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THESIS

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: ADAPTING THE PROCESS
TO MEET THE MILITARY'S EVOLVING ROLE
IN NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS**

by

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and

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December 1993

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Operation Restore Hope (ORH) presents an example of how our military is responding to the challenges of today's changing new world order. This analysis reviews the roles, capabilities and funding structure of the Department of Defense (DOD) in the conduct of humanitarian assistance (HA). The research considers the traditional HA roles that DOD performs in peacetime and the new emerging role in which U.S. led coalition and U.N. sponsored HA operations conduct peace enforcement. As the military adapts its forces to meet this new challenge, the budgeting structure governing DOD has not evolved to meet these new contingent requirements.

At the onset on ORH, costs were estimated to determine DOD funding requirements. The actual startup costs for ORH proved to be the largest. The DOD budget mechanism in place proved to be inflexible and not adaptable for the contingency. The impact is severe when the Services absorb the cost for these types of operation. The need for a long term budget mechanism to deal with these growing contingencies exists and is the focus of this thesis.

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

James A. Hogberg




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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

As non-traditional activities, peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster relief, and democratization programs have been unstructured and executed on an ad hoc basis. DOD support for these activities has been undertaken as part of other ongoing Service missions or in response to urgent unanticipated events. There has been no effort to establish guidance for prioritizing and integrating these activities into a cohesive policy framework. Statement from 1993 Global Cooperatives Initiative Study (OASD, June 1993, p. 4)

Humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations that involve humanitarian assistance activities compete for Department of Defense resources. Financing these operations often results in a redistribution of funds that would otherwise go towards maintenance, equipment and training. This paper researches the funding policies and procedures that support these non-traditional activities. As the new world order develops, humanitarian assistance will play a larger role in American military strategy. United States military forces are no longer facing a massive military opponent (Towell, 1992, p. 3759). With the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. military is the only viable organization that can carry out independent, large-scale relief operations worldwide. To preserve the integrity of the post "cold war" era, the United States will have no choice but to be a major player in relief efforts around the globe.

Beyond independent operations (including domestic disaster relief), the United States frequently provides a military commitment to United Nations peacekeeping and related humanitarian assistance activities. The United States will undoubtedly be an active participant in continued U.N. operations. United Nations peacekeeping missions fall into two categories. The first is traditional peacekeeping (post cease-fire action) and the second is large scale collective action. A consensus now seems to prevail that a third category is developing, somewhere within this spectrum. In 1991, a study by the Ford Foundation described this category as follows:

This category would be intended to put an end to random violence and to provide a reasonable degree of peace and order so that humanitarian relief work could go forward and a conciliation process could commence. The forces involved would be relatively small and would not have military objectives as such. But unlike peacekeeping forces, such troops would be required to take, initially at least, certain combat risks in order to bring the violence under control. (Urquhart, December 29, 1991)

Requirements for Department of Defense (DOD) assistance will increase as infrastructure and nation building requirements of emerging democratic governments are identified (OASD, June 1993, p. 9). Many developing countries simply cannot control natural disaster, social unrest and human rights issues. According to House Intelligence Committee Chairman Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.), "The Clinton administration is going to be more supportive of action to support humanitarian relief and democratic movements" (Towell, 1992, p. 3761). The U.S.

led coalition, from December 1992 through May 1994, in Somalia reinforces this statement and provides a dramatic example of the use of military forces in non-traditional crisis intervention for humanitarian purposes.

1. Humanitarian Assistance is Vital to U.S. Interests

Why should the United States become involved in international humanitarian assistance efforts that involve the U.S. military? There is a certain risk to lives of service personnel as well as large financial costs that burden the taxpayer.

Humanitarian assistance on an emotional level is the "right thing to do" morally. President Clinton has emphasized this theme by stating, "U.S. foreign policy cannot be divorced from the moral principle most Americans share." On an economic level, dollars spent on humanitarian assistance are small compared to the costs of offsetting a future major regional conflict. The end of the cold war has given the United States the unparalleled opportunity to take a focused role in eliminating instability in developing nations. The challenge is to keep the world's developing nations in the international fold and build a stronger global economy. Military relief efforts go a long way toward accomplishing this goal as they can help to promote long-term political and economic stability. Combined with other countries, the result is a collective engagement where nations are taking concerted

actions to pursue and solve problems that have international implications.

Since 1988, the U.N. Security Council has approved fourteen peacekeeping operations, more than in the previous 40 years. As the United Nations becomes the focus in deciding global intervention, the U.S. has generally moved to support its recommendations. Lawmakers have welcomed an active U.N. as a way to ease the burden that the United States has inherited in a post-cold war world. As a presidential candidate, President Clinton said that the U.S. should explore the possibility of establishing a "standby" voluntary U.N. rapid deployment force to deter international aggression. Former President Bush in his political agenda for the 1990s listed, "meeting urgent human needs by responding quickly and substantially to the suffering caused by natural or manmade disasters as a challenge and focus of our efforts." (Marshall, 1993, p. 525)

Humanitarian assistance missions also provide invaluable training for U.S. military personnel. Although it is a non-traditional format there can be no substitute for the organizational skills that are used and logistical processes that are tested because of participating in actual missions.

The real world significance of rescuing human beings from ongoing and imminent dangers enhance morale and confidence. Even the most realistic training mission cannot elicit the same exhilaration that accompanies the completion of a successful humanitarian assistance mission. Lt. General H.C. Stackpole, Commander Operation Sea Angel Bangladesh 1991.

Planning and executing deployments in humanitarian relief efforts is in many respects, similar to planning and executing the movement phase of wartime contingencies. Therefore, these activities in humanitarian relief missions also serve to exercise fundamental logistical capabilities. Critics of relief missions may contend that they are too far removed from "pure" military operations to be relevant. But, in reality they afford experience in a cooperative "real world" effort second only to actual combat in measuring the effectiveness of a joint staff. (Chase, 1993, pp. 17-18)

2. Capability of U.S. Military in Humanitarian Assistance

The United States has the unique operational, material and organizational capabilities to provide general humanitarian and disaster relief assistance at home and abroad. The U.S. military is prepared to operate in areas where there is no infrastructure or logistical support. They are also trained for crisis action response. The United States possesses the rapid response capability, sea-based forces and logistical requirements to meet challenges as they arise around the globe. Having the ability to call on a forward deployed and sustainable force, such as a Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit, is indispensable in humanitarian assistance operations. Besides rapid response, the ability to conduct operations from sea-based platforms allows for access to remote and undeveloped regions. With the assistance of

pre-positioned shipping, operations can be sustained for extended periods to meet the needs of the crisis. The logistical reach of the United States' military can be extended across time lines to meet the challenges and commitments of national policy makers.

3. Overlapping Issues

What types of missions constitute humanitarian assistance? The distinctions of funding categories are divided between Peacekeeping, Disaster Relief, and Humanitarian Assistance, though these distinctions are somewhat artificial. For example, delivery of food and medical supplies might be considered humanitarian assistance, disaster relief or part of a peacekeeping effort. Typically, the State Department will determine what the designation will be, based on the role that it has outlined for the Department of Defense. (MCCDC, 1993, p. 11)

Whatever the "political" designation for funding categories, humanitarian assistance involves the allocation of DOD resources to be used in military operations that are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disaster or other endemic conditions. While humanitarian assistance, in association with peacekeeping operations, may require the use of limited force it is only as a stabilizing mechanism. Humanitarian assistance helps to neutralize a crisis for intervention by international relief agencies. In its basic form humanitarian assistance will

involve a friendly and cooperative population within an environment of limited infrastructure rendered unstable because of economic and political factors. The wide spectrum of humanitarian assistance can range from coming to the aid of refugees on the high seas to a large scale, land operation such as in Somalia.

At any level of operation, it will be vital that the Department of Defense direct its focus towards budgeting for these unplanned missions. Although there are existing programs within the DOD structure to fund humanitarian assistance efforts, they have not been able to keep pace with the increased scope and number of activities. Funds have either been insufficient or late in arriving. Services have been forced to rely on their operations and maintenance budgets to initiate and maintain national command authority directed humanitarian assistance operations. This imposes a severe fiscal constraint on the component commands that should be addressed. The general impact on readiness is just beginning to be felt as the Services must also operate within a declining defense budget.

B. SPECIFIC PROBLEM

How can DOD effectively plan budgeting requirements for future Humanitarian Assistance Operations?

An overriding factor for planning DOD involvement in humanitarian operations is monetary considerations. A break in the funding process to support normal operations can

greatly effect readiness demands. Funding constraints also inhibit the flexibility of the on-scene commander to accomplish his mission.

Without a system for streamlining funding procedures, DOD is forced to resort to ad hoc methods to support operations. For example, the Department of Defense was required to use \$100 million from the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) to finance Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq. This procedure diverts resources from their intended purpose and creates long-term funding problems. Excess cash in a revolving account like the DBOF can either be used to lower the rates charged to its customers or diverted for other uses while customer rates remain at artificially high levels. This hides the identity of the bill payer for humanitarian operations, the operations and maintenance costumers. This situation requires improvement in the planning and budgeting process.

Historical data shows that in many humanitarian assistance operations, Services were never totally reimbursed for their incremental costs. Incremental costs are defined as those costs that would not have been incurred had the operation not been directed. For example, the regular pay of active duty personnel would not be an incremental cost because these personnel would have been paid whether or not the operations took place. The pay of activated reservists, however, would be an incremental cost. Today's budget mechanisms to support

humanitarian assistance operations have not been adequately integrated into the Department of Defense's funding process, nor have they kept pace with DOD's responsibilities. Integration in this instance refers to the timing, funding and statutory limitations inherent in the current process that inhibit the flexibility of the operational commander providing support. The unpredictable nature of humanitarian assistance operations make it necessary to find the true costs of such operations.

C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following questions were addressed and answered in support of the primary research subject.

1. How are humanitarian assistance operations being coordinated between DOD and the State Department?
2. What is the flow of funding within DOD for humanitarian assistance operations?
3. What are the costs involved in humanitarian assistance operations?
4. What are likely scenarios for future humanitarian assistance operations?
5. At what levels can humanitarian assistance operations be planned for in advance?

Each question relates to a particular aspect of humanitarian assistance planning. The research conducted to answer each question provided a focus for planning effective funding for these operations.

D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH

Much analysis of the humanitarian assistance funding issue has been limited to individual operations. This research project identifies the historical development of humanitarian operations and their particular funding sources. A cost analysis presented on Operation Provide Hope in Somalia is used to determine the typical costs incurred in humanitarian operations. Based on the data presented from government sources a profile of future operations will be outlined.

The research for this project was conducted in the form of data collection and interviews with The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Programs, Analysis and Evaluation (OSD, PA&E), The Office of Global Affairs, U.S. Transportation Command and various DOD Comptrollers. This thesis topic originated from OSD (PA&E) and they were a major facilitator for the project. Cost data was collected from many government agencies, to include the Marine Expeditionary Force Comptroller for Somalia. Additional cost data was obtained from various references located at the Naval Postgraduate School.

E. CHAPTER CONTENTS

Chapter II is a historical narrative outlining the U.S. military's role in humanitarian assistance. The development of various programs to meet the changing needs of operational funding are discussed. Chapter III presents the current and proposed funding process of the Department of Defense in

support of humanitarian assistance. The roles and missions of various agencies that control the funding process are discussed.

Chapter IV is an analysis of the costs incurred during Operation Provide Hope in Somalia. The data used is based on costs for military forces until the transfer of operations to U.N. authority in May 1993. Chapter V is a profile of future humanitarian assistance operations. Different criteria are used to determine where and when humanitarian operations might occur again throughout the world and how they will be funded.

II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A. BACKGROUND

Freed from cold war restraints and obligations, the American military may turn out to be the ideal organization for global humanitarian emergencies (Lynch, February 1993, p. 60).

The ongoing United Nations' sanctioned humanitarian relief effort in Somalia provides us with a look of what may be the model for future military humanitarian action. Somalia was the largest, latest, and most expensive example of United States military involvement in humanitarian aid. The military's role in humanitarian assistance has taken an upsurge during the last two years. This increase in the number of non-combat missions for the military has also meant a dramatic increase in the scope of the actual operations. Somalia is yet another example of how our country is responding militarily to the new and turbulent world order through actions defined under "humanitarianism."

Joint Publication 3-05 defines humanitarian assistance as Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or compliment the efforts of the host nation, civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

The environment that the military can expect to operate in while providing humanitarian assistance will vary from a benign situation to large scale conflict. Under ideal

conditions, humanitarian assistance will involve friendly and cooperative recipients who have just experienced a tragic disaster that is beyond the capabilities of their own government to mitigate. This type of aid may only require the logistical support of the military. At the other end, as characterized today, humanitarian assistance may be conducted in conjunction or simultaneously with peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. This type of aid would involve both combat and logistical military support.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief have proven to be important tools in promoting our foreign policy and national security interests. To that end, the Department of Defense has been addressing both ongoing and emergency needs of countries through several congressionally authorized humanitarian assistance programs. These funded initiatives provide another example of the military's role in humanitarian aid. There are currently three major legislated humanitarian programs: Humanitarian Assistance Program, Title 10 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, and the Foreign Disaster Assistance Program. There are also programs funded to provide domestic disaster assistance within the United States. In Title 42, of the United States Code, the utilization of DOD resources and services is authorized within prescribed limits.

To analyze the issues involved with military support for humanitarian aid, an understanding of humanitarian assistance,

disaster relief and the programs that provide support is required. This chapter will provide a historical perspective for these topics as they relate to Department of Defense. Examples will be presented of current DOD military operations as they relate to humanitarian assistance. These examples will illustrate at what levels humanitarian assistance operations can be planned. The chapter will also outline the planning and coordination required between DOD and the Department of State (DOS) for providing humanitarian assistance.

B. THE HISTORICAL NATURE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Not only does man support man, but all nature does so. The stars and the planets, and even the Angels support each other. Tikkune Zohar, 122, T. 43. (Newman, 1945, p. 60)

As the biblical quotation above recognizes the virtues of providing charity and a helping hand, our own humanitarian concerns today rest on these same moral precepts of our Judeo-Christian teachings. Humanitarian aid is also thought of from a foreign policy perspective as preventive medicine directed at third-world problems. If their problems are not remedied or improved, it could possibly lead to political unrest, violence, and ultimately armed conflict.

Consider for example, the role of famine in Somalia during the 1960s. In effect, our aid programs addressed only the social unrest and were guided by our "security-related" foreign policy. This foreign policy centered on the

containment of the Soviet Union and its proxies. Thirty-four years later, we find ourselves again in Somalia confronting the same situation that we faced earlier. Today we are on the threshold of charting a new global course to deal with these types of humanitarian situations. As we should appreciate today, the use of humanitarian assistance must be a well-thought, integrated strategy that is coordinated and based on a genuine concern for the long-term well being and development of the recipients. The costs of not pursuing the right strategy may influence the outcome of the "new world order" that we are trying to create.

Without a declared disaster, DOD can address a variety of constant humanitarian needs facing undeveloped countries primarily by making available and transporting to them excess non-lethal DOD property. Department of Defense excess property includes medical supplies, clothing and gear, shelter, food, and heavy equipment and vehicles. This program is called the Excess Property Program. It is also the largest program in the Humanitarian Assistance Program. This program was established by the Defense Authorization Act of 1986 and codified in Title 10 of the USC section 2547 (GAO, January 1991, p. 1). The program is presently coordinated for DOD by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs (Humanitarian Assistance). DOD provides these items on a worldwide basis when tasked through and coordinated by the Department of State.

This program began in 1985 when Congress appropriated funds to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan resistance groups. As Congress approved wider authority, to include additional countries and activities, more than 100 countries have benefitted from DOD humanitarian assistance (Touma, 1993, p. 2). The new authority included medical evacuation of war wounded and injured individuals to the United States and Europe for privately arranged medical care. The primary role that the military performs in this program, beyond providing excess property, is the transportation of these items around the world. Historically, the costs of transporting these items have required the greatest percentage of humanitarian assistance funds (GAO, 1991, p. 10).

The Humanitarian Assistance Office in DOD also coordinates the execution of the Denton Space Available Transportation Program. This program authorized by Title 10, Section 402, allows the Secretary of Defense to transport, without charge, on a space available basis, humanitarian relief supplies furnished by non-governmental sources. This authority is the only legal means to transport private cargo on U.S. military aircraft. This program is an interagency effort involving the DOS, Agency for International Development (AID), and the United States Air Force (USAF). A listing of the program's status of support for Fiscal Year 1991 is provided in Appendix A.

To date the most extensive effort of humanitarian assistance under this program has been to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This effort, known as Operation Provide Hope, began on January 27, 1992. This ongoing effort provides DOD airlift and sealift assets to transport both U.S. government and privately donated supplies and materials to the CIS. According to a State Department report, "The airlift also marks the beginning of what we hope will become over time, a truly international effort aimed at accelerating shipment of emergency supplies to the former Soviet Union."

This initial airlift operation began phase one of Operation Provide Hope and transported an estimated 4.5 million pounds of food and medicine on 64 relief flights (Smith, 1992, p. 1). Phase II of the operation began on February 27, 1992 and used both air and sea modes to deliver relief. Normal humanitarian assistance procedures require DOD to transfer the excess property over to a State Department representative. The country representative receiving the property is responsible for its distribution. (GAO, 1991, p. 2) During this operation, the unique capabilities of the military to support humanitarian assistance forged a new mission for peace. The Army's On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) has the mission of supporting the verification of nuclear weapons reduction treaties between the United States and the former Soviet Union. As such, its members are fluent in the Russian language and knowledgeable about the host

country. Due to the size of the distribution requirements of the relief, the OSIA was deployed back to the CIS to assist the DOS representative in coordinating this mission. In all, the OSIA, traveled over 400,000 miles to coordinate the distribution of aid to the former Soviet republics. The new non-traditional role being conducted by the military in humanitarian assistance is summarized by the following quotation of one OSIA member "the mission was the most gratifying thing I've done in my life. During my time in the Army, I expected to go to the Soviet Union only one way--in a tank. Never like this." (Hasenauer, 1992, p. 46)

Operation Provide Hope was an emergency humanitarian relief effort supported by the military that is now entering its third phase in 1993. The goal of providing aid to alleviate the suffering of the people, and to promote the ongoing democratic developments in the CIS, is a challenge to our leaders. The degree of strategic planning and international cooperation in this effort will dictate how effective these measures are in the future.

C. TITLE 10 HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Humanitarian assistance can also be performed by the military during the conduct of military operations. In this regard, congress has authorized the military under specified circumstances to conduct humanitarian and civic assistance (H/CA) during its training overseas. This program, commonly called "Title 10," is administered by the regional commanders

(CINCs) directly, with coordination and approval provided by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs. This program, as do all the above humanitarian assistance programs, involves interagency coordination. No humanitarian assistance may be provided under this program unless it is specifically authorized by the State Department. The CINC is responsible for budgeting, defending, and programming for these initiatives. The CINC develops a five-year plan for projects in his area of responsibility. The planning process begins with the CINC coordinating with the State Department's host nation team to determine viable military projects for the host government (Pence, 1989, p. 27). After coordination at the local level, the project is submitted as part of the five-year plan to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs (Humanitarian Assistance Office). This office then conducts the coordination with DOS for submission to the Secretary of Defense for final approval (Pence, 1989, p. 36). The provisions for this program are found in Title 10 USC, Chapter 20, Section 401. The restrictions on the use of Title 10 funds for humanitarian activities are as follows:

1. They promote the security interest of both the United States and the host government.
2. That the specific operational skills of the military personnel involved are exercised.
3. That the activity complements rather than duplicates the efforts of other forms of assistance.

4. This assistance may not be provided to individuals, groups, or organizations engaged in military activities.

The congressional authority restricts H/CA, funded under Title 10, to the following:

1. Medical, dental, and veterinarian care provided in rural settings.
2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
4. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

The Stevens Amendment authority contained in USC Title 10, Section 402, provides the same authority and guidelines for conducting humanitarian and civic assistance together with Joint Chief Staff (JCS) directed exercises (Pence, 1989 p. 11). These programs, which involve military forces on training exercises or deployments in foreign countries, have a worldwide impact.

This type of humanitarian assistance can be viewed as the military's preventive medicine to alleviate suffering and help the development of poor nations. As the value of this program becomes better understood by all, several opportunities to improve our capability to provide humanitarian assistance becomes evident. The role of the Civil Affairs specialist in support of humanitarian efforts stands out. This is a military specialty that is required in time of war to be able to perform the following:

1. Provide emergency care and evacuation.
2. Establish or supervise the operation of temporary or semi-permanent camps.
3. Resettle or return civilians dislocated by war to their homes.
4. Advise and assist host-country and U.S. agencies on camps and relief measures for dislocated civilians.
(Barnes, 1989, p. 12)

The biggest obstacle in employing Civil Affairs (CA) units in humanitarian assistance are their reserve status. In fact, 97% of CA units are in a reserve status. (Barnes, 1989, p. 39) From a funding perspective, however only the costs for transportation, subsistence and housing are required to support reservists used for H/CA efforts while undergoing annual training. The value of providing training for CA units in support of peacetime disaster relief efforts can only improve the capability of our CINCs in responding to the new mission of humanitarianism.

The invaluable use of logistical specialties such as engineering, medical, and dental in Title 10 projects has been amply documented. Exercising logistical support as part of a training mission while simultaneously providing humanitarian assistance to those in need is a prudent use of limited operations and maintenance funds. The need to expand the funding and integrate projects in a coordinated long range plan for developing countries is vital. This would involve governmental and private agencies in humanitarian assistance and should be the vision for the future.

