MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL SECURITY.

Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr.
Meeting the Challenges of Regional Security (U)

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The author, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Leonard Sullivan, maintains that in the post-cold war world, old alliances, structured for containment, will not be adequate. Instead, regional security apparatuses (RSAs) will be needed to deal with problems which issue from specific socio-cultural and economic conditions, rather than from ideology or the pursuit of traditional national interests by the superpowers. These RSAs will be charged with the collective enforcement of international laws and standards, as well as those specific to the regions involved. He concludes that the technologies developed during the cold war may be used by appropriately structured RSA forces in meeting the challenges of the "new world disorder."

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MEETING THE CHALLENGES
OF REGIONAL SECURITY

Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

February 1, 1994
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FOREWORD

The Honorable Leonard Sullivan, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, maintains that the disorder in the post-cold war world must be addressed in radically new and innovative ways. Old alliances, structured for containment, will not be adequate in a world where the challenges may be more appropriately addressed by police forces than by traditionally structured military forces.

This sweeping analysis suggests that, in the future, regional security apparatuses (RSAs) will be needed to deal with problems which issue from specific socio-cultural and economic conditions rather than from ideology or the pursuit of traditional national interests by the superpowers. Mr. Sullivan maintains that the United States can use its advantage in technology as a part of its approach to meeting the many challenges posed by "the new world disorder."

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study as a contribution to that growing body of analysis dealing with the post-cold war world.

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Colonel, U.S. Army
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF THE AUTHOR

Honorable LEONARD SULLIVAN, JR., is a Washington-based consultant on national security matters. He spent 12 years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, serving three years as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation). Mr. Sullivan consults for various think tanks, and is active in the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs. His articles have appeared in Armed Forces Journal, Foreign Policy, Atlantic Community Quarterly, and the American Defense Annual. He frequently lectures at the senior service colleges and is an honorary faculty member at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
SUMMARY

Cold war concepts of superpowers, alliance systems, nuclear deterrence and the accompanying military structures have lost their relevance. The problems and challenges of this diverse and disordered world might be better addressed by paramilitary or nonmilitary forces than by military institutions and forces structured and accoutered for traditional interstate conflict.

History may, indeed, record the 1990s as the beginning of the end of the supremacy of the nation-state as it has existed in western civilization since the French Revolution. Some states, like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, have already dissolved into a number of ethnically-based nations. Germany and Yemen, on the other hand, have forsaken artificial political structures imposed by cold war necessities to unite into single nations.

Indeed, the world of the 21st century is most likely to experience further upward drift in sovereignty in which regional authorities enforce global laws of conduct over generally subnational organizations pursuing criminal activities.

The alternative to the United States as the world's policeman imposing a Pax Americana Technocratica is to establish a number of regional security apparatuses (RSAs). These RSAs will be charged with the collective enforcement of international laws and standards as well as those specific to the regions involved. Many of the technologies compelled and developed during the cold war may be useful when employed by appropriately structured RSA forces operating within new systems devised to meet a variety of challenges.
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New Disorders Do Not Match Old Orders.

The disorders afflicting the world in the aftermath of the oppressive global cold war will require the serious, long-term attention of the civilized world. Virtually every region of the world is experiencing some form of disorder which detracts from inter- and intra-regional stability and diminishes aspirations for both personal and collective prosperity. These disorders simply cannot be dealt with effectively by security systems designed primarily to perpetuate and petrify a tense equilibrium between two antithetical, but supposedly equally legitimate, approaches to politics and economics.

Cold war concepts of superpowers, superpower blocs, competing intra-regional military alliances, rigid "vital interests," nuclear deterrence, and bilateral arms control have lost their relevance. Even such well-ingrained distinctions as "the West" as a meaningful entity with its "special relationships," and the blind sanctity of "internal affairs" as an excuse for ignoring inhumanity, have lost their credibility. Prompt evolutionary change is essential to deal with the new forms of danger which now challenge the more generally accepted rules of human behavior.

There has probably never been a period when more governments on Earth have codified what is right and what is wrong, or when there were more organizations operating beyond those established norms and standards. These improprieties run the gamut from humanitarian, ethnic, military, and political, to economic, trafficking, and environmental. Limits of acceptable conduct are defined extensively by various government-ratified covenants, treaties and agreements adopted through various formally recognized organizations either global (U.N., World Bank), functional (OECD, GATT, IAEA) or regional (NATO, CSCE, APEC, ASEAN). Absent a
clear-cut "red-blue" superpower ideological contest, however, the world is ill-prepared and uncertain how to react to conflicts between civility and incivility, conformity and nonconformity, morality and legality, majorities and minorities: Bosnia is but the most obvious and shameful case in point.  

Controlling Crimes Versus Winning Wars. Most new world disorders do not relate well to the current capabilities of the world's military forces, designed to fight each other in huge set-piece battles backed up by thousands of nuclear weapons. In fact, many current disorders would be better handled by paramilitary or nonmilitary forces. Many are really extensions on a larger scale of previously domestic disorders: they are (or started out as) crimes deserving legally accepted police actions rather than the more macho but impersonal wars between military forces. Unchecked, some of these crimes have clearly grown out of control, and surely do not honor the extensive codes of professional military conduct (outlawing rape, torture, starvation, civilian attack, and hostage-taking).

It also seems clear that in resolving many of these disorders, the objective cannot be to defeat the criminal element, but only to control the level of violence and destruction to some level of international social tolerance. Ethnic/religious strife appears to be as endemic to the new world as are American casualties due to drunk driving, street crime, and drug use. The issue is whether it can be contained within tolerable levels, such as the decades of Irish and Palestinian violence, or whether it is allowed to escalate to levels that arouse the international conscience, such as genocide in Cambodia, displacement of the Kurds, three-way mayhem in the former Yugoslavia, or the wanton generation of refugees in Lebanon.

There is also the question of increasing ambiguity about the level of authority responsible for these organized transgressions. Nations and/or allies tend to declare and conduct war against other nations and/or alliances on a government-to-government basis. Today's disorders may be government directed (Sadam Hussein vs. the Kurds, or Yugoslavian Serbs vs. Bosnian Muslims), but they are as often subnational extremists (the Hezbollah vs. Israel, or the Irish
Republican Army vs. the United Kingdom); or renegade multinational "corporations" (Latin American drug cartels, or BCCI-like banks). Current security arrangements and forces are ill-equipped to deal with nongovernmental crime, and to shift focus from being anti-national to being pro-victim. Concepts of the inviolability of "internal affairs" are slowly giving way to concepts of "enforced humanitarianism," not only at the national level (protection of minorities, child labor laws) but at the family level as well (marital rape, children's rights).

Even the matter of arms control has clearly outgrown the initial concepts of limiting nuclear arms and balancing the size of opposing superpower conventional forces in Europe. There are residual concerns over the possible mishandling of the major nuclear arms inventories in the remnants of the Soviet Union, and agreements on retargeting were reached in January during President Clinton's trip to Moscow. However, the focus of concern has now shifted to the "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" throughout the less-developed world. The old arms control treaty framework is irrelevant in this case, as are the highly formalistic verification regimes. Moreover, the signatories to the START and CFE treaties bear little relation to the new "players" (donors or recipients) in global arms proliferation, such as China. It is also far from clear in many instances whether the suppliers' governments are unaware of, or tacitly or actively involved in, the transfers.

Furthermore, the cold-war definitions of "proliferation" and "weapons of mass destruction" are subject to change. It could well be argued that rockets and artillery used against defenseless civilian populations in places like Beirut, Sarajevo, and South Lebanon should qualify as mass destroyers, even though they did not recently proliferate from some far-off heinous supplier, and even though the destruction takes months rather than minutes to inflict. In fact, the wanton use of large caliber and automatic weapons in the pursuit of clearly illegal political activities is as unacceptable as the excessive use of firearms (and semi-automatic weapons!) in petty crimes and drug trafficking. International standards of conduct are being set, and international inspection and enforcement must follow if our common values are to be upheld.
One is reminded of the origins of the colloquial term "rule of thumb." In 18th century America, it was deemed by the courts unacceptable to thrash one's wife with a cane larger in diameter than one's thumb. This was clearly an early, but not unique, effort at arms control, if not peacekeeping. Perhaps the civilized world should now deem it unacceptable to slay one's enemies with a firearm of caliber greater than one's thumb. Controlling the trafficking, possession, and use of arms exceeding that rule could become a major responsibility for emerging security forces. In this way, we might keep disorders from exceeding our tolerance threshold.

