The Army Industrial College and Mobilization Planning Between the Wars

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ABSTRACT

The Army Industrial College was founded in 1924 "to train Army officers in the useful knowledge pertaining to the supervision of procurement of all military supplies in time of war and to the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to war-time needs" (War Department General Orders No. 7, February 25, 1924). Research into newly-declassified material in the National Archives from the Army Industrial College in the pre-World War II period shows the role the AIC played in training Army, Navy and Marine officers in planning the industrial mobilization of the next war. Although the AIC graduated only somewhat more than 1,000 officers (regular and reserve) prior to closing on December 23, 1941, many graduates were in pivotal positions to influence the production of the Industrial Mobilization Plans, which were officially the responsibility of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The failure of President Roosevelt to use these Industrial Mobilization Plans was a result of the gradual U.S. involvement in events leading up to our entry in the war and in the lack of an identifiable "M-Day" on which mobilization would commence.
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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1940, as war spread to Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Belgium, pressure on President Franklin D. Roosevelt grew.

Prominent persons in both parties began to call for action. Some suggested the use of the Industrial Mobilization Plan but members of the White House staff urged Roosevelt not to accept the suggestion. They told the President that the IMP was based on 1914-1918 experience and did not pay enough attention to the changed nature of war... They also told the President that the needs of the military were arrived at under the IMP by the 'most elementary rule-of-thumb' methods by Army officers 'after a half-a-day lecture on statistics.' In fact, the White House advisers stated that many of the war plans are 'nothing more profound than student exercises, worked up in a few hours or days as a problem in a brief Army Industrial College course.'

By the fall of that year, the wheels were in motion to rearm the United States and to provide equipment to Great Britain in an attempt to shore up her defenses and prevent her capitulation to Germany. Fortune magazine carried a three part series in its September, October and November issues on U. S. defense--"the Armed Forces," "the Sinews," and "the Dollars" respectively. The October article emphasized the industrial aspects of rearmament, and twice referred to the Army Industrial College:

In the end [discussing the shutting down of World War I factories], we were left with no munitions industry at
all. Thus the people and their statesmen washed their hands of war. Only the professionals—the army, the navy—continued to practice an art that the people were confident would never again be employed in their time. In the dreary cubicles of the Army Industrial College, a handful of officers wrote dull but solid papers on how plants making adding machines, automatic lead pencils, cash registers, boats, pipe organs and lawn mowers could be turned to revolvers, ammunition components, bomb fuses, pontoon bridges, saddle frames, and shrapnel. Doggedly, the War Department allocated M-Day assignments, which some vice president, busy with other duties, filed away and forgot. Our neighbors were friendly or weak. There was no need for the U.S. to hold itself in what the military man calls 'a position of readiness.'

There is a U.S. plan for economic defense—the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Product of twenty years' research by the Army Industrial College, it is a thin pamphlet of eighteen pages of fine type. By itself, the document seems a painfully meager guide for mobilizing a nation. But taken in conjunction with the earlier reports, the 1940 analysis, which runs 200 pages, the fat volume on procurement, the exhaustive card index of industry, it is an impressive work, covering all phases of reshaping the economy, from M-Day to peace.

What role did the Army Industrial College play in preparing the nation for another war? This paper will look at how the AIC came into being as a result of the lessons learned in the World War I mobilization effort, how it interacted with the organizational structure responsible for planning for future mobilizations, and how the plans developed were set aside as the nation geared up for war.

CREATING A STRUCTURE FOR MOBILIZATION PLANNING

The National Defense Act of 1920 charged the Secretary of
War with the formulation of policies relating to the procurement of supplies. In turn, the Secretary of War assigned the Assistant Secretary responsibility for "the purchase and lease of real estate, the purchase of commodities and supplies, the collection of information, and the compilation of data 'assuring adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and of the industrial organizations of the country essential to the war time needs.' . . . It was further provided that in matters pertaining to procurement, all branches of the Army having procurement functions were to report directly to the Assistant Secretary." Initially, assignment of similar functions to the General Staff caused confusion, but following the report of a board of inquiry (the "Harbord Board") in the summer of 1921, the division of responsibility between the OASW and the General Staff was clear. The General Staff would prepare specifications and detailed drawings of materiel to be obtained, and handle inspection, testing and acceptance, and storage and issue of materiel. "These functions . . . involved a military and not a business relationship with the supply branches. All business activities, such as the control of purchase and acquisition, involving designation of purchasing agency, financial arrangements, preparation and standardization of contracts, and condemnation of facilities, was [sic] placed with the Assistant Secretary."5

General Orders No. 41 of 1921 assigned six functions to the OASW:

3
(1) procurement of all military supplies. . . ;

(2) procurement of real estate. . . ;

(3) collection of information and compilation of data pertaining to sources of supply;

(4) assurance of adequate and timely provision for the mobilization of the material and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs, including arrangements in the supply branches and arrangements with agencies outside the War Department;

(5) the settlement of all claims against the War Department due to the cancellation of contracts. . . ;

(6) sale or other disposition of all supplies, equipment, plants, factories, land, or other facilities declared surplus by the Secretary of War.6

Additional duties assigned to the Assistant Secretary in these General Orders involved representing the War Department in coordinating the allotment of industrial facilities with the Navy Department in cases where there was mutual interest or need and similar representation with any interdepartmental or superdepartmental agency involved in allocation of materials and facilities. The chiefs of the supply branches were made responsible to the Assistant Secretary "in all matters relating to procurement and industrial mobilization."7

The Assistant Secretary set up his office in five major divisions: Procurement, Director of Sales, War Department Claims, Purchase or Lease of Real Estate, and Miscellaneous. The Procurement Division was further divided into a Planning Branch and Current Supply Branch.
The Planning Branch was charged with the responsibility of preparing peacetime and wartime plans and policies for the procurement structure to be established in the Office of the Assistant Secretary. . . . [It] was to supervise the procurement of supplies and real estate and to provide for the mobilization of materiel. It was further provided that the Planning Branch represent the Assistant Secretary in cooperating with the Navy Department in the allotment of industrial facilities to meet the requirements of a joint war program, and in dealing with any interdepartmental or superdepartmental agency which might be established for the allocation of materials or facilities.  

The records of several World War I agencies, including the War Industries Board (chaired by Bernard Baruch) and the Council of National Defense, came into the custody of the Planning Branch.  

General Order No. 51, November 29, 1922, created the Army and Navy Munitions Board to "coordinate plans for the acquisition of munitions and supplies necessary for the proper prosecution of the Army and Navy war programs. . . . [It] was the peacetime equivalent of a war resources administration, reviewing munitions and supply programs during a period of planning."  

The members of the ANMB were the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secretary of War, assisted by various committees as its organization changed. Initially, things did not run smoothly: "In 1924, and continuing later, a complete impasse resulted on the fundamental issue between the Army and the Navy on the question of requirements. The Army was working on the basis of a War Department General Mobilization Plan. The Navy was working
Differences were resolved, and beginning with the 1933 Industrial Mobilization Plan, IMPs were produced by the ANMB, which conducted an annual review and publication of revisions as needed.

CREATING THE ARMY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE

The need to train officers to work in mobilization and procurement planning was increasingly obvious. While the Army had sent students to civilian institutions, including the Harvard Graduate School of Business, having a school of its own would allow it to increase the number of students who could participate in such a program, and to tailor the curriculum to the special needs of military officers charged with interacting with the civilian industrialists and businessmen who would support any future war efforts.

The Army Industrial College opened in February, 1924. Organizationally, it was assigned to the Director of the Procurement Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War (this division also included the Planning Branch). It remained part of the Procurement Division until November, 1929, when it became a separate division within the Office of the Assistant
Secretary. Its mission was to "train Army officers in the useful knowledge pertaining to the supervision of procurement of all military supplies in time of war and to the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to war-time needs." Relations with the Planning Branch were close: "Officers from the planning section are available to give advice or lectures. All information in the planning section is at the disposal of the student officers."

Although established as an Army school, AIC included students from the Navy and Marine Corps from 1925 on. Navy instructors were assigned as early as 1931. As a 1932 report stated:

The Industrial College has come to be an agency of primary importance in the promotion of joint procurement planning. Joint assignment to problems brings out differences in points of view, in objectives, in organization, and in legal restrictions. The course leads to a greatly improved understanding of joint problems, establishes a background and an interest in joint procurement planning which is manifested by the graduates in their subsequent assignments.

There tends to be a beneficial synchronization of the work in planning agencies and in the course being pursued by the students. The benefits of the work of the student officers is available to the planning agencies.

From the very beginning, the curriculum addressed procurement and mobilization issues. Divided into "problems" for consideration by the students, it reflected changes in the
current planning system as they evolved. For the first course (February-June, 1924), for example, Problem No. 4 was entitled "War Time Procurement Plan of the War Department, - or - Ways and Means of Passing from Requirements to Resources." The second course (September, 1924-January, 1925), included three problems in this area: "The War Time Procurement Plan of the War Department," "Group War Plan" and "The War Time Procurement Plan of the Supply Branches." By the third course (February-June, 1925), "Orientation--Mobilization and Procurement Plans--Individual Studies--All Officers" was in the curriculum. The fourth course (September, 1925-January 1926) included four relevant problems: "Mobilization and Procurement Plans--Individual Studies--All Officers," "Industrial Mobilization in Great Britain During the World War," "Industrial Mobilization in France During the World War," and "Industrial Mobilization in Germany During the World War." The fifth course (February-June, 1926) added Italy to the foreign mobilizations studied, and included a new problem on "Industrial Mobilization during the Civil War by the U. S. and Confederate States." The Civil War problem lasted only one session, and was subsequently dropped. The course expanded to a full year starting in September, 1926. The individual foreign mobilization studies were dropped in the 1927-28 academic year and replaced by two problems, "Control of Industry in Foreign Countries During the World War," and "Labor Problems in Foreign Countries During the World War."
For the academic years from 1929-30 to 1932-33, a problem called "Test of a Mobilization Plan in Regard to Procurement" was included. The publication of the 1933 Industrial Mobilization Plan brought a new problem for the 1933-34 to 1936-37 academic years: "Analysis of War Department Mobilization Plan, 1933 with respect to Procurement." In 1937-38, the problem "Procurement Requirements of the War Department Mobilization Plan, 1937" appeared (the 1933 IMP had been revised in 1936). The 1938-39 schedule included "Procurement Requirements of the Protective Mobilization Plan and Augmentation Plans," while in 1939-40, the previous year's problem continued and "Industrial Mobilization Plan" was added. The two short courses conducted from August to December, 1940 and January to April 1941 also included "The Industrial Mobilization Plan."  