D. INFLUENCE OF THE 1961 FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Under the Foreign Disaster Assistance Program, DOD can provide disaster relief assistance on a worldwide basis. The agency for International Development (AID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) coordinates all forms of relief efforts, both governmental and private, in responding to foreign disasters. This program began when Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This act was codified into Title 22 of the United States Code. Under this legislation, the President can draw down on military resources to provide humanitarian assistance to foreign countries or international organizations for emergency requirements (U.S. Code Title 22, 1989, p. 506). This legislation established the responsibilities, authorities and limitations to conduct foreign disaster assistance. The legislation, however, does not address domestic disaster relief. The following discussion on the subject of disaster and the unique capabilities that the military can provide is germane to all types of disaster. The Department of Defense defines disaster relief as "prompt aid which can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims." (DOD Directive 5100.46, 1976, p. 1) This assistance can take the form of coordinating large scale operations, providing assessment, planning, and other logistical support, providing material support such as food and other supplies, and evacuating refugees. The first record of a DOD assistance to an OFDA request for Foreign Disaster

Relief assistance occurred in FY 1984. This relief support was provided to Zaire and it involved an airlift of medical equipment to combat an AIDS epidemic. Appendix B contains a listing of DOD responses for foreign disaster assistance from 1984 to 1991. This listing provides DOD disaster relief support up to Operation Provide Comfort in April 1991. In most cases, the primary support provided by the military was for transportation of emergency supplies and equipment.

Disaster is understood by many to be caused by natural phenomena such as floods hurricanes or a major accident. It could also be the results of man-made activities such as warfare. In such circumstances, local, national, and non-governmental relief agencies may be inadequate to respond to the humanitarian crisis and emergency international relief may be requested. United States involvement begins after our ambassador in the effected country declares an emergency. It is under these circumstances known as "disaster relief" that military forces may be called upon to provide emergency humanitarian assistance.

Disasters can be either natural or man-made. Disasters can be further broken down as shown in Table 2-1.

Relief support for disasters can be broken down into three interdependent phases: emergency, rehabilitation, and post-rehabilitation. The emergency phase deals with the immediate aid to survivors of a disaster. The military possesses the unique capabilities to transport, distribute, and provide aid

TABLE 2-1

DISASTERS		
CATEGORIES	ORIGINS	EXAMPLES
NATURAL	METEOROLOGICAL	STORMS, DROUGHTS
	TOPOLOGICAL	FLOODS, LANDSLIDES
	TELLURIC/TECTONIC	EARTHQUAKES
	BIOLOGICAL	INSECTS/EPIDEMICS
MAN-MADE	CIVIL DISTURBANCE	RIOTS
	WARFARE	ALL FORMS
	REFUGEES	FORCED MOVEMENTS
	ACCIDENTS	MISHAPS, CALAMITIES
Source: Skeet, "Manual For Disaster Relief Work," 1977.		

under adverse operating conditions. This is a factor that often prevents traditional relief organizations from providing the needed aid in a timely manner. This role for the military in the emergency phase falls within the provisions of the foreign disaster relief program.

The next two phases of disaster relief that precede the emergency phase deal with the rehabilitation for the country. This assistance can be characterized by providing assistance that allows the country to return to a state of 'normalcy' and efforts to provide long-term development (GAO, October 1992, p. 9). This form of aid is carried out by the present system for international relief. The organizations that support this system are the United Nations, private organizations, and donor governments (Green, 1977, p. 29). The role of Title 10

programs involving military humanitarian assistance during training operations can also be a consideration during these phases. Even though the CINC Title 10 programs are planned five years in advance for funding purposes, the CINC is authorized to request modification (substitutions) to this plan to meet emergent high priority Humanitarian and Civic Assistance activities (Pence, 1989, p. 41). The unique contributions and benefits to be gained by employing Civil Affairs units in these efforts were addressed previously in this chapter.

To appreciate the unique role that the military can perform in disaster relief, an understanding of the critical aspects of disaster relief that determine success or failure is required. These elements of relief are preparedness, prediction, assessment, appropriate intervention, timely intervention, and coordination (Kent, 1987, p. 21). In every one of these elements the military can provide a unique contribution.

Preparedness deals essentially with pre-disaster planning. Here the capabilities of CA units can be used to train the host government and its agencies in the procedures required to assist civilians in need. Here is a vital wartime mission for the military that can be easily applied during training or to the increasing number of peacetime "humanitarianism" missions that the military is tasked to support. Unfortunately, during peacetime the Federal Emergency Management (FEMA) has been

reluctant to use CA units in CONUS and the Department of State reluctant to request military assistance overseas (Barnes, 1989, p. 39). The use of engineering tasks in Title 10 projects to support disaster prevention is a possibility. Examples would be reinforcing existing structures to withstand earthquakes or digging irrigation ditches for drought control in areas where disaster can be predicted. In recognition of the military's role and requirements in this area, funding was earmarked in FY 1993 for DOD disaster relief planning and preparedness activities (Touma, 1993, p. 3). Prediction is the second element of disaster relief. Disasters often are not unforeseen events. Technology now exists to identify the hazards that may threaten a country and estimate the areas and settlements that will be effected (Kent, 1987, p. 22). As our country downsizes its military infrastructure and converts military technology to civilian use, we may find alternative uses of existing systems. Only recently the Navy's secret underwater program developed to detect the former Soviet Union's submarines is being integrated with civilian disaster monitoring agencies to predict earthquakes. The degree of benefits to be derived in this area will be a function of how well we integrate the capabilities of all in providing humanitarian aid in this maze of interagency involvement.

Assessment is the third element of disaster relief. The importance of determining the requirements of a disaster is critical in the emergency phase. This is normally performed

by the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) provided by OFDA after a disaster (GAO, October 1992, p. 11). As we saw during Operation Provide Hope, when the assessment involves a major relief effort the military can play a vital role in supporting DART.

Appropriate intervention is the fourth element of disaster relief. This element deals with ensuring that the correct type of relief is provided. This could take the form of providing the right types of equipment and supplies to deal with the disaster. The military's allowance of equipment contain many items in the area of engineering, transportation, and communication that could classify as critical to the conduct of a relief effort. The military has the capability to establish expeditionary airfields where none exist to support the delivery of needed emergency supplies. They also have the capability to deliver supplies externally by either fixed-wing (airdrops) or rotary-wing (external lift) aircraft to reach remote areas inaccessible by land transportation. The capability to either produce or deliver, and store fuel and water in large quantities is a critical life sustaining capability which the military possesses. Finally, the ability to communicate which is so essential to the control of any operation is an area that the military maintains sufficient assets to meet its wartime missions. Many times during disasters when a nation's communication system is disrupted, problems arise that directly impact on relief assistance.

Supplies pertaining to shelter, food, and medicine are part of the military's supply system and in most cases are on hand and appropriate to disaster relief requirements. The above topics are addressed in the latter part of this section when specific military humanitarian operations are analyzed.

The fifth element is timely intervention. This element compliments the element of appropriate intervention. No matter how accurate an assessment of needs for relief are determined, unless the relief is provided in a timely manner it is of no value. It is here where the utility of the military's logistic pipeline to deliver personnel, equipment and supplies are unmatched by any nation or private organization. The following description of the magnitude of the military's disaster relief effort during 30 days in 1992 best demonstrates this principle.

The amount of cargo the Air Force carried into Florida in the first ten days (14,000 tons) was nearly identical to the volume of shipments brought to Saudi Arabia at the start of Operation Desert Shield in August 1990. Air Mobility Command (AMC) officers calculated that, between August 5 and September 24, an Air Force airlifter touched down every three minutes bringing supplies to Florida or Hawaii, helping typhoon victims on Guam, or ferrying food and medicine to points in Yugoslavia and the old Soviet empire. (Lynch, 1993, p. 63)

The final element of disaster relief is coordination. This is the element where we believe our military greatest strength lies. The inherent capabilities of military command and control procedures and organization used to deal with military operations can ideally be employed to support a humanitarian operation. The challenge here is to effectively

integrate the efforts of all the participants both governmental and private toward a common mission - humanitarian aid.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study on the Foreign Disaster Assistance Program in 1992. Its scope did not include the role of DOD, but it did address a number of issues pertinent to this thesis. A summary of these issues and conclusions are provided:

1. Development and Disaster Assistance are not fully integrated.
2. Because disasters are unpredictable, Congress authorized special provisions to permit OFDA to use expedited procurement procedures to fund its requirements.
3. Civil war undermines effective relief efforts.
4. U.N. coordination is not always effective (GAO, October 1992, pp. 29-54).

One problem identified the lack of linkage between disaster relief and development activities sponsored by the State Department which result in a reduced likelihood of integration of these activities (GAO, October 1992, p. 3). As we defined the phases of disaster relief earlier, implicit to this process is that the efforts in each phase influences the actions of those that follow. To ensure that the funds provided for humanitarian assistance are spent efficiently, the efforts involved in all phases of disaster relief must be integrated in a long range plan. The GAO report also noted the need to possess funding flexibility and special

appropriations to ensure responsive support to unplanned disasters (GAO, October 1992, p. 33).

The report also did not evaluate the role and effectiveness of U.N. relief operations. The report did note that OFDA officials felt that the U.N. had not been consistently effective in coordinating disaster relief (GAO, October 1992, p. 30). Recognition was acknowledged, however, for the current U.N. initiative to strengthen its role in coordinating international relief. In February 1992, the Secretary-General appointed a new Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs to coordinate U.N. emergency assistance efforts around the world. The responsibilities of the new Secretary-General include:

1. Coordinating and facilitating the U.N.'s assistance in those emergencies requiring coordinated response;
2. Facilitating access to emergency areas for rapid delivery of emergency assistance;
3. Serving as a central focal point with governments and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations concerning U.N. emergency relief operations and, when appropriate and necessary, mobilizing their emergency relief capacities; and
4. Promoting the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction as relief operations under his aegis are phased out (GAO, 1992, p. 30).

In 1977, the Council on Foreign Relations, a non-profit and non-partisan organization devoted to international affairs, sponsored a number of studies to look at issues that would be of an international concern in the coming two decades. The studies were known as the 1980s project and one

of them, conducted by Stephen Green in 1977 dealt with international disaster relief. His study provides a framework for establishing a more responsive international relief system built around the U.N. that is still relevant today (Green, 1977, p. 22). The end of the Cold War has created an environment that is conducive to Green's vision of sixteen years ago. He foresaw the increase in number and intensity of future disasters. He also understood the importance of coordinating and integrating the limited resources we have for providing relief (Green, 1977, p. 48). In all the above humanitarian programs that DOD participates, the level of interagency coordination required is extensive. If one considers that different agencies approve and coordinate the funding for these programs, the problem is magnified and can impose problems for the commander charged with the mission for providing support.

E. APPLICATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Sea Angel are current examples of the application of the humanitarian assistance process in action. Both of these operations have become benchmarks in the development of humanitarian assistance in military mission planning.

1. Operation Provide Comfort

On 5 April 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 688 condemning Iraq for its repression of the Kurds and appealing to member states to provide relief

to the Kurdish refugees (Cavanaugh, 1992, p. 7). That same day President Bush assigned DOD the mission of providing humanitarian relief to the Kurdish civilians fleeing the repression of Saddam Hussein into mountains of Northern Iraq and Southern Turkey. This new resolution would set a precedent in international law for future humanitarian operations. Now the U.N. claimed the authority to intervene unilaterally in a sovereign state's territory for humanitarian purposes. In this situation, the host country of Iraq resisted foreign interference in its territory. So began Operation Provide Comfort which would be the largest relief effort undertaken by the military up until that time.

This humanitarian intervention effort would become a combined task force involving thirteen allied nations. At the height of Operation Provide Comfort, over 21,000 allied troops would be deployed throughout Turkey, Northern Iraq, and aboard ships in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. In all, over 30 countries and 50 private and non-governmental organization would provide personnel and supplies (Allardice, 1991, Jull 71024-35616).

The initial mission of the combined task force (CTF) was to feed the Kurds and reduce the suffering and dying by providing short-term air delivery of supplies. Air delivery of food, blankets, tents, and medical supplies to the Kurds along a 206-mile border area began on April 7, 1991 (Goff, 1992, p. 1). This mission was expanded to sustainment of the

entire refugee population for thirty days and to deploy humanitarian forces directly into the refugee areas. This mission required the CTF to:

1. Provide sufficient food and water;
2. Provide medical care;
3. Move into the refugee camps;
4. Provide assistance for aerial resupply effort;
5. Build a distribution center;
6. Organize the refugee camps;
7. Supervise the distribution of food and water;
8. Improve sanitation; and
9. Provide medical care (Allardice, 1991, JULL 121049-17995).

On April 16, 1992 the decision was made to establish a security zone in Northern Iraq in order to eventually move the stabilized refugees to more supportable locations where temporary camps with better facilities were established (Allardice, 1991, JULL 21049-45804). Forward ground bases or transit centers were established in both Turkey and Northern Iraq to expedite the distribution of supplies. As the military situation in Northern Iraq was stabilized, temporary communities were built to house the displaced refugees, the first of these communities was built near Zakhu, Iraq. By the middle of May 92, CTF personnel began assisting the refugees to return to their homes. On June 7, 1991 the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees assumed responsibility for the humanitarian relief effort and the last transit camp was

closed (Allardice, 1991, JULL 21049-45804). Thus Operation Provide Comfort ended its first phase of humanitarian relief efforts for a man-made disaster. However, the operation would continue into its second phase from 17 July to 24 October 1992. The mission of Operation Provide Comfort II was to provide security in the area of Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey while the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) assumed responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance for the Kurds (Collins, 1992, p. 22). Support is still being provided at this time to Northern Iraq by the United States European Command (EUCOM) which was tasked with the control of the original operation (Interview with Melanson, July 14, 1993).

The significant accomplishment of Operation Provide Comfort was the military's successful completion of the emergency phase of an enormous disaster relief effort and the efficient transition of relief activities to civilian agencies. In fact, CARE, the leading NGO in country, was able to take over all food-distribution operations in less than a month upon arrival into the secured zone of Northern Iraq (Elmo, 1992, p. 9).

2. Operation Sea Angel

Even though our military forces were actively undertaking the largest relief effort of its time during the month of April 1991 in Iraq, a devastating tragedy was unfolding in Bangladesh.

On the night of April 29, 1991, Bangladesh, was hit by a cyclone named Marian. That evening, 139,000 people would be killed, more than one million cattle would perish, and the country's entire infrastructure along the Bay of Bengal would be destroyed. The magnitude of this disaster was catastrophic and beyond the capabilities of the country and NGO to provide assistance. On May 10th, the U.S. Ambassador formally requested military assistance. The following day CJCS issued the execute order to USCINCPAC to provide assistance to Bangladesh (Stackpole, 1992, p. 1).

Within 24 hours, General Stackpole and a small team had reached the scene--the leading element of a joint task force that would touch the lives of 1.7 million survivors during a five-week operation. To the people of Bangladesh, they were angels of mercy, coming from the sea. The operation's code name was a perfect fit: Sea Angel. (Stackpole, 1992, p. 110)

In 1970, Bangladesh then East Pakistan, experienced a similar disaster, a cyclone followed by a tidal wave would devastate these countries. It was estimated that 500,000 people died, most of the livestock was drowned, almost all its crops were destroyed, and the countries suffered enormous infrastructure damage (Skeet, 1977, p. 2). This disaster also occurred during a time of political instability in Bangladesh, which created a massive refugee movement involving ten million people fleeing to India. Disaster relief efforts were halted in 1971 because of developing civil unrest when Bangladesh declared its independence. War finally erupted with India and

relief efforts could not be reinitiated until 1972 (Skeet, 1977, p. 3).

The situation for Bangladesh in 1991 bore some similarity to the events that transpired 20 years earlier. A large disaster had occurred to the country during a time of political instability. However, the commander for Operation Sea Angel developed a three phased campaign plan that dealt with both the disaster and the current political situation. The three phases of the relief plan were as follows:

1. Phase I: Deployment of initial command and control and assessment of the situation.
2. Phase II: Immediate assistance and deployment of additional forces.
3. Phase II: Follow-on assistance to permit the government of Bangladesh to carry on the recovery effort (Stackpole, 1992, p. 1).

The initial emergency relief effort involved the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters and Army Special Forces Disaster Relief Survey Teams who performed the function of disaster assessment. These forces were augmented on May 15, 1992 by an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) of 7 ships returning from Operation Desert Shield.

Medical support and the production and distribution of water were critical elements of this relief effort. The transportation of supplies by helicopters and Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) were successful in overcoming the washed out and non-existent road networks to reach the survivors in need. The use of amphibious forces also enabled the JTF to

keep a minimum footprint ashore during the operation. Operation Sea Angel, as was the case in Operation Provide Comfort, was a large scale joint/coalition operation with significant NGO integration. In both cases, international efforts to provide emergency relief were deficient in capabilities and required the assistance of the military. The prior planning for disaster preparedness that the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) conducted for its area of responsibility helped in the planning and conduct of Operation Sea Angel (Marshall, 1993, p. 17).

The operation spanned over 4 weeks, delivered over 4,000 tons of supply by air, 2,000 tons by LCAC, and over 266,000 gallons of water was produced by Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU). Also 7,000 Bangladesh citizens were provided medical treatment (Gangle, 1991, MCLL 61048-62515).

F. DOMESTIC DISASTER RELIEF

Under the Major Disaster Assistance Program, DOD can provide disaster relief assistance in the United States. Title 42 USC, Sections 5121-5203, also known as the Stafford Act, provides the authorization and authority to conduct disaster relief. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal agency for disaster relief. FEMA's Federal Response Plan assigns DOD with the primary responsibility for two of the twelve Emergency Support Functions

(ESF). The ESF assigned to DOD are Public Works and Engineering, and Urban Search and Rescue.

For the vast majority of disasters that occur each year, FEMA provides responsive disaster relief support through its Federal Response Plan (FRP). During the disasters that have occurred in the last two years, DOD has provided assistance well beyond those two primary designated ESF functions. The recent domestic disasters have shown that when a disaster is of a catastrophic nature the entire relief system can become quickly overwhelmed. As is the case for Title 10 programs, involuntary call-up of reserve units or personnel for disaster relief operations is prohibited. The issue of using Civil Affairs units to support humanitarian assistance is germane.

G. DOMESTIC DISASTER RELIEF APPLICATION

At 0500 on August 24, 1992 Hurricane Andrew struck the state of Florida. The destruction from this hurricane cost an estimated \$20 billion dollars (Davis, 1992, p. 2633). On the same day, DOD was tasked by FEMA to provide disaster relief assistance. On August 27th, Joint Task Force Andrew (JTFA) was formed to provide humanitarian support and relief operations.

The JTFA was to provide support by establishing field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local and line haul transportation, and other logistical support to the local population (Department

of Army, 1933, p. 2). JTFA operations were conducted in three phases:

1. Phase I: Relief Phase - provide immediate life support systems for food, water, shelter, medical supplies, services, sanitation, and transportation.
2. Phase II: Recovery Phase - ensure sustainment of those services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, State, and local governments within our capabilities to establish public services.
3. Phase III: Reconstitution - Continue reestablishment of services under control of non-DoD Federal, State, and local governments while JTFA redeployed (JTFA AA Report, 1993, p. 4).

In the largest peacetime deployment of DOD forces in the United States' history, Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew achieved a hugh success in accomplishing its disaster relief mission in Southern Florida in the wake of Hurricane Andrew.

Within a three week period of Hurricane Andrew two additional regions of the United States suffered major natural disasters. These disasters were Typhoon Omar on Guam that occurred on August 28, 1992 and Hurricane Iniki which that struck the Island of Kauai on September 11, 1992. In both these disasters, DOD provided emergency relief support. Appendix C, summarizes DOD's domestic disaster relief support for these disasters.

The above examples of disaster relief operations provided by the military, demonstrate an outstanding opportunity to help Americans in need. These events provided an opportunity to provide humanitarian assistance and realistic logistic

support training. In the above cases, the military provided the critical initial emergency assistance and then turned over the relief efforts to appropriate civilian relief agencies. There is one example of a military humanitarian assistance operation that demonstrates, however, the wrong way to employ military forces. This ongoing tasking, which involves refugee assistance, is Operation Gitmo. This operation began in the fall of 1991 with the Coast Guard rescuing Haitian refugees at sea. As the number of Haitians fleeing their homeland increased, the involvement of DOD expanded to include the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps. A joint task force was established for this humanitarian mission. The military established a refugee camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to temporarily house the Haitians. As diplomatic efforts began to address the cause of this Haitian refugee situation, the military continued to feed, house, clothe, and care for Haitian refugees in Cuba (Matthews, 1993, p. 21). This situation went on for over two years. Throughout this period no transition of relief efforts to civilian relief agency occurred, as the military was to retain this responsibility (Matthews, 1993, p. 21).

H. UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

The United Nations is a global organization made up of approximately 180 nations that was established at the end of World War II to promote international peace and security. The United Nations officially came into existence on October 24,

1945 when the 51 original members ratified its charter. The main purposes of the organization was to provide a better future for all nations; develop friendly relations among states; cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems; and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Grolliers CD, 1992, p. 1 of 19).

In 1991, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2816, which created the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO). UNDRO would be the central coordinating agency for the U.N. system for disaster relief. Its role would be similar to that of the DOS's OFDA in coordinating the interagency efforts for disaster relief, but at the international level. Table 2-2 provides a list of the agencies involved in the United Nation's disaster relief system.

