ABSTRACT

The definition of Reconstitution was significantly expanded by President Bush in August 1990 from a purely tactical term to one of strategic importance. Reconstitution was subsequently established as one of the four pillars of the National Security Strategy and addressed our ability to build forces above the Base Force to counter the reemergence of a global threat. This paper defines Reconstitution, in its strategic context, and provides some of the more significant interpretations of how it should be implemented. Additionally, the paper determines if Reconstitution represents a new approach to preparing for conflict or is merely another name for the existing mobilization system.

Reconstitution: Panacea or Palliative for Mobilization

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INTRODUCTION

Reconstitution has customarily been used at the tactical and operational levels of war to refer to the process of rebuilding the combat power of units that have been degraded as a result of battle. This term was significantly expanded by President Bush in his August 2, 1990 speech before the Aspen Institute in which he enunciated his national security strategy for the 1990's. One of the main elements of this strategy was reconstitution which he explained as:

“Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of reconstitution of our forces. By the mid-90's, the time it would take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that marked the depths of the Cold War, will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces — but to generate wholly new forces. This readiness to rebuild, made explicit in our defense policy, will be an important element in our ability to deter aggression.”

Subsequently, Secretary of State Dick Cheney amplified on the President’s vision by outlining the basic elements of the new national security strategy to the Senate Armed Services Committee. This strategy was comprised of four elements or pillars which are:

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE against Soviet capabilities and the threat of limited

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1 “Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium, the Aspen Institute, Aspen Colorado,” Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, August 2, 1990.

ballistic missile strikes from other countries

FORWARD PRESENCE in Europe and other regions at reduced levels but with continued emphasis on peacetime engagement

CRISIS RESPONSE to regional crises with existing active and reserve forces at the reduced levels included in the FY 91-92 and successive Defense Budgets

RECONSTITUTION to provide a capability to build new forces to counter the reemergence of the Soviet threat or some other global threat.

The gist of this strategy lies in a Base Force (addressed by the first three pillars) capable of rapid response to regional crises, along with a capability to rapidly add (reconstitute) wholly new force structure as a hedge against the reemergence of a global threat like the former Soviet Union. Such a strategy provided the overarching guidance for the United States in the post Cold War era. However, as strategic circumstances continue to change, adapting this concept has become a challenge.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to define reconstitution, present some of the more significant interpretations of how it should be implemented and finally to determine if it truly represents a new approach to preparing for conflict or is merely another name for the existing mobilization system.
RECONSTITUTION DEFINED

The term reconstitution is unclear and perhaps even misleading. The prefix "re" suggests the rebuilding of once existent forces. However, the thrust of reconstitution is in creating completely new units to confront a threat beyond the capabilities of the Base Force. Sizing such a reconstitution force in either numbers or types of units is not prudent. Neither is building back to some previous force structure, be it the FY 89 structure that we intended to fight a global war with or the 70+ divisions formed at the height of World War II. Such a force would not necessarily provide us with the correct combination of capabilities (i.e., combat to support capabilities, active to reserve components, etc.) to meet an emerging, undefined future threat.

Despite the somewhat contradictory title, all of the activities within both the Department of Defense and the federal agencies accept common rationales for reconstitution. Those rationales\(^3\) are to:

* Deter a potential adversary, be it a single hostile power or a coalition, from entering into a rearmament competition by creating additional U.S. forces which could defeat this adversary in the event of war.

* Maintain the ability to build new military capabilities, in a responsive, timely manner, so that existing forces can be

In view of these rationales, the definitions of reconstitution used by these activities, each of which are slightly unique, bear a common thread. One of the most succinct and useful is provided by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources which defines reconstitution as:

"The ability to continuously maintain, in sufficient measure, capabilities beyond those in the active and reserve units retained in the Base Force."  

However, this definition could reinforce the misperception that reconstitution is primarily focused on the traditional mobilization objective of expanding the manpower in uniform. As a consequence, a more comprehensive definition of reconstitution provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense may be more appropriate. It is defined as:

"A national security strategy to ensure the capability to expand the existing force posture by maintaining and investing in the necessary 'long lead elements.' The capability to reconstitute, demonstrated through policies, plans and investments is intended to reduce the risk of global threat and minimize its likelihood by demonstrating the intent and capability to respond to changes in the international environment."  

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5 Briefing by Mr. Michael Albane, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, June 6, 1991.
The long lead time elements referred to above have been identified in a recent study as materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial production, training base capacity, medical support, command and control, communications and host nation/allied coalition offsets and give some idea of the complexity of the effort.