In addition to problems, the curriculum over time also included war games and tests. The 1929-30 AIC Annual Report discusses the introduction of the "Test of a Mobilization Plan in regard to Procurement:"

The purpose. . . was to work out methods of testing the effectiveness of industrial mobilization plans prepared in conjunction with military mobilization plans and to make an actual test of and report on procurement possibilities in a specific military situation formulated by the Army War College. The desirability of such a joint problem has long been apparent and it is felt that this study should continue as part of the course."

Planning for the war games included coordination with
outside organizations which might be able to suggest situations to add reality. For example, a May 16, 1933 memo from the AIC Director, Lt. Col. McCain, was sent to the Executive, OASW; Director of the Planning Branch; the Procurement Planning Officer in the seven Supply Branches; and the Planning Officers of the Navy Department, outlining the phases and assumptions of the three-day war game, based on the 1933 Industrial Mobilization Plan. Students assumed roles in manning all agencies of the emergency establishment, including the War and Navy Departments (except for the two Secretaries), while the faculty and director served as the heads of peacetime agencies and took the role of President.is

The approach taken by the AIC is reflected in recommendations submitted by a Committee of the Army Industrial College Advisory Board in August, 1924. Assistant Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis appointed three general officers "to meet...for the purpose of submitting recommendations to the Board as to the course to be given... during the coming term."¹⁹ The Committee report, dated August 13, 1924, presented their views on the course:

The object of the course is to train officers and others in peace time planning for procurement in war, and for procurement in war. In considering procurement during war, the Committee believes that one of the most necessary factors to provide for is the proper control of industry by super-agencies and the allocation by these agencies of facilities to the various government departments, and for the support of the civil popula-
tion. If this matter of super-agencies is not properly provided for, great confusion will exist at the beginning of a war. No other educational agency having been established which makes a study of the organization and duties of such super-agencies, or how they shall function, the Committee believes that a study of these problems should be made in the Army Industrial College. The course therefore should include:

I. A study of the methods to be adopted for the control of industry in time of war and what, if any, agencies should be established in time of peace with the object of preparation in time of peace for control of industry in time of war.

II. Instruction to fit selected officers

(1) To take charge of the preparation of plans in time of peace for major procurement operations in time of war.

(2) To take charge of large procurement operations in time of war.

The Committee believes that in the course special attention should be given to the study of the financial aspect of government procurement in time of war, not only with a view to greater economy, but with a view to better understandings with contractors. . . .

The Committee believes further that the work of the Army Industrial College should be confined to instruction in matters of general policy and the broader aspects of procurement activity, both in war and peace, leaving to each Supply Branch the work of instructing its officers in the more detailed and special phases incident to its own activities.20

An example of the results of the case study approach is reflected in the report prepared by four students in the fourth class on the "Allocation of Facilities." The students, who included then Lt. Col. Harry B. Jordan (later AIC Director in 1934-1938), titled their December 4, 1925 report "Defect in the present war planning agency."
While the Committee has nothing but highest praise for the excellent organization within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War engaged in war planning, it feels most strongly that the National Defense Act is not being interpreted and carried out as intended by Congress. To put it briefly, the Assistant Secretary of War is not assuring adequate mobilization under the present system and can not assure this, unless and until he exercises that authority over the other governmental agencies necessary to make them do their war planning along proper lines.\textsuperscript{21}

The Committee Report is accompanied in the archives by a memo from Major Nix (in charge of allocations in the Office of the ASW), with an analysis of the points made by the committee, particularly the criticism that the Navy "will get what they need first, entirely independent and regardless of what the Army's plans may be, unless they are co-ordinated with the Army by some organization that has the right and power to force compliance with its requests and decisions."\textsuperscript{22} Nix wrote:

Taking a broader aspect of this subject, and independent of any academic discussion, it appears inopportune to raise this issue now for the following reasons:

(1) The Navy should be given a fair chance to cooperate in the Army and Navy Munitions Board before this agency is pronounced a failure by the Army. I believe that accomplishments to date do not warrant such drastic action.

(2) I believe that if the recommendations of the committee were carried out that they would require the Assistant Secretary of War and the Secretary of War to raise an issue with the Navy along industrial lines comparable to one of the main contentions of Colonel Wm. Mitchell of the Air Service on military lines, to wit: The necessity for a Director of Munitions on the one hand and a Secretary of National Defense on the other. Should the proposed issue result in failure it
would probably handicap to a large extent the cooperation which has already been established with the Navy. . . . [The present President of the United States would likely view such agitation with disfavor.]

In a second, cover memo of the same date, Major Nix summarized:

These conclusions and recommendations are believed to be somewhat at variance and not adequately supported by facts appearing in the solution of the problem as it now stands. . . .

If every committee on every problem in the Army Industrial College takes this letter as a precedent the Assistant Secretary of War would probably be swamped with a large number of radical conclusions unfortified by facts.

There is no indication in the archives that the committee report was forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of War by the Director of AIC in 1925, but Col. Jordan apparently resurrected it in February, 1935. The files contain a handwritten note from Lt. Col. Earl McFarland, the OASW Executive Officer:

Dear Jordan:

I found the two papers very interesting and a number of your ideas have become actualities.

Last year at the War College, U's. Grant spoke a number of times on the great desirability--in fact of the necessity of obtaining the active efforts of other departments of the government in their preparation for war.

I should like to talk with you about the matter sometime. It is very interesting.
WHO SHOULD PLAN FOR MOBILIZATION?

Responsibility for developing mobilization plans and working out allocation of facilities to meet the needs of the Army and Navy was vested in the Army-Navy Munitions Board. In the 1920s, however, the ANMB did not produce any plans, although it had set up a number of committees to coordinate the procurement program between the services. In a 1931 speech to AIC by Maj. Dwight D. Eisenhower, then on the staff of the Planning Branch, he reports that the ANMB had been completely reorganized "and is undoubtedly better suited now to carry on its functions than it previously was."

The first mobilization plans were produced in the 1920s by the Planning Branch within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. The 1922 and 1924 plans were sketchy and addressed procurement rather than mobilization of industry and the civilian economy. In 1928 a "Basic Procurement Plan" was published, and it was revised in 1929 and 1930. The first relatively complete Industrial Mobilization Plan was completed in 1930. Eisenhower described it: "in form it is rather a study containing a tentative plan than it is a concise plan itself. [It] was expected to have a certain educational value among people not intimately acquainted with the problem at hand, and it was thought best that the first edition should be more a narrative than a strict directive." The plan was based on a range of existing subsid-
iary plans, including the Army Procurement Plan, Unit Plan of OASW, Branch Mobilization Plans, Specific Procurement Plans, Raw Material Procurement Plans, and Factory Plans. In the Unit Plan, the wartime structure of the OASW was described, and the Army Industrial College provided manpower for the Administrative Division, described as the "headquarters group" of the OASW. The Executive Section of this division was to include the Director and Secretary of AIC in wartime.²⁹

An exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of War, Patrick J. Hurley, and the Secretary of the Navy, C. F. Adams, is quoted in the May 1, 1932 report of the Executive Committee of the ANMB. Adams' April 27, 1931 letter stated that the 1930 plan "has received the careful consideration of the Navy Department." He supported the plan, with some changes, but stated that "the Navy Department believes... while any industrial mobilization plan must affect all government departments in time of an emergency, the War and Navy Departments are especially adapted to pursue the study of such a plan in time of peace. The two services, therefore, should proceed at once to the joint development of such a plan..."³⁰ He recommended conducting this development under an existing agency--the Army and Navy Munitions Board--with some reorganization of the Board. Hurley's May 14, 1931 response concurred that ANMB should take on the role. The new organization and functions were approved on February 12, 1932, and increased the functions of the board "to include all
material and industrial matters of joint interest. . . ." Specifically the Board is required to study and develop the Industrial Mobilization Plan, and to launch that plan in case of a major emergency. . . . 31

The preparations for revision of the IMP in 1936 included a call from the Planning Branch for comments and criticisms by all War Department agencies. A separate memorandum was sent to the Director of the Army Industrial College by the Planning Branch Director: "It will be appreciated if the Director and Faculty of the Army Industrial College will submit comments and criticisms likewise on the draft of Revision of the Industrial Mobilization Plan." 32 No response from AIC has been found.

By October, 1937, the Planning Branch had 18 officers assigned, and a report to the Inspector General indicates the magnitude of their task: "Considering that expenditure of the Supply Arms and Services for the first year of a war would amount to over eight billion dollars, it is believed that the assignment of 18 officers for coordination of planning for the expenditure of such an amount is thoroughly justified." 33 The impact of AIC is apparent in the Planning Branch manning at this time: of the 18 officers listed on an organization chart, only one was not an AIC graduate. 34
MOVING TOWARD WAR

On September 29, 1937, an officer in the Planning Branch sent a memorandum for the Branch Director on the subject of "Financing of Proposed Industrial Mobilization Board," laying out the methods used in financing the Baker Board. The reason for the memorandum is not clear, but it discusses how expert advisors could be paid ("... if the expenses of the proposed Industrial Mobilization Board cannot be paid out of emergency funds under the control of the President, they may be hired as expert advisors to the Secretary of War at a rate not exceeding $9,000 per year and paid for out of current Army appropriations. ... If it is impossible to finance the Board out of emergency funds, it is suggested that the cost be prorated among the supply arms and services according to their shares of the prospective war load.") A subsequent memorandum (October 4) forwarded drafts of "a directive and letters necessary for the organization of the Advisory Board for the Mobilization of Industry," with a four-step plan:

a. Executive Order creating the Advisory Board for Industrial Mobilization.

b. Letter of Inquiry from The Assistant Secretary of War to the selected members asking whether or not they will be willing to serve on the Board.

c. Upon signification by the Board Member that he will serve, letter of appointment from the President.

d. At the first meeting of the Board, directive and orientation talk by the Assistant Secretary of
Correspondence was exchanged between The Assistant Secretary of War, Louis Johnson, and Bernard Baruch discussing the formation of the Advisory Board. Mr. Baruch suggested in his October 7 letter that it include as many as possible of the surviving members of the War Industries Board besides myself. They are General Hugh S. Johnson, who represented the Army; George N. Peek, Finished Products; J. Leonard Replogle, Director of Steel; and Howard Ingels who was Secretary. . . .

