The Role of National Guard Combat Maneuver Units in Future Force Structure

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-- ABSTRACT --

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT MANEUVER UNITS IN FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE

by LTC Douglas M. Harris, US Army

This article provides an historical report, with contemporary analysis, of why National Guard combat maneuver units have never been employed effectively in their federal role through Vietnam. It discusses political reality, the historical rift between regulars and citizen soldiers, and mobilization outcomes—including analysis of the total-force roundout policy and the impact that the Desert Shield/Storm call up will have on its future. Conclusion explains three imperatives for consideration regarding a role for Guard combat units in the future Base Force structure.
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THE ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT MANEUVER UNITS IN FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE

...Probably the most important mission of the regular Army is to provide the knowledge, the expert personnel, and the installations for training the citizen soldier upon whom, in my opinion, the future peace of the world largely depends.

--Gen. George C. Marshall

INTRODUCTION

Post-Cold War National Security Interests and Election-Year Politics

The end of the Cold War and the swift, overwhelming defeat of Iraq in Operation Desert Storm have left the United States of America with few militarily threatening adversaries. Thus, theorizing that the risks to our national security interests are considerably less than even a year or so ago, many Americans expect a peace dividend.

Seldom in a presidential election year, however, are issues of intense controversy and sensitivity the subjects of soundly reasoned political debate in this country. Clearly, the already-in-progress draw down of the Defense Department's share of the national budget is one such subject. For example, "Mr. Bush's peace dividend--or savings on previously planned defense outlays--would total about $66 billion by 1997. His Democratic opponents are calling for savings of between $180 billion and $200 billion by that date."2

Election-year politics have already accelerated and amplified congressional criticisms of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) smaller total-force proposal--the Base Force. Debate over how much of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) we should dedicate to future national defense is likely to become more
rational after the 1992 elections. But it will not become less political by any means.

Embedded within Base Force criticisms are questions surrounding how deeply this nation should cut human resources in both its Active Component (AC) and its Reserve Component (RC) forces, and in what structural mix the downsized forces should remain. The debate became more rancorous when, on 26 March 1992 at a Pentagon Press Conference, The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Dick Cheney, and Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, announced plans to cut back or deactivate 830 National Guard and Reserve Units. Cheney and Powell also explained that under the Base Force proposal, some RC missions would be transferred to AC units to generate a “come-as-you-are,” “go-it-alone,” crisis response corps with minimal reliance on initial RC support. As for RC combat maneuver unit involvement in the crisis response force, what are now “roundout” brigades assigned to AC divisions that would deploy for such missions, would become "roundup" brigades and would augment their parent divisions, if needed, upon successful completion of post-mobilization training.3

The Base Force concept purports to restructure US military forces into a cost-effective strength and mix required to counter known and postulated future threats at an acceptable level of risk to national security. The Total-Army claim on this force would consist of: "four Corps, 12 Active Divisions, 6 Reserve Component Divisions, and 2 Cadre Divisions, all based on an active endstrength of 536K and reserve endstrength of 567K."4 In a year charged with partisan politics, congressional rhetoric on the DOD proposal is still much in a state of flux. Though our senior Army leaders are working hard to keep battle lines from being drawn, AC/RC animosities have been rekindled as of late. Lobby groups have been
energized. We have little time in DOD to settle our in-house parochial matters. Soon after the elections come to a close, we should not be surprised at more decisive congressional action on the defense appropriations, and thus, on force structure.

**Focus**

In this paper, I will examine a relevant dimension of the AC/RC mix dispute--the role of National Guard combat maneuver units. I chose to focus on combat maneuver units (Armor and Infantry fighting units with a mission to close with and destroy the enemy) for four primary reasons:

1) Throughout our nation's history, Army National Guard combat units have rarely been employed in their federal role properly during war or conflict. Yet even today, "[g]enerally speaking, the Army National Guard is charged with combat missions...,"5 I will explore why we have done this, and why this situation is likely to continue.

2) The Desert Shield/Storm controversy over the readiness and efficacy of National Guard combat maneuver "roundout" units has sent a signal to strategic planners.6 The signal may have been misinterpreted. This needs to be cleared up in the context of future force structure requirements.

3) The Base Force envisages the need for a "go-it-alone" AC corps to respond quickly and decisively to regional contingencies. National Guard combat maneuver units, in particular, would be omitted from the crisis response role of such a corps (though Guard "roundup" maneuver units could later reinforce AC units already deployed to a crisis area).7

4) Finally, there are indications that the above three issues may be contributing toward the emergence of self-serving attitudes and a renewed rift between AC regulars and RC citizen soldiers. This phenomenon has occurred just before and after every war or major conflict we have had.8 We must understand the nature of this tendency and reverse it.
American Military Tradition Has Roots in Medieval Europe

By the end of the tenth century, basic European medieval military organization had taken form and remained functionally intact through the seventeenth century. A recurring pattern of military need within kingdoms gave rise to a tripartite division of military responsibilities. In essence, each king would raise and pay a professional army (known as "housecarls"), which would be reinforced as necessary with enrolled militia (the "select fryd"), and finally, if needed in last ditch defense from invaders, unenrolled militia (the "great fryd") would be employed.

The housecarls were quartered in the king's castle and were frequently mounted, provided with armor and distinctive uniforms, and were employed in battle directly by the king. Often, housecarls were mercenaries. They had an additional mission to provide training to the select fryd who were productive and respected farmers, merchants, smiths, and craftsmen of the kingdom. Housecarls of today would most resemble the regular army.

Members of the select fryd gave numerical force to a king, but they were called to duty only when needed or to train for brief periods. They provided their own weapons, and usually only the officers were mounted. The state of training and will of the select fryd members to perform their duties nearly always meant the difference between victory or defeat during conflict among kingdoms. It is uncanny that the modern military structure most like the select fryd is called the Selected Reserve (the largest subcategory of the enrolled Ready Reserve).
When the homeland was threatened and all available manpower was needed to repel an opposing force, the great fryd was pressed into service. These were the remainder of all able-bodied men within a kingdom from ages fifteen to sixty. Though largely undisciplined, unequipped and untrained, the great fryd was often used as a source to bolster the ranks of the select fryd. The Standby and Retired Reserve fulfill this category today. Though the Standby Reserve is of insignificant strength currently, it was a critical asset to State governors during WWII when all available manpower was federalized.

**Constitutional Military Power**

It is interesting to note that our American military tradition is deeply rooted in rather aged European models. But the evolution seems to have been a logical one. In early colonial America, for example, the King's professional soldiers were rarely available to protect new world settlements. It was citizen soldiers, or militiamen (not unlike soldiers of the select fryd) who provided security to the remote struggling communities. Over time, militia bands from the colonies naturally assumed ever-increasing American loyalties and identity.