A graphic depiction of the reconstitution process is provided at Figure 1. In this graphic, the first bar represents the active force and those members of the Reserve component on full time active duty.

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Reconstitution Basis

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Figure 1 Time

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7 Briefing by LTC George Williams Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4), November 5, 1992,
The second bar shows the entire Base Force activated in response to a regional or global threat. The third bar shows the base force supplemented by wholly new units created to respond to a global threat and provided with all equipment, training and sustaining support required. This is a useful depiction of reconstitution, although it is important to note that activation of the reserves in response to a growing threat, as illustrated in the graphic, does not necessarily have to occur before reconstitution can begin.

**EVOLUTION OF THE RECONSTITUTION CONCEPT**

The reconstitution concept has changed significantly within its relatively short life. As a result, numerous definitional problems have arisen as the concept is adapted to the changing strategic situation. A brief review of this evolution is necessary to understand the seeming multitude of interpretations held within the U.S. Government concerning the reconstitution concept.

Initial planning for the post-Cold War U.S. defense policy in early 1990 continued to see the Soviet Union as our greatest threat. Despite the continuing disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union was still intact with large numbers of forces forward deployed in Eastern Europe. As a consequence, the reconstitution concept was based on the continued Soviet threat, which, although weakened could potentially be expanded to wage global war against the West and clearly had the
capability to be a serious regional threat to Europe. It was in this environment that President Bush presented his Aspen speech and introduced the concept of strategic reconstitution into our security strategy.

By early 1991, it was estimated that the time the Soviet military would require to mount a conventional attack against NATO had increased from months to at least two years.

With the arrival of 1992, it was apparent that the Soviets no longer posed a formidable global threat. The Soviet coup of August 1991 and the virtual disintegration of the USSR caused us to refocus our reconstitution concept and accept a much more general approach as reflected in the 1992 National Military Strategy, which stated:

"As we reduce the size of our military forces in response to the demise of the global threat, we must preserve a credible capability to forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States. The "reconstitution" capability is intended to deter such a power from militarizing and, if deterrence fails, to provide a global warfighting capability. Reconstitution involves forming, training, and fielding new fighting units. This includes initially drawing on cadre-type units and laid-up military assets; mobilizing previously trained or new manpower; and activating the industrial base on a large scale. Reconstitution also involves maintaining technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and innovation necessary to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of..."

potential military competition."

Despite this more relaxed environment in which an immediate threat of global war is less likely, our superpower status still carries with it the responsibility for leadership in the free world should the potential for global conflict emerge as it has already three times (WW I, WW II, Korea) in this century. Even though we will not retain sufficient forces required for global conflict, we must know what it takes to build up the necessary levels and to effectively employ the forces. Reconstitution can now take on different forms depending upon the assessed time available to prepare the forces and equipment and our CINCs must plan for this eventuality, but as a last priority. At its current state of evolution, reconstitution has now shifted toward maintenance of critical defense capabilities that can be used to sustain both the Base Force and reconstitution.

CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF RECONSTITUTION

A review of critical defense capabilities conducted by DOD officials responsible for formulating reconstitution policy produced the following consensus list of requirements which must be maintained "to facilitate reconstitution".

* Plans and resources to meet increased materiel requirements.
  Acquisition of enough weapon systems and other military equipment to equip new force structure, through activation of stored industrial and technical bases and assurance of sufficient strategic and

critical raw materials.

* **Provision of sufficient leadership for reconstituted units.** Both officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO's), as well as the training base (material and doctrinal) to generate more leaders when reconstitution begins.

* **Plans and resources to obtain more manpower.** Ability to enlist and/or induct and train larger numbers of entry level (junior enlisted and officer) personnel to man reconstituted units.

* **Assurance of needed installations and facilities.** Training a larger force structure requires more physical plant and land, either through greater use of existing facilities or the construction and acquisition of new ones.

This list may, however, be inadequate to accommodate reconstitution if the warning times are relatively short.

There are two distinct contingencies that we need to prepare for: a short warning case which provides about two to three years notice, and a long warning case providing notice of five years or more. The short term warning scenario would have to make use of reconstitution to address specific shortfalls in the Base Force in order for it to deter a threat which arises with comparative quickness. It would rely on stored equipment rather than industrial expansion to generate new units. Additionally, it would rely primarily upon existing pretrained manpower (active force, reserve
components, and retired military personnel) for leadership and skilled personnel.

