Peace-Enforcement and the United States Military for the Start of the 21st Century

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**Peace-Enforcement and the United States Military for the Start of the 21st Century**

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This monograph discusses the utility of the Weinberger Criteria for peace-enforcement decisions into the 21st Century. The mission of peace-enforcement and the new world order require US decision makers to review their criteria for employment of US combat forces. This monograph examines the six tests of the 1984 Weinberger Criteria to see if they are sufficient for the 21st Century decision maker.

The monograph first presents the six tests of the Weinberger Criteria and applies them to the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention to gain a historical perspective. Next, a new world order is developed out to the year 2010. The Weinberger Criteria and the Dominican intervention perspective are then applied to the proposed new world order.

Finally, two decision paradigms are presented—one from the Cold War and one for the new world order along with three overall conclusions. The monograph concludes that: one, personalities are a key element in decision making; two, the new world order requires a paradigm shift in decision makers; and three, the Weinberger Criteria lacks sufficiency as the peace-enforcement criteria for the 21st Century.
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I Introduction

The collapse of the USSR and the familiar bi-polar structures of the Cold War are creating a new and unfamiliar world order. In the current sole super-power world ethnic, religious, regional, and humanitarian problems continue to increase concurrent with the review by the US of its interests and its military's roles and missions. The useful and appropriate application of military power is a more complex issue in this post-Cold War world. Peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and peacekeeping are terms that are becoming more significant for US decision makers. Of some importance for civilian and military decision makers and advisors are the criteria for the use of military force in peace-enforcement operations. Peace-enforcement is defined in the draft Joint Publication 3-07.3 as "Military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention, and may be engaged in combat activities." (1) This is a new concept and is often confused with peacekeeping and peacemaking. (See Appendix I for definitions.)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the utility of the Weinberger Criteria as the criteria for US decision makers' use for peace-enforcement decisions into the 21st Century. To gain historical perspective the Weinberger Criteria are first used to analyze the US 1965 Dominican Republic intervention. The 21st Century utility of the Weinberger Criteria is then determined by applying the criteria and the results from the Dominican intervention analysis to a projected new world order. The body of this monograph is built around five sections. Section II introduces the Weinberger Criteria. Section III presents a chronological history of the 1965 Dominican intervention. Section IV
is an analysis of the Dominican intervention using the Weinberger Criteria. Section V develops and projects the world order out to the year 2010. Section VI is an analysis of the Weinberger Criteria and the findings from Section IV in Section V's new world order. The principal findings and conclusions are summarized in the Conclusions.

II The Weinberger Criteria

The Weinberger Criteria has become a touchstone for the use of military power. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger outlined six major tests for the use of US combat forces in his remarks to the National Press Club, 28 November 1984.(2) These six major tests make up the Weinberger Criteria. Although his remarks were made in the context of the Cold War bi-polar world, he also felt that he placed his finger on the "single-most critical element of a successful democracy: a strong concensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes."(3)

The six major tests of Secretary Weinberger are:

First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.

Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.

Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.

Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed--their size, composition and disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.

Fifth, before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.

Finally, the commitment of US forces to combat should be a last
Secretary Weinberger's tests were drawn from past lessons learned. His concept would allow the US to avoid the commitment of insufficient force for non-vital national interests that lack public support. In his view his criteria—plus decisive leadership at the executive and legislative levels—would serve to protect the peace for ourselves, our friends, and future generations. The Secretary of Defense drew his criteria from the past to apply to future events. We will analyze a past event to evaluate the utility of applying the Weinberger Criteria.

III The Dominican Republic Intervention, 1965 - 1966

The US intervention into the Dominican Republic in April 1965 traces its roots to the May 1961 assassination of the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. His death after thirty-one years of rule started a bitter power struggle. United States' and the Organization of American States' (OAS) sanctions moved the Dominicans to support free elections under the OAS. Juan Bosch, a leader of the liberal, leftist Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), was elected. President Lyndon Johnson who attended the December 1962 inauguration saw Bosch as a leader without plans for the country, lacking experience, imagination, or strength to put any plan into effect.

Bosch's action of legalizing the previously outlawed Communist parties resulted in a September 1963 military coup planned by Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin, commander of the elite Armed Forces Training Center (CEFA). For safety Bosch fled to Puerto Rico. In September 1964, under US pressure, Wessin turned power over to a three-man
civilian junta led by Donald Reid Cabral, an American-educated businessman who was Bosch's Foreign Minister. Reid's government was recognized by President Johnson who appointed William Tapley Bennett as US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. Bennett was selected for the post by Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, a Cold War hardliner who President Johnson called "the one voice" for the hemisphere.(7)

An absence of moderates in the political makeup of the Dominican parties hurt Reid as the now-outlawed Communist and extreme leftist parties started terrorist and guerrilla activities. At the same time Bosch's PRD and Social Christians agreed to overthrow Reid and restore the 1963 Constitution. Counterguerrilla warfare and poor economic performance in the sugar industry increased unrest at the same time that Reid was trying to introduce military reforms and deal with military corruption. Reid's actions angered the older conservative officers who resisted change and the younger junior officers who favored more changes. Although both factions planned coups, Reid believed that he could deal with any coups.

On Saturday, 24 April 1965, the Dominican crisis started. Reid sent his Dominican Chief of Staff to the 27th of February Military Camp to cancel the commissions of four officers accused of plotting against Reid. This action started a premature coup that involved 1500 Army officers and men, and an elite Navy "frogman" unit. The recently appointed Chief of Armed Forces, General Wessin, did not oppose the military coup. This coup was however joined by PRD which seized Radio Santo Domingo, declared that Reid was overthrown, and called for the people to join the PRD in the streets. The 14th of June (1J4), a
Castroite group, joined the PRD and armed large numbers of civilians. Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD), a small Maoist group, also joined and seized commercial gasoline stations for assembly and distribution of Molotov cocktails. William Connett, Jr., US Charge de Affaires in Santo Domingo, cabled Washington to warn of the uprising and Communist involvement. Ambassador Bennett had been called back to Washington for consultations on 23 April. Reid, however, cleared the streets, retook Radio Santo Domingo, and announced that the coup had failed. Washington believed that the situation was controlled.

Rebel forces recaptured Radio Santo Domingo on Sunday, 25 April, and public order collapsed. Wessin still refused to attack the rebels. Rebels captured the Presidential Palace and Ozama Fortress, the main government arsenal. Weapons were passed out indiscriminately. Coup d'etat turned into a civil war when pro-Bosch forces and Communist leaders installed Jose Molina Urena as the provisional president of a Constitutionalist (rebel) government in preparation for Bosch's return. Wessin, who opposed the return of Bosch, now led the military forces against the Constitutionalsists. As the Dominican Air Force strafed Constitutionalist positions at the Presidential Palace, Connett ruled out intervention to save Reid, informed Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the Constitutionalist controlled downtown Santo Domingo, and that the Loyalist military was ineffective. Law and order disappeared in Santo Domingo as Reid escaped into hiding. Without direct Presidential authority, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron, with a Marine Battalion Landing Team afloat, to Dominican waters for possible evacuation of American citizens.

On Monday, 26 April, Connett arranged for a cease-fire to evacuate
Americans from the Embajador Hotel and port of Haina. Connett believed PRD and IJ4 Communists now outnumbered the original rebel regular soldiers under the command of Colonel Francisco Caamano. Caamano admitted to giving guns to the Communists in order to get rid of the Reid government, but he felt that once in power he could recover the guns. As the Caribbean Ready Squadron arrived in position, the JCS alerted the 82d Airborne Division for possible deployment to the Dominican Republic.