**Economics and Environment.** In a different regime, there is certain to be increasing international concern for environmental transgressions, most of which are indifferent to arbitrary national boundaries. Sooner or later, physical international responses will become justified to control some form of atmospheric pollution (such as Chernobyl-like fall-out, ozone depletion, or acid rain) or resource abuse (such as preemption of river waters or overkill of protected species), or even the spread of communicable diseases (in humans, animals and insects).

Violations of economic agreements will continue to precipitate armed struggles as well, from product dumping (e.g., China's opium wars) to fishing rights (e.g., Iceland's fishing fleet vs. the British navy in the 1970s). As economic "interdependence" continues to grow, and economic competition replaces ideological competition as a central focus of national governments, the "book of rules" is bound to grow, and so will the temptations to circumvent it. The OECD is only now defining "corrupt practices" in international commerce. "Trade wars" may break out again, and violence over the abuse and exploitation of workers may arise. Illegal trafficking in various commodities from drugs and arms to workers and babies already occupies the time of law enforcement agencies worldwide.

In a new world otherwise fascinated by remarkable opportunities for growth in economic and political prosperity, these disorders will have to be discouraged and controlled by
new mechanisms unlike any already extant: new authorities, new formations, new training, and new equipment. New "rules of engagement" will also be required that prevent the hesitant application of force that can turn any operation into "another Vietnam quagmire," or that prevent major nations like the United States from participating.

Unfortunately, the emphasis will remain on "control" rather than "discouragement"—i.e., on crime punishment rather than crime prevention. One rare exception is the work of the IAEA in trying to enforce the U.N.'s nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty through mandatory inspections. The difficulty of this task is now being demonstrated in Iraq and North Korea. Moreover, the approach is only valid where the host government controls the operation. One cannot imagine an International Illegal Drugs Agency being able to conduct inspections of drug-producing facilities in Colombia or Burma.

*Renewed Upward Drift in Sovereignty.* Following the cold war there is a renewed or accelerated upward drift in sovereignty. More and more proud national prerogatives, from traffic signs and passport design to area codes and interest rates, are being taken over by international or global bodies. The shrinking, more interdependent world is accepting greater standardization and regulation of behavior and practices as means of sharing increased humanity, security, and prosperity. Progress in the European Community, APEC, and ASEAN cannot be ignored. At the same time, there is more virulent and desperate resistance from groups that wish to reject homogenization and return to the supremacy of local cultures. The fractionalizing of Eastern Europe is surely cause for concern, but the existing and solid framework of the CSCE limits the vulnerability of the smaller states. The struggle between "good" and "bad" is now often evidenced as a conflict between supranationalism and subnationalism.

"Globalization" trends in trade, finance, and business are further eroding national sovereignty. International banks and the large and spreading international corporations, as well as the International Labor Organization, clearly recognize few national boundaries. Collectively, they provide a major stimulus for development and homogenization of the global
workforce. The adoption of international work (and quality) standards has totally changed the nature of manufacturing, and vastly hastened the internationalizing of technology development and application. Many major products no longer have a meaningful "country of origin." This has been highlighted in the global automobile and electronics industries, and in the U.S. attempts to "punish" Chinese business practices without harming Hong Kong and Taiwan.

These global business and finance trends have not been overlooked by the criminal elements which have themselves internationalized. They freely pursue trans-border illegal activities, from bank fraud and money laundering to illegal trafficking in drugs and arms, benefiting from the lack of standardization of criminal law or its enforcement. Individual nations cannot deal with international crimes beyond their borders, but the U.N. cannot cope with dozens of simultaneous warfighting infractions (13 as of January 1, 1993), to say nothing of the dozens of continuously ongoing lesser crimes.13

In fact, history may well record the collapse of the cold war as the beginning of the end of the supremacy of the nation-state as the key structure in political, economic, or societal development and stability. Some larger nations have already begun to crumble in Eastern Europe and Asia, while some of the arbitrarily divided states (Germany, Vietnam, Yemen, and soon Korea) are reunifying. Furthermore, as the power of the state declines relative to the influence of some of the illegal operators, national governments can no longer be held responsible for the crimes committed within their legal boundaries. Two current examples include the major drug cartels in Colombia,14 and the usurpation of Southern Lebanon by Hezbollah elements supported from Syria and Iran. Law enforcement must clearly operate against criminal elements, and not just criminal or "rogue" governments.


Internationalism and interdependence are clearly on the rise, continuing, if not accelerating, the virtual shrinkage of our planet. The notion of one (or two) superpower(s) with catholic
interests and concerns is no longer credible. There will be no Great White Policeman of the World; no Global Bobby. Yet there is a growing and inescapable demand to enforce globally-adopted codes of individual and group conduct and behavior. The new world must pursue universal human interests guided by universal human values.

Clearly, nations will have to learn to act together to preserve their agreed common values. The egocentric cold war concept of committing national resources/treasure only to support "vital national (self-)interests" is being supplanted by a concept of "obligatory community service" to support global values and enhance assurance of regional stability and prosperity. In fact, such global values may flow from both supra- and subnational organizations as well as from classic national governments. International business conglomerates and relief agencies have special demands at one end of the spectrum. Various exploited minorities and the several nationless tribes (Kurds, Palestinians, Montagnards, etc.) require protection at the other.

Current Security Institutions Dated. The concept of interlocking regional U.S. military commands covering most of the world seems anachronistic in a world without superpower struggle, and with vastly reduced military budgets. Nothing could better reinforce the empirical notion of "policeman of the world" than to have permanent unilateral "precinct stations" all over the world. The U.S. "unified commands" for the Southern Hemisphere (SOUTHCOM), and for the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean regions (PACOM), will also need to be restructured to better represent today's threats and today's divisions of responsibility.

Many lesser conflicts are being addressed by U.N. peacekeeping forces after truces have been arranged. "Trucekeeping" might be more apt. Bigger violations have been handled by ad hoc arrangements, including the short-lived Suez War, the U.S.-led Vietnam War, and the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Sometimes larger powers have dealt with the problems unilaterally—and quite awkwardly (Grenada, Falklands, Panama). But there is growing resistance to the unilateral use of military force, particularly to enforce unilateral
diktats, ambitions, or standards. Based on the newfound atmosphere of cooperation in the post-cold war U.N. Security Council, authority is shifting towards global approval/endorsement of ad hoc coalition responses for both prevention and punishment of breeches of worldwide standards of conduct.

The costs to both the "criminal" and the enforcers must reflect the severity of the misdemeanor or felony. Often, the "punishment" (or persuasion) may simply be fines or other sanctions to express displeasure but not exacerbate the recklessness of the violator. Policies and procedures for deterring, ameliorating or terminating unacceptable behavior will certainly have to be "legal," not wanton. Unlike bipolar wars, the "guilt" will have to be correctly "balanced" between government and nongovernment instigators, (or, say, between the supplier, the deliverer, and the demander in drug or arms trafficking). Furthermore, both the breadth and severity of the "crime" will have to be viewed through the culture of, and resolved through the languages of, the afflicted region.

Additionally, use of excessive force ("brutality") against persons or property will have to be avoided: neutralization and incapacitation will replace death and destruction. Deliberate overreaction needs to be discouraged. The "enemy" (criminals) will often be protected by citizens' "rights," and their offenses are as likely to be illegal businesses (drug/arms trafficking) as violent crimes (hostage taking). Operations will have to respect the constraints of responding within legal limits to offenders who recognize no such constraints. Frequently, the offenses cannot be eliminated, but only brought under acceptable control.

Global Gospel: Regional Enforcement. The notion of passing directly to the U.N. all aspects of international law enforcement requires a huge and unrealistic leap of faith. It is one thing for the U.N. to be the major source of the Global Code of Ethics. It is quite another matter to expect so large a political committee to provide the instruments for its implementation. There is no successful case of global management of any single highly complex operation (business, relief) without the use of divisional or regional implementers. Even the Catholic
Church with its highly centralized focus on rule-making depends on regional and subregional structures for "enforcing" its fiats. The ability to manage dozens of diverse operations worldwide almost certainly requires some intermediate levels of authority and accountability.

It seems to me inescapable that the world will gradually evolve a set of regional security apparatuses (RSAs) legitimately authorized to enforce broadly (if not globally) accepted laws and standards, while respecting the mores and peculiarities of the region(s) involved. This report looks at some of the likely procedures, characteristics, and authorities of RSAs tailored to the needs of the coming century. Management and control, operational procedures, and unit equipage of often ad hoc coalition forces will be very different than we had come to expect, and train for, in the NATO/Pact scenario. However, they might well evolve from the increasingly anachronistic regional unified command structure of the U.S. military.

