UNITED NATIONS - DIVIDED STATES:
PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S

by

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DECEMBER, 1993

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This thesis examines the ability of the United Nations to use military forces to aid in the resolution of intrastate conflicts. The new spirit of multilateral activism has nurtured the belief that intervention in the internal conflicts of a state is legitimate and necessary to the peace and security of the world community at large. The purpose of this thesis is not to examine the validity of this claim. The purpose is to examine the ability of the United Nations to carry out this task.

This thesis is structured around four chapters. Chapter II surveys the "evolution" of the concept of peacekeeping and new roles assigned to U.N. forces. This chapter also examines an emerging trend in conflict in the late twentieth century - state disintegration. Chapter III investigates the ability of the United Nations to execute these new missions given its inherent limitations as a system of highly diverse political actors. Chapter IV evaluates the problems intrinsic in this new class of mission, such as the efficacy of the use of force and the requirements for the control of large tracts of territory. Chapter V is a case study of the political process as it emerged in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

In the final analysis, this thesis contends that the United Nations security apparatus, as it presently exists, is ill-suited to deal with situations as intractable as Cambodia or Somalia.
United Nations - Divided States:
Peacekeeping in the 1990s

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the ability of the United Nations to use military forces to aid in the resolution of intrastate conflict. The end of the Cold War has fostered a new spirit of enthusiasm for the peacekeeping function of the United Nations. This enthusiasm encouraged the view that the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces can serve as a panacea for a wide range of conflicts. This includes intrastate conflicts.

This new spirit of multilateral activism has nurtured the belief that intervention in the internal conflicts of a state is legitimate and necessary to the peace and security of the world community at large. The purpose of this thesis is not to examine the validity of this claim. The purpose is to examine the ability of the United Nations to carry out this task.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the ability of the United Nations to use military forces to aid in the resolution of intrastate conflict. The end of the Cold War has fostered a new spirit of enthusiasm for the peacekeeping function of the United Nations. This enthusiasm encouraged the view that the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces can serve as a panacea for a wide range of conflicts. This includes intrastate conflicts.

This new spirit of multilateral activism has nurtured the belief that intervention in the internal conflicts of a state is legitimate and necessary to the peace and security of the world community at large. The purpose of this thesis is not to examine the validity of this claim. The purpose is to examine the ability of the United Nations to carry out this task.

The ramifications of this new direction give rise to a host of questions, such as: one, what are the requirements for an external actor to be capable of brokering a solution to intrastate conflicts and forming stable governments in states that have all but collapsed? Two, is the U.N. capable of the decisive, effective action required in these operations.
given its inherent limitations as an organization of politically diverse member states? Three, what are the principal difficulties in the use of external military forces to solve an intrastate conflict? And finally, can the "successful" completion of a United Nations peacekeeping operation ensure the future viability of the state?

In order to address these questions this thesis is structured around four chapters. Chapter II surveys the "evolution" of the concept of peacekeeping and new roles assigned to U.N. forces. This chapter also examines an emerging trend in conflict in the late twentieth century - state disintegration. Chapter III investigates the ability of the United Nations to execute these new missions given its inherent limitations as a system of highly diverse political actors. Chapter IV evaluates the problems intrinsic in this new class of mission, such as the efficacy of the use of force and the requirements for the control of large tracts of territory. Chapter V is a case study of the political process as it emerged in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Integral to this thesis was a research trip to Cambodia in April and May 1993, just a few weeks prior to the United Nations-administered elections. The author was afforded full access to the UNTAC mission area, ranging from the troop level to an interview with the second highest ranking civilian
official in UNTAC, the Deputy Special Representative of the mission. This trip also included visits to front line units of the Cambodian People’s Armed Forces, interviews with the local population (including ethnic Vietnamese refugees along the Mekong River as they fled racially motivated violence). Interviews were also conducted in Washington D.C. and New York at the U.S. State Department, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and United Nations Headquarters. Additionally, the author has had extensive experience working with the United Nations as a military observer in the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Israel and Egypt and was able to closely examine the functioning of other peacekeeping operations.

While this thesis is meant to be both descriptive and prescriptive, its ultimate purpose is to provide an analytical framework to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of United Nations intervention to save failing states. The final product is a result of both personal experience and a careful review of the positions of both enthusiasts and detractors of the U.N.’s recent expansion into these new mission areas. In the final analysis, this thesis contends that the United Nations security apparatus, as it presently exists, is ill-suited to deal with situations as intractable as Cambodia or Somalia.
I. INTRODUCTION

In a time of renewed enthusiasm for multilateral operations, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) represent a new class of mission for the United Nations. This new mission type is a move away from traditional "peacekeeping" operations: the imposition of a neutral force as a confidence building mechanism between states with an established truce or cease-fire. This new class of mission, the placement of military and civilian authorities in the intrastate conflict of a "failing" state, represents an increase in mission difficulty that is geometric, not linear.

It is important to clearly define and understand the limitations of this new category of mission before policy-makers commit U.S. forces to an expanded U.N. mandate. In a September 1993 speech at the Naval Postgraduate School, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry, stated that clarifying the U.S. military's role in future U.N. operations was one of the most important policy challenges of the 1990s.

The purpose of this thesis will be to evaluate the challenges presented by this new interventionism by examining both the inherent difficulties in this type of operation and the United Nations' system in general. This thesis will
demonstrate that the mission requirements for successful resolution of these internal conflicts are, by nature, extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the United Nations to accomplish through military operations.

A. BACKGROUND

The world-wide "call to arms" for this new class of mission was made by the U.N. Secretary-General in his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace. In this report to the Security Council, Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared his intention to embrace this new class of mission with the statement, "the time of absolute sovereignty has passed." This new initiative on the part of the U.N. gives rise to a host of questions, most of which remain unanswered. Key among them are: first, what are the requirements for an external actor to be capable of brokering a solution to intrastate conflicts and forming stable governments in states that have all but collapsed? Second, is the U.N. capable of the decisive, effective action required in these operations given its inherent limitations as an organization of politically diverse member states? Third, what are the principal barriers that confront external military forces when they intervene to solve an intrastate conflict? Fourth, can the "successful" completion of a United Nations peacekeeping operation ensure the future viability of the state?
B. APPROACH

This thesis is structured around four independent but closely related chapters: The New Era of Peacekeeping, Problems of Coalitions, Problems of Intervention and an UNTAC Case Study. A final chapter discusses the conclusions reached in each of these chapters.

Chapter II begins with an overview of the evolution of U.N. peacekeeping concepts and the U.N. system of forming missions. This comprehensive overview will discern the differences between traditional operations and the new missions that fall under the broad rubric of peacekeeping. Next, this section will clarify the current definitions of U.N. operations as presented in An Agenda For Peace. Additionally, Chapter II examines one of the increasingly common sources of conflict in the post-Cold War era: persistent violence caused by failing or disintegrating states. Finally, the Chapter will present the United Nations' operational intent in deploying military forces to these failing states.

Chapter III will include an assessment of the United Nations' ability to fulfill the mission requirements of these operations given the coalitional nature of all U.N. military forces. This chapter will evaluate the problems of effectively carrying out the more difficult mission requirements of this new class of operation with a
multinational force that has no prior operational or training history. This examination of the problems of coalition-building is scrutinized on three levels: the strategic level of interaction between the contributing states; the operational level of interaction between the conflicting parties and the United Nations forces; and the tactical level between the forces themselves. Chapter III will show that the "force dividers" inherent in combined operations have a greater impact on these new missions than on standard peacekeeping operations. Finally, Chapter III will weigh the prospects for a standing U.N. force.

Chapter IV will examine the obstacles inherent in the implementation of these operations. This will include: first, the increased difficulty in changing from "peacekeeping" to "peace-enforcement" strategies; second, the problems facing an external actor in establishing authority over a society to which it has no sovereign claim; third the efficacy of the use of force; and finally, the paradox facing a U.N. which hopes to remain above the conflict as a neutral broker yet wishes to have a mandate for the use of force beyond self-defense.

Finally, in Chapter V the difficulty of manufacturing a comprehensive political settlement to an intractable civil war will be demonstrated by a case study of the political process in UNTAC. Certain aspects of UNTAC will prove to be mission-
specific, but many of the lessons learned will have potentially important implications for peacekeeping attempts to save other failing states. Chapter V will show that the choice of goals for this new type of mission rests somewhere between the short-term stability of an externally imposed artificial settlement and the long-term solutions to the internal problems of a failing state. The last section of Chapter V will examine the problem of defining victory in operations such as UNTAC. The determination of what this "end-game" should be in future missions like UNTAC will have direct bearing on their structures and mandates.

Integral to this thesis was a research trip to Cambodia in April and May 1993, just a few weeks prior to the United Nations-administered elections. The author was afforded full access to the UNTAC mission area, ranging from the troop level to an interview with the second highest ranking civilian official in UNTAC, the Deputy Special Representative of the mission. This trip also included visits to front line units of the Cambodian People's Armed Forces, interviews with the local population (including ethnic Vietnamese refugees along the Mekong River as they fled racially motivated violence). Interviews were also conducted in Washington D.C. and New York at the U.S. State Department, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and United Nations Headquarters. Additionally, the author has had extensive experience working with the United
Nations as a military observer in the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Israel and Egypt where he was able to closely examine the functioning of other peacekeeping operations such as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the United Nations Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the non-U.N. Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai.

While this thesis is meant to be both descriptive and prescriptive its ultimate purpose is to provide an analytical framework to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of United Nations intervention to save failing states. The final product is a result of both personal experience and a careful review of the positions of both enthusiasts and detractors of the U.N.'s recent expansion into these new mission areas.
II. THE NEW ERA OF PEACEKEEPING

Since its inception in 1945, one of the United Nations' primary objectives has been the maintenance of international peace and security. The drafters of the Charter of the United Nations envisioned an organization where the member states would band together in alliances of collective security led by the great powers (the victors of World War II). The purpose of these alliances was to respond to traditional cases of interstate aggression (i.e. the use of overt military force across recognized international boundaries). The use of military forces in the enforcement or compellence of peace was provided for in Chapter VII, Articles 39-51 of the U.N. charter.¹

However, the political realities of great power alliance formation and cooperation doomed the idea of collective security through the United Nations to failure. This failure of the United Nations to fulfill its ambitious mandate of international peace and security maintenance has generally been blamed on the emergence of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. What emerged from the

organization was instead a more modest innovation of collective security known as "peacekeeping." This innovation arose out of the Cold War as a method of preventing superpower involvement in localized conflict.

Peacekeeping operations were never envisioned as a function of the U.N. in its charter. Peacekeeping evolved as a method for the United Nations to display at least a minimum manifestation of authority over the management of international conflicts and disputes.\(^2\) Peacekeeping missions in their traditional sense were designed to provide a buffer or confidence building mechanism between belligerents that have agreed to a cease-fire or a truce.

The original peacekeeping mission: the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), formed in the Sinai after the 1956 Suez Crisis and withdrawn previous to the 1967 war, was exactly this type of buffer force. Of the fourteen U.N. field operations, generically defined as peacekeeping missions, formed between 1945 and 1985 eleven fell under the rubric of buffer or confidence building force.\(^3\) These traditional

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peacekeeping operations were generally not given enforcement mandate or power. The one mission which stands out as a glaring exception to the genre of Cold War era peacekeeping operations was the U.N. Operation in the Congo (known by its French initials, ONUC). ONUC, as the one Cold War era instance of U.N. intervention into a state's internal politics, has some lessons that are still valid for interventionalist peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era.

The end of the Cold War has fostered the image of a resurgent United Nations. Between 1985 and 1992 the United Nations initiated as many peacekeeping operations as it had during its previous forty years of existence. Obviously, in the words of U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "peacekeeping is a growth industry." By the end of 1992 the number of U.N. soldiers around the world exceeded 50,000. However, along with this vertical growth of the number of operations roughly defined as "peacekeeping," there was horizontal growth in the scope of these operations. The vertical and horizontal growth patterns are functions of the perception that "peacekeeping operations" can be the panacea for a wide range of problems.

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5Ibid., p. 90.
Of the fourteen operations initiated during this "new era" nine were involved in the resolution of "domestic" conflicts.\textsuperscript{6} Part of the reason for this increased intervention in the internal affairs of states has been the blurring of the idea of state sovereignty. The U.N. Charter is very specific in prohibiting intervention in the internal matters of one of its members. Article 2(7) of the Charter states that

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.

However, in his 1992 report, \textit{An Agenda for Peace}, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality."\textsuperscript{7} This dimming of the concept of sovereignty was accompanied by a clouding of the definition of peacekeeping. It has given rise to numerous phrases, such as peacemaking, peace-enforcement, preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace building, which are euphemisms for moving beyond the United Nations' classic role of an "honest broker" to its


attempting the imposition of solutions upon warring parties, regardless of whether the conflict is inter- or intrastate.

In order to analyze the dynamics and efficacy of these new missions, one must first understand the definitions and goals of these operations. This chapter will address four subjects: one, the definitions of various types of operations as set forth by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* will be explained and evaluated; two, these definitions will be evaluated against established conceptions of the nature of armed conflict; three, one of the more likely patterns of conflict in the post-Cold War era (state disintegration) will be examined; and four the role of the United Nations intervention in these conflicts will be appraised.

A. NEW DEFINITIONS OF PEACEKEEPING

The term peacekeeping has recently been used to describe a wide range of operations that involve the maintenance or restoration of peace or security by military forces of states not immediately involved in the conflict. An initial description should be made of the various missions placed under the broad rubric of peacekeeping in part by popular perception of U.N. controlled operations. In *An Agenda for Peace*, U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali distinguishes five broad areas of United Nations involvement in peace and
security issues: peacekeeping, peace-building, preventive diplomacy, peace-enforcement, and peacemaking. If participation in U.N. missions increases in the future, a clear comprehension of these definitions is necessary to understand what is the role of military force and avoid its misuse.

1. Peacekeeping

The original and most basic function of a peacekeeping operation has been to stand between hostile forces which have reached a truce or cease-fire as a confidence building measure. However, the definition of peacekeeping has expanded to include: humanitarian assistance, monitoring of elections, maintenance of security in a given area, administration of natural resources such as water, monitoring the withdrawal of an invading army, disarming an insurgent force and, as the U.N. plan calls for in Cambodia, the virtual rebuilding of the state through stabilization, pacification and administration. The United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), at its inception, was the most ambitious peacekeeping operation ever attempted in both size and scope. It has since, however, been superceded by the U.N. efforts in Somalia and Yugoslavia.

8Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 11.

Peacekeeping operations, under U.N. guidelines, have evolved to function with three limitations: first, the operation is undertaken without prejudice to any of the parties concerned; second, consent of all concerned parties is necessary to start the operation; and third, the peacekeeping forces only use arms in self-defense. These guidelines were developed by then U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in his report on the UNEF experience in 1958.

2. Peace-Building

In his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali used the term post-conflict peace-building. This term generates some confusion. Peace-building is defined as:

> efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming previously warring parties, restoration of order, custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

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12 Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 32, emphasis added.
Obviously, because of its mandate for functioning in many of these areas, UNTAC resembled more of a post-conflict peace-building operation than a peacekeeping operation.

3. Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy is defined as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." The arena of preventive diplomacy can include fact finding missions, the use of confidence building measures such as "good offices" and preventive deployments of forces. In an effort to keep the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia from spreading further, a preventive force was deployed in Macedonia as a sort of strategic tripwire. The purpose of such a force, which could be easily overwhelmed by the Serbian military, is to discourage possible aggression through the moral authority of the U.N. and deterrent value of international troops. The United States deployed an infantry battalion in the Spring of 1993 as part of this force.

Another type of operation listed under the category "preventive deployment" in An Agenda for Peace is humanitarian assistance. The purpose of military forces in humanitarian assistance operations is to limit or control violence so that

\(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 11.
relief organizations can alleviate conditions such as massive starvation. This is the type of mission which UNITAF (the U.S. led United Task Force) and UNOSOM II (Second United Nations Operation in Somalia) originally embarked upon.

Observer missions are one type of operation which fall under the rubric of many of these categories. The United Nations has often provided unarmed observers, usually military officers, to monitor situations like the ones described above. These observers are often the advance party for a larger operation or they may stay behind to monitor the situation after a peacekeeping force has departed. However, they may also act as part of a larger force as liaison between the civilian population and the armed peacekeepers or they may be deployed in situations where a peacekeeping force is unsuitable.

4. Peace-Enforcement

While peacekeeping operations enforce a truce or cease-fire which has been established, peace-enforcement operations are designed more to compel or coerce peace. Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter gives the Security Council the authority to enforce its will on the state or states that cause the breakdown of peace or order. The only examples of the U.N. authorizing the use of military force in an offensive manner are the conflicts in Korea, the Persian Gulf, and more recently the Security Council Resolutions
mandating UNITAF (the U.S. led coalition in Somalia) and UNOSOM II (The Second United Nations Operation in Somalia).\textsuperscript{14}

Unlike peacekeeping forces, peace-enforcement forces may not have the consent of all, or any, of the belligerent parties. By its very nature the intervening force may become a party to the conflict. However, the punishment of one, or some, of the belligerents is not the original purpose of peace-enforcement. Therefore, operations such as those conducted in Korea (1950-1953) or Desert Storm (1990-1991) do not neatly fit into this category. They can more correctly be defined as collective security operations with a mandate from the United Nations. This type of collective security is a related, but distinct, type of operation and consequently does not fall under the scope of this thesis.

5. Peacemaking

The term peacemaking has often been confused with peace-enforcement. One of the original drafts of Joint Pub 3-07.3, JTTP (Joint Techniques, Tactics and Procedures) for Peacekeeping Operations, incorrectly defines peacemaking as "a type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force."\textsuperscript{15} A


later draft of this publication defined peacemaking as the "diplomatic process of arranging an end to disputes and solving the underlying causes."\textsuperscript{16} According to the United Nations' definition, peacemaking is the use of various mechanisms, possibly including force, for the resolution of conflicts.\textsuperscript{17} These mechanisms, outlined in Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, include: use of the World Court, amelioration through assistance and the imposition of sanctions. Actions taken in the area termed "peacemaking" range from assistance to coercion, and attempt to bridge the gap between preventive diplomacy and peace-enforcement.

Peacemaking efforts can also include gestures defined as "amelioration through assistance," which are actions to alleviate circumstances that have contributed to a dispute or conflict.\textsuperscript{18} This can include assistance to segments of population which have been displaced by the conflict; often taking the form of refugee assistance. In a post-conflict phase this may have positive connotations, such as the repatriation of over 300,000 Cambodian refugees by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. However, this refugee assistance can also take on a negative flavor in ethnic


\textsuperscript{17}See: Boutros-Ghali, \textit{An Agenda for Peace}, 1992, pp. 20-25.

\textsuperscript{18}Boutros-Ghali, \textit{An Agenda for Peace}, p. 23.
conflicts when the U.N. may unwittingly assist aggressors in a form of "migratory genocide" by transporting large segments of one ethnic group from their homes. If United Nations forces are unable or unwilling to protect ethnic minorities they may have no choice but to protect them as they are driven from their homes. This unforseen consequence of United Nations operations will be discussed further in Chapter IV under "The Responsibilities of Authority."

Descriptions such as the preventive deployment of forces, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building, and peace-enforcement represent an attempt to categorize the various means of accomplishing political ends through the use of military forces. In order to better understand these different categories it is useful to understand where they fit along a continuum of conflict from peace to war.

B. PEACEKEEPING AND THE CONTINUUM OF CONFLICT

Views of war and peace have generally characterized the two as diametric states rather than parts of a unified continuum. The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, The Army defines three distinct environments: peacetime, conflict and war. However, in reality, war and peace do not exist either singularly or in totality apart from this third category of

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conflict. Nineteenth Century Prussian military strategist Karl von Clausewitz's thesis of the dual nature of war argued that all acts of organized violence can vary in intensity from armed demonstrations to wars of annihilation. 20

This continuum of conflict, displayed as the level of violence across time, is shown graphically in Figure 1. Underneath the bell curve, which describes the level of violence, is the corresponding function of an intervening military operation required to lower the level of violence at that point in the conflict. 21 The traditional method of tracking the level or intensity of violence is a determination of the amount of conventional military equipment involved, i.e. the use of artillery or airpower by the belligerents is of higher intensity than a guerrilla warfare fought with irregular forces. By contrast, in the definition used here, the level of violence is a function of the amount of the population involved in the conflict combined with their goals, i.e. defense, offense or annihilation.


21The idea of using a bell curve as a description of the level of violence was taken from Edward E. Thurman, "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis and War: The Continuum of Military Operations" Military Review, April 1992, p. 28.
Just as Clausewitz recognized the diverse nature of war,\textsuperscript{22} operations grouped under the nebulous heading of peacekeeping exist along a continuum. Theoretically, the level of military force used in the spectrum of U.N. operations, undertaken to sustain or restore peace, can range from zero to quite considerable. The function of any "neutral" United Nations operation along the continuum of conflict is to suppress or contain the level of violence.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Continuum of Conflict}
\end{center}

\textbf{Level of Violence Over Time}

- Peace Enforcement
- Coercion
- Suasion
- Peacekeeping
- Peacemaking
- Preventive Diplomacy
- Deterrence
- Post-Conflict
- Peace-Building

\textbf{TIME \ldots>}

\textit{Figure 1.}

As the level of violence increases the use of intervening military force or forces changes from influence to deterrence to suasion to coercion. Peacekeeping, and other "peace-support operations," attempt to re-equilibrate a conflictual situation. Figure 1. shows where the different types of peacekeeping missions are engaged to this end.23 The two phrases coined by Clausewitz most often used or misused by modern military strategists are: "War is nothing but the continuation of politics with other means,"24 and "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."25 However, the United Nations by the very purpose of its charter cannot declare war on any of the factions involved in internal conflicts. So it seems appropriate to paraphrase Clausewitz and declare that "Peacekeeping is nothing but the continuation of politics with other means," and especially "... the kind of peacekeeping on

23Interposing the descriptions of peacekeeping missions on the continuum of conflict was originally suggested by Prof. Dana Eyre, National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School.

24Clausewitz, p. 87.

25Clausewitz, p. 88.
which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."

Peacekeeping operations, viewed in a wartime context, exist in the U.S. Army’s continuum as an "operation short of war." The categorization of all U.N. operations as "short of war" is analagous to the somewhat misleading term, low-intensity conflict, coined during the 1980s in reference to guerrilla or intrastate conflicts. This term belies the zero-sum nature of most intrastate conflicts. Rarely are internal wars settled by compromise or conciliation. In intrastate wars losing usually means extinction. In his study on war termination, Negotiating Peace, Paul R. Pillar demonstrates that interstate wars are twice as likely to be settled by negotiation as intrastate conflicts. According to Clausewitz, a conflict that is "freely operating and obedient to no law but their own" will eventually escalate toward absolute violence ending in the total destruction of one side by the other. Clearly a peacekeeping operation such as UNTAC could only be deployed once the various factions had


28Paret, Understanding War, p. 109.
moved beyond the peak of violence. Regardless of the changes in the international system enabling the United Nations to more easily deploy military operations, an attempt at peace-enforcement intervention at the peak of the violence level in any conflict is impossible without overwhelming coercive force.

The function of intervention during the incipient stages of a conflict, defined as preventive diplomacy, is to influence or possibly deter the various parties from further belligerency while the level of violence is low. This might include the use of fact-finding or observer missions. If the level of violence continues to rise, preventive diplomacy may give way to the preventive deployment of armed forces as a peacemaking option.

Peacemaking includes some of the most difficult operations for military forces on the ground. As the level of violence increases, peacemaking attempts to use these intervening forces to assuage the factors contributing to the conflict. This may include enforcing sanctions, containing the conflict's spread to bordering areas, or preventing outside forces from intervening in a conflict.

If the level of violence has already risen to a point where the preventive deployment of forces cannot prevent an escalation of the violence, troops may be used to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid or the evacuation of non-
belligerents. This is the function of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the U.N. forces are able to do little to separate the belligerents.29

The use of force to compel belligerents in humanitarian aid missions may have several unwanted consequences: the perceived loss of neutrality and targeting of U.N. forces or the withdrawal of troop-contributing countries who volunteered their soldiers only for the original mission.

At the peak of the level of violence, the option of using a military presence to coerce belligerents toward lowering the violence level is peace-enforcement. It should be stressed that in this discussion the use of coercion in peace-enforcement operations is distinguished from pure coercion used in collective security situations such as in Korea or the Persian Gulf. The use of coercive force in peace-enforcement operations is closer to coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade an opponent to cease aggression through the threat or limited use of force while coercion is the use of force as a bludgeon against a foe.30


The use of military forces in a confidence building role after the peak of violence has passed is peacekeeping in the purest sense of the term. Peacekeeping operations must presuppose the existence of a peace, or at least a robust cease-fire, to keep. Because of their limited mandates and firepower, peacekeeping forces cannot be effective in situations where the belligerents are not willing to come to the terms of a truce or ceasefire. Some of the most successful operations of this kind are not well known because they have been so successful: i.e. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights or The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula. A clear example of a peacekeeping force which has been unable to fulfill its mandate because of the lack of acquiescence, or at least acceptance, of the belligerents in The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

It is apparent that in situations of internal war and/or ethnic conflict where the level of violence is extremely high, traditional peacekeeping is bound to fail in supressing violence. A deterrent strategy will not guarantee success due to the highly decentralized and zero-sum nature of these types of conflict. Inherent in a strategy of deterrence, and peacekeeping in this continuum, is the assumption of rational
opponents for whom compromise is an option.\textsuperscript{31} However, in intrastate conflicts "outcomes intermediate between victory and defeat are difficult to construct ... one side has to get all, or nearly so ... since the passions aroused and the political cleavages opened render a sharing of power unworkable."\textsuperscript{32} Certainly at the height of Khmer Rouge power, coterminous with the peak in the level of violence in the Cambodian conflict, the Khmer Rouge would not have been open to compromise and could not have been influenced, deterred or suaded.