As American resistance to Great Britain resulted in armed conflict, militiamen clearly had an historical role. It is more folklore than accurate history, however, that the popularly lauded "Minutemen" were ever consolidated into a unified, effective fighting force prior to or during the Revolutionary War. It took a recruited, undivided army of volunteers (many recruits of whom were former militiamen)--the Continental Army--to effectively engage the regular British Army. Colonial militia units sometimes augmented the Continental Army to add strength, but usually militia units provided home defense.
organizations made important contributions to victory over Britain, but (notwithstanding alliances or aid) it was the volunteer Continental Army that was decisive.12

The necessity to raise an army for the Revolutionary War, along with the desire to rely on militia for security during times of peace, caused the framers of our Constitution to specifically provide for both requirements. Article I, Section 8 of The Constitution gives Congress the power "to raise and support armies," and it also guarantees a militia. Further, military power is divided between the federal government and the States. The States have the authority to appoint officers and train their own militia, but "to the discipline prescribed by Congress." State militias may also be called to federal service by Congress "to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." And, later in the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment states: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."13

Regulars, Militia or Something Else?

From the earliest days of the republic, the dialectic of whether or not the federal government should provide for a standing army or a well-regulated militia empassioned our greatest statesman. Thomas Jefferson felt strongly that a standing army and navy would threaten American liberty, a vestigial fear of the excessive executive power enjoyed by "the Crown" in the seventeenth century. Yet, George Washington advocated a regular, standing army as a means of ensuring national security. Alexander Hamilton addressed the roles of militia and a standing army in Federalist Papers 24 through 29. Slightly favoring a strong
regular army, Hamilton realized that "[war, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice." It would take a professional, regular army to guarantee proficiency in the military science. From this early debate would stem a long-standing rivalry between regular and part-time citizen soldiers.14

As this country engaged in more wars and conflicts over time, the military structure that actually evolved was not an either/or constitutional question. Some remnant of an active duty regular army always survived during peacetime. Militia organizations filled with part-time citizen soldiers flourished, though they were not usually well-regulated. But, neither the militia organizations nor the ill-strengthed standing army could field the trained, ready armed force necessary to continuously provide for the common defense of the republic, and to enforce foreign policy abroad. Therefore, during war, America came to rely on "volunteers" to expand the ranks of the regular army. Eventually, as a result of congressional reform legislation (referred to later), demobilized active duty units and militia organizations were restructured to better fit national security needs. Most of the land-force reserves, which we know today as the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, are more or less linked to the old colonial militia. Of course, the National Guard is still a State Militia unless federalized (called into federal active service).15
REFORM AND MOBILIZATION HISTORY

The Reserves Reform--Again and Again

As the United States matured, Congress enacted reform laws--e.g., the Militia Act of 1792, the Dick Act of 1903, the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920, and the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 to name the most important--to regulate and empower the reserve forces in accordance with changing national security requirements; and, indeed, to bend to political pressures. Note that this legislation either preceded or followed major wars--the Revolutionary War (considering also the Constitutional drafting and ratification period through 1791 when the Bill of Rights was added), the Spanish-American War, WWI, and the Korean War.16

[Note also that militia as well as regular activity during the Civil War period is a complex, politics-laden study unto itself (in both Union and Confederate armies).17 I have not overlooked this important period in our history. But, bye and large, the Civil War did not produce militia or reserve reform legislation of any far-reaching significance. Accordingly, there is no need to discuss it in this paper].

The reserve reforms sparked a debate within a debate. If the National Guard was going to survive under the militia concept, it had to organize and train such that it would be prepared to mobilize and fight if federalized. The National Guard wanted a combat role as a reserve organization. Yet, reservists who took another position argued that a US Army Reserve, organized like the regular army and not a State militia, could best prepare for mobilizations and augment the standing army in war or crisis. This sub-debate, in part, gave rise to pressure groups such as the National Guard Association (NGA), and later the US Army Reserve counterpart, the Reserve Officers Association (ROA).
The NGA, formed in 1879, has vigorously pressed for two principal political goals for the Guard under the militia clauses: to obtain federal assistance and secure a role as the front-line reserve to the regular army; and to retain legal status as a State military force so that it would be free from federal control in peacetime. The ROA has argued that Congress might have chosen to organize reserve forces entirely under the clause that gives it power "to raise and support armies." Both groups represent reserve force interests. Ironically, however, the ROA has often found itself in precarious rivalry with the NGA over the militia clauses in the Constitution. The ROA would prefer that the Guard take the strict State militia role so that a strong standing army would be backed by a strong Federal Reserve in peacetime. On the other hand, the ROA is supportive of the NGA when their interests overlap. When such teaming occurs, those organizations have maximum leverage on Congress—a situation we may see developing today.18

In addition to special interest groups, the reserves have long enjoyed immense political influence and clout directly from members in Congress who are pressured from State governors and adjutants general, or who are actually active or retired members of reserve organizations themselves. Hundreds of small communities across the nation have a National Guard or Reserve armory which is often the center of civic activity. Such deeply entrenched connections have been beneficial to reserve program legislation. Since WWII, reserve reform legislation has been much in favor of the reserves.19

**A Combat Role, Yes: But Mobilization History Is Not Good**

Indeed, with the help of the NGA and other political connections, the Guard has been quite successful throughout its history in convincing Congress to protect
its interests. The Guard did have two significant scares—in 1916 when it was thought briefly that the Guard could not be legally employed overseas, and during the post-WWII period when then Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall was credited with the singular vision that saved the Guard from extinction. But, owing to the militia clause argument, there was never much real danger of the National Guard being disbanded, or that its front-line combat mission would be assigned exclusively to the Army Reserve.

The Guard's disappointing mobilization history, on the other hand, has provided strong argumentative grounds to those who advocate the resourcing and fielding of a strong, continuously combat-ready standing army to minimize the risks of relying on ill-prepared reserves. At face value, the Guard's lack of readiness and proficiency upon mobilization was factual. Much of it, however, the Guard might not have been able to avoid. Often, the Guard had little control over its fate, and its unpreparedness became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The regular army had not designed viable programs to work with, train to acceptable levels of proficiency, and periodically measure the performance of Guard units for their federal role. Therefore, when examined, Guard units understandably failed to meet the undefined expectations.

Because high-ranking professional soldiers discredited the readiness of the Guard—though usually for factual reasons—National Guard units tended to become manpower pools. For example, upon enactment of the Selective Service Act of 1917, then Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, had decided that there should be but one big Army. So, in a case where both Guard soldiers and Guard units were manipulated to quickly increase the strength of active forces, March simply reorganized already federalized National Guard units into the active Army. The
State Guardsmen of those units were ordered into the United States Army as individuals starting 5 August 1917. Moreover, regular army leaders took over the units displacing Guard officers, many of whom had served for many years in those units. Guard officers protested, but because this action gave the soldiers equal status and pay (to that of the regulars), the enlisted men had few objections at the time.22

Of course, since WWI was thought by many to have been "the war to end all wars," both active and reserve forces suffered neglect and under-resourcing between WWI and WWII. The WWII experience started with a politically unpopular prewar mobilization of some Guard units. Post-Pearl Harbor mobilization requirements and the renewed use of selective service, however, found many National Guard units serving again as early sources for individual replacements.23 Further, the need for all units to be on active duty lent to the loss of the National Guard's militia identity, except on paper, throughout the duration of the war. In other words, to the National Guard, the massive national mobilization eventually meant that they were treated in the same way as any regular unit. Ranks were filled by volunteers or draftees and in short order there was little connection to the unit's State or hometown.

