair. At the operational and strategic level, especially in the areas of command relationships, war planning, war gaming, and education, the development of joint operations was a shared effort between the Army and Navy staffs and the War Colleges. Tracing Krueger's career through multiple assignments in these institutions illustrates the

⁸ Truscott Board, pp. C-B-8, 9.

role he and the institutions had in the development of doctrine.

Would things have turned out differently had Krueger not been in these institutions? Probably not in the final victory of World War II. However, his persistent voice in the area of command relationships while at the Naval War College and at AWPD surely influenced the development of plans even if his views were written out of JAAN (1935) in subsequent revisions. His position on unity of command was noted when in 1942 the Army and Navy leadership assigned unity of command to all continental U.S. defense commands and Oahu.⁹

There can be no doubt that with one memo in October 1937 Walter Krueger changed the way the War Department approached war planning. His method of drafting war plans was adopted and his ideas on contingency planning remain in place today. His changes to War Plan Orange may not have changed the way the war actually unfolded, but the American response was framed by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, not on some fixed prewar plan. Based on Japanese fighting capability as seen in the war, had the U.S. Fleet gone charging across the Pacific with what they had on hand at D+12, the Japanese probably would have inflicted serious casualties. Would the Japanese have won the war? Probably not, but with a different beginning to the war Krueger's comments on the support of the population would have had greater bearing. His ideas on

⁹ NA, RG 225, Series M1421, Roll 16.

garnering popular support for a war have a familiar ring based on events of the past thirty years.

There is more to these issues than just personality. Walter Krueger was the right man to command 6th Army in the Pacific War. His special experiences prepared him for the position of Commander, 6th Army and to command the amphibious assaults that liberated New Guinea and the Philippines. The Luzon Operation was, indeed, one of those crowning moments; the culmination of a lifetime of work. That lifetime of work was, in many ways, dedicated to one thing: Producing officers of all services, familiar in the missions, abilities, and limitations of the sister services, and prepared to dedicate themselves to "loyal cooperation" in order to achieve American objectives through military means. Walter Krueger's life work was to establish parts of a system that ensures that in the future success is not "a matter of personalities."

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