I would also suggest that you ask each one of the members of this Board to nominate a younger man as his alternate, who would sit with the Board in all its discussions. Thus, you would have a trained personnel as the older men passed out of the picture.

Mr. Johnson's reply on October 20 thanked Mr. Baruch and discussed the Board:

In the appointment of this Board I am confronted with a number of determining factors. The personnel must be of a type to insure national confidence; the membership of necessity must be limited; the Board must have representation from those concerned with industrial mobilization during the war, but, in order to promote a continuing future interest in this broad subject and to provide an active contact with industrial problems of today and tomorrow, I feel that the predominance of the personnel should be of comparatively young men.

Mr. Baruch's reply of October 21 noted,

May I say that I think if an announcement is made now,
it will make people think war is in the offing.

You are quite correct that the personnel of the Board must be of a type to insure national confidence. Do not make it political but one which the public will know will be able to function in case M day arrives. Put experienced men on the Board with alternates under forty years of age.

Mr. Johnson apparently later proposed to the President that the Advisory Board for Industrial Mobilization should be created. A routing slip from November 26 indicates that the President in response asked if the Council for National Defense, a World War I organization, was still a legal entity which could be revived to perform the same functions as the proposed Board. Mr. Johnson replied, apparently based on information from the Planning Branch, and recommended institution of his proposed Advisory Board, rather than the reestablishment of the Council of National Defense, or an Advisory Commission to it, even though statutory authority for the old organizations still existed. His argument reflected his concerns for civilian input to planning, his assessment that the old Council for National Defense duplicated the functions assigned to his office in the 1920 National Defense Act, and the need for continuity:

In the original concept, it had been my feeling that no individual connected with the government should be associated on a board of the character suggested. I believe that a group of civilians, nationally known and of sufficient ability and prestige to give weight to their advice, is to be preferred to any organization of government officers. Since the stress of war will fall so heavily on all of the people, it is believed that representatives chosen directly from the people should analyze and evaluate the [mobilization] plans.

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The Industrial Mobilization Plan provides for the immediate establishment in time of war of a War Resources Administration which would perform functions similar to those of the War Industries Board in the World War. The membership of the proposed Advisory Board for Industrial Mobilization closely parallels a typical membership of a War Resources Administration and thus would permit comment on the plans by the individuals who might be called upon to participate actively in such an organization in war.

Although Bernard Baruch and selected businessmen were involved in preparing for mobilization, at least one veteran of the World War I War Industries Board was on the sidelines taking shots at planning in the late 1930s. In a November 1, 1938 article entitled "One Man's Opinion," Gen. Hugh S. Johnson attacked the Assistant Secretary of War's political ambitions and criticized "recent voluminous War Department publicity handouts about present preparedness for economic war" as "largely pure bunk." "Under the [1920] defense act, industrial mobilization is [the ASW]'s baby and he isn't going to have any civilian industrial veterans of the World War butting in who are not apt to be his economic stooges from the outset. Until he gets such specimens, industrialization is to be planned and done by men in uniform." He also talks about AIC:

The Army Industrial College is a get-rich-quick course in which professional Army officers are taught, in a few months, all about running the industries of this country by military instructors, most of whom never even ran a peanut stand. I am not knocking its purpose or its personnel in the least. It is highly necessary to have some officers in the Army who have at least a bowing acquaintance with our economic and industrial problems. The average officer lives a life
as remote from our day-to-day business struggle as a cloistered monk.40

In another article, on May 5, 1939, with a headline of "Army to Direct Industry in War; Officers Don't Understand Business," Johnson writes:

The executive assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War is quoted in the news as having said to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce:

'An Army industrial college is now training about 60 Army and Navy officers each year to direct the mobilization of industry.' . . .

No cramming course in 'industry' and nothing he can read out of any books can make the average officer fit for business administration--much less to 'direct the mobilization of industry.'

The War Department itself has no business whatever 'directing' industry in war. That is a mammoth and vital task--as great and vital as fighting a war. The Army already has the latter task. It should not jimmy up the works by taking on another just as big the moment the guns begin to roar. It will need all its regular officers to train troops.

It would be just as absurd and disastrous to use them on this job as it would be to elbow all the generals aside and put industrial leaders in command of armies.

Put armies under soldiers and industrial mobilization under industrialists and let all shoemakers stick to their lasts.41

THE 1939 INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PLAN

A revision of the 1936 plan was completed in the spring of 1939, with publication as a Senate document dated October 24,
The 1939 plan was considerably shorter (18 pages) than the 1936 (75 pages) or 1933 (102 pages) versions. The 1939 Plan appears not to have been officially promulgated, as indicated in a speech to the AIC by Brigadier General Hines, Director of the Planning Branch, on August 8, 1941:

"This revision was completed in May 1939 and has been approved tentatively by the Acting Secretaries of War and of the Navy. The use of this draft has been approved for instruction and planning purposes but it has not been approved formally as a public document. It is noted, however, that the functional organization of the superagencies that are being developed in the present emergency are built on the principles outlined in the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Each major change brings the OEM and the OPM nearer to the principles we think best of any superagency plan."

The Assistant Secretary of War's Annual Report for 1939 pointed out three changes in the 1939 revision:

(1) It recognizes the changes in our Government structure during the past few years and proposes to use existing Government agencies to their fullest extent.
(2) It recognizes fully the desirability of providing close coordination between the various agencies involved in the mobilization of economic resources for war.
(3) In the interest of clarity supporting annexes and appendices have been omitted in the 1939 revision. These annexes [War Finance, Commodities, War Trade, Facilities, Power and Fuel, Labor, Transportation, and Price] will hereafter be separate so that they may better be kept current. The 1939 revision, therefore, contains the same basic material as previous editions but has been condensed and prepared so as to appeal more to the civilian reader.

The initial annexes were prepared by joint Army and Navy
Committees in the Army and Navy Munitions Board, but the AIC played a role in keeping the new annexes up to date. The Commandant's report for the 1939-40 academic year contains the statement:

Partly at the request of other agencies of the War Department special studies and researches reviewing and revising existing annexes to the War Department Mobilization Plan, collecting, evaluating and recording information on economic warfare and essential raw materials were made.

Thatcher's Planning for Industrial Mobilization cites an October 3, 1939 memorandum from Col. Hines to the Assistant Secretary of War as the source for his statement, "As another instance of the practical usefulness of the college, the class of 1938-1939 was called upon to aid in the revision of the annexes to the 1939 Industrial Mobilization Plan and rendered a valuable service in this task." In fact, it appears that most of the work was done by subsequent classes. The 1939-1940 class conducted a series of "special problems" that had as their goal the preparation of supplements to or revisions of IMP annexes for War Trade, Transportation, Labor, War Finance and Price Control. In four cases (excepting only Labor), the annexes were addressed in the fall of 1939 and again in the spring of 1940. The Price Control Annex was forwarded to the Secretary of the Army and Navy Munitions Board in January, 1940 by Col. Miles, who noted: "This is a study rather than an annex to a plan which it is believed should be a definite, concise, officially predetermined scheme of
Students and instructors were given special assignments on May 18, 1940 to "extend the appropriate annexes" (War Trade and Ocean Shipping, Transportation, War Labor and Price Control) with a deadline of June 8, working with Major Sadler of the Planning Branch. In the case of the Transportation Annex, the supplements in the spring, 1940 revision turned out to be in conflict with the existing annex, and Col. Miles recommended to Col. Rutherford at the Planning Branch, "steps should be taken to reconcile such conflicts either by rewriting the existing Annex completely or inserting appropriate errata sheets."

The College also prepared a proposed Annex to the 1939 IMP covering the Executive Division of the War Resources Administration. This Division was to be "considered as the office for the study and coordination of general economic plans and programs, including those related to priority, price control, clearance, conservation and post-war readjustment and for the promulgation of broad policies to the appropriate administrative divisions and agencies." According to Maj. Gano, the instructor for the problem, Col. Hines, the Secretary of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, who provided "instructions" and "guidance" in the preparation of the annex, "does not expect that the report will serve as the final Executive Division Annex until after it has been modified and revised. He desires to have a paper which
would fill a vacancy in the list of required annexes and would serve as a stopgap until a more suitable annex could be prepared. The report is submitted as suitable for the purpose." Miles' memorandum forwarding the report to Col. Hines critiqued the product: "Throughout the report there are evidences of lack of clarity, both as to thought and expression. A thorough reading of the report will disclose such lack of clarity. The report should be revised and modified to eliminate such lack of clarity when the annex is prepared in final form." There is no indication the memorandum and report were sent to Col. Hines; the report is not contained in the files at the National Archives and is not included with the 1939 IMP annexes located in the National Defense University library.

The first short course (August to December, 1940) produced a revision of the Power and Fuel Annex, submitted to the Planning Branch on December 17, 1940 with comments from the instructor, now Lt. Col. Gano:

This proposed annex was prepared with a view to its possible substitution for the existing, approved, Power and Fuel Annex. In my opinion, the proposed Annex, as submitted, does not have sufficient merit to justify its use instead of the existing approved Annex. In general, the following major deficiencies have been noted:

Apparent inconsistencies.

Lack of logic, clarity and coherence in certain instances.

Lack of flexibility in not providing for alterna-
tive courses of action.

Failure to use the same 'phases' or 'periods' which have been used as a pattern in the preparation of other annexes.