After the WWII victory, General Marshall's directives for the reserves were eventually carried out. The National Guard Bureau and NGA were tacitly in favor of the post-war changes which put units back together in better organized and equipped Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) units with "...a dedicated, hard core of officer leadership...."24 Because of the war surplus, many Guard units were outfitted better than ever before. Things were looking good for the
Guard as the droves of postwar equipment and manpower returned to communities all across America. Future mobilizations had every chance of being successful.

Then, just a few short years later, without much warning, and with no plan for such a contingency, the Korean War broke out. It looked as though the National Guard would get yet another opportunity to prove that it could efficiently mobilize for war. The regular army was not postured to adequately respond to this new major crisis in time. Here was the Guard’s big chance to fulfill its combat role!

Regular Army Bias or Strategic Prudence?

Curiously, however, the Guard was never fully mobilized and sent to fight in Korea. The regular army was hastily beefed-up to restore the line between democracy and communism. Except for the Air Guard, only a few nondivisional ground force units and two divisions (California’s 49th and Oklahoma’s 45th Infantry divisions) were deployed to Korea. The remaining National Guard combat units activated were relegated to training roles, and provided a "replacement pool" for the engaged regular army divisions.

Why integral Guard units were not used to fight seemed to revolve around a now familiar theme—the draft. The Selective Service Act of 1950 and the "individual replacement" philosophy reflected the feeling of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman) that the Korean War could be handled as a "police action." But a new twist emerged: in case the Chinese or Stalin wanted to push the conflict into WWIII, the Guard and the Atomic Bomb were allegedly held in strategic reserve to deter or counter any such move.25 Thus, it
was considered an act of strategic prudence to employ the regular army and leave
the National Guard (and other selected parts of the regular army) out of the
immediate fighting as a means to react to the "uncertain" threat.

Once again disappointed and embittered at what they considered a regular army
bias on the part of the Joint Chiefs during the Korean War, Guardsmen turned to
the NGA. The "police action" clearly would not require full mobilization. Even
well before the Korean armistice was signed at Panmunjom in 1953, the Defense
Department was once again eager to draw down military manpower and consolidate
reservists.

The NGA wasted no time in applying its political clout to convince Congress
that better definition of National Guard roles and missions in peace and in war
was mandatory. Legislation was introduced which, among its other important
aspects, would categorize all reserve forces within one commonly defined and
manageable package, and would specify required levels of manning and readiness for
those categories.

The resultant Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 cleverly tied Selected Service
(the draft) to options of service in the Ready Reserve of the National Guard and
each of the services (Army, Navy, Marines and Coast Guard) under certain
conditions. Along with "G.I. Bill" benefits accrued to servicemen, this act
virtually guaranteed an experienced manning of all categories of reserves forces.
After policy and statutory adjustments stemming from the Korea War, the National
Guard was satisfied that it would retain an important role in providing an
adequately trained force to back up the regular army against any foreseeable
threat to national security.26
In the ensuing transitory years, the Army National Guard went through a period of change and reorganization where divisions were organized into a specified mix of Infantry and Armored Divisions under a couple of different doctrinal TO&E series reflecting the Pentomic Army structure, then the ROAD (Reorganized Army Division) revision. In the mid fifties and into the sixties, the Guard felt comfortable with its vital strategic deterrence role. The NGA effectively parlayed its political strength across the nation, and particularly in Congress, into many undeniably impressive successes in the Cold War years.

So Why Were Guard Combat Maneuver Units Not Deployed to Vietnam?

We have to examine critical events of 1961 and 1962 to understand why the National Guard was not mobilized in response to the growing combat role of US Forces in Vietnam from circa 1963 until the US pulled out. In the Summer of 1961, Russia challenged the status of Berlin. The Berlin Crisis ensued. Rather than risk "massive retaliation," conventional strengths were immediately beefed up to offer a conventional alternative to nuclear warfare. Because Active Component (AC) strengths were too low to pose a strategic threat to the Soviets, 150,000 reservists were mobilized for what was envisioned to have been about a year. Additional Guard divisions were alerted to be ready for early call to active duty.

The entire need for so much as this minor, partial mobilization was challenged immediately on the floors of both houses of Congress. It became at once controversial. With these doubts as sounding-boards, a few self-serving politicians emitted the plaintive wail that the young manhood of their States were being burdened with the duty of all.
Paradoxically, this was one of the few periods in American history that the Guard was truly in harmony with its constitutional existence and the security requirements of the nation. The call up represented "...the first use of reserve forces as an instrument of diplomacy, in this case a demonstration of national resolve intended to prevent a war rather than fight one."\(^{30}\) But, when federalized by integral units in 1961—something the Guard had only hoped would happen in so many previous saber-rattling situations—"foul" cried the very politicians that had enabled the Guard to achieve its critical role in our national security! The Guard's own source of political strength became its biggest liability. Even more importantly, many disturbing mobilization shortcomings were discovered during the build-up.

While the reserves were engaged in repairing the problems discovered and political damages done as a result of the Berlin Crisis mobilization, another strategic crisis was evolving in Southeast Asia. In part because of what happened during the Berlin Crisis call up, but chiefly because Johnson did not want to provoke the Chinese or the Russians, mobilization of Guard combat units was not a selected option when the Johnson administration sent American combat forces into Vietnam, then built them up significantly for many years. We were right back to the Selective Service system of providing individual replacements to beefed-up regular army units.\(^{31}\)

**The National Guard Acquires an Image Problem**

Contributing to yet another diminution of the Guard's image, reserve service in the sixties became a "safe haven" for "...affluent, overqualified, draft-induced, 'volunteers,' who were seeking to avoid almost certain service in
Vietnam. Had the face of the citizen soldier changed? Largely due to disappointment in this "new breed," an increasing number of senior Guardsmen, many of whom were WWII and Korean War veterans, retired from service as soon as eligible. The experience-base began to swiftly erode.

Nevertheless, prompted by the USS Pueblo incident and the Tet Offensive, approximately 37,000 reservists were finally mobilized in 1968. But only 76 Guard and Reserve units of battalion-sized or smaller were mobilized. Less than half of these mobilized forces ever got to Vietnam, and the call-up disclosed serious manpower readiness and qualification problems in a number of units. Moreover, court cases challenging the legality of the mobilization ran rampant. So what good were the reserve forces anyway?

The National Guard's reputation and, indeed, its very reasons for existence were in serious question once again in the late sixties and early seventies. After Ohio Guardsmen killed four Kent State University students at an on-campus anti-war protest in 1970, the Guard's credibility reached its nadir. By the turn of the decade, Americans were thoroughly tormented over Vietnam, unenamored with the draft, and disenchanted with the military in general. In 1972, President Nixon won a landslide victory and another term in office having run on a "peace with honor" platform. The ensuing Vietnam retrograde would bring with it another significant down-sizing of the regular army. And in the wake of the painful reserve mobilizations of 1961 and 1968, their sparse use during the Vietnam War, and their all-time low popularity, DOD became increasingly more perplexed over what future role National Guard combat units could possibly fulfill.
The Total-Force Policy Emerges

As we began to pay more attention to our NATO commitments, we saw that the Cold War situation was not improving. In fact, new intelligence estimates caused strategists to reassess the ominous Warsaw Pact threat in Europe. The Soviets had enjoyed a relatively unopposed quantitative and qualitative military build-up over the ten year span that this country was focused on "containing" communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

Renewed warnings of the growing Soviet threat fell largely on deaf ears in the USA. There was talk of going to an all-volunteer, professional force. Amazingly enough, it would be the National Guard and Reserve to which, again, national strategy policymakers would have to turn for a possible solution. Since it was clear that a small, standing professional Army could not adequately counter the threat, it seemed only logical to include the citizen soldier in war contingency planning.