RSAs, then, would be primarily charged with the collective enforcement of international laws and standards within the community (i.e., "behave or be penalized"). This is very different from the recent military alliances for collective security (like NATO and Warsaw Pact) formed to deter or wage intercommunity wars with goals of "destroy or be destroyed." RSA actions would draw more from civil police work (or CIA/DEA "special operations") than from military missions like counteraggression, deep strike, or antisubmarine warfare. In essence, an RSA would reflect growing notions of "regional sovereignty" over common, inseparable intraregional infractions and disorders, and provide the mechanisms required to assure reasonable, albeit certainly not total, compliance.

In this respect, RSA "forces" would be extensions of domestic peacetime law enforcement agencies. Using such forces would by no means be a "last resort" option as with military forces. Many of their functions would be continuously exercised to maintain intraregional "law and order." Moreover, casualties would be inevitable and should become as accepted as losses "in the line of duty" among the law enforcement
agencies (LEAs). Questions about whether such operations are "worth dying for" (as now raised regarding Somalia) would be inappropriate.16

**RSA Procedures and "Battlegrounds."** Initial RSA responses might simply involve more pro-active diplomacy, followed by on-site inspections, and then by economic or political sanctions, if needed. More serious violations might draw boycotts, isolation, impoundage, or property forfeiture. In more acute cases, population control, leadership "persuasion," arrests, or even "SWAT team" actions against specific targets might be authorized—once the offender has been legitimately "indicted."

The "battlefields" are far more likely to be urban/suburban/industrial areas rather than deserts, jungles, or hedge rows, and the "targets" are more likely to be gangs, governmental functions or industrial facilities than military formations. Understanding, influencing, or, if necessary, controlling the urban/industrial "anatomy" (infrastructure) will be far more important than pinpointing and blasting enemy units in the field. There is no body of expertise in this area equivalent to that developed, say, to warn of—and react to—an impending Warsaw Pact armor attack across the "inner-German border" of yesteryear.17

There will frequently be a clear premium on acting swiftly before a situation becomes unmanageable. However, the procedures for instigating reactions are likely to be cumbersome at best and the context in which the disorder originated may be quite obscure at the outset. In any event, RSAs would perforce be permanently staffed and should not require any awkward last-minute transfer of assignment or control (a la NATO). They would be primarily supported, however, by units drawn on demand from participating members that have been cross-trained and equipped for RSA operations.

RSA actions would probably be authorized (like warrants) by some fully legitimate international body (or court), based on some "finding" (declaration of emergency) or "indictment" (viz, U.N. resolution) derived from some regional "prosecutor"
(security council?). The initial alert might come through some crisis control center (a la CSCE), and confirmed by some sort of fact-finding procedure: either a cooperative inspection mission (like Red Cross in Azerbaijan or IAEA in Iraq), or a noncooperative intelligence gathering program (such as "regional technical means" or on-site "witnesses").

*One Hypothetical Scenario.* Consider a purely hypothetical future scenario for East Balkan trauma in an era when a suitable pan-European regional security apparatus (ERSA) has evolved (presumably from NATO's remnants) under the general control of a politically stronger CSCE of 60-odd nations (perhaps merged with the Council of Europe), then embodying its own security council, perhaps an outgrowth of the Western European Union (WEU) and/or the new Forum for Security Cooperation. Assume that Moldovan nationalists, supported by Romanian extremists, have begun to brutalize the remaining resident Russian minority with increasing ferocity, in clear violation of the recently adopted Code of Conduct. A particularly nasty incident ravages a small village, and Russia brings the issue into the CSCE crisis control center, claiming that humanitarian precepts of both the U.N. charter and the CSCE Code have been violated for the nth time by criminal activities at or below the Moldovan national level.

The CSCE security council might then demand an on-site inspection, but be denied by the Moldovan government—implying official collusion. The council might then declare an alert, tasking its ERSA to gather indisputable intelligence for judgment at the CSCE Review Conferences prior to presentation of the U.N. satellite imagery, combined with testimony from covertly extracted survivors, which might convince the U.N. Security Council to promulgate a U.N. Resolution condemning (i.e., indicting) Moldovan nationalists and their Romanian supporters for their criminal actions. The resolution could authorize suitable ERSA nonmilitary responses, to be escalated under ERSA operational command, but only if serious infractions continue. The ERSA might then design and implement a program of stringent economic sanctions, including the severing of vital economic, financial and communications links with Romania.
At the same time, covert intelligence gathering operations would be authorized in and around Kishinev, using ERSA special teams from Russia and Ukraine. As a precautionary move, high-tech special forces (perhaps drawn from 9-nation WEU multinational units) would be readied for neutralization operations against a special list of civil infrastructure "targets." The ERSA might also assure that the Russian minorities are provided with various equipments to insure direct encrypted reporting of further violations. Some might also be provided special training in target designation techniques.

Subsequent covert confirmation of such violations could lead to authorization by the CSCE of escalated ERSA intervention in accordance with the original U.N. resolution. Following suitable warnings from the CSCE security council concerning the consequences of official support for the crimes of the Moldovan nationalists, certain essential infrastructure functions such as communications, finance, transport, and electric power might mysteriously begin to malfunction. Shortly thereafter, with reluctant Moldovan government acquiescence, ERSA might mount a joint special forces operation that successfully captures (for trial) some—and disperses the rest—of the leadership of the offending nationalist movement. Discussion of the elements of such a regional security apparatus follows.

RSA Command Structure and Operations.

The preceding scenario depicts an evolving one-time ethnic outburst requiring specific and unique reactions. However, certain RSA responses should be automatic and not require fresh political consensus. Just as a local fire department does not need a go-ahead from its local council to respond to a fire within its district, RSA activities should be internally generated in response to recurring disorders (such as drug trafficking, money laundering, or arms control violations). Certain continuous enforcement/regulatory functions could well gradually shift from national to supranational institutions: an EC customs service; an ASEAN coast guard; a CSCE
conventional arms control service; or a Caribbean drug enforcement agency, for instance.

Command of each RSA would surely be civilian, not military, and would most likely rotate between major nations of the region as decided by some regional implementing charter or treaty. Deputies and "J-staff" would surely include both military and civil law enforcement groups adjusted to reflect the major current threats in that region. For instance, a European RSA under CSCE might be designed to focus on ethnic strife and forced migrations, whereas a Latin American RSA (under an invigorated OAS?) might focus on financial chicanery and drug trafficking. Clear "connectivity" to all regional governments, law enforcement agencies and military would be needed. The skills and prowess of the military in communications, transport and logistics, and intelligence would surely be essential.

The question of operational command of composite military forces is not yet settled. There is a natural reluctance to place major U.S. units under foreign control, and strong resistance to allowing command to drift upwards to inexperienced individuals—or committees. This argument was settled by firm U.S. leadership in the joint military reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in the initial U.S. response to starvation in Somalia. On the other hand, the recent squabbles between NATO and the U.N. over the control of military operations into Bosnia, and the difficulties being faced by the current U.N. control of military activities in Somalia indicate the impracticality of U.N. operational command. This is one sound reason for inserting RSAs as regional operational commands between the global arbiters of behavior, and the hands-on resolution of specific strife-prone disputes.

RSAs will have to include access to respected, seasoned regional military commanders with forces familiar with the territory and its inhabitants. Ideally, a high-ranking military deputy to the RSA director/commander would have some military units (possibly rotating) seconded to his operational control at all times, and would be responsible for their joint training, readiness, and logistic support. The NATO notion of individual country logistic support for joint forces would be
clearly unacceptable for forces expected to fight rather than posture emptily in front of nuclear arsenals. Logistic problems among ad hoc U.N. peacekeeping units are, unfortunately, legendary.

Each RSA could also provide a FEMA-like mobilization core for assembling and deploying community responses to natural (earthquake) and manmade (reactor meltdown) disasters, environmental crises, or even plagues and pestilences. The apparatus should be authorized to commandeer relevant assets, such as transport and hospital facilities, and assure the necessary regional logistic access through overflight, landing, and docking rights. It should also be prepared to provide "cultural advisory units" to help incoming strangers cope with language and dialects, local mores and taboos, etc. (The British provided Middle East desert-experienced NCOs to U.S. units deployed to the Persian Gulf in DESERT SHIELD.)

