THE NAVY'S PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM:
HAS IT IMPROVED SINCE "DESERT SHIELD/STORM?"

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DAVID J. MIAVEZ, LCDR, USN
B.A., University of North Florida,
Jacksonville, Florida, 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The thesis asserts the Navy has improved its public affairs programs because of coordinated changes in maritime strategy and a concurrent program of information that uses this new strategy as a theme. Other changes that improve Navy public affairs include better management of CHINFO internal communications, increased personalized attention to media requests for information and embarkations, use of emerging technologies for filing news stories, and better communication among Navy leaders. The study recommends revised policy guidance for national news publication requests and formalized quality assurance for CHINFO news desk. This study investigates the perception among some Navy leaders that the Navy did not tell its story well during Operation "Desert Shield/Storm." The study analyzes public affairs policies and methods for changes, and the resulting improved Navy public affairs. Study focus is on aspects of Chief of Information's (CHINFO) management of Navy programs in public affairs, including internal, external and community relations programs, and uses interview techniques for primary data collection.
THE NAVY'S PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM:
HAS IT IMPROVED SINCE "DESERT SHIELD/STORM?"

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DAVID J. MIAVEZ, LCDR, USN
B.A., University of North Florida, Jacksonville, Florida, 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Name of candidate: Lieutenant Commander David J. Miavez

Thesis Title: The Navy’s Public Affairs Program: Has It Improved Since “Desert Shield/Storm”?

Approved by:

Mr. Michael D. Baker, MA

MAJ Anne P. Legare, MA

LTC Lowndes F. Stephens, Ph.D.

Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE NAVY'S PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM: HAS IT IMPROVED SINCE "DESERt SHIELD/STORM?" by LCDR David J. Miazza, USN, 140 pages

The thesis asserts the Navy has improved its public affairs programs because of coordinated changes in maritime strategy and a concurrent program of information which uses this new strategy as a theme. Other changes improving Navy public affairs include: better management of Navy Office of Information internal communications, increased personalized attention to media requests for information and embarkations, use of emerging technologies for filing news stories, and improved communication among Navy leaders. The study recommends revised policy guidance for national news publication requests and formalized quality assurance for Navy Office of Information news desk products.

This study investigates the perception among some Navy leaders that the Navy did not tell its story well during Operation "Desert Shield/Storm." The study analyzes public affairs policies and methods for change and the results that improve Navy public affairs. The study focuses on aspects of the Chief of Information's (CHINFO) management of Navy programs in public affairs, including internal, external and community relations programs, using interview techniques for primary data collection.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation for the cooperation of those Navy Public Affairs offices that I contacted in the course of my research, but especially to Commander Mark Van Dyke (USSTRATCOM), Commander Craig Quigley, Commander Steve Burnett, Ms. Judy Van Benthuysen, Commander Ned Lundquist (FHTNC) and Mr. Dennis Klauer in the Navy Office of Information for their exceptional help in providing me research material. My sincere appreciation to Lieutenant Commander Betsy Jenkins Bird (CINCPACFLT) and PH1 Shanks (NWC) for support in supplying me with essential data.

In addition, I wish to thank Mr. Mick Baker (Major, USAF Reserve), my committee chair, for providing me the direction and guidance to help bring this project to fruition.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of Study</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodicals and Articles</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theses/Papers</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Documents</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Office of Information</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology Summary</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. RESEARCH ANALYSIS</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and Analysis of Publications</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and Analysis of Manpower and Management</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and Analysis of Technology</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and Analysis of Public Affairs Education</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Case Study: Operations &quot;Earnest Will,&quot;</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Desert Shield,&quot; and &quot;Southern Watch&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................. 74
   Relationship to Previous Studies .................................. 74
   Suggestions for Further Research .................................. 75
   Summary of Changes and Improvements in
      DON Public Affairs ............................................. 76
   Conclusions .......................................................... 79
   Recommendations ..................................................... 82

ENDNOTES ........................................................................ 84

APPENDICES ......................................................................
   A. CHRONOLOGY OF NAVAL EVENTS AND PRESS GUIDELINES ...... 97
   B. FIGURES .................................................................... 113
   C. MEDIA SURVEY .......................................................... 125

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................... 130

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................ 139
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Most students of modern warfare accept Operation "Desert Storm" as a textbook use of airpower and ground maneuver forces to achieve decisive victory. In less than one hundred hours the coalition forces had won the battle and had beaten Saddam Hussein's army. But what part did the U.S. Navy play in this successful conflict? If superior airpower and ground maneuver were Saddam's demise, how did Naval power contribute to a call for cease-fire?

Navy officials contended that the media did not favorably portray the Navy's contribution to the successes of the joint and combined coalition forces. The Chief of Naval Information (CHINFO), Rear Admiral Brent Baker, USN, stated in August 1991,

The ability to communicate our story reached a new importance in Desert Shield. We must learn to practice good media relations skills in war or peace, not for personal publicity or gratification, but in order to recognize our people and tell their story to our families and the general public.'

Navy officials acknowledge that they did not thoroughly inform the public through the media. The media, by its coverage of joint/combined coalition force operations in the Southwest Asian conflict, served as the
means of information transfer, one of the key instruments of national power, and helped mobilize the will of the American people in a positive manner. "[T]he Navy did not play the press. We tend to avoid the press; the U.S. Air Force embraced the press. The results were viewed almost around the clock during the course of the war by people all over the world," stated Rear Admiral Riley Mixson, USN, Commander, Red Sea Battle Force, in his article about perceptions which influenced the Navy's public image during "Desert Shield/Storm."

This perception by Navy officials that the Navy did not tell the public what it was doing to support the war effort as completely or efficiently as the sister services was held at the highest levels within the Department of the Navy (DON), and Navy leaders recognized media management as a deficiency during the conflict. But what changes have arisen from these problems identified by Navy leadership?

My thesis investigates the changes the DON has made since Operation "Desert Shield/Storm" and answers the question, "Have the Navy's policies and methods for media management since Operation 'Desert Shield/Storm' changed to result in improved public affairs?" To answer my primary thesis question, I reviewed policies, doctrine, organization, training, command relations, and operational aspects of the public affairs relationship with media.
Once I identified these policy changes, I determined whether or not CHINFO has implemented them during the last eighteen months. I then conducted a study to determine the degree to which they are applied in the Navy’s public affairs system. By conducting a thorough content analysis of both old and new policies and methods, followed by a comparison of changes, I assess these changes in policy within the context of case studies. My approach to assessing improvement in Navy public affairs programs is measured by survey instruments and interviews with customer users in the media.

My case studies focus upon Naval operations in which media have been closely involved with Navy Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) and CHINFO personnel. Specific cases include: Operation "Southern Watch" (the air blockade of Iraq below the thirty-second parallel), Operation "Desert Shield/Storm," and Operation "Earnest Will" (U.S. Navy tanker escort of refagged Kuwaiti merchant ships during 1987). In these examples the Navy has applied methods or policies that have changed during the period of my study.

I will also analyze the way the Navy implements the changes by tracking the policy changes from problem identification, formulation of solutions, policy application, and acceptance by Navy public affairs personnel. Analyzing the process as well as the output will allow me to make conclusions about CHINFO’s ability to implement change.
Assumptions

My thesis assumes that the Navy can recognize problems within its public affairs program and find solutions to these problems. Additionally, I assume that the Navy has translated these solutions into policy changes and has promulgated, implemented and effected these changes.

Definitions

Media management: Though perhaps inferring the erroneous connotation of media manipulation, the term "media management" is defined by the Department of the Navy (DON) as the broad program applied to public affairs, information programs, and internal public affairs information distribution. It encompasses dissemination of video, still photography, print, and broadcast media from the journalistic point of view. It also refers to DON information campaigns designed to inform the public about the Navy's missions.

Policies and Methods: For this study, policy and methods include:

1. Published material from the Office of Assistant Secretary of the Department of Defense for Public Affairs (OASDPA), Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) instructions, notices, white papers, and memoranda.

2. Formal and informal guidance given to personnel within the Navy's public affairs organization for directing and influencing public affairs programs administration.
Media pool: A group of journalists covering a media event and are not necessarily constituted under official sanction of the DON/DOD. These individuals represent various journalistic genre and are either embarked in a Naval vessel or at a shore installation to cover newsworthy media events.

National Media Pool: A permanently constituted group of media representing all media during short-notice national employment and deployment of U.S. military in operations. The pool members are a mix of print, photo, broadcast, and television media specialists pooling their products for release. The national media pool numbers between fourteen and eighteen individuals who are on-call twenty-four hours a day for movement anywhere in the world.

Media event: Any truly newsworthy incident or story. Through my use of this term, the reader should not be confused with staged or pseudo-events for the purpose of an information campaign.

Operation "Desert Shield/Storm": Used in this study, Operation "Desert Shield/Storm" will apply to the period of 2 August 1990, the day of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, to 3 March 1991, when Iraq accepted all terms of the United Nations cease-fire agreement.

Operation "Earnest Will": The 1987 U.S. Navy escort of reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq war. This operation marked the first use of the national media
pool. Operation "Earnest Will" is a significant media event involving embarkation of media personnel aboard naval ships.

**Operation "Southern Watch":** The coalition and U.S. joint military operation to enforce a "no-fly" zone over southern and northern portions of Iraq in 1992 and 1993. This operation also involved the embarkation of a media pool aboard Navy ships and is in effect at the time this study is published, thus provides an opportunity to study current policies and methods of embarking media pools in ships.

**Operation "Restore Hope":** The military term applied to U.S. military Joint Task Force operations to secure the country of Somalia and permit agencies to provide food to the starving population. "Restore Hope" commenced on, or about, 9 December 1992, and was completed on 5 May 1993.

**Limitations**

A significant limitation to my study is the absence of written policy changes within the DON Office of Information. The DON changes regulations and instructions periodically, but these changes may reflect an accumulation of changes over a period of years. Inter- or intra-office memoranda are the most visible and immediate way of recognizing written policy changes. They are often routed internally to an organization and have limited distribution, making access difficult.

I compiled much of my research data through telephone interviews with personnel in the Office of Informa-
tion. Due to my physical location at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, many of the interviews I conducted by telephone required coordination and prior preparation of selected questions. Telephone conversations do not convey the non-verbal communications of face-to-face interviews. My physical dislocation from the offices of CHINFO was also a significant impediment to my material data collection.

The technical field of information transfer is changing rapidly, and what holds true for today’s method of filing a news story or transmitting a video may not hold true tomorrow. Media organizations are constantly updating their methods for presenting timely stories to the public, while the military is continually assessing this technology for its impact on operational security. The military is searching for ways to use new technology internally, by its own military media personnel, and to reduce interference with existing military hardware.