It was General Creighton W. Abrams, the Army's post-Vietnam Chief of Staff who envisioned a modern Army largely dependent on RC units to fight. He was heard to have said on many occasions, "They are not taking us to war again without calling up the Reserves." He proposed increasing the number of active divisions from 13 to 16 without increasing active duty end strength "...by creating roundout brigades who would go to war with their Active counterparts." This "total-force" concept was first expressed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970. It was viewed as a means of shedding old Vietnam-era stereotypes, and as a way to economically achieve military strength requirements which would be needed for national security vis-a-vis the proposal for a smaller, all-volunteer

17
force. Promulgated in 1973 by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, the total-force (sometimes more precisely referred to as the total-army in this paper) approach to national defense meant that the Guard and Reserve would be inextricably linked to AC forces deploying for a national emergency. This milestone in the evolution of the reserves, however, revealed a fundamental weakness in the nation's defense posture. The USA could not successfully mount and sustain a significant military operation without relying on the Guard and Reserve units in every category of combat, combat support, and combat service support.

The Symbiotic Relationship Develops

In effort to live down the poor mobilization record of the reserves in 1961 and 1968, the NGA and the ROA used both the popular post-Vietnam complaint that the President had too much power to commit troops into prolonged conflict, and the opinions and comments of General Abrams, to further their causes. These, of course, became two of the several premises for the total-force proposition. Three more convenient reasons to rally behind the concept are contained in this statement: "The political leaders bought the Total-Force concept because it allowed them to reduce the size of the active force and thus end the draft and to curry favor with the reserve lobby on Capitol Hill." Consequently, the reservists began to view a total-force policy as a means of survival. Though they knew it would mean more federal control (tougher training, frequent regular army evaluations, etc.), the alternative of a larger standing army was distasteful to them. Guard and Reserve leaders also knew that the
required partnership with the active components was probably the only way to ensure a strong reserve national security role given a Cold War paradigm. Despite a few extremists who, based primarily on cost factors, lobbied for a greater proportion of RC to AC units in the total-force endstrength, most reservists willingly accepted the total-force concept.

An important total-force view held by professional military leaders was that it could force a President to mobilize the reserves and get the American people behind any future military effort. The military never forgave President Johnson in his unwillingness to do just that; it led to "gradualism" and deprived military leaders of a quick victory.

Thus, given the ensuing downsizing of AC forces, the DOD also recognized that a symbiotic relationship between AC and RC units would be critical to a Cold War national security strategy. The total-force policy seemed to put the legislative and executive branches in synch with one another, and it would significantly improve the understandings and working relationships between AC and RC units. Then too, General Abrams' "roundout" idea would give National Guard combat units a unique role in the total-force.

Recapitulation

The National Guard's past is filled with turmoil and triumph, disappointment and delight, but surprisingly little combat as an integral force. For reasons attributed to lack of demonstrated readiness and resolve on the part of reservists, regular army biases, and the draft system during times of war and crisis, National Guard combat units have rarely been used soundly in their federal
role. As a result, the Guard's federal mission as well as its very existence have frequently been in question.43

Despite the historical inefficacy of National Guard combat units, frequent animosities between Guardsmen and regulars, and sporadic overtures to transfer the combat role of the Guard to the Army Reserve, the Guard has survived. Political pressure groups, power politics, and a favorable interpretation of the constitutional militia clauses helped keep the Guard alive from its earliest organized militia days through the Vietnam War.

Finally, the total-force policy outwardly revitalized our entire military capability and forged a symbiotic relationship between AC and RC units from 1973 through the end of the Cold War. Because the Guard shared an indispensable role in national security with AC forces, its combat maneuver roundout units grew stronger and became better trained and equipped than ever before. Roundout units have been severely scrutinized, however, as a result of their mobilization performance for Operation Desert Shield/Storm.44 Regardless, the National Guard remains a powerful American military institution today. Political reality indicates that this will most likely be the case for the foreseeable future in this country!

Reserve lobby groups are vigilant as DOD initiates US military force structure changes to adapt to redefined and more uncertain threats. With an appreciation for the Guard's political clout, and armed with knowledge of the Guard's evolution in historical context, we must soon find the answer to a difficult question: What should the role of National Guard combat units be into the 21st century? First though, we need to reexamine some very recent events and emerging thinking before we can develop a rhetorical position.
THE IMPACT OF COLD WAR AND GULF WAR VICTORIES
ON THE TOTAL-FORCE

Will The Wins Convert to Losses?

By August of 1980, US Forces Command (FORSCOM) had assigned all RC units their wartime missions and alignments under the Capstone Program. Finally, the reliance on RC augmentations and roundouts peaked in the 1980s when three Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) were activated into the restructured AC forces. Of concern in the era of the zero sum gain (the LIDs got added, but AC end strength had to remain at 780K), was the remarkable amount of CSS capabilities that had been transferred to the RC to pay the bill for more "combat slots" in the new crisis response-capable light forces.

A major idea behind the total-force concept, of course, was to get more "flags" into the US Army by including RC units in forces required to prosecute a wartime mission. Under the policy, forward deployed combat divisions enjoyed full manning, whereas a number of CONUS-based reinforcing divisions did not. By 1989, six of 12 CONUS AC divisions had a roundout brigade. At echelons above division, capabilities to adequately back up forward deployed combat forces, and even designated stateside rapid deployment forces were transferred more and more to RC units. Eventually, 54 percent of the total-army's combat units, 58 percent of its combat support (CS) and 70 percent of the Combat Service Support (CSS) capabilities were organized into the Guard and Army Reserve.

The weighty reliance on RC CSS was indeed audacious. Even more incredibly, the Army made the total-force appear more potent than it would actually have been in early hostilities through a priority effort to modernize and train roundout and
other Guard combat units. This helped; but, in fact, the total-force policy was a risky proposition against the Warsaw Pact threat's capabilities. For instance, a National Guard roundout brigade could not deploy to NATO in the 10 days or less required of certain CONUS reinforcing divisions. For a large number of RC elements (not just the roundout units), however, this policy guaranteed that they were to be strategically important to national security. The AC forces would be stretched too thin to maintain forward-deployed focus in Central Europe and Korea, and be capable of conducting combat operations in other contingency areas without considerable reliance on RC units of all types.49

The risk taken was apparently worth it. We all know what happened to the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet threat. And with a series of combat operations in the last several years--Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in Panama, and Desert Storm in Southwest Asia--the world has been significantly ridded of major military threats to our national interests. We won the Cold War; the most ominous threats have been vanquished!