RSA units might also augment inadequate (or reestablish interrupted) national capabilities that threaten regional stability. In roles reminiscent of "strike-breaking," special units might, say, assume control of dysfunctional air traffic control centers, reopen shut down pipelines, or bolster local customs (anti-smuggling) capabilities. In rare incidents, illegitimate or rogue governments (viz, Iraq) may need to be deposed (an option certain to grow in acceptability through some regional impeachment process). In others, the aim may be to reestablish a functioning government where anarchy holds sway (viz Somalia, or much earlier, the Dominican Republic).

The burdensharing of RSA costs could also involve trading "contributions in kind": just as the United States provides LEA training, say, to many developing countries, those countries could provide translators for U.S. intelligence efforts.

Since RSA problems would run the gamut of civil law enforcement and disaster relief agencies, RSA "reaction forces" could well be mobilized from national civil agencies with "reserve" roles in RSA activities (such as the U.S. Coast Guard vis-a-vis our Navy). This dual-hatting could well be extended to other federal agencies from Border Patrol and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, to Federal Aviation Agency and Customs Service. Mobilization would incur relaxation of
various peacetime statutory limitations, and bring into play new command and control systems. One can conjure up diverse combinations of French customs agents, British frogmen, Canadian Mounties, German submarine units, and U.S. ATF agents, say, in the enforcement of CSCE-dictated economic and arms sanctions against expanded Irish terrorism. The possibilities are endless.

Military Functions. In some scenarios, the military roles might exclude combat forces but extensively engage intelligence, transport, and combat support personnel (from surveillance, communications and engineers, to civil affairs, medical, decontamination, and graves registration units). It is not anomalous that military units will sometimes respond to nonmilitary crises, such as disaster relief, while some unauthorized military activities, such as Chinese missile exports, may be countered by nonmilitary sanctions. Some military commanders still resist being distracted from their readiness to execute their "core missions" (like preparing for the re-birth of the Evil Empire?), but others believe that "plowshare missions hone the sword" by providing otherwise unavailable training and experience, particularly in the joint arena.

Combat military units would range from infantry or military police for peace- and trucekeeping activities, to elite helicopter units to recapture an airfield, neutralize a port, interdict smugglers, free prisoners, or shut down a central telephone. Likewise, night-capable, side-firing gunships can discourage urban artillery harassment or illegal resupply of sanctioned commodities. Larger "enabling forces" might sometimes be needed to "kick open the door."

In most cases, "de-equipping" the offender's air and air-defense forces, navy, or main army units—if deemed necessary—would be a relatively simple (or even clandestine) operation. Assurance of air supremacy would be key to conducting highly specialized military operations with low collateral damage. Elimination of ragtag submarine forces among Third World countries should be a matter for regional/global arms control initiatives, but could also be carried out expeditiously by RSA elements.
Over the longer haul, multinational manning of certain specific military units and functions should be feasible. In this case, the extensive use of jointly manned units in the U.S. forces defending the Republic of Korea might serve as the model: Korean "KATUSAs" are host-country military personnel serving in U.S.-led and U.S.-manned units. With increasing budgetary stringency, even U.S. forces assigned to NATO have incorporated "host nation support" units and staff augmentation. In fact, NATO-owned AWACs surveillance aircraft supporting the air exclusion zones over Bosnia are multinationaly manned. While certain combat units might better keep a national identity, there seems little reason to avoid multinational combat support and service support units. Base, depot, and troop support; air defense, transport, medical, communications, equipment maintenance, fuel handling, and many other essential logistic tasks clearly can be shared with host countries' military and civil assets.

In addition, there is no inherent reason why some supposedly "unique" U.S. capabilities should not be manned internationally. U.S. amphibious ships could certainly carry other nations' marine forces. U.S. aircraft carriers could have several nations' aircraft aboard, and use multinational crews. U.S. airlift assets could include RSA-indigenous pilots, aircrews, and ground crews from countries with their own modern national airlines. NATO has demonstrated the practicality of a multinational headquarters, at least during peacetime, and the WEU has some limited experience in multinational command of naval units deployed into the Persian Gulf and the Adriatic Sea.

One of the most essential characteristics of effective RSAs will be absolutely reliable, secure, multichannel communications throughout their regions, connecting not only the military units, but the political infrastructure, and the various law enforcement authorities. This is one enormous advantage of existing U.S. unified and specified command structures—and of NATO as well. These noncombat functions can surely adopt shared manning during noncrisis periods, and shared augmentation during high crisis times.
Intelligence and Alerting Systems. Another particularly key aspect of RSAs would be their resident and augmentable intelligence capabilities. They must have continuous information on ongoing suspicious activities within their member states, most likely supplied by internal law enforcement agencies, but already frequently shared through international links such as Interpol. These efforts must clearly be augmentable with or without approval of the local jurisdiction harboring the potential disorder. Intelligence must be both shareable with, and collected independently by, the RSA members. U.S. intelligence ("sterilized," if necessary), could often make major contributions to the RSAs—on demand. Holding supersecret and sacrosanct the relevant outputs from U.S. "national technical means" is yet another archaic and needless practice from the cold war era.

Good, reliable, unambiguous, early intelligence would be vital to sound collaborative RSA leadership and to its timely and authoritative response. An RSA could voice the alert, prepare the "indictment," assure swift and relevant responses, and set the rules of engagement. Early publicity on disorders and egregious violations of internationally accepted behavior can attract the spotlight of regional/global concern and possibly nip them in the bud and prevent their uncontrollable expansion. Bosnia/Serbia and Somalia are both relevant examples of woefully untimely joint reactions, based at least in part on the reluctance of some countries that should be sharing the leadership role.

Just as U.S. forces use a "DEFCON" (defense condition) ladder to symbolize alert status (DEFCON 5 is "all quiet"; DEFCON 1 a "major attack imminent"), and our intelligence community uses "WATCHCONs" to prioritize focus on certain trouble spots, the RSAs might use a "SUSCON" (suspicion condition) ladder to mobilize various resources such as intelligence gathering in response to various alerting systems (from CNN to escaped prisoners). "Big Brother" would then be authorized to watch closely only when suitably provoked, and then to perform on-site inspections if deemed appropriate.
Extra-Regional Support and U.S. Role. While most RSAs should be comprised of and managed by regional resources, "outside" contributions may be required on demand from the U.S. or other extraregional powers. Ancient animosities may make it impossible for some members to participate in rectifying their own regional disorders. Germans are not very welcome in Serbia; Egyptians are not very welcome in Somalia; and so on. Special capabilities not held by regional members might be needed, ranging from airlift to precision air strikes, or from extinguishing oil well fires to cleaning up nuclear fallout.

A hopefully diminishing role will be forthcoming for an overextended United States. The failure of Europeans to grasp the leadership of their own continent is a tragic psychic remnant of cold war expedience, exhibited yet again in the Balkan crisis. Latin American recalcitrance seems to have deeper roots. Only the Asians seem relatively undisturbed by a declining U.S. dependence. But on occasion, the imprimatur of U.S. assistance may be needed to assure regional action in any part of the world. Support of global civility by participating in regional security efforts—as a strong, honest broker—could well become a major factor in U.S. force planning and design.24

Most important, albeit most elusive, however, is the continuing need for the United States to express its outspoken support for the ideal of global morality and the clear need to extend and enforce international law and order. The world seems to need some sort of "secular pope" who personifies global standards of behavior, and, like it or not, most of the civilized world looks toward the United States to provide that function, even though presidential elections and U.S. congressional priorities seldom relate to it. When the United States drags its feet, progress in much of the world—particularly Europe—slows down.

New Operational Domains.

There are some significant new technological opportunities that can be available to RSAs. Some capabilities are already fielded with special units and forces, others are in use by LEA3,
some are awaiting a statement of need. They can be put together very effectively, in the hands of well-trained troops, to provide a new operational domain between hollow threats and passive declaratory policies on the one hand and full-scale ground force intervention or old-fashioned bombing on the other.

Nothing herein suggests that such operations would be without risk, casualties, collateral damage, or some innocent victims. Law enforcement and special forces operations are certainly not "immaculate warfare," although they can be far more discriminating than has been possible in the past. Nor is it claimed that results would be immediate rather than cumulative. In fact, the goal cannot be to "win decisively," but rather to better balance and gradually reduce the violence to levels apparently acceptable in other unsettled parts of the world—such as Ireland, Israel, South Africa, or Washington, DC.25

The lower the intensity of the "war," and the more it approaches a "law enforcement" operation, the more the overall mission emphasis must change. Relatively greater focus must be placed on developing reliable, unambiguous intelligence, even if it takes substantial time, and less on the immediate destruction of some convenient target set. More emphasis is needed on clearly identifying targets that should not be destroyed—from cultural symbols to friendly political elements. Ultimately, law enforcement operations involve the gathering and presentation of irrefutable evidence of the crime committed and the arrest of its perpetrators ("target acquisition"), while "target destruction" is replaced with the exercise of justice through the established court systems. This requires military and para-military forces to adopt new and different standards of discipline and conduct that are publicly judged (viz, the Rodney King police brutality case).