**Delimitations**

I limit the time I commence analyzing policy changes in the period before Operation Desert Shield/Storm to after Operation "Urgent Fury" (invasion of Grenada), about 1983-1985, to the end of the Persian Gulf conflict, the date of formal cease-fire (3 March 1991). The lessons learned from Operation "Urgent Fury" resulted in broad changes to DOD public affairs policy and were a basis for many policies during the "Desert Shield/Storm" period. I consider policy
changes effected after 3 March 1991 as post-"Desert Shield/Storm."

The Navy's media policy is the focus of my research, but other military services and policies will be studied as well to obtain a comprehensive picture of how DOD policy is implemented.

**Significance of Study**

The importance of my research will be to learn if the Navy has been sensitive to acknowledged deficiencies, what changes it made to correct these deficiencies, and if these changes have been effective. The Navy must ensure that an enlightened public understands Navy missions and roles, particularly important in today's austere fiscal environment. Alan Protheroe explains why successful media relations are so important in his forward to Hooper's *The Military and the Media*.

My experience, from the media and the military sides of the matter, convinces me it is invariably better to give an answer — and that the response must be accurate and truthful. Explanation prevents speculation: explanation guarantees understanding."

Policy changes in the Navy that result in successful communications may have application for other services and government agencies.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Books

My literature search encompasses all pertinent books, journals, periodicals, news stories, theses, and papers available through the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I conducted key word searches in the automated card catalog using "media," "military and the media," "public affairs (PA)," "Desert Shield/Storm," "press," and "Navy" for citations which led me to literature available on the military’s relationship with the media.

Book Reviews

John Fialka’s book, Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War, is a short but comprehensive work that tells one journalist’s view of the war.¹ He is highly critical of the military’s media pool method of distributing journalists to combat units, citing a paucity of resources to file timely reports, lack of transportation, and unwilling commanders as the primary reasons. One positive aspect of the book from a military-media standpoint is the Marine Corps’ successful media campaign.
It was bad enough that the public received a truncated, gap-filled picture from our efforts, but the result was actually worse than that: The picture that did emerge was distorted by the vast difference in skill and effort applied to the press relations job by the Army and Marine Corps. If the PR rivalry between the two services involved in the ground war had been a basketball game, the score would have been Marines 149, Army 10.  

He attributes General Walter E. Boomer, the Marine field commander and former head of Marine Corps public affairs, with a positive attitude toward the press, the single most important factor in "skewing the coverage in favor of the Marines." He contrasts the Marines with their Army PA counterparts who, if assigned journalists, would risk "(1) getting lost, (2) becoming unable to communicate, or (3) being ejected or isolated by Vietnam-addled field commanders who worried that journalists might get too close to their troops." His dissatisfaction with military-media relations during the war stem more from a view of media pool logistic shortfalls and inadequate support from some chains of command.

Fialka uses the term "unilaterals" and, for the uninitiated, defines them as journalists working outside the official Joint Information Bureau (JIB) organization. These journalists were in the combat area for stories and considered unauthorized because civilians were prohibited within one hundred miles of the Saudi-Iraqi border established by military rules.
The Marines' innovative use of technology in the field enabled media pool members to file reports rapidly, using military laptop computers, message transmission systems, and telephone fax. Fialka applauds their initiative and flexibility, allowing time-sensitive news to be filed in real-time fashion.6

*How CNN Fought the War*, by Major General (ret.) Perry M. Smith, exposes the inner workings of what is arguably the most successful television news campaign in the history of the medium.7 His book discusses the impact of professional military analysts and the credibility they lent to television coverage of the war, the impact of twenty-four-hour-a-day coverage, and the controversy created by live coverage from enemy territory. He discusses the effect on public opinion, influenced by the immediacy of television images, a theme he retains throughout his book.

*The Gulf War Reader: History. Documents. Opinions*, edited by Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf is a compendium of articles from journals, newspapers, excerpts from congressional testimony, speeches, and editorials that provide useful background reading into the sociological, political, and fiscal reasons for the Persian Gulf conflict.8 One article, "Free to Report What We're Told," by Robert Fisk, refers to the military's restrictions on freedom of the press. He believes that through excessive censorship and exclusion from combat areas, the press told an
incomplete story to the public.9 One instance occurred aboard the USS KENNEDY, when members of an embarked media pool discovered that "the captain and other senior officers deleted all swear words and changed some of the quotations before sending on their dispatches after a delay of twelve hours."\(^{10}\) He further relates an incident in which a dispatch was altered and references removed to "pilots watching pornographic video tapes."\(^{11}\)

Fialka's passages were some of the only references made to embarkation of media in U.S. Navy ships during "Desert Shield/Storm," which may indicate that few media were embarked or that embarked media stories are not well documented.

One article in Sifry and Cerf, "Television and the Instant Enemy" by David Halberstam, asserts that television reporting, by its mere presence, makes an event significant whether it really is or not.\(^{12}\) An important event, such as the Iran/Iraq war, becomes a non-event simply because there is little or no television coverage. He observes a demise in television media credibility during the Gulf War coverage, stating: "We have become terribly dependent upon an instrument of mass communications that feels that the cardinal sin is not so much to be inaccurate as to bore."\(^{13}\)

Halberstam talks of the effect television had on the Gulf War, and Alan Hooper echoes his sentiments in The Military and the Media.\(^{14}\) In Hooper's discussion of the
public during the Vietnam war he

the impression the American people had of the war was the media's insatiable appetite for sensationalism, a selection of news. Hooper's article contends that effective military-media relations will exist only when both are educated about each other's needs. Maintaining a continuing relationship with the military during times of peace and war is one way of bridging the education gap for the media. He concludes that it is the military public affairs organizations that must "bear the brunt" for being responsible to inform, train, and maintain a consistent dialogue with the press corps.

Newsman and National Defense, edited by Lloyd J. Matthews, is a collection of articles and essays on the military-media relationship through the years. Topics run the gamut of describing the military-media dichotomy, from Sherman's march during the Civil War, to the recent Persian Gulf conflict.

In the Matthews book, Barry E. Willey's article entitled "Military-Media Relations Come of Age," is highly laudatory of the press pool concept and cites the 1989 use of national media pools embarked in Navy ships during the Iranian "tanker wars" in the Persian Gulf region as proof.

But was this type of pool really feasible for the long haul and was it capable of covering hostilities, should they occur? The answer is yes. During the nine months between the first embarkation in July 1987 to the dramatic U.S. reprisals against Iranian oil platforms on 18 April 1988, 47 transits (of the
there was a markedly successful evolution.

He attributes this success to continuing close interaction between pool members and their military escorts.\(^\text{20}\)

Willey's article characterizes successful Navy-media relations using the media pool concept before Operation "Desert Shield/Storm" and is subject to more critical study in my thesis.

**Periodicals and Articles**

My search for published topical material from journals, magazines, and news articles started with the assistance of CARL librarians. I conducted a keyword search of the Public Affairs Information Service, Inc., National Technical Information Center database (NTIC), and INFOTRAC (periodical information and cataloguing) databases using the following prompt words:

- Joint/Combined Information Bureau
- magazine(s)
- mass media
- media
- military media
- news
- Operation Desert Shield
- Operation Desert Shield/Storm
- Operation Desert Storm
- periodical(s)
- public affairs
- Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
- television
- TV

I identified one hundred thirty-eight items. My search was restricted to published articles since 1990. Fifty items were not immediately available through CARL. An additional ten titles in the "Air University" to "Military Periodicals" listings under the top:
information," "public relations," "publicity," and "Operations 'Desert Shield/Storm/Desert Storm'." The articles are too numerous to review here, but I reference relevant entries throughout my study and they are listed in my selected bibliography.

**Theses/Papers**

CARL librarians assisted me in a database search of the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) database. I conducted this on-line database search of the Defense Research, Development, Technical and Evaluation Online System (DROLS), in the classified publications section of CARL. I accomplished key word searches in DROLS by using the following list of terms as search qualifiers:

- Joint/Combined Information Bureau
- magazine(s)
- mass media
- media
- military media
- news
- Operation Desert Shield
- Operation Desert Shield/Storm
- Operation Desert Storm
- periodical(s)
- public affairs
- Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
- television
- TV

I applied search limitations which sorted entries published within the last ten years. I queried all organizations that make inputs into the database by collective computer address, yielding eighty-nine items that were triggered by my search parameters. I then viewed the title/author data and visually scrolled through the list to select those abstracts I wished to investigate further. My
final list of titles/abstracts was then printed for reference.

The results of my DTIC database search are listed below:

- US ARMY Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas)
  - three masters' theses
  - four monographs (written by students in the School for Advanced Military Studies)
- ARMY WAR COLLEGE (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania)
  - five independent study projects
- AIR COMMAND AND STAFF (Maxwell AFB, Alabama)
  - one student report
- AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio)
  - three masters' theses
- NAVY WAR COLLEGE (Newport, Rhode Island)
  - two final reports

With the exception of two theses/papers, all were available in either printed copy or microfiche form in CARL. The studies listed are contained in my theses/papers selected bibliography and those studies that are pertinent to my research receive discussion in chapters four and five.
In addition to books and scholarly papers, such as theses, to assess change in Navy media policy I reviewed government publications within DOD and DON. I studied the current Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and CHINFO instructions, policy statements, memorandums, and practices for guidance to Public Affairs Officers, both before and after "Desert Shield/Storm." These will receive a detailed analysis in chapters four and five of my thesis.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODS

Research Design

I conducted research in three basic phases. Phase one outlines the methodology for my research and includes a compilation of data and material from all resources outlined in my literature review. Additionally, I rely heavily upon telephone interviews to collect data from my primary research sources.

During phase two, I compare policies that I have selected as the focus for change within the Navy public affairs organization and analyze instances where they were used during an information campaign or media event. I list, catalog, and summarize the changes for further analysis.

In phase three, I determine the impact of policy and method changes to the Navy. I ask what perceived or actual deficiencies are addressed by changes and analyze the effectiveness of changes made. I do this by observing the policies identified during phases one and two in case studies. I then analyze changes for their application during a specific media campaign or event.

I chose to study events before and after changes in media policy and methods were effected. By selecting more
than one event during each time period (pre/post-Operation "Desert Shield/Storm"), I was able to analyze more data and occurrences in which policies have changed. I was also able to reduce the bias or error which might occur in a smaller sampling of media events. Appendix B displays a block graphic of my research design.

The instruments I used to analyze these changes to assess their utility within the public affairs programs in the Navy were surveys and interviews with journalists who were involved in the media coverage of these events. By providing evidence of improvements in the process of media relations with the media, I show effective changes in the Navy media management practices.