The process of post-conflict peace-building can only be accomplished once the intensity of violence has either subsided or been suppressed to a level where diplomatic and/or military action can identify and support structures which will strengthen and solidify peace and prevent a relapse of violence. In terms of an interstate conflict this might include a remaining observer mission or border patrol force as confidence building measures.

In cases of intrastate peace-building operations, one of the primary foci is the attempt to redress the underlying causes of the conflict through the establishment, and possibly protection, of political mechanisms. UNTAC, because of its

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Craig & George, p. 188.
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broad range of tasks in re-establishing a state structure of Cambodia and low suasion capability, fits more accurately into the category of peace-building.

The term peacekeeping is generally used to refer to any one of these tasks involving the United Nations. Obviously, peacekeeping, in the truest sense of the term, is only one part of the scope of these operations. In order to minimize confusion, the group of operations, as an entirety, will hereafter be referred to as peace-support operations.

C. POST-COLD WAR CONFLICT: STATE DISINTEGRATION

A trend in the conflicts of the late twentieth century has been the disintegration of sovereign states which were held together by the freeze of the Cold War. As the international system "warms up," the bonds holding these states together are dissolved in the thaw. The standard method of state disintegration appears to take the form of successionist movements or the division of a larger state into constituent ethnic "nations." The prototype example of this type of disintegration is the former Yugoslavia which fractionated along roughly ethnic lines. However, two of the largest U.N. peace-support efforts in this new era (UNTAC in Cambodia and UNOSOM II in Somalia) have been deployed to help states that can be described as being on the verge of collapsing under the weight of numerous crises.
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the accelerating rate of state entropy and failure world-wide will be a phenomenon linked to severely atrophied states which for years have possessed sovereignty only in terms of legal statehood. Throughout the Cold War, legal statehood provided these states with a "negative sovereignty" derived from the right of self-determination, but they did not possess the capacity for effective government (positive sovereignty). Negative sovereignty has been defined as the formal-legal condition of freedom from outside interference.33 While the end of the Cold War has revealed the deficiencies of the most glaring examples of negative sovereignty, many of these "nascent," "quasi," or "pseudo" states continue to exist because "once juridical statehood is acquired ... diplomatic civilities are set in motion which support it, exaggerate it, and conceal its lack of real substance and value."34

Negative sovereignty and non-intervention have been described as two sides of the same coin. The principle of non-intervention has been the central principle of the classical law of nations: the sphere of exclusive legal


jurisdiction of states or international laissez faire. As states, which have never possessed positive sovereignty, lose their ability to maintain negative sovereignty the principle of non-interference has started to wane.

This trend of catastrophic deterioration where the state is "utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community" was described by Gerald B. Helman (former ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva) and Steven R. Ratner in their essay, "Saving Failed States." Through a variety of factors (different combinations of civil strife, government breakdown, natural disaster) these states do not have the means to fulfill the social contract of providing for the protection of their citizens. The internal situation denegrates into a Hobbesian universe where "men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man." Sociologist Max Weber’s theory of what defines a state declares that it is a human community that claims the "monopoly of legitimate use of physical force" within a

35 Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and The Third World, p. 27.


The trend in these disintegrating states is that the state institutions no longer maintain this monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. In the early stages of disintegration, the state’s role in the maintenance of order for the protection of life and property within its borders and abroad is challenged by other mechanisms of society. In later stages, the state’s authority is no longer simply challenged but completely absent.

In Cambodia, the genocidal rule of the Khmer Rouge and over a quarter of a century of conflict has left the country far behind even most of the developing world. In Somalia, government ceased to exist as fourteen different armed clans controlled fractions of the countryside. In the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzigovina never achieved even ostensible sovereignty as this multinational entity unraveled within a larger disintegrating multinational state.

This self-destructive pathology of social systems is not, however, unique to the late twentieth century. Since humans have been organizing themselves into political entities, states, of one form or another, have gone through cycles of integration and disintegration. The example of the ancient Greek polis of Athens, arguably one of the most intimate and

integrated of all political entities in history, bears remarkable resemblance to the failed states of the post-Cold War era. In The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides describes a situation of war between two great powers, Athens and Sparta, which impoverished each beyond what anyone could have foretold. Just as in modern conflicts, the citizens of Athens took refuge in the urban centers for protection. Once crowded inside the city walls an outbreak of the plague produced a condition of panic and the citizens began to commit atrocities they would have once found unthinkable. Soon society became so polarized that revenge became more important than self-preservation.40

Just as in ancient Athens, the combination of war, disease and crime have rendered some states, which would be considered "low achievers"41 in the best of times, in a state of complete anarchy. These "low achievers" begin to look less like a sovereign state and more like the state of nature described by Hobbes. However, the existence of instant world-wide telecommunications and "supranational" organizations such as

39Ferguson & Mansbach, p. 29.


the U.N. means that social systems can no longer dissolve without the effects being felt around the globe. The converging trends of these states no longer being able to sustain themselves and the globalization of information have prompted the United Nations to forsake its founding principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs.

D. FAILED STATES, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS, AND PEACE-SUPPORT INTERVENTION

Military historian Martin van Creveld has identified three principal characteristics of low-intensity conflicts: one, they tend to take place in the less developed parts of the world; two, very rarely do they involve regular armies on both sides; and three, they do not rely primarily on high-technology collective weapons.\(^4^2\) Van Creveld points out that besides being numerically predominant since 1945, these "low-intensity conflicts" have been far more violent than conventional wars. As the United Nations becomes involved more in intrastate conflicts, especially where states are approaching catastrophic failure, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of insurgent warfare, or low-intensity conflict, to properly choose and successfully prosecute peace-support operations.

Intrastate war may occur for a variety of reasons. However, the overriding trait of these conflicts is the loss of a state's legitimacy. Political legitimacy entails the acceptance by a society that the state has the institutionalized authority to both invoke obligations and use force to ensure compliance. In general, there are two mutual obligations that link the ruler (i.e. the state) to the ruled (society): first, an implicit social contract subjects each of the parties to a moral obligation to carry out certain tasks; second, reciprocity demands that either party has grounds to refuse the execution of its portion of the social contract if the other fails to perform its obligations. The state's portion of the social contract can be broken down into three distinguishable though related sectors: first, and perhaps most essential, is protection; second, maintenance of peace and order; and third is behavior which contributes to the material security of the ruled. In short the state's social contract "comes down to security: security against foreign and domestic depredation, supernatural, natural, and


human threats to the food supply and other material supports of customary daily life."\textsuperscript{45}

Dynamics of Insurgency

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\caption{Figure 2.}
\end{figure}

The failing state's inability to fulfill its basic obligations of the social contract will lead to moral anger and the rise of political opposition. The rise to political opponents who cannot or do not want to vie for power through legal means creates a new societal force called the counter-state.\textsuperscript{46} The dynamic of an insurgent conflict, as shown in Figure 2, results from the interaction between the state, counter-state and the general population of society. Both the state and counter-state attempt to gain support from society while targeting one another for destruction.

\textsuperscript{45}Moore, pp. 21-22.

\textsuperscript{46}This model of the dynamics of insurgent conflicts was developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School.
In some cases, like Afghanistan, Peru, or Mozambique, counter-states have reached a position near parity with the states and control wide areas of territory. In extreme cases the state, for all intents and purposes, has ceased to function and authority is fragmented among various collective actors (collectivities) that effectively become miniature counter-states. These collectivities may consist of the failed previous government which still possesses some of the trappings of power; a nation, clan or tribe; various guerrilla organizations; or any combination of these. This challenge to the authority of the state and redirection of legitimacy toward these collectivities is the beginning of erosion of state sovereignty.\(^{47}\) In a failed state, the state can no longer assert authority. However, none of the quasi counter-states is able to gain enough power to fill the vacuum.

The United Nations has attempted to fill this vacuum in a peace-support operation where it moves beyond the separation of belligerents and attempts to administer sovereign authority over the territory of the state. In short, in the absence of a state apparatus capable of maintaining at least negative sovereignty, the U.N. attempts to assume the role of the state in many respects, especially the authority over legitimate use of force. One of the initial goals envisioned by the United

Nations for both UNTAC and UNITAF was to deny the various state and counter-state collectivities the means of physical force through disarmament; either voluntarily in Cambodia or by force in Somalia. However, in both cases the United Nations designed mechanisms that allowed the elites of the various factions to maintain nominal control of the states' sovereignty. In Cambodia this mechanism was the Supreme National Council (SNC) formed out of the leaders of the four factions and headed by Prince Nordom Sihanouk. In Somalia, after the authorization of UNOSOM II, the fourteen factions met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to set up a U.N.-monitored interim government for two years.

In using peace-support operations to quell the violent fragmentation of failing states, the United Nations has developed a new class of mission which is inherently more difficult than standard peacekeeping. Additionally this new class of mission is qualitatively more difficult than a

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sovereign state fighting an insurgent war. In order to be successful, not only must the United Nations effectively assume the monopoly over the legitimate use of force (at least temporarily), but it must do so while remaining ostensibly neutral and denying itself some of the tools available to a sovereign state. For example, an effective intelligence and information capability is central to nearly all aspects of an insurgent conflict. However, the United Nations does not have a capability even remotely resembling an intelligence organization. In United Nations operations the branch which nominally fills this position is the Military Information Cell. This problem will be addressed further in Chapter IV.

The dynamics of this new class of mission, shown diagrammatically by Figure 3, involve the United Nations targeting the fragmented collectivities of society for control or neutralization. In an insurgent conflict the state targets the counter-state for destruction. However, in a peace-support operation the U.N. will seek to either weaken or bolster these collectivities' relationships with society. This may take the form of active disarmament of factions (as in Somalia) or reforming the law enforcement capabilities of the government (attempted by UNTAC's Civilian Police component

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\textbf{Dynamics of U.N. Intervention}

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\caption{Figure 1.}
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One of the key handicaps of peace-support operations used in situations of higher levels of violence is that the United Nations is hesitant to identify clear-cut aggressors. In order to prevent the various collectivities from successfully imposing their will upon the situation while persuading them that they have no viable alternative but to negotiate a
settlement the United Nations' political objective is suasion. Unfortunately, as has been demonstrated in many insurgent conflicts, the contest between the legitimate authority and the counter-state is often a contest in the effective management of coercion. However, U.N. forces attempt to lower the level of violence of all of the belligerents by simply presenting a credible military threat. Force is used to neutralize, but not defeat, the belligerents.

In order to be successful in peace-support operations designed to save a dysfunctional state from anarchy, the United Nations, or any other organization, would need to develop and demonstrate capabilities akin to those of a successful counter-insurgency: the capacity to act with speed, consistency, and discrimination. To this end, operations in these environments may have to preclude the three traditional limitation of U.N. missions: one, undertaking operations without prejudice to any of the parties concerned; two, consent of all concerned parties; and three, the use of force only in self-defense. In addition to simply protecting the population, the surrogate state must be able to identify aggressors and institute mechanisms to neutralize

53Leites & Wolf, p. 155.
55Leites & Wolf, p. 154.
them. However, the characteristics of the United Nations specifically, and coalition operations generally, make this task extremely difficult.
III. U.N. OPERATIONS: THE PROBLEMS OF COALITION ACTION

With the end of the Cold War many felt that there was a possibility that the United Nations could attain the power early enthusiasts envisioned in its Charter to mediate conflicts. At its inception, many such idealists, like long time U.N. Undersecretary General Brian Urquhart, felt that the United Nations would be able to act on the international level in the same way that governments act on national levels.\(^1\) The conventional wisdom is that the gridlock on international action has been caused by a bipolar world order, rather than the realities of alliance politics. The repeated calls for strengthening the United Nations' enforcement capabilities in the post-Cold War system ignores the reality that the U.N. "is not and cannot be an autonomous political actor in a world of sovereign states."\(^2\) Rather, the United Nations is an instrument that states find useful when it serves parallel interests and easily ignored when interests are contrary.

What is clear is that the United Nations, under the best of circumstances, does not act as a cohesive unit. The

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paralysis suffered by the United Nations in security matters, furthermore, will not disappear as readily as the Cold War. Because the Cold War was not the sole cause of this paralysis, the United Nations, in its present form, will find it difficult if not impossible to effectively prosecute the new class of mission described in the first chapter: specifically, peace-support operations to rebuild dysfunctional states through the use of multilateral military intervention. The key factor in its present inability to successfully execute these missions is that it does not have the cohesive decision-making power of a sovereign actor. The effectiveness of any association of independent, sovereign states depends upon the capacity of its members to agree and cooperate.\(^3\) To the degree that this capacity is limited, the association's effectiveness will suffer. As the U.N. takes on more complex missions, moving from conflict containment to conflict resolution, lack of cohesion will no longer simply inhibit operations; it may sow the seeds of their failure.

A defining question when examining these operations is do these "alliances without an enemy" take on the characteristics of other alliances? germane to this question is the lack of an accepted definition of what constitutes an alliance. Some scholars use the terms alliance, coalition, pact and bloc

\(^3\)Craig & George, p. 110.
interchangeably; others distinguish them based on various criteria.4

Stephen M. Walt in *The Origins of Alliances* defines an alliance as "a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states."5 However, according to other definitions, alliances are limited only to security arrangements and exclude formal agreements with broad ranges covering trade, cultural affairs and the like.6 Obviously situations of collective security such as the Korean conflict or Desert Storm, are cases of alliances acting within a United Nations mandate. While "peacekeeping" operations are significantly different than these alliances for collective security they do qualify as an alliances, according to Walt's definition, because they are concerned with "threats to the peace and security." At the very least the characteristics of alliance politics will be evident in any military force that is a coalition of different states' troops, regardless of the mission.

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4For example, twenty-three centuries ago, Indian statesman-philosopher, Kautilya writing about inter-state politics in *Arthasatva*, stated that in an alliance the burdens and rewards are shared equally, whereas in a pact they are not. See: Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann & John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1973, p. 43, n. 2.


6Holsti, Hopmann & Sullivan, p. 3.
As the United Nations moves into this "new era," the surprisingly familiar realities of alliance politics and coalition building will come into play regardless of the operation. Member states will still attempt to influence the outcome of disputes to their advantage. If they have no agenda within the dispute, they will tend to abstain or look for an advantage in participation within a larger context, such as credibility or power within the Security Council. With a few notable exceptions, such as Canada or the Scandinavian countries, most states do not contribute to U.N. missions without some sort of "national interest" in the conflict. During the Cold War years this meant forces from the superpowers were excluded because competition between the two was considered zero-sum by either side.

Additionally, historic trends will continue to have effects even in this era of a "new world order." For example, China has historically abstained from or opposed sanction resolutions that impinged on the sovereignty of states' internal politics. Since China is sensitive to "internal" issues, such as human rights, in regard to its own policies, they will continue to be disinclined to support U.N. proposals.
which impose sanctions against states because of their internal politics.\textsuperscript{7}

Operations using multinational forces have always faced problems of cohesion. By definition, a coalition functions through divided counsel and variable commitment.\textsuperscript{8} The problem of determining the degree of force which can be used in a strategy of suasion or coercion is compounded by the problem of interpretation by different actors within a coalition. Coalition partners bring particular national agendas to the coalition which other members choose to tolerate. Unless there is a major shift in the perception of state sovereignty and the willingness of states to subordinate absolute control of their forces to the United Nations, U.N. field operations cannot overcome the problems associated with coalition action. Because the coalition happens to be under the umbrella of a United Nations operation does not make this assertion less valid. Although peacekeeping forces are under the command of the U.N., it is well recognized that most national contingents will clear orders with their national command authority before


acting. This is particularly true in situations of higher intensity.9

Multilateral action sanctioned by the U.N. comes with associated costs and benefits. While a United Nations mandate provides a certain legitimacy to the application of military force, the associated multilateral nature of the operation will impose certain "force dividers." These force dividers mean that any force operating under United Nations control cannot operate at maximum efficiency. As a general rule, military commanders attempt to maximize the forces available to them through the use of various "force multipliers." By enhancing a force's intelligence, command and control or supporting arms capabilities, a military commander attempts to make his force greater than the sum of its parts. By the very nature of coalition operations, the whole of United Nations operations will never be equal to the sum of its parts.

These force dividers exist on three broad levels: the strategic level of interaction between the contributing states and the United Nations; the operational level of interaction between the conflicting parties and the United Nations forces; and the tactical level between the forces themselves.

9Durch, pp. 64-65.
A. PROBLEMS OF COALITION ACTION: THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Former U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, has described the U.N. as a political system rather than a political institution. This system has been described as analogous to a government consisting of "executive, legislative, administrative, and judicial agencies at its center and numerous specialized agencies in the field that are relatively autonomous of its central organs." However, while this U.N. system is a representative institution, it does not represent the world population the way that state representative bodies represent their populations. The U.N. system represents governments and rulers. And these governments do not necessarily represent their own people. According to Kirkpatrick:

Inside the United Nations, nations do not behave as dispassionate, disinterested single members seeking only to use their influence in ways that will advance justice and peace. What happened in the United Nations is that a political system developed which features all the elements of power-seeking on behalf of some version of the public good common to more mundane political systems.

Furthermore, what has developed within the United Nations systems is a division of the states into blocs, functioning

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11Rosenau, p. 44.

12Kirkpatrick, p. 222.
much in the same way as political parties in legislative politics. The relationship between these blocs, which are often political, cultural, or geographical, is the key to the function, or sometimes disfunction, of the General Assembly and to a lesser degree the Security Council. Obviously, the two most important blocs during the Cold War were those built around the superpowers (even if former Representative Kirkpatrick would have us believe that the U.S. had no bloc\(^1\)). One of the most important blocs to emerge because of the bipolar world was the non-aligned bloc or the G-77 (named for the 77 original members of the non-aligned movement).\(^1\)

In the future actions by a more interventionalist United Nations may be opposed by a stronger bloc of the non-aligned states because of their particular sensitivity to infringements upon states’ sovereignty.\(^1\)

It is plausible that, with the end of the Cold War, the power of regional blocs will become increasingly important in the arena of security. It is not hard to imagine blocs being formed around a European and Asian leaders in the future, especially if Germany and Japan purse permanent seats on the

\(^{13}\)Kirkpatrick, p. 225.

\(^{14}\)Kirkpatrick, p. 223.

Security Council. The relationship between powerful new blocs may not necessarily be as adversarial as that between the Cold War blocs. However, it is clear that the transitional period of great cooperation within the Security Council is already beginning to show signs of weakness. As power, or perceived power, is realigned, long time allies in the Security Council may well become adversaries for power. For example French President, Francois Mitterand, recently proposed re-instituting the Military Staff Committee, envisioned by the U.N. Charter. This proposal was advanced apparently to break the United States' perceived hold on U.N. actions. Along these lines French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, stated that Europe and the United Nations should help counter U.S. power because "American might reigns without balancing weight."  

Regardless of how power is realigned in the future, deployments of military force under the mandate of the United Nations will always require the leadership and funding of "linchpin" actors: the great and near-great powers of the day. Any state which is a permanent member of the Security Council is automatically in this category because of their


possession of veto power. Great power support will always be necessary for the deployment of forces because lesser powers, while they may be able to contribute troops, generally do not have the ability to rapidly transport or sustain them. This problem will be further addressed in the section on tactical level problems. Additionally, the contributions of "linchpin" states may be necessary to encourage the participation of other troop contributors. For example, Britain and France made their participation in UNITAF and UNOSOM II conditional upon the presence of U.S. combat forces.\textsuperscript{18}

Certain states may be considered a linchpin actor in one operation and not another if they have a vital regional interest in containing or suppressing the conflict or if their presence is necessary to hold the operation together. In the case of UNTAC, Japan and Australia moved into this category along with the French, Chinese and the United States. UNTAC proved to be a testing of the waters for Japan as it deployed troops outside its own borders for the first time since World War Two. Japan, like the United States, has a financial stake in the success of UNTAC because it is the second largest contributor to peacekeeping funding at 12.45%. Japan indicated that it might be willing to pay for more than its

\textsuperscript{18}Interview with Brigadier General J.W. Kinzer, Deputy Chief of Staff - Office of the Department of the Army Operations Center, Washington D.C., 23 February 1993.
current assessment calls for, perhaps as high as 30%, with the provision that it is given as much of a decision making role as the five permanent members of the Security Council. The U.N. acknowledged Japan's contribution by appointing a Japanese diplomat, Yasuchi Akashi, as the civilian head of UNTAC.

It is not uncommon for "linchpin" actors to demand a larger role in operations in order to protect their investments of personnel, money, or prestige. This is especially true when combat troops are involved or the mission is considered more dangerous. Another example of this is the United States' insistence that retired U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe be appointed as the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Somalia. While the force commander was Turkish general, Cevik Bir, the real authority within any United Nations operation rests with the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The problems associated with this arrangement will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. Because there has been misgivings about the prospects of U.S. troops serving under foreign commanders the U.S. obviously wanted to be able to exert greater control

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over the operation. The United Nations had little choice but to defer to the concerns of U.S. leaders because their support was necessary to keep the operation in Somalia intact.

Japan’s motivation for enhanced involvement in UNTAC is twofold. UNTAC has provided the Japanese government with a vehicle to become more active in Southeast Asia, and was an opportunity to further its cause to attain a permanent seat on the Security Council. Japan’s security interests in Southeast Asia are considerable because of investments in the region. The Japanese foreign ministry’s announcement that it was providing a $4 million aid package to the provisional Cambodian government to keep its administration, including the police force, operating\(^2\) was an indication of Japan’s intention of playing a continuing important role in Southeast Asia beyond the end of UNTAC’s mandate.

The deployment of troops as part of UNTAC is the first tenuous step in Japan taking more of a military role in the region.\(^3\) Both of these goals were viewed warily by Asia’s other regional power, China, and by Japan’s citizens.\(^4\) Japan has countered China’s protestations that involvement in


\(^3\)Reinhard Drifte, "Japan’s Security Policy and Southeast Asia," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 186-197.

Cambodia is a sign of increasing Japanese militarism with the belief that "Beijing is trying to force it to remain an abnormal state so it would be denied a permanent seat on the U.N. security council." 25

China also made its first tenuous steps in the peace-support operations arena through UNTAC. The 400-man engineer battalion deployed to Cambodia represented China's most significant contribution to an international force to date. Its purpose has raised some questions in the international community, pointing out China's close ties with the Khmer Rouge and its engineering operations in other parts of Southeast Asia. 26 Despite the apparent conflict of interest that this situation presents, the United Nations finds it difficult to refuse an offer of participation from any country. This is especially true as the scope of the United Nations' peacekeeping mission has increased by an order of magnitude in the past two years and resources to fulfill all of the new operations are scarce.

Additionally, an offer of help is particularly hard to refuse when the country possesses veto power within the Security Council and has the ability to block the entire


operation before it is even started. Attempts to implement effective actions are difficult when one of the belligerent parties has a linchpin power patron. For example, in the UNTAC operation, attempts by the Security Council to impose economic sanctions to punish the recalcitrant Khmer Rouge faction for not complying with Phase II of the Paris Peace Plan (cantonment and disarmament) were consistently weakened by the Chinese representative.\(^{27}\)

China's former rival in the Cambodian conflict, now reborn as Russia, has also deployed forces as part of UNTAC. The Russian military has provided the air support group and operates the helicopters for UNTAC. Russia's motivation for involvement may no longer be tied to any ideology other than money. Russia has been unable to pay its annually assessed 11.4% share of the peacekeeping budget or the debt that it inherited from the Soviet Union. The United Nations pays hard cash to the soldiers while they are deployed under U.N. auspices and operating costs are written off against a country's peacekeeping assessment or arrearages. Because of this, the Russian Air Force has become one of the primary contractors for airlift of U.N. forces and equipment world-

\(^{27}\)Interview with Mr. David Wallace.
While the Russian military may still possess the hardware to act as a "linchpin" state, the reality of relying upon a military facing uncertainties of its own has costs on the operational and tactical levels, which will be discussed in the following sections.

France, significantly more active in United Nations peace-support efforts than other permanent members of the Security Council, appears to be the only linchpin actor who manipulates the U.N. system with unabashed transparency. The French have demonstrated the willingness to operate within the U.N. system as a major power. In 1993, with approximately 6,000 soldiers deployed world-wide in places such as southern Lebanon, Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, France was the largest troop contributor to U.N. operations. This is a departure from the traditional practice of permanent member states only deploying supporting units to peacekeeping missions. Predictably their participation, as a linchpin actor, was not without demands. For example, France wanted a French general officer to be designated as the UNTAC Force Commander. However, since Australian Lieutenant General Sanderson was already chosen, the French government pushed

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hard for the Deputy Force Commander position, which they received.\(^{30}\)

Additionally, the French Battalion deployed to UNTAC was originally to be assigned a sector in the northeast of the country that was of less importance economically and politically, because of the low population level. The French Battalion was chosen because it was more capable of self-sustainment and could operate more effectively than others in areas farther away from the logistical support of U.N Headquarters in Phnom Penh. However, the French government insisted that the battalion be deployed in Kampot Provence which, aside from Phnom Penh, is economically the most important area of Cambodia.\(^{31}\) Because this province was easily resupplied and supported because of its proximity to Phnom Penh and the seaport of Kampong Saom the sector logically should have been given to a contingent that did not have the French’s level of logistical self-sufficiency.

Another major drawback to "linchpin" actors, aside from their insistence on exerting more control over an operation, is that while their leadership is necessary in putting together U.N. operations, their withdrawal or faltering

\(^{30}\)Interview with LCOL Rich Rice, Southeast Asia Desk Officer, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Intelligence Estimates Division, February 24, 1993.