This new operational domain includes several new objectives that are unfolding in situations like the Gulf, Somalia, and the Balkans: the first is to use para-military forces in the enforcement of economic sanctions; the second is to cap the upper limit of destructive power of the weapons used (such as tanks and artillery); and the third is to generate confidence
destroying measures (CDMs) to persuade offenders and their followers (whoever and wherever they are) that they are no longer in charge of their own future, and that their unacceptable goals are not achievable.

Concepts of Nonlethal "Persuasion." SA operations could involve very innovative approaches to nonlethal "persuasion" to alter aberrant behavior patterns. The cold war catch word "deterrence" may have little application against tribal/ethnic zealotry, or the urge to accumulate arms. Terms "nonlethal warfare" (slippery foam?) and "psychological warfare" (surrender leaflets?) are generally disparaged. However, there is a potentially applicable nascent artform (popularized on the TV show "Mission Impossible"), in which offenders are persuaded by unexpected and/or uncontrollable events to either mend their ways, lose their illegal holdings, or "self-destruct."

Such CDMs may become acceptable forms of persuasion at the national level as they are at the local level against hijackers, and hostage takers. Their purpose is to reduce the assurance of the perpetrators or their followers that their actions or cause can produce the desired results. Against drug dealers, it might be to interfere with their financial transactions. Against terrorists, it might be to cause repeated premature detonation of their devices. Against arms smugglers, it might be repeated "accidental" loss of cargos at sea. Against violent subnational movements, it might be dissention within the leadership caused by suspicions of disloyalty. Among aberrant national governments, it might be to convince their publics that their leaders can no longer keep their national infrastructure operating at tolerable levels.

In this regard, RSAs could eventually have to accept the use of very specialized high-tech covert activities, just as law enforcement agencies do, and develop realistic procedures for their authorization. In particular, such operations could be instrumental in minimizing harm and inconvenience to "innocent bystanders" caught up in regional disorders. They could also differentiate between destruction and disabling of key facilities or "targets," thus hastening the restoration of normalcy and lowering the clean-up costs. In many cases, such
operations could markedly reinforce the will and stature of an indigenous resistance movement—if so desired.

The ability to use "dirty tricks" could become a significant element in CDMs, and its acceptability will eventually have to be in some way approved, at least in general, by regional or global authority. Disorders driven by greed, paranoia, fanaticism, and rivalry are all susceptible to exploitation in one form or another. Such vulnerabilities can be exacerbated by ignorance, fear, and/or distrust of modern high technologies. Fledging Third World national infrastructures generally depend, for instance, on foreign operation and/or support: an exploitable opportunity for nonlethal persuasion. Each RSA would benefit from having its own "Office of Strategic Services" (OSS)—to resurrect a term and capability used successfully in World War II (and which was eventually transformed into the CIA).

**Economic Sanctions.** Economic sanctions and political exclusion, established forms of persuasion, have been generally unsuccessful as currently practiced. Little rigorous and professional analysis has been applied to improving their effectiveness or developing alternatives. Military practitioners understand the target sets that assure the functioning of heavy weapon systems like artillery, barrage rockets, and tanks. But it is by no means clear that Western strategists have developed clear and rational taxonomies for enforcing economic sanctions. In fact, it is not clear they have decided to prosecute the providers or shippers as well as the receivers of proscribed commodities. Furthermore, the gamut of economic infrastructure "targets" surely must extend beyond transportation equipment and facilities to civil communications and financial institutions.

Similarly, CDMs should include interruptions of (or at least distrust for) seemingly essential domestic services and economic support systems like public media and news sources, telephones, and urban transport. Many of these "target sets" are well-suited to influence by modern technology, but generally have been of little military interest.
Leadership Management. Various combinations of the capabilities outlined above are bound to give rise to renewed consideration of means for altering the leadership of rogue states and tribes short of the classic notions of "decapitation" (like the abortive raid against Qaddafi). I believe it quite likely, for instance, that if a decision had been made to "arrest and remove" (kidnap?) Noriega from power in Panama as a covert operation rather than a full fledged military campaign, modern technology would have permitted it to be successfully carried out—primarily by nonmilitary forces, using military supporting assets. Similar choices may have been available in the well-intended but clumsy Grenada caper. Such unconventional operations may become more politically acceptable as criminal elements expand the viciousness of their acts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues.

While fear of retaliation may continue to bar actions against national leaders (i.e., assassination), the same qualms probably do not prevent actions against other classes of "international criminals." It is, in fact, a primary option among domestic law enforcement agencies everywhere—once an "arrest warrant" has been obtained. Such parallels should be extended to regional security efforts, if they can be demonstrated to be practical and useful. The U.N. forces' pursuit of the Somalian "warlord" Aideed is a case in point. Not only were elements of U.S. special operations forces unsuccessful in capturing him during a 3-month pursuit, but the U.N. command subsequently decided he was no longer a criminal.28

Leverage For the Good Guys. These approaches depend in varying degrees on the growing gap between the higher technologies and greater wealth of the RSAs and those available to the offenders (not always true in the drug war!). Many can benefit from human cooperation from within the contested area. Indeed it should be possible to give such resistance movements enormous new leverage in the passing of intelligence and the application of power. Some require substantial "air superiority," others require only that the good guys control the night airspace. Many are also less effective in
bad weather, but together, they can lower substantially the offenders’ options and freedom of activity.

The theme behind many of these developments is to allow the "enforcers" to shift away from "we can bomb you back into the Stone Age, with precision and from over the horizon" (or "reach out and touch someone, anytime, anywhere" as the Air Force likes to say) towards something more like: "we know what you’re doing; you can run, but you can’t hide." In essence, our forces must become omniscient, not omnipotent.

New Technological Opportunities.

The following section discusses briefly some emerging capabilities in a variety of areas pertinent to the three tasks previously described in this new operational domain (economic sanctions, damage limiting, and CDMs). Note that many of these capabilities can and should be introduced as part of contingency preparations for subsequent actions. Note also that these new capabilities do not obviate the continuing need for excellent "main force" units.

Many of these technologies had their origins in the frustration of the Vietnam war, but have since proved themselves in the "wars" against drug traffickers, mafia, and terrorists, and in limited operations such as Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf. Others not mentioned here are doubtless used only by special agencies in covert operations. Others still languish for lack of suitable priority and funding.

In the United States and elsewhere, the relatively inexpensive research, development, technology, and engineering efforts required to enhance law enforcement capabilities, including arms control, should supplant some of the vast sums still spent for obsolescent major war weaponry.

Area and Traffic Surveillance. "Realtime," daytime, clear-weather satellite photographic coverage is, of course, outstanding, and now becoming more easily distributed to operational and tactical headquarters. A variety of photorecon aircraft, and unmanned drones, ground- or air-launched, are available to gather more detailed tactical information when
weather permits. Infrared surveillance satellites, developed to
detect ICBM missile launches, are believed to have some value
in detecting tactical ballistic missile launches, but are probably
not adequate to detect artillery and barrage rocket fire.

There are many devices for detecting and locating
electronic emanations across the full radio frequency
spectrum. The ability to analyze their signals and generate
suitable jamming responses is a matter of course. Generating
an accurate "electronic order of battle" over a few days or
weeks is routine, if the assets and their early use are
authorized.

The United States has been perfecting airborne radars to
detect moving ground traffic for 30 years. The latest
prototype, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System (J-STARS), was used successfully to detect main
avenues of advance (and retreat) for Iraqi main force units
without entering Iraqi airspace. Coverage is day/night/all-
weather, but may be somewhat reduced by mountains
(depending on orbit location). JSTARS did help detect and
track Iraqi missile transporters approaching or leaving their
launch sites, and on occasion vectored orbiting fighter aircraft.

JSTARS was not conceived to monitor legal or illegal
economic traffic (rail, road, inland water, sea), but it should be
able to develop reliable traffic patterns of any kind over
time—and can be used prior to hostilities. With 12-hour
on-station times, it should also be able to monitor significant
track traffic at border-crossing points, but the side-looking
radars cannot reliably distinguish vehicle types unless the
targets are suitably "tagged."