The increasing number of disasters that are occurring have placed a tremendous strain on the ability to respond by relief agencies. The frequency of disaster occurrence reached such a point that relief organizations described the situation this way, "It's like the ten plagues, I just don't know where it will hit next. I cannot recall a period in our collective history when the challenges have been so great and our resources stretched so thin." (Doherty, May 11, 1991, p. 1212). In 1991, the U.N. Secretary-General in response to

TABLE 2-2

U.N. DISASTER RELIEF AGENCIES		
Organisation	Unit/Function	Date
Food and Agricultural Organization	Office for Special Relief Operations	1975
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Emergency Office	1980
United Nations Children's Fund	Office of the Emergency Operations Coordinator	1971
World Food Program	Emergency Unit	1975
World Health Organization	Emergency Relief Operations Center	1975
United Nations Development Program	Role of in country U.N. relief coordinator	1971
United Nations disaster Relief Office	Main coordinator for U.N. Relief system	1971
Pan-American Health Organization	Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Relief Coordinator	1977
United Nations Office of the coordinator for Special Economic Assistance	Concerned with countries economic emergencies	1977
Source: Kent, "Anatomy Of Disaster Relief," 1987.		

this development undertook an initiative to strengthen the United Nation's system for providing humanitarian assistance. He stated that for an international effort to be effective two conditions were essential: (1) sufficient and readily available resources, and (2) improved coordination within the system involving all the participants who provide humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 1991, p. 421). This U.N. initiative made clear that change was needed in direction to ensure effective coordination and funding for this challenge.

Change would occur in another area of importance to the U.N, there was a new world order unfolding as the Cold War had ended. The role that the U.N. would play in maintaining international peace and security among the nations of the world would also be affected. The changed world order had transformed from bipolar, involving the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., to multipolar, involving all regions of the world. The previous threats of a superpower confrontation had given way to regional conflicts for the world body to address. However, now the U.N. could carry out its charter to maintain international peace with a body of nations that could now work together to solve emerging problems. The importance of the U.N. peacekeeping role would definitely have to increase to meet this challenge. The new world order would both present new regional conflicts and allow existing conflicts to be confronted in a collective effort. Many of these new conflicts would involve civil war that would cause manmade disasters. As identified earlier, civil war has historically hampered the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.

Despite saving lives and alleviating the suffering of many, AID's disaster assistance efforts cannot fully resolve the crisis created by ongoing civil strife. In the absence of peace, disaster assistance is only a stopgap measure, and affected countries cannot fully recover and benefit from reconstruction and development programs. Diplomatic efforts are also required to establish a secure environment in which emergency relief supplies can be distributed to those in need. (GAO, October 1992, p. 54)

In 1992, the Secretary-General introduced another initiative to improve the United Nations. This time the subject was

not disaster relief, but an issue related to it, ways to improve the United Nation's capacity to improve diplomacy and peacekeeping operations. (Loomis, 1993, p. 126) In his report on the initiative, the Secretary-General outlined the relationship between the changing world order and the emerging expanded roles and functions for the United Nations. The following list identifies those new roles and functions:

1. To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence;
2. Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;
3. Through peacekeeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementation agreements achieved by the peacemakers;
4. To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
5. And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. (Loomis, 1993, p. 127)

This proclamation for the U.N., besides setting the agenda for an increase in the role and number of U.N. peacekeeping operations, would also generate considerable debate on the new use of U.N. forces for peacemaking. The latter point on U.N. peacemaking and the role of the DOD in this mission is an issue beyond the scope of this thesis. However, all the discussions on America's unique military capabilities to

provide humanitarian assistance and its attendant costs are germane to this issue.

Since 1988, the U.N. Security Council has approved fourteen new operations as outlined above. This increase in scope is significant when one considers that there had been only thirteen such operations for the U.N. in the prior 40 years (United Nations, 1990, pp. 419-448). The costs to conduct these operations have also increased significantly. In 1987, the total U.N. peacekeeping budget was \$200 million. In 1992, it was \$2.5 billion, and it could increase to more than \$3.5 billion in 1993 (Vita, 1993, p. 4c). Table 2-3 outlines the fourteen active peacekeeping operations that have almost 80,000 "blue helmets" deployed to all parts of the globe. This increase in numbers and costs has become an issue for those providing the forces to support these operations. This topic will be addressed in the next chapter.

The authority and guidelines to use the military for purposes of U.N. Peacekeeping operations are in the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, which have been codified into Title 22, Sections 287d and 2348. The authority to furnish services and commodities directly to the U.N. on a reimbursable basis is contained in Section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Peacekeeping operations are first established by the U.N. Security Council. DOS reviews and approves all U.N. requests for U.S. assistance. In those

TABLE 2-3

Active U.N. Peacekeeping/Peacemaking Operations	
1. <u>Cyprus</u> UN Peacekeeping Force	Est: 1964-present Personnel: 1,529 Est 1993 cost: \$31 million
2. <u>Croatia-Bosnia, Macedonia</u> UN Protection Force	Est: 1992-present Personnel: 24,434 (to grow) Est 1993 cost: \$850 million
3. <u>El Salvador</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1991-present Personnel: 397 Est 1993 cost: \$49 million
4. <u>Angola</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1992-present Personnel: 105 Est 1993 cost: unknown
5. <u>Somalia</u> UN Peacemaking Force	Est: 1993-present Personnel: 28,000 Est 1993 cost: \$1.5 Billion
6. <u>Cambodia</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1992-present Personnel: 21,100 Est 1993 cost: \$2 Billion
7. <u>Israel</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1948-present Personnel: 5,242 Est 1993 cost: \$153 million
8. <u>Western Sahara</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1990-present Personnel: 330 Est 1993 cost: \$80 million
9. <u>Mozambique</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1992-present Personnel: 5,000+ Est 1993 cost: \$330 million
10. <u>Lebanon</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1978-present Personnel: 5,242 Est 1993 cost: \$153 million

TABLE 2-3 (CONTINUED)

Active U.N. Peacekeeping/Peacemaking Operations	
11. <u>Syria-Golan Heights</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1974-present Personnel: 1,121 Est 1993 cost: \$43 million
12. <u>India-Pakistan</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1948-present Personnel: 40 Est 1993 cost: \$5 million
13. <u>Iraq-Kuwait</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1991-present Personnel: 318 (to grow) Est 1993 cost: \$200 million
14. <u>Rwanda</u> UN Observer Force	Est: 1993-present Personnel: 50-200 Est 1993 cost: \$10-30 million
Source: CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations, 1993	

cases where DOD support is required, DOS will request the necessary support from DOD. However, DOS has the right to waiver U.N. reimbursement to DOD, if it is in the national interest. This authority has been exercised regularly by the DOS as a means to reduce the U.S. obligation for its share of U.N. peacekeeping costs (GAO, September 1992, pp. 30-3). The DOS is also experiencing a strain on its budget in finding the funds to cover the costs for all its increasing commitments. These commitments, in which the military is becoming more involved, range from disaster relief to U.N. peacekeeping.

I. APPLICATION OF A U.N. OPERATION

In Somalia, the deaths of tens of thousands; the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees into Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and elsewhere; and the threat of starvation for

millions is stark evidence of the international community's failure, to date, to solve the crisis.

This observation is the concluding remark of an analysis of foreign disaster assistance provided to Somalia in 1992 (GAO, October 1992, pp. 54-55). Congressional concern about Somalia began to grow during the summer months of 1992 as reports on the suffering reached catastrophic levels. Calls for U.N. involvement in Somalia echoed in the chambers of Congress. There was caution called for by the State Department in any contemplated action for Somalia (Congressional Quarterly, 1992, p. 535). Diplomatic concerns rested on the lack of accord among the warring factions in the country. The Senate finally passed a conference resolution on August 3, 1992 urging the President to get the U.N. involved in Somalia (Congressional Quarterly, 1992, p. 535). On August 14th, President Bush called upon the military to begin an emergency airlift of humanitarian supplies to Somalia. This operation would be known as Operation Provide Relief, the first of three phases of military operations in support of humanitarian assistance for Somalia.

Operation Provide Relief was mainly involved with the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. The military would establish a transshipment point in Kenya for the receipt and ultimate distribution of relief supplies to Somalia (Interview I MEF, July 7, 1993). This phase of the operation would continue until the decision was reached to expand the

U.S. involvement in this humanitarian relief effort during December 1992.

The initial efforts to provide humanitarian relief supplies to those in need proved ineffective due to the ongoing civil strife among the various clans involved in the country's struggle to establish a new government. Somalia had only recently disposed of its former political ruler. This man, Muhammad Siad Barre, ruthlessly controlled Somalia and laid the seeds for future unrest among the various clans. His regime lasted from 1969-1991. Throughout this period Somalia suffered many disasters. However, the efforts of U.S. relief support would not begin until after Somalia expelled its Soviet advisors in 1977 (Grolliers (CD), 1992, p. 15).

Siad Barre was driven from power in 1991 by the uprising of the various Somalia clans. The success of removing one dictator from the country was overshadowed by the chaos that was to be created by the in-fighting among the clans. This civil unrest created a situation in which 30 percent of the Somalia's population faced starvation, and compelled the U.N. to become involved. (Grolliers (CD), 1992, p. 16). This U.N. involvement took the form of a U.N. peacekeeping operation that was limited to 500 men and restricted in its ability to deal with an on going civil war. Traditional U.N. peacekeeping operations are based on the consent and cooperation of the host nation involved. The primary weapon of the peacekeepers is their international status and their international

support. Their rules of engagement do not authorize proactive combat roles but rather peaceful conflict resolution techniques. As Operation Provide Hope would experience, no effective relief support could be provided as long as civil war was present.

The situation in Somalia would again captivate the public's conscious as scenes on television would show the suffering of the children, as was the case during Operation Provide Comfort. President Bush would communicate in November 1992 to the U.N. that he was prepared to lead a multi-national effort to provide security for the relief mission in Somalia. On 3 December 1991, the U.N. would finally pass a resolution on Somalia.

The key points of this resolution were:

1. Recognizes "the unique character" of the "human tragedy" in Somalia and says it requires "an immediate and exceptional response,"
2. Welcomes the U.S. offer as well as "offers by other member states to participate in that operation;"
3. Authorizes the U.N. Secretary-General "and member states cooperating to implement the offer referred to...above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.
4. The resolution also left open the time to be decided when the decision would be made for the transition to U.N. peacekeeping operations (Towell, 1991, p. 3762).

The significant aspect of this resolution was the authority to use force to carry out this U.N. peacekeeping mission. The role of peacemakers for U.N. sponsored troops would now find its beginnings in Somalia. The U.N. also

accepted a U.S offer to lead a joint task force in Somalia with the mission of providing a secure environment to allow humanitarian aid to be distributed. This U.S. initiative would have the military remain under U.S. command, as was the case in Operation Provide Comfort. Under this arrangement the cost of this phase of the operation would be borne by the United States as part of a multi-national force. A Special U.N. Somalia Trust Fund based on voluntary contributions was established to finance, as required, the participation of other coalition forces in this operation. (Interview I MEF Comptroller, 1993)

In early December 1992, President Bush would announce that he would send approximately 28,000 troops to Somalia to ensure that the needed humanitarian relief supplies reached the people who desperately needed it. In his address to the American people on 4 Dec 1992, he would outline his intent for this mission.

Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distance place, quickly and efficiently, and thus save thousands of innocents from death.... We will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia, so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation.... Once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular U.N. peacekeeping force. (Towell, 1993, p. 536).

So would begin the second phase of the Somalia operation. It would be called Operation Restore Hope to U.S. troops and United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM I) to U.N. forces. This operation, like the one conducted during Operation

Provide Comfort, was characterized by a host country that lacked an adequate infrastructure to support relief efforts. Due to the mission requirements, all aspects of the military's capability would be called upon to support this effort. The operation would commence with an amphibious assault conducted by Marines and supported by Navy carrier air to secure the port and airfield of Mogadishu, the capitol of Somalia. After that, Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) would begin their offloading of supplies and equipment to support the Fly-In-Echelon (FIE) of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. An Army brigade would follow shortly and the Air Force would begin operations out of Mogadishu.

The use of MPS assets proved essential in providing initial support in a region that lacked any form of host nation support. This was not the first time that MPS assets had been used to support humanitarian assistance. MPS was used to support the disaster relief efforts in both Mount Pinatubo, Philippines and Typhoon Omar, Guam. A contributing factor to this MPS success was the prior planning and training conducted in this area by DOD.

This phase of the operation, 4 Dec 1992 until 4 May 1993, achieved success in securing the area and ensuring that relief supplies reached people in need. One aspect of the operation's success was the negotiations held in early December 1991 with the warring clans to help the humanitarian relief actions of the military force (Towell, 1993, p. 537). The

concept of operations for the JTF during Operation Restore Hope was:

1. Phase I - Establish lodgements/security for relief operations in Mogadishu.
2. Phase II - Expand security operations to major interior relief centers/lines of communication.
3. Phase III - Continue expansion and stabilize interior relief centers.
4. Phase IV - Relief in place of U.S. and coalition forces by U.N. peacekeeping forces.

The mission of the U.S. forces broadened as the operation developed. What started out as one of providing protection for the delivery of relief supplies progressed to one that included seizing weapons and repairing some of the war damaged facilities.

In May 1993, the operation entered its third phase under U.N. control and is known as UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II continues as this thesis is being written. One of the unique features of this phase of the operation is that some of the U.S. troops in the area around Somalia are now under U.N. command. These American troops are primarily logistical and number close to 4,000. The transition of peacekeeping responsibility for Somalia to the U.N. follows the same course as occurred in Operation Provide Comfort. It demonstrated that only the U.S., or a joint coalition such as NATO, has the military capability to conduct effective peacemaking. At this same time, the Pentagon would announce that it would send 300 troops to join an international force to Macedonia in an

effort to contain the strife in the former Yugoslavia. (Vita, 1993, p. 1c)

This involvement in Yugoslavia would not be the first one for DOD. The U.S. began airdrops of humanitarian relief supplies to Bosnia and set up a military Army field hospital in Croatia early in 1993 (Interview with Carrigan July 14, 1993). However, the U.S. has not committed any ground troops to the on-going U.N. peacekeeping operations in Bosnia at this time. The U.N. peacekeeping operation is overseeing the delivery of humanitarian supplies on the ground, but it is not engaging in any peacemaking actions, as is occurring in Somalia. As is the case in Somalia, Bosnia is experiencing a civil war that is causing a man-made disaster. Another parallel with Somalia is the impotent U.N. efforts to distribute humanitarian supplies. The peacekeeping force lacks the capability to provide the required security for this mission. United States attempts to formulate a coalition response with its NATO allies to Bosnia as was done in Operation Provide Comfort failed last year. Although the American public is sensitive to the plight of the human suffering in Bosnia, Congress has indicated its desire to limit the employment of military forces for U.N. peacekeeping operations. Congressional concern has grown as the risks of such operations becoming costly in terms of lives and funding responsibility have increased. This current political

situation is developing as the U.N. is in the process of defining its role in this new world order.

J. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter provided an historical overview to the programs and agencies involved with humanitarian relief efforts. An example of the military's involvement in each type of humanitarian mission was provided. In all cases except domestic disaster relief, coordination is required between DOD and DOS. This interagency process of coordinating humanitarian assistance within the federal government has not always proven effective. Recent operations have shown that the frequency and scale of involvement in these new types of humanitarian missions are increasing. The military has demonstrated the ability to conduct planning at the CINC level to prepare for these new humanitarian missions. It has also adapted to the experience gained from each mission. Only recently, DOD unveiled a new Meal Ready Eat (MRE) developed specifically for humanitarian operations. Admiral Miller, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, wrote a paper in 1992 on the subject of the military roles in the 1990s. He wrote that the "requirement is not doing more with less but doing better with our currently unmatched capabilities." The challenges of this vision DOD has meet in responding to the missions for humanitarian assistance. As the examples outlined in this chapter demonstrated, the importance of integrating all resources as a team in a joint, coalition, or

multi-agency operation is the key to success. What has not kept pace with this trend is the process to both fund and improve coordination for these unprogrammed humanitarian missions. As the last example illustrated, the role of the U.S. in both peacekeeping and peacemaking operations continues to escalate, the operation in Somalia may be a prototype for future U.S. involvement.

III. FUNDING PROCESS

A. ISSUES

If we are going to do more Somalias - and presumably when you look around the world there is an awful lot more places that the same thing could happen, how are we going to establish a funding mechanism so that the American taxpayer is not stuck with the whole bill? Les Aspen (Palmer, 1993, p. 186)

When an operation such as Provide Hope in Somalia is undertaken, what is the process that must be contemplated to fund such a mission? What is the fair "burden share" to be divided among coalition forces? There are many answers to these questions. The U.S. government has several different processes, each of which is triggered by some forcing mechanism that is based on disaster relief, humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping. In addition, factors such as the size and duration of the operation are important in deciding which funding procedures to follow. Federal funding is always subject to the distribution of limited resources. This applies equally to U.N. sanctioned operations. Because of a tight budget for foreign affairs, the State Department has become more insistent that the Pentagon pick up part of the tab for international programs, such as U.S. contributions for U.N. peacekeeping operations.

In the U.S., all funding must follow the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990. In its most basic form, this Act specifies

federal limits for discretionary spending. This requires that any supplemental appropriations for humanitarian assistance must come at the expense of other programs or be designated an emergency by the President and Congress. An example of an emergency would be House Resolution 1281. This was a 1991 supplemental appropriation bill that was used to pay for the indirect costs of the Persian Gulf War. President Bush requested \$3.7 billion, of which \$940 million was to be considered exempt from the discretionary caps. The amount not designated as an emergency fund would be added to the discretionary spending totals. Regular appropriation bills must then be reduced to fit additional spending in supplemental appropriations bills. (Doyle, 1992, p. 10)

This chapter will outline the current funding procedures (focusing on the second research question) in place to support DOD involvement in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations. Also, this chapter will describe how funding flows within the Department of Defense for humanitarian assistance operations. The supplemental appropriation process will be addressed, as well as its effect on Operations and Maintenance accounts within the Services. The government's formal organizational structure, under the control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs, will also be presented. In addition, the newly proposed Global Cooperatives Initiative and guidelines for humanitarian assistance funding are included to give an overview of the

courses of action that can be expected in the short-term for humanitarian assistance operations. United Nations funding policies are then outlined which demonstrate the unique attention that must be given to U.N. sponsored peacekeeping operations.

B. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION - BUSINESS AS USUAL

Typically, funding for large operations conducted by the Department of Defense will eventually be approved through the supplemental appropriation process. Initial funding is taken from Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts to begin operations. This method offsets the timing delay that is inherent in the appropriation process. If the costs are significant, fiscal constraints may develop that effect the operational readiness of the units supporting the action. Scheduled training and maintenance must sometimes be cancelled or postponed because of reduced funding. According to Defense Secretary Les Aspin, the services have had to raid their training funds and other readiness-related budget accounts to cover the costs when operations are taken on short notice. This is usually the case when operations begin close to the end of the fiscal year. New sources of funding are harder to find in later fiscal quarters as the majority of the budget dollars have already been obligated.

The supplemental appropriation process routinely causes political controversy, as funds must either be reallocated from other sources, or more debt must be incurred. For example, in Somalia, President Bush proposed to reduce

research grants earmarked for universities and colleges throughout the country that Congress had already included in the 1993 Defense Appropriation Bill. The funding was to be reallocated to pay for the unanticipated expenses caused by Operation Provide Hope in Somalia. The opposition in Congress argued against dropping the grants, since in many cases the money would have gone to their constituents. Besides the grants, Bush proposed transferring to the Somalia operation \$248 million that had been slated to buy eight C-130 cargo planes that were to be stationed in the home state of Rep. Bill Hefner. (Congressional Quarterly, July 1992, pp. 537-538) This scenario illustrates the fact that the supplemental appropriations are often the subject of debate and not completely reliable. The supplemental appropriation process can be lengthy and does not relieve the problem of short-term funding.

Does the controversy over funding mean that DOD components will never get reimbursed for operations? No, in most medium and large-scale operations supplemental appropriations have eventually been approved. The problem is the time lag between operations and reimbursement. Operations and Maintenance budgets are allocated on a quarterly basis. In Somalia, when Marine Corps O&M funds scheduled for the fourth quarter had already been spent by the second quarter, the planning process became disrupted later in the year. The Marine Expeditionary Force arrived back in the United States, in May 1993, with its

O&M funding for the rest of the fiscal year already allocated. This influenced operational readiness as units became financially unable to conduct previously scheduled training and maintenance.

The bottom line is that funding the increasing number of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance programs has been, inefficient, and often has been provided at the expense of other DOD programs. In FY 1992, an estimated \$42 million was absorbed into the Services' regular Operations and Maintenance appropriation for incremental costs of DOD support for various U.N. operations. Additionally, in FY 1992, DOD incurred costs for some humanitarian assistance activities, and received regular or supplemental appropriations for others. Although DOD has the authority to undertake humanitarian assistance operations, non-supplemental appropriations have not been provided for such activities on a regular basis. In practice the costs for such operations are reallocated from Operations and Maintenance appropriations.

C. DOD STRUCTURE FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Within the Department of Defense there is a formalized hierarchy set up to coordinate humanitarian assistance. This is managed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs. Beginning in 1994, responsibility for humanitarian assistance operations will be transferred to a newly created, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping. The Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping will be the focal point for all future operations. This office has the responsibility for managing the account appropriation and has defined its future priorities as:

1. To develop and refine strategies for regional and country priorities for delivery of DOD excess property, privately donated supplies, and other relief assistance;
2. To improve the efficiency, effectiveness and timing of DOD's humanitarian and disaster relief assistance programs by reviewing and improving upon programs and procedures, and to assist crisis prevention efforts;
3. To facilitate contingency planning with other U.S. government, international, and non-governmental organizations to assure DOD disaster relief preparedness;
4. To expand cooperative relationships with the United Nations, other international, and private volunteer organizations to facilitate or assist non-government and humanitarian assistance efforts. (OASD, June 1993, pp. 4-5)

It will be the responsibility of the new Assistant Secretary to direct, manage and coordinate all humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping activities. Below is a description of each program under the authority of this office.