Apparent lack of an adequate and comprehensive appreciation of the problem to be solved in preparing this proposed annex.3

AIC PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS AND THE PLANNING PROCESS

Following the German invasion of Poland in September, 1939, plans to boost preparedness within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War brought approval by Mr. Johnson of a memorandum from his executive officer, Col. Burns, outlining details by student officers at the AIC to the branches within the OASW. Three officers were assigned to the Procurement Plans Division, and one each to the Commodities Division, Administration Division, Executive Assistant's Office, and Statistical Branch, with augmentation of the Current Procurement Branch to be announced later. These officers were also to attend all lectures and conferences of AIC and "perform an amount of college work necessary to entitle them to a diploma." The curriculum was to be changed so that the problem on the 1939 Industrial Mobilization Plan would be presented as the second item on the schedule. "It is understood the College will do everything in its power to provide for the early indoctrination of its students to the end that they may be ready for detail with other branches as early as practicable." In addition, some of AIC's space was to be turned
over to the OASW Statistical Branch immediately, with additional space released as student personnel were assigned to duty with the various OASW branches. A history of AIC notes, "After 1939 the College reflected emergency conditions. . . . The course was revised to meet increasing demands for personnel for special tasks in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and in other offices. By May 1940 there remained only 19 full time students and they were working on a special problem, 'what to do in the present situation.'

The impact of the Army Industrial College on the mobilization planning process can be seen in the personnel assignments listed in the 1939 IMP revision. The War Trade Annex contains an appendix describing the superagency to be formed, with a chart showing the peacetime organization of the Planning Branch as of November 3, 1939. Of the 27 named individuals on the chart, 23 are graduates of the AIC, and an additional individual, the Planning Branch director, Col. Harry K. Rutherford, was on the faculty of AIC in its earliest years.

An additional example of AIC's influence is the composition of the Executive Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Of the six members representing the Navy and War Departments in January, 1940, four were graduates of AIC, including two of the three Navy Department representatives, and Col. Rutherford was the fifth member. Only one of the six, Captain E. D. Washburn,
has no known AIC connection. One of the members, Lt. Col. Russell L. Maxwell, a 1925 AIC graduate, was later named the first Administrator of Export Control in July, 1949, where, in conjunction with the State Department, he controlled licenses for export of materials, chemicals, products and machine tools.

WAR RESOURCES BOARD

One probable object of study in late 1939 and early 1940 was the confidential report of the War Resources Board, which had been appointed by President Roosevelt, through the Joint Chairmen of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, Louis Johnson and Charles Edison, on August 9, 1939 to review the 1939 version of the Industrial Mobilization Plan and to advise the ANMB on policies pertaining to economic mobilization in the event of a war. The Board was chaired by Edward Stettinius, Jr., with a membership of Karl T. Compton, Walter S. Gifford, Harold G. Moulton, John L. Pratt and Robert E. Wood. (John Hancock, who as a Navy commander had been responsible for procurement of all Navy supplies in World War I, was appointed on September 6.) Col. Rutherford was named Secretary to the Board. A joint War-Navy Department press release announced its role: "... in an emergency the War Resources Board would become an executive agency of the Government with broad powers similar to those of the old War Industries Board. In this event the Board would report directly to the President as a War Resources Administration."
Previously that summer, on July 5, 1939, President Roosevelt had issued a military order placing the Army and Navy Munitions Board under the direction and supervision of the president as commander-in-chief, along with the Joint Board, Joint Economy Board and Aeronautical Board. The War Resources Board's role was to "advise with the Army and Navy Munitions Board in reviewing and completing the Industrial Mobilization Plan prepared by that agency, specifically for use only in the event of a major war."\(^2\)

The press release announcing the WRB's formation indicated "one of the first activities of the new committee would be to consult with the chairman of the old War Industries Board, Mr. Bernard Baruch, and other 'elder statesmen' of the World War period to the end that the advice and counsel of those distinguished patriots would be utilized to the maximum."\(^3\)

The WRB received an analysis of the experiences of World War I prepared by "certain members of the Faculty" of the AIC, consisting of a two page outline and 43 page discussion. The copy of the outline in the files at the National Archives contains page references, and concludes with part B, "Summary of Baruch Analysis (Copy pages of Baruch book, pp. 96-100)."\(^4\) Col. Rutherford sent a letter to the AIC Commandant, Col. Miles, on September 25, 1939:
Mr. Stettinius, Chairman of the Board, has requested me to acknowledge receipt of this document and to express the appreciation of the members of the Board for preparing this outline. The method of presentation of the summary is very satisfactory and will be of material assistance to the Board in conducting the work to which it has been assigned.

The War Resources Board report was submitted to the President in late November, and his letter to the members thanking them for their efforts gave a clear indication that he was not going to immediately act on their recommendations:

This report will be carefully studied. I feel certain it will prove of material assistance in perfecting our plans for the national defense.

I have noted and heartily concur with the concluding paragraph of your report which reads as follows:

'In submitting this report the Board feels that it has rendered the principal service for which it was appointed. So long as the United States is not engaged in war, such a Board has no power and no executive responsibility. We feel that such preparedness plans as are deemed necessary should be carried forward under the auspices of the Army and Navy Munitions Board with the cooperation of other departments of the government. However, if it is desired that we continue to meet from time to time in an advisory relationship with the Army and Navy Munitions Board, we shall of course be happy to serve in that capacity.'

A similar letter was sent to the members by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Edison, expressing their thanks as joint chairmen of the ANMB:

The report which you have submitted is now being studied in the War and Navy Departments and its conclu-
sions and recommendations will be given thorough consideration in perfecting our plans for the national defense.

In accordance with your generous offer of further service, we shall welcome the opportunity to call upon you from time to time for advice and counsel relating to our plans for industrial mobilization.67

The minutes of the Executive Committee meeting of January 30, 1940 contain a recommendation that a committee at the Army Industrial College conduct a confidential study of the WRB report,

in compliance with the intent of the President and of the Assistant Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy as expressed by them in their letters to members of this Board on November 24, and December 6, 1939. . . .

The Board [ANMB] recommended that the report of this Committee and any discussion within the College be kept confidential and that no publicity whatsoever be allowed in reference to this subject; also that a sufficient number of copies of the report be made to accomplish the above purpose, and that such number of copies be kept to a minimum, numbered and restricted as to their circulation.64

A confidential memo from Col. Hines, Secretary of the ANMB, to Col. Miles, Commandant of AIC, on February 21, 1940 forwarded four copies of the WRB report and cited the ANMB minutes quoted above. The memo requests Col. Miles to prepare a directive for the committee doing the study and allow him to see it prior to reproduction for publication. "It is suggested that this committee consider our present plan and the proposed changes recommended by the War Resources Board; also that they submit any recom-
mended changes which would improve our present Industrial Mobilization Plan." 69

Any actions taken by the AIC in response to the ANMB request to review the WRB report have faded without a trace. The 1939-40 class, the last to complete the full curriculum prior to the war, finished the term in June, 1940, and subsequent classes--consisting largely of reservists--went through a shortened program before the AIC was closed two weeks after Pearl Harbor. By 1945, the "Hancock Board" reviewing training in industrial mobilization, which included as members John Hancock, who had served on the WRB, and Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, USA, Commandant of the reopened Army Industrial College, discussed the WRB report and the distribution of copies ("A copy came to the Secretary of War, a copy to the Secretary of the Navy and a third copy to the President. The President's copy disappeared after he got it. It might be found in the files somewhere. There were also copies available in the Army Industrial College for some time afterward. There were 50 copies, I believe.") without any reference to an AIC study of the report. 70

When the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, Andrew J. May, transmitted to the War Department House Concurrent Resolution 70, "Requesting the President of the United States to turn over to the House Military Affairs Committee the War Resources Board report of October 1939" on June 29, 1940,
Secretary Stimson replied:

The report in question is one of a number of studies which have been made at the instance of the Army and Navy Munitions Board by groups from civil life. It is not believed that any useful purpose would be served by releasing this particular report at this time, especially since its recommendations have already been thoroughly studied and applied by the Army and Navy Munitions Board. It is therefore recommended that House Concurrent Resolution 70 be not approved.\textsuperscript{71}

\textbf{ADVISORY COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE}

On May 28, 1940, President Roosevelt reactivated the Council of National Defense and the Advisory Commission. The Advisory Commission (NDAC) included Mr. Stettinius as advisor on industrial materials, as well as William S. Knudsen, industrial production; Sidney Hillman, employment; Chester C. Davis, farm products; Leon Henderson, price stabilization; Ralph Budd, transportation; and Harriet Elliott, consumer protection. The Council of National Defense, consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, was inactive and the individual advisors reported directly to the President. William H. McReynolds was Secretary to the Council and the Advisory Commission. McReynolds had been named Administrative Assistant to the President for Emergency Management in 1939, following issuance of an Executive order on September 8, 1939 creating within the Executive Office an office for emergency management—the beginning of the structure to manage the mobilization and the
war. He presided at the meetings of NDAC because there was no chairman provided for in the 1916 Act creating the Council or the Advisory Commission.

At an early meeting of the NDAC, Mr. Nelson discussed his confusion over how the planning that had been done meshed with the actions of the new organization:

He said that he was concerned about the relation of the industrial mobilization plan of the War Department, on which a great deal of work had been done for a number of years, to the preparedness program, the development of which was now under way, that it would appear that the preparedness program in effect abolishes the M-Day program of the War Department, and that he felt the Commission should give immediate consideration to the problem presented by that situation.

There followed a lengthy discussion of the scope and objectives of the M-Day program, its relation to the defense program, and the extent to which the two programs could be correlated, and at the conclusion of the discussion Mr. Nelson suggested that a committee of the Commission be appointed to study the M-Day program to decide as to its adequacy, and to make recommendations as to the extent to which the defense program fits into the M-Day program so that it may be determined what parts of the latter may be used.

In accordance with Mr. Nelson's suggestion a committee composed of Messrs. Nelson as Chairman, Stettinius, Knudsen, and Hillman, was appointed to consider the matter and make a preliminary report to the committee at its meeting on Wednesday, July 24.72

The record of the meeting of July 24 and subsequent meetings contains no mention of any report by this committee.