In the main, however, the evolving spectrum of likely
disorders cannot be dealt with from airborne or orbital stations.
Human intelligence, gathered first hand on the ground in the
troubled areas, will be key to understanding the conflict and
developing carefully tailored solutions. In this respect, many of
the technology items listed below enhance the capabilities for
exploiting "humint" and other clandestine operations.

**Target Identification and Synthesis.** High resolution satellite
photography can generally distinguish vehicle types. If cued as
to where to focus (e.g., "near Vlasenica"), it can surely detect prison camps, artillery parks, and mass gravesites. Accuracy should be good enough for preparing "indictments" of illegal activity, showing buildups of suspect targets over time, assessing strike damage, and, of course, developing up-to-date maps of crucial urban and industrial areas. Coupled with modern digital computer photo processing, these photos can provide the basis for generating 3-D models (at any scale) for attack profiles, training, and missile terminal guidance. Satellites are of dubious use for real-time target designation.

Modern ground-based phased-array radars also make practical the detection of incoming artillery and mortar rounds, with almost instantaneous computation of their launch point. Providing these truck-sized units and their small, skilled crews is step one in stopping urban artillery sieges. Installing, calibrating and bunkering them before hostilities would improve effectiveness, and possibly provide some deterrence value as well.

**Urban/Economic Target Analysis.** Although the military mindset is accustomed to singling out obvious targets of immediate military value, the highly regimented intelligence organizations have little experience in diagnosing urban and economic infrastructure for less than destructive purposes. This is not a problem in technology, of course, but in choosing analysts and priorities. For instance, a cadre of former mayors, businessmen, city planners, or financial managers would develop totally different anatomical views of urban areas than would a set of bomber pilots. This is an area where *preparation time* could make a vast difference, and broaden the range of suitable "targets of persuasion." Such efforts require and deserve the ability to "mobilize" pertinent personnel and assets for short periods of time.

Rapid manipulation of huge diverse data bases is key to dissecting criminal infrastructures, and identifying relevant regional and global linkages. New digital processing techniques for photographic images can vastly improve the generation of new maps of unfamiliar regions (including the urban anatomy of infected cities). They can aid in reaction force planning and training. One 10-inch optical disc can easily store
(and display at any scale with 4-digit coordinates) every available map of the Balkans from the National Geographic down to local road and street maps, and compare them with available aerial photographs, given a modest compilation leadtime of a few weeks. Simpler versions of these capabilities are already available commercially as aids for travelers and tourists.

Using optical scanners and computer mapping, I would estimate that every telephone number in New York City could be converted to its 4-digit coordinates by "reading" phone book addresses! Electronic systems can doubtless sort out normal and unusual (legal or illegal?) electronic fund transfers, telephone calls, border crossings, or container shipments.

**Target Selectivity and Monitoring.** The ability to single out specific structures (bridges, tunnels, locks, docks, buildings, TV/radio towers, and power distribution points) for special lethal or nonlethal attention has improved greatly. Although reliability is surely not 100 percent, many newer weapon delivery systems do now achieve operational records over 80 percent of hitting an aimpoint within about 10 feet (day or night). These include terminally-guided mortar and artillery shells, armed helicopters, PGM-laden high-performance aircraft, side-firing gunships, and stand-off cruise missiles, first tried in Vietnam in the early 1970s. Accuracy and selectivity improve as opposition drops—and with increased use of trained *ground spotters* familiar with the area.

While mountainous and foliated regions offer the defender certain undeniable advantages, they also create certain vulnerabilities. These include canalizing traffic; increasing dependence on roads, bridges, and tunnels; and limiting warning time of an incoming strike, or other covert operation. Dead-of-night sweeps by attack helicopters or aircraft at low altitude down narrow valleys in response to JSTARS alerts could be quite awesome, particularly if only very specific targets were engaged, captured, or lifted away! Rugged, foliated terrain also provides excellent cover for special operations, as Yugoslav partisans demonstrated during World War II.
The ability to keep certain classes of targets under continuous surveillance has also improved vastly in recent years. A variety of remote read-out sensors is now routinely available (even to homeowners) to provide alerts of intrusion, motion, vibration, heat, smoke, noise, magnetic metals, or what-have-you. Most require on-site installation, of course. Properly and covertly installed, there should be relatively little difficulty in knowing when a bridge is being crossed, an artillery firing position is occupied, a loading dock is being used, a storage site vacated, a palace or bunker visited, an apartment (or a telephone) is being used, a lock has been broken, and so on. Tiny concealed and sensor-activated TV cameras can provide unambiguous proof of occupancy and activity. (Ask the former mayor of Washington!). Such sensors can now be routinely linked to communications satellites. Pre-hostility insinuation of a few dozen high-tech undercover agents could make potential trouble spots much easier to control subsequently.

**Target Designation and Location.** The unambiguous designation of a particular point against which to aim a weapon, or a parachute drop for that matter, is also becoming routine. A variety of hand-held (and I assume remotely deployable) and digitally-encoded laser designators are now available, giving a lone forward observer the ability to call in anything from artillery shells to 5000-pound bombs. Laser reflecting paints and various types of beacons can also enhance target prominence. Some were invented to locate downed aircraft and pilots, others are used routinely to improve air traffic control performance.

The ability to take photographs or TV tapes clandestinely has improved greatly. Individual TV pictures can be printed out in hard copy with portable devices like facsimile machines. Handheld photos transmitted by fax machine can improve confidence in the designation of individual targets, or even be used for subsequent photomatching missile guidance. Photographic evidence of individuals and specific crimes are obviously useful in identifying ring leaders for "indictment"—or passport inspection at border points.
Virtually anyone who wants to, from camper or boatsman to soldier or pilot, can know where he is in absolute worldwide coordinates within a few tens of feet. This is how U.S. forces navigated the Arabian deserts, how coastal drug traffickers establish underwater caches for subsequent diver recovery, and how U.S. trucking firms keep track of their vehicles. This is also how one-way cruise missiles can navigate to their "dump point," and covert agents can reach a predetermined extraction point.

**Target Tracking and Seeking.** One emerging capability largely ignored by the military is that of "tagging" targets in order to track them when they move, as biologists track migratory animals, birds, and, with the Navy's help, whales. The LEAs, on the other hand, have learned to use various kinds of beacons or other markers by which to follow critical items. A famous Drug Enforcement Agency caper attached beacons to barrels of chemicals sold to drug dealers through a New Jersey "sting" operation, and then tracked the barrels (intermittently) by satellite to their arrival in a Bolivian jungle cocaine factory, which was subsequently raided by a "joint" paramilitary force.

Other automated marking systems are used to identify railroad cars in transit, stolen money, merchandise not paid for, cleared personnel, and so forth. Many of these techniques can be used in monitoring economic sanctions, or tracking commodities to unknown destinations. The first commercial devices for police tracking of stolen automobiles is now on the market for a few hundred dollars.

Most of these marking systems obviously require access to the "target" for marker installation. Again, for tracking illegal products, arms, or even bullet-proof sedans, such access should be available at some time either openly or clandestinely. In fact, installation by the manufacturer could become a condition for initial sales and resales. Such devices may eventually provide routine verification of arms control pacts, or aid in limiting arms proliferation. They will also lead to nontransferrable "smart passports," "smart license plates," and
"smart containers," by which to screen out a few suspects from a large continuous peacetime flow of travelers and goods.

Homing devices now employ a variety of seekers that enhance their accuracy manyfold. Homing on small beacons is now routine in searching for downed pilots, military or civil. Homing on illegal radio broadcasters is used routinely to enforce communications rules and standards. Homing on effluents from various illegal activities or environmental violations is practical. Weapon seekers range from radar-seeking missiles to destroy radars, to infrared and optical seekers that allow a pilot to remotely steer the missile to its aimpoint. While most still require relatively clear air, nighttime is as acceptable as daytime.

Target Tainting. Technologies also permit the "doctoring" of various commodities and things so that they no longer serve their intended purposes—or stop working on command. Ammunition can be doctored to explode on command, by handling, or prematurely on firing. Fuels can be polluted to gum up or stop engines. Vehicle engines can be remotely commanded to stop running. Some drugs might be given frightening or embarrassing nonlethal side effects. Again, access is required, but is more plausible in the environments foreseen. Preparation time, of course, can be extremely useful—if not essential.