In the absence of those old familiar threats, contemporary post-war political rhetoric advances the idea of a peace dividend. Americans sense that our military force structure can be significantly downsized without endangering national defense. Saved defense dollars could then be diverted to "other" programs, or to service the national debt. The debate over where and how much to cut defense programs and manpower will be in progress for some time. Meanwhile, strategic planners plead that a "go-it-alone" AC corps is a must as a means of swiftly influencing regional contingencies. At the same time, think-tank scholars proclaim that National Guard combat maneuver units have lost their prominent, front-line place in force structure.50 Following these premises then, the Cold
War win might logically result in loss of missions and possible redesignation or inactivation for many RC elements, including combat maneuver units.

The Anomaly of Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Even before August 1990 and the Persian Gulf War, DOD was planning to significantly downsize US military forces as an inevitable outcome to the end of the Cold War. Perhaps restructuring of our military forces might have been less emotional and much less difficult had Operation Desert Shield/Storm not been executed. But, on balance, the mobilization for the Gulf War provided a shot of adrenaline to the RC. Post-Cold War downsizing options took on new meaning as over 160,000 members of the Guard and Reserve redeployed from Southwest Asia.51

Operation Desert Shield/Storm was a rite of passage of sorts for the reserves--albeit an anomalous one, in that the mobilization was a convolution of a contingency deployment from CONUS, and an out-of-theater movement of forward deployed US forces dedicated to NATO. To support this unique operation, in the Army National Guard alone, 398 units from 48 States, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico were federalized. Ninety-four percent of the part-time soldiers passed the deployability criteria upon call up. Even considering time-phased deployment priorities and insufficient strategic lift assets, 67% of those units deployed within 45 days after mobilization.52

This might have marked the first successful large-scale Guard mobilization in this century--certainly since before WWII. The results of the Desert Shield/Storm mobilization are unquestionable evidence that the closer (than pre-1973) AC/RC relationship has helped the Guard substantially improve its readiness. In the
Guard's own terms, it attributes this unprecedented triumph to the total-force policy. In the words of Lieutenant General John B. Conaway, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, "When historians look back upon this century, they will record that the Guard and the Total Force Policy came of age with Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations."53

The Guard's combat maneuver units did not fare as well. In fact, even while reservists reveled in their Desert Shield/Storm successes, the seeds of acrimony between AC regulars and RC citizen soldiers were once again being sewn. Reserve component leaders felt that DOD did not call up National Guard combat brigades during the earlier stages of the Gulf Crisis because the SECDEF and his advisors believed they required considerable post-mobilization training to reach an acceptable state of combat readiness.54 An October 1991 Congressional Research (CRS) Report to Congress entitled, "The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War" authored by Robert L. Goldich, made the following statement: "The exclusion of Army combat reserves, and hence the roundout brigades, from the initial callup suggests that the President was not going to incur the political and psychological burden that a more massive reserve callup, including the brigades, would entail, unless absolutely necessary."55

Non-Deployment of Guard Combat Units Opens Old AC/RC Wounds

It wasn't until late November and early December of 1990 (four months after Operation Desert Shield began) that three roundout brigades were finally mobilized. Those units were the 48th Infantry, Georgia, roundout to the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized); 155th Armor, Mississippi, roundout to the 1st Cavalry Division; and the 256th Infantry, Louisiana, roundout to the 5th Infantry Division.
Division (Mechanized). The two whose parent divisions fought in the war did not deploy with those divisions. In fact, on the day of the Gulf War cease fire, the 48th Infantry was "validated" as combat-ready at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA.; but, none of the roundout brigades left the U.S.

Unfortunately, however, the post-mobilization training of those units became a source of tension between active and reserve soldiers. Again, according to the Goldich CRS report: "The brigades' experience generated much controversy about the viability of the roundout concept and the active Army's relationship with the National Guard."\(^{56}\)

Understand that for such a small segment of the total-army (only 9% of all mobilized Guardsmen and Reservists), the roundout mobilization experience had far-reaching ramifications. For the approximately 13,000 roundout Guardsmen and the estimated 3,600 regular army observer/controller/trainers (preponderantly senior NCOs and officers) who were tasked to ensure the combat readiness of the Guardsmen, the four months between December, 1990 and March, 1991 were, at times, pure hell.\(^{57}\) The regulars were from two AC mechanized infantry divisions--the 4th ID(M) from Ft. Carson, CO., and the 5th ID (M) from Ft. Polk, LA.--and the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft Irwin, CA.

One 4th ID(M) lieutenant colonel assigned duty to assist in training the 155th Armor brigade observed that by mid-February of 1991, the animosities and rifts between regular army and Guard leaders had solidified. Though the young leaders and soldiers were pulling along okay, many of the senior NCOs and too many of the senior officers in the 155th Brigade had made up their minds that they were only mobilized for the regular army to make them look unprepared, untrained, and unwilling to go to war. Many Guardsmen truly believed that they were the subjects
of a cruel plot to undermine the roundout concept. Though they had some very
important and provable points regarding double standards (from previous RA
evaluations they had received), equipment mismatches, and the overbearing RA
presence, the RA trainers took their mission to heart—they were training men to
go to war; standards had to be achieved. That's what it boiled down to. No one
was going to certify a soldier, squad, team, tank crew, section, platoon, or
company until they were ready to go to war.58

The shortcomings and problems of the roundout brigades very quickly became
newsworthy and political. Numerous investigations developed from the Army
Inspector General's (IG) Office, The General Accounting Office (GAO), from
State-level agencies, and from US Congressional staffs. Testimony on this subject
also abounds in the records of congressional hearings.59 With an allowance for
the occasional, unavoidable battle between personalities, the allegations and
counter allegations between senior regulars and reservists were basically aimed at
one target—readiness. Were the brigades going to be combat ready enough to go to
war, or not?

Much was at stake for the activated brigades, but much was at stake for the
regular army too. Under the total-force policy, the regular army had been
responsible for much of the training and virtually all of the evaluations of
roundout units for some 17 years. General Officers had publicly praised the
roundout units; one even went on record with Congress in 1987 saying, "I would
take my roundout units to war tomorrow, if necessary."60 Despite a few votes of
confidence here and there, many roundout Guardsmen felt strongly that another
regular army bias, similar to the ones they had protested at the outset of every
mobilization this century, had again kept them out of the fighting in Operation
Desert Storm.