According to a 1946 study by the Bureau of the Budget,
Decision to revive the Advisory Commission meant a rejection of the Army-Navy Industrial Mobilization Plan. The plan, however, scarcely merited the build-up it had been given; it was a document dealing only in generalities with the problem of governmental organization for war and it was formulated for conditions unlike those which actually arose. It presumed the existence of a state of war under which almost any power could be had from Congress for the asking and under which a full-fledged war organization would have to be created. Neither of these conditions prevailed, and until war came, progress could be made only as public opinion crystallized into decision. Another crucial factor in the rejection of the "M-day" plan was its provision for a single administrator with vast powers over governmental organization and policy, far greater powers than those exercised by the Chairman of the War Industries Board in World War I. Delegation of such enormous powers would have made it difficult for the President to control the broad strategy of defense preparation and foreign economic policy during a most critical period. Such action would have constituted virtual abdication by the President and would have made him less able to meet his constitutional responsibilities. Moreover, the plan carried with it potentialities of far greater military influence in the management of governmental affairs than appeared either desirable or politic at the time. For these reasons, the plan seemed unattractive to the President. For the same reasons, his political opponents held the plan in high esteem.\footnote{3}

THE WAR APPROACHES

Although the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was still five months away, the July 25, 1941 Annual Report of the Planning Branch looks at the failure to implement the Industrial Mobilization Plan: "The past year has marked the transition from the planning stage to operations incident to gearing the industrial capacity of the nation to produce with the least delay the munitions necessary not only for our own requirements, but those
needed under the provisions of the Lend Lease Act."

Among the accomplishments listed for the fiscal year, the report includes:

While the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939 revision, was not placed into full operation, it was followed very closely in War Department procurement activities--unit mobilization procurement plans of the Under Secretary of War, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, and the several supply arms and services had been based upon and coordinated with the Industrial Mobilization Plan.

In 1940, the AIC's Extension Course Division published Special Text No. 20, Industrial Mobilization (In Analysis and amplification of the Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939). The text's purpose was to "present the broad aspects of planning for war, against which the student may project industrial mobilization and of the principal features of 'Industrial Mobilization.'" In discussing the 1939 IMP, it points out:

The Industrial Mobilization Plan is undergoing piecemeal revision constantly. . . . The moment it ceases to change, its usefulness begins to end, for unless it is constantly prepared to function for the solution of the critical situation of the immediate present, it brings down on itself the familiar complaint that at the outset of hostilities nations are always prepared for the last war instead of the present one."

The 1941 Annual Report of the Secretary of War contains the usual section discussing activities at the Army Industrial
College. As of the date of the report (June 30, 1941), 1,038 regular and reserve officers of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps had been graduated. AIC was conducting four courses per year to increase the number of officers trained for duty during the emergency. "The course continued to serve as a kind of incubator which fosters new thought and ideas by means of which constant progress is achieved. Valuable research is conducted which frequently is later translated into actual plans and procedures."

Four short courses were actually completed prior to the closing of the AIC in December, 1941. The courses were designed for reservists as well as active duty officers, and the first course, which opened August 12, 1940, included 59 reservists out of 75 students. An Economic Warfare Information Section was created in early 1940 to "keep students informed on important happenings in a world at war." At the end of 1940, this section was transferred by the Secretary of War to the Office of the Administrator of Export Control. Four of the graduates of the August-December, 1940 class also were assigned to the Office of the Administrator of Export Control.

In an address to AIC students on May 31, 1941, Russell L. Maxwell, Administrator of Export Control and by then a Brigadier General, expressed his appreciation of the assistance AIC had given him:
Shortly after we got under way we felt the need for further planning so, having no personnel I could spare, I came down to the Industrial College and asked the Commandant to lend a hand in the planning. He responded very well and appointed a group of committees to do some planning work for us. Until the end of that course, which came about the middle of December 1940, I really depended entirely upon the Industrial College to do my planning work. Following the graduation of that class, I got a few of the members in my office and on the staff, and the work was set up in our own office."

On December 23, 1941, the last class was graduated and the school closed."

LOOKING BACKWARD

By the fall of 1943, the prospect of reopening the Army Industrial College was being discussed, and a War Department Board headed by Major General O. P. Echols was designated on November 27, 1943. Notes in the AIC archives quote Gen. Echols' opening remarks at the first meeting of the board on December 3, 1943: "If it hadn't been for the AIC, just what little we get out of it, we would not have the nucleus and background for our whole tremendous effort for expansion." A paper written for the Board by Colonel F. H. Miles, Jr., Commandant in 1938-40, and redesignated Commandant for the reopening of the AIC on December 28, 1943, commented on various aspects of AIC's involvement in pre-war planning:

The Industrial Mobilization Plan, which should have been called the Economic Mobilization Plan, was
the joint product of the Planning Division and the College. Although the Stettinius Board... endorsed the Industrial Mobilization Plan, it was never seriously implemented. Had it been implemented, many false starts and months of organization and reorganization might in fact have been avoided. Yet much that was constructive and important has been achieved outside the framework of this document. However, as the war goes on the principles and policies expressed in the Industrial Mobilization Plan have come closer and closer to being put into effect...

The Army Industrial College performed a large part of the prewar economic research and was the forerunner in this field of the Administration of Export Control, the Bureau of Economic Warfare, the Office of Strategic Services and the Foreign Economic Administration. Its pioneer work in this field was outstanding and of critical import to the agencies mentioned above. The role of the Army Industrial College must be resumed so as to take over for these temporary agencies as they finish their war work. The vital role of the College in the field of economics, national and international, is thus apparent.

Deficiencies in Prewar Army Industrial College

1. It lacked prestige within the War Department.

2. It failed to sell its product to those in high authority—the Industrial Mobilization Plan and related plans which visualized the economic setup of the country in wartime.

3. It lacked adequate teaching and research personnel, equipment and housing, and had too few students.

In the Hancock Board deliberations in 1945, the question of the role of the AIC and the reasons for disregarding the IMP again arose. General Armstrong's view, as one of the officers involved in study and preparation of the IMP, was that

[W]e made a mistake—very definitely. We were at fault. We submitted that plan to a few, comparatively
few, experts, like Mr. Baruch and Mr. Hancock.

Where we made our mistake was in the failure, it seems to me, to develop in the minds of industry and labor, particularly, a confidence in the ability of the Planning Branch. It did a first-rate job and it, incidentally, had the participation of General Eisenhower, back in 1930 and 1931, who, in spite of the fact that he was an Infantry officer, was instrumental in working up the first model of the Army's Industrial Mobilization Plan.66

Regarding the AIC, General Armstrong said, "the Army Industrial College lacked prestige and, therefore, its work was not seriously considered."67

Another member, Captain Strauss, said that the reason the IMP was not implemented was: "All of us were depending on M-Day, but M-Day did not come. We crept up on it and the Administration set up its own controls which, by the time we had actually gone to war--officially gone to war--a whole set of different controls were operating so that you would have had to scrap them in order to effect your industrial mobilization plan."68

In a subsequent meeting of the Hancock Board, the members discussed the purpose of AIC training:

Admiral Farber: You say, "training people to make a plan." I would like to be clear on just what we are talking about. . . .

I understood the mission of the Industrial College was to train people to go out and make plans.

General Armstrong: The Planning Branch made the
plans and the Army and Navy Munitions Board. You won't see anything about making plans in these objectives [for the reopened school]. . . . 59

THE ARMY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE'S ROLE: MYTH VS. REALITY

In spite of Col. Miles' assertion to the Hancock Board quoted above ("The Industrial Mobilization Plan. . . was the joint product of the Planning Division and the College."); the responsibility for the Industrial Mobilization Plans from 1933 to 1939 rested with the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The AIC undoubtedly performed a useful service in studying the various versions of the plans, and in subjecting them to war games to identify shortfalls. As the war grew closer, graduates of the AIC were in place in positions within the ANMB and the Planning Branch where mobilization would be managed for the military services, and where military planners would interact with civilian agencies. The Army Industrial College had fulfilled its mission of "the preparation of officers of the Army. . . for positions of large responsibility in the Procurement and Industrial operations of the War Department and the Army." 90

The idea that Roosevelt's failure to use the Industrial Mobilization Plans reflects on the Army Industrial College's efforts prior to the war appears to be false. Although the overwhelmingly military involvement in mobilization planning and the arrangement which would put military officers and organizations in charge of the entire American economy until a
superagency was established once M-Day was declared were criticized at the time, the gradual involvement in preparations for war and the lack of a time which could be said to correspond to M-Day seem to be more responsible for the shelving of the IMP. The build-up for support of Lend Lease may be another factor: the IMPs did not take into account the possibility that the American economy would need to be mobilized prior to American involvement in war in order to provide equipment for our future allies.

The role of the AIC in preparing for mobilization and in writing the Industrial Mobilization Plans appears to have been exaggerated by the writers quoted at the beginning of this paper. AIC was not responsible for writing the IMPs--the Planning Branch in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and the Army and Navy Munitions Board were. In 1939, the AIC Director, Col. Miles, responded to an inquiry from a reporter at the New York World-Telegram by explaining that, "The Army Industrial College engages in research and study on problems involving preparedness but acts in an advisory and research capacity only. As you probably know, the role of The Army Industrial College is to educate officers of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps in the matter of procurement and industrial mobilization."91

Undoubtedly, the Army Industrial College had an impact on mobilization planning and the development of the Industrial Mobilization Plans, through training the men who wrote them,
through studying them in the problems of the AIC curriculum, and
through testing them in war games. The success of AIC in influ-
encing the mobilization planning is reflected in various AIC and
OASW annual reports, such as the AIC Director's report for 1937-
38:

The Army Industrial College has been studying the
relation of military activity to the national economy
and has been training officers to assist in meeting
this responsibility of The Assistant Secretary of War.
The average untrained service officer has a very slight
conception of industrial procedure. . . .