On Tuesday, 27 April, the Loyalist generals at San Isidro selected a three-man military junta led by Air Force Colonel Pedro Bartholome Benoit. The generals believed that a new and less senior junta would be better supported by the Loyalist forces. While Loyalist troops advanced on Santo Domingo, rebels entered the Embajador Hotel and wild shooting occurred that put the American evacuees into a state of panic. While Loyalist planes rocketed and strafed the city Ambassador Bennett arrived back in country and continued coordination for evacuation of Americans. Antonio Francisco, the PRD Secretary General, and some rebel leaders came to Bennett in an effort to have Bennett talk by telephone with Bosch. Bennett refused and emphasized that: the US wanted a cease-fire so a new provisional government could be formed; Molina was not governing effectively; extreme leftists were taking advantage of the situation; a "left" Bosch should tell rebels to lay down their arms. Loyalist Police Chief General Herman Despradel talked with Bennett and told him that the streets should have order restored that night. At 1600 hours Molina and Caamano came to see Bennett asking him to intercede to stop Loyalist attacks on the Constitutionalist forces and to mediate a negotiated settlement. Bennett refused to start
negotiations and blamed the PRD for the Communists' advantage. Bennett was under Presidential instruction not to take a chance on a Communist takeover; he was not sure that the Constitutionalists could maintain a moderate position. Bennett also believed that the rebel leaders thought that the Loyalist troops would win; he informed the State Department that the Communists were calling the shots on the rebel side. Upon leaving the US Embassy Molina and civilian PRD leaders sought asylum in the Colombian Embassy, leaving Caamano to assume the leadership of the movement.

Early Wednesday morning, 28 April, the Loyalist advance stalled. Caamano had rallied the Constitutionalist forces and counterattacked to halt the Loyalists. Benoit and the Loyalist Police Chief told Bennett that they could no longer protect US citizens. Bennett reported both views to the State Department. As fighting and bloodshed increased in Santo Domingo, Radio San Isidro announced the new Loyalist military junta under Colonel Benoit and their purpose of preparing and holding free and democratic elections. After the radio announcement Benoit called Bennett asking for 1200 US Marines "to help to restore order."(8) Bennett cabled Washington recommending contingency planning only; he stated, "I do not believe (the) situation justifies such action (landing the marines) at this time."(9) However, within two hours Bennett called requesting the landing. At 1530 hours, Benoit requested in writing US support in putting down the Communist-directed rebellion: he did not mention the protection of US lives.

At approximately the same time a White House meeting on Vietnam was held by the President. No military personnel were at the meeting. During the meeting two cables from Bennett arrived. The first, at 1730
hours, asked that Marines be landed to control the evacuation center at
the Embajador Hotel and to reinforce the Marine Embassy guards. The
second cable arrived shortly after the first.

He (Bennett) foresaw a complete breakdown in all government
authority. In light of all the circumstances, he recommended
that 'serious thought be given in Washington to armed
intervention which would go beyond the mere protection of
Americans and seek to establish order in this strife-ridden
country . . . we should intervene to prevent another Cuba from
arising out of the ashes of this uncontrollable situation.'(10)

Johnson decided at 1800 hours to land Marines to protect US lives.
Four hundred Marines moved ashore at 1900 hours. Mann telephoned
Bennett between 1800 and 1830 hours and asked him to have Benoit
request in writing the landing of US Marines to protect US lives.
Benoit did so and his request was sent to Washington after midnight;
this became the legal basis for the intervention. At 2040 hours on
national radio and television President Johnson announced the landing
of US Marines in Santo Domingo for protection and evacuation of US
citizens. He also appealed for a cease-fire. Concurrently the State
Department asked for a special meeting of the OAS on the 29th.

The OAS Council met on Thursday, 29 April, but had difficulty
coming to agreement without conferring with their governments. The OAS
Council was cool, but not adverse, to US operations to save lives. The
Council agreed to have the Papal Nuncio try to arrange a cease-fire.
OAS Secretary General Jose A. Mora was informed by the Dominican Papal
Nuncio that the situation was serious and that he was working on a
cease-fire. That day Bennett reported that Loyalist forces were
discouraged, the police force was decimated and ineffective, and rebel
forces were still in the city but could break out. He told the
Secretaries of State and Defense, and CJCS, General Wheeler, that a
rebel victory would lead to a pro-Communist government. President Johnson increased Marine forces to 1500, the JCS designated the Dominican operation Power Pack, and lead elements of the 82d Airborne Division were ordered to deploy. The division commander, Major General York, would be the land forces commander. Johnson feared that there would be "difficulty of persuading" the OAS, having them "agree on a course of action", and "act quickly in a crisis." The OAS knew nothing of the unilateral US action. President Johnson made the decision because he was confident of his ability to overcome the resentment this action would cause. He also felt that he had the full support of his military and civilian advisers for the 28 April landing to save American lives and for the 29 April intervention to prevent a Communist takeover.

The first elements of Power Pack landed at San Isidro at 0215 hours, 30 April. During the day the 82d Airborne Division moved toward Santo Domingo securing the Duarte bridge and a bridgehead on the west bank. Upon York's request to the JCS for additional troops, Johnson approved the deployment of the rest of the 82d, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and the 101st Airborne Division. XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters was activated for deployment with Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer the newly appointed commander. John B. Martin, former Dominican Ambassador, arrived the same day in country as the President's special emissary. Bennett was viewed as having little credibility with the Constitutionalists. Martin and the Papal Nuncio met with Loyalists and Constitutionalists to work on a cease-fire. At 1400 hours in Washington the OAS voted to establish an International Security Zone (ISZ) in the diplomatic quarter of Santo Domingo and
called for a cease-fire. They adjourned without knowing that the 82d
had landed at San Isidro and that US Marines had deployed in the ISZ
before OAS approval. During the day Loyalist troops withdrew, leaving
a gap between Marines in the ISZ and the Army in the Duarte bridgehead.
At the same time Martin negotiated a cease-fire without US military
input. Martin was also concerned about Caamano's leadership of the
Constitutionalists; he believed that Caamano could become a "Dominican
Castro." In his view Caamano "had few political advisers in Santo
Domingo at the time but Communists."(12)

Shortly after midnight on Saturday, 1 May, Palmer arrived at San
Isidro. After conferring with York he refused to recognize Martin's
cease-fire due to the gap between Marine and Army forces. He ordered
patrols to find a linkup corridor. Violent Latin American and OAS
reaction to the size and the unilateral nature of the US intervention
caused President Johnson to reconsider the Friday troop deployments.
His advisors were concerned that this violent reaction would undercut
US efforts to have the OAS establish a multinational force for the
crisis. Late that night the OAS Secretary General and the OAS
Commission arrived in Santo Domingo.

On Sunday, 2 May, the OAS Commission approved the establishment of
a corridor between US forces. President Johnson approved its
establishment not earlier than midnight. In Santo Domingo Martin held
a press conference. In his view, US forces should change from
protection of US lives to prevention of a Communist takeover because
the PRD revolt was now under the control of the Communists and other
extremists. Later that day President Johnson informed the American
public in a television address of the anti-Communist objectives of the
ongoing intervention. Johnson ordered Martin to see Bosch in Puerto Rico that night. Martin met with Bosch who refused to believe that the Communists were taking over his movement. Bosch was also upset at how Bennett handled Molina. Martin called Johnson to see if he should continue talks with Bosch and if it were possible for Molina to be installed as President. Johnson agreed and told Martin to inform Bosch that "I want Mr Bosch to know that our purpose is to protect lives and have a progressive liberal government there and have elections. We want nothing except to stop the bloodshed and let self-determination operate."(13) Martin and Bosch agreed to meet again in the morning.

At one minute past midnight, 3 May, US forces moved to establish the corridor. One hour later the corridor was established and eighty percent of the Constitutionalist forces were trapped in Ciudad Nueva, the old part of Santo Domingo. This operation was thought to eliminate the chance of a rebel military victory. When Martin and Bosch met that morning, Bosch informed Martin that the Dominican Congress (the Constitutionalis) would elect Caamaño or Colonel Rafael Fernandez Dominguez as the President on 5 May to serve out Bosch's term until 1967. Bosch was not planning on returning to Santo Domingo. Upon return to Santo Domingo Martin started working to form an interim government with General Antonio Imbert Barreras, one of the generals that overthrew Trujillo. Martin knew that a Caamaño government would not work with the San Isidor junta. The Constitutionalist Congress elected Caamaño their President on 4 May.