\(^{31}\)Interview with COL. Mohd Aris, Malaysian Army, UNTAC Chief of Operations, Phnom Penh, 29 April 1993.
leadership can bring about critical weakening or even catastrophic failure of the operation. For example, in late April 1993, the UNTAC election effort appeared to be on the verge of collapse as the Khmer Rouge attempted to disrupt the process by targeting the United Nations directly. The death of a Japanese election official in Cambodia in early April 1993 prompted the Japanese Government to request special assurances from the United Nations that their nationals would only be deployed in "safe" areas.\textsuperscript{32}

Similarly in UNOSOM II, following the disastrous October 3rd, 1993 raid to capture Mohammed Farah Aidid, the Clinton Administration announced that it would withdraw all U.S. forces participating in the U.N. from Somalia within a six month time period. It was acknowledged that the withdrawal date of 31 March 1994 was arbitrarily chosen.\textsuperscript{33} UNOSOM II's mandate to complete an UNTAC-like plan, and create a democratic government, was estimated to take 12 months longer.\textsuperscript{34} United Nations Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan, described the effects of the United States' withdrawal from the Somalia mission as


frantic. Following the U.S. announcement, the French, German and Belgian governments decided to withdraw their troops also. And the Italian Government, with the second largest contingent in UNOSOM II, decided to "re-evaluate" their continued presence in Somalia.  

B. PROBLEMS OF COALITION ACTION: OPERATIONAL LEVEL

While the United Nations is a system of blocs and alliances on the strategic level, peace-support operations are more accurately described as ad hoc coalitions. Joint Publication 0-1, JTTP For Combined Operations, defines an alliance as "a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives," while a coalition is "an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for a common action."  

A coalition is a system through which the participants reap mutual benefits and advantages, however, a coalitional relationship is one where the autonomy of each individual is still the greatest concern.  

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that the cohesion of a U.N. operation is adversely affected by
the reality of contributing states placing their national
agendas above the agenda of the mission, to one degree or
another.

Therefore, one of the key problems facing multilateral
operations, especially those intervening into intrastate
conflicts, is the varying relationships that the different
national contingents will have with the belligerents. While
one of the overriding principles of U.N. operations has always
been the strict neutrality of forces, different national
contingents will more often than not establish decidedly
non-neutral relationships with the belligerents. As the types
of missions shift upward along the continuum of conflict this
reality will have a compounded negative effect on the
operation's ability to act cohesively. Especially as the
force, as a whole, is perceived as non-neutral by the parties
to the conflict.

A clear example of this problem, in a non-United Nations
peace-support operation, is the ill-fated Multinational Force
(MNF and MNF II) in Lebanon in the early 1980s. While this
endeavor was not under a mandate from the United Nations, it
provides some useful lessons for any form of peace-support
operations in the future, especially those approaching peace-
enforcement and in circumstances of high-intensity violence.
Paramount among these lessons is the stipulation that none of the contributing nations be perceived as aligned with any of the conflicting parties. In Lebanon, the U.S. government tended to see the Syrian forces and the Lebanese factions supported by Syria as the most serious threat to the Marines on the ground and U.S. national interest.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, as U.S. aircraft and naval gunfire bombed the mountains surrounding Beirut, the pro-Syrian guerrillas viewed the United States as less of an impartial broker and increasingly as aligned with Israel.

Another important lesson learned is that escalation from a deterrent strategy to a coercive one does not necessarily accomplish the original mission of a peace-support operation. This is primarily true because, as discussed earlier, the purpose of these types of missions is to neutralize rather than defeat belligerents. This problem in peace-support operations will be discussed further in Chapter III.

In the case of UNTAC, France's participation provides the clearest example of the operational level problems of using forces which may not be completely impartial. One of the early blunders of the Cambodian operation, which impinged upon its ability to remain neutral in the eyes of all of the

\textsuperscript{38}Frank Gregory, \textit{The Multinational Force - Aid or Obstacle to Conflict Resolution}, Institute For The Study of Conflict, London, 1984, p. 29.
belligerents, was committed when the French government deployed its UNAMIC (United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia) contingent through Vietnam, rather than Thailand, without prior U.N. approval. While this maneuver may have served France's purposes well in its normalization with Vietnam, it immediately provided the Khmer Rouge with a reason to begin claiming U.N. favoritism.  

This pattern of unilateral activity by the French would remain constant throughout the operation in Cambodia. Predictably, other participants in the peace process have grown upset with the increasing number of bilateral agreements between France and the current authorities in Phnom Penh, which include an offer to provide extensive military assistance to the new government after the election. It appears that the French have been somewhat successful in convincing the Cambodian leadership to move back into the French sphere of influence. Besides signing a military training agreement with the French, the provisional government of Cambodia is seeking full membership to the Association of French Speaking Countries even though the

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39 Interview with LCOL Rich Rice.


majority of Cambodians feel that English would be a better secondary national language.\textsuperscript{42}

Similarly the participation of secondary regional powers as troop contributors yielded some of the same problems as those associated with the linchpin powers. Two ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, Malaysia and Indonesia, were troop contributors to UNTAC. ASEAN was created in 1967 primarily as a response to the perceptions of external threat stemming from the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{43} The increased cooperation between the ASEAN nations can be directly traced to the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the Vietnamese conquest of Cambodia.\textsuperscript{44}

In 1982, ASEAN was instrumental in putting together a coalition of Cambodian resistance factions, including the Khmer Rouge, known as the CGDK (Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea) which occupied Cambodia’s seat in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{45} As ASEAN nations, both Indonesia and Malaysia aided the combined resistance factions in their fight against what was considered Vietnamese expansionism, even if


\textsuperscript{44}Walt, p. 29, n. 40.

that meant siding with a group like the Khmer Rouge. However, this apparent lack of neutrality did not prevent the United Nations from accepting them as troop contributors to UNTAC.

Even within the ASEAN alliance there were grave differences concerning an approach to the Cambodian conflict. For its part, Indonesia has indicated that it is dissatisfied with the manner in which ASEAN had been drawn into an alignment with China against Vietnam even though it regarded China as its prime source of external threat. As has been shown by historical experience the disappearance of an external threat will produce alliance disintegration. The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia further added to cracks in the ASEAN alliance. With economic considerations somewhat replacing geostrategic concerns the various regional powers can be seen as using U.N. participation to further their own national agendas and prevent others from emerging as hegemonic powers. The mid-1989 announcement by Thai Prime Minister Chatichai of his Souvannaphoum (Thai for "Golden Peninsula") concept for establishing a pan-Indochinese marketplace once the Cambodian conflict was settled, prompted negative reactions from other ASEAN countries. This was

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46 Leifer, p. 10.
48 Schlossstein, p. 208.
especially true of Indonesia, with whom Thailand has had a historically volatile relationship.

Ostensibly, Malaysia's and Indonesia's stake in volunteering for UNTAC is to promote regional stability. However, asserting their own regional power comes along with their participation. As pointed out by the UNTAC Malaysian Battalion's Information Officer one of the reasons for Malaysia's participation as a troop contributor was to match Indonesia's deployment of troops to the Indochinese mainland because "every neighbor is a potential enemy." Since both countries had teams seconded to the Secretary General's planning staff for UNTAC, the two Indonesian and one Malaysian battalions were assured of strategically important locations within Cambodia.49 Because of pressure placed upon the United Nations, one of the Indonesian Battalions was placed in Kampong Thom province, which is strategic to Cambodia economically.50 Unfortunately, this province also proved to be a hotbed of Khmer Rouge activity and according to various sources within UNTAC, the Indonesian forces were under separate orders from their government not to use force against any of the Cambodian factions.

49 Interview with LCOL Richard Rice.

50 Interview with LCOL Edward Waller, U.S. Army, Chief of Information, UNTAC, Phnom Penh, 03 May 1993.
Thailand's participation in UNTAC can be viewed as a double-edged sword. Because of Cambodia's virtually destroyed infrastructure and the land mine threat, routes through Thailand had to be used to emplace and resupply the U.N. battalions in the northeastern provinces of Cambodia. Therefore Thailand's cooperation with UNTAC was necessary for its functioning. However, when diplomatic pressure was applied to Thailand through the United Nations to enforce the bans on lumber coming out of Cambodia, the Thai military countered by cancelling air clearances for U.N. supply flights which landed in Thailand.\(^{51}\)

Additionally, while Thailand did not participate within UNTAC as a major troop contributor, it volunteered military officers to work on the UNTAC staff and 2 engineer battalions, not in the U.N. chain of command, to help rebuild the infrastructure in Cambodia. In reality, because of their economic ties with the Khmer Rouge and corruption within the Thai military, their "aid" was seen as part of the problem rather than part of the peace process.\(^{52}\) In the first half of 1992, Thai engineers built seven roads from their border

\(^{51}\)Interview with CAPT. Robert Thomas.

\(^{52}\)Interview with LCOL Richard Rice.
directly into Khmer Rouge-controlled territory\textsuperscript{53} to exploit the lumber and precious gem trade.

One of the problems associated with using military forces from countries where the military forces have significant political power in U.N. operations is that they may not be fully under the control of their governments. The Thai military remained the conduit for Khmer Rouge trade in and out of Cambodia. However, the United Nations could not exert too much pressure on the Thai government because, in turn, the inchoate Thai democratic government could not exert too much pressure upon the Thai military. The argument was made within UNTAC that if the Thai government impinged too strongly on the corporate interests of the military, it may have prompted another military coup.\textsuperscript{54}

As pointed out in \textit{Rebellion and Conflict}, one of the key tasks in reducing the level of violence in an intrastate conflict is ensuring that the supply of weapons and ordnance is denied to the belligerent forces. In an intra-state conflict the various collectivities, in order to be effective, retain an intense need for inputs of certain key resources, such as arms and medicine, which are likely to come from


\textsuperscript{54}Interview with LCOL Damien Healy, Australian Army, Mixed Military Working Group, UNTAC.
external sources. This task is essential to U.N. operations such as UNOSOM II where the U.N. forces are directly engaging the belligerent parties. In an operations such as UNTAC attempts to enforce restrictive measures to quell fighting between the belligerent may only draw the peacekeepers into the conflict.

The imposition of harsher sanctions may cause a backlash effect against the United Nations forces on the ground. During the UNTAC operation the Khmer Rouge tended only to harass U.N. troops on the ground and not target them directly because the U.N. did not directly threaten the Khmer Rouge. However, the imposition of sanctions against them most likely would have changed that. One Khmer Rouge spokesman said that specific sanctions against them would be an act by the United Nations "tantamount to war." Furthermore, unilateral actions by any of the participants in a multinational operation has the possibility of causing anomosity against the entire force. Even seemingly innocuous actions, such the airdrops of humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Herzegovina by U.S. Air Force planes, have the potential to affect the conflict resolution process. Ground commanders in UNPROFOR viewed the airdrops as unwarranted and potentially

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55 Leites and Wolf, p. 76.

dangerous considering the fact that they could get ground
convoys through in most instances.\textsuperscript{57}

The difficulty of imposing economic sanctions on a
recalcitrant party described in the previous section on
strategic level problems. However, part of the problem with
instituting such measures is having the political will and the
forces on the ground to enforce them. As long as regional
powers, with stakes in the outcome of these internal
conflicts, "partially contribute" to U.N. missions this
essential task will be unfulfilled. The irony of the
Cambodian situation was that by mid-1993 the Khmer Rouge had
become rich and well-armed enough that arms were no longer
imported into Khmer Rouge territory. Conservative estimates
put the Khmer Rouge's independent income from gems and logging
at $60 million annually.\textsuperscript{58} They had such an abundant
stockpile that the weapons flow has reversed and former Khmer
Rouge weapons have been traced to insurgent forces in Burma.\textsuperscript{59}

The increase of U.N. activity in intrastate conflicts has
introduced a new dynamic altogether which exacerbates rather

\textsuperscript{57}Unilateral U.S. Policy On The Balkans Tilts Peace Process, "
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, London, 28 February
1993, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{58}Catharin Dalpino, "Khmer Rouge's Riches," The Christian

\textsuperscript{59}Interview with Steve Johnson, Analyst of Indochina, United
States Department of State, Intelligence and Research Division,
than alleviates the fighting: outside powers using the U.N. as cover for the delivery of military aid to one of the factions. In July of 1993 the government of Saudi Arabia shipped 120 tons of weapons in containers marked "humanitarian aid" to Maribor Airport in Slovenia in violation of the U.N. embargo on weapons to the former Yugoslavia. Saudi Arabia then acquired 26 Russian Mi-8 helicopters and painted them white to resemble United Nations aircraft. Slovenian authorities discovered the weapons before they could be distributed because the containers had to be opened to fit into the helicopters.60 In Somalia, prior to the UNITAF deployment, the United Nations was using Russian aircraft painted with U.N. markings to deliver humanitarian aid. In June 1992 one of these Russian aircraft with U.N. markings, but whose crew's contract with the U.N. had expired, delivered weapons and newly printed Somali currency to one of the clan leaders, Aidid's rival Ali Mahdi, in northern Mogadishu.61

One of the key foundations of the integrity of the United Nations' collective security system, as outlined by the Charter, was the concept that it was not to be dependent upon the states' perception of where their national interest lay.

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60Yosef Bodansky, "Muslim Forces Plan Major Offensives After a Peace Accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 31 July 1993, pp. 6-7.

Conceptually, becoming a member of the United Nations entails the decision that a state's national interest lies in ensuring the efficacy of the collective security system. However, it has been displayed over numerous examples that states may participate in a multinational peace-support operation directly in the interest of their own security, or as an expression of their power in the region. In the case of weaker states with no apparent national agenda, such as Ghana or Fiji, participation in U.N. operations may provide a means of supplementing their military capability through equipment and experience at an acceptable political and economic cost.

This fact may present U.N. operations outside the traditional level of peacekeeping with an unsolvable paradox. Deterrence theory has shown that the validity of a deterrent strategy is directly related to a demonstrable relationship between the commitment and the commitment-maker's real national interest. As the United Nations moves into situations of higher levels of violence, only states with a vested national interest in quelling the conflict will be willing to participate because "the greater the expenditure of

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63 Gregory, pp. 5-6.

64 Craig & George, p. 192.
blood and treasure, the more imperative the demand that they should be spent for a vital cause.'"65

C. PROBLEMS OF COALITION ACTION: TACTICAL LEVEL

When the United Nations initiates a field operation it does not have the capability of drafting forces; it must rely on voluntary troop contributions from member states. When asking states to commit troops, the U.N. attempts to maintain a balance between several different factors. First and foremost, it attempts to attain a global balance of forces. While the highly trained and thoroughly equipped troops of the more developed states may provide the most efficient forces for an operation, constituting a force relying heavily on these militaries "smacks of colonialism." According to Canadian Major General Lewis Mackenzie, former UNPROFOR Chief of Staff, "it is very important to have Third World developing nation representation because we don't want this to become a white Western club."66 Additionally, by being able to force the U.N. to make tactical level decisions based on political considerations rather than efficiency, linchpin actors can degrade the U.N.'s capabilities by turning tactical considerations into strategic problems.

65Van Creveld, p. 146.
This "force divider" means that a U.N. force will pay an operational price of having to assign some of the less self-sustaining contingent forces to an area which is more supportable but perhaps less desirable. The sparse road networks, destroyed infrastructure and mine threats common in mission areas such as Cambodia, Somalia and Western Sahara demand decentralized operations with heavy reliance on air transport (and water transport in the case of Cambodia) to supplement the usual fleet of four-wheel drive vehicles which are ubiquitous in all U.N. missions. Unfortunately, only the armies from the so called "northern" states are able to deploy battalion-size units with organic equipment to provide for their own survival in the instances of rapid deployments into harsh operating environments. In Cambodia, the U.N. attempted to overcome these tactical constraints by cobbling together a "U.N. air force" and a "U.N. navy" with mixed results.

Regardless of the force mixture, combined operations will always fall prey to tactical level problems in five areas: doctrine, training, equipment/logistics, language and, culture/sensitivities.67 These problem areas remain constant

67In "The Challenges of Combined Operations," pp. 3-11, Freeman, Hess & Faria list nine areas of operational level, referred to here as tactical level, problems: goals, doctrine, intelligence, language, training, equipment, logistics, culture and sensitivities. Of these nine the area of goals is considered a strategic and operational level problem; intelligence is covered in depth in Chapter IV. Logistics and equipment are combined into one section as are culture and sensitivities.
even in a successful alliances, such as NATO, which have had
decades to work out problems of interoperability. In the ad
hoc operations put together by the U.N. the problems may seem
insurmountable or the cause of catastrophic mission failure.

1. Doctrine

The need for military forces to have a concept of
operations (doctrine) is as old as organized armies
themselves. These doctrines are important because they
describe the system that enables military organizations to
execute specific operations. They are, in essence, the very
building blocks of an armed force. Doctrine is basically "an
authoritative, approved statement of how to perform a task."\textsuperscript{68}

The problem of doctrine as it applies to United
Nations operations is twofold. First, there is the problem of
"peace-support" doctrine itself. While problems are easily
identified in operations there is no standardized U.N.
document covering the wide range of operations described in
the section \textit{New Definitions of Peacekeeping} in Chapter II. As
described by UNTAC’s Chief Plans Officer, "armies are accused
of preparing to fight the last war, but the U.N. does not even
train to keep the last peace."\textsuperscript{69} Second, since the U.N. does

\textsuperscript{68}Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., \textit{The Army and Vietnam}, The Johns

\textsuperscript{69}Interview with COL. Huijssoon, Dutch Army, UNTAC Chief of
Plans, Phnom Penh, 29 April 1993.
not have a common doctrine, the various areas of any U.N. force will reflect the doctrine of the national contingent posted there. This presents a minimal problem in traditional peacekeeping where each contingent simply has a set area of a buffer zone to control. However, in situations such as Cambodia or Somalia, the difference in doctrine can prove to be dangerous or disastrous.

Doctrine is a reflection of each country's character and will affect and influence the command style and force employment of each separate contingent. When the different contingents are required to provide combat support to one another, doctrinal differences will become glaring. This is especially true of operations with a strong civil-military mission. One of the problems of allowing United Nations forces, engaged in civil-military type operations, to abandon the principle of using force only for self-defense is the possibility of the use of excessive force. Some contingents come from armed forces which have been used to quell civil unrest in their home countries with varying degrees of use of force and respect for human rights.

The policy of using force only in self-defense has so far served the U.N. well because it represents the lowest common denominator. As mandates are expanded to include the use of force to protect the mission, as happened in UNTAC when its mandate was changed to include protection of the election
process or in Somalia where famine relief protection turned into "nation building," the rules of engagement will be subject to interpretation according to each of the contingents' doctrines.

Doctrinal differences will always exist, but their severity can be limited by institutionalizing operational guidelines within the United Nations system and establishing multilateral training programs in preparation for such missions. For example, in September 1993, the United States and Russia signed a pact for peacekeeper training exercises between the U.S. Third Infantry Division and the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division. However, enhanced training or greater experience within U.N. operations may not be enough to overcome the conceptual characteristics of an army.

France, which appeared to be regaining some lost imperial pride, sent a battalion of elite paratroops when UNTAC deployed in early 1992. While the French were arguably the most proficient of all of the battalions in UNTAC, they were also viewed as the most aggressive. Doctrinal dissimilarities may also reflect the cultural differences and independent political goals of the contingents. In UNTAC

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these differences within the force were clearly demarcated between the French troops who were ready to actively engage the Khmer Rouge and the Indonesians who would not only refuse to return fire when attacked but turned over their weapons and clothing to Khmer Rouge guerrillas or simple bandits.

The French military's characteristically aggressive posture has been noted in other peacekeeping operations. As part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), France initially contributed an infantry battalion. However, the French troops were considered too "aggressive" by many U.N. officers who were said to want them "quietly withdrawn." The French infantrymen seemed less suited than some of the other contingents to the restraints of peacekeeping.72 France continued to contribute a logistical battalion to UNIFIL after withdrawing their infantry battalion in 1987.

Armies, like any other organization, must be able to adapt to new environments and missions. However, the operational character of an army may have become deeply imbedded and difficult to overcome. The operational doctrine of some armies may even be antithetical to what is required for peace-support missions.

In *The Army and Vietnam*, Andrew Krepinevich describes how the U.S. Army evolved into a superb instrument for combating field armies in a conventional war but was an inefficient and ineffective force for defeating insurgent guerrilla forces in a "low-intensity" conflict. The key to understanding how this happened is in the examination of the U.S. Army's concept of war:

the Army's perception of how wars ought to be waged and is reflected in the way the Army organizes and trains its troops for battle. The characteristics of the Army Concept are two: a focus on mid-intensity, or conventional, war and a reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties—in effect, the substitution of material costs at every available opportunity to avoid payment in blood.\(^7\)

The U.S. Army's experience coming out of World War II and Korea did not prepare it well for counterinsurgency wars. The U.S. Army's difficulty in fighting a counterinsurgency can be traced to its inability to overcome organizational inertia and adapt to a different type of warfare. This same inability to adapt doctrine may make it difficult for some armies to participate with combat troops in peace-support operations.

As explained in Chapter II, many of the characteristics of the force needed to be successful at counterinsurgency, are the same needed for saving failed states through peace-support operations. In situations like Somalia the emphasis should be on firepower restraint, not its

\(^7\)Krepinevich, p. 5.
widespread application; and resolution of political and social problems within the state targeted by the various counter-state collectivities, not closing with and destroying their field forces.

The U.S. military's success in Operation Desert Storm may have "licked the Vietnam syndrome" but it also may have further cemented the Army's philosophy of "it is better to send a bullet than a man." Just as in counterinsurgency, the use of force in these new types of peace-support operations should place a premium on the protection of the population which is often contradictory to the axiom of liberally applied massive firepower. In response to the killing of 23 Pakistani troops in an ambush in early June 1993, the United States used AC-130 Specter gunships and attack helicopters to destroy locations in Mogadishu described as a command and control center for Aidid's militia, a radio station which U.N. officials said was used to incite hostility against the United Nations, and "unauthorized" sites used to store weapons.

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75See: Krepinevich, p. 6.

This response, resulting in some of the initial cracks in the UNOSOM II operation, showed the dynamic characteristic of the various levels of coalition problems. The response, caused by the tactical level problem of widely different doctrinal behavior, gave rise to strategic and operational level problems. On the strategic level, the Italian government began to threaten withdrawal of its troops because the original relief mission had "turned into a combat operation taking sides in a civil war." The Italians in this case could be considered a linchpin actor because of their former colonial status in Somalia and the fact that they had the second largest troop contribution. Additionally, on the operational level, the response from various troop contributors to the raid prompted the U.N. to warn several governments that the troops in Somalia were part of a U.N. force and not to be given orders through their independent national command authorities.

2. Training

The gap between the operational proficiency of various contingents in a combined operation is due to numerous factors: reliance on large number of short-term conscripts

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versus a professional force; vastly different officer and noncommissioned officer development programs; lower technical skills and educational level of the enlisted personnel; resource limitations and degree of emphasis placed on field training.\textsuperscript{79} In any coalition operation, logically the proficiency level of the various contingents, along with equipment and logistics, should be the primary considerations when assigning tasks and operational areas. However, since maintaining a "global balance" is a requirement of the United Nations and, as demonstrated, operational level factors often determine the placement of units, training and operational proficiency have often been secondary considerations.

The capability gap will be especially wide in a force that mixes armed forces from highly developed states with those from developing states. In some types of operations it may be possible to bring the more poorly trained units up to standard. However, most U.N. operations are deployed in response to an immediate crisis and time will not permit for an initial training period. The only feasible short-term option is to recognize the capability gaps within a combined force and plan accordingly. The need to overcome political considerations in determining the placement of contingents is especially acute in operations in environments of intense

\textsuperscript{79}Freeman, Hess and Faria, p. 8.

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violence or harsh environmental conditions. The lack of training by some contingents can have deadly consequences. In Mogadishu in February 1993, Nigerian troops panicked when demonstrations began to turn violent. They began firing automatic weapons at the crowds until they were practically out of ammunition.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, as stated earlier, many developing states will use U.N. operations as a way of gaining field experience for their armed forces and have the United Nations pay for it. This is also true to a certain extent of more developed states like Ireland and Australia. According to the Chief of the General Staff of the Australian Army, Lieutenant General John C. Grey, participation in operations such as UNTAC and UNITAF provides "excellent opportunity to exercise a significant component of the Ready Deployment Force" and to "enable significant numbers of the Australian Army to develop further skills that are essential to its primary mission."⁸¹

In the older, more established operations, like UNIFIL, troop contingents usually rotate home every six months. Some of the contributing states' armed forces have developed training programs to prepare the troops for the U.N.

⁸⁰Stevenson, p. 141.

mission prior to their deployment. However in situations like UNTAC, where the mandate is extended beyond the original redeployment date and certain battalions are not rotated, the overall force capability is in danger of falling below the original lowest common denominator.

The original operations plan for UNTAC redeployed six of the twelve battalions in October 1992. When the cantonment and disarmament phases failed, the U.N. requested that all twelve battalions remain in Cambodia to provide security for the election process. As the most dangerous period of the UNTAC mission (the May 1993 elections) approached, battalions such as the Malaysian contingent had been unable to conduct even the most rudimentary training for almost a year.

Obviously contributing states which were financially strapped to deploy troops could not afford to rotate their battalions and most troops ended up spending over 15 months in the mission. A significant cause of force capability

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84 Interview with CAPT. Mazur, Malaysian Battalion Information Officer, UNTAC, Battambang, 01 May 1993.
denegation is the lack of budgetary authority by an operation's Force Commander. The way that U.N. operations are designed, the military Force Commander has no budgetary discretion. The result is that a Force Commander cannot make training decisions for his force based upon changing tactical situations. For example, UNTAC Force Commander, Lt. General Sanderson, requested increased funding for training ammunition after UNTAC's mandate was extended; U.N. Headquarters in New York denied his request.85 Because of the enormous cost of the mission the U.N. risked paying an operational price to save money. By not funding additional training or paying for the rotation of battalions UNTAC became a hollow force which could not have withstood a serious threat from any of the armed factions in Cambodia if it had materialized.