1. Humanitarian Assistance Program

The Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), which distributes excess supplies, has been the historical approach for humanitarian assistance provided by the U.S. military. This program is expected to become more important as military forces are being reduced and bases closed, causing substantial increases in DOD excess property

available to meet ongoing humanitarian assistance requirements. (Touma, July 1993, p. 10)

The Defense Act of 1986, authorized the Humanitarian Assistance Program (also called the excess property program), under which the Secretary of Defense can make available for humanitarian relief purposes any non-lethal excess supplies in the DOD system. The purpose of the program was to donate excess property to help refugee and resistance groups in Afghanistan, and to fly wounded Afghans requiring surgery to the United States and Europe. The first flight of supplies was sent in March 1986. Subsequently, in 1987 the program was expanded to include resistance groups in Cambodia. Requests for excess supplies and equipment are usually originated by U.S. Embassies, and sent via the State Department to the Department of Defense. After DOD fills the request, it ships the property overseas, and then transfers the property to a State Department representative. The representative in country receiving the property is responsible for its distribution. (GAO, 1991, p. 1)

In addition to excess supplies, the Humanitarian Assistance Program has a variety of complementing programs that also use DOD resources to meet humanitarian assistance requirements. Currently, the program provides for transportation costs of defense excess materials and supplies from the private nonprofit donor community for humanitarian, refugee, and disaster relief purposes. DOD's unique transportation

assets and excess property, including food, medical supplies, clothing, tents, heavy equipment, trucks, and other non-lethal equipment, are made available through designated or space-available transportation to eligible recipients when other traditional means of U.S. support are not adequate. (GAO, January 1991, p. 3)

2. Denton Space Available Program

The Humanitarian Assistance Office also coordinates the execution of the Denton Space-Available Transportation Program (annual funding for this program is approximately \$15 million) which provides space available transport for privately donated cargo aboard military aircraft. Transportation costs have historically required the greatest percentage of humanitarian assistance funds. Using room on existing flights helps to control humanitarian assistance funds without adding to the incremental costs associated with it. This authority is the only legal means for U.S. military aircraft to transport private cargo at no cost to third parties.

3. Title 10 Humanitarian Assistance Funding

This is administered by the CINCs, but approved by the Humanitarian Assistance Office. Under this program, military forces complete civic assistance projects while on training exercises and deployments in foreign countries. Funding is provided by the DOD Executive Agent for each CINC and is based on CINC requests to the Executive Agent. Authorized funding for this program has averaged \$3.3 million per year. This

program is a goodwill activity that does not effect the unanticipated requirements of humanitarian assistance operations.

4. Emergency Response Fund

Another potential source of funding is the Emergency Response Fund (ERF). This is a revolving account used to fund supplies and services provided by DOD for humanitarian assistance. The advantage of the ERF is that it can be useful to fund humanitarian assistance, although reimbursements from other agencies have proven difficult to obtain. The language establishing this fund states:

The fund should be available for providing reimbursement to currently applicable appropriations of the Department of Defense for supplies and services provided in anticipation of requests from Federal Departments and agencies and from state and local governments for assistance on a reimbursable basis to respond to natural or manmade disasters. The fund may be used upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense that immediate action is necessary before a formal request is received. Reimbursements and appropriations deposited to the fund shall remain available until expended. (Carrigan, 1993, pp. 1-3)

The Emergency Response Fund was established by Congress in 1990. A total of \$100 million was appropriated. The Army is the Executive Agent for the ERF. An example of an operation in which this fund was used is Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh. The operations were funded by each military component from O&M funds with the assurance of reimbursement. All O&M funding provided by the parent Services for Operation Sea Angel were then reimbursed through the U.S. Army, acting as executive agent (in this case, \$6.35 million). It was the

responsibility of the Army to request that DOD release funds for reimbursement purposes. (Stackpole, 1991, p. 3)

5. Foreign Disaster Assistance Program

The Department of Defense has been involved in disaster relief around the globe. In response to tasking through the Joint Staff, with approval from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, individual military units may provide personnel or resources to respond to the needs of a disaster stricken region or country. When a CINC provides disaster relief, the funding is provided through the component commanders, who use internal O&M funds for assistance, generally without reimbursement. These operations are carried out in response to Joint Staff taskings to the CINCs.

Requests to provide foreign disaster assistance are coordinated by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in the Agency for International Development (AID). During the 1980s, OFDA's spending grew without a corresponding increase in annual disaster assistance appropriations. To meet its funding requirements, OFDA increasingly relied on its borrowing authority. However, consistent use of borrowing authority alters congressional priorities by shifting funds from development assistance to disaster assistance outside the normal annual budgeting process.

Until FY 1992, DOD provided foreign disaster relief without benefit of a specific appropriation. Often, the State Department reimbursed DOD for a wide range of specifically

requested activities. The number and scope of DOD's involvement in conducting foreign disaster relief has been steadily increasing. As its role has grown, the Department of Defense has expressed a growing concern over obtaining funds for humanitarian assistance. In exceptional cases where large-scale military involvement was required to conduct foreign disaster relief activities, DOD funds were reprogrammed or transferred from other DOD accounts.

In FY 1992, Congress, recognizing that DOD had been absorbing increased unplanned costs in conducting foreign disaster relief assistance, began approving specific appropriations to fund disaster relief activities. Also in FY 1992, a \$25 million appropriation was passed to reimburse military units for the unanticipated costs of providing foreign disaster relief assistance. In FY 1993, a separate additional appropriation was also approved to mitigate the costs of DOD conducting foreign disaster relief worldwide. An important new activity that is being funded by this \$50 million appropriation is the procurement of items such as food and medicines. (Touma, July 1993, pp. 2-3)

6. CINC Initiative Fund

This is a revolving account controlled by the JCS. It can be used to help streamline the funding process to component commanders for the reimbursement of humanitarian assistance operations. The current annual funding level for this program is \$25 million. This approach to funding

operations is extremely efficient, but, seven other CINC activities compete for this funding. With the amount available the fund can only be made available for operations that are limited in scope and cost. The idea, if expanded, has the potential to alleviate much of the funding problems.

D. GLOBAL COOPERATIVES INITIATIVE FUNDING PROPOSAL

Included in the 1994 budget proposal is the Global Cooperatives Initiative (GCI) Appropriation. This proposed \$448 million package captures the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster assistance and democratization programs in a single, centralized transfer account. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping will have the responsibility for monitoring these funds. The amount requested for the Global Cooperatives Initiative would cover many activities in which U.S. forces have previously been engaged, such as participation in international peacekeeping operations. In the past, the Services usually had to pay for the costs of such measures out of their own budgets, and they often had to cutback on training as a result. These funds will be made available as two-year appropriations to maintain program flexibility. The appropriation request includes:

	FY94 (millions)
Peacekeeping	\$ 300
Humanitarian Assistance	48
Disaster Relief	50
Promotion of Democracy	50
Total	\$ 448

This program is a first step to streamline the funding process so that military departments would not have to cancel or defer other programs to fit the costs associated with such initiatives. The idea is to minimize the impact on Operations and Maintenance appropriations, thus protecting funds for operational readiness. The Global Cooperatives Initiative Appropriation also will provide DOD greater flexibility to respond quickly to events with appropriate capabilities by reducing the time-consuming decision process over the source of funding for each action. The funding levels for the Global Cooperative Initiative are to remain constant over five years. (OASD, June 1993, p. 516)

	FY95	FY95-99 (millions)
Peacekeeping	\$ 300	\$ 1500
Humanitarian Assistance	50	250
Disaster Relief	50	250
Promotion of Democracy	50	250
Total		\$ 2250

While \$2.25 billion may seem like a lot of money, it will probably fall well short of what will be required. Operation Provide Hope in Somalia cost over \$750 million. That is significantly more than the total 1994 appropriation. As humanitarian assistance programs are integrated into the force structure of the military it is apparent that the funding requirement for operations should be increasing over the near term instead of remaining constant. There is little doubt that the Global Cooperatives Initiative Appropriation will alleviate some strain currently felt by the service components, however, other programs will also be necessary to meet increasing commitments.

Transportation and other costs are expected to increase further as greater numbers of international and non-governmental organizations seek DOD support for their various humanitarian assistance programs. DOD humanitarian activities in Northern Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Bosnia outline not only a likely increase in the number of manmade disasters in the 1990s as regional instabilities are aggravated, but also the likelihood that DOD will be called upon to play a significant role in subsequent relief efforts. (Touma, July 1993, p. 3)

All DOD humanitarian and disaster relief activities funded by the Global Cooperatives Initiative are conducted at the request of the State Department. The breakdown among these two components of the package is as follows:

Humanitarian Assistance	\$48 million
Excess Property Donations	4
Transportation Assistance	44
Disaster Relief	\$50 million
Planning and Training	3
Relief and Rehabilitation	40
Reconstruction	7

These types of humanitarian assistance programs are to be expected of future military operations. In many cases operations are outpacing the funding programs that are in place to support them. Component commanders cannot automatically look to the CINC to cover their costs. This time-consuming process greatly affects operational readiness as it limits the use of O&M funds. In small scale operations the impact of conducting operations with O&M funds and finding reimbursement may not be a problem. This, however, is no longer the normal situation. The size and scope of humanitarian operations are increasing. Despite anticipated program growth, funding is to be held constant each year at \$50 million for humanitarian assistance and \$50 million for disaster relief through 1999. This leaves the supplemental process as the only method available to recover expenses (OASD, June 1993, p. 518).

E. UNITED NATIONS INVOLVED FUNDING

The United Nations is currently involved in an effort to rewrite and clarify its reimbursement procedures for peacekeeping operations. The U.N. realizes that there is a need for a central funding mechanism to ensure the provision of adequate resources in peacekeeping operations. The Secretary-General has proposed that, under his authority, a central emergency revolving fund (in the amount of \$50 million) be established that would act as a cash-flow mechanism to ensure the rapid and coordinated response of participating states.

A major lesson learned to date is that the United States must develop an interface with the U.N. system and not expect the U.N. system to accommodate ours. In Somalia, failure to comply with the U.N. system made reimbursement difficult, since the necessary procedures to identify costs were not in place early in the operation. Other U.N. operations face the same problems, primarily because the ground rules were not known when operations started, and sometimes the parties involved were not aware that the operation was reimbursable. It is important that the logistical commander in the field be provided the guidance and information necessary to establish a reimbursement baseline and to minimize non-reimbursable costs (see Appendix D for a list of United Nations costs eligible for reimbursement).

Funding for U.N. peacekeeping operations are presently obtained from the following sources:

1. Regular U.N. budget;
2. Assessed contributions in accordance with a formula determined by the General Assembly; and
3. Voluntary contributions.

When calculating the costs that may be charged to the U.N., it is the general practice only to seek recovery of the additional costs that fall to the state contributing troops. In some cases this will equal the full cost of providing a service. Where capital purchase is necessary, the full cost is appropriate. Full visibility of all costs that are to be the subject of reimbursement by the U.N. will be required if payment is to be authorized. In this regard, lack of supporting documentation will likely result in a significant delay or even nonpayment. (Joint Staff, 1993, pp. 1, 4)

Under the formula for peacekeeping dues, the United States pays 30.4 percent of each mission. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has estimated annual peacekeeping costs will rise to \$3.6 billion by the end of 1993. That would put the U.S. bill at nearly \$1.1 billion. This is significantly more than the 25 percent that the U.S. is assessed annually for the general U.N. budget. Under a 25 percent guideline the cost to the United States would have amounted to \$900,000 for peacekeeping.

F. GUIDELINES

All of the funding programs managed by the Office of Humanitarian Assistance have central guidelines that must be followed to acquire resources. It is important for component commanders to be aware of their options in obtaining funding. Costs to the U.S. military will depend on the size and type of forces that may be deployed to support humanitarian assistance operations.

When operating under the U.N. flag for peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operations it is important to identify reimbursable costs (see Appendix D for list). Most U.N. operations will result in incremental costs to DOD that involve military personnel (such as family separation pay) and transportation expenses. In a 1993 Bottom-Up Review by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy, Resources and Requirements) several illustrative examples of force packages and their approximate incremental costs were outlined. These included:

1. Deployment of an engineer battalion to an African country for six months: \$77 million.
2. Deployment of 4000 logistics support troops to an African country for 12 months: \$100 million.
3. Humanitarian airlift to Europe/Asia for three months: \$52 million.
4. Deployment of 5000 special forces troops to Middle East for 6 months: \$127 million.
5. Deployment of 4000 logistics support troops to Eastern Europe for 12 months: \$157 million.

6. Deployment of an Amphibious Task Group to an Asian country for 2 months: \$11 million (OASD, June 1993, pp. 14-15)

These costs are only illustrative; anticipated costs must be incorporated into budget planning to support overall Defense Strategy.

Most of the programs within the Office of Humanitarian Assistance are only designed to provide resources for activities that are limited in scope and size. Therefore, committing a unit of any significant size to a United Nations operation would entail more resources than any one of the programs under the structure of the Department of Defense could handle. However, projecting requirements based on a changing world environment rather than maintaining funding at a steady measure over the next five years, as in the case of the Global Cooperatives Initiative Appropriation, would seem more appropriate. Direct estimates of operational costs need to be incorporated into any type of appropriation planning process. This is particularly important in the case of the GCI or any similar program designed to streamline the funding process.

G. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE IN U.N. OPERATIONS

The State Department is responsible for overseeing U.S. interests in U.N. operations that involve the Department of Defense. Within the State Department, there is a division of responsibility for the political and financial dimensions of humanitarian assistance operations. The DOD supports U.N.

operations with services such as military airlift, logistics, and military personnel. The State Department receives requests from the United Nations, and then coordinates with DOD to provide assistance. In return for providing assistance the State Department receives credits toward the U.S. assessment for the value of its military contribution.

The Department of Defense and the State Department are often in disagreement over reimbursement policies. According to a recent General Accounting Office study, Department of Defense policies for reporting support are outdated. Further, DOD has not been reporting the cost of its peacekeeping operations because it felt that there was no requirement to do so. As a result, the State Department often will not reimburse DOD for its contribution. What credits the State Department does receive from the United Nations instead is applied to the United States' portion of the U.N. General Assessment. (GAO, 1992, p. 3)

H. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has outlined the formalized structure within DOD for humanitarian assistance funding. The Global Cooperatives Initiative is the Defense Department's solution for avoiding delay in identifying funding every time a new mission arises. The acknowledgement that an appropriation of this type will fall short of actual requirements necessitates that component commanders and individual Services still be aware of

all the programs and guidelines available to support humanitarian assistance operations. Current funding for humanitarian assistance operation is outlined in various programs controlled by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs. These programs include the Humanitarian Assistance Program, Foreign Disaster Assistance Program, Emergency Response Fund, and the CINC Initiative Fund. Coordination between many of the programs is often limited or under tight bureaucratic controls. A more effective funding system might incorporate the use of a centralized point of contact that could reduce unnecessary duplication, and seek a synergistic effect for all types of operations.

Funding for U.N. operations is coordinated through the State Department for the Department of Defense. The State Department receives credits from the U.N. for the value of DOD contributions, and in turn is supposed to reimburse the Defense Department for the amount of the credits. The State Department has been reluctant to reimburse DOD because of conflicting political and financial interests within the State Department, and inadequate policies and procedures by which DOD accounts for the value of humanitarian assistance.

IV. SOMALIA COST PROFILE

A. OVERVIEW

Given the increasing demands for DOD assistance to U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is essential that the full value of U.S. contributions and reimbursable billings be accurately determined and reported. To date there is no single unit within the Department of Defense tasked with compiling and maintaining such records (Senate Report 103-112, July 27, 1993, p. 337).

The above Congressional statement highlights the present situation facing DOD in its attempts to deal with the budget implications of humanitarian operations. Historically, the costs associated with these types of missions have fallen within the range of Congressional authorized spending limits. However, as we have witnessed the dramatic increase in frequency and scale of such operations their costs have exceeded authorized levels. As the Services fund these contingency missions from their own budgets, the importance of identifying and reporting the costs incurred for future reimbursements becomes critical.

DOD is currently updating the policies and procedures for reporting costs and determining reimbursement procedures for these non-traditional operations. This process of revising fiscal procedures to reflect the methods of employing our armed forces for conducting humanitarian missions is a challenge. Reimbursement procedures established under one situation, like that for an NATO multinational force, may prove cumbersome between countries under a U.N. sponsored

operation. A U.N. sponsored operation can have up to 180 different countries involved. Reimbursement procedures for a single item of support in a U.N. situation could involve many varying fiscal arrangements.

During Operation Provide Comfort, the coalition force was composed of NATO countries. Usually, existing NATO mutual support agreements covered the provisions required for reimbursement for cross-service support among the coalition members. In other cases, prior Section 607 agreements under the Foreign Assistance Act with other coalition members were invoked for reimbursement. Regarding the funding for the U.S. military involvement in the operation, existing Congressionally authorized funding levels proved to be insufficient and restrictive. As we now appreciate, Operation Provide Comfort was the first large-scale humanitarian mission undertaken by the military. Its impact on the Services' operating budget would be minimal, since it was only the first of many humanitarian missions to follow. Also, "excess" funds from Operation Desert Storm were available to finance the operation. The only impact on DOD funding caused by Operation Provide Comfort was the timing for obligating the Service's O&M funds for the conduct of the operation. The operation occurred during the third quarter and the O&M accounts were already programmed for third and fourth quarter obligations. Funding from the supplemental did not require the Services to re-program existing O&M appropriations to pay for the operation.

As the examples of DOD humanitarian missions in Chapter II showed, these operations are being conducted as part of either a multi-national or U.N. sponsored operation. Often, DOD provides support to other coalition forces for these operations. These requests originate from the fact that many countries do not possess the capability to project and sustain a large military force. This is one unique capability of the U.S. military. A recent GAO report on U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, identified several issues that impact on DOD peacekeeping contributions. The following list highlights those issues:

1. DOD logistic support procedures are outdated and are not being applied correctly for U.N. reimbursement.
2. Since 1989, DOS has waived DOD reimbursement for U.N. airlift support. Instead the reimbursement is used to credit U.S. peacekeeping assessment.
3. DOD lacks current policies and procedures to track and report peacekeeping assistance (GAO, September 1992, pp. 30-33).

This report provides the background that motivated the debate in the Senate Report highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. These GAO findings occurred after the beginning of Operation Provide Comfort but before Operation Restore Hope. Attempts to get historical data on Operation Provide Comfort for this thesis provided only limited data.

This chapter will provide a profile of the costs reported for Operation Restore Hope. The cost data covers the five-month period from December 1992 until the U.N. turnover in May 1993. Cost data is broken down by Service and cost category.

A comparison of the actual and estimated costs for Operation Restore Hope will be presented. The process of developing a supplemental appropriation to fund this operation is presented. The significance of reviewing the costs involved in Somalia is that the operation involved the U.S. in both a multi-national and U.N. peacekeeping operation. This operation also pointed out the weaknesses of a large scale U.N. humanitarian operation without the help of the U.S. military. Operation Restore Hope is now the largest and costliest military deployment for a humanitarian mission. An understanding of the cost elements for Operation Restore Hope can provide some insights for future humanitarian budget planning. By its very nature, humanitarian operations will occur as a contingency mission. This fact underscores the inherent problem of budgeting for these unprogrammed requirements. As described in Chapter III, the Services provide their own O&M funds to initially fund the operation's cost. The process for supplemental reimbursements may take months, as occurred in Somalia. The need to account for all costs involved in an operation is critical for receiving reimbursements from a supplemental appropriation or funds from other sources. Somalia can be characterized as a model for future humanitarian operations. It required DOD to use all aspects of its military capabilities to conduct the operation in an austere environment. This latter point coupled with the funding

issues involved, provides information that can be used to plan future humanitarian budgeting requirements.

B. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE COST PROFILE

The Administration made these deployments and didn't figure out how to pay for them, and now they're trying to come back and hurt our military effectiveness. (Schmitt, January 17, 1993, p. I7:1)

This was Representative John Murtha's reaction to President Bush's, January 12, 1993, proposed "zero-sum" supplemental appropriation to cover the costs for Operation Restore Hope. This zero-sum proposal would fund the operation's estimated costs from existing appropriations in DOD. The request proposed transferring \$560 million in FY 1993 DOD appropriations and \$23.2 million in realized cost reductions to finance the operation. This supplemental request would be the first of the initiatives to fund this operation. It was the administration's intention to conclude and transfer responsibility for this operation to the U.N. in March 1993. The supplemental identified \$583.2 million in estimated incremental costs for the operation. This figure was based on an estimate of deploying 28,600 personnel for 90 days. The estimate equates to an average daily cost rate of approximately \$226.57 per man. This cost estimate did not include any costs associated with providing support to coalition forces. These costs were to be reimbursed by either the U.N. Somalia Trust fund or existing support agreements in force with other nations.

The cost estimates identified in the proposed supplemental applied to the following DOD military appropriations: Personnel, Operation & Maintenance, and Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF). The Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) uses the DBOF to finance its operations. The proposed source of funding to finance these incremental costs would come from offsetting decreases within the DOD budget. This supplemental requested the authority to transfer these internal DOD funds. Appendix D contains a summary of the proposed supplemental.

Table 4-1 provides the Services' inputs for the estimated incremental costs associated with the personnel appropriation. Personnel cost estimates include the following categories: Imminent Danger Pay (IDP), Family Separation Allowance (FSA), Foreign Duty Pay (FDP), and reservists who receive pay and allowances. The rates used for estimating personnel cost were: IDP - \$150 man/month, FSA - \$75 man/month, and FDP - \$25 man/month. Pay and allowance cost for volunteer reservists is based on their rank and location of active duty. Similarly, the cost for Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), which is authorized in garrison, is based on the rank structure. BAS costs would be deducted here, since Somalia is a field duty. These BAS cost adjustments were included in each Service's personnel cost estimate.