On 5 May the OAS Commission established a formal cease-fire by having both sides sign "The Act of Santo Domingo." The cease-fire respected the ISZ and corridor. The next day the OAS approved the
establishment of an Inter-American Armed Force (IAAF) for use in the Dominican Republic. Bennett and Palmer wanted a US commander of the IAAF to ensure US freedom of action, but General Wheeler disagreed since internationalization was to gain OAS support. All US forces would be under a Latin American general in the IAAF with Palmer the Deputy Commander. General Hugo Panasco Alvim, Brazil, was named the IAAF Commander. In Santo Domingo Imbert continued to form a government and on 7 May he became the "president" of the US-backed Government of National Reconstruction (GNR). The GNR replaced Benoit's military junta.

US troop strength of 22,500, more than was currently in Vietnam, was reached on 10 May. Although Palmer believed that this rapid troop buildup stabilized the situation, Johnson felt pressure at home and abroad to withdraw troops as quickly as possible. Rebel (Constitutionalist) activity in northern Santo Domingo—especially from Radio Santo Domingo—became increasingly disruptive. As GNR planes attacked Radio Santo Domingo, Bennett and Palmer recommended unilateral action to clear northern Santo Domingo of rebels. Johnson refused, stating, "I'm not going down in history as the man responsible for putting another Trujillo in power."(14) The White House now moved from a pro-Loyalist to a neutral position. At the same time domestic opposition to Vietnam and the Dominican intervention increased as intellectual groups used the White House Festival of Arts on 14 May to show their opposition.

The White House sent McGeorge Bundy, Cyrus Vance, Thomas Mann, and Jack Vaughn to Santo Domingo on 15 May to organize a new provisional government around Silvestre Antonio Guzman, a moderate PRD member and
Bosch’s former Minister of Agriculture. Bundy’s mission undercut Martin’s efforts and the Imbert GNR government. Imbert felt that he was being dumped after only nine days in office. The GNR refused to deal with Bundy and on their own attacked the rebels in northern Santo Domingo. Washington instructed Palmer to prevent GNR air and naval forces from supporting the GNR ground operation in northern Santo Domingo. Johnson polled his White House team in Santo Domingo, Bennett, and Palmer on the Guzman option on the 17th. Palmer felt that he could not guarantee a free democratic Dominican Republic under Guzman. Johnson decided on the 18th not to continue with the Guzman plan. Returning to Washington on the 19th, Martin met with Johnson who complained of press and liberal criticism. Johnson wanted more OAS action, but no Communist government or military dictatorship.

GNR forces successfully cleared northern Santo Domingo and captured Radio Santo Domingo by 20 May. Constitutionalist forces were now located only in Ciudad Nueva. Three days later the IAAF was signed into being with Palmer as Deputy Commander. General Alvim assumed command upon his 29 May arrival. The IAAF was renamed the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) on 2 June and was to assume a neutral role. At the same time the GNR accepted and supported the OAS and the proposed OAS-sponsored election. The OAS now had the lead in Santo Domingo, but 123 people were in key positions. A Second OAS Committee arrived 4 June to negotiate a political settlement. Ellsworth Bunker, US OAS Ambassador, headed the three-man committee. US troop strength was reduced to 12,000 with the 6 June Marine departure. The Latin American Brigade, IAPF arrived and took control of the ISZ on 11 June.

On 15 June the most serious fighting to date broke out. The
Constitutionalists attacked the IAPF hoping to gain international support and inflict casualties on the IAPF, thus increasing the intervention's costs to the US and OAS. IAPF responded by launching their own attack with York's 82d Airborne Division. They badly mauled rebel forces and cleared 56 city blocks of rebel territory in Ciudad Nueva. Alvim and York thought of pushing all the way through, but Palmer halted the advance thus enforcing the neutrality of the IAPF. Later Bennett told Palmer, "It's too bad you didn't let the 82d go." (15) Palmer feared that IAPF destruction of the rebels would be seen internationally as "the Budapest of the Western Hemisphere" and end the leverage on GNR. (16) This action was viewed as a demonstration of the IAPF's responsiveness to OAS political guidance and control. The 15-16 June fighting may have strengthened Caamaño's moderate leadership because the more radical elements had been weakened in the fighting.

On 18 June the Second OAS Commission proposed a political settlement, The Act of Dominican Reconciliation. Although Imbert resisted the proposal, the OAS gained leverage by cutting off all GNR salaries. The US was paying the GNR salaries through the OAS. Additionally, Bunker found out that the GNR military, the Dominican Chiefs, would support the needs of the republic, not one individual. Imbert was forced to resign on 30 August. On the same day all sides accepted the OAS-sponsored Act of Dominican Reconciliation. The role of the IAPF now changed from neutral to support of the provisional government. Hector Garcia-Godoy, Foreign Minister under Bosch, was sworn in as Provisional Government President on 3 September.

The Godoy provisional government went through a series of crises
that required the active support of the IAPF. Godoy's abolishment of Wessin's CEFA on 5 September required strong support from the IAPF when Wessin refused to comply. Godoy's next crisis started with his 6 January 1966 announcement that certain Constitutionalist officers and all his military chiefs were being posted overseas. This announcement was the result of a December firefight between local Loyalist police and military, and Caamaño's Constitutionalists. The Dominican Chiefs refused to obey and Godoy ordered Alvim and the IAPF to intervene. Alvim initially refused Godoy's order, but under OAS pressure he did intervene and end the crisis. Alvim was disenchanted with the Godoy government because of the removal of Wessin, a strong anti-Communist, the failure to prevent Bosch's 25 September return to Santo Domingo, and the lack of law and order in the downtown area. Alvim's increasing resistance to the OAS's political guidance and to Godoy's government hurt the reliability of the IAPF. Bunker and Palmer worked out a plan to replace both Palmer and Alvim with officers of lesser rank. They were replaced on 15 January. By the end of February Caamaño, other prominent Constitutionalists, and the Dominican military chiefs were posted overseas, defusing the situation prior to the start of the election campaigns on 1 March.

The election campaigns were conducted without incident and fair elections were held on 1 June. Joaquim Balaguer, a moderate, became President on 1 July 1966. The last of the IAPF departed the Dominican Republic on 21 September 1966.

IV Analysis of the Dominican Intervention
The Weinberger Criteria for intervention were developed from past lessons learned and, therefore, should be relevant when applied to the Dominican Republic intervention. In applying the Weinberger Criteria to the Dominican intervention each of the six major tests will be reviewed.

The first test deals with the commitment of combat forces in support of vital national interests. In the Dominican Republic intervention there are two threads for this test: the protection of US lives and the prevention of a Dominican Communist government. The first is a basic thread for the US, the protection of its citizens. The intervention to protect lives in Santo Domingo was supported by the US and other allies despite their initial coolness or public disclaimer. This support rested mainly on the international and domestic perception that the situation had badly deteriorated in Santo Domingo. Although Johnson’s picture of the Dominican conflict, with headless bodies floating in the river, was later disregarded and even attacked as exaggerated, the actions at the Embajador Hotel on 27 April, the reports by the Dominican Papal Nuncio, General Benoit’s request to restore order on 28 April, and all the US Embassy reports support a dangerous situation for US citizens and others. Protection of US citizens is an interest of the US. Some would call it a US security interest. The true point of contention was the unilateral use of military force to achieve it.

The unilateral US violation of Dominican sovereignty caused domestic and international reactions. The decision also had the distinct historical implication of a return to US direct interference in domestic Latin American affairs. The US history and tradition of
using force for settling Caribbean problems immediately resurfaced.
Prior to the rise of the Trujillo dictatorship US Marines had occupied
the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. Subsequent events have
labeled the Dominican intervention as the start of the Johnson
Doctrine, the prevention of Communist government in the Western
hemisphere. This second thread is viewed against the backdrop of Cold
War history built on the concept of George Kennan's containment that
originally applied to Europe.