**Navy Office of Information**

Additionally, I considered the process of change within the Navy Office of Information and the Navy public affairs organization, answering questions, such as: Who ultimately chooses new policy guidelines? How are they implemented? What is the measurable effect? The process for change suggests internal organizational efficiency or lack of efficiency and for these reasons merits additional study. An organizational block diagram of the Navy Office of Information is contained at appendix B.
Research Questions

My research has developed secondary and tertiary questions, which I will discuss more fully in chapters four and five of my thesis:

Organization and Manpower

In the category of organization and manpower, I ask the following secondary and tertiary questions:

Secondary

How have organizational structure, personnel and manpower changes met new requirements for public affairs programs within the Navy?

Tertiary

What form does Navy input to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASDPA) take for "fair share" of (JIB) press pool coverage? This question is generated by then Director, Navy Office of Information, West, Captain Mike Sherman, USN, in his article "Informing Through the JIB," in which he states the JIB acted as "director, counselor, adviser, and coordinator" for all military agencies and the media. Further study of the JIB policy during "Desert Shield/Storm" could possibly answer why there was a paucity of Navy coverage in "Desert Shield/Storm."

How has Navy PAO and PA personnel manpower on the JIB and Combat Camera teams changed? Lieutenant Gary W. Butterworth purports in his article "Where Were the Navy
Images?" that 40 percent of Navy Combat Camera teams were assigned to Air Force and Army units, at the expense of Navy photographic coverage during Desert Shield/Storm.²

How does the Navy supply personnel to panels (forums for information) or decide who, with specific subject matter expertise, should attend public forums?

What schools/curriculum for public affairs personnel are available, and what is required for a particular level of specialty or billet? The Navy relies heavily upon commands to take initiative for PA programs at the unit level. These programs are often managed by a collateral duty PAO, and the success of PA is heavily dependent on the personal interest of the commanding officer.³

Censorship and Freedom of Information Act

Secondary

What changes have occurred in the requirements to conduct security reviews of press releases? Journalism is protected by the First Amendment, the right to free speech, and operational security may interfere with "journalistic license," freedom to write what one may wish.

Tertiary

What policies are in effect to review Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to release declassified material to the media?⁴
What general policy for review, declassification and release of information guides the afloat unit in publishing or releasing stories to the press?3

What guidelines are there for the afloat command that dictate policy for journalist access to operations spaces (briefing rooms, ready rooms)? In an interview with Commander Steve Burnett, Director, Navy News This Week, Navy Office of Information, he suggested that new policy for embarked media pools allows journalists direct access to pilots.4

How do commands conduct security review and what review options are exercised by commands before release of press stories?7

Technology

Secondary

What technological advances have changed Navy policies and methods for media management? Information exchange is a rapidly changing technology, and a common complaint from journalists during Operation "Desert Shield/Storm" was their inability to file stories or send video in a timely manner. Another inherent deficiency is that press embarked in ships having no access to traditional methods of filing reports such as the telephone, fax, or similar transmission method. Embarked media are at the mercy of the ship to provide them communications connectivity ashore.
Tertiary

Is there an emphasis on the use of a specific medium (video, still photo, print, or audio) for press releases and how is that emphasis portrayed in policy? In my interview with Commander Quigley, he asserts that new capabilities for digital photo reproduction and transmission show the Navy is finding new methods of speeding photo journalistic review and publication.⁸

How does the Navy use new forms of data transfer technology for filing press releases (fax, modem, portable word processor)?⁹ John Burlage published an article in Navy Times detailing the recent use of digital imagery, satellite telephone, and Macintosh laptop computer to reproduce photos from the USS INDEPENDENCE, which was deployed in the Persian Gulf for Operation "Southern Watch."¹⁰

What is the current guidance for INMARSAT (satellite telephone) terminals to file press releases? Commercial satellite duplex communications are now in many large naval combatants. These same communications could be used to file press stories, voice reports, or fax images."¹¹

What plans or policy for KU-band satellite at-sea transmission/receive to conduct live television feeds does the Navy have?

Has the Navy installed aircraft video recording capability for battle damage assessment and collaterally supporting public affairs/media campaigns?
Rear Admiral Riley Mixson, USN, then Commander of the Red Sea Battle Force, which included three aircraft carriers during Desert Shield/Storm, commented that:

The Navy is sorely lacking in state-of-the-art mission recorders, which not only provide timely bomb-damage assessment and better training, but also good press coverage of targets struck.12

Media and Information Campaigns

Secondary

What changes has the Navy made in media strategy or information campaigns? If the Navy is effectively managing its media exchanges, then education of the press and, subsequently the public, is crucial.

Tertiary

Is there any change in the number and/or focus of "educating the public" releases (unsolicited or otherwise)?

What is the Navy's strategy for "using the media" as an information tool to further the public image of the Navy?

What are the policies concerning Navy response for requests of unit-level interviews/familiarization periods (underway at-sea, mission-oriented operations)?

How does the Navy use public opinion surveys/polls to target issues for information campaigns?

Has there been an increased emphasis on combined/joint Navy operations reporting to the press? Operation "Restore Hope," the current operation to support efforts to bring order to Somalia, has received tremendous press
coverage. How much of that coverage was invited, coordinated with PA personnel on the Joint Task Force Commander’s staff, and is this the portent for new emphasis on PA by Navy commanders? Many articles indicate that the tendency to manage the media through pools or restriction of coverage is not existent in Somalia."

Has the Navy increased recognition of Trade Press publications as a vehicle for media campaigns?

What has the Navy done to address special-interest group issues or campaigns targeted at the Navy through information campaign/releases?

Media Pools

Secondary

How has the Navy changed policy and methods for embarking media pools?

Tertiary

Have the number of media embarks aboard ships changed?

Policy From OASDPA

Secondary

What policy changes have been made by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASDPA) that alter Navy policies?
Tertiary

What changes have been made to guidelines for relations with accredited but non-pool journalists in a theater of action?

Have individuals been given expanded authority to contact standing correspondents? The "unilaterals" of "Desert Shield/Storm" were the outcasts of the war, from the military PA perspective. Will it be different the next time?

Have changes in host nation public affairs relations been made? Saudi officials were initially very restrictive in granting travel visas to visiting journalists. How can the host nation customs and visa application process be streamlined to accommodate the media?

Have procedures for filing press releases from afloat units changed? In my interview with Commander Burnett, he related a story of a recent live broadcast from the bridge of the USS INDEPENDENCE during Operation "Southern Watch," in which the journalist used a cellular phone to file a voice report that was rebroadcast live over CNN television network. This was possible because the ship was steaming near Bahrain and could establish cellular phone communications.14

Has the policy/regulations for allowing female correspondents onboard combatant vessels as members of a media pool changed?
Have any appreciable changes occurred which include operational planners in the public affairs planning process, contained in ANNEX F of the Unified Commanders' OPLAN/CONPLAN/OPORD's?

Have the Navy operations experts become more involved in preparation of proposed questions and answers for operational contingencies which would have high media interest?

What guidance to military dependents is given regarding statements to the media?

Methodology Summary

By answering these questions, I will acquire data to support my thesis and support my contention that the Navy has made effective changes to policies and methods in its media management programs, resulting in improved public affairs.
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH ANALYSIS

Review and Analysis of Publications

I analyzed policy changes made within CHINFO by first reviewing pertinent policy documents which guide the Navy Office of Information in its day-to-day operations. My review encompassed formal instructions, educational publications, policy papers, and Naval messages (transmitted by electronic means or through the mail), all of which may receive either general or limited distribution to Naval activities.

Department of Defense Instructions

A result of a lawsuit filed by fourteen major news affiliates against the Department of Defense after Operation "Desert Shield/Storm,"1 "Statement for DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations" and an attachment, "Attachment on Security Review," are perhaps the most visible policy changes to DOD guidance for the services to public affairs from "Desert Shield/Storm."2 These principles are taken nearly verbatim from Associated Press proposed guidelines announced 17 April 1992.3
Acknowledging that the press pool concept does, by its very nature, restrict access to some combat operations, units, and areas, this directive seeks to reaffirm the DOD premise that "open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations."

Further, this paper clarifies the DOD position regarding treatment of press pools and is summarized below (complete text is quoted for reference in appendix A):

1. Press pools may be the only means of providing early access to military operations.
2. Pools may be appropriate for coverage in "remote locations or where space is limited."
3. Journalists will abide by military rules and regulations, meant to protect U.S. troops and preserve security. Accordingly, news organizations should endeavor to use experienced/knowledgeable journalists for combat coverage.
4. Journalists will be transported in (on) military vehicles where feasible, and transportation provided them.
5. Journalists will be permitted access to all military units (with exceptions to special operations units).
6. PAOs will act as liaisons but not interfere with the reporting process.
7. Military will supply PAOs with rapid, secure, and compatible means of transmitting media material, refrain from prohibiting news organizations from using their own transmission means, unless electromagnetic operation security considerations do not permit.3

The impact of this affirmation is that the press pool is not the preferred means but may be the most expedient means of managing media coverage of military operations in combat. We have witnessed this recently in the media coverage of Operation "Restore Hope," the Somalia military operation.
Operation "Restore Hope" is not combat operations in the traditional sense, so there is little need to restrict the press from access to a particular area for security reasons. Additionally, with minimal government controls on tourist visas, journalists have been free to enter the country and cover media events, unlike the strict controls for granting visas exercised by the Saudi Arabian government in Operation "Desert Shield/Storm." During the initial landing of troops, the Commander-in-Chief, Marine General Joseph P. Hoar, had asked media to remain clear of the beach. 6

The event that occurred in Somalia during the initial landing phase of the Operation "Restore Hope" (week of 9 December 1992) exemplified media coverage that was disorganized and hazarded both military and media personnel. Television news personnel directed bright lights on special forces teams and Marine troops landing ashore at night, during the landing operations, blinding their night optical devices and exposing their landing positions, making operations more dangerous than necessary. 7

This does not mean that press pools would have served to organize and plan coverage of this media event better, but it does serve to demonstrate what may occur when no control of the media or, at a minimum, lack of prior coordination between the operational commanders and the media fails to occur. Virginia Hall, in her syndicated editorial
titled "Charge of the Lights Brigade," succinctly states "neither rigid control approaching censorship nor free and easy access approaching anarchy is the best military-media relationship." The OASD(PA) is currently writing doctrinal guidelines and new policies that address these issues.

Naval Instructions

SECNAVINST 5720.44A. CH-1

Included in my review and analysis was the "bible" for DON public affairs, Secretary of the Navy instruction (SECNAVINST) 5720.44A, with Change 1, dated 19 September 1990. This document is the comprehensive regulatory guide for Navy PA, receives general Naval distribution (all commands), and serves to regulate Navy units in the conduct of PA. Change 1 contained new guidance to the commander in the areas of Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts, command information bureau organization, internal information, cable television contracting, family support during crisis, drug interdiction operations, and community relations requirements during environmental actions.