Conversely, if a longer warning time were available, the reconstitution process could rely on industrial expansion to equip new units. Manpower would also be provided through new accessions and would require extensive training of the majority of the leadership and skilled personnel, as well as the junior personnel.

In order to be able to provide resources for the short-term warning scenario (sometimes known as regeneration – as in regenerating the resources to fill out the cadre divisions) several additional requirements must be added to the list of critical reconstitution requirements. These are:

* **Cadre units and stored equipment.** The Army estimates that existing National Guard Divisions could be combat ready in six to twelve months, while new divisions would require at least 24 months to prepare. Cadre divisions, which are estimated to be combat ready in 12 to 15 months, would fill the gap between the National Guard and the new organizations. New units would have sufficient time for the defense industrial and technological base to produce their weapons/equipment and to organize into units, but existing forces will need equipment readily available.

* **Short term protection of selected aspects of the defense industrial and technological base.** Keeping some production lines open and mothballing others, so that the Base Force and short term reconstitution can be supported. Production for new forces can virtually be produced from a cold start with the warning time available.
* Pretrained individual military manpower. New forces will acquire and train their personnel in the time available. However, the Base Force will have to retain a high level of proficiency.

Obviously, intelligence activities will be responsible for providing early warning, but as shown in Iraq prior to the Gulf War, it is often hard to clearly identify a short-term warning. Consequently, we must be able to provide reconstitution for both the Base Force (to fill such things as equipment shortages) and newly formed units. The cost of reconstitution is at this point undetermined. In the absence of a viable global threat, a reconstitution objective in either force size or time available to complete a build up has not been established. Reconstitution has been integrated into the DOD budget process. The most recent Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) includes a section on reconstitution and the services prepared initial Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). However, DOD officials indicate unofficially that this submission requires much more refinement and will likely have a low priority in the budget submitted to the Congress.

Despite the lack of budgetary support, our reconstitution capability is relatively strong at this point because of the large amounts of modern equipment and an excess of trained manpower resulting from the drawdown of our Cold War structure. Placing this equipment in storage and having many of the personnel available on retiree status or in the individual ready reserve will allow us to rapidly expand the Base Force if
necessary. However, this is not a panacea, for at some point equipment will become obsolete and the skill of our manpower will become dated.

Although DOD does not apparently plan to spend much money directly on reconstitution, the funding for programs with reconstitution implications is substantial. Industrial base protection, primarily through the acquisition process, is being undertaken for the major weapon systems in order to maintain capabilities essential to continued modernization and sustainment of the Base Force. Actions to keep production lines open and mothball other key capabilities will support not only the Base Force but also reconstitution.

DIFFERING VIEWS ON RECONSTITUTION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Although there is general agreement on the overall concept of reconstitution, significant disagreement exists on implementation of the policy. This controversy stems from several factors the foremost of which is that reconstitution overlaps rather significantly with the long established concept of mobilization. This is further exacerbated by the changing nature of the strategic environment and the significant adaptive changes that it has caused in our reconstitution concept. Additionally, we are seeking to learn from our history and not voluntarily sacrifice our military superiority. After every war (in this case after the Cold War) we have drastically cut defense spending and willingly accepted the risk that we won’t have to go to another war of that
magnitude. Korea in 1950 and specifically Task Force Smith, which the Army Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, has publicized so extensively, is a prime example of what we do not want to repeat. In that spirit (but in recognition of the reduced global threat), we have stated in our National Military Strategy that “we will not retain the forces required for a global conflict,”\(^\text{10}\) and we will size our Base Force to handle a maximum of two Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). In order to ensure maintenance of our military superiority in larger scale conflicts, we must do reconstitution right, and it is with this mission in mind that the differing positions on reconstitution policy have evolved. Secretary of Defense Cheney articulated this concern well in the following statement\(^\text{11}\) regarding downsizing:

> “Unfortunately, if you look at the historic record, we have never, ever gone through one of these periods and gotten it right. We’ve always screwed it up. Every single time when it’s happened previously we’ve been so quick to cash in the peace dividend, to demobilize the force, that within a very short period of time we find that our weakness in and of itself becomes provocative and tempts others to do things that they shouldn’t attempt; that we always end up having once again, to commit the force some place – we get in trouble some place in the world and have to send in the troops; that we find ourselves with troops that are not well trained or well equipped, not prepared to go to war.”

The opposing views regarding reconstitution policy basically stem from the

\(^\text{10}\) NMS, p. 16.
interpretation of the role of mobilization in reconstitution.