The work done by the student body of The Army
Industrial College in the past few years, particularly
with reference to the tests of the Mobilization Plan of
1933, has developed the fact that personnel plans and
material plans must be strictly coordinated; and in
connection with the magnificent work of the Planning
Branch of the Office of The Assistant Secretary of War,
in my opinion, has been the cause of the revision of
that plan. In this work we take a natural pride."

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APPENDIX A

NATIONAL ARCHIVES
RECORD GROUP 334
RECORDS OF INTERSERVICE AGENCIES
ENTRY 43

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
SUBJECT FILES 1924-1942

Box 1 ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND - AGO MIMEOS

"Subject Headings" - 3 pages

"Aberdeen Proving Ground" correspondence re visits 1937-1939

"Advisory Board - A.I.C" correspondence 1924-1931, mostly board minutes; has responses on honorary advisor appointments conferred at 1925 commencement from Baruch, Willard (B&O), Green (AFL-CIO), others; advisory board in 1924 consisted of Assistant Secretary of War (Chairman ex officio), Quartermaster General, Surgeon General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, Chief of Air Service.

"A.G.O Correspondence" Jun. 14, 1927-Dec. 29, 1941. Publication orders, PCS information, strength figures for A.I.C., motor vehicles, etc.

"A.G.O. Mimeos Jan. 1, '41 - Oct. '41"


Box 2 AIR CORPS - ARMY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE

"Air Corps" Aug. 19, 1936-Nov. 28, 1941. Correspondence, includes "Post Operations Office, Bolling Field, D.C., Feb. 2, 1940" - 26 page instruction on "before being cleared as principal pilot in B-18 type airplanes assigned to this station, pilots must satisfy the following requirements;" also Bolling field flying regulations from 1936 and 1937.

"Air Corps Schools" Mar. 6, 1935-Mar. 23, 1939. Correspondence re speakers at air corps schools.

April, 1993
Army Industrial College, with endorsement by O.A.S.W. exec; study done by Lt Col John C. H. Lee, C.E., apparently proposing combatant arms officers at A.I.C., study not in file.

"Army Industrial College Directives - 1940-1945" Jul. 12, 1938-Sept. 27, 1938. Directives for '39-'40 and for long-range planning '44-'45, with endorsements re quotas and contents.


"A.W.C. Efficiency Reports 1935-1936" Correspondence re "unfavorable entry" on some ERs at Army War College regarding general staff duty.

"Auditorium" Jan. 8, 1941-Oct. 29, 1941. Correspondence re reservations for use.

"Babson Institute" Oct. 19, 1926-Sept. 27, 1939. Correspondence re speakers from Babson Institute.


"Budget - Army Industrial College" Sept. 15, 1924-Aug. 30, 1939

Box 4 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNAL PEACE - COASTAL ARTILLERY


Untitled file, also civilian personnel. 1939-Jul. 20, 1942. More of same. File not in chronological order.

"Coast Artillery" Apr. 9, 1937-Feb. 9, 1940. Memo re quotas, reference for Mrs. Zinn (probably wrong file).

Box 5 COLLEGE DEANS - DIPLOMAS


"Command and Staff College - Ft. Leavenworth" Sept. 26, 1928-Oct. 6, 1941. Correspondence regarding info, pubs; annual reports; class lists.

"Conference with A.S.W. June 29, 1937" Jun. 25, 1937-Jul. 6, 1937. Correspondence; report by Director of A.I.C. and staff to new A.S.W. (Colonel Louis Johnson); memos on meeting.


"Correspondence Going Outside the War Department" Jul. 3, 1940-Nov. 27, 1941. Correspondence to individuals, publications and industrial firms.

"Council of National Defense" Sept. 27, 1933-Dec. 7, 1939. Requests for information on the Council (inactive since 1921); requests by scholars for use of records; request for access by Senate Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry (1934).

"Department of Agriculture Graduate School" 1938-1939 to 1940-41 course lists.

"Desk Library Set" May 9, 1936-May 28, 1936. Correspondence re issuing reference material for '36-'37 school year.

"Destination After Graduation" Lists for graduating class Oct.-Dec. '41 (multiple copies)

"Detailed Program of Course to T.A.G." Jun. 10, 1926-May 26, 1941. Correspondence and programs of A.I.C. course (schedules and blocks).

"Diplomas" Jun. 22, 1925-Dec. 16, 1940. Samples and correspondence. Also ICAF 1946 diploma.

Box 6 DIRECTIVES - ESTIMATES AND APPROPRIATIONS


"Economic Warfare Information Section" Mar. 11, 1940-Oct. 29, 1940. Correspondence re section at A.I.C. (established Apr. 20, 1940); press clippings and information requests; transferred to Administrator of Export Control Dec. 15, 1940.


"Educational Advisory Board - A.R. 350-110" Oct. 7, 1931-Jul. 6, 1933. Designation of A.I.C. director as member of Educational Advisory Board (1931); 40 page booklet "Questions for Consideration by the Educational Advisory Board" (undated).


Box 7 EXTENSION COURSE - GENERAL STAFF CORRESPONDENCE

"Extension Course" Feb. 3, 1938-May 14, 1941. Correspondence re A.I.C. and Army extension courses.

"Faculty Board Meetings, 1925-40" Jun. 26, 1925-Dec. 13, 1941. Notes of meetings, memos, some grade lists.

"Faculty & Staff Employment, Pay & Movement" May 29, 1925-Dec. 9, 1941. Enlisted personnel, officers, study of pay in machine tool industry (Oct. 1940) for Office of Administrator of Export Control and "Formulation of a Sound Policy for Export Control of Aviation Gasoline"
Grants and Lubricants"


"General Staff Correspondence" Jan. 19, 1932-May 9, 1940. Tabbed: Chief of Staff; G-1; Selective Service; G-2; Public Relations Branch; G-3; G-4.

"Faculty Personnel" Feb. 26, 1924-Dec. 31, 1941. Memos, staff directives.

Box 8 GRADUATES - INCOME TAX REGULATIONS

"Graduates" Mar. 23, 1936-Jun. 19, 1941. Charts by year/arm or service starting in 1924; lists, recommendations for attache duty.

Notebook: "Graduates of the Army Industrial College" Lists of graduates, graduates also from C&GS, Harvard Business School, USMA, etc.

"July 1, 1941- " Jul. 1, 1941-Dec. 29, 1941. Yellow copies of outgoing correspondence (chron file)


Box 9 INFANTRY - JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL


"Instruction Courses - General Service Schools" Jun. 17,
1925-May 6, 1940. Schedules for A.I.C. and others, correspondence.

"Instruction Courses - Special Service Schools" Jan. 28, 1936-Aug. 26, 1941. Schedules, correspondence, catalogs.


"Intra-Office Memoranda 6/14/26-6/20/38" Includes correspondence going outside, e.g., to State Planning Boards.

"Invitation List" starts with Nov. 25, 1934 reception, ends graduation July 1941; includes some company names and people for A.I.C. trips; General Officer appointment releases, lists of lecturers.

"Judge Advocate General" Apr. 9, 1937-Nov. 5, 1940. Quota memo and request for detail of JAG-reservist to staff of A.I.C.

Box 10 LECTURE MATERIAL - MILITARY ATTACHES


"Library" Jan. 25, 1927-Aug. 30, 1941. Correspondence, memos, thank yous for books and articles received, bills of lading; memo signed by MAJ Eisenhower transferring library of O.A.S.W. to A.I.C. (Feb. 11, 1932).


"Mail Regulations and Collections" Jul. 31, 1940-Dec. 31, 1941. Correspondence and memos.

"Maps, Charts & Photographs" Apr. 26, 1939-Feb. 21, 1941. Envelope with negatives marked "staff of A.I.C. 9-1940;" correspondence, requests for maps and photos.

"Medical Corps" Feb. 9, 1935-Mar. 27, 1941. Memos,
correspondence.

"Memoranda Within the Army Industrial College 6-1-40" Jul 2, 1940-Nov. 17, 1941.

"Memoranda Within the War Department" Jul. 2, 1940-Nov. 25, 1941. Annual Report of Planning Branch (Jul. 25, 1941, 27 pages); Army Ordnance Bulletins; evaluations of students; 21-page "Statistical Analysis of the Educational Orders Program," Jun. 3, 1940 to The Assistant Secretary of War, submitted by Donald J. Leehey, Capt., Corps of Engineers, Statistical Branch, OASW, June 8, 1940.

"Military Academy - West Point" Oct. 18, 1933-Jan. 3, 1941. Correspondence re exchange of materials, list of speakers at A.I.C. recommended for USMA lectures, USMA instructors recommended for A.I.C.

"Military Attaches" Aug. 13, 1921-Sept. 3, 1940. Designation of Foreign Liaison Officer in G-2; memos re visits of foreign officers to A.I.C.; requests for material from foreign attaches; recommendations for attache duty; list of U.S. military attaches and assistants, May 1, 1939.

Box 11 MISCELLANEOUS - NATIONAL DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMISSION

"Miscellaneous - June 23, 1939 to " Jul. 1, 1939-1940. Invitations to conferences, letters, applications for employment at A.I.C., requests for info on A.I.C.


"Misc. Information from Bur. of Public Relations" Feb. 26, 1940-Dec. 16, 1941. Clippings, press releases, list of General Officers June 16, 1941; manuscript of long article by Harold J. Tobin (Mar. 23, 1940) on press censorship and public relations; letter from William A. White, Emporia Gazette (Mar. 9, 1940) to Col. Lewis re "public relations in wartime."

"Misc. Information of Interest to Studs., etc." Apr. 13, 1936-Aug. 20, 1941. Invitations to lectures, memos re
visits to White House, forms, calling card information, travel information; lecture extract on "Actions on Arrival at Station" (Oct. 1, 1940)--etiquette reminders; social activities.

"Mobilization Assignments and Regulations - 1940" Jan. 5, 1940-Mar. 26, 1941. Regulations and instructions only.


Box 12 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD - PARKING SPACE FOR AUTOMOBILES

"National Industrial Conference Board" Nov. 18, 1935-Oct. 7, 1940. Pamphlets, correspondence, report on visits; designation of Col. Jordan (Commandant) as member of NICB ('36-'38); meeting minutes.