TABLE 4-1

PERSONNEL COST ESTIMATES (\$MILLIONS)		
SERVICE	BUDGET INCREASE REQUESTED	RESERVE PERSONNEL WHO VOLUNTEERED
Army	8.3	225
Navy	2.8	243
Marine Corps	11.4	120
Air Force	23.8	2300
Other DOD	8.3	NA
Total	46.30	2,888
Source: I MEF Comptroller		

The largest incremental cost area in support of Operation Restore Hope would be in the Operation & Maintenance appropriation and the DBOF for TRANSCOM. Table 4-2 provides the Service's estimate of the incremental costs associated with the Operation & Maintenance appropriation.

TABLE 4-2

OPERATION & MAINTENANCE COST ESTIMATES (\$MILLIONS)	
SERVICE	BUDGET INCREASE REQUESTED
Army	73.8
Navy	24.0
Marine Corps	101.3
Air Force	147.5
TRANSCOM-DBOF	182.0
Total	528.60
Source: I MEF Comptroller	

The Operation & Maintenance cost estimates include the following categories:

1. Subsistence - This category covers Class I food and water.
2. In Country Sustainment - This category covers the estimated logistical support needed to operate and maintain the force in Somalia.
3. Engineering/Contract support - This category covers engineering requirements and the costs for contracted engineer services from Brown and Root.
4. Medical - This category covers the costs estimated for providing medical support to the forces in Somalia.
5. Reconstitution - This category covers the estimated costs to reconstitute supplies and equipment back to a deployment status. The MPS ships would fall under this category.
6. In Land Transportation - This category covers the estimated costs for movement of the force and equipment to and from home bases and points of embarkation and debarkation.
7. OPTEMPO - This category covered the estimated incremental costs to support additional Air Force KC-10 and KC-135 flying hours in support of the operation. The estimate for this support was \$110.3 million.
8. Transportation - This category covers the estimated costs for airlift, sealift, and port handling in support of the operation. This would be the largest cost area with an estimate of \$182 million.

The estimated airlift costs for deploying, redeploying, and sustaining the force was \$132 million. Sealift cost estimates were \$42 million and port handling costs were \$8 million. The rates used for airlift costs for both inter and intratheater lifts were as follows: C-130 \$2,090/Hr, C-141 \$3,255/Hr, C-5 \$8,780/Hr, and KC-10 \$2,457/Hr. Commercial flight rates will vary among the various carriers. Estimated intertheater

airlifts for the operation were approximately 810 C-141, 450 C-5, and 90 commercial flights.

The supplemental offered several offsetting decreases to fund the estimated \$583.2 million. Some of these decreases included funds that were determined to be excess in each Service's Personnel Appropriation. Excess funds in the Personnel Appropriations included the savings attributed to the volunteer reservists forgoing annual training. Other than the Air Force, the Services were able to fund the incremental personnel costs for the operation from funds offered in the supplemental. The primary decreases to fund the remaining incremental Operation & Maintenance costs came from National Guard and Reserve appropriations and Defense-Wide Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Appropriations. The following quotation best describes the process of developing the military's portion of a supplemental appropriation.

In what has become an annual ritual after Congress approves the military budget, the Pentagon submits a list of pet programs it wishes to rescind. Lawmakers howl with outrage and offer more modest recommendations. (Schmitt, January 17, 1993, p. I:7)

As the events unfolded in Somalia, this initiative would be delayed and require revisions based on a deployment greater than ninety days.

To appreciate the development of these estimates, you have to understand the prevailing situation in Somalia. The operating conditions for Somalia were austere. There were severe infrastructure limitations and virtually no Host Nation

Support (HNS). This environment would require the military to operate in an expeditionary manner in Somalia. The role for transportation in supporting and sustaining the force would be critical. During the first 30 days, 90% of the force closure would arrive by air and 10% by sea. After day 30 and for the life of the logistic plan, sea lift would provide 90% of the transportation. It was planned that by day 25 (January 3, 1993) the sea lines of communication would be open. However, sealift would prove to be critical during the early stage of Operation Restore Hope. Early common services and support to all members of the Joint Task Force (JTF) would be completely dependent on the supplies and equipment from MPS (1st FSSG, August 12, 1993, p. 1).

The Marine Corps would assume overall JTF responsibility for logistic support during the first 50 days of the operation. As the theater matured, the Army would assume JTF responsibility for common item support. This would occur on January 28, 1993. Since the planning assumed a 90-day operation, the Army commenced planning on February 17, 1993 to transition logistic responsibility to UNISOM II. The decision was made to contract commercially for engineering logistic support that was hampered by the lack of existing infrastructure and HNS. This civilian logistic support for a military operation was deemed appropriate for a humanitarian mission. By using contractors to augment the lack of HNS, the military's engineers could be more effectively employed in

support of the main mission of providing relief supplies to the country. This contract was negotiated by the Army Corps of Engineers with the Brown and Root Company. The contract for logistical services would begin on December 11, 1992 and be extended under UNISOM II. The estimated costs for these engineer related tasks would be \$50 million for Operation Restore Hope.

It was determined that contracted logistical support should be consolidated for all members of the task force. Consolidation of requirements would save time and money for everyone. However, Congressional restrictions preclude the use of DOD funds to pay for coalition support. The Army, Marine Corps, and Coalition Forces agreed to breakout the funding requirements needed to reimburse the Brown and Root company for support provided under the contract. This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on taskings and the required reimbursement procedures for contractor support was signed on March 20, 1993. The reimbursement funding procedure for coalition logistical support was completed well after the start of the contract in December 1992. This situation typifies the processes that DOD would encounter in wrestling with Somalia funding issues not covered under current policies or procedures. In a contingency mission, which would characterize DOD involvement in humanitarian missions, the policies and procedures on funding matters must be in place before the operation begins.

The comptroller for the JTF generated the JTF cost estimates for the operation in January 1993. His cost estimate totals are approximately the same as those derived by the Services working with OSD on the zero-based supplemental. The main cost drivers identified by the JTF in their estimates were for transportation and contractor support. The airlift cost estimate for the operation was \$269 million, and the sealift estimate was \$124 million. Coalition support cost estimates were included in the JTF estimates. They were estimated to be \$5.29 million, of which \$4 million was for contractor support from Brown and Root, as of January 29, 1993. Out of this total, \$1.3 million would be reimbursable under the U.N. Trust Fund for approved countries (Interview I MEF, July 7, 1993). This fund was established for ten underdeveloped nations that were participating in the multinational operation. The remainder of the costs was to be reimbursed under existing or developing support agreements. As Somalia demonstrated, existing support agreements with coalition members created varying fiscal rates for services provided. The need to revise existing agreements to accommodate standardization in a large coalition is warranted.

C. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE ACTUAL COSTS

On 4 May 1993, the U.S. turned over responsibility for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operation in Somalia to the United Nations. This was two months later than the planned ninety-day operation outlined in the zero-sum appropriation request

in January 1993. During the five-month operation, all Services provided monthly cost reports to the OSD Comptroller. The final DOD reported total costs for Operation Restore Hope was \$766.1 million. Figure 4-1 provides a breakdown of this total by component. Appendix E contains the reported costs for Operation Restore Hope.

The total incremental costs reported by DOD for the operation was \$692.2 million. As defined earlier, incremental costs are those costs that can be attributed solely to the operation. Table 4-3 provides a comparison of the total and




Figure 4-1

TABLE 4-3


OPERATION RESTORE HOPE TOTAL AND INCREMENTAL COSTS (MILLIONS)		
SERVICE	TOTAL COSTS	INCREMENTAL COSTS
ARMY	160.3	160.3
NAVY	36.4	24.7
MARINE CORPS	110.7	110.7
AIR FORCE	69.9	69.9
TRANSCOM	383.3	322.6
DEFENSE AGENCIES	5.5	4.0
TOTALS	766.10	692.20
Source: DOD Comptroller		

incremental costs reported by each component. In two cases, there were significant differences between incremental and total costs. This occurred with Navy and TRANSCOM reported costs. In the case involving TRANSCOM, the variance was due to sealift. Specifically, the costs for MPS and the Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF) reported only \$480 thousand in incremental costs. Their total actual costs were approximately \$53 million. As indicated earlier, equipment and supplies from the prepositioning ships provided the critical early support to UNITAF. Many of the actual costs needed to reconstitute the prepositioning ships back to a deployment ready status were already funded under programmed Operation Desert Shield funds. The Navy cost variance was attributed to programmed costs for operating its ships in the area.

To evaluate the costs for Operation Restore Hope, the actual costs for transportation must be considered. The fact that incremental costs were reduced by Operation Desert Storm funding masked the true incremental costs of the operation. This situation is only applicable to Somalia and cannot be projected to offset future costs. The largest cost driver for the humanitarian operation was transportation. This was the support provided by TRANSCOM to transport and sustain the military force in Somalia. As was noted in Chapter II, transportation is the largest cost driver for other DOD humanitarian programs. The reported total transportation costs were \$383.3 million which represented 50 percent of the total costs incurred for the operation. This amount also included \$16.3 million in coalition lift support. Figure 4-2 provides a breakdown of the transportation costs by month. During the first 60 days of the operation, the cost of transportation provided would be \$240.1 million. This amount is 62 percent of the total transportation cost for the operation.

The large airlift cost during the first two months coincides with the rapid deployment of the 28,600 person force and the closure of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) on January 28, 1993. Once the SLOC was opened, sealift would play a more significant role in supporting the operation. As

SOMALIA MONTHLY TRANSPORTATION COSTS
AIRLIFT - SEALIFT



Note: Sealift includes Port & Handling costs
Source: DOD Comptroller

Figure 4-2

the deployment of the force would come to a conclusion in January 1993, the retrograde of 850 Marines would also begin in the middle of January 1993 as a symbolic indicator of our long-term intentions. This retrograde of the force would continue in anticipation of the transition of responsibility to U.N. operation. This transition would not occur in March as planned, but the force would be retrograded down to 8,000 in phases by the end of April.

The monthly costs for all Services would also be the largest during the early phase of the operation. Figure 4-3 provides the breakdown of costs by month for each Service. The deployment of the 28,600 force in December 1992 would require 36.4 percent of the total cost of the operation. In fact, by January 1993, the cost of the operation would be 61 percent of the total. Figure 4-4 provides the cumulative costs for Operation Restore Hope.




Figure 4-3

This large initial funding requirement would have to be borne by each Service's O&M budget. The delays incident to the




Figure 4-4

reprogramming process of the Operation Restore Hope supplemental would cause significant readiness problems for the Services. The Marine Corps would experience a large funding shortfall. Not only would they absorb the costs of deploying their own force, but they had to budget for 50-days of logistic support for the entire JTF. To appreciate the demands of the operating environment on the JTF, the cost category of in country sustainment was the largest cost area

for the Services. Out of the total cost of \$382.8 million for the operation, in country sustainment costs were \$278.1 million (72.6 percent of the total costs).

The First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was the command that provided the Marine Component for the JTF. The MEF would have to request realignment of second, third, and fourth quarter O&M funds into the first quarter. This was needed to budget for its estimated costs of \$114 million on December 7, 1992. Within two weeks in country, the Marines realized the scope of this expeditionary operation and began to revise their funding estimates. The Marine Corps would incur 70.7 percent of their total costs for the entire operation in the first month. This new cost estimate of \$152 million would reflect a worst case scenario. This action would reduce Camp Pendleton's Base Operation funds by 80 percent for the third quarter and 100% for the fourth quarter. The MEF's rear operational forces O&M funds would also be reduced by 100% for both the third and fourth quarters (Interview I MEF Comptroller, July 7, 1993). The funding relief in the form of supplemental reprogramming of funds would not occur until the summer of 1993. Throughout the operation the MEF was faced with continual hardships in trying to balance its operational budget and still maintain its total readiness.

As mentioned in Chapter II, DOD's involvement in Somalia began in August of 1992. This operation known as Operation Provide Relief was a JTF and involved mainly the airlifting of

humanitarian supplies. The total costs for this operation were \$21 million. TRANSCOM's DBOF provided the bulk of the financing for this operation. Partial reimbursements to the DBOF for this phase of the operation would come over time from existing DOL disaster assistance accounts. During Operation Restore Hope, the DBOF would again finance the transportation costs for the operation. As with the Marine Corps, TRANSCOM would also experience a tremendous drain on its funding sources to fund the costs for Somalia. This use of the DBOF to fund the incremental transportation costs would indirectly affect everyone that uses the DBOF. The cost charged by TRANSCOM for its services to DOD depends on its costs to provide the transportation service.

The Army experience with funding its involvement in Somalia operations would also create chaos. The disruption caused by diverting readiness O&M funds to fund Operation Restore Hope would be large. The Army's most recent total cost estimate for Operation Restore Hope was \$164.8 million (Freitag, 1993, p. 1). This amount does not include the costs associated with support provided to other coalition and U.N. forces for \$63.2 million. The reimbursements of these bills would occur over time. Only \$3 million of this amount is still awaiting reimbursement at this time. These costs are associated with U.N. Letters of Assist (LOA) such as the transfer of \$27 million worth of trucks to Pakistan. The Army's involvement in Somalia would continue over into UNISOM

II under both a U.N. and U.S. command. This topic of DOD involvement in UNISOM II will be discussed in a later section of the chapter.

DOD requested \$750 million for Congressional Reprogramming Action for the Somalia Operation Restore Hope in April 1993. The differences between this figure and the \$692.2 million reported are the ongoing adjustments in completing the billing rates for all costs. This second supplemental initiative revises the original zero sum proposal submitted in January 1993. The costs requested in the supplemental were based on a 150-day operation in support of approximately 24,000 troops. The plan envisioned having 8,000 troops left by the end of April 1993. This estimated figure appears to be an extrapolation of the earlier estimate. A model for estimating incremental costs of non-traditional operations has been developed by the DOD Comptroller. These estimates developed by DOD for the costs of the operation in Somalia were reliable. Revisions to the funding estimates were required to account for the large in country support needed early and the operations extension to five-months. The supplemental was approved by Congress in June 1993. As with the original proposal, the supplemental contained no new additional funding to finance the operation. All funding for the operation would come from internal DOD reprogramming. However, this time the

proposed offset for decreases would not come from Congressional pet projects. Appendix F contains a listing of the DOD appropriations subject to reprogramming.

D. UNISOM II

As outline in Chapter II, UNISOM II would involve DOD in a U.N. peacekeeping operation. This transition of responsibility over to the U.N. would occur on May 4, 1993. The U.N.'s role in Somalia would now change to take on the mission of nation building. The original mission of Operation Restore Hope to provide a secure environment to conduct humanitarian relief operations was successful. The mission of DOD forces under UNISOM II was to augment the U.N. with both a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and a responsive logistical capability. These two areas of augmentation emphasize the present limitations of the U.N. to conduct large scale humanitarian operations.

The estimated costs for the U.N. operation over the next six-month period are \$556 million (Interview with Bourseth, October 7, 1993). Considering only the U.S. assessment for U.N. peacekeeping operations, the U.S. share of these costs for UNISOM II would be approximately \$169 million. The estimated DOD military cost for this six-month period is \$56.7 million. The source of funding for this phase of the Somalia operation would again come from the Service's O&M budget. However, UNISOM II is occurring near the end of the fiscal year and the availability of funds are limited due to the Service's existing obligations. The feasibility of requesting

another supplemental in FY 93 to fund DOD involvement in UNISOM II was remote. This was due to the timing of the operation and the growing Congressional concern over the U.S. involvement in Somalia.

Congressional involvement in the commitment of DOD participation in hostile operations are defined in the 1973 War Powers Act which is contained in Public Law 93-148. Under this legislation the President must report to Congress any deployment of DOD forces into an area where hostilities are imminent. Within 60 days of this report, the President must end the operation unless Congress has enacted specific authorization for the use of DOD forces (Doherty, February 13, 1993, p. 323). This implies that if Congress does not authorize the operation the funds needed to finance that operation are also not authorized. Congress has not vigorously exercised this authority in the past. When Operation Restore Hope began, the President told Congress that DOD forces would not be placed in danger operating in Somalia (Doherty, February 13, 1993, p. 323). The War Powers Act was not invoked for Somalia. However, recent events in Somalia, have provided the impetus to consider debating this requirement for Somalia and any future non traditional mission for DOD forces.

E. FUTURE FUNDING ISSUES FOR SOMALIA

As was addressed earlier, the future funding of DOD involvement in UNISOM II has taken on a new dimension.

Attempts to request any FY 1994 funds to support DOD involvement in Somalia may find Congress not as agreeable as in the past. Considering our budget deficit environment, the pressure to reduce rather than increase DOD's budget is a reality for many. The fact that the budget walls of the BEA are down in FY 1994, the DOD budget is now more susceptible to reductions than reprogramming.

The historical review of DOD humanitarian operations presented in Chapter II showed that in all cases the missions were of a contingency nature. Therefore, the costs for these operations could not be programmed in advance. As such, the Services are required to fund these operations out of their own O&M budget and await reimbursement. Reprogramming of DOD funds through the supplemental process is the current way to budget for these types of humanitarian operations. This process may cause two potential problems for DOD. One problem deals with the availability of funds to pay for these operations out of the Services O&M accounts. The part of the fiscal year plays an important role in determining the impact on the Services. The other problem deals with the time it takes to process a supplemental appropriation. As with Operation Restore Hope it took over six months to process the supplemental. These conditions may cause unnecessary restrictions for the commander conducting the operation and the supporting Service's readiness.

During Operation Restore Hope, the largest requirement for funding occurred during the first 30-days of the operation. This period is the most crucial for a military operation. As presented earlier, the Services funded this phase of the operation at the expense of their remaining fiscal year readiness requirements. If Operation Restore Hope occurred in the fourth quarter of that fiscal year, the Services O&M funds would not have been sufficient to cover the costs of the operation. Emergency measures to fund this operation would have had to been considered by Congress in this situation.

F. REIMBURSEMENTS

As our government learns to budget in a period of austerity, the proper use of scarce resources remains important. In terms of budgeting, the functions of proper accounting and reporting of costs is essential to the use of resources. Each military Service employs standardized accounting procedures to account for the resources entrusted to them. Due to the limited involvement in non traditional operations, DOD had never fully exercised the existing procedures to account for the costs of these missions. The tracking of costs during Operation Restore Hope was stressed at all levels. As more attention was placed on proper accounting procedures, many cost issues were identified in the Somalia operation.

One issue dealt with the variety or lack of established support agreements among the forces in Somalia for reimbursable support. Existing support agreements vary in terms of

the required reimbursement. These support agreements were developed when the external support requirements were small. Current reimbursement procedures for external support can take the form of either cash payments or exchange transactions (bartering) (Schutzenhofer, April 1, 1993, p. 2). This is a problem that will emerge in any large-scale humanitarian assistance scenario involving multi-national or U.N. forces. As we witness the evolution of the U.N. as a viable instrument for world peace, the future employment of military forces may involve more operations like Somalia. The development of standardized support agreements and accounting procedures for contingency operations is needed. This initiative should reduce the complexity and time required to implement reimbursement procedures. During an operation is not the time to determine that either procedures or policies are not applicable or adequate to the situation at hand.

As outlined in Chapter III, the U.N. has specific procedures for authorizing and requesting reimbursements for support provided. One of the primary U.N. forms used to request and authorize support is the Letter of Assist (LOA). Support may also be authorized as prescribed by formal support agreements that cover a specific operation. This general agreement is the basis for the U.S. support to UNISOM II. The LOA is still used as the contractual document to request support and serve as the basis for reimbursement by the United

Nations. The LOA will contain the type of support required and the funding limit authorized for the request. Operation Restore Hope showed that the time between the date support is provided and reimbursement is received from U.N. may be considerable. In all external U.N. support requirements, an LOA is required to establish the baseline for reimbursement. The U.S. is also entitled to reimbursements for the force it employs as part of a U.N. Peacekeeping Force (UNPF). The U.N. authorizes payment of a monthly rate of approximately \$1,000 per man and a percentage reimbursement for depreciation on authorized equipment to UNPF participants.

Reimbursements from the U.N. for support of peacekeeping operations has not kept up with demands. Many countries have not paid their assessments for UNPF operations causing the funding base of the U.N. to be under funded. The U.N. peacekeeping budget for 1993 was \$2.4 billion. Of this amount, \$1.1 billion represents unpaid contributions from member states. The U.S. owes \$268 million for assessed peacekeeping operations in addition to the \$518 million for regular U.N. dues (Preston, August 26, 1993, p. A23). This lack of U.N. funds has not prevented the U.N. from continuing to contract for support. The U.N. obligation for this reimbursement is still valid, but there are no binding restrictions on the time when the payment is to made. DOD support under these conditions requires that the Services continue to fund these support costs out of their O&M budgets.

This situation presently describes the actions taken by DOD units supporting UNISOM II. If the U.N. does not have the funds to reimburse DOD for support provided, the Services will have to handle these bills internally.

A related issue for DOD is the category of non-reimbursable U.N. costs. An example would be the U.N. authorization for payment of UNPF troop rotation every six months. In Somalia, the Army policy for troop rotation was every four months. The difference in cost for this two month period would be an unreimbursable cost to DOD. Another non-reimbursable cost would be the deployment of equipment not authorized by the United Nations. The U.N. realizes it does not have the assets to support a large UNPF force. In large UNPF operations it will authorize countries to bring specific equipment along for support. This authorized equipment is called Contingent Owned Equipment (COE). COE equipment is eligible for depreciation reimbursement based on the U.N. scale. Any equipment that DOD brings in excess to what the U.N. approves would be considered as a non-reimbursable expense.

G. CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

During Operation Restore Hope, DOD contracted with a civilian company, Brown and Root, for in-country logistical support. The lack of any real infrastructure or HNS necessitated this civilian augmentation. As mentioned earlier, this contract was negotiated by the Army Corps of Engineers. The

cost of this contract was approximately \$50 million. The contractor provided most of the efforts in upgrading the various degraded buildings and facilities used by the JTF. They also conducted water well drilling, field laundry service, and operated trash disposal areas (I MEF Comptroller interview, 1993). In all, the contract contained about eighty logistical taskings.