The tradition of containment, however, was applied world-wide by
the US. The Korean War had been fought to stop Communism. Within the
Caribbean region Cuba's move to the Communist bloc in 1959 was a
setback for the US government. Kennedy experienced the 1961 Bay of
Pigs failure and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. At the time of the
1965 Dominican intervention the US was deploying forces to South
Vietnam to confront Communism. The prevention of another Communist
government in the Caribbean was viewed by Johnson and others as vital
to the national interests not only in the Caribbean but also for
support of Vietnam. (18) Johnson was fully committed to preventing this
spread.

The second test covers the wholehearted commitment to win if
combat troops are committed. It is clear that Johnson was willing to
undertake unilateral action to prevent a Communist government. It is
also clear that Johnson was initially willing to commit as much
military power as necessary to achieve this end. However as
disapproval increased both at home and abroad Johnson waivered. This
affected the role that US forces played in the intervention. On 14 May
US military support shifted from support of the Loyalist forces to a
strictly neutral position. This was done in order that the US intervention would not be viewed as supporting another Trujillo-type military dictator. Johnson developed this concern after the start of the intervention.

As Johnson's support, both domestic and international, continued to erode he moved from a sole US solution to an OAS solution. He hoped this move would increase his support. Due to this pressure Johnson reconsidered the amount of US force employed, sought to withdraw US forces as rapidly as possible, and replaced US forces with the IAPF.

Early in the operation the military consideration of "winning" was also undercut by Ambassador Martin's establishment of a cease-fire without military input. Additionally there was a lack of unity of effort at the highest levels. The initial lack of coordination among the President's emissary, Ambassador Bennett, and the ground commanders, York and Palmer, placed the desired "winning" endstate, no Communist government, in jeopardy. Johnson also sent mixed signals through Martin with his 1 May message to Bosch. The problem of defining "winning" in the Dominican intervention and ensuring unity of effort was caused by the lack of clarity in the political and military objectives.

Weinberger's third test covers the establishment of clearly defined political and military objectives that the committed forces can accomplish in a precise way. Only the Marine evacuation operation meets the full requirement. Although the establishment of the ISZ was accomplished before the OAS authorization, it is clear that securing the ISZ would directly accomplish the objective of the safe evacuation of the US and foreign nationals. The force initially employed was
capable of performing the task, especially due to the 26 April cease-fire agreement. The objectives start to be obscured in the shift to preventing the establishment of a Communist-controlled government. A clearly defined statement of what that government would look like and the military objectives to achieve it were missing. Additionally the timing of Martin's efforts to achieve a cease-fire to stabilize the political situation was at cross purposes with Palmer's military objective to stabilize the situation by linking the 82nd corridor with the Marine JSZ. In the end the military objective of linking the ISZ and the corridor clearly supported the objective of preventing a Communist government because it divided and isolated the majority of the Constitutionalists in Ciudad Nueva.

Johnson's no Trujillo-type government and opposition to US military support for GNR action to clear rebels forces from northern Santo Domingo further clouded the objectives. His special mission under Bundy on 15 May also caused confusion by attempting to establish an apparent pro-Bosch government under Guzman. When this failed Johnson shifted to a solution through the OAS.

The absence of clearly defined political and military objectives prior to the intervention resulted in this evolving and shifting endstate. The effect on US forces through these changes was dramatic. US forces proceeded from unilateral action to protect US lives, to direct prevention of a Communist government, to support of the GNR, to neutrality in support of the OAS commission, to active support for the OAS-established Godoy government. During these shifts in the political and military objectives, the leadership of Bunker and Palmer appears to be a key reason for the final accomplishment of the initially desired
general endstate, no Communist government. This underscores Weinberger's view that his criteria require decisive leadership.

The fourth test of committing, reassessing, and adjusting the forces committed in relation to the objectives would appear to have been accomplished. However, the composition and numbers of US soldiers were also influenced by external factors. Johnson's initial use of overwhelming force was historically based. Johnson was clearly aware of the results of the lack of sufficient force in the Bay of Pigs operation. The responsiveness of the Caribbean Task Force was a result of President Kennedy's previous concern for the amount of force and readiness in that area. Military leaders also remembered the poor response to the initial days of the Korean War. The JCS's action of alerting additional troops for Presidential use in the operation reinforces this view.

The progression from 400 Marines for the initial evacuation to the 4th Marine Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, and supporting naval forces for Power Pack shows a clear reassessment and increase of forces for changing missions. The transition to the IAPF also shows the reassessment of the need to internationalize the force and support the OAS. But Johnson's reconsideration of forces and desire to bring down US strength as soon as possible were also directly related to domestic and international reaction and pressure.

Palmer's and Bunker's leadership and personalities once again directly affected the operation. Palmer and Bunker continually reassessed the situation to provide the best relationship between forces available and the changing political and military objectives.
As the deputy commander, Palmer directly affected the composition, disposition, and commitment of the IAPF as that force met the changing objectives, crises, and requirements that developed following the initial intervention. Palmer’s astute assessment and method of changing the leadership of the IAPF—General Alvim and Palmer himself—directly contributed to the success of the IAPF and the OAS mission.

Weinberger’s fifth test requires that before the commitment of combat forces there be a reasonable assurance of support from the American people and Congress. To gain and sustain this type of support requires that the threat be truthfully portrayed. Johnson’s action to protect US lives was supported, but the unilateral commitment of additional troops on 29 April lost international and OAS support. Loss of domestic support started with Johnson’s second national announcement on 2 May that informed the nation that the intervention was also to prevent a Communist government. It was the failure to convincingly reveal in a timely manner the second objective that lost support for the operation.

The revolt of the liberal Democrats that impacted on Johnson’s foreign policy for the next three years started with the Dominican intervention. Led by Senators Wayne Morse and William Fulbright, Congress cut funds for the Alliance for Progress and led to the “end of the bipartisan hard-line Cold War consensus.”(20) The after-effects of the Dominican intervention would lay the ground work for the Vietnam challenge and charges of Johnson’s arrogance of Presidential power. Johnson’s grassroots support was undercut when his charge of headless bodies in the river failed to be supported by sufficient proof. In the
view of Secretary Rusk, "If there was a mistake it was the way in which we present our actions to the American people and the world". (21)

Additionally the charges that Johnson had overstated the case of Communist involvement seemed to be supported when the CIA’s efforts to produce a list of Communist agents revealed only names of dead, jailed, and out-of-country persons and duplicate names.

This credibility gap was increased by the role of the media. In some cases openly hostile to the military and the administration, they were sufficiently astute to see the initial pro-Loyalist military actions despite the administration’s claim of neutrality. (22) Military statements about “enemy” and “killing commies” undercut the credibility of the administration and military. (23) The failure to prevent this media relationship deterioration directly impacted on the support for the operation.

Support from the military also eroded. As the rules of engagement became restrictive to further the political objectives, military commanders felt constrained in their ability to accomplish the mission while protecting US lives. They felt that certain advantages were being given to the enemy due to the constraints. Chief of Staff of the Army Harold K. Johnson wrote that “one thing that must be remembered . . . is that the command of squads has now been transferred to Washington and is not necessarily limited to the Pentagon either!” (24)

Perhaps President Johnson and his advisors simply overestimated their support. The “lens” through which they viewed the Dominican situation was their personal “Cold War Lens”—a “lens” through which “containment” and presidential foreign affairs decisions were supported.
The sixth and final test for Weinberger is that the commitment of US forces to combat be the last resort. The commitment of the Marine force for the evacuation of US citizens does not appear to be covered by this test. It was in a sense the only option that the US had under the circumstances. However, in light of the evacuation cease-fire, this evacuation force was not being committed to "combat operations." The deterioration of the situation that resulted during the course of the evacuation was an acceptable risk.

The follow-on commitment of forces with the mission to prevent a Communist government clearly had the direct possibility of combat operations. In this case the use of combat forces was not a last resort. Ambassador Bennett's refusal to mediate between Molina and the military junta was a missed chance to use other means to resolve the situation. The crux of the problem again goes back to the objectives desired. The requirement for no Communist government and the faltering performance of the Loyalist forces supported the commitment of US forces to actively prevent a Constitutalist victory. However, the subsequent shift to an OAS solution would lead one to believe that a negotiated settlement could have been attempted through Bennett or the OAS prior to unilateral US action. Commitment of US force was Johnson's personal means to assure the desired outcome for the US. Subsequent domestic and international response affected Johnson's desires and challenged the need for a quick US military response in spite of the Cold War backdrop.