The majority of the DOD community views reconstitution and mobilization as synonymous terms using the same process to produce new units. In other words, reconstitution is our national mobilization strategy. One recognized reconstitution expert expressed the relationship this way:

"Mobilization is the process of marshaling resources to support actual or possible military operations. Reconstitution is the process of marshaling resources to form 'wholly new forces' to increase the actual and potential military power of the nation."

It is important to note that this will be accomplished through the concept known as the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) which was established in 1987 to provide a framework for managing increases in military capability to meet existing or potential national emergencies.

The opposing opinion sees reconstitution and mobilization in synonymous terms only to the extent that they both are designed to produce forces above those in the Base Force. The difference is seen in when they begin. Reconstitution is viewed as a continuous process that requires no activating event to begin committing resources to hedge against an emerging threat and fills the gap between the Base Force and the force ultimately needed to counter that threat. In other words, to be an effective deterrent reconstitution must possess a demonstrable, believable capacity to

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keep pace with a potential challenger. Mobilization (viewed more from a traditional than GMR perspective), on the other hand, is seen as beginning with a crisis and, as a result, is invariably in a reactive posture. Such a posture, in the view of the long lead times required to develop modern forces, impairs our ability to deter a potential threat by failing to demonstrate our resolve to meet or exceed his buildup. Additionally, the extent to which we mobilize is felt to be threat dependent. That is to say, when new forces should be created and in what number, is determined by the strength of the threat when the national emergency is declared. Again, if this threat is underestimated, given the lead times required, the United States could potentially lose its advantage and be required to use force instead of deterrence against the threat. Conversely, reconstitution (from this viewpoint) should be structured to provide a planning process that measures the capacity in our critical areas to provide a level of force structure over time. Such a strategy "would determine what we can do, how fast, under what conditions and when new forces and capabilities could be delivered - packaged and ready to go." Figure 214 is provided to contrast the two strategies.

Under the current system (reading straight across), the Base Force is compared to the threat's size and technological prowess then an appropriate force is identified to counter it. However, our capacity to produce this force in the time required is


14 IBID, p. 4.
uncertain. Under the reconstitution strategy (reading down and to the right), our capacity is iteratively assessed in each of the key components (capacity drivers, following the "Capacity Driver Approach" arrow), so we can determine what forces are available, when they will be available, and, as necessary, make additional resource allocations to ensure an adequate capacity.

"MATCHING STRATEGY TO RESOURCES": APPROACHES

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CAPACITY-DRIVEN APPROACH

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FIGURE 2

Two other figures are also provided to demonstrate the differences between reconstitution and mobilization in consonance with this line of reasoning. Figure 3\textsuperscript{15} shows the reactive nature of mobilization. Since Congressional authorizations are required to build new units, requirements above the Base Force cannot be satisfied.

\textsuperscript{15} IBID, p. 2.
until after a conflict starts. The only moderating resources available are what is contained in war reserves and can be used to replace Base Force combat losses until the industrial base can catch up. Figure 4\textsuperscript{16} demonstrates how reconstitution could improve this situation. Number 1 demonstrates our resolve to meet or exceed a threat's build up by gradually building up our own capability. Number 2 shows what additional forces could be generated using the capacity drivers strategy prior to a national emergency in order to further deter the threat. Letter M again shows when, after declaration of a national emergency, mobilization could provide resources.

\textsuperscript{16} IBID, p. 3.
RECONSTITUTION VERSUS MOBILIZATION

Examination of the provisions of mobilization alone with those of reconstitution is appropriate at this point to resolve the differences expressed in the previous section. An objective comparison of the two programs reveals a high degree of similarity as demonstrated by the following definition of mobilization which is provided for comparison with those of reconstitution previously provided.

MOBILIZATION - The process of preparing for war or other emergencies by assembling, organizing, and using manpower, material, and resources. Our mobilization process can enhance our warfighting and, thereby, help deter war. Therefore, mobilization plans must include a range of phased incremental improvements in force readiness, deployment capabilities that may be taken prior to, or during, a war. This process must

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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Master Mobilization Plan, May 1988, p. 3.
encompass all activities necessary to mobilize gradually, or rapidly from partial through total mobilization. Both programs are designed to deter an emerging threat through incremental increases in our military power.

The Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR)\textsuperscript{18} is organized into three stages.

STAGE 3 Preparation and Planning - In peacetime the primary task is to ensure that plans, processes and procedures are in place to respond to a national security emergency.