"Naval Powder Factory - Indianhead" Mar. 20, 1936-May 8, 1940. Correspondence re visits, lectures, charts.

"Navy Department" Jul. 21, 1924-Jan. 6, 1942. Correspondence, memos; Naval and Marine students at A.I.C.; Naval security regulations March 1938 and January 1937; also correspondence with Naval War College.


Box 13 PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN - POLICIES

"Personnel, Civilian to October 1, 1938" Apr. 26, 1937-Sept. 16, 1940. Correspondence, memos, group of correspondence and regulations dealing with Air Corps
officers--flying qualifications, training flights.

"Personnel Records" Leave records for 1941 and 1942.

"Personnel Regulations (Civilian)" Aug. 9, 1928-Dec. 15, 1941. Regulations.


"Policies" Oct. 11, 1923-Jan. 1, 1942. Memos re closing in 1941, students, including non-military agencies (1938), reservists, quotas; correspondence on General Staff duty comment on efficiency reports; selection of instructors, relations with Planning Branch.

Box 14 POLICIES - PUBLICATIONS

"Photograph" Nov. 20, 1939-Dec. 4, 1939. Photos of reserve officer class (12-25 November 1939), resume of course, student rosters.


"Priorities Study" Nov. 25, 1938-Apr. 16, 1941. Memos forwarding study by Major Frank N. Gano on War Industries Board and acknowledgements--study not included.


"Property Accountability to 6/30/39" Feb. 23, 1926-Jun. 30, 53
1939. Memos, receipts, inventories.


Box 15 PUBLICITY - REQUISITIONS

"Publicity - A.I.C." June. 17, 1925-Dec. 11, 1941. Press releases and copies of articles re A.I.C.; monthly reports on activities; proposed letter to list of journalists (Alsop, Lippman, Pearson, Pegler, etc.) to be offered info on A.I.C. and industrial mobilization (not sent--"Mr. Johnson decided that this should not be done")--Jun. 1, 1939; article by 1st Lieut. H. S. Bishop, Jr., "The Development of War Department Organization and Plans for Industrial Mobilization" (based on solution of problem in 1930-31 course, A.I.C.), 11 pages with chart.

"Quartermaster Corps" No folder, attached by binders. Apr. 9, 1937-Dec. 13, 1941. Quotas, memos, Quartermaster Corps Procurement Planning Program, Sections I and II, July 1939 to June 1940 (19 pages), forwarded Nov. 5, 1940; Photostats of correspondence re Ration, Emergency, Chocolate (Aug. '38-Jan '39).


"Requisitions - B&G" Oct. 6, 1931-Dec. 31, 1941. Memos and complaints re buildings & grounds.

"Requisitions (Slides, Photographs)" Jan. 25, 1938-Nov. 12, 1940. Forms and memos.

"Requisitions (Sept. 1, 1938 to Dec. 31, 1940)" Sept. 6, 1938-Aug. 20, 1941. Memos and requests.


Box 16 REQUISITIONS - RESERVE OFFICERS

"Req'ns - Printing & Binding" Apr. 23, 1933-Dec. 9, 1941. Forms, annual estimates, memos.

"Requisitions - Signs" Sept. 6, 1938-Oct. 8, 1940. Forms and memos.


"Reserve Officers - Regulations" Jun. 16, 1936-Dec. 16, 1941. Tabbed: Active Duty Tours; Apps. of Res. Off. & NG; Appointments; Bus Line Fares; Classification; Certificate of Capacity; Change of Status, Reserve Officers; Deferment; Extension Courses; Fares (Traced); Misc.; Leave of Absence; Pay & Allowances; Physical Report; Promotion; Relief of Reserve Officers from Duty with Reg Army; ROTC Courses; Transfers. Regulations and limited correspondence.

Box 17 SHERBAK - SPEAKERS

"Sherbak" Sept. 21, 1935-Jan. 5, 1938. Correspondence with H. Scherbak--inventor of "coordination system"


"Speakers - Lists of" Lists of speakers, topics and dates, 1933 to 1941. Industrial Contacts List.

"Speeches for A.S.W." Jul. 6, 1937 speech on "The Industrial Training of Military Service Officers."

Box 18 STAFF

Binder - Staff VOLUME I - Ames Thru Kelton. Tabbed Ames, L. C. Major; Armstrong, F. T. Colonel; Best, W. A., Commander, USN; Best, W. N., Lt. Col., USMC; Borden, W. A., Lt. Col.; Brophy, N. D., Major; Brown, R. W., Colonel; Buck, W. A., Lt. Commander, USN; Burgess, G. H., Major; Carr., I. J., Major-General; Dunham, F. C., Commander, USN; Fairchild, J. K., Major; Gano, F. W.,

Box 19 STAFF


"Staff Memorandum on 'First Aid Parachute Troops'" Nov. 15, 1940-Nov. 20, 1940. 3 page memo for Chief of Air Corps by Maj. Pike and memo forwarding to Chief of Air Corps.

"Telephone Data" Oct. 8, 1934 - Nov. 29, 1940. Cards with invitations to graduation at various schools (Signal Corps School, Air Corps Tactical School, etc.) and correspondence with schools (maybe missing "Schools" folder). Telephone directory entries, admin memos, phone bills Dec. 31, 1930 to Nov. 4, 1941.

Box 20 TETANUS TOXOID - UNIVERSITY

"Tetanus Toxoid" Jun. 11, 1941-Oct. 7, 1941. Correspondence re immunization at A.I.C.

"Third Corps Area" Jan. 25, 1938-Dec. 31, 1941. Memos and instructions relating to Third Corps Area, headquartered in Baltimore, and correspondence and reports to 3rd Army Hqs.


"Traffic Director" Oct. 26, 1934-Apr. 12, 1941. Correspondence with D.C. Director of Traffic re licenses and drivers' permits, regulations.


"Under Secretary of War" Sept. 20, 1940-Dec. 18, 1941. S.4370, bill to create Under Secretary of War; memos thanking speakers signed by USW; memo on new location of Statistics Branch, OUSW; memo to Chief of Staff on closing of A.I.C. (Dec. 16, 1941).

"Uniforms" Dec. 1, 1930-Dec. 10, 1941. Tabbed Army Regs; U.S. Navy uniforms; A.I.C. uniforms; Inspection; White House; Commercial Firms; Assoc. Military Stores; Horstmann; Luxenberg; Miller; Schloss Bros.; Wilner. Prices, brochures, regulations.

"Universities - Miscellaneous" Jun. 21, 1940-Oct. 3, 1941. Correspondence, requests from universities to cooperate on courses on Industrial Mobilization, use of Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration (Aug. 1, 1940).

"American University" Feb. 28, 1941 memo re A.I.C. faculty members' meeting with the A.U. graduate class in Government Control of Economic Life; First semester '41-'42 list of courses.

Box 21 UNIVERSITY - WORLD ECONOMICS & MONETARY CONFERENCE

"George Washington University" Apr. 23, 1940-Apr. 26, 1940. Correspondence, request for course outline of A.I.C.'s Industrial Organization and Management.

"Georgetown University" Feb. 18, 1938-Nov. 27, 1941. Correspondence, lecture announcements, arrangements for A.I.C. faculty to lecture at Georgetown.

"Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration" Feb. 2, 1928-Sept. 4, 1941. Correspondence, synopsis of Harvard courses, debate on quality of Army students at Harvard; schedule for Reserve Officers Industrial Training Course at Harvard 1940-41 session (Sept. 30, 1940-Mar. 29, 1941); "Memorandum of Understanding of conditions under which the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, a Department of Harvard University and as such operated on a non-profit basis,
might be called upon to meet the desires of the United
States as to the preparation and use of its facilities
and personnel for a national emergency" (Mar. 27,
1940)--would transfer A.I.C. to Harvard.

"Harvard University" Oct. 30, 1939-Aug. 31, 1940.
Correspondence, additional on Harvard proposal above,
comments by A.I.C. faculty; letter signed by Louis
Johnson (USW) on June 3 or 4, 1940; MOU dated May 25,
1940; Aug. 16, 1940 memo to Chiefs of Supply Arms and
Services re Army Industrial College Instruction for
Reserve Officers and responses.

"University of Kansas" Nov. 14, 1933-Dec. 9, 1933.
Correspondence re cooperation with C&GSC and Army
Industrial College.

"War College Correspondence" Aug. 26, 1929-Dec. 9, 1941.
Correspondence, faculty and student lists, AWC
committee report on Economic and Industrial Support of
War dated Dec. 22, 1931.

"War College Directives & Assg'ts Students" Nov. 19, 1930-
Jun. 20, 1940. Tabbed: Student Assignments;
Directives. Selection of students, class lists from

"War College Schedules" Sept. 17, 1938-Jun. 15, 1940.
Weekly and Academic Year schedules.

Correspondence and news releases; "Summary of World War
Experience Involving the Control of Industry" (pencil
note--"prepared by Maj. Brophy 9/14 for W.R.B."--43
pages).

"World Economic & Monetary Conference" Sept. 15-17, 1936.
Invitation to conference (to be held Oct. 14, 1936).
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
COURSE FILES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box</th>
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<tr>
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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
ANNUAL REPORTS

Boxes 1-4 Annual Reports, 1924-1941
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
COURSE DIRECTIVES

Box 1  ICAF ANNUAL REPORTS 1924-1928
Box 2  ANNUAL REPORTS 1928-1930
Box 3  COURSE PROGRAM DIRECTIVES - 1936-1937
Box 4  COURSE PROGRAM DIRECTIVES - 1937-1938
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Box 7  COURSE PROGRAM DIRECTIVES - 1940
Box 8  COURSE PROGRAM DIRECTIVES - JAN.-APRIL 1941
Box 9  COURSE PROGRAM DIRECTIVES - JULY-SEPT. 1941
Box 10 COURSE PROGRAM DIRECTIVES - JULY-SEPT. 1941
Box 11 COURSE PROGRAM DIRECTIVES - OCT.-DEC. 1941
1. Albert A. Blum, "Birth and Death of the M-Day Plan," in American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1963), 88. In the note on this paragraph (93 n. 96), the source is given as "Comments on Industrial War Plans (read and returned by President, May 20, 1940) in files of Currie, Rowe, Forrestal and McReynolds at Hyde Park."