The application of the Weinberger Criteria to the Dominican intervention also points out three additional factors. These factors relate to the role of the Weinberger Criteria, the relevance of history
and tradition, and the importance of the individual personalities. These factors may seem so obvious that they are overlooked and, therefore, not fully considered.

The Weinberger Criteria are not a "go - no go" simple set of fixed rules. They are an attempt to apply a rational process to difficult and dangerous decisions. They clearly show a tempering in the concept of the use of force within the Cold War paradigm. The Dominican intervention shows that national interests, a clear intention of winning, and a continuing reassessment of forces required were considered as the Weinberger Criteria require. The analysis also points out that the Weinberger Criteria could have provided the framework to clarify the political and military objectives, to better consider both domestic and international support, and to review the appropriateness of employed forces. These could have been addressed prior to the commitment of forces to the intervention.

The utility of the Weinberger Criteria is to ask the hard questions before the start of the operation, not during the operation. Although it was in the interest of the US not to have a Communist government in the Dominican Republic, clear political and military objectives to achieve that endstate were not defined. The resulting confusion was seen in the multiple political activities, the changes in the composition of the military force, and the shifting of what the military forces would support. Johnson's failure to timely and clearly present the total threat to the country and the OAS hurt the support for the intervention. Johnson greatly underestimated the support required and the reaction to the intervention while he overestimated the strength of his administration.
Any criteria, even the Weinberger Criteria, are used against the backdrop of the history and traditions of the times, the region, and the participants. Johnson’s concern about previous Communist events in the Caribbean—as well as current efforts in Vietnam, the status of the Cold War, personal knowledge of Bosch, evaluation of OAS effectiveness, and over-estimation of the administration’s political strength and support—would have affected the application of any criteria that he could have applied. A similar backdrop of history and traditions affected each advisor, each member of the OAS, the military, the media, Loyalists, and Constitutionalists. During the period 1945 to 1975 much of the effort of policy makers was directed toward the creation of the bi-polar world order, in which national interests were equated almost universally with national security in the Cold War struggle. The historical time and geographical location of events are the easiest to recognize, but often are not taken into consideration. Equally important is the impact that history and tradition has on each individual decision maker.

The decision makers’ separate and distinct histories and traditions obviously affect their skills and experiences—their personalities—that they bring to the crisis. The personalities of the individuals in the intervention were the key factors in how the events were resolved. The personalities of Johnson, Martin, Bennett, Caamano, Bosch, Imbert, and all others directly involved affected the decisions that they made. Their effectiveness also varied. The personalities of Bunker and Palmer stand in stark contrast to that of Bennett, York, and Alvim. The personalities of Bunker and Palmer assisted them in linking the desired endstate through all three levels of war—strategic,
operational, and tactical—in a coordinated and meaningful manner. They linked the application of force with the objective to be achieved. Personalities play an important role in shaping the "lens" each participant used to view the interests involved. While this is obvious to the historical reader, it may not be apparent during the decision process.

The personalities of those involved in international affairs can be classified by various schools of thought. The best known are the "realist" pursuit of power school of Hans J. Morgenthau and the "idealist" ethics and morals school of Woodrow Wilson. Where the participants fall between these two poles of thought affects how they view the situation and interpret vital national or allied interests. It shapes their "lens". There are some long term general national interests that remain constant over time, but the specific interpretation of what is a national interest is done by the participants at the time of the event. The personalities of those participants bear directly on their interpretations. Johnson's view of national interest in the Dominican Republic was not shared by members of Congress, the public, or the OAS. Even Secretary Weinberger himself faced the same difficulty of agreement on national interests with Navy Secretary James Webb and Congress during the Gulf Crisis of 1987. In all these cases it is the interpretation by decision makers of "vital national interest" that determined the sufficiency to commit US forces.

This analysis of the 1965 Dominican intervention using the 1984 Weinberger Criteria is useful. If available for the Dominican intervention, the use of the Weinberger Criteria would have assisted
the decision makers in two key areas. First, selection of clear political and military objectives could have better focused the overall effort. The importance of this piece of the Weinberger Criteria has been key to recent American success in the view of General Colin Powell: "in every instance we have matched the use of military forces to our political objectives." (29) Second, a plan for better public, international, and Congressional support for the action would have provided the decision makers a less adversarial environment and reduced the erosion of political power.

The analysis also revealed the three additional factors. One, the Weinberger Criteria are not a rigid "check list" to be used for a "go-no-go" decision on the use of military force; each test of the Criteria is, in itself, subject to interpretation. Two, history and tradition are major factors regardless of the criteria used. Three, the personalities of the participants are keystones in the decision process.

These three factors act as lenses through which the decision maker views the event. (See Figure 1) Like an optometrist the decision maker tries to bring the event into focus through these lenses. The comparison of the event as seen through these lenses with the decision maker’s mental paradigm sets the stage for decisions.

V. The World Order to 2010

Projecting the future is normally based on an analysis of past and current trends that one believes will be carried forward. Although this section is of necessity conjecture, assumption, and guesswork, the foundation is based on trends and, therefore, provides some plausible
framework for the future. (30) The overarching assumptions that support these trends are: no general war, no World War III at the strategic nuclear or conventional level; no major ecological collapse that destroys the earth's biosphere; no worldwide economic collapse; and, the continuation of general historical trends such as population growth and technological development. The general foundation trends for the 21st Century are as follows.

The world's total population will continue to increase, with the real growth in the less developed countries. Population in developed countries will decrease, with direct impact on the age distribution. The more developed countries will have an older population. This will directly affect labor-intensive industries and the size of the military age manpower pool. The year 2010 will see a world population of about 7.2 billion with 19 percent in more developed countries and 81 percent in less developed countries. (31) Migration pressure will increase between the less and more developed countries.

Shortages of water and petroleum will become critical. Water shortages will cut across industrial and non-industrial nations, but this impact will be regional. Reserves of petroleum could well move toward depletion, causing great impact on industrial nations. Use of replacement energy sources for oil will substantially increase. Nuclear energy use will increase throughout all nations. Some industrial nations will establish preferential agreements with oil-producing countries or cartels. Alternative energy sources and moderation will be fully developed only when the overall system reaches a critical point. (32)

Conventional and nuclear weapons proliferation will increase
regardless of non-proliferation treaties. Due to increased competition for world resources, advanced high technological conventional weapons—including biological and chemical—will be considered an investment in security. Possession of these types of weapons could lead some nations to regional assertiveness. Defense arrangements will be more ad-hoc. The overall military capabilities in 2010 will exceed all other eras in history, and the use of nuclear weapons will remain a world-wide threat.\(^{(33)}\)

Science and technology will continue to advance, led by the more advanced countries of the world. The transfer of technology can be expected to flow increasingly unimpeded throughout the world. The ability to maintain exclusive control of technology will be extremely difficult except in the area of highly sensitive military information. In general, technology transfer will be of great benefit to all nations. However, in some societies it will cause disruption in traditional values, skills, and lifestyles. The spread of technology can be expected to cross cultural barriers limited only by the ability to pay for and absorb the new technologies. The ability to absorb the new technologies will be limited by the education of the people. This exploitation of technology could create domestic problems such as the loss of jobs. The media will increase their capability to report world events as they happen.\(^{(34)}\) This increased capability will further increase the media's ability to influence governments and international audiences. These trends provide the backdrop for the most dramatic trend, the change in the world order.

The world order will continue to move toward a multipolar world with a sole military superpower. The sole military superpower, the
United States, will however decline in relative economic power. The shift and changes in international market economies, the reduced threat from the old USSR, US domestic issues, and weapons proliferation account for some of the diminished US influence. It is, however, a relative loss. The two historical tests for longevity as a superpower have been the ability to maintain a balance between defense requirements and the means to meet those requirements and, directly related, to maintain a viable economic and technological base in a changing world market. The growth of US influence as a superpower after World War II can be traced to the marked imbalance in the world economic and military order at that time.