It is significant to note that Change 1 was distributed prior to Operation "Desert Shield/Storm" and does not meet the strict definition of change that occurred after the cessation of the war. Distribution of the change was mailed in the late fall of 1990 and preceded my date for assessing post-"Desert Shield/Storm" changes by approximately four to six months, but the receipt by Naval commands, implementa-
tion of changes and actual effects of policies outlined in
Change 1 to the basic instruction would not be evidenced
until some time after distribution. Therefore, I consider
changes implemented by Change 1 subject to analysis in my
study.

For the purpose of this study, the revised
instruction made significant changes to procedures for
accommodation of press pools during combat/wartime
situations, protecting the privacy of service members and
dependents, increased emphasis on internal distribution of
information to service member dependents, and the importance
of community relations.

SECNAVINST 5720.44A (Change 1) orders public affairs
into three functional applications: public information,
internal information, and community relations, defining them
as:

- **Public Information/Media Relations**: Public informa-
tion is the collection, analysis and dissemination of
unclassified, official and otherwise releasable
information to the public or the news media. Public
information also involves feedback from the public,
such as monitoring of media coverage of Navy, Marine
Corps and defense matters.

- **Internal Information**: Internal information is the
essential function of command and an integral compo-
nent of the Navy and Marine Corps retention effort. It
is the means by which an organization establishes,
maintains and employs two-way channels of communica-
tion, linking leadership and the people of the
organization. The DON internal information audience
consists of active duty military personnel families,
civilian employees, Naval and Marine Corps Reserve
personnel and retired persons and their families.
Internal information refers not only to the formula-
tion of messages or themes for members of the command,
but also the means by which such messages are communicated.

Community Relations: Community relations refers to an array of activities that place Navy and Marine Corps people and hardware in direct contact with the public. The actual conduct of a sound, goal-oriented community relations program will vary considerably from one command to the next for many reasons. Among them are mission and allowable degree of public access, local public attitude toward the military, events that provide opportunity for direct interface with the public, and local issues which divide or unite the military and the community.

Significant change is made to these definitions in Change 1 to the instruction, with emphasis on the internal information programs and the command responsibility to ensure information dissemination to family, civilian, and reserve personnel. Use of "external news media (public information) channels and selected groups such as the U.S. Navy League, Marine Corps League, or Fleet Reserve Association (community relations) channels to reach the total internal audience" is directed for comprehensive public affairs planning in all three functional areas.

Coordinating internal, external, and community relations in a holistic approach marks a change to Navy public affairs strategy, particularly important because the Navy increasingly views its role in public affairs as one of total information management, coordinating the public affairs functional areas to complement each other. Additionally, the emphasis on internal information is prescriptive guidance for commands to prioritize the care of Navy personnel and dependents. This is often a problem for units which deploy for
months at a time and have little or no contact with family, local communities, or support commands in the area of their homeport or base.

With regard to public information/media relations, paragraph 0102 of the instruction states the DON philosophy for providing public information and specifies five basic principles for distribution of information:

[I]t is DON policy to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens will be answered in a timely manner. In carrying out that policy, the following principles of information will apply:

(1) Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification.

(2) A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

(3) Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.

(4) Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.

(5) The Department’s obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within the Department and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in DOD public affairs programs.13

34
My review of literature discovered numerous criticisms of the military during Operation "Desert Shield/Storm" for inhibiting the flow of timely information. This was, to the journalist, tantamount to censorship, since stories were delayed in transmission until they were too old to be of any news value. These delays were attributed to poor military logistic support to transmit releases for field journalists, the requirement for all press releases to be routed through the JIB in Dhahran and, on occasion, some unit commanders insisting that releases receive local security review. The foregoing principles specifically state that security review will not serve to detract from the timeliness of information distribution, from the source to the public.

One important change to SECNAVINST 5720.44A (CH-1) was the Navy's addition of the "Media Officer" to the Command Information Bureau. Normally established on a temporary basis at large commands (i.e., aircraft carrier afloat, naval base ashore, or joint task group/force in a theater of operations) to coordinate public affairs for a specific operation, the Command Information Bureau is tailored to specific information needs and strategies. The Media Officer's responsibilities are:

(a) Ensures availability of press kits, transportation disclaimer forms . . . CIB office equipment and files.
(b) Supervises preparation of editor assignment sheets.
(c) Supervises distribution of news releases and other materials to news media.

35
(d) Coordinates with the appropriate command for media support services (i.e., berthing, messing, etc.).
(e) Prepares the daily news summaries and periodic news release proposal messages.
(f) Ensures the press center is prepared with seating, coffee, water, press kits, audiovisual support, etc.

I assess this change was made due in large part from the experiences learned from the Navy's embarkation of media pools during Operation "Earnest Will," the escort of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq war, which occurred in July 1987. During this, the first operational deployment of the national DOD media pool, the personal relationship that media pool members fostered with their Navy PAO counterparts played an important role in the perceived success of the embarkation. "A key to the success of this pool deployment was the continuing and close interaction between the pool members and their military escorts," states Barry Willey in his article "Military-Media Relations Come of Age."

During my interview with Commander Mark Van Dyke, USN, who was then Staff Public Affairs Officer for Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East during Operation "Earnest Will" and the PAO liaison for the embarked media pool, he expressed these sentiments quoted above in Willey's article and related them in an anecdote from the same period. Commander Van Dyke said that helicopters were in particularly short supply during the operations and journalists had taken some film shots of recent action during a
phase of the operation in which Iranian units and oil platforms were attacked by U.S. ships (an action taken in response to the mining of the *USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS*, Operation "Praying Mantis"). One of the news services had contracted for a helicopter to transport the film, but since it was not a Navy helicopter, the contracted helicopter was not certified to land on the ship. After obtaining the captain's approval, the helicopter hovered over the flight deck, the film was handed to a helo crewman, and the film was returned to Bahrain for subsequent transmission.

The Commanding Officer's willingness to accommodate the exchange preserved the timeliness of this media event. This example shows the value of personal attention to the needs of the media and the profound influence of the commander's positive attitude toward the embarked media pool, which made a decided difference in the success of the media embarkation."

An example of the importance of personalizing the media/military relationship, particularly when in close quarters such as an underway embarkation aboard naval vessels, is a recent initiative taken by CHINFO. CHINFO writes a message to each commanding officer that will embark media and gives him background on the journalists in the media pool, a focus for possible questions and answers by the embarked media, and suggested emphasis for supporting infor-
nation (i.e., what might be unique or interesting about his ship or unit that may not have been previously seen by the media). 3

Another change to the instruction is the emphasis placed upon the role of the PAO in timely and accurate information flow to dependents in time of crisis. 2 The untimely death or injury of Naval personnel due to accident or mishap is often a significant media event and, unfortunately, dependents of the victim(s) may be sought by national media as a "prize," without thought to the loss, grief, and bereavement suffered by family and loved ones. The goal of revised policy in this area is to ensure expeditious dissemination of accurate, undistorted information to the affected families, before they may learn about an incident from public sources or the media. 2 Additionally, specific guidance is given to dependents about their right to privacy, with special attention to rights regarding interviews or statements to the media.

In summary, the Navy's "bible" for public affairs has undergone changes designed to tailor afloat support for press pools/media embarks. It is definitive about what actions the command PAO will take to become more pro-active in the area of internal information and rights to privacy for Naval personnel, and dictates measures to coordinate the use of various public affairs media simultaneously, economizing assets but multiplying the overall effect of communications.
Another publication change which has resulted in major organizational changes in the DON occurred with the promulgation of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Note (OPNAVNOTE) 5430, dated 5 October 1992. This notice reorganized the DON in the first major reorganization effort in recent history.

The reorganization achieved three objectives: First, it realigned the three major warfare communities (surface, subsurface, and aviation) into one program and planning requirements office, enhancing coordination between the communities for planning and budgeting. Second, the codes and functions of major departments within the Navy changed from "OP" codes to "N" codes, and now adopted not only similar names but similar functions to DOD joint staffs. For example, N3/N5 or Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Plans, Policy, and Operations has the same function as his J3/J5 counterparts on the Joint Staff. This enhances communications both within and external to the staff, and achieves commonality with the other service branches. And finally, the reorganization streamlined the CNO staff, eliminating duplication within organizations, and is in concert with the overall DOD philosophy of reducing staff positions, required by recent reductions in defense spending. A block diagram of the old and new OPNAV organization is shown at appendix B.
No change resulted from this reorganization to the relationship between the CHINFO, the CNO, and SECNAV. CHINFO retains dual responsibility to both SECNAV and the CNO, remaining directly subordinate to SECNAV and a special assistant to the CNO as code N09C (Special Assistant for Public Affairs Support).³

Significant is the overall effect of this reorganization in terms of efficiency. The Navy has long been hampered with internal struggles between the major warfare program offices for budget monies. This internal discord has contributed to inefficiency in allocation of resources, often determined by self-serving motives, parochialism, and the requirement to perpetuate warfare-specific weapons systems.

An exception to this was the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System III (LAMPS Mark III) helicopter, developed in the mid-1980's by the surface and aviation program offices as a joint project. The LAMPS Mark III combines both helicopter (based on a common airframe to the Army H-60 Blackhawk) and shipboard electronics subsystems. The resulting weapons system is a multiplication of capability over a system that segregates system capability in solely a helicopter or ship. The success of the LAMPS Mark III program was suggestive of the possibilities that closer coordination between program managers could bring, now mandated by reorganization within the DON.

40
The move to adopt better internal coordination and dispense with redundant staff sends the correct signal to the public and is beneficial to Navy public relations. Cost reduction in personnel, operations, and research/development of new weapons systems conveys to the public DON willingness to change for improved internal programs.

White Papers and Official Reports

From the Sea

Since Operation "Desert Shield/Storm," the Navy has adopted a new maritime strategy. From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century is a document that marks a profound departure from previous naval strategy and an information campaign initiated by the DON to publicize its efforts to adapt mission and roles to the evolving world order of the post-Cold War environment.

The demise of the Soviet Union as an open ocean, blue-water maritime power has removed the threat of maritime war that U.S. Naval strategy used as its cornerstone for warfighting and tactics. No longer do Soviet Naval Aviation maritime bombers threaten aircraft carrier battle group supremacy in area sea control. Our enduring maritime strategy of sea control as a means to preserve the security of the United States, the economic sea lines of communication, and preserve alliances remains valid, but the threat is now one of regional hegemony by unknown entities in
littoral, near-land, and bounded-sea environments such as the Mediterranean Sea."

*From the Sea* states a theme that the Navy and Marine Corps will provide: "(1) Naval Expeditionary Forces, (2) Shaped for Joint Operations, (3) Operating Forward from the Sea, and (4) Tailored for National Needs." The Navy doctrinal missions of strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, sea control, and power projection remain essential and enduring, but the latter two missions have been altered to accommodate evolving threats and are modified to meet regional contingency requirements, with a variety of flexible options for implementation.