3. Equipment and Logistics

Emplacement of a functioning logistics system to support a large force in the field is one of the most demanding problems that combined operations face. The problem appears so unmanageable that the basic NATO policy for the last four decades has been to make logistics purely a national responsibility.86 Obviously this is an impossible option when planning a U.N. operation. Because of varying resources of

85Interview with CAPT. Bob Thomas.
86Freeman, Hess, & Faria, p. 9.
the troop contributing states, contingents will have to rely on a unified logistics system.

UNTAC was unique among U.N. missions in that it had a long lead time for planning and the benefit of two technical evaluation surveys of the country prior to deployment. However, even with these advantages it appears that the first real danger that UNTAC faced in 1992 was the possibility of collapsing under its own weight because of the inadequacies of the U.N. logistics system. Forces, which were not self-sustaining, began to deploy into Cambodia before a logistics train was in place to support them. In fact the early headquarters staff in Phnom Penh only became aware of the Malaysian Battalions early deployment into the country by a Voice of America news brief three days before their arrival.  

Paramount among the problems of the U.N. logistics system is the lack of understanding by permanent U.N. civilians of what is required for a large military operation. For example, during the initial planning stage in New York, the military logistics component of UNTAC was "capped" at 827 personnel by the civilians in the Field Operations Division over the protests of the military planners.  

87 Interview with MAJ. Gilles Briere, Canadian Army, Logistic Coordination Cell, UNTAC, Phnom Penh, 29 April 1993.

logistics support group of 1800 would be required to support an operation the size of UNTAC (22,000 total at its peak).

One of the results of the technical evaluation missions noted earlier was the promulgation of a "Guideline for Contributing Countries" that listed equipment and logistics requirements for the forces deploying to Cambodia. One of the primary requirements put forth by the U.N. was that each of the battalions should be self-sufficient for a minimum of 60 days. However, it appears that the guidelines that were developed were largely ignored; mainly because of resource limitations of some of the contributing states. The most egregious examples of this was the battalion from Ghana which deployed to Cambodia without the capability of sustaining itself for even one day. Arriving with only personal equipment, the Ghana Battalion was, by necessity, placed in the Phnom Penh "Special Zone." In short, UNTAC was effectively missing one battalion. Not only could UNTAC HQ not deploy the battalion; it had to pull resources designated for other functions to support the battalion.

In peace-support missions operating in environments of high levels of violence the tactical level cost of having under-equipped contingents as part of the force may be the direct cause of the loss of life; of both the peacekeepers and

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89Interview with COL. Mohd Aris, Chief Operations Officer UNTAC.
the population they are attempting to help. For example in Mogadishu the Pakistani forces' lack of armored personnel carriers and flack jackets contributed to their high casualty rate when they were ambushed on 5 June 1993. Similarly, the lack of proper riot gear was a contributing factor in the killing of Somali civilians when Pakistani troops fired automatic weapons to dispel angry crowds.\textsuperscript{90}

However, not all contingents arrive with less than the required equipment lists. Forces from the more developed states often arrive with equipment not required by the United Nations. This too, however, can cause friction between the U.N. and the troop contributor. Because the United Nations often makes decisions based more on budgetary considerations than mission needs, contributing countries are not compensated for the cost of deploying, operating, or maintaining equipment above the guideline list. In the case of UNTAC the Dutch Battalion arrived with four of its own helicopters, which proved invaluable for the battalion which was deployed in one of most dangerous provinces in northwestern Cambodia. Also the French Battalion deployed with 250 vehicles more than

"required" by the guidelines. The cost of these "luxury" items is not reimbursed by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{91}

The wealthier force contributing states may be able to absorb these costs in order to better protect their troops, but the resulting disparity is at cross purposes to cohesion and the capability for effective action. For example, battalions deployed to UNPROFOR where ordered to bring only 15 armored personnel carriers (APCs). The Canadian contingent deployed with 83 APCs and were told to send back the additional vehicles on the next troop rotation.\textsuperscript{92} If the Canadians had done so, UNPROFOR would have been unable to deploy to Sarajevo when the UNPROFOR mission was expanded. The Canadians were sent because they were the only battalion capable of reaching Sarajevo relatively safely. By placing budgetary considerations before mission requirements, as perceived by U.N. civilians, the United Nations also loses the capability of adapting a force to the changing tactical situations inherent in these types of new missions.

4. Language

The tactical level problem of language also has a dual nature. First, English and French are the working languages of the United Nations but usually only a few staff officers in

\textsuperscript{91}Interview with COL. Huijssoon, UNTAC Chief Plans Officer.

\textsuperscript{92}Ian Kemp, "'9 to 5' U.N. Criticized," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 March 1993, p. 27.
each of the contingents has a working knowledge of either. During the initial planning phases of UNTAC French planners wanted equal number of French and English speaking battalions. Part of the rationale for this request was the fact that Cambodia was a former French colony and French was perhaps a more widely spoken "international" language than English. However, this requirement would have meant that a significant portion of the battalions would have come from Western Africa. As was the case with the Ghanese Battalion, units from these states may be unable to provide for their own deployment or initial survival in the field. The French request also ignored the fact that most French speaking Cambodians were killed or driven from Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge's pogroms against all those "influenced" by foreigners.

In the Cambodian case, this lack of "international language" speakers in the population was particularly severe. However, this communication barrier demonstrates the second level of language problems. As peace-support operations take on more civil-military type operations there is an increasing requirement for personnel to be able to communicate in the local language. In the cases of both Cambodia and Somalia neither of the native languages are spoken anywhere else in

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93 Interview with: LCOL. Damien Healy, Australian Army, Mixed Military Working Group, UNTAC, Phnom Penh, 29 April 1993.
the world. This means that the only means of communicating with the local population will be through native interpreters. In a situation like Cambodia, admittedly it is uniquely severe, these interpreters were a scarce resource and not every unit on the tactical level was able to have an interpreter.

The language problem between the troop contributing contingents is one of the most significant limiting factors in effective operations at the tactical level. It is especially constraining on the degree to which smaller units can be integrated for supporting activities. The language barrier between the contingents means that U.N. operations become "stove-pipe" organizations where liaison between the various units only takes place at the headquarters level. This problem is especially acute with contingents where only one or two members of the headquarter staff have a working knowledge of English. According to the UNTAC Chief of Operations this was the case with both the Indonesian and Bulgarian Battalions; it was his estimation that only 70% of his operation orders were understood and complied with by these contingents.94

The language problem took on special significance in the case of the UNTAC Indonesian Battalions because of their

94Interview with COL. Aris, UNTAC Chief of Operations.
strategic placement in Kampong Thom province. One of the watershed events of the UNTAC operation was the killing of a Japanese election volunteer, Atsuhito Nakata, and his Cambodian interpreter in Kampong Thom province on 15 April 1993. This killing, more than any other single event, threw the prospect of proceeding with the May elections into question. It prompted opposition to Japanese participation by Japanese citizens and caused U.N. election officials in Cambodia to question the wisdom of continuing with the election plan if the UNTAC military component could not protect them. The killing, initially blamed on the Khmer Rouge, may have been preventable because Nakata had been in radio contact with other U.N. personnel in the area and had requested help. However, Indonesian troops did not quickly respond to his distress calls, possibly because the local unit commanders did not understand English.

The requirement for heavy reliance upon air transportation, as discussed earlier, also highlighted the need to address the language problems. The fact that very few of the Russian pilots spoke English caused severe problems with air traffic control and reporting emergencies. Eventually the UNTAC Headquarters had to request that there be

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at least one English speaker aboard each Russian aircraft at all times.96

5. Culture and Sensitivities

Differences in culture and cultural sensitivities between troop contingents will impact on the performance of any combined operation. The differences will be minimal in coalitions formed with forces from similar cultures. However, in a combined force formed from states that have widely divergent cultures the differences will seem endless. The impact of cultural differences on mission performance is relatively minor in more static operations of "traditional peacekeeping" where the troop contingents have limited interaction with one another. However, in the more dynamic missions of the "new era" cultural differences will become more than a nuisance. They may directly affect mission performance.

The problem is further exacerbated in recent operations that have an increasing civil-military aspect. Cultural friction between the one of the military contingents and the local civilian population has the potential to affect the mission as a whole. As noted in Problems of Coalitions: Operational Level, unilateral actions by any of the force

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participants has the possibility of causing anomosity against the entire force.

One of the advantages of participation of the Indonesians and Malaysian Battalions in UNTAC was the cultural similarities between the troops from these Asian states and the population of Cambodia. Cultural similarity meant that contingents from these Asian states were accepted by both the political elite and general population more readily than forces from global powers or non-Asian countries because they were viewed as possibly having "imperialistic" goals in Cambodia.97 Similarly, the non-U.N. peacekeeping mission in Liberia, The Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), has the advantage of being an all sub-Saharan African force. However, as shown by the example of the ASEAN countries' participation in UNTAC, states with regional interests in a conflict tend to bring their own regional agendas to an operation. In ECOMOG, the Nigerian leadership, Major General Adejunji Olurin, turned the force into another combatant committed to defeating the Charles Taylor faction.98

97 Frederick H. Fleitz, Central Intelligence Agency, Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, 3 December 1993.

Operations planners need to recognize and compensate for cultural differences. Failure to do so may cause friction within the force and between the contingents and the civilian population. Perceived slights can become matters of national honor. Censure of individuals by a commander of a different nationality is virtually impossible within a U.N. operation because small events tend to escalate to the strategic level quickly. At the mission level, attempting to change a troop contingent for tactical reasons is strategically difficult. General Sanderson’s desire to repatriate the Bulgarian Battalion from UNTAC because of mounting problems with the contingent was not allowed by U.N. Headquarters in New York because of political considerations.

D. CONCLUSION: A STANDING U.N. FORCE?

Even if the U.N. was willing to ignore its self-imposed requirement for a global balance and request only more self-sufficient forces for operations with an unforgiving operating environment (i.e. the lack of supporting infrastructure in Cambodia or Somalia or the threat level in Bosnia-Herzegovina) these troops may not always be available. With the geometric increase in U.N. operations many contributing states already

99 See the following section.

100 Interview with LCOL Aris, UNTAC Operations Officer.
feel that they are overcommitted. One telling comment by a member of the UNTAC staff about the force that was finally put together was that once again Cambodia was a "sideshow" to other international events. Initially, a great deal of enthusiasm was declared for the U.N. mission. In late 1991/early 1992 officials in UNAMIC had expected more troop contributions from European and other Western militaries. However, these troops were unavailable when countries such as Great Britain and Canada deployed their forces to UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁰¹

The problem of over-extension by the U.N. worldwide in the early 1990s meant that ongoing operations suffered. For example, the overriding concern for the conflict in the former Yugoslavia averted international attention away from other U.N. missions such as UNOSOM I in Somalia. With only 500 Pakistani troops, the U.N. force was able to accomplish nothing but protecting their compound in the Mogadishu airport. As a result, Boutros-Ghali berated the Security Council for ignoring Somalia because of its ethnocentric concern with a "rich man's war."¹⁰²

¹⁰¹Interview with Mary Fisk, Assistant to the U.N. Special Representative in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, May 1993.

In short, the United Nations is caught on the horns of a dilemma. These new classes of peace-support operations require the military capabilities of world powers or strong regional powers to independently deploy and temporarily sustain themselves. As noted in Problems of Coalitions: Tactical Level, only these powers have the necessary training and equipment to operate effectively in harsher environments. However, these powers, by the nature of their status, will either have neo-imperial goals or be perceived as having such. Even the seeming altruistic operation in Somalia (the U.S.-led humanitarian mission, UNITAF) was perceived by some in the Middle East as a neo-colonial operation to control the geopolitically vital choke-point coming from the Suez Canal. Forces from states considered to be absolutely neutral often do not even have the organic capabilities to provide for their basic survival in the environment in which they’re asked to operate. This conundrum seems to lend credence to the idea of forming a standing U.N. force, or a U.N. legion.


Clausewitz recognized this problem with allied forces and coalitions. His writings of over 160 years ago seem as though they could have been written this year in a call for a standing U.N. force:

It would all be tidier, less of a theoretical problem, if the contingent promised - ten, twenty, or thirty thousand men - were placed entirely at the ally's disposal and he were free to use it as he wished. It would then in effect be a hired force. But that is far from what really happens. The auxiliary force usually operates under its own commander; he is dependent only on his own government, and the objective the latter sets him will be as ambiguous as its aims.¹⁰⁵

The existence of a United Nations auxiliary force which answered to no other operational commander than the Security Council would appear to solve the unsolvable paradox which faces the United Nations: forces from militarily weak states cannot sustain themselves and forces from militarily strong states have their own agendas and will not surrender operational control. However, the formation of peace-enforcement units, as suggested in An Agenda For Peace, or rapid deployment forces made available to the U.N. by major powers on short notice¹⁰⁶ would still face the problem of independent control by the contributing states. Only a force

¹⁰⁵Clausewitz, p. 603.

whose units are not tied to a sovereign state would be truly under the control of the United Nations. Also, a "completely U.N." force would be less prone to developing separate force dividing relationships with the belligerents it is attempting to control. However, Clausewitz was correct in pointing out that any force not constrained by the factors of national allegiance is, in effect, a hired force.

1. **Prospects for a Standing Force**

Any standing U.N force would have to be formed from individuals willing to renounce allegiance to their home country and profess sole allegiance to the United Nations. Basically, it would be no more than a mercenary force. While it can be posited that certain individuals would enlist in this force because of utopian goals, the reality is that mercenary soldiers usually claim allegiance to only one thing, money. However, monetary gain has always been one of the primary attractions of U.N. service. Any observer of U.N. missions worldwide recognizes that the majority of long term U.N. bureaucrats stay in the U.N. because of the lucrative salaries.

In the past, arguments over corruption and inflated salaries in the U.N. have caused rifts within the system. The United Nations' financial crisis in the mid-1980s was prompted by the U.S. Senate's Kassebaum Amendment which sought to control corruption and exorbitant salaries by limiting the
United States' assessed contribution to all United Nations organizations to 20% of the total U.N. budget until the U.N. undertook significant administrative reforms. These reforms included budgetary changes and a reduction of U.N. employees' salaries and pensions to levels comparable to U.S. civil service employees.\textsuperscript{107}

The stories of high salaries for U.N. employees and the problems that it causes were evident in UNTAC. Disputes over pay and compensation between the civilian components and the military contingents led to bitter exchanges, hate mail and even death threats.\textsuperscript{108} Much of the controversy was centered around the Mission Subsistence Allowance (MA) received by all U.N. civilian employees and some of the military staff in UNTAC. The subject of much of the criticism was the fact that the original MA for Cambodia was exorbitant: 145 U.S. dollars per day in a country with an average annual income of 170 U.S. dollars.

However, the root of the controversy lay in the fact that many of the military staff, not attached to a supporting unit from their home state, did not receive the same MA as the civilians even though they were forced to live off of the economy. The situation reached a crisis point according to

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\textsuperscript{107}Congressional Quarterly, 15 June 1985, p. 1176.

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the Force Commander, General Sanderson, who received a threatening letter stating that, "there may be cases of physical assault on some VIPs including senior civilian officers. There may be incidents like killings also."\textsuperscript{109}

The problems of having a force with little or no allegiance to the mores, norms, and culture of a society at large show themselves in instances of mutinies and fraggings.\textsuperscript{110} This behavior was clearly demonstrated by the Bulgarian Battalion in UNTAC which was recruited through local newspaper ads\textsuperscript{111} and caused more problems in the Cambodian situation than they solved. At one point the Bulgarian troops mutinied against their officers who were said to be stealing their pay. There were also reports that members of the Bulgarian Battalion were involved in business ventures with Khmer Rouge cadre. Simple banditry was initially reported as the motivation behind the killing of three Bulgarian soldiers by the Khmer Rouge in April 1993.\textsuperscript{112} However, later reports pointed to a possible disagreement over a business deal as the cause.


\textsuperscript{111}Michaels, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{112}Keven Barrington, "K.R. Slay Bulgarian Hosts of Peace Dinner," \textit{Phnom Penh Post}, 09-22 April 1993, p. 3.
Additionally, a standing U.N. force will be unable to develop the organizational cohesion matching national armed forces. Research has shown that organizational cohesion, "the commitment to a principle of patriotism, just war, ideology, or belief in the nation's principles" is necessary for soldiers to withstand the stress of combat.\textsuperscript{113} While soldiers involved in peace-support operations may not necessarily be subjected to combat conditions, there is evidence that the cumulative stress of peacekeeping operations in situations of high levels of violence, such as UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, can be as stressful as combat.\textsuperscript{114}

Another major problem with the idea of a standing U.N. army is the problem of development of agendas within the United Nations that move the organization beyond the role of an independent broker. Presently the organization exists more as a process or system than as an actor. Unless there is a revolutionary restructuring of the notion of state sovereignty, the United Nations will be more successful retaining its traditional strengths as a system in which actors maneuver, instead of assuming the characteristics of an actor itself. If the United Nations formed its own army it

\textsuperscript{113}Stewart, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{114}Dunkel, p. 8.
could begin to assume the traits of sovereign actor and thus develop its own agendas.

A trend in this direction is already evident in the evolution of the United Nations' peacekeeping function. For example, the personal antagonism that was widely reported between Mohammed Farah Aidid and Boutros Boutros-Ghali\(^{115}\) fundamentally compromised the Secretary-General's position as a neutral representative of the organization. Following the Security Council's decision to seek a "political solution" to the escalating situation in Somalia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued to personalize the conflict by pressuring the Security Council, in a four page letter to its members, to continue trying to apprehend and detain Aidid.\(^{116}\)

A U.N. Security Council with its own army would, in practice, only be able to use its forces against small, weak states or non-state actors which do not pose a significant threat to the force. A small force used for a preventive deployment to deter a possible aggressor would in most cases be a largely symbolic. Relying on the moral authority of the U.N. as a tripwire against aggression, however, is more likely to be effective against state actors. The non-state collectivities within a failing state, such as the Khmer Rouge

\(^{115}\)Stevenson, p. 149.


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or Aidid’s clan, have far fewer reasons to respect the moral authority of the United Nations.

In fact, development of a U.N. army could sow the seeds of destruction of the organization. If the Security Council was able to overcome the strategic level problems of employing a U.N. standing force, which is unlikely, the tactical level problems would be minimized. However, this would not change fact that the five permanent members and their client states are inevitably treated differently than other states. States that are powerful militarily or politically would still find it somewhat easy to ignore United Nations resolutions.

Additionally, a collective security arrangement based on states with widely varying goals and views can only be effective in a narrow set of circumstances. Evidence has shown that in diffuse international systems, alliances tend to be temporary because objectives derive from interests more than a common set of beliefs or ideologies.\textsuperscript{117}

Imbalances in the distribution of international power, perceived or otherwise, will always cause new alliance formation.\textsuperscript{118} A United Nations with its own army would begin


to take on the characteristics of an autonomous actor, and thus a possible threat, to other actors too weak to counter it. It is possible to imagine the formation of anti-U.N. blocs within the international system.

Less developed countries (LDCs) would have the most to fear from a U.N. with its own army. Historically, one of the primary objectives of the less developed countries in the United Nations has been the sustainment of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. This concern was expressed by the former U.N Under-Secretary-General for African Affairs, Abdulrahim Abby Farah of Somalia, who noted that the overwhelming view of the less developed countries, as expressed by the 1991 General Assembly debate concerning humanitarian assistance, is that sovereign rights of states should not be violated "even in the name of the noblest gestures."

2. Suggestions for Improvement

When viewing the quantitative and qualitative growth of U.N. peacekeeping operations "evolution" is the proper term to use. In nature whenever dynamic polarities exist there are two possibilities: conflict and equilibrium. Equilibrium

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itself is the result of conflict between opposing forces of equal strength. Charles Darwin recognized that conflict was the primary force at work in evolution. The method to the madness of U.N. operations has evolved out of the bureaucratic necessities of doing business within a system of widely different cultures and interests. Peacekeeping evolved as it did because of the uneasy equilibrium between the superpowers during the Cold War. The gridlock of the Cold War prevented the Security Council from making meaningful decisions. It may also have prevented the Security Council from undertaking operations that were outside the capabilities of the organization. When opposing forces become unequal, conflict resumes until a new equilibrium is established. The United Nations' security function will attempt to grow in fits and starts until a new equilibrium is reached within the U.N. system.

Relying on ad hoc coalitions to respond to larger threats to international peace is more realistic than developing a permanent worldwide security structure. The best option for strengthening United Nations peace-support operations dealing with lesser threats and humanitarian assistance, without developing a potentially threatening...

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force, is to enhance its logistics capabilities and command and control apparatus for peacekeeping operations.

In *An Agenda For Peace*, Boutros-Ghali stated that the infantry units that are the cornerstone of peacekeeping operations, are generally available in the required numbers. Satisfying the United Nations' logistics and transportation requirements, however, poses a greater problem because few states can afford to spare or underwrite the use of such assets for extended periods. As shown earlier in this chapter, the initial logistics problems in the deployment of UNTAC could have been the most likely cause of catastrophic mission failure early in the operation if not for good fortune and the extremely hard work of the small military logistics staff.

The best way for the United Nations to improve its ability to deploy operations should involve the development of capabilities to support them in the field. First and foremost, this would entail the development of a standing military staff at U.N. Headquarters in New York substantially

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123 From the time of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords until the deployment of the first battalions of UNTAC there were only three staff officers on the ground in Phnom Penh planning the entire deployment and supporting the advance mission, UNAMIC. Interview with Major Briere, UNTAC Logistics Staff Officer.
larger than the present Military Advisor’s Group (MAG). Second, would be the development of capabilities that the U.S. Army refers to as combat support and combat service support (logistics units, engineer units, etc.) to maintain the armed battalions drawn from troop contributing states. Since many of the tasks of combat service support have high applicability in the civilian sector (i.e. construction, transportation management, etc.), if a U.N. capability were developed and administered properly, it would have the added benefit of training individuals from less developed countries in skills which are in short supply in their own country.

UNTAC provides some important lessons learned in the area of logistics for these types of operations in the future. Even though Cambodia was relatively small in size (roughly the size of Missouri) and population (approximately 8 million) it was difficult to establish a presence in all areas of the country because of the lack of infrastructure, the land mine threat, and the area covered by water during the flood season.

A land mine threat will continue to be a challenge in operations following intrastate wars because they are an extremely cheap method available to belligerents for protecting defended locations and to delay and demoralize

\[124\text{In early 1993 there were only 8 officers in the Military Advisor’s Group responsible for 13 missions worldwide. Interview with LCOL Yosuf, UNTAC Desk Officer, MAG, U.N. Headquarters, New York.}\]

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advancing infantry (called "nuisance mining"). The widespread use of nuisance mining combined with advances in technology have made it much more difficult to find and disarm mines. Additionally, poor or nonexistent mapping of the minefields makes the mine threat greater in conflicts like Cambodia and Somalia than it might otherwise be in conventional conflicts. Cambodia’s long civil war was the first conflict in history where mine casualties surpassed injuries caused by all other weapons. The United Nations specifically formed a separate entity within UNTAC, the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), to train Cambodians for the herculean task of demining the country. At the current rate of demining, some observers have estimated that it will be as much as 200 years before Cambodia is completely mine free. The growing use of mines in these types of conflicts in the future suggests that the U.N. should develop an organizational organic engineering capability before attempting to form and outfit combat units.


UNTAC was unique among U.N. operations because it was the first time that a large maritime component was required.\textsuperscript{128} Approximately 70\% of Cambodia’s rural population lives along the banks of either the Tonle Sap or Mekong River and transportation is primarily conducted via the waterways, especially during the flood season. These facts necessitated the development of an UNTAC Naval Component.\textsuperscript{129} While approximately 40\% of the unarmed military observers in UNTAC were maritime based, the cost of outfitting a "U.N. navy" was prohibitive. The original UNTAC plan was to use vessels that the Cambodian People’s Armed Forces (CPAF) turned over during the cantonment phase. Once the cantonment process failed, the U.N. was forced to rely on vessels manned by CPAF sailors to transport the military observers, making it impossible for the military observers to fulfill one of their functions: deconfliction with Khmer Rouge forces. It also provided the Khmer Rouge with more opportunity to claim U.N. bias.

Once again the U.N. paid an operational price by ignoring mission requirements and attempting to accomplish tasks as cheaply as possible. In order to convince wealthier states to fund high cost operations properly in the future,


\textsuperscript{129}Interview with CAPT Musmano, Uruguayan Navy, Commander, UNTAC Naval Component, Phnom Penh, 03 May 1993.
the U.N will have to administer them properly. This means fundamentally re-prioritizing the way that money is spent in operations. No longer can the United Nations afford to budget the way that it did in UNTAC, where five times as much money was expended in magazine and newspaper subscriptions than in external auditing of the operation.¹³⁰

The most pragmatic, but politically unlikely, approach to strengthening the United Nations’ ability to conduct peacekeeping operations is to realize the advantages and disadvantages that are inherent in the contribution of different types of states. The future of peacekeeping operations should lie in developing peacekeeping forces structured around the principle of "comparative advantage." The theory of comparative advantage shows that countries will manufacture goods which they have a relative or comparative advantage in producing; in other words, specialization.¹³¹

For operations on the lower ends of the continuum of conflict (peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building, etc.) relying on states that are not global or regional powers to supply the infantry battalions means they are less likely to bring separate agendas along with their participation. Of

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course they would have to be bolstered by the support capabilities of the larger powers. Wealthy states which are prohibited from deploying troops overseas because of self-imposed restrictions, such as Japan and Germany, should make their contribution through financial support.