Such tainting can also extend to making certain areas untenable through mining or dusting with other chemicals. Some techniques may be particularly useful for enhancing "resistance" movements, while others may be more applicable to the enforcement of economic sanctions. Chemicals can be developed to taint illegal commodities or identify their handlers and users (as now used to "label" bank robbers). Built-in or covertly added disabling systems can make illegally obtained weapons and equipment inoperable. Some "golden key" systems are believed to be used in sensitive weapon systems sold to dubious Third World adventurists, and could be added to vital high-tech components of various urban and national infrastructure elements (from air traffic control radars and telephone switching centers to payroll computers—and money counters!).
Sensory Enhancement. One of the most successful technologies to derive from the Vietnam war has been night vision devices which essentially let people see under conditions with virtually no visible light. Western military and law enforcement agencies commonly use such devices, as do various categories of criminal elements. Equally important, many of the newer devices work almost as well through many types of fog, smoke and even dust storms, providing enormous advantages to their users. In fact, man-made dust storms (created, say, by helicopter rotor wash) or smoke can help balance uneven odds.

Virtually all the human senses can now be augmented. New biotechnologies will almost certainly lead to improved olfactory sensors for detecting the presence of drugs, explosives, and even aliens in confined spaces (like containers, automobile trunks, and sealed truck bodies). New techniques are already being fielded for detecting dangerous chemical aerosols (e.g., poison gases). Utilization and effectiveness of animal sensors (such as dogs’ noses) can doubtless be expanded for tracking smugglers, finding the remains of crime victims, and searching for illegal commodities. Combining sensors and modern computer technologies will almost certainly make possible new nonintrusive means for detecting liars and guilt, overhearing remote conversations, and pinpointing the origins of gunfire.

Decoys and Deception. Decoy equipments and false clues of subversive activities (empty gun packages, supply parachutes, beached rubber boats, etc.) can be proliferated to saturate defenses and destroy confidence. Many new technologies used in the entertainment industries have possible applications.

New computerized digital processing of photographic/TV information can also prey on the common belief that "seeing is believing"; photographic "evidence" can be synthesized of compromising behavior by political or religious leaders. Various religious taboos and ethnic biases can be exploited in many creative and very subtle ways.
New telephonic devices can clearly be manipulated for psychological purposes. The ubiquitous fax machine, for instance, is remarkably susceptible to creating doubt and suspicion. Its output is easy to read (not even an envelope to steam open), and the sender's identity and location can be masked (the sender's "stationary" cannot even be checked for authenticity). The greater the criminals' paranoia, the more likely they are to react to bogus materials designed to cast doubts on, say, personal or organizational loyalties.

Communications Management. Satellites make it possible for relatively small transmitters to connect with the rest of the world. Modern electronics allows "digital burst" transmissions which rapidly transfer essentially secure data. Lap top computers and fax machines permit very sophisticated exchanges either through existing communications channels, or completely outside them. In a relatively unsophisticated background environment, one can be virtually assured of being able to keep in extensive contact with friendly forces of all kinds--anywhere.

While friendly communications can be extensive and secure, the extant communications of the offenders, both civil and military (drug dealers and Iraqis notwithstanding), are likely to be quite vulnerable to intercept. Particularly if there are opportunities before difficulties grow to "get into the systems," it is quite likely that the offenders can be placed at a substantial disadvantage. Those offenders, as mentioned earlier, should include outsiders who collude with violators of economic—or military—sanctions. Those who sign up in international fora to impose sanctions on a neighbor must be willing to have their promises tested, and if necessary, supervised and enforced by international authorities.

The surveillance of military communications is somewhat more difficult, but after 40 years of learning about Soviet military equipment, it is unlikely that friendly forces would be unable to eavesdrop on any forces equipped by them, or by any other obsolescent equipment. Almost certainly, computer-driven electronic financial transactions can be intercepted. They have become a virtual necessity for
international commerce and banking. They should, if transparent, be an important source of information on illegal transactions concerning arms or economic trade.

Communications are an important source of national and business confidence. The ability to "get into" any or all of these systems and sow confusion or doubt could provide a very significant "nonlethal" confidence-destroying measure. Airborne and ground equipment exists to overpower existing radio and TV stations and insert one's own programs. Endless "dirty tricks" can be played by getting into or simply using the host country's telephone system. Automatic switching systems are complex enough to present significant problems if damaged (or altered). Mail service can be disrupted. Electric power distribution can be upset. Interfering with or stopping electronic financial transactions could certainly cause widespread concern.

Weapon Range and On-Station Time. Other technological advances have made possible far greater "stand-off" range in the delivery of high accuracy ordnance against a variety of discrete targets. The general class of air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise missiles (including from submerged submarines) offer substantial (albeit not yet perfect) opportunities to retaliate very quickly and with great surprise against violations of established behavior from distances of several hundred miles. These missiles do not need "air superiority" to very selectively remove elements of a military, economic, or governmental infrastructure.

The advent of airborne tankers, improved engine efficiency, and the "weaponizing" of long-endurance transport aircraft make it possible to maintain weapons "on-station" for hours at a time—all night, if desired. Shorter-range helicopter units can sometimes establish temporary forward ground refueling stations. Striking back quickly at various infractions (and before the target disperses) can be key to deterring their continued or expanded use.

U.S. special forces now operate very capable fifth generation AC-130 side-firing gunships with extensive night vision capabilities. Given air superiority, these units can orbit
trouble areas all night and return devastating, adjustable, large-bore automatic cannon fire very selectively. They can shoot armor-piercing rounds, as well as others. Developed initially for the war in Vietnam (urban defense, and resupply interdiction), AC-130s were an important component of the JUST CAUSE night operations against Panama City as well as in DESERT STORM. They could be particularly valuable (together with other sensors) in interdicting illegal shipments, applying economic and urban "persuasion," and alleviating artillery and mortar sieges. The C-130 airframe is standard throughout western forces, but its attack equipment is not! C-130s could, however, readily be manned and maintained internationally.

Precision-guided munitions can now be delivered without involving aircraft as the often-vulnerable, sometimes time-consuming "middlemen." Ground-based artillery and longer-range missiles can remain "on-station" at the ready essentially indefinitely. U.S. attack submarines and surface combatants also carry high-precision cruise missiles with ranges over 700 miles, and can stay on station for months. Although the failure rate on these cruise missiles appeared unfortunately high in the retaliatory strikes against Saddam Hussein's military installations, reliability improvements as well as on-site target designators can greatly enhance their effectiveness and discreetness.

Night Operations. Denying the free use of the night to the offender seems key to "leveling the battlefield" for the enforcers. Night operations not only inspire awe and disadvantage the offender, but they can also reduce collateral damage and civilian casualties in the workplace. Giving the appearance of vastly superior intelligence, and assiduously avoiding needless damage or violence, are both important ingredients in regaining the upper hand. JUST CAUSE provided our first large-scale (25,000-man) quasi-military operation against an urban target (since the U.S. operation into the Dominican Republic)—and it was kicked off at 2:00 AM! DESERT STORM operations were conducted around the clock. Virtually all U.S. forces and law enforcement agencies are fully equipped and trained in night operations.
**Personnel Insertion/Extraction.** A variety of new technologies are improving the ability to insert and extract individuals (or equipment) deep within contested territory. Modern aerodynamics, accurate navigation, night vision devices, acoustic suppression, and "stealth" radar reduction can be combined to provide assured (if limited) access, essentially wherever desired. Covert operations, like "dirty tricks," can become an important element in limiting the extent and impact of illegal operations of any kind. "Night visitations" (a very successful Viet Cong tactic) as an alternative to permanent "occupation" may deserve further consideration.

**High-Tech Special Forces.** Many RSA missions would still involve the relative routine application of existing capabilities for peacekeeping, disaster relief, election monitoring, and the like. A variety of military and civil assets are available for their conduct. The more difficult scenarios involving more zealous and ardent criminal elements require the development of major new capabilities. Technology can make many of these practical.38

Technology can be applied in ways that certainly limit (but surely do not eliminate) the need for long-term commitment of vulnerable ground forces within the disordered zone. In particular, the effectiveness of internal/underground resistance movements can be magnified enormously, in many cases without arming them. Nowadays, it is virtually impossible to deny clandestine communications (via satellite) from within a beleaguered area. Covert insertion and extraction of people and things are routine in a benign air threat environment. Many high-tech "targets" can be rendered inoperable without destroying them. Other targets can be designated and pinpointed for very precise attack within minutes or hours by standoff weapons launched from behind a hill or from hundreds of miles away. Very small beacons, remotely operated, can provide unambiguous aimpoints for very large homing weapons (or guided parachute drops). It is not inconceivable that if these technologies had been available to various European resistance movements during World War II, many months of high intensity, high casualty war could have been avoided.
In a different area, the successful enforcement of economic sanctions could provide a major instrument (and future deterrent) for RSA. It is clearly within the technological state of the art, particularly as practiced by U.S. LEAs, but not by main unit military forces as currently configured. Violations of economic sanctions involve commodities of some sort, their providers and recipients, and various transfer links in between; a range of appropriate actions can be developed against each. Twenty-first century blockades and sieges may be crucial to restoring local law and order. Little if any rigorous research, analysis, or development has been conducted in these areas. It is inconceivable to claim we can field an effective "Star Wars" antimissile system, but cannot stop the illegal flow of usable fuel oil to Serbia (or of chemical or nuclear warheads for that matter), either at the source, in transit, or at intermediate and final destinations.