What is the significance to public affairs of this change in strategy? It shows the public that the Navy is evolving along with changing requirements in national security strategy. *From the Sea* sends a message that explicitly states the Navy will do more with less, by finding new ways to accomplish new tasks with forces available to perform critical security missions, particularly relevant in this age of force "build-down." But how is this message told?

*The Playbook*

On 27 November 1992, *The Playbook*, the Navy’s comprehensive public affairs strategy, was released to naval commands by the Chief of Naval Operations. Not intended to replace the DON PA regulations, *The Playbook* is "not a public affairs plan; it is a communications strategy, a
collective of 'plays' which can be used in a variety of situations,” writes the current CHINFO, Rear Admiral Kendell Pease, USN, in his cover letter to PAOs.

Originally intended for distribution to three and four-star admirals (most senior or major command levels) in the Navy, included in the "Commanding Officer’s PA Kit" (distributed by CHINFO during Prospective Commanding Officer course seminars), then distributed to all PAOs as well, The Playbook has been well received and word-of-mouth publicity has resulted in numerous requests for expanded distribution.

The Playbook is unprecedented in Naval history as a public affairs strategy and, by its existence, contributes in a coordinated effort to mount a public affairs strategy for the Navy in years to come. Logically, this strategy uses for its central theme a "master element that represents the fundamental perception that you wish your audience to hold.” Of course, this theme is From the Sea, the Navy’s maritime vision of naval roles and missions in the new world order.

The Playbook bears closer scrutiny for its content, which is prescriptive, and provides specific guidance to PAO’s.

This strategy attempts to focus on what should be communicated to whom. While it offers suggestions on how issues may be communicated, it is intended to provide great flexibility in allowing flag officers and commanding officers to achieve the goals in accordance with local needs and circumstances. In
addition, the communications themes in this document are not intended to be all-inclusive point papers. They should be supported by more specific Navy doctrine such as the Navy Posture Statement, Navy Policy Book, and ...From the Sea, the Navy’s blueprint for the future.34 (Bold are from original text.)

It is clear that both From the Sea and The Playbook are a coordinated information campaign, directed at "the citizens of the United States [are] our primary customers,"35 (bold from original text) and that other targets of this strategy are "national, state and local elected officials and the news media."36

Does this mean that the Navy has embarked on an information blitz designed to preserve budget and programs, or does this "one-two punch" improve Navy public affairs by doing a better job of telling the Navy story?

The Playbook states that while "Navy public affairs efforts in recent years have often been proactive and aggressive ... these efforts have lacked focus and coordination and, therefore, have not been as effective as they could have been,"37 and it is for this reason The Playbook was created. The combination of new Navy themes in From the Sea and a way to tell those themes, The Playbook, are a coordinated effort to market the Navy as an adaptive force during the current period of military force reductions.

Dennis Klauer, Special Assistant for Internal Policy, Navy Office of Information, relates that what is remarkable about The Playbook is that it was a "top-down" initiative. Admiral Pease [CHINFO] personally formulated much of this
strategy during the staffing and discussion of the Navy’s new maritime strategy (of which many of the conferences he was personally involved), From the Sea."

The Playbook describes internal and external target audiences and subordinate communication themes for 1993. "Sustained forward presence" by Naval forces, which does not rely on expensive and politically vulnerable bases; Naval/Marine Corps Team’s ability for rapid response; Sailors and Marines as superb role models; the Navy commitment to protecting the environment; protection of the American taxpayer’s investment are external themes outlined in The Playbook."

Internal themes include: efforts to improve pay, benefits and quality of life for personnel; emphasis on core values of honor, commitment and courage; knowledge and expertise in joint operations as critical to professional development and career advancement; Navy/Marine Corps as an integral, inter-dependent team; and the sacrifice that the American public makes by paying for everything the Navy does.40

Dennis Klauer asserts that the Navy’s strategy for improving internal communications is to target the bulk of Navy personnel." Those people are young men and women in the seventeen to twenty-five age group, who comprise 49 percent of all active duty officer and enlisted Navy person-
nel. *The Playbook* emphasizes these demographics with charts and descriptions.42

In Annex C of *The Playbook*, the external communications strategy further specifies the Midwest, and in particular the states of "Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin"43 as the focus for external communication efforts in 1993. When queried about this information strategy, Dennis Klauer replied that while the Midwest is typically very receptive to the Navy story, it does not have exposure to community PAO resources that are available in coastal states where Naval bases reside, and that the Navy has an aura of mystique to people in the Midwest because of infrequent direct contact with Navy personnel.44 Additionally, he noted that since this is Edition 1 of *The Playbook*, it will be an annually updated strategy, and CHINFO will target another area for 1994. In fact, CHINFO has recently decided that the southwestern U.S. will be the next focal area for external communications.45

Other focal groups or demographic targets for external information include professional women (ages 30-55), business leaders (Chief Executive Officers of large companies), and senior citizens (ages 55-75).46 By adopting a common focus for information distribution, the methodology is one of ensuring success with one audience rather than attempts to saturate a broad area or front.
These two documents represent a clear effort by the Navy to improve public affairs. By changing not only methods of strategy but adopting new foci for communicating, Navy public affairs demonstrates flexibility and remains attuned to a rapidly changing world.

**Navy Talking Points**

*Navy Talking Points* are policy papers published by the Office of Information on an "as required" basis. They are openly distributed to news desks at all major media offices. Their purpose is to highlight Navy changes in policy, participation in major world events, or to emphasize Navy roles in the defense organization.

For example, in January 1991, a *Navy Talking Point* titled "Navy-Marine Corps Team -- Desert Shield/Storm 1990 -- 1991" detailed the Navy's participation up to and including the start of the war on 17 January 1991. The fourteen-page document provides facts, figures, names, and assignments for Navy units assigned to the Gulf War. There is also a chronology of Navy build-up in the region which details the role that the Navy had played until that date.

**Review and Analysis of Manpower and Management**

*CHINFO*

Several changes in manpower and management have occurred within the CHINFO organization since "Desert Shield/Storm," and fall into the categories of change inter-
nal and external to the headquarters organization. I will address those changes in the succeeding paragraphs.

**CHINFO Change of Command**

The single most visible change to the Office of Information in manpower has been a change in Chiefs. Rear Admiral Kendell M. Pease, Jr., USN, succeeded Rear Admiral Brent Baker, USN, in August 1992 as Chief of Information. In military organizations, the commander sets the pace and dictates the vision for the command, and CHINFO is no exception to this rule. This "vision" is the focus, the embodiment of a tone or theme in words and actions to set an organization "marching to the same sheet of music." While Rear Admiral Baker’s primary theme for PA was professional development, the education of commanding officers and PAOs about personal effectiveness in public affairs, Rear Admiral Pease emphasizes the importance of effective and efficient internal/external communications.

During his tenure as CHINFO, Rear Admiral Baker instituted programs to educate new commanding officers about effective public affairs by conducting seminars at the Prospective Commanding Officer course taught in Newport, Rhode Island. He also created the position of Assistant Chief of Information for Professional Development at CHINFO, with the charter of developing awareness among Navy commanders of the power of good public affairs, as well as the development of effective PAOs. He is an academic,
scholarly individual and has written numerous articles for professional publications that have publicized the Navy and CHINFO initiatives. Upon retirement, he assumed the position as Dean, College of Journalism, Boston University.

Admiral Pease is a Naval Academy graduate and noted athlete, excelling in football at the academy. He is a large, imposing figure who is known as an "action oriented" individual. He numbers as friends and associates his former academy classmates, many of whom have attained flag-rank and are in positions of leadership in the Navy. This personal relationship, coupled with his gregarious personality, has facilitated good working communications with all levels of Navy leadership.

Total Quality Leadership (TQL)


In 1991 the CNO mandated TQL as the Navy standard for management. An all-Navy operational commands message (NAVOP) directed that commands provide initial familiarization briefs and commence the process to introduce TQL.

TQL begins with all members of the command understanding their contribution to the process of producing a product, what that product is, and how they contribute to
the quality of that product. Quality Management Boards (QMBs) routinely meet to discuss production and problems that may arise. A Process Action Team (PAT) is formed when, in the opinion of the QMB, there is a problem within the organization that requires further analysis. The PAT is comprised of a cross-section of the organization, all individuals who contribute to the process of production. Once constituted for a particular purpose, the PAT studies a specific process and output (or product) associated with the defined problem and makes recommendations for improvement.

CHINFO completed implementation of TQL in August 1992 and has formed two PATs since then. The first PAT was generated by the perception that requests from the public (media, journalists, researchers, private individuals, etc.) to the CHINFO news desk were not being handled as efficiently as possible. The PAT was tasked to study the problem of speeding information flow from the Media Operations Department (01-2) type desks. The PAT recommended reorganizing manpower within CHINFO by allocating three PAOs assigned to the Department of Plans, Policy and Community Programs (01-5) and using them to augment existing personnel at each of the three "type desks" (surface, subsurface, aviation) in Media Operations.

The Navy recently implemented the change and the result is a 30 percent increase in manpower at the type-desks, responsible for information requests in their
particular areas of expertise, while the Assistant Chief of Information for Plans, Policy, and Community Programs (OI-5) office personnel were shifted to these new positions. Where there had been two people to handle all requests, there were now three, which allowed the third person to do additional assignment work, including special assignment to media embarkations, research, or defining DON policy on issues involving the entire Navy.\(^4\)

The Navy formed another PAT to study and explore a new format for one of the Navy's internal information publications, *All Hands* (a complete list of all Navy internal information media is listed at appendix A). This glossy, monthly magazine was originally published to inform the Navy about items of safety, professional education, and topics of general interest. An informal survey completed by the PAT showed there was no target audience, the magazine was for "the Navy," which was deemed too broad an audience for effective communication, and that readership among junior enlisted was low.\(^5\)

The PAT recommended changing the format of the magazine to target the majority of Navy enlisted and that recommendation has been instituted. *All Hands* is undergoing a format change that will use a layout patterned from selected popular magazines (using cartoons, action photos, etc.) for the seventeen to twenty-five year-old, to give it a "new look." For example, the back cover of the first new issue
will have an environmental preservation message. By using artwork depicting an unsightly dump and when folded along dotted lines, creates a picture of a rose, All Hands hopes to effectively package an important message."

CHINFO is using TQL to make honest assessments of the value of its product, that of Navy public affairs, and has made two significant steps to improve that product.