STAGE 2 Crisis Management - These activities focus on a specific crisis situation that has begun to develop and on preparatory actions required to address it. Activities at this stage are specifically designed to maximize response potential with minimal disturbance to the economy.

STAGE 1 National Security Emergency/War Phase - As the crisis escalates a substantial increase in the magnitude and urgency of defense production and other essential national defense activities occur. A national security emergency or declaration of war is not required to begin this stage (however, conscription cannot occur without a presidential request and congressional authorization). Activities include: "production of materiel, provision of energy, transportation, health care, food and other infrastructure services, economic and financial measures, provision of new recruits for military service and skilled manpower for defense plants; and modification of the Government to manage the process."


\textsuperscript{19} Brinkerhoff, p. 10.
Additionally, the GMR has the authorization, initially during the Planning and Preparation Stage, to initiate investment programs to resolve specific resource problems. The product of this effort is sets of related actions, developed into costed packages, which provide the President with options for his response to warning of a particular set of threatening actions.

The GMR is then a process not an event. This was not always the case. Prior to 1987, the traditional mobilization model was used. It required Presidential and Congressional authorization to initiate mobilization action and essentially occurred as a gigantic spasm. The comparison of GMR to traditional mobilization is analogous to a rheostat which can increase power or light gradually, and a light switch that is in either the off or on position.

Reconstitution, by definition, is designed to work the same way in order to ensure that we have the capability to create forces over and above the Base Force. It has been said that "If GMR did not exist, reconstitution would require that we invent it." However, three key differences, (relating to the longest leadtime elements in building new forces: the industrial base and skilled manpower) require examination. First, reconstitution has been differentiated from mobilization in the way that it competes for funding. By virtue of the fact that reconstitution has been integrated into the DOD budget effort by inclusion of reconstitution programs and budgets in each

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20 Ibid, p. 18.
Service's POM, it is viewed as being superior. As previously mentioned, dollars can be expended to protect key industrial capabilities under GMR, but funds have habitually not been allotted for this purpose. However, the prospect of obtaining funding for reconstitution through the POM is similarly remote until the strategic situation becomes more settled and we determine if we want to store current equipment for future use or produce state-of-the-art equipment as a threat arises. In actuality, the only money currently spent for such purposes is through the acquisition process and it is not specifically targeted for reconstitution, but rather to protect key sectors of the defense industrial base.

A second difference is that reconstitution is viewed as an effort which is run almost exclusively within the Department of Defense. This is again not really achievable when the magnitude of the effort is considered. At least two agencies under the guidance of the NSC, must have a role in planning the reconstitution effort, OSD and FEMA.\textsuperscript{21} OSD has the lead for the military portion and is also responsible to clearly articulate the goals and operational assumptions. FEMA (in accordance with Executive Order 12656) must coordinate and manage the overall efforts of both the Federal agencies representing the civil sector and DOD. To leave out either agency would most certainly result in a less than comprehensive effort.

Finally, a reconstitution program separate from GMR seeks to obtain additional manpower before a national emergency occurs so that necessary training can be

\textsuperscript{21} IBID, p. 17.
conducted, and this manpower can be used early in a conflict resolution. This effort is clearly worthwhile, but the amount of manpower available may be insignificant since it is strictly reliant on the recall of retirees and in obtaining voluntary recruitments (along with congressional authorization to increase the military end strength) since mobilization of the reserves does not provide new forces. In addressing this issue, an OSD memorandum stated: "that there is very little in the (reconstitution) proposals that differ from alternatives to increase the supply of manpower for mobilization." As a consequence, unless the law is changed regarding conscription a significant influx of manpower cannot occur until total mobilization is authorized, as shown below in the hierarchy of mobilization actions.

a. SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION - Needed for support of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.

b. PARTIAL MOBILIZATION - Expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress or by the President to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, and individual reservists along with the resources for their support during war or other national emergency in confronting an external threat to national security.

c. FULL MOBILIZATION - Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure.

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22 "Manpower for Reconstitution," Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary (Requirements and Resources) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), January 1992.
23 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, December 1989, p. 237.
d. TOTAL MOBILIZATION - Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, during war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security.