Although its relative power has declined, the US will continue to be a significant military power into the 21st Century. The US will face the same demands that all nations will face in the 21st Century: to provide for security of national interests, to satisfy the needs of its people, and to ensure sustained growth in order to continue to support the first two demands. Although the US will enter the 21st Century as the single most powerful military power, any military structure that is not resting on a stable national economic foundation is subject to fall. The collapse of the former USSR in the 1990's is the most recent example of the five-hundred year history of the rise and fall of great powers. The US faces the dangers of "imperial overstretch" based on military power that is not grounded in long term economic strength.

Laying down the leadership role that this military power gives to the nation and its leaders could be difficult. This is especially true when military power can directly influence how the economic game is
played, and as the sole military superpower the US will be looked to for leadership during crisis. "Imperial overstretch" could also occur when the demand for US leadership and military power exceeds her will and resources.

The economic leaders of the 21st Century will be the US, Japan, and Europe (Common Market with new member nations). The overall strategic leader could be Europe. Europe could move into the forefront because it could make the necessary changes to deal in the new economic game. America, however, enters the economic battle carrying its past history. Its history extols the role of the sole individual, motivated by income, consumption, and leisure. These are not the traditional traits of future economic builders. At the same time America will be trying to learn the new economic game that the Europeans and Japanese have defined. Regardless of who becomes the strategic economic leader, the dominant position that the US filled after World War II will not exist.

Economies of the all 21st Century nations will be interconnected. American leadership could be charged with the requirement to manage the relative erosion of the US position so that no short term gains are made at the expense of long term advantage. This places great importance on the skill and experience of international and domestic leaders. Additionally the world has seen a deep transformation in the international political system. The nations of the world order will be affected by "end of history" as they enter the 21st Century.

The "end of history" is the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" which results in mankind accepting Western liberal democracy "as the final form of human government." Karl Marx's dialectic has
resulted in liberal democracy being the winner over Communism. A democracy "grants its people the right to choose their own government through periodic, secret-ballot, multi-party elections, on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage."(44) The "liberal" part is related to how the state views the economics of its system. Those governments that in principle protect the "legitimacy of private property and enterprise" are considered liberal.(45) This does not mean that there is a straight-line progression of liberal democratic development within world history. In the short term there is a rise and fall of democratic development. However, in the long term democracy has emerged as the preferred government over other alternate forms—monarchism, fascism, and Communism. Liberal democracy included 13 nations in 1900, 25 nations in 1919, 13 nations in 1940, 36 nations in 1960, 30 nations in 1975, and 61 nations in 1990.(46) Although there is up-and-down progress inside a 20-year window, the long term trend is increasing. The 21st Century will continue this oscillating but upward trend of democratic development as the world order becomes a mix of post-historical and historical nations.

The post-historical nations will be the liberal democracies. In reaching liberal democracy these post-historical nations will find their chief axis in economic matters. The historical nations will still be moving through the evolution toward the end of history with its liberal democracy and industrialization. Only democracy can deal with a complex modern economy, and only democracy produces a middle class that demands political participation.(47) This implies an un-warlike character in the liberal societies because the liberal democracy provides other outlets for the drive to superiority. Liberal
democracies, therefore, do not generally go to war with one another. (48)

Historical societies, however, do have a tendency toward warfare. Clashes between post-historical and historical societies will also occur. The root causes can be energy sources, water, migration from poorer to richer nations, and world order questions such as the spread of modern weapons systems. (49) Between these non-democratic and democratic nations force will still be the common "coin of the realm" in dealing with their fear and distrust of one another. Ideology, as in the old Cold War, still has a heavy influence on how the world order will deal with threats. (50)

Ideology expands to include the issues of integration and fragmentation that affect all nations regardless of where they are in the continuum of history. Integration in the purest sense could lead to the collapse of political, economic, religious, technological, and cultural barriers that have traditionally separated nations. The moves toward European union reflect this trend. To the degree that this occurs the overall sovereignty of nations is affected. Fragmentation is the opposite pole which would resurrect old barriers or create new ones between nations and people. Ethnic unrest in the Balkans and in the former USSR is a forerunner of this trend. The future fragmentation trends continue to be the rise of nationalism, economic wars, and religious fundamentalism, all rooted in some type of national sovereignty. (51) It would appear that these two competing processes will take the place of the Cold War ideologies with the resulting consequences.

The 21st Century is, therefore, seen by this writer as a world
order of post-historical and historical societies, both dealing with the overall trends of population growth, depletion of resources, proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons, and the advancement of science and technology. Economics and industrialization will drive both societies. Post-historical nations will see shifts in the economic strength among themselves. The world order could continue its diversification and less stable arrangement. Europe could become the economic leader due to its potential ability to overcome its past fragmentation history. The US must deal with its new role as the only military superpower, but a relatively declining economic power. The US military will decrease, as is the historical trend after all American wars, due to economic requirements. This occurs at the same time as the requirement for increased leadership. There will be a constant change in the relationship of societies as the new world order adjusts, but the overall long term movement will be toward a post-historical world order. The issues of integration and fragmentation, however, will be the backdrop for all events and nations. The use of force will still exist. It will still be how "one simplifies the situation by assuming that the evil to be overcome is clear-cut, definite, and irreversible. Hence there remains, but one thing: to eliminate it."(52) But the use of force will be seen by the post-historical societies as not only having an effect on their foe, but also on themselves, the users of force. "They must, if they are true to themselves, use raw power sparingly," and they can not directly control the subject people.(53) They could "see it (war) as an exceptional event, to be entered into only upon extreme provocation and (where possible) after careful deliberation."(54) This "careful deliberation"
will be influenced by the personalities of the participants, their history and tradition, and their selection of criteria.

VI. The Weinberger Criteria in the 21st Century

Based upon the analysis of its application in the Dominican intervention, the Weinberger Criteria are refined for peace-enforcement into the year 2010. As seen in the Dominican intervention, the application of the Weinberger Criteria requires that they first be filtered by the lenses of personality and history and tradition. (See Figure 1) The personalities of those involved color and shade the "lens" through which an event is viewed, advice given, and a decision made. Skill and experience remain key factors in the personalities of these involved people. Initially most 21st Century political leaders will lack military experience, and the majority of military leaders could come from an era characterized by high technology, low casualties, and quick combat victory. Among contemporary leaders the Gulf War experience replaces Vietnam War experience. Combined multi-national operations and the use of international organizations, like the UN, will be seen as the norm. However, this initial personality foundation will be tempered by the skill and experience gained in the post-Cold War years. Experience in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and multi-national and inter-agency operations will round out leaders' development. The successes and failures that are experienced during this time will establish a new paradigm for these decision makers.

The history and tradition "lens" at the start of the 21st century is influenced by the post-Cold War years. Application of force by
post-historical countries is normally through an international agency in order to present a united effort. This unity of effort is due not only for the visible sign of political unity but also for the requirements of combat strength. Force would be used almost exclusively in the historical world. Crises among post-historical societies could occur in economic, trade, or other areas, but the direct use of force between post-historical nations would be unacceptable. This shows a strong drive toward integration in the new world order.

This trend of integration is underpinned by a general collective understanding of sovereignty among nations. The ability of the United Nations, for example, to continue to function as a world-wide agent depends on agreement with the Security Council. This requires a common view of what "sovereignty" means in the post-Cold War era. The role of peacekeeping is well on the way to becoming part of the post-Cold War history and tradition. It reflects an integration theme of stability and mutual consent. As the cost in forces, material, time, and funds continues to increase this agreement could change. All nations, especially post-historical nations, could find that peacekeeping is in competition with their economic agenda.

The history and tradition of peace-enforcement are less clear. At present it appears that peace-enforcement is acceptable when there is a crisis that has an absence of "sovereignty"--a legal effective government--a compelling humanitarian reason, an absence of competing international "vital" interest, and wide media exposure. The Somalia operation, while being called humanitarian assistance, appears to be the closest example of "peace-enforcement." However, this view of
"peace-enforcement" as seen through the history and tradition lens can be distorted by changes in the personalities involved. The underlying cause would almost always be some issue of national sovereignty. Additionally, the short term cycle of the rise and fall of some developing liberal democracies could affect the 21st Century paradigm of continued liberal democratic development. The failure of Eastern Europe or Russia to continue to move toward a post-historical solution would obviously affect the general world order.