The presence of troops from a powerful state is a two-edged sword in operations such as a preventive deployment of troops. While the participation of a strong power gives an operation more deterrent value, troops from these states present greater political targets to spoilers in the peace process. Operations at the peak of the continuum of conflict (peace-enforcement) would have to be left to ad hoc coalitions led by powerful states, such as Desert Storm.

However, applying the theory of comparative advantage to U.N. military operations may be politically unfeasible. While it may be pragmatic, this approach may seem racist because soldiers from the "south" would be placed in harms way more often than soldiers from the "north." Of course considering that the vast majority of these types of new generation U.N. operations are likely to occur in the "south," it is more in the interest of these states to provide for the stability and continued sovereignty of the less developed countries.
IV. PROBLEMS OF INTERVENTION

To one degree or another all U.N. operations will suffer from the coalition-building problems described in the previous chapter. While these problems will always exist, by recognizing them and planning appropriately, their impact upon the operation may be minimalized. Having said this, however, it should be noted that the new types of operations that the United Nations has taken on have specific requirements that will magnify the "force dividers" described in Chapter III. Specifically, the problems encountered in these "second generation" U.N. operations involving the administration of large tracts of territory, resemble the difficulties that an occupying army faces following the defeat of another country. An occupation can be defined as "the effective control of a power (be it one or more states or an international organization, such as the United Nations) over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title."¹

The classification of U.N. military troops as an "occupying force" has been discounted in past missions such as the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The U.N. Special Representative in charge of that operation, Ralph

Bunche, stated that "the United Nations Force is in the Congo as a friend and partner, not as an army of occupation."² While the Congo operation was of significant size, with over 19 thousand troops at its peak strength,³ and had a quasi-internal defense function, it did not have a mandate of the scope of either UNTAC or UNOSIM II. The large expansion in the scope of these U.N. mandates will highlight the substantial problems of intervention in the internal conflicts of a state.

The areas of concern that will become more important in these types of operations are centered around five basic issues: first, the dilemma of uncertain mandates and "mission slip" that is inevitable when the requirements for these missions is combined with the U.N. modus operandi; second, the obstacles faced when trying to establish authority over large areas with essentially minimal military force and the possible absence of popular support by the population; third, the difficulties that face the U.N. when it authorizes the use of force against belligerents that do not recognize the moral authority of the organization; fourth, the need for enhanced, yet decidedly different, intelligence capabilities in

A. MANDATES AND MISSION SLIP

The mandates of all U.N. missions are, by necessity, vague in order to fulfill all of the constraints placed upon it by various powers. Consensus for decisive actions within the Security-Council or General Assembly is difficult to reach because of the divergent ideologies, interests and outlooks of the member states. In order to avoid points of contention which can block entire resolutions, mandates must be deliberately ambiguous on specific points. This means that all mandates are open to wide interpretation by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative or any of the various contributing contingents.

The requirements for U.S. involvement in U.N. operations established by the President Clinton in late 1993 included the need to identify and "end point" in advance and developing clear exit strategies. 4 These requirements ostensibly block future U.S. participation in the type of operations in which the U.N. has recently been involved. While these requirements taken at face value seem wise they are, in fact, mutually

4Elliot, p. 39.
exclusive of both the types of missions that the U.N. has taken on recently and the way that the U.N. does business.

Having a precise exit strategy and date when establishing peace-support missions in intrastate conflicts is an unrealistic requirement given their dynamic and intractable nature. The United Nations will find that a more realistic option is to determine if an outside military force is capable of aiding in the resolution of the conflict. To that end, the U.N. leadership must understand the inherent limitations of forces under its control. If a U.N. force cannot help toward a solution, the best it will be is a burden on the member states who contribute. At worst, the force may create a barrier toward a solution or weaken the United Nations as an institution. In the past, political cleavages among the member states over the mandates of operations, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) specifically, and peacekeeping in general have caused serious crises for the organization. The Soviet Union and France's disagreement with the U.N. Secretary-General over his handling of that operation resulted in a severe weakening of the organization.⁵

Realization of the limits of United Nations forces should have prevented one of the most obvious examples of a U.N. 

peacekeeping force being deployed in a conflict in which it had no chance of bringing about a solution: the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Since its inception and deployment in 1978, UNIFIL has lost at least 183 soldiers in the conflict.\textsuperscript{6} If this figure is not alarming enough, it should be noted that while UNIFIL was never considered an open-ended operation, with its mandate reviewed every six months, it consistently failed to fulfill its stated mission objectives for over fifteen years.

UNIFIL's original mandate assigned three tasks to the force: one, to monitor and confirm an Israeli withdrawal; two, to restore peace and security; and finally, to help the government of Lebanon re-establish its authority in the area.\textsuperscript{7} From the beginning of the operation, UNIFIL has been in violation of one of the preconditions of a peacekeeping force, in spirit if not in letter. Traditionally, the United Nations has only deployed peacekeeping forces with the consent of all of the belligerents. While the Israeli Government agreed to UNIFIL's deployment, it has never displayed much respect for the force's presence or the U.N.'s authority. The Israeli government very likely was pressured to accept the presence of a peacekeeping force by the United States. The U.S. was

\textsuperscript{6}This figure comes from the author's own experience as a UNIFIL staff officer and briefer while attached to UNTSO.

\textsuperscript{7}James, p. 1.
chiefly interested in attaining a quick withdrawal of the Israeli forces so that the invasion would not derail the Middle East "peace process" on which the Carter Administration was embarked.

While UNIFIL was named as an interim force, there was little illusion within the United Nations that the mandate would be filled quickly or easily. The term interim was proposed by the U.N. Secretary-General to imply that force was only a short-term solution to the problem and to gain acceptance by all parties involved.

Initially, UNIFIL did enjoy some success in fulfilling the first two tasks of its mandate. The area of Southern Lebanon had become relatively stable. A de facto cease fire was arranged between Israel and the PLO, and the border was almost completely quiet for a year between July 1981 and June 1982. However, the Israeli government claimed that all hostile acts against it by the PLO should have stopped, whether they were across the Lebanese border or not. A rash of terrorist incidents against Israeli targets overseas, combined with an alleged buildup of PLO long-range artillery prompted the Israelis to overrun the U.N. force and drive for Beirut in operation "Peace for Galilee." 8

Given that the U.N. force was lightly armed for self-defense, UNIFIL had no option but to let the massively superior Israeli force bypass its position, even if its mandate had authorized resisting the invading army. The Israeli army would stay in Lebanon in force for the next three years and has never fully withdrawn. Israel imposed a "security zone" in Southern Lebanon which overlapped the UNIFIL area of operation and permanently claimed portions of Lebanese soil for tactical reasons. These "high ground" tactical positions became known as permanent violations in U.N. jargon.

The third task, aid in re-establishing authority over the area by the Lebanese government, proved impossible because of the disintegrating situation caused by the civil war. With no effective government in place, which possessed statewide legitimacy or acceptance, the U.N. Secretariat felt that withdrawal would have simply meant the return to anarchy which existed previously.

Of course, part of the problem with UNIFIL is that during the majority of the operation's history, the U.N. was constrained by the dictates of Cold War politics. A more comprehensive U.N. effort, which would encompass almost all of Lebanon, was proposed by the French in 1984 as the non-U.N. peacekeeping effort disintegrated. While the proposal did not generate much enthusiasm in the Security Council, all but two
of the members voted for it. It was defeated by a veto from the Soviet Union which did not want to strengthen a western-oriented state in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{9}

With the end of the Cold War, resolutions to mandate and deploy ambitious peacekeeping efforts around the world initially met with little resistance. However, cost and commitment aside, the United Nations began to intervene in situations which were as complicated, if not more so, than the quagmire that existed in Southern Lebanon. Considering that the majority of recent peacekeeping operations have been established to resolve civil wars and not international disputes,\textsuperscript{10} the measure of agreement within the international community that "something must be done" in these intractable situations is of little consequence. Clear mandates and easy solutions are impossible in situations like Lebanon, Cambodia or Somalia where there are long-standing ethnic rivalries, numerous warring factions, and nearly every adult male carries a weapon.

Furthermore because of political nature of Security Council, the U.N. usually establishes mandates which are very generalized that do not address specific issues. The application of generalized mandates to specific and dynamic

\textsuperscript{9}James, p. 10.

situations invariably results in two interpretations: one based upon strict interpretation of the mandate and the other predicated by the day to day situation in which the mandate is applied. 11

The inevitability of differences in interpretation of mandates between the troop contributors and the U.N. was evident from the very beginning of the U.S.-led UNITAF in Somalia. The Security Council resolution authorizing force in the operation called for the establishment of a "secure environment." When U.S. forces refused to disarm individual clan gunmen, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali sent a letter to then U.S. President George Bush outlining what he thought the requirement for a secure environment entailed: removing heavy weapons, disarming individual gunmen and clearing land mines widely scattered during the civil war. U.S. commanders refused to disarm individual gunmen and would only destroy weapons that appeared to present a clear and present danger to the force, such as the truck-mounted heavy weapons driven by the so called "technicals." In fact, in order to avoid a possible backlash reaction by the population, U.S. commanders ordered French Legionnaires under their control to return seized weapons to their owners. 12

11 Abi-Saab, pp. 18-19.

The disagreement over disarmament between the UNITAF commander, U.S. Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnson, and the U.N. Secretary-General also belied the United States' desire to avoid high-risk operations beyond opening supply routes for humanitarian relief. Additionally, de-mining and disarmament operations would have required a long-term commitment of U.S. forces that the Bush Administration did not envision.¹³

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali argued that he could only recommend to the Security Council the transition of responsibility from the U.S.-commanded, and mostly U.S.-manned, UNITAF operation to the U.N.-commanded UNOSOM II mission after his definition of a "secure environment" was established.¹⁴ Boutros-Ghali's insistence on disarmament in Somalia should be viewed in the context of the United Nations' situation in other operations at that time. The Somali operation began only a month after the U.N. publicly recognized that the voluntary disarmament in Cambodia had been a complete failure.

As in the Somalia operation, Boutros-Ghali hoped to garner support for an expanded mandate in Cambodia to use force to


disarm the Khmer Rouge and stop repeated cease-fire violations. On the 15th of February 1993, Boutros-Ghali held talks with Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazwa and Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe. The primary focus of the meeting was to gather backing for the idea of using more heavily armed "peace-enforcement forces," including the Japanese Self Defense Force, to salvage the disintegrating situation in Cambodia.\textsuperscript{15} Prime Minister Miyazawa rejected the proposal, stating that, "the United Nations has never adopted the idea of organizing peace-enforcement units with heavy weapons as its own responsibility."\textsuperscript{16}

B. ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTHORITY

Authority is the key word in the Cambodia operation's U.N. designation: "United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia." The concept that the United Nations could establish effective authority over the essential functions of a state, more than any other criteria, established a radical departure in the scope of U.N. peacekeeping operations. However, UNTAC decidedly failed to establish the authority in Cambodia necessary to accomplish its mandate. In fact, UNTAC


\textsuperscript{16}Ibid.
did not even establish basic authority over its own operations.

For example, UNTAC used a civilian contractor, Morris Catering, to resupply food to the battalions in the field. Because of the delays in ground transportation, due to the mine danger and threat of banditry, it was preferable to move fresh food by air. However, the contractor was refused licensing rights for its aircraft because the State of Cambodia's government wanted its carrier, SK Air, to deliver the food. This curiosity is by no means restricted to UNTAC. In fact, it is a persistent theme in U.N. operations.

UNIFIL provides another example the U.N.'s inability to exert even nominal authority over its own operations. It is a clear lack of authority that has rendered the U.N. force incapable of even ostensibly controlling the passage of their own troops through the border between Lebanon and Israel. It is a military reality that UNIFIL could not stop an Israeli armored column. However, it is a lack of political authority which dictates that U.N. forces must pass through Israeli Defense Force (IDF) checkpoints to traverse the border and that passage is subject to Israeli whim.

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Furthermore, the UNIFIL battalions were never equipped or mandated to deal with a modern army which did not recognize their authority. UNIFIL forces could not effectively control their areas of operation as long as the IDF could act with impunity well beyond their established "security zone." One of the key factors in this situation is the virtual air power monopoly that the IDF had over Southern Lebanon. The UNIFIL battalions had no mandate or capability of stopping Israeli close air strikes into their areas of operation.

The requirement that a U.N. force be accepted by all belligerents in a conflict has been one of the traditional prerequisites for that force's approval and deployment. However, as the United Nations enacts mandates for intervention in situations where the belligerents' consent is waiving or non-existent, U.N. military force will be forced to rely less on moral suasion and neutrality than on coercive ability.

Because of its low coercive potential, the U.N. will be unable to establish effective control over its areas of operation without the continued acquiescence of all belligerent parties. One of the reasons the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) was seemed successful was that all of the parties, both internal and external to the conflict, benefitted more from peaceful
resolution than continuation of the conflict.\textsuperscript{18} Part of the problem with UNTAC was that the United Nations tried to use the same operational plan in Cambodia that worked in Namibia,\textsuperscript{19} not recognizing that the situations were completely different. Unlike the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) guerillas in Namibia, the Khmer Rouge had very little to gain from cooperation with the United Nations.

1. Responsibilities of Authority

In his work, \textit{The International Law of Occupation}, Eyal Benvenisti points out that two of the primary concerns in the administration of an occupied territory, according to the 1907 "Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land," are: first, to preserve the sovereign rights of the government (or in the case of state disintegration, the local variation of contenders for authority), and second, to protect the local population from exploitation.\textsuperscript{20} This second requirement covers protection from exploitation by both the belligerent parties and the occupying force.

In the case of UNTAC, the United Nations fulfilled the first consideration, arguably to a fault, through formation of the Supreme National Council (SNC) which represented the


\textsuperscript{19}Interview with COL. Huijssoon, UNTAC Chief Plans Officer.

\textsuperscript{20}Benvenisti, p. 28.
sovereignty of the Cambodian people through the four factions in the conflict. Similarly, in Somalia, sovereignty is embodied in the Transitional National Council. In fulfilling the second consideration of occupation, protection of the local population, UNTAC unquestionably failed. In an attempt to deter the increasing number of acts of banditry and violence, UNTAC used its military units to patrol major roadways and establish roadblocks. Nevertheless, violence motivated by material gain became as significant a problem as political violence.  

Perhaps even more disturbing was UNTAC’s inability to protect ethnic minorities from violence directed at them from all of the factions within Cambodia. After the signing of a peace plan in 1991 and the institution of United Nations sponsored elections, the question of ethnic identity would once again play a major role in the affairs of Cambodia. The issues of the "Vietnamization" of Cambodia and Khmer nationalism dominated the Khmer Rouge’s arguments against continued participation in the peace agreement.

As the May 1993 elections approached, the number of attacks on ethnic Vietnamese increased, including massacres of Vietnamese "floating villages" along the Tonle Sap, causing

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the largest mass migration in Indochina in over a decade.\textsuperscript{22}

By May 1993, over 21,000 ethnic Vietnamese had left Cambodia in response to anti-Vietnamese violence.\textsuperscript{23} The ethnic massacres, generally blamed on the Khmer Rouge, were condemned by all of the political parties in Cambodia. However, only the political party of the Vietnamese-installed State of Cambodia (SOC) did not express the opinion that the ethnic Vietnamese should leave Cambodia.\textsuperscript{24}

It was readily acknowledged by UNTAC officials that the U.N. force was powerless to protect the ethnic Vietnamese. After the massacre of 33 ethnic Vietnamese in Siem Riep, UNTAC Force Commander, Lieutenant General Sanderson, responded to the issue of whether the U.N. could prevent such attacks, by stating, "we are here on a peacekeeping not ... internal security mission."\textsuperscript{25}

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\textsuperscript{22} Nate Thayer, "Wretched of the Earth," \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, 15 April 1993, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{23} Sonya Hepinstall, "Cambodian Economy Hurt by Fleeing Vietnamese," \textit{Bangkok Post}, 7 May 1993, p. 5.


\textsuperscript{25} Katrina Peach, "UNMOs Powerless to Protect Ethnic Vietnamese," \textit{Phnom Penh Post}, 26 March - 08 April 1993, p. 4.
However, maintenance of public order was an established requirement according to UNTAC’s mandate. Implicit in the disarmament of a state’s capability to protect public order, as originally envisioned in the UNTAC mandate, is the requirement not to allow the situation to revert to banditry. In situations like Cambodia or Somalia, where weapons are readily available to large groups that are not under the control of an established command structure, the security requirements present a significant challenge to the ability of an occupying force to establish authority.

It must be realized that those who are most willing to disarm are those who have the most to gain from a negotiated settlement; these individuals are less likely to present a direct threat to the U.N. force or the local population regardless of whether or not they are disarmed. Disarming the population in a society where the rule of force has been the dominant principle has possible unintended consequences.

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27In early 1993 the going rate for a hand grenade in Battambang, Cambodia was the equivalent of 92 U.S. cents, an AK-47 went for approximately $31. John Kreiger, "Behind the Khmer Rouge Lines: ‘We’ll Kill Anyone Who Tries To Stop Us’," U.S. News & World Report, 24 May 1993. According the UNTAC Special Representative Akashi’s aid, Mary Fisk, the legal cost of an AK-47 in Phnom Penh was $80.
These unforseen consequences intensify the requirement for an U.N. force to maintain public order. For example, in Somalia, as American and Belgian troops confiscated the weapons of relief agency guards, who were relatively easy to disarm, there was an increase in the looting and violence against foreign relief agencies by clan gunmen who were not so easy to disarm.\textsuperscript{28}

While UNTAC's responsibilities, as the "authority" in Cambodia, to maintain public order may have been negated by the refusal of government forces to disarm, a significant reason for diminished backing of UNTAC in Cambodian public opinion was the ineffective ability of the United Nations to protect the local populace from Khmer Rouge terror, State of Cambodia (SOC) intimidation, and simple banditry. A confidential UNTAC report, quoted in the \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, states that the U.N.'s inability to intervene is one reason why there is "a serious erosion of public confidence in UNTAC and the peace process."\textsuperscript{29} In fact, UNTAC's inability to control the countryside was so severe that it had to rely on CPAF (Cambodian People's Armed Forces - the army of the SOC)


soldiers to provide protection for polling sites during the May 1993 elections.

As stated previously, an occupying force must also meet the requirement for protecting the local population from exploitation by its own soldiers. Criminal acts by any member of a U.N. force denigrates the ability of the force as a whole to maintain the benign support of the local population and thus undermines the occupying force’s legitimacy. Obviously, the United Nations is venturing into relatively unchartered legal territory by deploying large multinational military forces amongst civilian populations with uncertain mandates for action and no status of forces agreements.

A body of armed soldiers that is uncertain about the use of force, for what ends and under what circumstances, and by what means is less of an army than a mob.30 While the likelihood of an entire U.N. force turning into an uncontrollable mob is remote, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant will inevitably blur in situations where regular forces are employed against guerrillas or simple criminals.31 The necessity to regulate the actions of soldiers thrust into operations in the midst of civilian unrest has been demonstrated by the 1984 conviction of a

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30 Van Creveld, p. 90.
31 Van Creveld, p. 92.
British soldier of murder while on duty in Northern Ireland\textsuperscript{32} and the April 1993 conviction of a U.S. Marine for assault in the shooting of two Somalis.\textsuperscript{33}

Historically, the United Nations has claimed that the use of force by the U.N. against an aggressor is legally different from war by a state. During the Korean conflict The Committee on Study of Legal Problems of the United Nations concluded that "the purposes for which the laws of war were instituted are not entirely the same as the purposes of regulating the use of force by the United Nations," and that, "for the time being the United Nations should not feel bound by all the laws of war but should select those laws that fit its purposes such as the rules on prisoners of war and on belligerent occupation."\textsuperscript{34}

However, the United Nations has no judicial mechanism for controlling the actions of soldiers placed under its mandate.\textsuperscript{35} While United Nations has created task forces in

\begin{itemize}
\item[35] Interview with COL. Mohd Aris, UNTAC, Chief Operations Officer.
\end{itemize}
the past to investigate alleged illegal activities by soldiers in a U.N. force,\textsuperscript{36} the requirement for disciplining criminal acts is left to the contributing states. The potential for problems in interpretation is greatly exacerbated by the coalitional problems outlined previously. Furthermore, it is doubtful that most states would allow their soldiers to be adjudicated by a supranational judiciary. Any attempt to force this requirement upon contributing states would cause further hesitation in volunteering forces.

2. Controlling Territory

Historically, United Nations forces have not been direct targets of the belligerents in a conflict. United Nations casualties in the past have generally occurred as the result of being caught between belligerents when a cease-fire or truce breaks down. The first line of defense for U.N. operations has been the moral authority of operating under the U.N. flag and a non-threatening posture. Because of the limitations on the use of force and the non-offensive nature of most United Nations operations, a U.N. force must assume a basically defensive and reactive (as opposed to proactive) posture.

However, belligerents may target U.N. forces in order to evoke an escalatory response or withdrawal of one of the

\textsuperscript{36}Michaels, pp. 66-67.
U.N. contingents. This is especially true in intrastate wars where maintenance of the status quo is not in the interest of one or more of the belligerents. As pointed out in Chapter II, most intrastate conflicts have an inherent zero-sum quality to them. Gains by one of the parties are, by definition, losses for the others. Because of this quality, a U.N. force in the middle of a civil war must be able to effectively defend itself from a wider range of threats than in traditional peacekeeping operations. It is an unusual paradox that U.N. forces may be able to better defend themselves against a conventional force than guerrilla organizations. However, in order to execute more elaborate mandates, in areas such as the protection of an electoral process or delivery of humanitarian aid, the United Nations will have to realize the consequences of attempting to control territory in a guerrilla threat environment.

Clausewitz first recognized the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare against a conventional occupying army as he returned from the Russian front in 1813 and witnessed first hand the problems of controlling vast tracts of occupied territory:

The immensity of the Russian landscape prevents the assailant from occupying and holding the country strategically. He simply moves forward, without being able to secure his rear. Having thought on the matter at length,
I am now convinced that a great civilized European country cannot be conquered unless there is dissension within it.\textsuperscript{37}

From his experience with guerrilla warfare Clausewitz developed a series of broad conditions under which a general uprising can be effective:

1. The war must be fought in the interior of the country.
2. It must not be decided by a single stroke.
3. The theater of operations must be fairly large.
4. The national character must be suited to that type of war.
5. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forest, marshes, or the local methods of cultivation.\textsuperscript{38}

These five conditions seem tailor made to the situations in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia. What makes these conditions as valid today as they were in 1830 is the fact that the development of weaponry which delivers high firepower and is man-portable has allowed guerrillas to grow stronger at a pace greater than regular organized armed forces. Just as the invention of the crossbow and firearms removed the advantage of the armored knight, the Stinger Missile and rocket propelled grenade reduce the advantage of a technologically advanced force fighting a guerrilla war. So, just as the Yugoslavian partisans during World War II were able to immobilize more German troops than the entire Anglo-


\textsuperscript{38}Clausewitz, p. 480.
American force on the Italian front, modern day guerrillas can effectively and indefinitely tie down large numbers of U.N. troops.

Interestingly, the humanitarian corridors and safe havens used by UNPROFOR are surprisingly similar to lines of communication and strong points utilized by the Germans in the Balkans in World War II. The descriptions of these strong points in a 1954 U.S. Army publication, *German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)*, bear remarkable resemblance to the U.N. placement of forces in fortified positions from which they conduct humanitarian assistance. While the purpose of the German occupying force was completely different from the U.N. mission, they share common weaknesses in the face of guerrilla tactics. Indeed all modern mechanized armies share the same vulnerability to guerrilla forces.

Historically there has been a category of troops proven to be unaffected by the use of guerrilla tactics: "special purpose" troops organized to be independent of their lines of communication and to operate in the guerrilla's environment. Highly effective units employed by the Germans

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39Rougeron, p. 47.

40U.S. Army, *German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)*, Department of the Army, p. 47.

41Rougeron, p. 40.
were the Jagdkommando (ranger detachment) which operated with precisely these methods. However, the employment of these types of units is antithetical to the very nature of U.N. operations, even those with an enforcement mandate such as UNOSOM II. The employment of special operations type units is an operational quantum leap that United Nations mandates and methods are unable to handle.

Similarly, methods such as surgical strikes or no-fly zones will have very little effect on compelling belligerents to cease aggression since heavy artillery, armor, or air-strikes have never been effective against an irregular force which is careful to avoid direct confrontation. The U.S. Army's primary strategic document (FM 100-1, The Army) recognizes "the fundamental truth is that only ground forces possess the power to exercise direct, continuing and comprehensive control over land, its resources, and its people ... landpower can make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval forces." If involvement in United Nations operations shifts from the arena of deterrence to coercion, the political and military leadership will have to realize that it will require the

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42 German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 48.
43 Rougeron, p. 48.
active engagement of dismounted infantry to defeat and disarm the warring factions or at least bring aggression below the acceptable threshold.

In a strictly defensive operation, the troop requirement for establishing effective control over large tracts of territory against a guerrilla threat can be described by the "air defense model." Since defenders countering air attacks must effectively cover every potential target their requirements are driven more by the number of targets than the size of their adversary's air force. Similarly, conventional forces who counter a guerrilla army must spend most of their resources on defending potential targets. Since the forces of non-state actors, which the U.N. will have to deal with in these types of operations, generally have the attributes of a guerrilla army (flexibility, mobility and non-attachment to territory), the number of potential targets, more than the size of the threat, will dictate the number of troops required to protect the growing number of functions under U.N. control.