Shared Blame and Analyses of Shortcomings

Without question, the AC shares in the blame for fostering an inflated
readiness picture of National Guard combat units in the late eighties. Not to
condone the unmaliced transgression, but recall what was at stake for the
total-army during those years when it appeared that the threat had an advantage.
Ready Guard combat units were a strategic necessity. To be sure, politics were
somewhat to blame for the elevated ratings; but, so were more objective factors
such as a lack of a sophisticated evaluation and rating system. For example,
training performances evaluated against Army standards were often evaluated under
varying and constrained conditions (e.g., a dwarfed tank gunnery range at Camp
Shelby cannot possibly test tank crew skills to the extent that they can be tested
at the more expansive and up-to-date ranges at Fort Hood).61

Let's be forthright though. From a pragmatic perspective, the most poignant
criticism of National Guard combat maneuver units is that the training time
available to Guardsmen annually is just not enough for them to achieve the
required level of combat readiness to deploy on short notice. With few
exceptions, this will remain an insurmountable challenge for Guard units as long
as they must deploy and be ready to fight in less than 90-120 days after
mobilization. As future warfare becomes more technical and complex, Guard units
are likely to become even less capable of achieving required levels of readiness
in their 39 days per year training paradigm. This reality has led to ongoing
exhaustive studies of the roundout concept. Preliminary results of these studies are available in the Goldich CRS report cited earlier.62

No matter how one interprets the post-mobilization training experiences of the roundout brigades federalized for Operation Desert Shield/Storm, only through hindsight can we discover what was right and wrong with the call up. Regulars who served in divisions not fully modernized, but nevertheless combat-ready, have wondered why they were tasked to train Guardsmen rather than go fight themselves. Guardsmen have asked, "What total-force wisdom has the AC really shown in the last decade by generously committing resources to train and evaluate us--then not deploying us to fight?" Many Guardsmen view this as a breach of faith on the part of the regular army. Then again, no crystal ball was available to the President, SECDEF or CJCS either. How could they possibly have known the optimum time to activate the roundout brigades, or was there even a genuine strategic need to do so (some argue that need never existed anyway)? The key questions is, "How can we do it better next time?"

In Congress, in the Guard, and certainly at the highest levels of the Department of the Army (DA), such questions have spawned thorough examination of the lessons learned from this last mobilization. Analyses of shortcomings are already being translated into actions and tentative decisions regarding total-army force structure. Army Chief of Staff, Gordon R. Sullivan has announced that roundout brigades are here to stay, and Guard combat units will continue to play an important role in contingency and reinforcement forces. But a crisis-response corps might also preclude some of the Desert Shield/Storm-problems we faced. So until final DOD proposed force structure decisions are approved in Congress,
General Sullivan has the total-army moving out on mobilization issues that can be improved upon or corrected.

Corrective Action

Three major DA programs designed to put total-army theory into practice will significantly impact upon National Guard combat maneuver units (as well as other RC units), and upon AC requirements to assist, train and evaluate them. These programs are: The Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC), the Roundout Brigade Task Force, and Project Bold Shift. The RCCC, chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, is an older council that has recently been revitalized. Its purpose is to provide a forum for communication and information exchange between and amongst key RC players and AC army leaders. The Roundout Brigade Task force, which according to General Sullivan may later roll into the RCCC because they’re doing some of the same things, is an action group chartered to continue the study of the roundout concept in light of recent Desert Shield/Storm investigative reports and lessons learned.

A major Army initiative, which takes full account of the requirements for deployment of reserve forces into combat, and which will significantly influence RC training, is Project Bold Shift, under the direction of the Commanding General, FORSCOM. With the Roundout Brigade Task Force providing Senior Advisory input, Bold Shift has already picked up considerable momentum in affecting pre and post-mobilization readiness changes right down at the platoon level. The "bold shift" is from the flawed pre-Desert Shield/Storm RC training philosophy to an approach where individual and small unit fundamental combat skills, to include combat leadership and staff training, are stressed in pre-mobilization training;
and more complex collective and multi-echelon unit training is focused on during the post-mobilization training period.63

Bold Shift is no small undertaking. The project office operates out of FORSCOM, J3 and involves: the Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), the Director of the Army National Guard, US Army Reserve Command (USARC), and the State Adjutant Generals (TAGs). Advisory cells also come from implementing AC and RC units and activities. Bold Shift’s purpose is to improve RC readiness and thereby enhance the total-army for the evolving National Military Strategy. Hence, it will play an important role in the realized capabilities of future force structure. Building on force generation requirements, lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm, and DA Inspector General (and other investigative report) findings and recommendations, the program is particularly focused to shape the RC force for the contingency era.64

In an incentive-driven, high pay-off approach, Bold Shift seeks to revise and reform several training and readiness programs in selected high priority RC units (especially roundout/roundup units). There will be operational readiness exercises (ORE’s), leader training development programs, training with wartime chains-of-command, increased full-time support to RC units, and a better definition of required levels of proficiency for pre and post-mobilization training. This program is, so far, receiving a mixed reception in RC units--everything from passive avoidance to vigorous support. In States where the TAGs emphasize participation, Bold Shift shows great promise. It is, however, a resource-intensive endeavor.65
There is a danger that the operational ranks within RC elements will view Bold Shift as more proof that AC professionals just don't understand the time constraints, training challenges, and recruiting and retention issues faced by part-time citizen soldiers, particularly leaders. A backlash of recalcitrance from Bold Shift could further contribute to AC/RC animosities.

**Recapitulation**

Of history, it has been said frequently and in many clever ways that, if we do not study and learn from it, we will be doomed to repeat it. This may be as much truth as cliche, but regarding the Desert Shield/Storm experience, anyone who claims that history has repeated itself for the reserves is drawing an invalid conclusion. Granted, there are similarities between the Gulf War mobilization and earlier mobilization shortcomings, but there are infinitely more positive differences too. Remember; this was the first clearly successful large-scale RC mobilization/deployment. The success can and should be attributed to the total-force policy. And as to the fully modernized roundout brigades, they proved capable of being validated for deployment within 90-120 days after call up. Following investigation of the entire affair in painstaking detail, by several chartered organizations, the Goldich CRS report concluded: "This is an unprecedented achievement, when compared to the previous historical experience of mobilizing National Guard combat units of brigade or division size."66

Unfortunately, between the need to drastically and rather quickly downsize the force, and the proliferation of the well-documented AC/RC rift associated with the non-deployment of the roundout brigades to the Gulf War, the future role of National Guard combat maneuver units in the force structure has become a highly
charged political issue and debate. Lobby groups tend to link DODs strategic "go-it-alone" corps rhetoric with the old constitutional debate over a well-regulated militia versus a standing army in time of peace. They protest that the "go-it-alone" corps is tantamount to supporting a needless and overpowerful large standing army; they reject the concept and want more, not less, RC involvement.67

With the Desert Shield/Storm experience as a recent emotional backdrop, sensible post-Cold War cuts to both AC and RC units will be difficult, and probably won't happen in this election year.68 Programs such as Bold Shift look toward the future and lay out aggressive plans to smartly correct RC mobilization shortcomings of the past. Tentative force generation requirements allow for a total-army vision and a roadmap to the future. But we can't get there from here if we don't agree upon what has to be done within the DOD. It is finally time to dispense with the AC/RC recriminations, close ranks to find a realistic and united political stance, and continue to build on the many historically significant and positive aspects of the total-force policy. Somehow, we in DOD should combine rhetoric and bring to bear on the legislative branch, the tremendous political strength enjoyed by RC lobby groups and the respected professional acumen of our regular army men and women.69 With all of the foregoing as a basis of understanding, I can now offer my concluding points.
Evolutionary Patterns, Trends and Observations

A review of historically critical milestones affecting National Guard combat maneuver units seems to show a pattern of recurring shortcomings whenever there is a need to mobilize RC combat units. From the very beginning, there has been a rift between regulars and part-time citizen soldiers, which has manifested itself in many ways. Notwithstanding the issue of combat readiness, the President and/or leaders in the DOD (or prior to 1947, the War Department) have repeatedly foregone planned, intended or optional employment of Guard combat units for reasons of political expediency or out of professional military bias, or both. On the other hand, until the advent of the total-force policy, Guard combat units had done little to improve their combat readiness on their own. Each time mobilized, until Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the Guard made a factually poor showing, which contributed to AC leadership’s lack of confidence in the Guard as a fighting force that could be relied upon.