The continued changes and developments in post-Cold War history and tradition and developing personalities will create changes in their "lens". It is possible that the tension among the post-historical societies on integration issues such as trade could directly affect their consensus and support for united action against a historical society. The use of post-historical-historical, integration-fragmentation tensions could be used by some nations as a path for achieving their own national objectives. The belief that one could manipulate the new world order to its advantage is already part of the post-Cold War history and tradition. The actions of Iraq in the Gulf War and after indicate such an attempt. Miscalculation by the personalities involved will remain the wild card in the "lens". This leaves the final "lens", the Weinberger Criteria, for use in the 21st Century. The Weinberger Criteria, however, fail to fit the 21st Century paradigm as well as they fit the Cold War paradigm. (See Figures 1 & 2.) The tests of the Weinberger Criteria fail to "focus" the new world order for the decision maker.

The first test—engagements vital to US national interests or those of its allies—is the first difficulty. The absence of the
black-and-white Cold War struggle creates the environment for a return to a more basic view of vital interests in the 21st Century. However, with the exception of self-defense the process of integration among nations can blur an individual nation's concept of "vital interest." Nations, especially post-historical nations, are more interconnected. "Vital national interests" may become "common interests." Common interests for post-historical nations center around economic issues. Even the need for self-defense falls before these economic concerns, especially in the absence of a clear threat. The majority of post-historical nations are currently cutting their combat forces as rapidly as possible. Historical nations have a "clearer" view of their "vital national interests". Historical nations see nationalism, religious fundamentalism, or ethnic sovereignty as "vital", and they fight for them. Bilateral agreements or ties between post-historical and historical nations in areas such as energy or ethnic support can create an additional concept of "vital interests." Additionally the use of combat forces in non-vital national interest areas such as humanitarian assistance clouds the relationship between commitment of combat forces and interests involved. Even commitment of combat forces to peacekeeping missions can cause confusion when that environment becomes hostile.

The decision to commit forces only for vital national or allied interests does not seem to apply in current practice. This means that, while critical, agreement on what vital interests are in the environment of the 21st century will not be the sole reason for committing combat forces. In general terms, using force can result in that event being considered a "vital" interest for the US and other
post-historical nations. This is also in line with some historical views. "Former (Army) Chief of Staff (General) Fred Weyand once defined America's vital interests as 'those interests the president says are vital when he commits troops to their defenses'." (55) The "lens" of personality and the "lens" of history and tradition can affect not only what is seen as "vital" or an "interest", but also the role of combat forces.

The second test is more difficult to define in the 21st Century. The difficulty comes in defining "winning" or success in shifting paradigms. The old zero-sum game of the Cold War does not apply. Combat forces could still be committed wholeheartedly to a given situation, but success requires that the endstate be determined and achieved. It requires the decision maker to have a paradigm that links success through the levels of war in order to achieve the desired endstate. Due to the 21st Century multi-national trend, "winning" could also be defined in a collaborative way and become vaguer. The degree of vagueness is invariably related to the clarity of the political and military objectives.

Defining clear political and military objectives, the third test, will be difficult in the 21st Century. Coalition warfare, UN-controlled forces, and international contributions are all post-Cold War trends that will continue into the year 2010. While US leadership--both military and political--remains key, multi-national consensus on political and military objectives is required for multi-national operations. A sole US position would be highly unlikely. Force structure size and deployment requirements also affect agreement on the objectives. The smaller, technologically developed
forces of the post-historical nations will require unity of effort in confrontation with the technologically enhanced forces of the historical nations. Unity of effort will be especially critical for US logistical support of operations in remote or non-traditional areas, areas outside of NATO or Korea. This coalition or allied force requirement of the 21st Century will affect the selection of the political and military objectives. Unilateral US action, while possible, will be unlikely given this 21st Century environment and the development of US history and traditions and personalities in the post-Cold War era.

The fourth test, the relationship between the objective to be achieved and the forces committed, remains germane but different in the 21st Century. Force commitment will still be affected by external pressures, as seen in the Dominican intervention, that have little to do with matching the force to the objective. The lowering of troop strength in the Dominican intervention was a result of public pressure, not mission analysis. Multi-national force commitment will dramatically influence this process. What the 21st Century also brings to the continuing reassessment and adjustment of forces is that while the effect on the object is still considered the effect on the subject may be more critical. The effects on multi-national alliances before, during, and after are more important due to the 21st Century world order. In this post-historical-historical, integration-fragmentation environment, the possibility of "winning" the war but "losing" the peace becomes more of a reality. Post-historical societies with limited expensive combat forces walk a commitment tight-rope. Combat loss is an obvious concern, but a more difficult problem is the
potential for long term commitment of these limited forces to peace-enforcement missions. Long term commitment will result in economic drain and loss responsiveness to future crises.

The support requirements of the fifth test still rely on the ability to provide the information to build and retain public support. The increase of media technology and the environment in the 21st Century will create a more demanding requirement for this test. Integration and fragmentation issues will freely cross all borders, especially in the post-historical societies. This places a greater burden and demand on the post-historical societies to gain and maintain the support for their actions, especially when action requires a multi-national approach. The danger to the post-historical nation is that to build support for commitment of combat forces a black-white, good fighting evil approach may be used. As the Dominican intervention showed, such efforts result in a backlash and credibility problem in a liberal society. It also impacts on the even-handed requirement of peace-enforcement operations.

It is most telling that the logical use of the Weinberger Criteria requires that post-historical nations must logically justify their use of force. The willingness of the American people, Congress, and the international community to "buy" peace-enforcement for a given event will be directly related to the skill, experience, and personalities of those trying to "sell" the requirement. This "selling" will be done through the media and applies to the use of combat forces for any mission. The analysis of the Dominican intervention underscored the role of the media.

The media, however, present a more demanding challenge than just
the development of support for or against a selected course of action, or an alliance. The independent media of the 21st Century post-historical nations have the ability to generate as never before the demand for action independent of US or allied interests. These actions will place demands on the limited available forces. The issue of support then directly affects not only the commitment of forces but all activities of peace-enforcement in the 21st Century.

The last test calls for combat forces to be the last resort. The Dominican intervention points out that this is not always the case. The utility of using force is a greater principle than the "last resort" principle. Military power must be used in conjunction with the other elements of power to be effective. Just as in the Dominican intervention the political and economic elements--through Bunker and the OAS--and the military element--through Palmer and IAPF--were blended to achieve the endstate. Conflict between the post-historical nations will occur, but the use of force in these cases to achieve political ends will be unacceptable.

The use of force between post-historical and historical societies will rest on its utility to accomplish the objective while retaining support and minimizing the damage to the post-historical society. The use of force could be seen as a means to stabilize the situation for a future settlement. This concept for the use of force for peace-enforcement of agreed cease-fires has already been put forth by the UN Secretary General.(56) The role of the IAPF during the Dominican intervention reflects this concept to a degree. US combat forces moved from support of the Loyalist government to a neutral role enforcing the cease-fire as part of the IAPF. The IAPF developed into
a force that supported the provisional government.

This use of force also reflects a new view of deterrence. "Deterrence remains the primary and central motivating purpose underlying our (U.S.) national military strategy." Deterrence is most often associated with total war; the concept of passive and active deterrence could grow in the 21st Century. Peace-enforcement could be a form of active deterrence—combat operations taken to deter escalation to total war or use of weapons of mass destruction. The major problem is time. Multi-national organizations, like the UN, move slowly, and formation of multi-national forces takes time. The rapid action in the Dominican intervention was due to US unilateral action which was later followed by OAS action. The use of US force as a last resort in the 21st Century may be a result of slow multinational action and not application of decision criteria.