As UNTAC prepared for the mission of protecting the electoral process in May 1993 it faced an "air defense" requirement that was not envisioned in the original operations plan. Because of the Khmer Rouge and CPAF's pervasive

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45 Leites & Wolf, pp. 68-69.
presence throughout the country, all of the approximately 1400 polling stations required protection against possible attacks. This was a daunting task considering that of UNTAC's total strength of 22,000 only 10,600 were actual combat troops.\footnote{Interview with COL. Huijssoon, Chief Plans Officer, UNTAC.}

As the elections approached, it appeared that the Khmer Rouge would specifically attack U.N. targets in order to disrupt the process. The effects of not being able to disarm the factions became a critical factor to mission success. In order to respond to international pressure to carry out the elections despite the lack of a "secure environment," UNTAC planners were willing to continue decreasing the number of polling sites in inverse proportion to the Khmer Rouge threat. If Khmer Rouge forces had attacked U.N. targets in earnest UNTAC would have responded by collapsing the mission upon itself until it could attain a satisfactory degree of protection for whatever polling sites remained.

As it turned out, the Khmer Rouge chose not to disrupt the elections for as yet unclear reasons (see the section in Chapter IV: Theories of Victory). Just as UNTAC should not have been planned around the apparent U.N. success in Namibia, the requirements for future missions of this type, if there are any, should not be planned around the assumption that UNTAC was able to effectively control either territory or the
election. In the future the U.N. will have to make fundamental choices in the way that it mandates the use and non-use of force in operations if the belligerents do not grant or withdraw their acceptance of a U.N. force.

C. THE USE AND NON-USE OF FORCE

In operations like UNTAC or UNOSOM II the United Nations has attempted to assume the state-like monopoly of the use of legitimate force. The act of establishing control over the monopoly of force means that at least the tacit acceptance of the belligerents is necessary and they must be willing to disarm. If this approval is missing the U.N. force has basically two options: it can choose to use force to accomplish its goals, or it can choose to abstain from the use of force. While this choice may seem simple on the surface, it is possibly the most crucial question that must be considered in this new generation of U.N. missions.

During the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964 the U.N. faced the question of the use of force more than once. Part of ONUC's original purpose was to "restore and maintain law and order throughout the Congo."\footnote{Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, p. 21.} During the initial stages of the ONUC operation a controversy arose over whether to use force to disarm the Congolese
National Army (ANC). Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold argued that the operation’s emphasis should,

be put on the protection of the lives of the civilian population in the spirit of the Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This may necessitate a temporary disarming of military units which, in view of present circumstances are an obstacle to the reestablishment of law and order in the interest of the people and the stability of the nation.\textsuperscript{48}

The line of reasoning that the prevention of human rights violations and genocide had primacy over the principle of non-intervention was the legal line of reasoning used by Hammarskjold. ONUC did not, however, use force to disarm ANC soldiers because of protests by the Soviet Union’s representative. ONUC was latter authorized to use force beyond self-defense to prevent civil war and expel foreign mercenaries.\textsuperscript{49}

In Cambodia, where all the factions signed an agreement to disarm, the United Nations did not pursue disarmament through force. In Somalia, where there was no such agreement amongst the factions, the Secretary-General chose to make disarmament a priority. In reviewing past operations the use of force question usually revolves around whether or not the U.N. should have used force. Perhaps the more appropriate question


\textsuperscript{49}Liu, p. 19.
to ponder first is could the U.N. have used force effectively? In the Congo operation, when the U.N. used force it was inefficient, causing numerous casualties, and only partially successful.\textsuperscript{50}

It has been shown in the dynamics of an insurgent conflicts that a counter-state can use violence to persuade important sectors of the population to switch allegiance from government to challenger. The counter-state undermines the state's authority by demonstrating its inability to maintain order, forcing it to resort to an unwarranted, arbitrary, and indiscriminate use of power that often lead to further withdrawal of support.\textsuperscript{51} Similarly in U.N. operations which are responsible for maintenance of public order, the use of force by one or more of the belligerents without an effective response by the U.N. will result in a loss of credibility.

1. The Efficacy of Force

In conflicts with high levels of violence, and the lack of acceptance by one or more of the belligerents, the requirements for intervention need to closely match the conflict itself. In order to protect the population, an enforcement strategy of counter-force targeting may be

\textsuperscript{50}Abi-Saab, p. 140.

necessary. This is especially true where the armed belligerents are untrained or not under the control of a state actor. Because of the presence of heavy artillery and other technical weapons systems in the hands of uneducated and largely untrained combatants, the civilian population is inevitably drawn into the conflict. In Somalia heavy weapons were used by untrained combatants who fired weapons in the general direction of targets with no systematic attempt at accuracy, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties.⁵²

An occupying force in a peace-support operation does not have the option of using heavy weapons systems including artillery, missiles and attack aircraft against a recalcitrant belligerent. These weapons systems are still not sufficiently accurate to only target a belligerent who is "extremely dispersed, or indistinguishable from the civilian environment or intermingled with friendly forces. Because of this fact, intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have become the normal practice in low-intensity conflicts."⁵³


⁵³Van Creveld, p. 208.
Clausewitz, in the One War chapter "The Character of Strategic Defense," acknowledged that military force, "peace-enforcement" in this case, can be used for dissuasion or coercion as well as for actual combat. Later in the book Clausewitz stated that one "must be willing to wage such minimal war, which consists in merely threatening the enemy, with negotiations held in reserve."

A strategy of coercive diplomacy must display the effective use of force in order to demonstrate resolution. Additionally, the determination to use more force, if necessary, must be emphasized. Clausewitz recognized this fact in his statement that "Even when the only point of the war is to maintain the status quo, the fact remains that merely parrying a blow goes against the essential nature of war, which certainly does not consist of merely enduring."

In a situation which warrants an enforcement mandate, the issue may not be whether or not to use force. Instead it is: what are the circumstances under which force will be used and to what degree? According to theorists of intrastate conflicts, particularly revolutionaries themselves, "the

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54Clausewitz, pp. 370-371.
55Clausewitz, p. 604. (emphasis in original text).
56Craig & George, p. 197.
57Clausewitz, p. 370.
inefficient use of force, or reluctance to use it is decisive in the transfer of legitimacy to the opponents of the regime."\textsuperscript{58} Similarly, a requirement for enforcement-mandated peace-support operations is the ability to demonstrate force to compel factions to observe cease-fires, disarm or adhere to other agreements without resorting to excess force thereby alienating the population. So far the United Nations has been unable to meet this requirement.

If the use of force is necessary in civil-military operations it must be used with both efficiency and restraint. The methods applied by the British Army in Northern Ireland display the need for firepower restraint.

Perhaps the most important quality that a strong force engaged against a weaker one needs is self-control; and indeed the ability to withstand provocation without losing one's head, without overreacting and thereby playing into the enemy's hands, is itself the best possible measure of self-control. There must be a voluntary weakening, even approximately equal terms ... A good case in point is provided by the British who have been fighting and taking casualties in Northern Ireland for the last twenty years.\textsuperscript{59}

A conventional military's use of force against irregular force interspersed amongst the civilian population will never be as effective as the use of force against another conventionally formed army. The necessary restraint on the use of force has special significance in U.N. peace-support operations because

\textsuperscript{58}Linz, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{59}Van Creveld, p. 177.
they rely more heavily on consent and neutrality than a traditional occupying army that can use coercive measures more easily.

2. Neutrality and Force

One of the key unresolved issue in this new class of peace-support mission is to what extent is the United Nations capable of effectively dealing with non-state belligerents? The traditional strength of United Nations’ operations lies in operating with the consent of all belligerent parties and with the moral authority of being under the U.N. flag to accomplish mandates. Thereby U.N. forces only have had to use force in self-defense. The principle of the non-use of force is closely tied to the requirement of consent by the belligerents.

As a rule, however, non-state actors will be swayed less by the moral authority of the United Nations: an international body in which they do not have membership. Therefore they are less likely to consent to U.N. operations that may decrease their power. In order to be effective the United Nations may have to intervene against the wishes of whatever authorities claim to be in control. By forswearing the basic peacekeeping principles of strict neutrality and the

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60 Leaning, p. 120.

non-use of force the United Nations is venturing into territory that is outside its traditional strengths. Furthermore, the use of force in these new U.N. missions will still have limited effectiveness because the objective is to neutralize, not defeat, the belligerents.

Even if a United Nations operation does not have a mandate for the use of force, deployment of a force without continued consent will cause some of the belligerents to perceive the force as a threat. The mere existence of a large U.N. Force will affect the political situation, if only by changing the context within which the struggle for power takes place. In these circumstances every action, or inaction, taken by a U.N. force can have a potential effect on one or more of the belligerents and the balance or relative power between them. As shown by the experience of ONUC, attempting to maintain law and order "in a situation of relative chaos and a power vacuum," inevitably has an impact on the political balance of power.\(^6^2\)

This is especially true where one of the belligerents' primary goals is to deny the other parties their version of law and order. In Somalia, Mohammad Farah Aidid and the other clan leaders had little motivation to contain domestic anarchy. Insecurity in the domestic situation was to the

\(^{62}\)Abi-Saab, p. 65.
"technicals" advantage because it provided them with the basis of their power and revenues. As pointed out by sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr.,

insofar as a political leader working in a chaotic situation organizes his own armed bands, he of course partly frightens the population into supporting him. A great deal of revolutionary support by 'the people' is obviously synthetic and the result of sheer bullying. But the revolutionary's program can make an enormous difference in gaining popular support.63

Similarly in Bosnia, ethnic cleansing and migratory genocide through displacement of population centers are not an incidental by-products of the war. The strategic use of brutality and terror are the belligerents' very objective. Therefore, deploying U.N. humanitarian missions to situations like Bosnia or Somalia by definition means that U.N. personnel will not be considered impartial and that they will therefore become potential pawns in the conflict.64

Proponents of peace-support operations with increased mandates for the use of force are attempting to attain two goals which are mutually exclusive: one, an increase in the ability to use force and two, the maintenance of a high degree of neutrality by shielding the operation under the umbrella of the United Nations. The mutually exclusive nature of these

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64 Ruggie, p. 29.
two goals is displayed diagramatically in Figure 4. As a military operation uses greater amounts of force to carry out its mandate it will lose the support of at least certain sections of the population.

**Neutrality-Use of Force Curve**

![Diagram showing Neutrality-Use of Force Curve]

The unstated hope of U.N. "peacekeeping" operations with an enforcement mandate is that somehow the U.N. will be able to solve the unsolvable equation of maintaining an "ideal" relationship of neutrality and the use of force. Realistically, the amount of force used will inversely affect the perceived neutrality of the force by at least some segments of the population. This unsolvable paradox is exacerbated in situations where U.N. forces are dealing with non-state actors who have less respect for the moral authority of the United Nations. An ever present danger is that the use
of excessive force, real or perceived, will cause a "destabilizing event" which causes the eventual failure of the operation.

Escalation, as was seen in UNOSOM II or MNF II in Lebanon, is a game which peacekeeping forces cannot play. The disinterested quality (no hidden agendas or national interests) that the U.N. desires in its troop contributors means that the U.N. force will have a much lower "threshold of pain" than almost any foe they counter. As was seen in the United States' and France's experiences in Vietnam, belligerents in an internal conflict can attrite the will of an external actor by simply attacking his manpower without defeating his military strategy. Furthermore, the "will" of a United Nations force, or any coalition, is much easier to destroy than the national will of a unitary actor.

The aerial bombardment by U.S. aircraft and ensuing ground actions by Pakistani, Moroccan and French troops that resulted in the death of more than 70 Somalis, many of them evidently not gunmen, prompted a revenge response from factions within the Somali population. Mobs killed four foreign journalists and international aid workers, prompting the Italian government to threaten withdrawal of their troops

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65 Pillar, p. 156.
from Somalia.\textsuperscript{66} The ensuing withdrawal of forces from UNOSOM II can be traced back to the escalating effect that a destabilizing event has on any operation that relies, at least in part, on the neutrality of the occupying force.

The use of force, especially the use of lethal force, for civilian population control will inevitably lead to the loss of neutrality by an occupying U.N. contingent. This problem is not unique to U.N. operations. When the British Army was first deployed to Northern Ireland in August 1969, the Catholic population viewed them as an impartial force that would protect them against Protestant attacks which the Royal Ulster Constabulary had been unable or unwilling to do. The Catholic population accepted the British Army as long as it "adopted a relatively low profile, reactive policy toward disturbances."\textsuperscript{67} However, the British Army's development of a more forceful and intrusive strategy to counter the increasing threat posed by the newly-formed Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) progressively alienated the Catholic community. The army's use of coercive tactics proved to be a great asset for the PIRA. The killing of 13 civilians on 30 January 1992, "Bloody Sunday," by British paratroopers finished the Catholic community's acceptance of the force and

\textsuperscript{66} "Tweaking the Trunk of th' U.N." \textit{The Economist}, 17 July 1993, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Northern Ireland: An Anglo-Irish Dilemma?}, p. 22.

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an increased acceptance of PIRA operations which had resulted in civilian casualties. 68

Similarly, the use of lethal force by United Nations troops in crowd control situations alienated the Somali population and increased Mohammad Farah Aidid's popularity by portraying him as the only force within Somalia that could stand up to foreign domination. The implementation of the Security Council Resolution to arrest Aidid 69 and the distribution of reward posters offering $25,000 for his capture 70 were the declarations of a mini-war between the U.N. and the clan leader. The escalating nature of this event led to the eventual destabilization of the UNOSOM II operation. The use of force to simply neutralize a belligerent and not defeat him may not serve its intended purpose and can make a settlement even more difficult. According to Fred Charles Ikle, in Every War Must End, this fact is true of all limited wars:

the conditions on which both sides can agree for ending the fighting are not independent of the level of fighting. Hence, escalation that falls short of defeating the enemy may cut both ways. On the one hand, it may raise the ambitions on one or both sides and thus widen the gap between what one side would settle for and what the other


70George Church, "Anatomy Of A Disaster," Time, 18 October 1993, p. 46.
demands. It is these opposed effects of escalation that make it so hard to plan for limited wars and to terminate them.\textsuperscript{71}

In U.N. operations escalations in the use of force fundamentally compromise the organization's ability to remain a neutral broker. Former U.N. Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping, Brian Urquhart, understood that violation of the principle of the non-use of force "almost invariably leads to the peacekeepers becoming part of the conflict and therefore part of the problem."\textsuperscript{72} In fact, UNTAC's apparent success can be ascribed to the fact that UNTAC was not allowed to expand its mandate to enforcement and thereby it never became a direct threat to the Khmer Rouge. In fact, it can be argued that UNTAC took on the characteristics more of post-conflict peace-building than peacekeeping. Figure 5 shows how various operations have relied on a mix of the use of force and/or a neutral position to attempt accomplishment of their mission. Generally the operations which have enjoyed the greatest success have relied more on their position as a neutral broker than on the use of force. Certainly no peace-support operation, including UNOSOM II, has had as much firepower as the second Multinational Force (MNF II) in Lebanon. However, increases in firepower did not translate into success.

\textsuperscript{71}Ikle, Every War Must End, p. 42.

The ability to carry out an unrealistic mandate does not materialize with the application of greater force. In the case of UNTAC, the chances of a destabilizing event were reduced by maintaining the neutrality of the operation and steering clear of the use of force. In the end UNTAC resembled more of a peace-building operation than a peace-enforcement. The result of that strategy are discussed in the next chapter.

In Somalia, on the other hand, the shift toward the use of force from UNITAF to UNOSOM II resulted in destabilization of the operation. Once the U.N. Security Council decided to issue a warrant for General of Aidid, a questionable decision in itself, UNOSOM’s legitimacy within...
Somalia rested with its ability to arrest Aidid with low casualties of both U.N. troops and Somalis. In a situation of establishing public security nothing is more likely to enhance the authority's legitimacy in the eyes of the population than a demonstrated capacity to locate and punish criminals.\textsuperscript{73} This being the case, one of the contributing causes underlying the ineffectual use of force in Somalia was the inability of the U.N. to find and track General Aidid.\textsuperscript{74} This shortfall can be attributed, in part, to the United Nations lack of intelligence assets.

D. INTELLIGENCE

Any successful public security operation is dependent upon good intelligence. This is especially true in situations, as in Northern Ireland (and similarly Somalia), where the focus of operations shifts from the control of large crowds to the neutralizing of a comparatively small number of violent activists.\textsuperscript{75} This operational requirement led to the development of a network of intelligence and intelligence-related activities within the British Army and local gendarmeries in Northern Ireland. As the focus of operations

\textsuperscript{73}Leites and Wolf, p. 137.

\textsuperscript{74}Douglas Waller, "When the Bad Guy Has No Phone to Tap," Newsweek, 18 October 1993, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{75}Northern Ireland: An Anglo-Irish Dilemma?, p. 24.
in Somalia developed to include the capture of Aidid, UNOSOM II had a similar intelligence requirement. However, the ability to develop a comprehensive intelligence network is fundamentally against the United Nations' nature.

According to a U.S. House of Representatives intelligence committee member, "The United Nations is so disdainful and fearful of intelligence operations that it has banished the word from its vocabulary."\textsuperscript{76} Instead the intelligence branches of U.N. military operations are euphemistically called "Military Information." In part, the United Nations is fearful of an intelligence function because of the pejorative meaning that the term has to many countries. In many states an intelligence apparatus is associated with an instrument of state coercion such as secret police or death squads.\textsuperscript{77}

Besides its general antipathy toward intelligence operations, the United Nations is not able to establish a cohesive intelligence capability because of its organizational nature. This creates, in effect, another "force divider." One of the inherent difficulties of establishing an intelligence operation within a multilateral effort is the associated the operational level problem of variable goals of the contributing states described in the previous chapter. An

\textsuperscript{76}Waller, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{77}Interview with LCOL Waller.
example of this was provided by the UNTAC Chief of Military Information. UNTAC had a Thai officer as part of the Military Information Branch because of the requirement to provide a geographical balance in each of the branches of U.N. operations. Given the relationship between the Thai military and the Khmer Rouge described in the Chapter III, this situation to provided a possible direct link for the Khmer Rouge to sensitive UNTAC operational plans.  

It is a valid argument that, just as the U.N. should not possess its own army, an organic intelligence capability is inappropriate for the organization. To a large degree the U.N. must rely on the intelligence collection capabilities of contributing states. However, states will be reluctant to share intelligence with the U.N. because other contributing members, who may be considered adversaries in another context, will have access to the information. As with much intelligence information, the overriding concern may not be as much the information itself as the methods of collection.

The requirements for reliable intelligence are different for a military force involved in an insurgent conflict than those in a conventional war. Leites and Wolf point out that information may be more important in intrastate conflicts than

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78 Interview with LCOL Waller.

79 Interview with LCOL Rich Rice.
in other forms of conflict because improvements in intelligence are likely to be more important (productive) than increases in mobility or firepower.\textsuperscript{80} Similarly, the intelligence requirements for U.N. operations in an intrastate war are decidedly different than those for classic peacekeeping. Especially if the operation has a pro-active enforcement character instead of the reactive nature of traditional peacekeeping missions.

However, as U.N. operations become more offensive in nature, such as the manhunt for Mohammed Farah Aidid, the contingents within the force will be hesitant to share information with one another because of possible leaks generated by unilateral relationships between contingents and belligerents. Reports emerged from Somalia in this context, that Italian officers, who disagreed with the policy of attempting to capture Aidid, tipped off his followers in advance of raids on his hiding places.\textsuperscript{81}

The information requirements for these "occupation like" peace-support operations are more human intelligence (humint in intelligence jargon) intensive than the technical intelligence that is important in conventional conflicts. The intelligence requirements are centered around intentions more

\textsuperscript{80}Leites & Wolf, p. 137.

than capabilities. In short, to be capable of operations beyond classic peacekeeping (with a purely defensive posture), the United Nations must be able to deal more effectively with the requirements for intelligence.

E. REFORMING THE SECURITY MECHANISMS OF THE STATE

While the legal status of a U.N. force as an occupying power is debatable, the necessity of building or reforming the security mechanisms of the state saved from failure is irrefutable. Without a professionalized, non-politicized judiciary and military and police force the new state apparatus, to which the U.N. has been the mid-wife, will be unable to face the challenges which caused state disintegration in the first place.

One of the most immediate problems facing a new government is struggling with the security establishment inherited from its predecessor. The organizations of the security establishment will rarely undertake self-reform under the new government. Therefore, it is predictable that security organizations will continue repressive tactics under the new government unless reformed.\(^8\) Serious problems can also arise from security establishments that are replaced in the

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transition of governments, or have become highly politicized by the conflict (especially in communist militaries like the Cambodian People’s Armed Forces). Officers in the military and other security organizations often have strong political ideologies and may greatly resent their loss of power or status in the new order. Often the leaders of these organizations will actively work to bring down the new government. The role of the United Nations forces in the process of reforming a state’s military in past operations has been unclear.

From the beginning of the Congo operation it was assumed that one of its major tasks of the mission was to assist the Congolese Government in reorganizing and retraining the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC). The solicitation of such assistance was explicit in the initial communications between Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and Secretary-General Hammarskjold in July 1960 requesting the deployment of a U.N. force. The ANC could be referred to as an army in only the most euphemistic of terms. In fact it was "an undisciplined confederation of armed units, each of which was directed by

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84 Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, p. 67.
former non-commissioned officers."

The ANC and the gendarmerie were indeed two of the major sources of disorder in the Congo. If the ANC, which had no logistics system, had to deploy over any distance it was required to survive by "appropriating" from the local populace. This usually meant stripping the population in its path of anything of value. The most fundamental problem facing the Congolese Government and the U.N. in exerting control over the ANC was the lack of a competent officer corps to replace the Belgian officers who had departed when the Congo gained its independence.

The U.N. began a several fledgling retraining programs in late 1960. However, the programs were discontinued within a matter of months. The reason for discontinuation of the programs according to the U.N. force commander, Carl von Horn, was the recruits' propensity to begin training and then disappear in a few days with their equipment. However, one of the ultimate sources of Congolese non-cooperation with the U.N. can be traced to, then Commander of the ANC, General Joseph Mobutu's desire not to have the U.N. remove his base of


86 Ibid.

power by reforming the military. Mobutu preferred bilateral external military support, especially from Belgium, because it did not intrude into his domain by requiring restructuring and professionalization.

In order to force compliance with a retraining program, the U.N. force would have required a stronger mandate from the Security Council for which the Secretary-General was unwilling to ask. The eventual price of not being able to "reform" the ANC meant that the army remained a disruptive force in the Congo and was latter unable to meet the internal security needs of the Congo. The United Nations' inability to develop any meaningful foundation for the maintenance of public order or internal security, through the retraining the army, after the departure of the U.N. is an example of the inherent problems in using an international organization for what the U.S. Army terms "foreign internal defense." According to Lefever:

Historically, states needing military assistance have turned to a close ally or friendly state, and not to an internationally authorized multinational staff. Collaboration in the vital matters of national security implies a degree of mutual trust and some common political objectives. Such mutuality is virtually impossible between a sovereign government and a multinational U.N. mission. Even at best, relations between two close allies tend to be strained on sensitive national security problems. The Congo experience suggests that an international instrumentality is probably not psychologically and politically competent to

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88House, p. 151.
assist effectively in a task as sensitive as the building of the military establishment of a sovereign state. 89

Similarly, in Cambodia the U.N. recognized the need to provide provisions for the maintenance of security through the exertion of some modicum of control over the military. However, in Cambodia this took the form of payment and observation more than retraining. The military units of all of the factions had resorted to banditry during the U.N. operation because of the end of the external aid which had funded them prior to the Paris Peace accords. As the U.N. prepared to withdraw its military forces there was a fear that the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) and the remaining non-communist guerrillas would "slide into warlordism." 90 The possibility of military units becoming more pronouncedly autonomous would have given the inchoate government, elected two months previously, little possibility of controlling events outside of Phnom Penh.

Following the June 1993 agreement to integrate the the non-communist guerrillas with the CPAF into the Cambodian Armed Forces (CAF) the U.N. established a mechanism to pay the salaries of Cambodia's civil service and newly formed army. An estimated 11 million U.S. dollars was made available

89 Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, pp. 71-72.
through the Cambodian Trust Fund, which was made up of voluntary contributions from U.N. member nations. While UNTAC officials saw the budget support issue as critical to the military's continued commitment to the democratization process there was still the problem of training the armed forces to combat the Khmer Rouge.

The publicized "successful" offensive which immediately followed the consolidation of the three factions into the CAF, showed an underestimation of the tactical acumen and patience of the Khmer Rouge. The United Nations payment of the CAF soldiers' salaries was useful in the short term to inhibit the return to banditry by the military. However, the CAF, which is primarily composed of soldiers and equipment from the CPAF, is not even a mediocre army by Third World standards. This army, which had no luck in defeating the Khmer Rouge for over a decade with the assistance of a 100,000 plus man Vietnamese occupation force.

Reforming Cambodia's judiciary also presented severe problems for UNTAC. In January 1993, UNTAC chief Yasushi Akashi introduced special powers of arrest, detention and prosecution for the U.N. force to combat the wave of political violence. UNTAC's issue of arrest warrants for seven CPAF


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soldiers accused of murdering opposition opponents showed the inadequacies of the U.N.'s authoritative abilities. Since UNTAC had no judicial apparatus within Cambodia, it had to rely on the courts of existing administrative structure to try suspects. This presents grave problems when one considers that all of the judges were members of the political party of the Hun Sen regime. Implementing Cambodia's new constitution, after UNTAC's withdrawal, will be difficult when one considers that, all of the judiciary present at that time belonged to the Hun Sen Government's political party. According to U.N. officials, all of the lawyers in the country ready to become senior judges, of which there were only four, belonged to the CPP.

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V. UNTAC CASE STUDY - THE POLITICAL PROCESS

In order to understand this new type of "nation building" mission that the U.N. has taken on, one must be able to demarcate the inherent mission limitations, described in the previous two chapters, that are common to all of these operations as opposed to the limitations that are situation specific to each United Nations effort. While all of these operations have some commonalities, dictated mostly by the way that the United Nations does business, the situation-specific problems may make a political solution more difficult in one case than another.