To survive and flourish as institutions, the reserves have chartered strong lobby organizations, and have cultivated considerable political support from within the legislative branch. The trend of congressional intervention has strengthened the RC infrastructure. Today, however, special interest politics threaten to stand in the way of efficiently downsizing the Cold War-era force structure and shifting to a contingency-era Base Force composition.

Evolution of the Guard and reserve continues certainly; but now in a decidedly positive direction. The total-force policy, as particularly evidenced
by Operation Desert Shield/Storm--and by Operations in US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), as another example not to be slighted--has contributed to many firsts, and many more mobilization successes than failures. Overall, AC/RC relations have been improved markedly. And considering the past performances of mobilized combat maneuver units, the three mobilized roundout units have made quantum leaps in viability. The heavy scrutiny of roundout post-mobilization training, from both the AC and the RC perspectives, is without precedent. Unlike after previous mobilizations when we knew clearly what shortcomings existed in National Guard combat maneuver units but did little about it, Desert Shield/Storm corrective actions have been initiated without delay. This is a tribute to senior Army leadership, for we have reversed the historical patterns of inaction and misplaced fixing of blame. Fixes will be challenging, resource intensive, and perhaps distasteful to some; but they are underway.

Imperatives

Finally, we are not ready to specify much beyond FY 95 and the proposed Base Force yet, because there is much work to do in looking into the future. But, given the forthcoming threat analysis and any changes to the National Security Strategy of the United States, the actual role of National Guard combat maneuver units in future force structure ought to be determined by the following three imperatives:

1) THE FIRST ORDER IS TO EXECUTE THE REQUIRED DOWNSIZING. We just have to "bite the bullet" on this issue, AC and RC alike. We must avoid confounding the options, and stop wasting time and effort quarrelling within DOD over where and how deeply the cuts should be made. Cold War forces can no longer be justified; that includes over 800 RC units, many of which will be combat maneuver units. And there is no hidden agenda on the part of the regulars (as has been implied by RC lobby groups) to "save" AC forces, at the expense of RC forces, by restructuring
certain regular army units into a virtually self-supporting, AC "go-it-alone" crisis response corps. This is a legitimate strategic requirement. But it is being misread by legislators and RC personnel, many of whom see the proposal as a means for the Pentagon to sever reliance on RC forces in favor of retaining more AC units for national defense. That is clearly not an accurate assessment. In fact, by 1995, RC forces will come down only to their 1979/80 strengths, but AC forces will shrink to pre-WWII levels.71

2) KEEP NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT MANEUVER UNITS IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE. The total-force policy has demonstrated that this can work. Once the total-army is properly downsized, and with the diligent application of Bold Shift initiatives, National Guard combat maneuver units will become important economy-of-force sources of modernly equipped and partially trained combat soldiers. National Guard combat maneuver units not assigned a roundout or roundup role should continue to affiliate and habitually train with a like AC unit whenever possible. We simply cannot afford to keep enough combat maneuver units activated--especially in the heavy forces--to respond to multiple contingencies or protracted conflict with only AC combat forces. In this age of highly technical weapons systems and complex, lethal battlefields, the draft is not likely to expand our ranks with trained soldiers quickly enough. National Guard combat maneuver units can be there in 120 days or less. And when we do go to war (armed conflict more protracted than an initial crisis response operation) again, we need to avoid the mistake President Johnson made introducing troops into Vietnam. We should heed the teachings of Clausewitz regarding the importance of political will to the outcome of military conflict. Combat units deployed from across America will be an important barometer of the will of the people to wage war. DO NOT assign RC units CSS roles exclusively, as suggested by some analysts.72

3) CAPITALIZE ON EVOLUTIONARY STRENGTHS and DO NOT ABANDON THE ROUNDOUT/ROUNDUP CONCEPT. Of course, we do not want to repeat historical mistakes. We need to foster a cultural change that will close the dated rift between AC professionals and RC part-time citizen soldiers.73 But we also want to build on programs and policies that have worked, such as the total-force policy. As to the roundout program, under tough conditions it has survived its initiation rites. I believe this country is producing a new breed of Guardsmen who are up to the challenge. If we keep the expectations and the standards high, the roundout units will only get stronger and more mature. We must give them full acceptance. Roundout is being studied to the nth degree; perhaps refinements are worth testing (e.g., battalion and/or company roundout units vice an entire brigade). With the Bold Shift program providing the impetus, however, I believe that roundout units, as well as other National Guard Combat maneuver units, will provide this country with a cost effective strategic reserve capable of mobilizing for major contingencies or general war, and capable of achieving combat readiness within a reasonable amount of time to ensure our national security.

This is, indeed, a time of great uncertainty in our country as well as throughout the world. Citizen soldiers serving in combat maneuver units are needed in our strategic reserves as much today as they ever have been. They have
a demanding, but sacred role in guaranteeing America's security and liberty. It seems fitting, then, that I end this paper as I opened it--by quoting General George C. Marshall: "...[P]robably the most important mission of the regular Army is to provide the knowledge, the expert personnel, and the installations for training the citizen soldier upon whom, in my opinion, the future peace of the world largely depends."
END NOTES


10 Binkin and Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, p. 5.

11 Ibid. Also: Jim Dan Hill, The Minuteman in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1964), p. 486. “Emergency home defense units” (roughly equivalent to something like the “great fryd” in concept) had taken over a considerable number of National Guard Armories and were already “...available to State Governors for emergencies arising from storms, disasters and civil disorder...” (p.486).

12 Russel F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 12–32. Also: Hill, The Minuteman in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard, p. 1. Dr. Hill explains at the very beginning of his book that “…Militia, with various adjectives, is a term that necessarily recurs again, again and again. No noun in the military lexicon has been more frequently
abused and more thoroughly misunderstood.” (p.1). For example, Trainbands, Colonial Levies, Continental Line, and the Line of various States are all labels synonymous with Minutemen. Likewise today, such terms as Organized Militia, Volunteer Militia, and National Guard of the United States, are terms used to mean the same as the National Guard (be it Army or Air National Guard). And these terms are explicit of simply the National Guard. There are a different, associated, but not necessarily mutually exclusive set of labels for the Regular Army and the Army and Air Force Reserve forces. Most of these terms eminate from the generic term militia in one way or another.


16 Hill, The Minuteman in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard, pp. 207-223. Unlike most other significant (to the Guard) legislation that followed wars, the National Defense Act of 1916 preceded WWI. It was landmark legislation that, in fact, saved the National Guard as an organization. In February 1912, a legal interpretation of the Dick Act of 1903, with its 1908 Amendment, by President Taft’s Attorney General, George W. Wickersham, suggested that the law was unconstitutional. The Dick Act corrected many shortcomings in the training, resourcing and employment of (what was to become) the Guard which existed prior to and during the Spanish–American War. As a result of Wickersham’s legal opinion, a large-scale campaign was waged against the need for a National Guard. The War Department under Secretaries Stimpson, and later Garrison (of the Wilson administration, 1913), pushed for a “Continental Army” of regulars since it was considered unconstitutional to call the militia into service outside the Territory of the United States. (p. 204 and 220). The National Defense Act of 1916 cleared up the constitutional question and “turned out to be the most comprehensive military measure up to that date. Many of its principles remain.” (p. 221).