The application of the Weinberger Criteria for peace-enforcement in the 21st Century based upon the analysis of its application to the Dominican Republic suggests the following three qualifiers. (See Figure 2.) First, regardless of what tests or criteria are applied the event and decisions will be filtered through the two lenses: the personalities involved and the history and traditions of the times. Although this appears self-evident, it is rarely a conscious consideration in the decision maker's process. The lenses for the 21st Century are different from those of the 20th Century.

Second, the 21st Century World Order paradigm is different. There is, therefore, a different role for force in the relationships between post-historical nations, between historical nations, and between post-historical and historical nations.
Third, the six tests of the Weinberger Criteria themselves are not sufficiently stringent for US peace-enforcement criteria in the new 21st Century paradigm. The concept of US "vital interests" blurs as post-historical nations struggle with mutual 21st Century integration interests. "Winning" or success becomes increasingly vague in definition and achievement when measured against the shifting world order paradigm. Clear political and military objectives are less influenced by the US and more multi-national in nature and, therefore, less precise and more changeable. Force commitments are affected by multi-nationalism, economics, operational duration, and unity issues more than the relationship to the objective. The amount and effectiveness of these multi-national forces is also highly questionable.

While public support for peace-enforcement operations could dissipate quickly in the enhanced media environment, a media-generated "grass root" demand for action could be the more challenging test. The use of force as a last resort may be a result of the slowness of the multi-national process and not part of the criteria.

VII Conclusions

The purpose of this paper was to examine the sufficiency of the Weinberger Criteria for peace-enforcement decisions by US decision makers into the 21st Century. Prior to applying the criteria in a projected 21st Century world order, the Weinberger Criteria were applied to the 1965 US Dominican intervention as a historical test case. Three overall conclusions present themselves as a result of the overall analysis.
First, the human dimension as seen through the role that personalities play in the application of the Weinberger Criteria is an element that transcends time and space. Sun Tzu's admonition, "Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered", still applies in the 21st Century. The implication for those leaders of the 21st Century seems clear. Their skill and experience will be a critical factor in how this "lens" will be shaped. This skill and experience are elements that nations can attempt to shape and influence regardless of where they are on the post-historical-historical continuum. The effectiveness of military power is a function not only of the force used, but also the skill and the judgment of the user. The search for the most efficient force and criteria for its use is futile without the right personality. However, as seen in the Dominican intervention, it is not the skill of one individual that is dominant. The role of the many advisors and players has a cumulative effect on the successful application of military power. The ability of the US to develop these leaders and advisors across the political, diplomatic, economic, and military spectrum could be the true test for successful application of peace-enforcement in the 21st Century.

Second, the 21st Century will require a change in paradigms. The patterns that served in the past need to be reviewed and updated. The concepts in Figure 2 are an attempt to place the future peace-enforcement criteria in a useful paradigm for 21st Century decision makers. The failure of strategists, decision makers, advisors, and leaders to move beyond the late 20th Century Cold War paradigms will be dangerous and damaging. The changes in international security relationships, the concepts of nationalism and integration,
international law and intervention, and the US role in the international system are significant. (60)

Third, the Weinberger Criteria are not sufficient for peace-enforcement decisions in the 21st Century. The Weinberger Criteria were relevant and valuable in the Cold War bi-polar world, and may offer some framework for historical nations dealing with fragmentation issues. The Weinberger Criteria are at the very least a part of the history and tradition lens which will be involved in the focusing of 21st Century problems. However, in the post-Cold War multi-polar or uni-polar new world order, the Weinberger Criteria fail to sufficiently address peace-enforcement for a post-historical nation like the US.
Figure 2

1. Personalities
2. History and Tradition
3. New Criteria

Crisis/Events

Diagram:
- Decision Maker's Paradigm
- New World Paradigm?
- Decision Maker
- Decision Lenses
- New World Order
  - Weapons Proliferation
  - Science and Technology
- Post-Historical Nations
  - Integration
  - Fragmentation
- Historical Nations
- World Population
  - Resource Depletion
Appendix 1. Definitions and relationships.


**Peacekeeping**. Operations, conducted with consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions that support the diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict. (May also be called trucekeeping.)

**Peacemaking**. Process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement.

**Peace-building**. Post-conflict diplomatic and military actions that seek to rebuild the institutions and infrastructure of a nation torn by civil war; or build bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

**Peace-enforcement**. Military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention, and may be engaged in combat activities.

**Preventive diplomacy**. Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at removing the sources of conflict before
violence erupts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

B. Relationships. One scenario from the CSA Strategic Fellows' briefing on "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement", School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth KS, 22 January 1993 is shown below. This scenario could fit Boutros Boutros-Ghali's concept of peace enforcement as discussed in Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/1993) pages 93 and 94.

--- Peacemaking ---

--- Preventive diplomacy ---

--- Peacekeeping ---

--- Peace-enforcement ---

--- Peace-building ---
Appendix 2. The Weinberger Criteria

Text from Caspar W. Weinberger's remarks to the National Press Club, 28 November 1984, as found in Caspar W. Weinberger's Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, pages 440 to 443.

In those cases where our national interests require us to commit combat forces, we must never let there be doubt of our resolution. When it is necessary for our troops to be committed to combat, we must commit them, in sufficient numbers and we must support them, as effectively and resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops to combat we must do so with the sole objective of winning.

Once it is clear our troops are required, because our vital interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national resolve to commit every ounce of strength necessary to win the fight to achieve our objectives. In Grenada we did just that.

Just as clearly, there are other situations where United States combat forces should not be used. I believe the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. Let me share them with you:

(1) First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that a particular area is outside our strategic perimeter.
(2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces then could perhaps have prevented the holocaust of World War II.

(3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it." War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time, but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job—and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.

(4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change, then so must our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions:
"Is this conflict in our national interest?" "Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?" If the answers are "yes," then we must win. If the answers are "no," then we should not be in combat.

5) Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just be there.

6) Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the months and years ahead. The point we must all keep uppermost in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit forces to combat, we must support those forces to the fullest extent of our national will for as long as it takes to win. So we must have in mind objectives that are clearly defined and understood and supported by the widest possible number of our citizens. And those objectives must be vital to our survival as a free nation and to the fulfillment of our responsibilities as a world power. We must also be farsighted enough to sense when immediate and strong reactions to apparently small events can prevent lion-like responses that may be required later.
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., 437.

4. Ibid., 442-443.


10. Ibid., 197; Martin, *Overtaken by Events* 656-657.


13. Ibid., 678.


15. Ibid., 159.

16. Palmer, 82.


19. Johnson, 197. President Kennedy was concerned in October 1963 of the US ability to respond to problems in the Caribbean and Central America. The Joint Chiefs conducted a mobility exercise in 1964 which upgraded US ability to respond in the area.


21. Rusk, 373.


23. Ibid., 102.

24. Ibid., 142.


27. For example Nuechterlein, 17, lists the four long-term national interests in 1991: 1) defend US constitutional system; 2) enhancement of the nation's economic well-being and promotion of US products abroad; 3) creation of a favorable world order (international security environment); and 4) promotion abroad of US democratic values and the free market system.


31. Taylor, 29-32. The more developed countries are all of Europe, North America, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the former USSR. Less developed countries are all the rest.

32. Ibid., 49-51.

33. Ibid., 63-72.

34. Ibid., 52-56.
35. Kennedy, 514.
36. Ibid., 446.
37. Ibid., 515-539.

38. Thurow, 257-258. Thurow feels that Europe will be the leader. In the author's opinion recent events in Europe make this less certain.
39. Ibid., 118, 141, and, 298.
40. Ibid., 201.
41. Kennedy, 534.
42. Ibid., 536.

43. Francis Fukuyama, Have We Reached the End of History? (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1989) 2.

44. Fukuyama, End of History, 43.
45. Ibid., 44.
46. Ibid., 49-50.
47. Ibid., 112-116; 276-279.
48. Ibid., 262-263.
49. Ibid., 276-279.
50. Ibid., 264.

51. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 182, 201, and 215-216. Gaddis believes that the issues of integration and fragmentation will be the dominant issues in the post-Cold War world.


54. Gaddis, 181.


6.


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