In the case of Cambodia, the May 1993 elections represented the culmination of over a decade of diplomatic efforts and a two year peacekeeping operation by the United Nations, to bring an end to the state of civil war which has existed in Cambodia for almost a quarter of a century. By the some estimates the UNTAC effort has cost close to $3 billion\(^1\) and the lives of at least a dozen peacekeepers in the field.\(^2\)

The perceptions of whether the effort was a success or a

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failure will have a direct effect on the international community's willingness to invest in similar ventures in places such as the former Yugoslavia.³

According to the Agreements On A Comprehensive Political Settlement Of The Cambodia Conflict, otherwise known as the Paris Peace Accords, signed in October 1991 in order to restore and maintain peace in Cambodia, to promote national reconciliation and to ensure the exercise of the right to self-determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair elections ... only a comprehensive political settlement ... will be just and durable.⁴

However, the result of one of the largest and most expensive United Nations operations⁵ was that UNTAC officials salvaged the appearance of success without having really attained "a peaceful, just and durable solution to the Cambodian conflict."⁶ Instead of providing a vehicle for a comprehensive political solution through free and fair elections, the means became the ends for UNTAC. The end goal was simply to hold the "best possible" election given the


⁵It is estimated that the U.N. operation in Somalia may surpass UNTAC in size and cost. Interview with Mr. Behrooz Sadry, UNTAC Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Phnom Penh, 5 May 1993.

political realities of Cambodia and extricate the U.N. from a "political hot potato" as soon as was politically possible.7

According to all observers the requirements for "a neutral political environment" as envisioned by the 1991 Paris Peace Accords was abandoned for an election held under conditions described as "reasonably free and fair and acceptable."8 The distance between the original goal and the final reality meant that fighting continued on a large scale between the new Provisional Cambodian Government and the Khmer Rouge as UNTAC withdrew from the country.9

A. BACKGROUND

Prior to the October 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, the Cambodian civil conflict was formed around four warring factions: the Vietnamese installed regime and three resistance groups. These four factions, through an odd mixture of alliances and associations, have been fighting each other for control of Cambodia for almost three decades. They all have displayed a chameleon-like ability for changing their political positions.

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7 Sadry Interview, 5 May 1993.

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The central figure in any discussion of Cambodian politics is Prince Norodom Sihanouk. He was chosen by the Cambodian Regency to ascend to the throne in 1941 at the age of eighteen. He was the head of the Cambodian Government in one form or another from Cambodia’s independence from France in 1953 to his deposition by a military coup led by his defense minister, Lon Nol, in 1970. He spent almost all of the next 21 years in exile in China. He aligned with the Khmer Rouge against the Lon Nol Government and was reinstated as the Head of State following the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975. However, a year later he was placed under house arrest and returned to exile in China in 1978 following the Vietnamese invasion. While considered eccentric and temperamental, it would be a mistake to underestimate the popularity that this former "god-king" enjoys with a large percentage of the Cambodian populus.

Sihanouk founded one of the major non-communist resistance factions, the National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful, Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCIPEC). In 1982 he was named president of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), the tripartite resistance organization which also included the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). This coalition maintained the United Nation’s seat for Cambodia rather than the Phnom Penh regime. This arrangement caused a great deal of acrimony. Even many who believed that the Phnom Penh
regime, the State of Cambodia (SOC), was nothing more than a puppet regime for the Vietnamese and Russians, could not fathom granting an accord of international recognition to a pariah organization, such as the Khmer Rouge, out of Cold War necessity. Following the 1989 withdrawal of the Vietnamese army, Western governments began to acknowledge the fact that the Hun Sen Government actually had the support of significant portions of the local population.\textsuperscript{10}

The one term that has become universally synonymous with the civil war in Cambodia is "Khmer Rouge." The Khmer Rouge (KR) is an extremist, Maoist organization which was in power from 1975 to 1978. The Khmer Rouge hoped to re-establish a purely agrarian, purely Khmer society within Cambodia\textsuperscript{11} by forcing the evacuation of the major urban centers and purging all non-ethnic Khmers from the population. During that time it was responsible for purges that resulted in the deaths of between one and three million people, through outright murder or neglect.

It is evident from the accounts of refugees that the greatest cause of deaths during this period were hunger, disease and exposure. The official United States Department


\textsuperscript{11}Presently 88\% of the population is ethnically Khmer. The remainder are generally Vietnamese or Chinese.
of State's estimate of the number of deaths attributable to the Khmer Rouge is 1.2 million, while Amnesty International's figure is 1.4 million. Pol Pot, the secretive and elusive leader of the Khmer Rouge, estimated a modest 800 thousand. The population of Cambodia was estimated at 7.1 million in 1972 (the last census was taken in 1962). Using a figure which is the difference between the State Department and Amnesty International estimates, the Khmer Rouge was responsible for the unnatural deaths of nearly 20% of the Cambodian population.

Since being driven from power in 1979, the Khmer Rouge has existed as an insurgent group in northwest Cambodia and in camps along the Thai border. The military arm of the Khmer Rouge is the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). It was generally recognized as the best equipped and best organized of all of the resistance groups. Its strength before the Peace Accords was estimated between 40,000 and 50,000 combatants. However, its true strength at the time of the 1993 elections was between 13,000 and 14,000. Throughout the struggle the Khmer Rouge attained virtually all of its aid from the People's Republic of China, with Thailand acting as a conduit for the shipment of goods and equipment.

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13Ibid., p. 269.
The Khmer Rouge, which formally changed its name to the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), attempted to alter its public image following the peace agreement of 1991. While "new" Khmer Rouge rhetoric criticized the "excesses of the past," evidence indicates that the party's goal is to regain complete control of the Cambodian state.\textsuperscript{14} Part of this public image campaign to achieve legitimacy was the "retirement" of Pol Pot. He was officially listed only as an advisor to the party. This was widely viewed as a ploy to enhance the Khmer Rouge's badly damaged reputation, both domestically and internationally. The conventional wisdom is that Pol Pot was still the most influential leader within the Khmer Rouge. However, the nominal front man for the Khmer Rouge throughout the negotiations in the late 1980s and early 1990s was Khieu Samphan. He is highly educated, holding a doctorate in economics from the University of Paris, and presented a polished and moderate image to the public.

Of the two non-communist resistance factions, the one most closely associated with Prince Sihanouk was FUNCIPEC. It was organized in 1981 to oppose the State of Cambodia and its Vietnamese backers. While receiving support from a broad base of foreign powers including China, ASEAN (Association of

Southeast Asian Nations), and the United States, FUNCIPEC remained largely a collection of royal family cronies and loyal supporters of Sihanouk. Following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, FUNCIPEC was nominally run by Sihanouk's son Prince Ranariddh.

The armed force of FUNCIPEC was the National Army of Independent Kampuchea (ANKI), formerly called the Sihanouk National Army (ANS). ANKI was largely viewed as an ineffective fighting force with little chance of success against the army of the Phnom Penh regime or the Vietnamese armed forces occupying Cambodia. Troop strength estimates ranged anywhere from 7,000 to 11,000 combatants.\(^\text{15}\)

The other non-communist resistance faction was the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). Formed in 1979 by the remnants of the Lon Nol Government, it was the weakest of the three factions in all respects: financially, militarily and politically. Since its inception the KPNLF was characterized by the factionalism and incompetence that were the legacy of the Lon Nol Government. The internal schisms of the organization debilitated any effectiveness that it might have developed. Its military entity received arms from China and ASEAN nations, especially Singapore and Malaysia.

\(^{15}\)Department of the Army, Cambodia: A Country Study, p. 276.
Fielding a maximum of 8,000 troops at any given time,\textsuperscript{16} it was never considered a significant factor in the fighting between the CGDK and the Phnom Penh regime.

The State of Cambodia (SOC) was the de facto government installed in Phnom Penh by the invading Vietnamese Army that drove the Khmer Rouge from power in January 1979. It was a Marxist-Leninist creation of the Vietnamese Government that was built around numerous former members of the Khmer Rouge. The leadership of the SOC had defected from Khmer Rouge to avoid being purged as the organization began to devour itself toward the end of its reign.\textsuperscript{17} The two leading figures in the SOC faction were Chea Sim and Hun Sen, both members of the Khmer Rouge before defecting to Vietnam in 1978. However, after the U.N.-brokered peace agreements, the political wing of the government, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), attempted a drastic change in its image. Having changed its name to the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), it supposedly renounced communism and embraced democracy and free market economics. The military wing of the SOC was the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF). In the decade from 1979 to 1989 the CPAF was bolstered by the Vietnamese

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 274.

occupation force. It received training and the majority of its equipment directly from Vietnam. However, it did receive some aid directly from the Soviet Union. Its total strength was estimated to be approximately 100,000 troops.\textsuperscript{18}

B. THE UNTAC PLAN AND THE RESULTS

The key elements of the Cambodian peace plan developed by the United Nations were: a cease-fire by all parties; the cessation of all outside military aid; the formation of a Supreme National Council (SNC); U.N. organized elections by May 1993; the interim control of all critical state functions by the U.N.; the repatriation of 360,000 refugees from the Thai border camps; and the disarming and demobilization of an estimated 200,000 combatants. In order to accomplish these considerable tasks, the U.N. plan called for an eighteen month deployment of 22,000 personnel.

The U.N. peace plan originally envisioned, among other things, the presence of thousands of its own administrators and the multinational military force which would oversee the disarming and demobilization of 70\% of the warring factions' troops.\textsuperscript{19} Initially, the main functions of the peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{18}Guide to Key Players in Cambodia, A Reference Aid prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, p. 7.

force (16,000 military personnel of the entire 22,000 UNTAC contingent) had little to do directly with the election process.

According to the original Security Council plan, the actual military force of twelve infantry battalions (approximately 10,000 troops) had four main functions: one, verification of Vietnamese troop withdrawal and non-return; two, monitoring the cessation of arms supplies from foreign countries; three, finding arms caches, confiscating weapons and cantoning troops from all warring factions; and four, establishing a mine clearance plan for demining Cambodia. Originally, UNTAC military and police components were only to provide security arrangements for registration and polling stations in special circumstances.

The four-month cantonment and demobilization phase was the only phase of UNTAC in which it was planned to have a full strength international contingent of twelve infantry battalions. During this phase the leadership of each faction was to move its troops under its own command to various cantonment sites where they would take possession of all weapons and hand them over to U.N. authorities. Following

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20Ibid, p. 11.

this phase UNTAC was to move into the six-month electoral phase and six of the battalions would be repatriated.\(^22\)

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, and the military Force Commander, Australian Lieutenant General John Sanderson, arrived in Cambodia on March 15th, 1992 to assume command of UNTAC. Battalions from the various participating nations began to deploy on the 1st of May to monitor the proposed cease-fire, which was scheduled to begin on the 31st of May 1992, and supervise the cantonment and demobilization of the faction’s armed forces.

In one of the initial missteps of UNTAC, Akashi decided that 100% of the combatants should be demobilized. When asked how the factions might respond to this last minute change, a U.N. official answered, “What choice do they have?”\(^23\) This change from the agreed upon demobilization procedure may have further encouraged the factions to resist demobilization completely. According to U.N. documents, of the 200,000 combatants to be disarmed, only 52,000 were cantoned by the 10th September 1992. This included 42,000 from the Cambodian People’s Armed Forces (CPAF) and the 10,000 man total combined

\(^{22}\)&textsuperscript{22}Ibid., Annex 2.

forces of the non-communist resistance.24 The Khmer Rouge’s armed forces, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), had cantoned no one at this point.

The Khmer Rouge used various assertions as ploys to refuse to cooperate with the planned demobilization. These included assertions that Vietnamese troops were still present in Cambodia, that UNTAC illegitimately strengthened the SOC, and disagreement over the speed of demobilization.25 In order to retain its right to compete in the political process, the Khmer Rouge made a last minute concession in October 1992 by symbolically demobilizing a few guerrilla battalions, but retained the bulk of its forces and armaments. (The term "battalion" here has no equivalency to a conventional force’s definition. An average Khmer Rouge division contains on the average 450 men.) Due to Khmer Rouge intransigence, the SOC also halted the demobilization of the CPAF. Thus, the two most bitter rivals for power within Cambodia maintained the ability to affect the outcome of the 1993 election and future political activity through coercive force.


When it became apparent that the demobilization phase of UNTAC was failing, one of the key decisions made by Akashi and Lt Gen. Sanderson was to ask that the multinational battalions remain in the country to help protect the electoral process. Since the demobilization phase had failed, the only way to maintain the "secure environment" for the elections was to retain the military presence of troops on the ground. This subtle shift in mission placed the U.N. soldiers in a potentially more adversarial role with any faction that might want to disrupt the registration or election process.

Since a neutral political environment had not been attained through the disarmament phase, the U.N. needed to rely on its 16,000-man military force to establish secure conditions for the elections. However, it was realized early on that UNTAC's military strength was grossly insufficient to adequately protect the estimated 1,400 election sites that were initially considered necessary to canvas the registered population. When one considers that the "teeth" of the military force really only consisted of 10,000 armed men from the infantry battalions,\textsuperscript{26} UNTAC's situation became even more tenuous. In order to provide adequate security for the polling stations, UNTAC had to turn to the CPAF for soldiers. Thus, UNTAC found itself tacitly aligned with one of the

factions which it was supposed to disarm, thereby providing a modicum of truth to Khmer Rouge propaganda of UNTAC/SOC complicity. Furthermore, UNTAC was forced to reduce the number of polling stations in areas where the Khmer Rouge could deny them access. Three weeks prior to the elections the estimated number of polling stations was reduced to 1,400. The areas where UNTAC felt that it could safely establish polling sites excluded approximately 25% of the eligible voters in Cambodia.27

The Khmer Rouge consistently tried to undermine the peace process by claiming that there were still large numbers of Vietnamese troops in the country and that the U.N. has shown preferential treatment to the SOC. As proof of U.N.-SOC complicity, the Khmer Rouge pointed to the large number of mid-level SOC functionaries who helped UNTAC run the country. The Khmer Rouge demanded that the U.N. completely dismantle the SOC government bureaucracy. This, of course, was an impossible request simply because there were no other qualified individuals available to perform the necessary day to day duties of the government. Additionally, Annex 1 of the Paris Agreements specifically recognized that the SOC

27Interview with LT S. Hines, Royal Canadian Navy, Information Officer, UNTAC Naval Component Headquarters, Phnom Penh, 5 May 1993.
Administration would have to operate the everyday governmental functions of Cambodia.\textsuperscript{28}

A second critical decision made by UNTAC authorities was to allow the election timetable to proceed without the participation of the Khmer Rouge. According to the U.N. plan, in order for a political party to be considered valid it had to be able to provide verifiable membership lists of at least 5,000 registered voters.\textsuperscript{29} As the 31 January 1993 deadline for voter registration established by UNTAC passed, there were 22 parties officially registered, minus the Khmer Rouge.

The leaders of the SOC intermittently saw the advantage of distancing themselves from UNTAC. A show of resolve and effectiveness against the Khmer Rouge prior to the elections could only strengthen the SOC's position in the minds of the Cambodian people. Being able to present themselves as the only barrier to a Khmer Rouge return to power once the U.N. forces departed was an undeniable advantage that the SOC had over the other parties.

Prince Sihanouk also used the failings of the U.N. mission to further his own agenda. By unleashing a diatribe upon UNTAC, Sihanouk was been able to project himself as the only

\textsuperscript{28}Robin Davies, "Blue Berets, Green Backs: What was the impact?," \textit{Phnom Penh Post}, 22 October - 04 November 1993, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{29}Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992, p. 5.
hope for some sort of unified government. Sihanouk attempted to marginalize UNTAC's influence with the various factions and external actors by statements such as:

In order to be able to tell the U.N. and the world that they succeeded in their mission, UNTAC is going to have an election despite the fact none of the conditions for the election have been met. None. It is a hideous comedy.  

and

UNTAC is very unpopular ... The four factions detest each other, but UNTAC has brought unanimity of the factions against itself. They are unanimous in saying that UNTAC is very bad. I want to put myself above UNTAC, that is, to exercise power not in place of UNTAC but to do what UNTAC cannot or will not do ... I am fed up, but I am not going to expel UNTAC. I'll do everything to help UNTAC hold the election, because that is the best means of getting rid of UNTAC.  

So strong was his appeal that, as the UNTAC plan appeared to be unraveling, the ASEAN foreign ministers proposed that Sihanouk form a coalition government before the elections with all four factions, including the Khmer Rouge. The idea was rejected outright by Hun Sen and the SOC faction.

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32 Nayan Chanda and Nate Thayer, "I Want to Retake Power," p. 20.
C. IDEOLOGICALLY OPPOSED FACTIONS AND ELECTIONS

Any analysis of the Cambodian situation begs the question: how could an electoral settlement be expected to succeed in a zero-sum conflict where victory for one has meant extinction for the other? History shows that electoral solutions are extremely difficult in intrastate conflicts where the factions are not only battling over control of the state, but over ideological perceptions about the very nature of the state. In such "polarized political cultures" compromise is defined as betrayal of one's side.\(^3\)

Work by some analysts suggests that the decision by both the regime and rebel leaders to seek a democratic "exit" from a conflict is based upon rational cost/benefit calculations of playing the competitive electoral game versus continuing the armed conflict.\(^4\) The very nature of intrastate conflicts, that are neither separatist nor irredentist movements, suggests that neither side can be expected to settle for negotiated terms of an electoral competition if it anticipates it can improve its position by continued warfare. Only factions whose military power is reduced to insignificance


(i.e.,FUNCPEC and KPNLF) will readily opt for a negotiated settlement. A democratic solution is a distant second-best solution for parties that retain military power strong enough to win or at least effectively contest.

While the Khmer Rouge was the first party to reject the demobilization process, the SOC also used military force to increase its political standing. Within hours after the 31 January deadline for political party registration had passed, the CPAF launched a series of attacks against Khmer Rouge territory. This move was considered to be a political maneuver more than an operation of military significance. The January 1993 offensive by CPAF troops against Khmer Rouge positions in Battambang province was seen more as a ploy to garner public support for the SOC than a true "dry season offensive."

The fact that both the Khmer Rouge and the SOC maintained their coercive capabilities throughout the electoral process had significant effects on the elections. According to legal scholars, the international monitoring of elections to ensure the implementation of a population's "participatory entitlement" according to *The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* requires that voting be not only secret and honest but

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that campaigning be free of intimidation and repression. Incidences of Khmer Rouge violence directed against both SOC and UNTAC targets usually resulted in an increase in SOC popularity. The more the Cambodian population perceived the Khmer Rouge as a clear and present threat, the more they saw the SOC as the only force standing between them and another Khmer Rouge takeover. This feeling was exacerbated by general misgivings of UNTAC's peacekeeping job in Cambodia. Many Cambodians were confused by UNTAC's reluctance to actively search out and engage the Khmer Rouge and felt that they could only rely on the CPAF to protect them.

However, the leadership of the SOC government's party (the Cambodian People's Party - CPP) also displayed a willingness to use violence and political terror. In fact, while the Khmer Rouge received much of the negative press regarding coercive tactics prior to the 1993 elections, CPAF troops, as an instrument of the CPP, were accused of responsibility for a high percentage of the political violence. This includes assassinations of at least 50 opposition party candidates and workers prior to the actual campaign period, intimidation of


the population, and prevention of canvassing by opposition parties.\textsuperscript{38}

Additionally, while the Khmer Rouge was not on the ballot per se, its military strength gave it the ability to deny the election's, and thus the new government's, validity in any area that it effectively controlled. Essentially, this meant that it could have attempted to establish a separate de facto state in approximately one quarter of the country.\textsuperscript{39}

Clearly, the Khmer Rouge would have benefitted most from a clear FUNCIPEC victory. An outright FUNCIPEC victory might have meant an invitation into the new government by Sihanouk, and the opportunity to subvert the new government. Reports by Chinese diplomats that Prince Sihanouk offered the Khmer Rouge a role in the future government of Cambodia in return for a promise not to disrupt the election.\textsuperscript{40} Following these reports, both the United States and France threatened to withhold aid if the provisional Cambodian administration included the Khmer Rouge in the new government.\textsuperscript{41} In fact,

\begin{thebibliography}{41}
\bibitem{38} "Khmer Blues," \textit{The Economist}, 20 February 1993, p. 36.
\bibitem{39} Interview with LCOL Waller, 4 May 1993.
\end{thebibliography}
voters from Khmer Rouge held territory reported that Khmer Rouge cadre had instructed them to vote for FUNCIPED.42

A clear CPP victory would have been the worst case scenario for the Khmer Rouge because it would legitimize the SOC Government in the eyes of external actors, thereby providing them with access to military and economic aid. It was unlikely that the SOC would have been willing to surrender control of the military if it had lost the elections outright. In fact, some western powers saw a clear CPP victory as the best possible outcome because it would have ensured that the militarily strongest faction would not negate the results.43 An overwhelming FUNCIPED victory could have also triggered a potential coup by the CPAF. Prior to the elections it had been rumored that a FUNCIPED victory would only provide the military leadership with an excuse for a coup to ostensibly protect the Cambodian populous from an opportunistic Khmer Rouge attack.

The fears of a possible rejection of results or a military coup were grounded in some measure of truth. Following the effective tie between FUNCIPED and the CPP a faction within


43Interview with Mr. Mark Strella, Political Officer, U.S. Mission to Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 27 April 1993.
the SOC rejected the election results in certain provinces and attempted to form a rump state in the eastern provinces.44

While the newly formed Cambodian Armed Forces (CAF) was subordinated to the provisional coalition government, it still must contend with an insurgent force that it has not been able to defeat for thirteen years even with a huge Vietnamese presence. The CAF's attempts to finally defeat the Khmer Rouge will take more than a massive influx of military aid. Presently the CAF is not even a mediocre army by Third World standards and is beset with the same nepotism and corruption that is evident in the rest of the Cambodian bureaucracy.

The second best scenario for the Khmer Rouge was the result: an nearly even split between FUNCIPEC and the CPP. FUNCIPEC won 58 of the 120 seats in the national assembly, while the CPP won 51 seats.45 This result ensured a weak and inherently unstable new provisional government that may yet be unable to consolidate an effective government. Sihanouk, in his typical mercurial fashion, used the instability of the constituent assembly to further his own power within the new government. By playing both ends against one another Sihanouk


45Ibid.
was able to have himself crowned King on the 24th of September 1993.46

The newly elected assembly's primary task was to draft a new constitution which was adopted on the 21st of September 1993 and ratified by Sihanouk at his coronation. However, many observers of the constituent assembly's process remarked that the United Nations had spent $2 billion "to bring back the old forms of government."47 While the Constitution states that the King "reigns but does not rule," it grants Sihanouk, among other things, the power to declare a state of emergency if the prime minister and cabinet agree.48 This requirement may not present much of an obstacle considering that the Prime Minister is his son, Prince Ranariddh.

The constitution is also weak on the protection of minorities. Some of the rights in the constitution seem to refer only to Cambodian citizens (ethnic Khmer) and not to all of the residents of the country.49 While free and fair elections may be the sine qua non of a democratic process,


49 Ibid.
democracy generally means "rule by the majority with respect for the rights of minority." \(^5\)

Regardless of whether an external actor's ability to institute a "comprehensive political solution" to a failing state is within the realm of the possible, it should be realized that the bottom line is that it is generally true that successful electoral solutions to internal wars have only occurred when the rebels were demobilized prior to the elections. \(^51\)

D. CONCLUSION: THEORIES OF VICTORY

In the end it appears that the United Nations and the Khmer Rouge had the same theory of victory for UNTAC: namely the appearance of a successful election and the prompt withdrawal of the multinational force. For the ultra-xenophobic Khmer Rouge the "infecting influence" of thousands of foreigners on Cambodian soil was an ideological nightmare. For the leadership of the United Nations, the successful completion of the election was necessary to maintain the momentum they had been gathering to implement a stronger U.N. position in the security arena.

\(^{50}\) Linz, p. 64.

\(^{51}\) Shugart, p. 130.
A central operational goal of any organization is organizational health.\textsuperscript{52} "Most organizations define the central goal of 'health' in terms of growth in budget, manpower, and territory."\textsuperscript{53} The organizational growth of the United Nations, like that of other organizations, is determined by the leadership of the primary executive agents and bureaucracies within the organization. However, the personality of the Secretary-General is perhaps more important in determining the direction of the U.N. than that of the chief executive officer in other international organizations.\textsuperscript{54}

The work of various Secretaries-General to increase the power of the United Nations has resulted in the development of broader operational goals. In implementing these goals, the U.N. leadership has attempted to move the organization more in the direction of a supra-national actor. For example, through the development of the organization's preventive diplomacy capability Secretary-General Dag Hammarskhold felt that the organization had gained "a certain independent position, and that this tendency has led to the acceptance of an independent


\textsuperscript{53}Allison, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{54}Lee, von Pagenhardt, and Stanley, p. 27.
political and diplomatic activity on the part of the Secretary-General.  "55 

Zealous proponents of a strengthened United Nations military capability were happy with the selection of Boutros-Ghali as the Secretary-General and categorized him as an "activist" Secretary-General like Hammarskjold or Trygve Lie. 56 Boutros-Ghali's attempts to broaden the power of the United Nations range from the queries to the Japanese Prime Minister about changing the nature of UNTAC to an enforcement mission (see Chapter IV; Mandates and Mission Slip) to his 29 November 1993 letter to the Security Council showing his preference that the U.S.-commanded UNITAF mission be under U.N. command and control. 57 

In early 1993, with the United Nations' credibility already suffering from its inabilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, the U.N. desperately needed a success in Cambodia. According to one commentator: 

In international politics, nothing succeeds like success. Momentum accrues to the gainer and accelerates his movement. The appearance of irreversibility in his gains enfeebles one


56Lee, von Pagenhardt, and Stanley, p. 27. 