The use of Brown and Root for specific logistical tasks, provided DOD with two general engineering benefits. It saved DOD the time and money in acquiring commercial engineering equipment and supplies needed to upgrade the in country infrastructure needed to support the JTF. The second advantage was that it allowed the military's engineer personnel to devote their maximum efforts to supporting the humanitarian mission. In order to distribute the relief supplies, it was required to transport the supplies inland over the existing road network. The distances between the inland feeding centers and the main supply points located by the ports extended as far as 305 km to Belet Uem, 230 km to Baidoa, and 300 km to Bardera. This road network required extensive improvement to support the distribution of supplies. During the period of December 23, 1992 through March 1, 1993, the engineers would construct and repair 2,500 km of roads for this purpose (CJTF J-4 brief August 1993).

This contract for engineer support would be continued under UNISOM II. The contract for Brown and Root would remain

under U.S. administration during UNISOM II. The U.N. would reimburse the U.S. by means of a LOA for requested contracted services (Sjogren, April 21, 1993). The issue of non-reimbursement for incremental expenses related to Operation Restore Hope would arise under this new contract. DOD acquired, as a result of the contract with Brown and Root, some expensive engineer plant equipment. This COE equipment would be made available for contractor support to the United Nations. This situation raises the issue of not accounting for the allocation of overhead costs to the user.

H. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter we have presented the costs involve with Operation Restore Hope. This operation is now the United States' most expensive humanitarian relief effort undertaken to date. The data on the Somalia operation can be used to plan for future humanitarian operations. Operation Restore Hope was a contingency operation for DOD. Contingency missions by their nature cannot be predicted as to when they will occur. However, the information available on the funding requirements of the operation can be used as a guide for planning future contingencies such as Somalia. Key points identified in this chapter are:

1. The need to have special provisions to permit DOD to conduct large scale humanitarian operations without impairing the readiness of the Services was illustrated in Somalia.

2. The first 30-days of the operation required the greatest amount of funds. The impact on the Services O&M budgets would be great.
3. This diversion of Services' readiness funds to finance the contingency operation would cause major disruptions for all the Services.
4. The requirement to have adaptable procedures and policies for contingency funding matters in advance of an operation is critical.
5. Reimbursement procedures during the operation required additional time and negotiation to resolve situations that had no clear policies established.
6. The Services need a long-term mechanism to solve these contingency funding problems.

As we have learned over the past year, the call for DOD to perform humanitarian assistance is growing. The ability of the Services to balance budgetary requirements for their primary mission of readiness and pay for contingency missions is being severely strained. In relative terms, both the Marine Corps and TRANSCOM budgets receive the biggest impact in Somalia. The Marine Corps funded 7.3 percent of its appropriated O&M budget while TRANSCOM funded 34 percent of its total appropriations for Operation Restore Hope. This early funding requirement would impact all operations for the Marine Corps and TRANSCOM. As the budget for DOD continues to decline, the ability of the Services to absorb these contingency costs becomes more critical.

V. FUTURE PROFILE

A. ISSUES

Where will the next disaster relief, humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission take place? What types of DOD resources will it involve? Who will pay for it? The answer to the last question is simple. Inevitably the U.S. taxpayer pays the final bill and therefore public opinion will guide the government's decision process. The U.S. cannot afford to be involved in every nation's misfortune around the world. To respond repeatedly to international crisis while domestic issues occupy the daily activities of most Americans would seem to be unrealistic. So what does the future look like? For continued DOD involvement, it is likely that the U.N. will have to assume a predominant role in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance related operations. Although the United States already contributes a significant amount to U.N. peacekeeping missions, the participation of others in sharing the financial burden is often more acceptable to the American public.

Operations carried out in coordination with the United Nations, regional organizations and multinational coalition forces, outline future U.S. military humanitarian assistance efforts. In the context of United Nation's involvement, humanitarian assistance is frequently associated with

peacekeeping operations. In fact, the two terms have become almost synonymous. It is important to keep this in mind because much of the research provided in this chapter addresses the U.N. role in "peacekeeping," however, humanitarian assistance is a major component of the operations.

Forces that are "tailor made" to operate in an area requiring peacekeeping or related humanitarian assistance will be needed to bolster governments and gain popular support. In many cases, operations that have a limited member involvement ensure a better chance of success because of less limiting factors and a more popular mandate. Humanitarian assistance operations do not have to be carried out under a U.N. charter. Whatever the component structure, financing the operation will still be a determining factor that impacts any operation undertaken.

The U.N. is still developing the reimbursement procedures for its peacekeeping operations. Recent funding policies have been unclear and seem to be administered in an ad hoc manner. For U.S. military involvement in international peacekeeping and humanitarian organizations, DOD officials will need the assurance that their operations and maintenance funds are left intact. It is one thing to draw upon these funds for domestic disaster relief and quite another to use it for U.N. operations. Department of Defense funds exist to provide for the vital national security interests of the United States. Few Americans would approve of the transfer of funds appropriated

for U.S. armed forces to United Nations or coalition peacekeeping and related humanitarian operations.

This chapter will focus briefly on future disaster relief and the guidelines that need to be followed before committing the U.S. military to such operations. The remainder of the chapter will address the future role of DOD in United Nations, regional organization and multinational peacekeeping operations. It is important to understand the current perspective of those organizations involved in peacekeeping and related humanitarian operations to assess the future profile of such operations. Many organizations, such as the State Department and Department of Defense, realize they must change the way in which they operate in order to facilitate efficient operations and funding procedures. This chapter will identify the changes projected by these agencies. Finally an analysis on the future of overall funding for peacekeeping and humanitarian related operations will be presented.

B. DISASTER RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Disaster relief and the humanitarian assistance operations that evolve from disaster relief arise out of necessity and moral precepts. The decision to involve large numbers of U.S. military forces in such operations came about as the global environment shifted away from a Cold War ideology. The movement of troops into these non-traditional roles will continue there is no longer a need for a show of force against a Soviet aggressor. Determining where and when disaster

relief and humanitarian related operations (not in conjunction with the U.N.) will take place is often difficult because of their unpredictable nature. Readiness comes from planning, training, and clarifying funding procedures that can effectively adapt to varying situations.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs expects DOD's role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to increase significantly.

Many factors indicate that DOD's role in providing humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, and its attendant costs will continue to increase through 1999. Transportation and other costs are expected to rise further as the trend continues for greater numbers of international and nongovernmental organizations to seek DOD support for their various humanitarian assistance programs. DOD humanitarian activities in Northern Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia and Bosnia foreshadow not only a likely increase in the number of manmade disasters in the 1990s as internal and regional instabilities are aggravated in the post-Cold War era, but also the likelihood that DOD will be called upon to play a significant role in subsequent relief efforts. Activities that alleviate suffering and meet the basic needs of victims of social dislocation, economic strife, political conflict or natural disasters can be a helpful foreign policy instrument. Such efforts can also prove an effective means of addressing potential sources of regional instability before they can erupt into conflict and of promoting recovery and nation building after a crisis has occurred. (OASD, July 1993, pp. 4-5)

The decision to commit military forces to foreign disaster relief is sometimes a difficult one to make because of political implications. Therefore, it is likely that the magnitude of the disaster will have to be significant to justify involvement of the military outside its traditional role. Although disasters are almost impossible to predict,

there are some likely ground rules that will be followed in the process of committing military assets and personnel.

1. Local authority must be powerless to cope with the situation.
2. Civilian authority must be willing to accept the majority of responsibility and military forces should be kept at a minimum.
3. Adequate security is made available.
4. Adequate funding exists.
5. The U.S. military's role will end as soon as the operation can be turned over to a responsible international body.

These are reasonable constraints that should be considered before committing DOD resources. It can be expected that U.S. military involvement will most often occur when the military would be the decisive element in deterring a "secondary disaster" of human suffering. (Stackpole, February 1993, p. 18)

C. PEACEKEEPING

We are not the World's policeman, but guess where the people look when they need a cop.

General Colin Powell

It is important for the United States to remain an active participant in world affairs, acting closely with allies to guide the evolution of democracy in a favorable direction and seek to prevent the emergence of deterrent states. Although costs in the future will increase, U.N. peacekeeping activities represent a bargain to the United States with respect to the maintenance of world peace. The future of U.S. military

involvement in U.N. operations will expand because they serve national security interests. Peacekeeping helps prevent regional conflicts from expanding and directly threatening U.S. interests. For example, the continuation of the war in Yugoslavia would have a direct effect on important U.S. interests in the area. The large flow of refugees could undermine the efforts to support democracies in neighboring countries.

Just because peacekeeping represents a fraction of the cost of a major regional conflict, it is unrealistic to assume that the funding and cost of such operations is irrelevant. This is especially true within the political context that determines U.S. policy. Future peacekeeping and related humanitarian assistance operations will require a more clearly defined mandate if they are to be supported by the American public. Peacekeeping operations are not the guarantor of an armed truce or economic stability. The United States is beginning to realize this fact, and therefore will require more demands on the return of its contributed resources and military involvement. (Bolton, 1992, pp. 23-27)

Costs to the U.S. will depend on the size and makeup of U.S. forces that may be deployed to support peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. To the extent that they proceed under the U.N. flag, the only DOD incremental costs will be entitlements for military personnel assigned to the operations. (OASD, June 1993, p. 13) U.N. Secretary Boutros

Ghali has described the future role of peacekeeping operations as efforts to rebuild the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and in a larger sense to address the deepest cause of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. (Loomis, 1993, pp. 126-127)

D. COUNTRY PROFILES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

We have the opportunity to do great things: help stabilize fledgling democracies in countries that have known only tyranny for decades; promote human rights on a global scale; use U.N. and relevant organizations to help create greater international peace. John Bolton, Asst. Secretary of State (ISA), 1992.

The degree to which U.N. operations support American interests will have to be considered in response to the costs of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Whatever will make it a reasonable investment for the U.S. taxpayer is usually the determining factor. Future U.N. operations that involve the U.S. military will be built around this premise.

According to the Department of Defense the new peacekeeping policy initiative is projected to require \$300 million in each fiscal year from FY 1995-FY 1999. The budget estimates are based on peacekeeping operations that have taken place over the past two years. Approximately \$50 million of the budget is projected to support continuing U.N. operations in the following countries:

- Angola
- El Salvador

- Western Sahara
- Cambodia
- Yugoslavia
- U.N. Iraq/Kuwait observer mission
- Mozambique
- Somalia

The remaining \$250 million is expected to be used for new peacekeeping operations. The Department of Defense has determined that new peacekeeping (to include concurrent humanitarian assistance) operations are likely in the following countries: Haiti; Liberia; Mozambique; Rwanda; Zaire; Sudan; and the former Soviet Union. (OASD, June 1993, p. 14) Below is a brief synopsis of the impending situation in each of the countries designated for a possible commitment of military forces.

1. Haiti

There is already a precedent for humanitarian operations in Haiti. As described in Chapter II, the 1991 Operation GTMO involved U.S. Naval forces, Coast Guard and Marines in an operation to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to boat people fleeing political and economic repression. The continued persistence of refugees could be a catalyst for any future operations.

The majority of the population in Haiti lives in abject poverty and does not have access to safe drinking water, adequate medical supplies or sufficient food. Trade

sanctions applied by the Organization of American States since the 1991 coup of President Aristide have further damaged the economy. The country has little infrastructure and as an island nation would require naval support in any humanitarian operation undertaken. With only three permanent-surface runways, a large logistical support structure would be required in any military operation. (CIA, 1992, p. 143)

2. Liberia

According to Abass Bundu, executive secretary of the Economic Community of West African States, "throughout the whole of Africa, people are looking to the United States to bring about peace in Liberia" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), June 11, 1993, p. 24). Civil war during 1990 destroyed Liberia's economy and much of the infrastructure in and around the capital of Monrovia. Political instability in the country has threatened any prospect for economic recovery of some of the 750,000 people who have fled to neighboring countries.

A mostly peacekeeping operation in Liberia would be similar to the operation in Somalia. There is almost no infrastructure left and the political situation is severely fractured. Any operation would probably involve Naval forces operating from the North Atlantic as well as ground troops backed by an extensive logistical force. The need for direct humanitarian assistance in Liberia seems to be less of a concern than the need for political and economic stability.

Warring factions have split the country to the point where only by a third-party intervention can a collective action be taken to bring Liberia back into the international fold. (CIA, 1992, p. 198)

3. Mozambique

Per capita income in this country is the world's lowest at \$80 a year (FBIS, June 23, p. 25). Although an economic reform policy has resulted in successive years of economic growth, Mozambique continues to be involved in civil strife. The infrastructure is very limited, as more than half the country's schools have been destroyed along with many roads, bridges and commercial facilities. Already Mozambique receives more than \$5 billion in annual economic aid. There is sufficient infrastructure left, particularly runways and rail, to support a humanitarian assistance operation. Significant logistical support would be required, however, it would not be as extensive as the operation in Somalia. (CIA, 1992, p. 237)

4. Rwanda

Rwanda is a country that already relies heavily on foreign aid for its economic survival. It is a small country (about the size of the state of Maryland) and infrastructure is limited in this landlocked country. Only three permanent-surface runways exist and the majority of the highways are gravel or improved earth. The United Nations is already in Rwanda supervising a truce agreement between rival factions of

the Kigali government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Military forces, if called upon would likely take the role of peacekeepers in an attempt to stabilize the rival factions and bring about a lasting democratic government.

5. Sudan

Sudan has been plagued by chronic political instability. Sudan has experienced weak economic performances over the past decade, attributable mostly to reduced rainfall. A peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance operation here would be similar to the operation in Somalia. The infrastructure is limited, however, the level of food shortages is steadily increasing. Most of the telecommunications in Sudan are well-equipped by African standards but barely adequate by modern standards. A significant logistical capability would be required by any military force assuming a peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance role in Sudan. (CIA, 1992, p. 322)

6. Zaire

Factions within Zaire have already requested a United Nation's presence to assess and evaluate the critical human rights situation that has been going on in that country. Requests by the Tshisekedi government have called for a U.N. intervention force to restore the security threatened by the violence perpetrated by the supporters of President Mobutu. (FBIS, June 11, p. 1) Zaire is among the poorest nations in the world. It is almost completely landlocked and any military operation would require a major logistical

undertaking. Zaire has twenty-four permanent-surface runways and a telecommunications system that consists of an unreliable wire service. (CIA, 1992, p. 379)

7. Former Soviet States

Humanitarian assistance to the former Soviet Union is already underway in the form of Operation Provide Hope. The use of extensive military forces in any operation seems unlikely, however, DOD programs such as the Excess Property Program are likely sources of humanitarian aid. The political implications makes the appearance of U.S. military ground forces unlikely, except if they are under the control of the United Nations. The continued low-key involvement of U.S. military personnel in humanitarian airlifts, previews any future course of action in the newly formed democracies.

E. THE NEW DIRECTION FOR U.N. INVOLVEMENT

These profiles directly reflect the new mission profile of the United Nations as described in Chapter I. Outlined is a mission that falls somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and large-scale collective action. Certain combat risks would be necessary to bring violence and human rights issues under control. However, in most cases the military objectives would be relatively limited. The focus of military efforts will be to bring about a reasonable level of peace and order so that humanitarian work can go forward, elections held, and democratic institutions established. Humanitarian assistance

efforts in the future will need to be dominated by nongovernmental organizations if they are to be effective.

Military intervention only sets the stage for organizations to move forward, unimpeded by corruption and civil strife. In each of the countries targeted by the Department of Defense for peacekeeping operations, mandates will have to be clearly defined or risk losing the support of American lawmakers and citizens. It is easy to forecast that humanitarian assistance will be required in poor third-world nations. However, balancing the tasks between military forces and nongovernmental agencies will be necessary to ensure an efficient allocation of resources. This is an important responsibility that the U.S. must assume in its effort to maintain the new world order.

F. REGIONAL AND COALITION FORCES

Are there other possibilities that have a role to play in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations besides United Nations's involvement? Instability in drawing a consensus for U.N. missions and difficulties in locating funding sources may necessitate the future involvement of regional and multinational coalition forces.

There are alternatives to U.N. peacekeeping operations. One of the most predominant is that of shifting the responsibility to regional organizations. Organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) have already been successful in controlling threats to peace. Regional

operations have the advantage in obtaining popular support, because of this, organizations that can directly relate to and meet the needs of people in the area have a good chance of success. Another advantage is that regional organizations may be able to secure the authorization of participating members easier than a larger organization such as the United Nations. One drawback to their involvement is the lack of impartiality that could prevail as compared to a larger, more disinterested U.N. comprised force.

A second alternative to U.S. involvement in U.N. peace-keeping and humanitarian operations is the substitution of multinational coalition forces. Multinational forces are typically deployed with authority from negotiated agreements with the disputants. A primary advantage of a multinational force is the financial stability of the operations. Expenses are paid for by the participants and not subject to U.N. limitations. The participating states usually have a direct interest in resolving the conflict and therefore should incur the financial burden. Multinational forces also are not restricted to U.N. limitations on the use of military force in resolving disputes. Although multinational forces often risk some impartiality issues they are going to be a likely alternative in the future, particularly when supported by both of the disputants. (Diehl, 1993, pp. 210-216)

Regional organizations and multinational forces can help to reduce the costs to the U.S. by letting those with a direct

interest shoulder the financial burden. With this in mind these options outline a legitimate profile for United States policy on peacekeeping operations around the world.

G. THE FUNDING OUTLOOK

The establishment of the Global Cooperatives Initiative as a mechanism for funding is unlikely because of weak support from Congress. On September 30, 1993, the House of Representatives voted to deny the DOD budget request for this special global account. Many Congressmen were reluctant to support any program that would reduce their control over the "purse strings" for the military and give more power to the executive branch. (Rogers, 1993, p. 4) Despite the demise of the Global Cooperatives Initiative, the environment under which it was developed still exists. The purpose of this appropriation was to reduce the DOD budget in the future. It was designed to allow DOD the flexibility to complete its projected short-term missions, unimpeded by financial limitations. The result was to be a reduced need for larger forces in the long-term. In this prevailing political environment, the supplemental appropriation process and transfers from DOD accounts will continue as ad hoc funding procedures. In the long-term, however, some type of program similar to the Global Cooperatives Initiative will need to be enacted in order to maintain a desired level of operational readiness.

To the extent that the Department of Defense increases its involvement in U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian operations,

it is likely that Congress will attempt to pressure the U.N. to revise its funding procedures. This will provide some financial relief to DOD resources as Congress begins to realize the true cost to U.S. taxpayers of U.N. involvement. They have taken notice of the disparity in the United States assessment of 25 percent for the general U.N. budget and 30.4 percent for peacekeeping costs. This is in addition to providing U.S. logistical support and personnel to many missions.

For now the Clinton administration has endorsed the idea of the United Nations shouldering more of the responsibility in resolving global crisis. Congress, however, has begun to challenge that position. Already both chambers have reduced the \$642 million that the administration requested for U.N. peacekeeping. As a member of the Security Council, the U.S. and the four other members must pay 22 percent more than their regular budget assessment. As the result of a General Accounting Office study on this issue, it has been recommended that the Secretary of State instruct the U.S. Representative in the U.N. to seek support for (1) examining the process used by the General Assembly committees in reviewing peacekeeping budgets, (2) requiring that periodic reports be made on audit findings to member countries for peacekeeping, (3) a re-examination of the U.N. special assessment scale for peacekeeping operations. The State Department also added to the recommendations, viewing it to be even more important that the

U.N. develop a more accurate budget formulation process.
(GAO, 1992, pp. 4-5)

Currently, the Department of Defense lacks any requirement to monitor and account for its participation in U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. As a result, DOD has not always tracked the value of its U.N. contributions. The reimbursement system in place is further complicated because funding flows from the U.N., through the State Department, to DOD for reimbursement. This has created another roadblock to DOD receiving reimbursement, because the State Department has been reluctant to release funds for operations which lack accountability. Instead, the State Department has credited the value of DOD's contributions against U.S. assessments, dissolving any possibility of reimbursement to the Defense Department. The General Accounting Office has sought to remedy this situation by recommending that in the future the Secretary of Defense:

1. Account for and report DOD peacekeeping assistance to ensure that the U.S. receives recognition for its peacekeeping contributions, including personnel costs, per diem, transportation and other related costs.
2. Update policies and procedures for providing DOD logistic support to U.N. peacekeeping forces and ensure that (a) reimbursable costs are properly billed and controlled and (b) required financial activity reports are prepared and distributed.

Inevitably, it is Congress that holds the funds for any U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The recommendation made by the GAO is just the first step in clarifying the total costs within DOD to U.S.

taxpayers and gaining Congressional support. Another step in obtaining support for U.N. mandated operations could be requiring the State Department to notify Congress once informal discussions of a peacekeeping effort begins at the United Nations. The resulting negotiations can encourage fiscal responsibility and ensure Congressional support. In the future, Congressional authorizing committees may be forced to work more closely with the Administration in planning and funding the International Affairs account (this account supports U.S. contributions to the U.N.) to ensure fiscal reason. (GAO, 1992, p. 4)

H. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has focused on the likely scenarios for future humanitarian operations. The profile for U.S. involvement in peacekeeping and related humanitarian assistance:

1. Forecasts operations in areas of limited infrastructure and economic instability;
2. Suggests the environment will dictate a mission somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and large-scale collective action;
3. Focuses military efforts on bringing about a level of peace and order so that relief efforts by non-governmental and international organizations can be conducted.

United States involvement in U.N. operations, that require peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, will increase in the future. In addition, regional and multinational coalition participation should expand, as they provide alternatives to

the standard U.N. operations and have the potential to provide more flexibility and better funding to participating members.