20 Edward J. Philbin and James L. Gould, “The Guard and Reserve: In Pursuit of Full Integration,” The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, Wilson, ed., p. 46. Also: Hill, The Minuteman in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard, pp. 263, 392, 428 and 489. The Guard’s postwar problems began with its prewar readiness. In particular, one of the most outspoken senior Army leaders against the worthiness of the National Guard was (then) Brigadier General Leslie J. McNair, C.G. Army Ground Forces, whose headquarters evaluated the many participating National Guard units during the Great Louisiana Maneuvers of 1939. According to Hill, McNair set forth an anti-Guard fervor among his staff and the War Department which carried over into postwar planning for the future of the Guard. There was also a widespread feeling that draft of personnel by selective service would solve future manpower problems in peace and war.


25 Ibid., pp. 502-514.

26 Ibid., p. 508.

27 Ibid., pp. 541-553. Hill discusses the reconfiguration and reorganizations of the post-Korean War Guard in considerable detail. He also explains the Pentomic and ROAD organizations fairly well.

28 Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, p. 142


30 Binkin and Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, pp. 44-47.

31 Binkin and Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, pp. 48-56. (Many other sources are also quoted within these pages of the Binkin/Kaufmann text).


Arnold Punaro, "Pentagon's Plans for Reserve Cuts Across the Board Won't Work," The Officer (January 1992): 29. Mr. Punaro is the staff director for the majority, Senate Armed Services Committee. He has been on the SASC staff since 1973. He recalls Gen Abrams calling on his (Punaro's) boss, Senator Sam Nunn, in the mid seventies with the plan for 16 Army Divisions. General Abrams included in his plan, a strong role for National Guard combat units as a means to secure the support and will of the American people when forces might again be committed to combat—--a mistake, he believed, made in Vietnam. See also: John P. Murtha, "Reserves Are Critical to National Security," The Officer (March 1992): 29. Rep. Murtha (D-PA) chairs the House Defense Appropriations sub-committee.


Philbin and Gould, "The Guard and Reserve: In Pursuit of Full Integration," The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, Wilson, ed., pp. 46-47. The evolution of the total-force policy from concept, through its growing pains, and into virtual reality is a lengthy study in and of itself. This paper cannot do justice to the complexities of the total-force challenge. I strongly recommend that those interested in our future force structure (of which a continued total-force policy will be very much a part) take the time to read Wilson's excellent edited book.

Lawrence J. Korb, "The Reserves: Should They Be In The Front Lines?" The Christian Science Monitor, October 1, 1990. Dr. Korb was an assistant secretary in the Defense Department during the Reagan administration. He is currently Director of the Brookings Center for Public Policy Education. He was also Vice Chairman of the Committee for National Security. He was apparently a contender for SecDef when the Bush administration took over, but he lost to Mr. Cheney. Dr. Korb has written other articles praising the final outcome of Desert Storm. For example, another of his op-eds, "This Time the Military Got It Right," appeared in several publications and journals in the Summer of '91.

Binkin and Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, pp. 28-32. Depending on the source and how savings are figured, cost advantages range anywhere from 66% (according to a source from Army DCSOPS) to 25% of the cost to maintain AC forces. The Guard seems to use the 33% figure most often.

Ibid.

Hill, The Minuteman in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard. Though many references bear out this fact, Hill covers it most comprehensively, I think, in his 585 page volume.


David E. Shaver, Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony, Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992, p. 25. This citation comes out of Appendix B of Col. Shaver’s monograph. Appendix B, "History and Principles of Roundout and Capstone" was prepared by LTC Leonid Kondratiuk. See this source for an excellent and condensed synopsis of the Capstone Program. The history and differences between Roundout, Affiliation, and Capstone programs are succinctly explained.


50 Korb, "The Reserves: Should They Be In The Front Lines?" This entire article addresses this point in light of the end of the Cold War and the outcome of Desert Storm.


54 John M. Collins, "Desert Shield and Desert Storm Implications for Future US Force Requirements," *Congressional Research Service Report For Congress*, April 19, 1991, p. 6. This assertion was later rebuked by DOD officials who claimed that, in the early stages, no one thought that it would be five and one-half months and many Divisions later that battle would be actually joined with Iraqi forces. Had anyone known in August and September of 1990 that the situation would develop as it did, the National Guard combat brigades would probably have been called up well prior to the 30 November and 7 December dates that they were finally mobilized.

55 Goldich, "The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War," p. 11. This was just one of several conjectures as to why the President and DOD forced a delayed mobilization for National Guard combat units.


57 *Ibid*, p. 3.

58 *Ibid*, p. 22. Also: The lieutenant colonel referred to is this author, former commander of 2-35 Armor, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The 155th Armor Brigade, Mississippi Army National Guard was activated in December 1990, and conducted post-mobilization training at Ft Hood, Texas. LTC Harris was the officer-in-charge of the Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX) training module. Each company/team in each of the four assigned task forces of the 155th Brigade was required to successfully complete the CALFEX prior to deploying to their final task force and brigade level training at the National Training Center (NTC), Ft. Irwin, California. Two CALFEX ranges were in simultaneous use to meet the time pressures of getting the Brigade to the NTC on schedule.

59 Department of the Army Inspector General, "Special Assessment of National Guard Brigades' Mobilization and Deployment," Briefing Slides (hard copy), no date, but probably May 1991. (Copy obtained by the author, no protective markings). Also: The contents of most of the investigations referred to are encapsulated (and often cited) in Robert L. Goldich’s *CRS Report for Congress* entitled, "The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War"—cited many times herein. For any reader seriously interested in the roundout concept, this is "must" reading.

60 Goldich, "The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War," p. 16. The General Officer was left unnamed in the report.


64 Telephonic interview with Lieutenant General Neal T. Jaco, Commanding General, Fifth Army, Ft. Sam Houston, TX, 8 Feb 92; and Colonel Randall J. Anderson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, Fifth Army, 12 Feb 92. Also: "Bold Shift Briefing Slides" from the Roundout/Roundup Brigade TAG Conference, HQ FORSCOM, 21 Oct 91. Also: Sullivan, p. 28.

65 Ibid.


67 Punaro, "Pentagon's Plans for Reserve Cuts Across the Board Won't Work," p. 32.

68 See, for example: Hackworth, "A Pentagon in Dreamland: Doesn't Anybody Know How to Cut a Budget Around Here?" p. C3.

69 See: Shaver, Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony, pp. 1-27 for well-document academic treatment of this thought. Shaver, however, recommends that roundout as a force structuring concept be totally eliminated. I do not agree with him on that notion.


72 For example, see the monograph by Philip A. Brehm, "Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total Force," Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992.

73 The best source I can cite which discusses how to do this is: Shaver, Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony--though, once again, I disagree with his recommendation to eliminate the roundout concept.