57Makinda, p. 70. 

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side and stimulates the other all the more. The bandwagon collects those on the sidelines.  

As the date of the election approached, it was apparent that UNTAC was on the verge of unraveling. Cambodia was becoming, in the words of UNTAC's Deputy Special Representative, "a political hot potato." If UNTAC was unable to declare the vote "acceptable," the Cambodian operation would be the U.N.'s "most expensive and humiliating failure." With other operations ailing, UNTAC was the United Nations' chance to gain momentum.

As outlined earlier in this chapter, the appearance of success was not to be lost, even if the election was held in only a portion of Cambodia. To most observers' surprise, the Khmer Rouge did not disrupt the elections. However, UNTAC still had to deal with possible spoilers to keep their success intact. One week after the election Prince Sihanouk declared that he would form a coalition government with the Cambodian People's Party and FUNCIPEC. The creation of this government would have been in violation of the 1991 peace treaty which dictated that the new government was supposed to emerge out of the deliberations of the National Assembly. The U.N.

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59 Interview with Behrooz Sadry.

60 MacFarquhar, p. 46.
leadership displayed their desire to salvage the appearance of success, at the expense of the implementation of the Cambodian electorate's resolution, by appearing willing to accept Sihanouk's coalition government. The United Nations' apparent acquiescence to Sihanouk's whims showed that the UNTAC political leadership did not want to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory now that their biggest threat, the Khmer Rouge, was apparently subdued.

While the Khmer Rouge appeared to be isolated and vulnerable because of their reluctance to attack the political process designed by UNTAC, the significance of their political weight should not be dismissed now or in the future. The Khmer Rouge's strongest political weapons remain viable: ultra-nationalism (particularly anti-Vietnamese xenophobia), secrecy and guile. Given the Cambodians' popular perception that the Vietnamese are still intent on colonizing their country, the Khmer Rouge's nationalist appeal should not be underestimated.

Experts on the Khmer Rouge point out that in the past this guerrilla organization has effectively used the tactic of infiltrating agents into both allied and opposition parties.


According to these analysts, this tactic probably remains in use today. The presence of numerous Khmer Rouge agents within the FUNCIPEC party would not be surprising since they were allies for over a decade. In fact, according to statements made by Pol Pot to a gathering of his cadre in 1988, the re-establishment of Sihanouk as the leader of the Cambodian state is part of their strategy: "Let Sihanouk be the president. He is only the peel of the orange, while we are the fruit ... although he and the outside world do not fully comprehend this." It should be remembered that the Khmer Rouge came to power in the mid-1970s partly through co-opting Sihanouk as their titular leader. This fact alone could account for the Khmer Rouge allowing Cambodians from their controlled territory, as well as their own soldiers, to vote in the election with instructions to vote for FUNCIPEC. However, there may be another reason for this action.

To many observers, the Khmer Rouge decision not to disrupt the elections translated as the inability to do so. According to the Chief of the U.S. Mission to Cambodia, Charles Twining, the peaceful voting turnout proved that "the Khmer Rouge have failed ... This leaves the Khmer Rouge in the forest - and I

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64Peschoux, pp. 22-23.
hope they like it there."65 This statement ignores the fact that for over a decade the Khmer Rouge has been using a strategy of infiltrating cadre into villages for clandestine political work66 and that according to the U.N.'s own intelligence maps at the time of the election, the guerrilla organization was "operating with varying degrees of impunity in 25 percent of the country; and in another 25 percent of the country they (were) operating freely by day and in control by night."67

The appearance of defeat is perhaps exactly the image that the Khmer Rouge wished to present. Sun Tzu, a fourth century B.C. Chinese general and author of the "longest existing and most widely studied military classic in human history"68 (The Art of War), wrote that, "All warfare is based on deception. Therefore when capable, feign incapacity: when active, inactivity."69 The theory that the Khmer Rouge emerged from the election in a better position to return to power than any


time since 1979 has been referred to as the "Sun Tzu Thesis."\textsuperscript{70}

The military philosophy of Sun Tzu drew the attention of contemporary strategists following the guerrilla campaigns of Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh.\textsuperscript{71} The strategies of the Khmer Rouge have been based on those of Mao’s People’s Liberation Army,\textsuperscript{72} and reflect more the style of Sun Tzu than Clausewitz. Sun Tzu’s theory of victory, recognized to be profoundly anti-Clausewitzian, stresses using time rather than force to defeat an enemy.\textsuperscript{73}

The only way for the Khmer Rouge to "defeat" their greatest threat (namely, the international community’s attention focused on Cambodia during UNTAC’s tenure) was to use time rather than force. The presence of over twenty thousand foreigners on Cambodian soil was an ideological catastrophe for the xenophobic group that had attempted to remove all traces of foreign influence from their society during the late 1970s. Had the Khmer Rouge denied UNTAC its

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70}Etcheson, "Pol Pot and the Art of War," p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{73}Keegan, p. 202.
\end{itemize}
"victory" perhaps the U.N. leadership would have been prompted to remain in Cambodia past their projected withdrawal date.

As in the past, the U.N. is reluctant to abandon an operation that is unsuccessful, such as UNIFIL in Lebanon, because the alternative appears worse. Because the elections were completed in relative calm, both the Khmer Rouge and UNTAC achieved their ironically common goal: the quickest possible withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodian soil. In the end, both UNTAC and the Khmer Rouge employed the same tactics to achieve success: the willingness to trade territory for time and the use of time rather than force to achieve success. For the United Nations, UNTAC’s success meant the continued organizational growth of the "new era" of peacekeeping. For the Khmer Rouge, UNTAC’s success meant that the world’s attention would again turn away from Cambodia.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

At the outset of this analysis I proposed that the new type of peace-support mission being taken on by the United Nations posed four broad questions: one, what are the requirements for an external actor to broker solutions to intrastate conflicts and form stable governments in failing states? Two, is the U.N. capable of the decisive, effective action required in these operations given its inherent limitations as an organization of politically diverse member states? Three, what are the principal difficulties in the use of external military force to solve intrastate conflicts? And finally, can the "successful" completion of a United Nations peacekeeping operation ensure the future viability of the state? This final chapter will highlight the answers to the questions discussed in the four previous chapters.

A. THE NEW ERA OF PEACEKEEPING

One of the conflict trends of the emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War, has been the disintegration of sovereign states. Two of the largest U.N. peace-support efforts (UNTAC in Cambodia and UNOSOM II in Somalia) have been deployed to help states that had failed or were on the verge of failing because of the effects of internal crises.
For years, these severely atrophied states have had sovereignty only in terms of legal statehood. Legal statehood provided these states with the right of self-determination and freedom from outside interference, but they did not possess the capacity for effective government. Many of these "pseudo" states continue to exist in the international system, but lack real substance and power. The trend of catastrophic deterioration following the Cold War has resulted in a group of states that are incapable of sustaining themselves. In fact, in some of these states the combination of war, disease and crime have resulted in complete anarchy.

The existence of instant world-wide telecommunications and "supranational" organizations such as the U.N. means that social systems can no longer dissolve without the effects being felt around the globe. The converging trends of these failing states and the globalization of information have prompted the United Nations to forsake its founding principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs.

In extreme cases, the state ceases to function and authority is fragmented among various collective actors (collectivities) that effectively become miniature counter-states. These collectivities may consist of failed previous governments, nations, clans, tribes, various guerrilla organizations, or any combination of these. This challenge to the authority of the state and redirection of legitimacy
toward these collectivities begins to erode state sovereignty. In a failed state, the state can no longer assert authority. At the same time, it is seldom the case that any one quasi counter-state is able to gain a sufficient power base to fill the vacuum.

The United Nations has attempted to fill the vacuum created by the failing state in peace-support operations such as UNTAC or UNOSOM II. The organization has moved into a new mission area beyond the separation of belligerents and is attempting to administer sovereign authority over the territory of the state. In short, the United Nations is attempting to assume the role of the state in many respects, especially with respect to the state's exclusive authority to use force.

In using peace-support operations to quell the violent fragmentation of failing states, the United Nations has developed a new class of mission which is inherently more difficult than traditional peacekeeping. Additionally, this new class of mission is qualitatively more difficult than the challenge faced by a sovereign state fighting an insurgent war. In order to be successful, the United Nations must effectively assume the monopoly over the legitimate use of force (at least temporarily), and it must do so while remaining ostensibly neutral and denying itself some of the tools available to a sovereign state.
The dynamics of this new class of mission involve the United Nations attempting to control or neutralize the fragmented collectivities of society. In an insurgent conflict the state targets the counter-state for destruction. However, in a peace-support operation the U.N. will seek to either weaken or bolster these collectivities' relationships with society. This may take the form of active disarmament of factions or reforming the law enforcement capabilities of the government. In both Cambodia and Somalia the United Nations has used the intervention of military forces to create mechanisms for re-establishing state authority through interim governments.

B. THE PROBLEMS OF COALITIONS

The United Nations, in its present form, will find it difficult if not impossible to effectively prosecute the new class of mission described in Chapter II. It is clear that the United Nations does not act as a cohesive unit under the best of circumstances. The key factor in the U.N.'s inability to successfully execute these missions is that it does not have the cohesive decision-making power of a sovereign actor.

The effectiveness of the United Nations, as an association of independent, sovereign states depends upon the capacity of its members to agree and cooperate. The organization's effectiveness suffers to the degree that this capacity is
limited. As the U.N. takes on more complex missions, moving from conflict containment to conflict resolution, lack of cohesion will no longer simply inhibit operations; it may result in mission failure.

As the United Nations moves into this "new era," the surprisingly familiar realities of alliance politics and coalition building are evident regardless of the operation. Member states will still attempt to influence the outcome of disputes to their advantage. If they have no agenda within the dispute, they will tend to abstain or look for an advantage in participation within a larger context, such as credibility or power within the Security Council. With a few notable exceptions, most states do not contribute to U.N. missions without some "national interest" in the conflict.

Operations using multinational forces have always faced problems of cohesion. Because of their very nature, coalitions function with inconstant commitment from the contributors. The problem of determining the degree of force appropriate for an operation is compounded by the problem of interpretation by different actors within a coalition. Coalition partners bring particular national agendas to the coalition which other members choose to tolerate. The fact that the coalition happens to be under the umbrella of the United Nations does not make this assertion less valid. Although peacekeeping forces are under the command of the
U.N., it is well recognized that most national contingents will clear orders with their national command authority before acting. This is particularly true in operations involving higher levels of violence.

Operating under a United Nations mandate provides a certain legitimacy to the application of military force. However, the multilateral nature of a U.N. operation imposes "force dividers" that inhibit effective action. These force dividers mean that any force operating under United Nations' control cannot operate at the same efficiency of a unitary actor.

These force dividers exist on three broad levels: the strategic level of interaction between the contributing states and the United Nations; the operational level of interaction between the conflicting parties and the United Nations forces; and the tactical level of interaction between the forces themselves.

On the strategic level, deployments of military forces under the mandate of the United Nations will always require the leadership and funding of "linchpin" actors. Great power support will always be necessary for the deployment of forces because lesser powers, while often prepared to make a manpower contribution, rarely have the ability to rapidly transport and sustain them. Additionally, the contributions of "linchpin"
states may be necessary to encourage the participation of other troop contributors.

This category includes any state which is a permanent member of the Security Council because of their possession of veto power. Certain states may be considered linchpin actors in one operation and not another if they have a vital regional interest in containing or suppressing the conflict or if their presence is necessary to hold the operation together.

It is not uncommon for "linchpin" actors to demand a larger role in operations in order to protect their investments of personnel, money, or prestige. This is especially true when combat troops are involved, or if the mission is considered particularly dangerous. Another major drawback to "linchpin" actors, aside from their insistence on exerting more control over an operation, is that while their leadership is necessary in putting together U.N. operations, their withdrawal or faltering leadership can bring about critical weakening or even catastrophic failure of an operation.

At the operational level, one of the key problems facing multilateral operations is the varying relationships that the different contributors develop with the belligerents. While one of the overriding principles of U.N. operations is the strict neutrality of forces, different national contingents will often establish decidedly non-neutral relationships with
the belligerents. As U.N. operations shift toward enforcement missions this reality will have a compounded negative effect on the force’s ability to act cohesively. Furthermore, it should be remembered that unilateral actions by any of the participants can create animosity against the entire force.

The concept that participation in U.N. operations is not to be solely dependent upon a contributing states’ national interest is one of the key foundations of the integrity of the United Nations’ collective security system. Conceptually, becoming a member of the United Nations entails the decision that a state’s national interest lies in ensuring the efficacy of the collective security system. However, U.N. operations outside the traditional realm of peacekeeping are faced with an unsolvable paradox. As the United Nations moves into situations of higher levels of violence, only states with a vested national interest in quelling the conflict will be willing to participate because of the greater the expenditure of resources. In fact, it has been displayed over numerous examples that states may participate in a multinational peace-support operation directly in the interest of their own security, or as an expression of their power in the region. In the case of weaker states with no apparent national agenda, participation in U.N. operations may provide a means of supplementing their military capability through materiel acquisitions and experience at a price they can afford to pay.
When asking states to commit troops to a field operation, the United Nations attempts to attain a global political balance of forces, regardless of capabilities. While the highly trained and thoroughly equipped troops of the more developed states may provide the most efficient forces for an operation, constituting a force relying heavily on these militaries is politically unworkable within the U.N. system.

This "force divider" means that a U.N. force will pay an operational price of having to assign some of its less self-sustaining contingent forces to areas where they are more easily supported. Unfortunately, only the armies from the so-called "northern" states are able to deploy battalion-size units with organic equipment to provide for their own survival in the instances of rapid deployments into harsh operating environments.

Regardless of the force mixture, combined operations will always fall prey to tactical level problems in five areas: doctrine, training, equipment/logistics, language and culture/sensitivities. These problem areas remain constant in all coalition forces, even in successful ones which have had ample time to work out problems of interoperability. In the ad hoc operations put together by the U.N. the problems may seem insurmountable or the cause of catastrophic mission failure.
The problem of doctrine as it applies to United Nations operations is twofold. First, there is the problem of "peace-support" doctrine itself. Presently, there is no standardized U.N. doctrine covering the wide range of new operations. Second, since the U.N. does not have a common doctrine, the various areas of any U.N. force will reflect the doctrine of the national contingent posted there. This presents a minimal problem in traditional peacekeeping where each contingent simply has a set "buffer" area to control. However, in these new missions the differences in doctrine can be dangerous and even disastrous. When the different contingents are required to provide combat support to one another, doctrinal differences will become glaring. This is especially true of operations with a strong civil-military mission.

The gap in training, and therefore operational proficiency, between the various contingents in a combined operation is due to many factors: reliance on large number of short-term conscripts versus a professional force; vastly different officer and noncommissioned officer development programs; lower technical skills and educational level of the enlisted personnel; resource limitations and degree of emphasis placed on field training. Logic dictates that the tactical proficiency of the various contingents, along with equipment and logistics requirements, should be the primary considerations when assigning tasks and operational areas.
However, since maintaining a "global balance" is a requirement of the United Nations and political considerations often determine the placement of units, training and operational proficiency are usually secondary considerations.

The capability gap will be especially wide in a force that mixes armed forces from highly developed states with those from developing states. In some types of operations it may be possible to bring the more poorly trained units up to standard. However, most U.N. operations are deployed in response to an immediate crisis and time and resource constraints will rarely permit a preliminary training period. The only feasible short-term option is to recognize the capability gaps within a combined force and plan accordingly. The need to overcome political considerations in determining the placement of contingents is especially acute in operations in environments of intense violence or harsh environmental conditions.

Developing a functioning logistics system to support a large force in the field is one of the most demanding problems that combined operations face. The problem appears so unmanageable that the basic NATO policy for the last four decades has been to make logistics purely a national responsibility. Obviously this is an impossible option when planning a U.N. operation. Because of the widely varying
resources of the troop contributing states, contingents will have to rely on a unified logistics system.

Significant among the problems of the U.N. logistics system is the lack of understanding by permanent U.N. civilians of what is required to conduct large military operations. Key decisions are often made by default and operational considerations are usually secondary. The cost of having under-equipped contingents as part of a force in violent situations may be the loss of life; among both peacekeepers and the population they are there to assist.

The problems of coalition building and maintenance outlined in Chapter II would seem to call for the existence of a standing United Nations force which answers to no other operational commander than the Security Council. The formation of peace-enforcement units or rapid deployment forces made available to the U.N. by major powers on short notice would still face the problem of independent control by the contributing states. Only a force whose units are not tied to a sovereign state operationally or logistically would be truly under the control of the United Nations.

Any force not constrained by the factors of national allegiance would be, in effect, a mercenary force. Any standing U.N. force would have to be formed from individuals willing to renounce allegiance to their home country and profess sole allegiance to the United Nations. While it can
be posited that certain individuals would enlist in this force because of utopian goals, the reality is that mercenary soldiers usually claim allegiance to only one thing: money. Additionally, an independent force controlled by an organization of states with widely varying goals and views could still only be effective in a narrow set of circumstances. Evidence has shown that alliances for enforcement type actions tend to be temporary because objectives originate from interests more than common beliefs or ideologies.

In fact, development of a U.N. army could sow the seeds of destruction of the organization. Imbalances in the distribution of international power, perceived or otherwise, will always cause new alliance formations. A United Nations with its own army would begin to take on the characteristics of an autonomous actor, and thus a possible threat, to other actors too weak to counter it. It is possible to imagine the formation of anti-U.N. blocs within the international system.

C. PROBLEMS OF INTERVENTION

The problems encountered in these new U.N. operations resemble the difficulties that an occupying army faces following the defeat of another country. The large expansion in the scope of U.N. mandates will highlight the substantial problems of intervention in the internal conflicts of a state.
The three areas of consideration that are most important in these types of operations are: one, mission slip that is inevitable when the requirements for these missions is combined with the U.N. modus operandi; two, the obstacles that are faced in the process of establishing authority over large areas with minimal military force and the possible absence of the population's support; and three, the problems of effectively using force against belligerents that do not recognize the moral authority of the United Nations.

The mandates of all U.N. missions are, by necessity, vague in order to fulfill all of the constraints placed upon it by various powers. This means that all mandates are open to wide interpretation by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative or any of the various contributing contingents. This fact combined with the dynamic characteristic of intrastate conflicts will inevitably lead to "mission slip" in this new class of operations.

The concept that the United Nations can establish effective authority over the essential functions of a state, more than any other criteria, establishes a radical departure in the scope of U.N. operations. However, the United Nations has not historically displayed the ability to establish the authority necessary to accomplish the mandates required in these types of operations. Generally, the U.N. cannot even establish basic authority over its own operations. Because of
its low coercive potential, the U.N. has been unable to establish effective control over its areas of operation without the continued acquiescence of all belligerent parties.

Acceptance by all belligerents of a U.N. force has been one of the traditional prerequisites for its approval and deployment. However, where the United Nations assumes the mandate to intervene in situations where the consent of the belligerents is waiving or non-existent, U.N. military forces will be forced to rely less on moral suasion and neutrality than on coercive ability.

Two of the primary concerns in the administration of a failing state by an external force are the preservation of the sovereign rights of the government (or in the case of state disintegration, the local variation of contenders for authority), and the protection of the local population from exploitation by both the the belligerent parties and the United Nations force. Maintenance of public order is an unquestionable requirement of these expanded mandates. Implicit in the disarmament of a state's capability to protect public order is the requirement not to allow the situation to revert to banditry.

While the United Nations' responsibilities, as the "authority" in failing states, to maintain public order may be negated by the refusal of belligerent forces to disarm, the inability of the U.N. force to protect the local populace from
political violence or simple banditry will be a significant reason for diminished popular backing.

As stated previously, a U.N. force must also meet the requirement for protecting the local population from exploitation by its own soldiers. Criminal acts by any member of a U.N. force denigrates the ability of the force as a whole to maintain the support of the local population and thus undermines the force's legitimacy. However, the United Nations has no judicial mechanism for controlling the actions of soldiers placed under its mandate. Obviously, the United Nations is venturing into relatively unchartered legal territory by deploying large multinational military forces amongst civilian populations with uncertain mandates for action and no "status of forces" agreements. While United Nations has created task forces in the past to investigate alleged illegal activities by soldiers in a U.N. force, the requirement for disciplining criminal acts is left to the contributing states.

In this new class of operation the United Nations has attempted to assume the state-like monopoly of the use of legitimate force. The act of establishing control over the monopoly of force requires the coopertion of each of the belligerents, who must be willing to disarm. If this cooperation is not forthcoming, the U.N. has two options: it can choose to use force to accomplish its goals, disarming the
recalcitrant parties by force, or it can choose to abstain from the use of force an attempt to proceed politically in an unstable military environment. While this choice may seem simple on the surface, it is possibly the most crucial question that must be considered in this new generation of U.N. missions.

One of the problems of allowing United Nations forces to abandon the principle of using force only for self-defense is the possibility of the use of excessive force. Some contingents come from armed forces which have been used to quell civil unrest in their home countries with varying degrees of use of force and respect for human rights. The policy of using force only in self-defense has so far served the U.N. well because it represents the lowest common denominator. As mandates are expanded to include the use of force to protect the mission, the rules of engagement can be expected to be subject to interpretation according to each of the contingents' doctrine and experience.

In the evaluation of current operations the question of the use of force usually revolves around whether or not the U.N. should use force. Perhaps it is more appropriate to first question whether U.N. forces can use force effectively. The inability to use force effectively or discriminately may lead to the withdrawal of the necessary popular support. In U.N. operations that are responsible for maintenance of public
order, the use of force by one or more of the belligerents without an effective response by the U.N. will result in a loss of credibility. History has been shown that an insurgent can use violence to persuade important sectors of the population to switch allegiance from government to challenger by demonstrating the state's inability to maintain order and by compelling it to resort to indiscriminate uses of force that often lead to further withdrawal of popular support.

One of the key unresolved issues in this new class of mission is the extent to which the United Nations is capable of effectively dealing with non-state belligerents. As a rule, non-state actors will be swayed less by the moral authority of the United Nations - an international body in which they do not have membership. Thus they are less likely to consent to U.N. operations that may decrease their power. In order to be effective the United Nations may have to intervene against the wishes of whatever authorities claim to be in control. The principle of the non-use of force is closely tied to the requirement of consent by the belligerents. By forsaking the basic peacekeeping principles of strict neutrality and the non-use of force the United Nations is venturing into territory that is outside its traditional strengths. Furthermore, the use of force in these new U.N. missions will still have limited effectiveness.
because the objective is to neutralize, not defeat, the belligerents.

Even if a United Nations operation does not have a mandate to use force, deployment of a force without continued consent may well cause one or more of the belligerents to perceive the force as a threat. Attempting to maintain law and order in an effective power vacuum will inevitably influence the local political balance of power. The mere existence of a large U.N. Force will affect the political situation, if only by changing the context within which the struggle for power takes place. In these circumstances every action, or inaction, taken by a U.N. force can have a potential effect on one or more of the belligerents and the balance of power between them.

The unstated hope of United Nations operations with enforcement mandates is that somehow the organization will be able to resolve the inherent conflict over the need to maintain a neutral posture and the right to the use of force. Realistically, the amount of force used will inversely affect the perceived neutrality of the force. Additionally, an ever present danger is that the use of excessive force, real or perceived, will cause a "destabilizing event" which causes the eventual failure of the operation.

In the final analysis, the United Nations security apparatus, as it presently exists, is ill-suited to deal with
situations as intractable as Cambodia or Somalia. The organization's inherent limitation as an collection of politically diverse members inhibits the effective execution of large military operations.
# GLOSSARY

**ANKI**  
National Army of Independent Kampuchea (formerly the Sihanouk National Army [ANS]; renamed in April 1990).

**ASEAN**  
Association of Southeast Asian Nations; members are Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei.

**BLDP**  
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (formed by Son Sann’s followers within the KPNLF faction).

**CGDK**  

**CPP**  
Cambodian People’s Party (ruling party of the State of Cambodia faction; formerly the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party [KPRP]; renamed in October 1991).

**FUNCIPEC**  
National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful, Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia; strongest of two non-communist resistance factions; formed by Prince Sihanouk; now headed by his son.

**KPNLAF**  
Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces.

**KPNLF**  
Khmer People’s National Liberation Front; weakest of two primary non-communist resistance factions.

**KR**  
Khmer Rouge (informal term for Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea [DK]).

**MFO**  
Non-United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Sinai: deployed following the Camp David Accords

**MNF**  

**NADK**  
National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (military arm of the Khmer Rouge).
MGC  National Government of Cambodia; see CGDK.

ONUC  French acronym for the United Nations Operation in the Congo; now Zaire; deployed from 1960 to 1964.

PDK  Party of Democratic Kampuchea, proper name for the Khmer Rouge as a political party.

SOC  State of Cambodia; Phnom Penh regime founded by Hun Sen and Vietnamese government; (formerly the People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK], renamed in April 1989).

SNC  Supreme National Council; largely symbolic ruling body formed by the 1991 Paris Peace Accords; composed of members from the four main factions in Cambodia; chaired by Prince Sihanouk.

UNAMIC  U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia.


UNFICYP  U.N. Force in Cyprus; deployed since 1963.

UNIFIL  U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon; deployed since 1978.

UNITAF  United Task Force; U.S.-commanded force deployed to Somalia in December 1992; relieved by UNOSOM II.


UNPROFOR  U.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia; originally deployed to Croatia and Slovenia in January 1992; later expanded to include the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNTAC  U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

UNTSO  U.N. Truce Supervision Organization; the original U.N. observer mission; deployed in Israel and the surrounding Arab states since 1948.
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