The current funding procedures for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, for the short-term, will likely continue as supplemental appropriations and budget transfers from DOD accounts remain the normal courses of action. In the case of U.N. mandated operations, Congressional pressure to reform the funding assessment of 30.4 percent on peacekeeping missions will most likely continue. Short-term relief from U.N. reimbursement policies will come in the form of (1) a more detailed accounting system by DOD and (2) updated policies and procedures that clarify reimbursement procedures to the Services.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. DISCUSSION

Only recently has the Clinton Administration provided an outline of their vision for the future of foreign policy. This vision provides a glimpse of the direction that the U.S. would follow in the post cold-war era. The strategy would be based on enlargement rather than containment. Four principles for this new strategy were presented by Anthony Lake, national security advisor to President Clinton. These principles are:

1. Strengthen the core of major market economies while developing bonds of common interest among them. This principle would enhance collective efforts to solve future problems.
2. Help democracy and markets expand in those new areas where we have a national security interest. This would be the CIS, and would also include existing nations experiencing reversals to democracy.
3. Minimize the external threats by nations outside this family of democracy and economic markets. This would be the isolation of nations such as Iraq and North Korea.
4. Establish priorities on when to intervene in the growing number of unstable situations developing today.

The end of the cold war has eliminated many of the constraints on intervention. This means setting limits on the number of future military interventions. (Friedman, 1993, p. A18)

This policy vision indicates two roles for DOD. One is the traditional role of protecting our country from external threats. The second role implies DOD involvement in humanitarian intervention.

DOD involvement in humanitarian intervention is the subject for this thesis. This humanitarian intervention can take the form of airlifting emergency supplies to Moscow, conducting Title 10 HA/CA training abroad, or deploying forces to Somalia. In all these cases, DOD involvement in humanitarian activities requires integration with the State Department. Somalia demonstrates that peacekeeping operation alone can not solve a nation's problems. The need for nation building is required for a long term solution. Somalia also revealed the weaknesses of the U.N. in conducting humanitarian peacekeeping operations. Recent events suggest that U.S. led coalitions may be a more effective military force in dealing with humanitarian assistance. As our new foreign policy addresses these issues, the biggest challenge to implementing this vision will be our political will, ability to afford, and capability to make it happen. This thesis has looked at DOD's ability to fund its role in this new strategy as we all manage with limited resources. The ability of the military services to balance its resources to fund these contingency humanitarian operations and still maintain its readiness is the problem that needs a long term solution.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As a result of our research we were able to answer the questions presented at the beginning of this thesis. Below is summary answer to each question based on the research presented in the previous four chapters.

1. How are humanitarian assistance operations being coordinated between DOD and the State Department?

The State Department is responsible for overseeing humanitarian assistance operations that involve the Department of Defense. Proposals for planned humanitarian assistance operations under Title 10 are submitted by the CINCs through the State Department for approval. In the process of deciding where to commit Title 10 resources, coordination is carried out at the CINC level with in-country State Department teams. These teams, working with U.S. ambassadors, designate viable military projects that have host nation support.

The State Department also receives all requests from the U.N. for humanitarian assistance. The State Department will then coordinate with DOD to provide the support requested. Reimbursement for DOD contributions to United Nations humanitarian assistance operations comes in the form of U.N. credits to the State Department. The State Department is then responsible for the actual reimbursement of funds to DOD. The State Department has often foregone this reimbursement policy, and instead applied the credits against the U.S. general assessment to the United Nations. This places an increased funding burden on the Department of Defense which may impact on operational readiness. Current policies and procedures are under review by the General Accounting Office to rectify the situation. The Department of Defense, in the

meantime, is tightening its accounting and reporting procedures to ensure that it receives recognition for its contributions.

2. What is the flow of funding within DOD for humanitarian assistance operations?

Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs are a variety of programs that support humanitarian assistance operations. These programs consist of appropriated funds set aside for specific types of missions and services. Included is the Humanitarian Assistance Program, Title 10, CINC Initiative Fund and the Foreign Disaster Relief Assistance Program. These appropriated funds are limited and only available in amounts that can support operations that are relatively small in scope and size.

Funding large humanitarian assistance operations comes from Operations and Maintenance appropriations, supplemental appropriations, and transfers from other DOD accounts. To begin an operation, O&M funds will be required before more direct funding becomes available. Additional funding will have to engage the supplemental appropriation process which will involve congressional approval. An alternative to this approach is to transfer funds from other DOD accounts. This option also requires congressional approval.

Transportation costs are unique in the funding process. The U.S. Transportation Command is typically responsible for providing this support element to any

humanitarian assistance operation. They have the authority to borrow funds from the DBOF to finance transportation costs. Since transportation can easily reach more than 50 percent of the total costs this amount is significant. TRANSCOM is required to reimburse the DBOF once supplemental appropriation is approved.

3. What are the costs involved in humanitarian assistance operations?

Operation Restore Hope (ORH) provides a good example of the costs involved in a large scale contingency humanitarian assistance (HA) operation. The costs that were incurred can be used as a model for estimating and planning the costs for future HA operations. This operation required the military to operate as part of both a multinational and U.N. peacekeeping force. The operation illustrated the differences between reimbursable and non-reimbursable costs under various types of military organizations. Since ORH had to be conducted from the bottom up, as the country possessed an austere infrastructure and Host Nation Support was non-existent, it can be used as a model for a worst case HA scenario. Transportation costs proved to be the largest cost driver for ORH. In all other DOD HA programs, transportation has also been the largest cost element. In ORH transportation costs covered the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the force. The initial deployment for ORH required the largest commitment of funding resources. This large requirement for early funding would have a significant impact on the

military services, who are required to initially fund these unprogrammed contingencies.

4. What are likely scenarios for future humanitarian assistance operations?

Humanitarian assistance operations involving DOD will occur all around the globe. Each year the Department of Defense projects likely operational possibilities in designated countries. The countries currently profiled have very limited infrastructures and each suffers from severe economic instability. This will dictate that any operation involve the large logistical support elements that are necessary to support military forces from ground zero. As a result, increased funds need to be available early in an operation to support the deployment phase. Without a funding mechanism, such as the Global Cooperatives Initiative, future operational readiness will be impacted by humanitarian assistance operations, as Operations and Maintenance funds are used to finance the startup costs. To relieve some of the burden from DOD, an expected increase in United Nations, Regional Organization, and Multinational Coalition Forces is likely by the United States. In the case of U.N. involvement in humanitarian assistance operations, the mission for U.S. forces will fall somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and large scale collective action. Military efforts will be focused on bringing about stability to an area so that nongovernmental agencies can provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance. Military involvement is likely to be limited in

duration following the stabilization of an area, lasting just long enough to transfer responsibility to international relief agencies.

Likely scenarios for future humanitarian assistance operations include Regional Organization and Multinational Force involvement. Both provide alternatives to the more restrictive U.N. operations and alleviate some of the funding issues. Each country is responsible for the costs that they incur in providing support. The countries involved typically have a security interest in the area that makes it in their best interest to contribute resources. The U.S. will be involved in these types of operations when:

1. An international consensus is difficult to obtain under U.N. provisions;
2. Military forces require more flexibility than allowed under a U.N. charter;
3. Vital U.S. security interests are at stake;
4. Host nation support exists for such an operation;
5. Public opinion dissuades U.N. involvement.

The United States will continue to look for opportunities to share the burden of humanitarian assistance operations. Department of Defense funds exist to support the vital security interests of the United States. Any humanitarian mission that diverts funds from this purpose can expect only limited support. It is important to remember that humanitarian assistance is not the primary mission of the

military. Demand for this type of operation will continue only as long as a spirit of global cooperation exists.

5. At what levels can humanitarian assistance operations be planned for in advance?

They can be planned from a small scale disaster relief operation of transporting only emergency supplies to a large scale multinational humanitarian operation involving the employment of a large military force as in Somalia. Contingency operations involving multinational forces can be planned based on existing plans and procedures. This is true for operations involving regional countries such as those belonging to NATO. Provide Comfort was an example of a HA operation involving NATO forces. Throughout Provide Comfort, existing NATO procedures were applicable to the conduct of the operations. During Sea Angel, we witnessed the prior planning by CINCPAC for disaster relief operations in its area of responsibility. These contingency plans provided guidance for the commander in planning for Sea Angel. As Somalia demonstrated, the planning for U.N. humanitarian intervention requires revised policies and procedures.

6. Primary research question: How can DOD effectively plan budgeting requirements for future humanitarian assistance operations?

Since humanitarian assistance operations can not always be predicted, borrowing authority for DOD is the critical problem for budgeting future HA operations. As a general rule, funding responsibility for any costs incurred in a HA operation rests with the Service tasked to perform the

mission. Additional legislative funding options are pursued to reimburse the Services for these costs. However, pending the time it takes to approve legislative action, current Service resources (O&M accounts) must be used to finance these costs. Operation Restore Hope placed a severe demand on all the Services to "borrow" funds to pay for this contingency operation. TRANSCOM borrowed from the DBOF to finance the transportation costs of the operation. The Services had to realign their budgets for the remaining fiscal year to borrow funds to pay for the large costs incurred early in the operation. Legislative funding options took six months and provided only for the reprogramming of existing DOD funds to pay for the operation. The outlook for acquiring additional legislative funds through supplementals to support these contingencies does not look promising. The realities of a large federal deficit and a requirement to increase spending on domestic economic needs constrains the future DOD budget environment. Operation Restore Hope also illustrated that procedure and policy problems involved with reimbursements could also delay or deny funds to the Services. If Somalia is the example for the future employment of DOD, the Services need a long term mechanism to solve these contingency funding problems. The Services can no longer afford to suffer current funding measures for meeting today's humanitarian demands. What is required today is a sound fiscal policy that insulates the Services from the disruption, on the ability to prepare

for their primary role as a force in readiness, that is caused by these contingencies.

Non-traditional operations such as humanitarian assistance could become one of DOD's primary roles in the future or DOD could develop specialized units for this mission as part of an international force. Today DOD is meeting this challenge by integrating all its resources in a joint manner. As DOD adapts internally to these roles, the external structure that governs the funding for DOD must also evolve as the environment changes. If our nation is to be successful in meeting its emerging national security goals, the political, economic, and military resources must be integrated to achieve a common goal.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

This research produced five recommendations to improve the funding process supporting humanitarian assistance operations.

1. The Global Cooperative Initiative Fund should be introduced again in the FY 1995 DOD budget submission. This fund should be structured as a revolving fund to both disburse funds and receive reimbursements involved with the support of contingency operations. The demise of the initiative in 1993 was due to two factors: the late submission of the initiative in the budget process, and the growing concern by Congress over the commitment of DOD forces in dangerous humanitarian intervention without Congressional involvement. The initiative proposal should be drafted with language that ensures Congressional involvement in the deployment of DOD forces for such humanitarian intervention. Without considering the role of Congress in this matter, any funding initiative introduced that does not ensure their involvement will be challenged. The impact of not incorporating Congressional concerns will be that we will continue to apply short term measures to a problem that needs a long term solution.

2. A review of existing fiscal policies and procedures governing participation in humanitarian intervention involving both coalition and U.N. organization is required. The goal of this effort should be the definition of those costs that are both reimbursable and non-reimbursable. This effort should also review all existing agreements that cover DOD logistics support provided to foreign countries. Revision to these documents should be made to ensure standardized rates and procedures are incorporated. This action supports our main recommendation in two ways: it should facilitate the identification of proper costs to be reimbursed to the revolving fund, and it will ensure that DOD has standardized fiscal procedures to support future humanitarian operations.
3. Inclusion of subjects on humanitarian intervention operations and the organizations involved should be incorporated into our military education curriculum. If the goal of a new U.N. is the vision of the future, all military students should understand its organization, procedures, and capabilities. Key military personnel involved with fiscal matters need to be trained and educated in the fiscal policies, procedures, and forms used in humanitarian intervention. This recommendation could be accomplished by conducting joint training exercises both with and without troops that characterize U.N. operations. This type of training would benefit both the U.S. and the U.N. in developing their military capabilities.
4. A memorandum of understanding between the DOS and DOD needs to be developed for reimbursement to DOD for support provided to the United Nations. As the role of DOD increases in humanitarian intervention, the authority of DOS to waive DOD reimbursement becomes a net transfer of funds from DOD to DOS concerns. This situation requires modification to account for the increased participation and costs of DOD in humanitarian intervention. These reimbursements should flow back to the revolving fund to offset disbursements made from the fund.
5. The need to expand DOD's role in humanitarian assistance is prudent. Humanitarian assistance can be defined as preventive medicine. As we illustrated in Chapter II, when a nation's internal problems are caused by either natural or man-made disasters and are not remedied, they can lead to violence and instability. DOD humanitarian assistance, in the form of Title 10 programs, should be an integral part of a long term strategy based on the well being and development of a recipient nation.

Expanding the funding for Title 10 programs would provide valuable training for DOD and be part of the initial efforts to implement a coordinated long term strategy for our new vision. By integrating long term development projects with Title 10 programs we will realize a better use of limited resources to achieve a common goal. To this end, authority to call up selected reservists for humanitarian assistance operation, without a declared mobilization should be considered for legislation.

**APPENDIX A: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
EXCESS PROPERTY DONATIONS FOR FY 1991**

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION OF CARGO</u>	<u>MODE OF TRANSPORT</u>
10/90	Cambodia	Medical Supplies	Sea
10/12/90	Philippines	Heavy Equipment	Sea
10/16/90	Trinidad and	Medical Supplies	Air (C-130)
10/17/90	Poland	General/Medical Supplies	Land
10/25/90	Philippines	Medical Supplies	Sea
10/25/90	Philippines	Medical Supplies	Sea
10/25/90	Czechoslovakia	Medical Supplies	Air (C-5)
10/30/90	Philippines	Medical Supplies	Sea
11/05/90	Cambodia	Medical supplies	Sea
11/05/90	Cambodia	Rations	Sea
11/09/90	Mexico	Medical Supplies	Air (C-5)
11/21/90	Philippines	Medical Supplies	Sea
11/30/90	Antiqua	General/Medical Supplies	Air (Log air)
12/04/90	Hungary	Ambulances	Air (C-5)
12/05/90	Philippines	Food/ Medical Supplies	Sea
12/06/90	Nicaragua	Medical/Baseball Supplies	Air (C-5)
12/07/90	Argentina	General/Medical Supplies	Air (C-5)
12/12/90	Philippines	Facilities Supplies	Sea
12/16/90	Afganistan	Clothing/Equipment Cold	Air (C-5)
12/27/90	Cambodia	Medical Supplies	Sea
12/27/90	Cambodia	Truck/Water Trls	Sea

01/07/91	Philippines	Jeep	Sea
01/07/91	Philippines	Trucks	Sea
01/91	Panama	Heavy Equipment	Sea
01/24/91	Vietnam	Medical Supplies	NGO
01/31/91	Philippines	Office Furniture/Tools	Sea
02/07/91	Philippines	Medical Supplies	Sea
02/15/91	Brazil	Steel Pipe And Fittings	Sea
02/15/91	Nicaragua	Medical Supplies Private	Air (C-5)
02/25/91	Liberia	Medical/Food Private	Air (C-130)
02/26/91	Laos	Medical	Air (C-130)
03/01/91	Laos	Medical	Air (C-130)
03/05/91	Cambodia	Vehicle Parts/Tools	Sea
03/06/91	Romania	Medical Supplies Private	Air (C-5)
03/14/91	Philippines	Medical Supplies	Sea
03/14/91	Philippines	Heavy Equipment	Sea
03/17/91	Romania	Medical/Blood Supplies	Air (C-130)
03/18/91	Philippines	Medical Supplies	Sea
03/23/91	Kuwait	Litter/Cots Private	Air (C-5)
03/24/91	Afghanistan	Clothing/Gear Cold Private	Air (C-5)
03/27/91	Bahrain	Medical Supplies	Land
03/26/91	Cambodia	Furniture/Medical Supplies	Sea
04/01/91	Cambodia	Medical Supplies	Sea
04/01/91	Cambodia	M880 Trucks	Sea
04/03/91	Peru	Cots Private	Air (C-5)
04/06/91	Peru	Medical Supplies Private	Air (C-5)
04/10/91	Philippines	Electrical Equipment	Sea

04/22/91	Sri Lanka	Medical Supplies	Sea
05/01/91	Grace-Air	3 Aircraft Engines	N/A
05/06/91	Sri Lanka	Trucks/Engineer Equipment	Sea
05/09/91	Bangladesh	Medical/General Supplies	Air (C-141)
05/10/91	Bangladesh	Food/Medical Supplies	Air (C-5)
05/16/91	Madagascar	M880 Trucks	Sea
05/16/91	Romania	Medical Private	Air (C-5)
05/28/91	Tonga	Trucks and Trls	Sea
05/31/91	Cambodia	Engineer Equipment	Sea
06/04/91	Kuwait	Food/Medical Private	Air (C-5)
06/04/91	Egypt	Medical Supplies	Air (C-5)
06/07/91	Turkey	Medical Supplies	Air (C-5)
06/12/91	Laos	Medical supplies	Air (C-141)
06/15/91	Ecuador	Cots/Food Private	Air (C-5)
06/15/91	Peru	Cots/Medical Private	Air (C-5)
06/08/91	Ethiopia 1	MREs	Air (C-5)
06/08/91	Ethiopia 2	MREs	Air (C-5)
06/08/91	Ethiopia 3	MREs	Air (C-5)
06/08/91	Ethiopia 4	MREs/B Rations	Air (C-5)
06/08/91	Ethiopia 5	MREs/B Rations	Air (C-5)
06/08/91	Ethiopia 6	MREs	Air (C-5)
06/19/91	Ethiopia Sea	MREs	Sea
06/25/91	Philippines	MREs(2 Flights)	Air (C-130)
06/26/91	Philippines	MREs(2 Flights)	Air (C-130)
06/27/91	Philippines	MREs(2 Flights)	Air (C-130)
06/29/91	Philippines	MREs	Air (C-130)

07/01/91	Philippines	Disaster Relief Stocks	Air (C-130)
07/01/91	Ethiopia 7	MREs/B Rations	Air (C-5)
07/02/91	Ethiopia 8	MREs	Air (C-5)
07//91	Ethiopia Sea 2	MREs	Sea
07/03/91	Ethiopia 9	MREs	Air (C-5)
07/08/91	Chad	Food/Medical Supplies	Air (C-5)
07/10/91	Romania	General/Medical Private	Air (C-5)
07/16/91	Mongolia 1	General/Medical supplies	Air (C-141)
07/17/91	Soviet Georgia	Cots/supplies Private	Air (C-5)
07/18/91	Ethiopia 10	Mixed Salmon/MREs	Air (C-5)
07/21/91	Ethiopia 11	MREs	Air (C-5)
07/23/91	Ethiopia 12	MREs/B Rations	Air (C-5)
07/24/91	Albania 1-8	MREs/B Rations	Air (C-141)
07/25/91	Ethiopia 14	Tents	Air (C-5)
07/27/91	Ethiopia 15	MREs	Air (C-5)
07/29/91	Yugoslavia	Medical Supplies	Air (C-5)
07/30/91	Ethiopia 16	MREs/Tents	Air (C-5)
07/91	Guinea-Bissau	Medical Supplies	Sea
07/91	Kenya	MREs	Air (C-5)
07/91	Madagascar	Medical Supplies	Sea
07/91	Western Samoa	Medical Supplies	Sea
07/30/91	Peru	Medical supplies	Air (C-130)
07/31/91	Ethiopia 13	Litters/Cots	Air (C-5)
08/02/91	Djibouti	MREs	Air (C-141)
08/06/91	Jamaica	B Rations	Sea
08/08/91	Ethiopia 17	MREs	Air (C-5)

08/91	Ethiopia 18	MREs/Tents	Air (C-5)
08/08/91	Ethiopia 19	MREs	Air (C-5)
08/09/91	China 1	Cots/Blankets	Air (C-5)
08/10/91	Ethiopia 20	Blankets/Cots	Air (C-5)
08/17/91	Ethiopia 21	MREs	Air (C-5)
08/20/91	Ethiopia 22	MREs	Air (C-5)
08/20/91	Cambodia	General Supplies	Sea
08/22/91	Ethiopia 23	MREs	Air (C-5)
08/23/91	Philippines	Furniture	Sea
08/23/91	Philippines	Trucks/Medical Supplies	Sea
08/26/91	Romania	MREs	Air (C-5)
08//91	Albania 9-12	MREs	Air (C-141)
08/91	Sierra Leone	Trucks	Sea
08/91	Sierra Leone	B Rations	Sea
08/91	Sierra Leone	Medical Equipment	Sea
08/91	Mexico	Medical/Hospital Supplies	Surface
08/91	Nicaragua	Medical/Hospital Supplies	Surface
08/91	Grenada	Heavy Equipment	Sea
08/91	Guatemala	Heavy Equipment	Sea
08/91	Rwanda	Ambulances	Air
08/91	Peru	Food/MREs	Sea
08/91	Sri Lanka	Medical Supplies	Sea
08/91	Bangladesh	Medical supplies	Sea
08/91	Maldives	Medical Supplies	Sea
08/91	Tonga	Medical Supplies	Sea
08/91	Ivory Coast	B Rations	Sea