5. Ibid., 6.

6. Ibid., 6-7.

7. Ibid., 7.

8. Ibid., 8-9.

9. Ibid., 10.

10. Ibid., 15-16.


12. Ibid., 14-15.


16. Information from Directives contained in "Courses of Instruction, Army Industrial College, Mrs. Connell," Box 1, Army Industrial College Archives, National Defense University Library, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.


18. Lt. Col. W. A. McCain, May 16, 1933, Subject: War Game, Army Industrial College, 1933, in file "War Game--Army Industrial College--1933," Box 123, Entry 191, RG 107, NA.

19. Dwight F. Davis, July 15, 1924, in file "Advisory Board - A.I.C.," Box 1, Entry 43/Subject Files, RG 334. The three members were Major General Chas. McK. Saltzman, Brigadier General John B. Bellinger, and Brigadier General C. L'H. Ruggles. The Advisory Board as a whole consisted of the chiefs of the Army Supply Branches. See Appendix 1 for a finding aid for Entry 43, Record Group 334 in the National Archives (Entry 43 consists of three sequences of records: Industrial College of the Armed Forces Subject Files 1924-1942, Course Files and Annual Reports).

20. C. McK. Saltzman, John B. Bellinger and C. L'H. Ruggles to The Assistant Secretary of War, "Subject: Army Industrial College," August 13, 1924, in file "Advisory Board - A. I. C.", Box 1, Entry 43/Subject Files, RG 334, NA. The memo has a two page attachment, apparently a draft, that includes a third item under the list of duties for which AIC should prepare officers: "(3) To deal effectively with the War Industries Board or other super agencies that may be appointed in time of war to control industry."

22. Ibid., p. 2.

23. Major R. R. Nix to Col. Hilgard, December 8, 1925, in file "Comments--4th Class," Box 1, Entry 45, RG 334, NA.


31. Ibid., 8-9.

32. Col. C. T. Harris to Director, AIC, "Subject: Comments and criticisms on Revised Industrial Mobilization Plan," January 24, 1936, in file "Planning Branch Memoranda," Box 13, Entry 43/Subject Files, RG 334, NA.


34. Col. C. T. Harris, Jr. to the Executive, OASW, October 5, 1937, "Subject: The Inspector General's Questionnaire concerning officers on duty in Washington (inclosure)," in file "Assistant Secretary's Office," box 12, Entry 207, RG 107, NA. The single non-graduate was Lt. Col. Gatchell, head of the Procurement Plans Division.

35. Capt. Wallace E. Niles, to Director, Planning Branch, September 29, 1937, in file "Advisory Board for Industrial Mobilization," box 1, Entry 190, RG 107, NA. The Baker Board was
created by the Secretary of War in 1934 to study the Air Corps and consisted of military and civilians. Cf. Irving Brinton Holley, jr., Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), 56.

36. Niles to Director, Planning Branch, September 29, 1937. The pro rata shares contained in the memo are:

<table>
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<th>Organization</th>
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<td>Air Corps</td>
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<td>Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>Medical Department</td>
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<td>Ordnance Department</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Corps</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>2%</td>
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</table>

37. Capt. William R. Winslow, to Colonel Harris, October 4, 1937, in file "Advisory Board for Industrial Mobilization," Box 1, Entry 190, RG 107, NA.

38. The original letter from Mr. Johnson was not located, but the correspondence includes a letter from Bernard M. Baruch to Mr. Louis Johnson, October 7, 1937; letter from Louis Johnson to Bernard M. Baruch, October 20, 1937; and letter from Bernard M. Baruch to Louis Johnson, October 21, 1937, all in file "Advisory Board for Industrial Mobilization," Box 1, Entry 190, RG 107, NA.

39. Col. J. H. Burns to Director Planning Branch, Colonel Harris, November 26, 1937, and Louis Johnson to Franklin D. Roosevelt [Memorandum for the President], December 4, 1937, both in file "Advisory Board for Industrial Mobilization," Box 1, Entry 190, RG 107, NA.


42. Brigadier General Hines, "The Army and Navy Munitions Board," August 8, 1941, Box 10, Entry 45, RG 334, NA, 8. Speech given at AIC.


46. Thatcher, Planning, 41.

47. It is difficult to determine the extent of the work done by the AIC on the annexes to the 1939 IMP. The annex copies located in the NDU Library do not contain dates or authors and only one, the Transportation Annex, clearly indicates on its Table of Contents page that it is a revision. The language in the correspondence related to the fall, 1939, activity indicates that the work on War Labor resulted in a "special study" for the Planning Branch (Major Norman D. Brophy to Commandant, December 15, 1939); the War Trade Annex was an AIC "revision" submitted to ANMB and prepared under the supervision of Major Sadler of the Planning Branch (Major P. P. Logan to Commandant, December 21, 1939 and Col. Miles to Secretary, ANMB, December 21, 1939); AIC completed a "Special Committee Study" of the War Finance Annex (W. A. Best to Commandant, December 12, 1939); and the Transportation Annex submitted on December 19, 1939 to the Secretary of the ANMB may have been primarily an AIC product ("This Annex has been built up under the direct supervision of Major Sadler, Planning Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, and paragraphs 3 and 9 of Part V were written by him." Col. Miles to Secretary of ANMB, December 19, 1939). (All references contained in file "Special Problems - The Army Industrial College, Course 1939-1940", Box 15, Entry 43/Course Files, RG 334, NA.)

48. Academic Division Memorandum No. 68, "Special Assignments," May 18, 1940; W. A. Best to Commandant, "Special committee study, War Finance Annex to the Industrial Mobilization Plan," December 12, 1939, both in Box 15, Entry 43/Course Files, RG 334, NA.

49. Miles to The Secretary, Army-Navy Munitions Board [sic], January 3, 1940, Box 15, Entry 43/Course Files, RG 334, NA.

50. Lt. Col. Wm. A. Borden, Academic Division Memorandum No. 68, "Subject: Special Assignments," May 18, 1940, in file "Special Problems - The Army Industrial College, Course 1939-1940," Box 15, Entry 43/Course Files, RG 334, NA.


52. 1939 Industrial Mobilization Plan, 8.

54. Col. Miles to Col. Hines, "Subject: Temporary Annex to IMP, 1939, covering the Executive Division, War Resources Administration," May 9, 1940, Box 6, Entry 45, RG 334, NA.


56. Col. James H. Burns to The Assistant Secretary of War, September 6, 1939, "Subject: Use of The Army Industrial College Personnel and Space," in file "Army Industrial College 1939," Box 10, Entry 207, RG 107, NA.


59. Minutes No. 37, Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, January 30, 1940, in file "370.26/110.B ANMB," Box 2, Entry 190, RG 107, 6. The placement of these AIC graduates in influential positions involved in mobilization planning may counteract the relatively small number of AIC graduates available for the large number of mobilization jobs. Terrence Gough's article, "Soldiers, Businessmen and US Mobilisation Planning Between the World Wars," states, "If the AIC's contribution to the solidification of military-industrial relations is judged by the number of its former students who participated in the World War II mobilisation (putting aside the graduates' attitudes toward businessmen), then the school's role was slim.... Since the number of officers required in wartime army procurement was about 25,000, AIC graduates accounted for perhaps two per cent of the total engaged in such duty." (P. 72.)


61. Joint Release, War Department-Navy Department, Formation of War Resources Board, August 9, 1939, in file "War Resources Board," Box 21, Entry 43/Subject Files, RG 334, NA. Blum's
"Birth and Death of the M-Day Plan" contains an extensive discussion of the War Resources Board, especially pages 74-78 and 84-87.

62. Franklin D. Roosevelt to E. R. Stettinius, Jr., November 24, 1939, Appendix B to Minutes No. 37, ANMB, January 30, 1940. Also, Military Order, July 5, 1939, in file "Policies," Box 3, Entry 190, RG 107, NA.

63. Joint Release, August 9, 1939.


65. Col. H. K. Rutherford to Col. F. H. Miles, September 25, 1939, in file "War Resources Board," Box 21, Entry 43/Subject Files, RG 334, NA.

66. Roosevelt to Stettinius, November 24, 1939, Appendix B of Minutes No. 37, ANMB, January 30, 1940. Typed annotation on the letter copy indicates "same letter sent to" other members of the WRB.

67. Louis Johnson/Charles Edison to Walter S. Gifford, December 6, 1939, Appendix C of Minutes No. 37, ANMB, January 30, 1940, with typed annotation "This letter was also sent to" the additional members of the WRB.

68. Minutes No. 37, ANMB, January 30, 1940, p. 7.

69. Col. Charles Hines to Col. F. H. Miles, Jr., "Subject: Directive for Committee Problem on Industrial Mobilization Plan," February 21, 1940, in unlabelled file, Box 1, Entry 190, RG 107, NA.


71. Henry L. Stimson to Andrew J. May, August 6, 1940, in file "War Resources Board and Administration," Box 193, Entry 207, RG 107, NA.


75. Ibid., 26.


77. Ibid., 117.


80. "Graduating Class, August-December, 1940," in Box 17, Entry 43/Course Files, RG 334, NA. One of the four, Colonel Clabaugh, became Assistant Military Attache in London and was cited by Brig. Gen. Maxwell as the Office for Administration of Export Control's contact with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Russell L. Maxwell, "Export Control," May 31, 1941, in Box 23, Entry 43/Course Files, RG 334, NA, 12).


83. "History of the A.I.C., Notes on File 352.01 - Establishment of the Army Industrial College," AIC Archives, NDU Library. One of the members of the Echols Board was now Major General Russell L. Maxwell.


85. Ibid., 4-5.


87. Ibid., 20.

88. Ibid., 21.

90. Saltzman, Bellinger, Ruggles memorandum to The Assistant Secretary of War, August 13, 1924, 1.

91. Col. F. H. Miles, Jr. to Howard J. Carswell, April 7, 1939, in file "General Staff Correspondence," Box 7, Entry 43/Subject Files, RG 334, NA.