Media Operations Survey

In December 1991, the Media Operations Department (OI-2) in CHINFO conducted a media opinion survey by sending questionnaires to 100 selected media representatives. The survey was an internal initiative, the brainchild of then Assistant Chief of Information for Media Operations, Commander Mark Van Dyke, who wished to take a "TQL" approach to effectiveness in the department by looking at the product of his department, and the satisfaction of OI-2 "customers.""58

A copy of the survey questionnaire with summarized results is at appendix C of this study. Of the 100 questionnaires distributed, 50 were returned. The specific demographics of the polled media were newspaper and wires (32%), trade press (28%), freelance photographers (12%), book authors (10%), television (6%), radio (4%), and freelance writers (2%)."59 Additionally, nine respondents wrote letters to express more specific comments and generally to congratulate CHINFO on their survey initiative. The results of the survey are summarized below:
Respondents gave CHINFO a confidence factor of 6.3 on a scale of 1-10, and rated CHINFO as 6.2 in comparison to public affairs offices in other agencies and organizations. Also:

- 90% felt news desk staff was professional and courteous, and ranked officers high in honesty (8.3), courtesy (8.2), sincerity (7.7), accuracy (7.6), effectiveness (6.9) and timeliness (6.7).

- 58% said their deadlines were usually or always met, but only 12% felt they allowed action officers adequate deadlines.

- Four percent blamed action officers for problems, while 50% cited lack of support from other offices or senior leadership.

Seven recommendations were made to improve the Media Operations product.

- Improve relationship with trade press/freelancers. Results of this study also indicate that members of the trade press and freelance writers and photographers perceive they are not being accommodated as well as the other types of media with which we work. Recommend CHINFO devote more attention and time to understanding and supporting the special requests of these media customers and incorporate them more fully into our operation.

- Reorganize. The survey indicated that those who request embarks, for the most part, are not as satisfied with CHINFO’s product as those who normally request media queries. Efforts should be made in 01-2 to reorganize manpower to more efficiently handle specialized requests, acknowledging there is a difference in the way these requests must be handled.

- Improve Coordination. In order for the News Desk to accommodate media requests to the fullest and most timely extent possible and maintain a credible position with its customers, leadership support and inter-office cooperation are essential. More effort should be put forth to improve coordination with other offices.

- Prioritize. Since there is no plan for additional manning on the News Desk, the scope of responsibilities must be prioritized in order to keep up with the overwhelming number of media requests and maintain
quality production levels. This survey has shown the
correlation between action officer attention (communi-
cation, timeliness, courtesy) and confidence in Navy
public affairs. Every effort should be made to
determine which projects have priority, then work
those projects completely. Responsibilities which
fall outside of the primary task must take a lower
priority if we are expected to maintain quality levels
of work.

- Decentralize. Consideration should be given to
decentralizing media operations to allow media more
direct access to field PAOs and activities, keeping
CHINFO informed, as necessary. In order for this to
be accomplished, SECNAVINST 5720.44A should be revised
so that there is a clear explanation of what type of
requests must be worked by CHINFO, and which requests
may be worked on a local level.

- Stress Personalized service. As the study reveals,
close communication results in an overall higher
confidence and effectiveness level from the media.
Recommend News Desk personnel stress the quality of
their service and the importance of more personalized
service in accommodating news media requests.

- Conduct follow-up/further research. Certain data
from this initial study in media operations should be
used to generate hypotheses for further research.
Additional study should be conducted to determine
media attitudes towards Navy leadership support and
organizational support. Also, CHINFO should study
more closely the relationship with trade papers and
magazines in order to increase their confidence level
as far as Navy public affairs is concerned.44

The survey revealed that "trade papers and free-
lancers had the lowest confidence in CHINFO."45 The steps
that the news desk were to take as a direct result of recom-
mendations made to remedy problems highlighted by the survey
were to:

- dedicate more attention to understanding and support-
ing the individual requirements of trade press and
freelancers; reorganize manpower to more efficiently
handle specialized requests such as embarks; improve
coordination with other offices; prioritize news desk
workload; decentralize operations to permit some media
to work directly with fleet or field offices; stress quality of service and more personalized customer relations."

Commander Van Dyke stated that many of these recommendations were instituted while he was at CHINFO, and the subsequent formation of a PAT to study these same deficiencies (i.e., the problems noted with workload and efficiency of the news desk) provides evidence that the survey was a useful tool for identifying problems. Commander Van Dyke's memorandum caveated the results by stating "additional research is needed to explore an apparent lack of media confidence in Navy leadership and inter-office coordination. More data is needed before drawing any conclusions."

An interview with Lieutenant Commander Betsy Jenkins Bird on 5 February 1993 indicated that other specific actions had been taken in OI-2 to address the recommendations regarding improving coordination, prioritization, and stressing personalized service. A computerized data base had been initiated in April 1991 to study and track the types of media requests in OI-2. During 1991, this also became a useful tool for management because of its organization by request, action officer, date of request, and status of action taken. The data base was initially part of an intern project by an undergraduate journalism student, who was temporarily assigned to CHINFO from January to June, 1991.
Field Offices and Staff Positions

PAOs in the Navy are primarily cross-trained officers who, having attained their primary warfare qualifications, request transfer and redesignation as 1650 (designation for Public Affairs Officer). PAOs undergo an extremely competitive process of screening upon request for redesignation from their primary warfare billet specialties of surface, subsurface, and aviation. Officers are normally 02s (Lieutenant (Junior Grade)) or 03s (Lieutenant) by the time they request PAO redesignation. Because the process is so competitive, the Navy is able to be selective in the redesignation process. The single most important factor in selection for PAO is superior prior performance and sustained excellence.67

Afloat PAO Billets

A major change in billet structure that has occurred in the last two years is the designation of major afloat command PAOs as a "second-tour" billet (one in which the officer has had at least one afloat primary PAO billet previously), where previously that position had been filled with officers with less experience.68 The rationale within CHINFO is that aircraft carriers are normally "where the action is" and require the expertise of an experienced PAO. Major afloat commands such as aircraft carriers are more likely to have both high media interest and require complex internal coordination for effective public affairs.
CHINFO Operational Staff Augmentation

Frequently CHINFO will send headquarters staff as special staff assistants in a theater of operations when significant news events are likely to occur. These staff augmentees are experienced PAOs who have both experience onboard the unit embarked and knowledge of the current operation. Staff augmentees may be ordered to support either the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander in a joint environment or the Naval Component Commander (senior Navy commander, under operational command of a JTF Commander in a joint environment).

Staff augmentees to Joint Task Force Commanders, Naval Component Commanders, or for special media embarks are supplied from the staff at CHINFO and usually assigned from the Media Operations Department. These same experienced PAOs are normally employed at CHINFO on a type desk, serving their accounts by filling requests for information. Recent manpower changes within CHINFO allow the type desks to gain an additional person at each of the three desks. This has had the effect of reducing the impact to customers when staff augmentations are required from the OI-2 department.

Fleet Hometown News Center

Subordinate to CHINFO is the Fleet Hometown News Center (FHTNC), located in Norfolk, Virginia. The center’s purpose is to maintain files on each person deployed on a ship or stationed overseas, enter the data for those person-
nel in a database, and solicit news items from deployed commands. When news items, such as port visits, participation in major exercises, or goodwill missions are sent to the FHTNC, the computer database matches a hometown zip code to local media that have expressed agreement to publicize the news item. Currently there are 11,606 media outlets, such as local radio stations, newspapers or magazines that use this service provided by the Navy. 

Since 1991, FHTNC has increased its news releases from 750,000 to 1,130,000, a 58 percent increase in releases, while Navy manpower (number of personnel) in this same period has decreased by 4.9 percent. Commander Ned Lundquist, the center’s director, attributes this increase to management techniques he has applied that use a TQL approach to product improvement through customer survey. He has done this by attending trade shows in the past year, speaking at media conventions, and distributing surveys to media organizations around the nation.

The use of short stories to highlight local Navy people and their participation is not just good public affairs, it has the effect of people recognition, and is as much an internal information program as external. When sailors learn they have received press in the local paper, it builds morale in the unit as well as bolster public support, which in turn boosts personnel motivation and becomes a positive influence on unit readiness.
Review and Analysis of Technology

A revolution in information transmission technology has occurred in recent years, and the current growth in news media methods for video, data, and image transmission is testimony to this. John E. Boyle in his thesis "Emerging News Media Communication Technologies in Future Military Conflicts," states that, "If Vietnam was the first television war, then the Persian Gulf conflict was the first live satellite television war." If, as Boyle proposes, "The only major limitation to technological progress may come from military policies that may limit media access and live coverage of the battle area in an effort to prevent inadvertently releasing sensitive information that could be used by the enemy for intelligence purposes," then what has CHINFO done to accommodate these technology changes without compromising operational security?

When media embark in a naval vessel they are a captive audience, normally far from land and reliant upon electronic transmission of their news products if they desire their news stories or images to be filed in a timely fashion. Navy vessels find that they often do not have enough communications networks or satellite transmission channels available for their own operational use, let alone support for media. How has the Navy improved upon afloat transmission capabilities and support for embarked media?
These are the questions and issues I will address in the following paragraphs of my study.

CHINFO and Media Technology Advances

**Digital Imagery**

Recent technological advances in digital imagery reproduction and transmission have enabled the Navy to procure low-cost equipment to reproduce photo-quality images at sea and transmit them ashore anywhere in the world. Using a MacIntosh laptop computer and the INMARSAT (commercial digital duplex satellite link) telephone, images have been transmitted from the Persian Gulf, aboard the USS RANGER, to CHINFO in Washington, D.C. This real-time transmission of photographs, in this case of aircraft launching and recovering during Operation "Southern Watch," allowed CHINFO to release copies to the media within hours of the actual event.

Digital imagery is undergoing a revolution in technology. State-of-the-art digital camera equipment kits include a Kodak DCS 200 digital hard drive (a motor drive that attaches to a camera back) which stores 50 digital images, digital software (Adobe Printshop and Timbuktu are those in use by CHINFO still photo personnel), data compression software (J-Peg Data Compression software is used at CHINFO), and a MacIntosh 180 Powerbook laptop computer with modem.
The cost of a composite kit is approximately fourteen thousand dollars and the Navy has recently purchased three complete kits. The kits are dispersed to areas or units with possible high media interest, such as the deployed aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea (USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT), with the Combat Camera Team (fly-away Navy still-photo team) in Norfolk, Virginia, and on the deployed aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf (currently USS KITTY HAWK). Russ Egnar commented that the United States Air Force PA organization had recently purchased twenty-five kits for their photo-journalists.

Afloat and Field Use of New Technological Advances

**KU-Band Television Feed**

Satellite Newsgathers (SNG) are compact, mobile vans first developed in 1984 by HubCom, Inc., of St Petersburg, Florida. The difficulty associated with these vans is their size and weight when assessing practicality for use aboard ship. They are 28 to 30 feet long and require a substantial amount of room to place aboard most naval ships, and the weight of the van, when placed on deck, is a stability consideration because it is placed high on the ships' superstructure.