High technology can also be used effectively to deny the battering of urban areas and their populations as happened so tragically in Beirut and is now being repeated in Sarajevo. Counterbattery radars can accurately pinpoint the launch site of artillery, rocket and mortar fire, and airborne surveillance can often track the subsequent retreat of the attackers to their defensive positions and storage sites. Remote sensors can provide excellent indicators when known firing sites are occupied. A variety of very precise weapon systems operable at night and even in inclement weather can be used in a benign air environment to destroy such capabilities and force the attacker to use a lower level of harassment.

The successful application of capabilities such as those outlined above will require the formation and training of new kinds of high-tech (possibly covert) special units—military, paramilitary, or law enforcement agency—quite possibly multinational in the longer term. Designing, training, and equipping such units requires substantial creativity. The legal ramifications deserve substantial thought, and command and control of ad hoc multinational units needs special technical attention. In any event, the popular vision of "special forces" as snake eating, swamp swimming, throat slitting renegades will have to be replaced with (or at least expanded to include)
a new generation of high-tech science fiction heroes capable of employing the full range of emerging technologies to defeat the persistent forces of evil.

**Conclusion.**

Post-cold war disorders more closely resemble crimes than wars, and seldom pit government against government in high-intensity combat. The crimes are generally gross violations of the growing body of international law, but not wars that can be won in the military sense. They must be countered by a combination of military, paramilitary, and civil agencies applying a variety of political, economic, and physical sanctions. The question is whether such global laws and conventions will be enforced by global, regional, or national authorities. Neither global responses by the U.N. nor unilateral responses by individual nations (including the United States) are appropriate. The best alternative is to evolve RSAs capable of maintaining law and order within "acceptable" levels of (inevitable) violence, using a new combination of "high-tech" civil and military resources specifically tailored to deal with these categorically different circumstances.

Altogether, the development of versatile RSAs for Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Asia/Pacific region presents some fascinating alternatives to the now obsolete functions of NATO—and many unilateral roles and commands currently peculiar to U.S. forces. The United States would do well to encourage the formation and implementation of regional security apparatuses and to apply some of its now surplus technological creativity to augmenting their inspection, law enforcement, and paramilitary capabilities and to enhancing their effectiveness. The gradual transformation of both NATO and the U.S. Southern and Pacific Commands into RSAs would make excellent test cases.
ENDNOTES

1. This is a somewhat updated and expanded version of a paper published as Ridgway Viewpoints No. 93-8, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Pittsburgh, PA, Fall 1993.

2. The need for post-cold war institutional changes was first raised by this author in an Atlantic Council Occasional Paper, *Organizing for Change: An Essential Part of Comprehensive Security and Western Prosperity*, March 1989.


4. OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency.

5. NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization; CSCE - Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; APEC - Asia/Pacific Economic Council; ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asia Nations.


7. The United States apparently accepts an annual "peace time" death rate of over 40,000 people in automobile accidents, half due to drunk drivers; 109,000 forcible rapes; and almost 24,000 murders and manslaughters (two-thirds by firearms). 58,000 people were treated for gunshot wounds at a cost of almost $2 billion. Police agencies alone employ 750,000 uniformed and civilian personnel at a cost approaching $4 billion; 127 police officers died in the line of duty. (Statistics for 1992 from the 1994 World Almanac.)


10. Recognition of this upward drift in sovereignty can be found in such diverse places as the open borders between the "five swans" of the Nordic Council, and in the new constitution of independent Tajikistan.


12. Issues of diminished sovereignty have been highlighted by critics of both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the globally more important General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Uruguay Round. One reasoned article on the dangers is by Clyde Prestowitz, "How America Could Give Away the Stakes in the Next Big Trade Treaty," The Washington Post, November 28, 1993.


14. For a full discussion of the growing international drug trade, see Phil Williams, "The International Drug Trade: An Industry Analysis," Ridgway Viewpoints No. 93-6, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Pittsburgh, PA.


16. Imagine how foolish it would seem if the Congress demanded that the President certify that eliminating crime in the District of Columbia was a "vital national interest," or if the City Council demanded that Mayor Kelly eliminate all serious crimes in the District by a certain date, or pull out all law enforcement personnel to avoid casualties.


21. The stark differences between warfighting and crime fighting were first brought home to this author by the law enforcement agencies while chairing a year-long interagency Defense Science Board task force study, *Detection and Neutralization of Illegal Drugs and Terrorist Devices*, 1987, (never declassified).

22. KATUSA - Korean Assigned to U.S. Army.

23. In a remarkable rationalization, Caleb Baker explains that "the failure to snare an individual foe doesn't boil down to a lack of capability. Rather the SOF mission was limited by Executive Order, and complicated by inaccurate and untimely intelligence, a lack of clear command and control, and unfamiliarity with the foe's home turf." "Manhunt for Aideed: Why Rangers Came Up Empty-Handed," *Armed Forces Journal International*, December 1993.


25. The rate of violent deaths in Washington, DC, is 78 per year, per 100,000 inhabitants. At the height of Escobar's criminal activities in Medellin, the death rate reached 389 per hundred thousand; "Colombia's Violent Culture More Durable than Escobar," *The Washington Post*, December 3, 1993.

26. Devices to disorient human sense, and inhibit human movement have been sought unsuccessfully for many years. Our new dependence on high-tech electronic systems may prove considerably more vulnerable than our remarkably adaptive and redundant human bodies.

27. The long overdue capture (and demise) of Colombian drug kingpin, Pablo Escobar, by Colombian authorities resulted from a successful trace of several phone calls using high-tech equipment provided by the DEA; Douglas Farah, "Escobar Killed in Medellin," *The Washington Post*, December 3, 1993 (an ideal case study for a Latin American RSA).

29. Airborne radars for detecting enemy aircraft have been used by the Navy since World War II. The latest incarnations (Navy's E2C and Air Force's E3A) are currently in use in the war against drugs, and in the enforcement of sanctions against Bosnia. Airborne radars for detecting moving ground targets have been used by the Army (OV-1) since the mid-1960s. The latest and still developmental, E-6 (JSTARS), proved remarkably successful in DESERT STORM. Commercial airships may soon appear for urban traffic monitoring. All benefit greatly from advances in electronics and computers.

30. The need for greater military focus on urban warfare has been repeatedly stressed in Defense Science Board studies in the 1970s and 1980s, and the issue surfaced again after both the JUST CAUSE operations in Panama, and the DESERT STORM operations in Kuwait and Iraq.


32. A broad range of ground sensors originally developed under a crash program for the Southeast war (under the cover of the Defense Communications Planning Agency (DCPG)), were subsequently adapted and have been extensively used in Israeli border defenses for almost two decades.

33. Use of tags was first suggested by this author to enhance the subsequent detectability of enemy armored vehicles once they penetrated the "inner German border." "The Initial Defense of Fixed Borders: From Psychosis to Armored Sunroofs," *Armed Forces Journal International*, 1988.

34. Initial development of night vision devices was accelerated for U.S. forces in Southeast Asia in the late 1960s; 25 years later, scores of devices are offered on the open market. "Save on the Widest Range of MIL-SPEC Night Vision Products," full-page ad in *Armed Forces Journal International*, November 1993.

35. Human sensory enhancement using "smart hats" was proposed prematurely by this author in the late 1960s to enhance the effectiveness of military scouts operating in the jungle terrain of Southeast Asia. Enormous progress in electronic miniaturization now make such prospects practical.
36. Decoys and deception were clearly used by both sides during the U.N./Iraq conflict in 1991; it is not clear to this author which side used them more effectively, even though the overall outcome was never in doubt.

37. See note 27.