In summary, the differences between mobilization (GMR) and reconstitution are negligible. This is true to the extent that OSD considers the terms to be synonymous. Conceptually, the process will work as shown in Figure 5.24

This chart shows one complete reconstitution-mobilization cycle which begins and ends in a peacetime steady state. The continuum begins with a period of relative peace marked by the gradual emergence of a global threat to our national security. Reconstitution measures are taken to deter this threat through expansion of our forces, but escalation continues and eventually results in war. During this period, incremental mobilization occurs as well as reconstitution to expand and sustain the nation's military power until the threat is defeated. It should be noted that as the conflict escalates mobilization activates the Reserve component of the Base Force and reconstitution provides the new units.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Assuming that the preceding information is sufficiently convincing for mobilization and reconstitution to be considered the same thing, a logical question might be why we didn't just continue to call mobilization, mobilization. The motivation for the duplicative term appears to stem from the desire to create some renewed enthusiasm in a long standing program which was largely misunderstood.

During the Cold War, and specifically since the inception of the all volunteer force, mobilization has been generally thought of as a means of activating the
Reserves. We expected the next war to occur in Europe with little advanced warning and to last no more than a few months. Its duration may have been long enough to allow activation of the Reserves only. Mobilization actions were expected to start on the first day of the war and, as a result, new forces were not expected to be available in time to influence the outcome of the war. As a consequence, a substantial standing army was maintained and our defense industries had a full complement of capabilities in operation which required only additional acquisition funds to increase production.

In order to break this old mind set regarding mobilization, reconstitution was given its strategic definition and planning horizons were lengthened so we could begin mobilizing before some global threat did.

This is not to infer that Reconstitution/Mobilization strategy is fully ready to prepare us for the next conflict and is without flaws. Five key issues need to be seriously evaluated in order to strengthen this program.

The first is that reconstitution should consist of both long and near term programs. The long term program would produce the equipment to support "wholly new units" from new production. Conversely, in a near term program, we must have equipment and manufacturing capability mothballed as an insurance policy. Often, emerging threats are masked, not perceived as threats at first or simply not acted on as in the case of Iraq before the Gulf War. As a consequence, our Base Force (particularly as it is further downsized) may face a superior threat. The presence of a
near term reconstitution plan could fill the gap between exhaustion of the Base Force and mobilization of the industrial base. This is particularly easy to do now with the excess equipment and discharged, pretrained manpower resulting from inactivating forces.

Secondly, we must consider expanding the focus of reconstitution from just global threats to regional ones. A number of scenarios could be proposed that would require a greater response to a less than global conflict. Such catastrophic events as the use of a nuclear weapon (particularly in the Third World as proliferation continues), the unexpected prolongation of a regional war, or a lengthy occupation could tie down significant numbers within the Base Force and thus cause the need for force expansion, particularly if a second regional conflict arose.

Third, within DOD we must designate a single organization with responsibility for reconstitution policy. A recently released report said it well: "There is no single DOD, JCS or service-wide organization with overall responsibility for reconstitution policy. Proposals have been made to create a reconstitution steering group within OSD, composed of representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff and each of the services, but no action has been taken." Without such central coordination, the lower priority of reconstitution may be more likely to result in unwarranted neglect. Resources can drive thought on a subject; to the extent that reconstitution resources diminish,

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25 Goldich, p. 15.
26 Ibid, p. 15.
reconstitution plans and concepts, which can only be rendered coherent by some sort of central authority, may become more, rather than less, important. ²⁷

Fourth, the planning for GMR implementation among the Federal Agencies requires closer monitoring to insure that each activity's plans are comprehensive and complete. FEMA or perhaps a new separate agency, should be required to coordinate overall planning, adjudicate resource conflicts and maintain data which provides both industrial capabilities and DOD requirements. In order to ensure this is done on a recurring basis a report should be prepared and provided to OSD periodically (every two years is recommended) updating information and providing necessary status.

Finally, if our reconstitution strategy is to be viable, we must have solid intelligence upon which to make our assessments. In order to provide this, the Intelligence community must expand its resources in order to provide the economic and political intelligence which can signal a military build up. The increased warning time required for reconstitution to work mandates that we look at all sources of information and this portion has historically been less available than intelligence on sheerly military build ups.

These recommended improvements are not all encompassing, but merely a summary of the more glaring weaknesses. However, adoption of these resolutions should put reconstitution on a solid footing. Reconstitution is clearly the right compromise between a large standing force and accepting the great risk as we have

²⁷ IBID, p. 16.
after previous wars. The United States must be willing to use military force when necessary to secure our national security interests. This force must be able to handle anything from a regional "brush fire" to a global confrontation. With current warning times, reconstitution can allow us to deter and, if required, defeat a global threat, while still substantially reducing defense costs. Reconstitution's continued designation as a pillar of our National Security Strategy is therefore essential, as is its continued evolution and support. Our ability to successfully confront the next USSR depends on it.