Another practical consideration is the lack of pointing, or stabilized antenna. Since these vans are designed primarily for fixed sites and not for transmission "on the fly," their antennas do not continuously adjust antenna
azimuth and altitude to point at the satellite and maintain continuous two-way data-link, which is necessary on a ship that is underway and constantly in motion.

**Cellular Telephone**

Cellular telephone communications is limited to reliable FM communications ranges, normally 25 to 30 miles. Normally naval ships operate at distances much greater than this from a cellular telephone antenna. But when ships are conducting local operations near the coast, they often are able to maintain cellular phone connectivity. Recently, cellular phone was used for the first time by embarked journalist Tom Mentier (CNN Bangkok correspondent) to file a live voice report in the Persian Gulf. The aircraft carrier operations during "Southern Watch" were close enough to the coast of Bahrain during this period that cellular phone connectivity was feasible. CNN reporters made live voice reports by cellular phone from the bridge of the USS RANGER, which were then relayed over telephone lines to CNN studios in Atlanta, where they were broadcast live during a telecast of "Headline News."

**INMARSAT**

INMARSAT is a commercial satellite data exchange system commonly applied on merchant ships for at-sea communications. In 1991, the Navy contracted to use satellite communications on the INMARSAT system and commenced installation of the associated antennas and hardware on
aircraft carriers, tenders, some auxiliary support ships, major amphibious ships, and AEGIS-class cruisers. This gives the ship an afloat capability to conduct data exchange (via modem, fax, etc.) and voice communications anywhere in the world.

Originally installed to support electronic real-time transmission of logistics documents and critical or emergency operational traffic, INMARSAT terminals have become a convenient form of telephone communications for the afloat commander, for now he is able to access any telephone number in the world. Recent instances of INMARSAT to support afloat media operations have been observed in Operation "Southern Watch," and Operation "Restore Hope." 

Bob Brewin, editor of Federal Computer Week, a defense trade publication, commented about how convenient INMARSAT was to him during a recent media embark onboard the USS LASALLE (Commander, Third Fleet command ship) during a major amphibious exercise, "Tandem Thrust." He was able to spend a week aboard the ship and still file his stories daily, soon after writing them.

Hard-copy stories via fax, voice reports, and the digital images referred to earlier have all been filed by INMARSAT communications. Continuous satellite communications with commercial ties means it is easier to accommodate journalists with their requirements to file stories to their home office rapidly. Since only one channel is available to
a user at one time, INMARSAT requires prioritization of its use and commanders are finding competing interests in allotting time on the terminal. Additionally, it is expensive to use, since the government contract rate is approximately seven dollars per minute. Lastly, once an individual obtains a ships' number, he may call the ship and access the terminal, at the cost of preempting time-critical use by the ship. This requires close supervision by commands to ensure that access numbers are for use in official channels only. Currently no formal policy exists for security of INMARSAT phone numbers, but Naval Space Warfare Command is formulating specific direction to INMARSAT users regarding access by other than authorized Naval personnel.

INMARSAT is revolutionizing afloat internal information distribution methods to ships, as well as support information transmission ashore. In January 1992, several ships in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf received live digital television feed of the Super Bowl football game. This first successful transmission of a commercial TV signal to ships for crew entertainment initiates a policy of providing for more live television signals to ships, thereby enhancing the internal distribution of information and quality of life aboard afloat units.
Review and Analysis of Public Affairs Education

Seminars

The Navy hosts several seminars each year to address military-media issues. The Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island conducted such a seminar in March 1993. "These seminars offer valuable exchange between the media and military leaders and contribute to healthy communications," stated Bob Brewin. If, as Rear Admiral Baker asserts, "leadership attitudes are the deciding factor" in effective media relations," then forums such as media conferences in a "non-threatening" environment (like the Naval War College Seminar) will continue to improve public affairs for the Navy.

Educating the media and the military must take place at all levels of both organizational structures. The Cantigny Conference Series, sponsored as an annual event by the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, on April 23-24, 1992, provided "an independent and neutral forum for discussions" by "practitioners," not "theorists." "Participants adopted a policy of non-attribution of their remarks in order to foster free and open discussion," writes Neal Creighton in his forward to Reporting the Next War. This final published report summarized the conference results and conclusions." The conference was attended by then CHINFO, Rear Admiral Baker, as well as other senior officials within OASD(PA). The significance of this meeting was the
cooperation both media and military exhibited by recognizing "the need for continued communication and contact between the military and the media in an atmosphere of mutual respect."\(^2\)

The Navy must support "third-party" organizations, like the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, in their efforts to provide the setting for continued media-military dialogue.

Defense Information School (DINFOS)

Located at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, DINFOS is the Department of Defense public affairs school, managed by the Army, for all services. It is a school for both officer and enlisted. Navy PAOs attend a nine-week course in DOD public affairs upon acceptance as a 1650-designated PAO, normally prior to their initial tour as PAO.

The Public Affairs Handbook\(^3\) is a generic, multi-service text used at DINFOS for instruction. Chapter 4, "Navy Organization and Staff" explains in general terms the Navy and how its PA organization coordinates with leaders to effect the PA program.\(^4\) It was last revised in 1992 and reflects change in Navy organization, outlining the relationship of the PAO on major afloat staffs, Naval Information Centers (NAVINFOS), and CHINFO in Navy PA.

"Navy News This Week" (NNTW)

The Navy's television news show, "Navy News This Week" (NNTW) is also changing. Originally intended as a
internal information vehicle for policy, CHINFO recently decided to adopt a new focus for the news show.5

During its inception in 1986, NNTW was designed to transmit CNO policy, high interest items, safety issues, and official statements to leadership and personnel within the Navy. CHINFO has determined that the purpose of NNTW has changed to evolve into one of general internal information. It is now an information source of regular news items that have Navy interest, not a conduit for policy, and the audience it serves reflects the majority of Naval personnel assigned: the seventeen to twenty-five year old.6

NNTW is undergoing a set redesign to reflect current commercial television formats, similar to the network television show "Entertainment Tonight." Included in the format redesign is more music, shorter news stories, and stories of interest to junior personnel.7 The changes in NNTW represent sensitivity to the customer, the "troops in the trenches" watching this news show, that results from an analysis of the customer desires and results in improved internal communications.

A Case Study: Operations "Earnest Will," "Desert Shield/Storm" and "Southern Watch"

The first operational test of the national media pool (a result of the Sible Panel on media coverage of military operations after the media restrictions imposed during the Grenada invasion,5) was the embarkation of journalists
aboard Navy ships during Operation "Earnest Will," the escort of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in 1987."

While regarded by most journalists who participated as successful, there were some aspects of the embarkation that media representatives perceived as deficient. "The good news is that our access to information and ships' personnel was terrific. But we paid a price: the Navy read our copy before it was sent."¹⁰⁰ Policy dictated that security review was performed by the commander before transmission ashore. Unfortunately, this was interpreted by some commanders to include statements that might be unseemly or injurious to the Navy, such as in one instance when references to ship's officers drinking beer with the captain of a merchant ship were deleted from a text by the commanding officer prior to transmission.¹⁰¹

All news releases were transmitted off-ship by Navy electronic message transmission, and were classified "secret/specat." This required The Pentagon (OASD(PA)) to declassify the news stories prior to release, which made transmission from ship to shore cumbersome and subject to review both at the source and destination, though journalists were assured that "no attempt will be made to censor the news copy."¹⁰²

During Operation "Desert Shield/Storm" a similar incident took place when a press dispatch referred to aviators watching pornographic movies onboard the USS
KENNEDY, and all such references were removed by the ship's officers. In contrast, during Operation "Southern Watch," policy guidance in the form of "Statement of DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations" was administered to the media, who were permitted to file without security review. Additionally, reporters were permitted free and open access to aviators after missions and were allowed to interview them, which was not allowed during "Desert Shield/Storm" according to Commander Burnett, Executive Director, "Navy News This Week".

Technology has allowed more rapid dissemination of information from embarked media, as well. Use of cellular telephone to file a live broadcast during "Southern Watch" has been mentioned in my study. INMARSAT was also used with laptop computer and modem to transmit and file news stories during "Southern Watch." This, in marked contrast to the news stories filed during "Earnest Will," which were released by Pentagon officials as late as forty-eight hours after transmission from the gulf. "The average delay for the thirty-nine print dispatches was almost nine hours, although some dispatches were able to make it from the gulf to the Pentagon press room in an hour."

New technological advances with "near motion" satellite TV have allowed recent broadcast from the USS INDEPENDENCE by CNN crews in the Persian Gulf. This technology uses an omnidirectional antenna that allows continuous data
link with a satellite for live TV feed from a mobile, moving station, such as a ship at sea. A minor degradation in the resolution is experienced due to the format, which is transmitted in compressed digital form at 15 frames-per-second instead of the conventional 30 frames-per-second of standard video. CNN has broadcast several live TV feeds using the compressed video format from the aircraft carrier during Operation "Southern Watch."

Commander Burnett remarked that CNN had maintained a continuous presence aboard the aircraft carrier by rotating crews from Bahrain, a policy not previously permitted for media pools. The concept of the media remaining onboard for longer periods of time is not new, for the pool was onboard ships during "Earnest Will" for five days at a time. The new policy of allowing media, not a part of the national press pool, to remain onboard for longer than a "remain-over-night-1 (RON-1)" is becoming an accepted practice for commanding officers who wish to accommodate the press onboard their ships.

During "Desert Shield/Storm," press embarks averaged just over three days at a time, and there were ten pools embarked in 26 different ships on 31 separate occasions during the period 13 January through 28 February 1992.

Two aspects of media embarkations that often dictate success are logistics support to journalists and accessibility to the ships involved for a given operation. In the
case of "Desert Shield/Storm," all media personnel were required to register with the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran and obtain valid Saudi Arabian visas, which were extremely limited and strictly controlled. During both "Earnest Will" and "Southern Watch" all journalists were routed through Bahrain. For Bahrain, it is relatively easy to obtain a visa and their customs procedures are brief.\textsuperscript{115} During "Southern Watch," journalists were allowed access to U.S. ships through Bahrain, but political sensitivities did not allow them to visit U.S. Air Force units in Saudi Arabia, which were also participants in the operation.\textsuperscript{116} Navy PAOs ultimately assisted Air Force PA personnel by helping with news release and photo transportation out of the theater.\textsuperscript{117}

During my interview with Captain Michael Doubleday, USN, (Director for Defense Information, OASDPA), he stated that the willingness of operational commanders to allow news media onboard their ships has resulted in greater numbers of media personnel than ever before. The media are permitted to remain onboard for longer periods of time than had previously been allowed and access to ships at sea through helicopter transfers from Mogadishu, Somalia, and Bahrain for Operations "Restore Hope" and "Southern Watch," respectively, have been streamlined and tailored to specifically support media requirements.\textsuperscript{118}
When media requested an embark onboard amphibious ships in the Mediterranean for possible non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), the evacuation of U.S. Embassy personnel and civilians in Liberia, Commander Quigley stated there was "no feasible way possible to transport journalists hundreds of miles to the amphibious ship underway in the Atlantic, which could possibly remain underway and inaccessible to any means of air transport for at least another month." Often, there is not enough "pay-off" to merit journalistic coverage of naval operations, particularly when there may be weeks of relative inactivity, from a journalistic point of view.