08/91	Haiti	B Rations	Sea
08/91	Guyana	B Rations	Sea
08/91	Nicaragua	B Rations	Sea
08/91	Bolivia	B Rations	Sea
08/91	Djibouti	Medical supplies	Surface/Air
08/91	Mali	B Rations	Sea
08/91	Cambodia	Medical supplies	Sea
09/91	Poland	Ambulances/Medical	Surface/Air
09/91	Poland	Clothing	Surface
09/91	Djib./Ethiop.	4 WD trucks	Sea
09/91	Poland	B Rations	Sea
09/91	Romania	Private Cargo	Air (C-5)
09/91	Laos	Medical/Private Cargo	Air (C-141)
09/91	Mexico	Medical/Hospital Supplies	Surface
09/91	Mongolia 2	Medical/Ambulances/Food	Air (C-5)
09/91	Bangladesh	Trucks	Sea
09/91	Philippines	Heavy Equipment	Sea
09/91	Mali	Medical Supplies	Sea
09/91	Malawi	Medical Supplies	Sea
09/91	Cameroon	Medical Supplies	Sea
09/91	Namibia	Medical Supplies	Sea
09/91	Rwanda	Medical Supplies	Sea
09/91	Niger	Medical Supplies	Sea
09/91	Albania	Trucks And Ambulances	Sea
09/91	Peru	Clothing	Sea
09/91	Ecuador	Clothing	Sea

09/91	Mali	Fire Trucks	Sea
09/91	Philippines	Hospital Supplies	Sea
09/91	St. Lucia	Heavy Equipment	Sea
09/91	Chad	Heavy Equipment	Sea

**APPENDIX B: RECORD OF DOD RESPONSE TO OFDA REQUESTS
FOR FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE**

<u>FY</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>DISASTER/ASSISTANCE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
84	Zaire	Aids Outbreak/Airlift Medical Equipment	Unknown
85	Sudan	Famine/Airlift Dry Milk	\$125,000
85	Fiji	Cyclone/Airlift Tents, Sheeting Water Tanks	\$200,000
85	Mozambique	Refugee/Airlift Blankets	\$140,000
85	Sudan/ Mali/Niger	Famine/Airlift Food, Medical Supplies	\$234,000 \$90,000
85	Sudan	Famine/Medical Assistance Team	\$27,000
85	Chile	Earthquake/Airlift Plastic Sheeting	\$175,000
85	Somalia	Cholera/Airlift Medicines	\$15,000
85	Mali	Famine/DOD Survey Team for River Crossing and Ferry Service	\$5,000
85	Nigeria	Civil Disturbance/Provide Med. Supplies	\$15,000
85	Sudan	Famine/Airlift Transport Helicopters	\$325,000
85	Mexico	Earthquake/Airlift Supplies Equipment, Personnel	\$1,406,537
86	Columbia	Volcano Erupt./Airlift Shelter Blankets	\$11,362
86	Mexico	Earthquake/Retrograde Repair Equipment	\$39,600
86	Bolivia	Floods/Airlift Plastic Sheeting	\$28,488
86	Solomon Is.	Cyclone/Airlift Comm. Equip., Personnel, Plastic	\$240,000
86	Jamaica	Flood/Airlift Cots	\$25,000
86	Cameroon	Gas Release/DOD Personnel	\$63,000

87	El Salvador	Earthquake/Airlift Relief	\$337,000
87	Ecuador	Earthquake/Airlift Shelter, Blankets	\$21,150
87	Chile	Flooding/Airlift Blankets	\$70,000
88	Burma	Air Crash/DOD Personnel	State Funded
88	Philippines	Typhoon/Airlift Supplies to Remote Areas	\$50,000
88	Mozambique	Civil Strife/DOD Personnel	\$7,400
88	Costa Rica	Floods/Helicopter SAR Team	\$105,000
88	Pakistan	Explosion/DOD Medical Team	\$25,000
88	Sudan	Civil Strife/Airlift Plastic	\$147,000
88	Paraguay	Floods/Airlift Personnel & Plastic	\$30,000
88	Sudan	Floods/Airlift Personnel & Plastic	\$185,000
88	Sudan	Locust Plague/Airlift Comm. Equip.	\$975
88	Bangladesh	Floods/Airlift Personnel Supplies	\$400,000
88	Jamaica	Hurricane/Airlift Supplies Equip.	\$218,000
89	Jamaica	Hurricane/Airlift Supplies Equip.	\$233,000
89	Costa Rica	Floods/Helicopter SAR Team	\$100,000
89	Senegal	Locust/Airlift Pesticide Equipment And Personnel	\$370,000
89	Senegal	Plane Crash/Remains Retrieval	\$28,000
89	Sudan	Famine/Airlift, Air Drops	\$125,000
89	Armenia	Earthquake/Airlift Personnel	\$590,000
89	Sudan	Famine/Airlift Personnel	\$125,000
89	Mauritania	Civil Strife/Airlift DOD Medical Supplies	\$5,000
89	Korea	Flooding/DOD Engineer Team	\$60,000
89	Antigua	Hurricane/Airlift Supplies Equip.	\$64,191

90	Antigua	Hurricane/Airlift Supplies Equip.	\$172,100
90	Pakistan	Pesticide Release/DOD Antidote	\$200
90	El Salvador	Civil Strife/Airlift DOD Medical Supplies	\$210,000
90	Panama	Civil Strife/Airlift Medical Supplies	\$300,000
90	El Salvador	Civil Strife/Airlift DOD Medical Supplies	\$160,000
90	Rumania	Civil Strife/Airlift DOD Medical Supplies	\$250,000
90	Western Samoa	Cyclone/Airlift Supplies	\$60,000
90	Philippines	Earthquake/Airlift Supplies Personnel	\$325,000
91	Philippines	Typhoon/Airlift Plastic Sheeting Power	\$100,000
91	Honduras	Floods/Airlift Plastic Sheeting Power	\$11,000
91	Costa Rica	Earthquake/Airlift Plastic Sheeting Water Tanks	\$7,000
91	Peru	Cholera/Airlift DOD Medical Supplies	\$28,000
91	Kuwait	Post-War Repatriation/Airlift Assessment Teams	\$2,000
91	Costa Rica	Earthquake/Aerovac injured DOD Personnel	\$140,000
91	Panama	Earthquake/Airlift Plastic Sheeting Water Tanks	\$19,516
91	Costa Rica	Earthquake/Additional Support DOD Personnel	\$116,221

APPENDIX C

DISASTER ASSISTANCE SUPPORT PEAKS - ANDREW, INIKI, OMAR				
	FLORIDA	HAWAII	GUAM	LOUISIANA
PERSONNEL	23587	3728	798	36
BREAKDOWN				
ARMY	17102	2933	41	36
NAVY	4134	924	299	-
AIR FORCE	1393	188	251	-
MARINES	817	475	175	-
CANADIANS	398			
NATIONAL GUARD	5991	1798	328	1350
ARMY RESERVES	794			
DLA	25	1	1	
OTHER DOD CIVILIAN	919	137	79	208
SUPPORT				
MREs	1,003,000	326,000	250,000	
MKTs	53	10		
MEALS FED	897,783		422,018	
DEBRIS REMOVE/CUYD	441,000	1,013		
PRIME POWER GEN	35	8	9	

DISASTER ASSISTANCE SUPPORT PEAKS - ANDREW, INIKI, OMAR				
	FLORIDA	HAWAII	GUAM	LOUISIANA
OTHER GENERATORS	262	95	137	
TENTS	2,879	100	384	
COTs	54,884	1,600	2,837	
BLANKETS	100,000			
ROWPUS	8	16	10	
LSCs/FSCs	4	5		
PEAK POPULATION	2,979			
SCHOOLS	268	18		
MED PATIENTS	48,919			
USACE CONTRACTS (\$)	537.0 MIL	46.5 MIL		
VEHICLES	4,701			
SHIPS	6	2	9	
HELICOPTERS	157			
RADIOS ISSUED	20,500			
Source: Dept Of Army, "Hurricane Andrew, Typhoon Omar, Hurricane Iniki After Action Report," 1993.				

APPENDIX D

NATIONAL COSTS ELIGIBLE FOR REIMBURSEMENT BY THE U.N.

The following list, although not exhaustive, details those reimbursable costs that a member state may incur when contributing to a U.N. mission.

1. Mission subsistence allowance;
2. Standard troop cost reimbursements including elements for personal clothing, equipment and ammunition;
3. Welfare costs including an element for recreational leave;
4. Rations;
5. Daily allowance to troops;
6. Travel to mission area, rotation and repatriation;
7. Death and disability awards;
8. Locally recruited staff salaries;
9. Rental and maintenance of premises;
10. Renovation of premises;
11. Building materials;
12. Utilities;
13. Prefabricated buildings;
14. Air operations in theater;
15. Aviation fuel;
16. Air crew subsistence allowance;
17. Air ground handling costs;
18. Renovation of equipment;
19. Acquisition and rental of vehicles;
20. Repair and maintenance of vehicles;
21. POL;

- 22. Consumables;
- 23. Vehicle workshop equipment;
- 24. Vehicle insurance;
- 25. Communications equipment;
- 26. Freight and cartage;
- 27. Damage sustained in transit

APPENDIX E

SOMALIA PROPOSED ZERO SUM REPROGRAMMING
 FY 1993
 (\$MILLIONS)

	Appropriated Level	Increases	Decreases	Revised Level
Military Personnel, Army	23,238.5	11.8	12.014	23,239.1
Military Personnel, Navy	19,228.6	7.1	-	19,231.4
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	5,981.0	5.9	- 47.2	5,981.0
Military Personnel, Air Force	18,523.0	23.8	27.1	18,546.8
Reserve Personnel, Army	2,170.5	-	- 0.486	2,170.0
Reserve Personnel, Navy	1,653.2	-	- 0.300	1,652.9
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps	345.5	-	- 0.400	345.3
Reserve Personnel, Air Force	729.0	-	- 1.5	727.5
National Guard Personnel, Army	3,239.7	-	- 0.5	3,239.6
National Guard Personnel, Air Force	1,166.1	-	- 1.5	1,164.6
Operations & Maintenance, Army	13,442.4	73.8	-	13,516.2
Operations & Maintenance, Navy	19,108.6	24.0	-	19,132.6
Operations & Maintenance, Marine Corps	1,383.1	101.3	-	1,484.4
Operations & Maintenance, Air Force	16,009.0	147.5	- 1.5	16,155.0
Operations & Maintenance, Defense Wide	8,788.0	-	- 40.0	8,748.0
Defense Health Program	9,242.6	8.3	- 1.0	9,249.9
Defense Business Operating Fund Transportation	1,123.8	182.0	-	1,305.8
Aircraft Procurement, Navy	6,026.2	-	- 25.0	6,001.2
Weapons Procurement, Navy	3,760.7	-	- 9.1	3,751.6
Other Procurement, Navy	5,615.3	-	- 22.0	5,593.3
Research Development, Test and Evaluation Navy	8,930.4	-	- 10.1	8,920.3
Research Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense Wide	9,799.9	-	-248.3	9,596.9
National Guard and Reserve Equipment, Defense	1,567.2	-	-248.3	1,318.9
Total 1993 Supplemental		583.2	-583.2	

APPENDIX F

MONTHLY COSTS FOR SOMALIA/RESTORE HOPE													
	DEC TOTAL COST	DEC INCRMNTL COST	JAN TOTAL COST	JAN INCRMNTL COST	FEB TOTAL COST	FEB INCRMNTL COST	MAR TOTAL COST	MAR INCRMNTL COST	APR TOTAL COST	APR INCRMNTL COST	TOTAL COSTS FYTD	INCRMNTL COSTS FYTD	
TOTAL, ALL SERVICES	279.6	260.8	188.7	169.8	86.5	75.2	108.8	97.9	102.5	88.5	766.1	692.2	
AIR FORCE	32.7	32.7	25.3	25.3	5.7	5.7	3.5	3.5	2.7	2.7	69.9	69.9	
MILITARY PERSONNEL	1.1	1.1	2.8	2.8	2	2	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.6	9.4	9.4	
RESERVE CALLUP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RESERVE ON AD	0.4	0.4	1.5	1.5	1	1	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	4.4	4.4	
OTHER GUARD/RESERVE	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	2.3	2.3	
IMMINENT DANGER PAY	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	1.9	1.9	
FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOW	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.7	
OTHER MILITERS	0	0	0.1	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE	31.6	31.6	22.5	22.5	3.7	3.7	1.6	1.6	1.1	1.1	60.5	60.5	
PERSONNEL SUPPORT	3.4	3.4	0.7	0.7	-0.3	-0.3	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	4.9	4.9	
SUBSISTENCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RC ACTIVATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HOSPITAL/SUPPLY SHIPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER SUPPORT	3.4	3.4	0.7	0.7	-0.3	-0.3	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	4.9	4.9	
OPERATING SUPPORT	28.2	28.2	21.8	21.8	4	4	1	1	0.6	0.6	55.6	55.6	
INCOUNTRY	1.1	1.1	4	4	1.7	1.7	1	1	0.6	0.6	8.4	8.4	
EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RECONSTITUTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TRANSPORTATION	0	0	0	0	2.3	2.3	0	0	0	0	2.3	2.3	
OPTEMPO	27.1	27.1	17.8	17.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	44.9	44.9	
OTHER APPROPRIATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

TRANSCOM	118	105.8	122.1	105.2	53.7	43.1	43.7	33	45.8	35.5	383.3	322.6
AIRLIFT	91.1	91.1	78.6	78.6	32.9	32.9	24.8	24.8	30.1	30.1	275.5	275.5
SEALIFT	21.4	9.2	35	18.1	20.3	9.7	18.7	8	14	3.7	109.4	48.7
PORT HANDLING	5.5	5.5	8.5	8.5	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.2	1.7	1.7	16.4	16.4
DEFENSE AGENCIES	4.4	3.2	0.8	0.7	0.3	0	0	0	0	0.1	5.5	4
DIA (O&M)	0.6	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.6	0.6
DHP (O&M)	1.7	1.7	0.4	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.1	2.1
DMA (O&M)	2.1	1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0	0	0	0	0	2.8	1.3

MONTHLY COSTS FOR SOMALIA/RESTORE HOPE													
	DEC TOTAL COST	DEC INCRMNLT COST	JAN TOTAL COST	JAN INCRMNLT COST	FEB TOTAL COST	FEB INCRMNLT COST	MAR TOTAL COST	MAR INCRMNLT COST	APR TOTAL COST	APR INCRMNLT COST	TOTAL COSTS FYTD	INCRMNLT COSTS FYTD	
TOTAL ALL SERVICES	279.6	260.8	188.7	169.8	86.5	75.2	106.8	97.9	102.5	84.5	766.1	692.2	
ARMY	39	33	20.9	20.9	16.1	16.1	99.3	99.3	31	31	160.3	160.3	
MILITARY PERSONNEL	0.5	0.5	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.1	1.1	7.8	7.8	
RESERVE CALLUP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RESERVE ON AD	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	2.4	2.4	
OTHER GUARD/RESERVE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	
IMMINENT DANGER PAY	0.2	0.2	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4	0.6	0.6	5.3	5.3	
FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOW	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	2.5	2.5	
OTHER MILPERS	0	0	-0.8	-0.8	-0.7	-0.7	-0.6	-0.6	-0.4	-0.4	-2.5	-2.5	
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE	32.4	32.4	18.6	18.6	13.9	13.9	57.3	57.3	30.1	30.1	152.3	152.3	
PERSONNEL SUPPORT	9.1	9.1	2.7	2.7	1.4	1.4	3.7	3.7	1.3	1.3	18.2	18.2	
SUBSISTENCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RC ACTIVATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HOSPITAL/SUPPLY SHIPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MEDICAL SUPPORT	7.6	7.6	1.6	1.6	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9	11.1	11.1	
OTHER SUPPORT	1.5	1.5	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	3	3	0.4	0.4	7.1	7.1	
OPERATING SUPPORT	23.3	23.3	15.9	15.9	12.5	12.5	53.6	53.6	28.8	28.8	134.1	134.1	
INCOUNTRY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	2.5	2.5	
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RECONSTITUTION	22	22	12.9	12.9	10.5	10.5	53.2	53.2	29.4	29.4	128	128	
TRANSPORTATION	0.5	0.5	2.5	2.5	1.6	1.6	0	0	-1	-1	3.6	3.6	
OPTEMPO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
OTHER APPROPRIATION	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0	0	0.1	0.1	-0.2	-0.2	0.2	0.2	

MONTHLY COSTS FOR
SOMALIA/RESTORE HOPE

	DEC TOTAL COST	DEC INCRMNLT COST	JAN TOTAL COST	JAN INCRMNLT COST	FEB TOTAL COST	FEB INCRMNLT COST	MAR TOTAL COST	MAR INCRMNLT COST	APR TOTAL COST	APR INCRMNLT COST	TOTAL COSTS FYTD	INCRMNLT COSTS FYTD
TOTAL ALL SERVICES	279.6	260.8	188.7	189.8	86.5	75.2	108.8	97.9	102.5	88.5	766.1	692.2
MARINE CORPS	78.3	78.3	13.9	13.9	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	14.8	14.8	110.7	110.7
MILITARY PERSONNEL	2.9	2.9	3.4	3.4	2.3	2.3	1.9	1.9	0	0	10.5	10.5
RESERVE CALLUP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RESERVE ON AD	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0	0	0	0	0.9	0.9
OTHER GUARD/RESERVE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IMMINENT DANGER PAY	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.2	1.2	0	0	6.5	6.5
FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOW	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0	2.4	2.4
OTHER MILPERS	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0	0	0.7	0.7
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE	75.4	75.4	10.5	10.5	-0.5	-0.5	0	0	14.8	14.8	100.2	100.2
PERSONNEL SUPPORT	36.2	36.2	2.3	2.3	-1.8	-1.8	0	0	3.7	3.7	40.4	40.4
SUBSISTENCE	31.4	31.4	3	3	-2.5	-2.5	0	0	2.5	2.5	34.4	34.4
RC ACTIVATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOSPITAL/SUPPLY SHIPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MEDICAL SUPPORT	3.5	3.5	-0.8	-0.8	0.6	0.6	0	0	1.1	1.1	4.4	4.4
OTHER SUPPORT	1.3	1.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0	0	0.1	0.1	1.6	1.6
OPERATING SUPPORT	39.2	39.2	8.2	8.2	1.3	1.3	0	0	11.1	11.1	59.8	59.8
INCOUNTRY	39.2	39.2	7.3	7.3	1.2	1.2	0	0	7	7	54.7	54.7
EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE	0	0	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0	0	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.5
RECONSTITUTION	0	0	0.6	0.6	0	0	0	0	4	4	4.6	4.6
TRANSPORTATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPTEMPO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER APPROPRIATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

MONTHLY COSTS FOR
SONALIA/RESTORE NOPE

	DEC TOTAL COST	DEC INCRMNTL COST	JAN TOTAL COST	JAN INCRMNTL COST	FEB TOTAL COST	FEB INCRMNTL COST	MAR TOTAL COST	MAR INCRMNTL COST	APR TOTAL COST	APR INCRMNTL COST	TOTAL COSTS FYTD	INCRMNTL COSTS FYTD
TOTAL, ALL SERVICES	279.6	260.8	188.7	169.8	86.5	75.2	108.8	97.9	102.5	88.5	766.1	692.2
NAVY	13.2	7.8	5.7	3.8	8.9	8.5	0.4	0.2	8.2	4.4	36.4	24.7
MILITARY PERSONNEL	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	5.1	5.1	0	0	1.2	1.2	7.1	7.1
RESERVE CALLUP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RESERVE ON AD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER GUARD/RESERVE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IMMINENT DANGER PAY	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	2.8	2.8	0	0	0.7	0.7	4.3	4.3
FAMILY SEPARATION ALLOW	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.9	1.9	0	0	0.5	0.5	2.8	2.8
OTHER MILPERS	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE	12.8	7.4	5.3	3.4	3.8	3.4	0.4	0.2	7	3.2	29.3	17.6
PERSONNEL SUPPORT	0.3	0.3	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.4	0	0	0.7	0.7
SUBSISTENCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	0	0	0.1	0.1
RC ACTIVATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOSPITAL/SUPPLY SHIPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MEDICAL SUPPORT	0.3	0.3	0	0	0	0	-0.1	-0.1	0	0	0.2	0.2
OTHER SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.4	0	0	0.4	0.4
OPERATING SUPPORT	12.5	7.1	5.3	3.4	3.8	3.4	0	-0.2	7	3.2	28.6	16.9
INCOUNTRY	1.3	1.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0	0	0	6.1	3.2	7.8	4.8
EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT	0.2	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.2	0.2
EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE	1.1	1.1	0	0	0.1	0.1	0	0	0	0	1.2	1.2
RECONSTITUTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRANSPORTATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OPTEMPO	9.9	4.5	5	3.1	3.6	3.3	0	-0.2	0.9	0	19.1	10.7
OTHER APPROPRIATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPENDIX G

SOMALIA REPROGRAMMING
 FY 1993
 (\$MILLIONS)

	Increases	Decreases
Military Personnel, Army	11.8	12.014
Military Personnel, Navy	7.1	-
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	5.9	-47.200
Military Personnel, Air Force	23.8	27.100
Reserve Personnel, Army	-	-.486
Reserve Personnel, Air Force	-	-.300
National Guard Personnel, Air Force	-	-.400
Operations & Maintenance, Army	149.8	-6.408
Operations & Maintenance, Navy	25.0	-
Operations & Maintenance, Marine Corps	101.3	-
Operations & Maintenance, Air Force	166.4	-
Operations & Maintenance, DHP	4.9	-
Defense Business Operating Fund Transportation	254.0	-
Aircraft Procurement, Army	-	-3.000
Procurement Ammunition, Army	-	-19.100
Other Procurement, Army	-	-21.900
Aircraft Procurement, Navy	-	-64.800
Weapons Procurement, Navy	-	-8.000
Other Procurement, Navy	-	-81.450
Missile Procurement, Air Force	-	-10.300
Procurement, Defense Agency	-	-22.200
National Guard and Reserve Equipment, Defense	-	-257.950
Research Development, Test and Evaluation, Army	-	-6.200
Research Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy	-	-36.200
Research Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force	-	-45.092
Research Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense Wide	-	-80.000
Total 1993 Supplemental	750.0	-750.0

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