The Navy treats media embarks during "Southern Watch" as a primary event for ship's personnel, concurrent to and of significant import, with operational concerns. CHINFO now sends a message to the commanding officer of each ship embarking a media pool which details background on the journalists who are members of the pool, what interesting facts or newsworthy topics are appropriate for a given ship with its unique capabilities, and a focus for the message that the Navy wants the pool to leave with. By personalizing the media embark and prefacing it with this message, CHINFO establishes a relationship between the commanding officers and pool members before they arrive, and uses as a basis for the embark both journalistic and Navy wants and needs.

72
The changing views of leadership to the importance of facilitating media coverage of significant news events is exemplified in the recent media coverage of Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on Iraq. This event, which took place on 28 February 1993 and was in response to Iraqi refusal to comply with U.N. stipulations of the Persian Gulf War ceasefire agreement, was an attack on a factory suspected of manufacturing components for nuclear weapons. The attack was executed from ships in the Persian Gulf and multiple cruise missiles were launched from several ships.

The commanding officer of one ship, the USS CARON, flew the ship’s embarked helicopter with an infrared camera to capture on film the launch of Tomahawk cruise missiles for release to the media. These actions would have been unheard of during Operation "Desert Shield/Storm," where operational tasking was the only focus for most commanders.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Relationship to Previous Studies

Most recent studies in military-media relations have focused on reporting the battle operations, influence of the revolution in information technology on security review, the press pool concept and its restrictions, operational deception and the grooming of the public by television briefing, and Operation "Desert Shield/Storm" as the bench-mark for battlefield reporting of the future. My research has instead studied a portion of the military-media relationship as it affects the Navy. It has focused exclusively on changes in the past two years but, unlike previous studies, includes all forms of public affairs. My study analyzes internal information and community relations, external or media relations, and the Navy's organization for public affairs management, the Office of CHINFO, as the manager for Navy Public Affair Officers.

My study addresses Navy issues, many of which are unique to the Navy, but does have applicability to PA for the sister services. Within the larger context of joint operations, I have addressed the Navy interaction among PAOs assigned to joint staffs.
Suggestions for Further Research

Further research is required in the area of TQL implementation and effectiveness in CHINFO headquarters organization. The TQL program is in its infancy and instances that a PAT has been exercised within CHINFO do not constitute significant experience with the system or enable data to be collected for conclusions about effectiveness.

Another area that merits further study is the management of media requests within CHINFO, as Commander Van Dyke suggests. The scope of the OI-2 survey that is analyzed in chapter 4 of my thesis is narrow, requires an update and continued analysis to be a viable management tool.

Research in the area of information technology and current off-the-shelf hardware, its adaptability, compatibility, and economy for support to Navy PAOs, is one subject that requires further study. If the Navy is to remain competitive in the age of the electronic message it must use all media, all the time, and transmit information in a timely fashion to reach the public first.

Finally, the effect of negative news events, such as the Navy's "Tailhook" incident, the recent publicizing of "gays in the military," and the cost overruns and ultimate cancellation of the Navy's A-12 attack aircraft program needs further study. A focus for such study could be to determine the effect these negative events have on public
affairs, or the negative bias that is applied to a services' public affairs agency, such as the Navy's CHINFO.

**Summary of Changes and Improvements in DON Public Affairs**

Media embarkations receive greater attention and accommodation by Navy leadership since "Desert Shield/Storm." CHINFO supports these embarks by prefacing the embarkation with a message to the commanding officer, supporting the embark with designated PAO augmentation when it is required, and allowing little or no restrictions on news story content. Media embarks are much less structured, with the duration of the embarkation much more open-ended and for increasingly longer periods. The composition of the pools are not dictated, and news agencies may send the personnel they need to support coverage of the event.

Finally, access to ship's personnel is not restricted during media embarks, thus the journalist may truly obtain the sailor's view of the "deckplates," Navy life from the working man's perspective. An example of this concept in action was shown during recent footage of the enlisted berthing compartments aboard the **USS INDEPENDENCE** for a story about gays in the military. The footage had actually been taken during Operation "Southern Watch," but was used as "stock" footage to depict living conditions aboard Naval vessels, conditions which might be adversely impacted by a decision to allow gays in the military. Films
of enlisted berthing compartments would not have been taken unless free and open access to the ship’s personnel was afforded the press, and of even greater importance is the desire for an inquiring public to see, first-hand, how our sailors live on a daily basis.

The Navy has adopted new themes and strategies for PA. Both From the Sea and The Playbook are trend-setting documents, and mark new initiatives in public affairs strategy. They are revolutionary in Navy PA because together they represent not only new ways of accomplishing the Navy-Marine Corps mission but a way of telling this new story to the public as well. The information strategy includes both internal and external focus for communicating, and dictates secondary themes for emphasis in PA. In Admiral Pease’s words, "We have our batteries ‘ready,’ we now are ‘aiming’ with focused communications strategies [in The Playbook], and we have only to ‘fire’ by telling the good stories out there in the fleet."

Navy PA has changed its treatment of internal and external information, and purports a new philosophy that seeks to erase any differentiation between the two when prioritizing the importance of information dissemination. All people, the public and Navy personnel alike, are an essential audience when telling the Navy story.

Internal communications is undergoing change by modifying the format to media that receive wide distribu-
tion, like "Navy News This Week" (NNTW) and All Hands magazine. Both reformats are the result of the TQL process, applied by PATs at CHINFO, which is indicative of the growing sensitivity to the customer/product relationship and its importance in Navy management of PA.

This customer/product relationship has extended to the news desks in CHINFO as well, where reorganization has allowed increased manpower to assist in the growing number of information requests. This change is also a result of the TQL process. New emphasis is being placed upon the importance of personalizing accounts, or maintaining the continuity of relationships between media personnel and CHINFO action officers assigned to the news desk.

Most important of all is the Navy's change in leadership attitudes. Articles such as former CHINFO, Rear Admiral Baker's, and Rear Admiral Mixson's have informed commanders and commanding officers they may no longer be passive or resistant to the media. The call for proactive PA has gone out and been answered, but not without a concerted effort aimed at educating leaders within the Navy of the importance of PA.

When leaders at the highest levels exhibit the willingness to personally conduct interviews, make statements on the record, and entertain the media as an information conduit, not an impediment to information, other Navy personnel take note.
Conclusions

There are differences in certain military operations that lend themselves to effective media coverage. Operation "Desert Shield/Storm," unlike the "Grenada and Panama invasions which were over too quickly and conducted too secretly for TV to be much of a factor," was an operation that commanded the nation's attention for more than nine months. The military commander who was consistent in his approach to fostering good media-military relationships reaped the benefits of good public affairs.

Navy commanders did not want to take the time to accommodate press for lengthy periods and the media had sufficient time to research the military's story from every aspect, particularly during the period before the actual ground conflict commenced in February 1991. One may acknowledge the inherent difficulties in providing media access to ships, at sea for ninety-five percent of the conflict and accessible only by helicopter. But this has been done successfully, as shown by Operations "Earnest Will" and "Southern Watch."

Operation "Desert Shield/Storm" was primarily an air war followed by a ground war. The nature of the campaign dictated that the Navy was perhaps not as active or news-worthy a participant in the final phases of the war as the Air Force or Army, and was certainly not as easily accessible. But one cannot deny the key roles played by the Navy.
during the Gulf War. Support of the air war, execution of
the blockade on merchant vessels carrying goods destined for
Iraq (General Merrill McPeak, United States Air Force Chief
of Staff of the Air Force, singled out the blockade as a
critical contribution to the success of the war), support
to Marine forces that contributed to the ground campaign
with a deceptive amphibious feint, and numerous cruise
missile strikes on important targets deep within Iraq are
but a few examples of the Navy's roles in that conflict.

The decisive factor in press coverage among Naval
commands that were afforded the opportunity to accept press
onboard their ships was the attitude of the commander. Rear
Admiral Brent Baker summarized the difference by contrasting
the different attitudes of the Commanding Officers (COS) of
the two battleships present in the gulf during the conflict:

The CO [commanding officer] of the USS MISSOURI was
too busy with operations to be bothered by accommodat-
ing the press, while the CO of the USS WISCONSIN said
"sure, bring'em onboard," and got all the good
pictures and stories.6

Open, accessible leaders are essential for good
internal communications. Effective communications required
for public affairs is both internal and external, but starts
with effective internal communications within the organiza-
tion. In an organization that often represents the highest
leaders of the Navy as an official spokesman, such as CHINFO
does for the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO, the atti-
tudes of leaders dictate the tone of the media-military
relationship. The Navy has weathered several incidents that have taxed its internal information system, required timely information supplied to the media, responses vis-a-vis official statements by leadership, and aggressive follow-up action. The "Tailhook" incident, gays in the military, a recent missile-firing accident with the Turkish Navy, the \textit{USS IOWA} gun accident, and announcement of naval base closings have all been detrimental to the Navy's public image and a challenge to the public affairs organization.\footnote{7}

These incidents are not "good" of "bad" public affairs, but incidents that represent problems in the Navy organization.\footnote{8} Often one may be inclined to "shoot the messenger," and Navy public affairs may have suffered unfair criticism by acting as a communications conduit for problems within the Navy organization. This does not absolve the public affairs system of the responsibility for truthfully reporting the problem, but it does mean that the task of presenting positive stories to counterbalance the negative is made more difficult by adverse publicity.\footnote{9}

My study indicates that Navy public affairs is healthy, well organized, and changing to meet new challenges. The military cannot remain static and cannot afford to resist change in today's communication climate. Reduced defense budgets, the demise of the bipolar world and Soviet threat, and reevaluation of service roles and missions all require flexibility in the fight for dollars. The Navy will
do more with less, and must do it efficiently, for all the services are under a public magnifying glass and must justify their current force levels.

The American people are the Navy's customers, and expect to receive a good product for their money. It is the job of the public affairs organization to communicate a message, a message that says the Navy is fulfilling its obligation to the nation, and CHINFO is doing that in improved ways with a coordinated communications strategy.

Recommendations

Specific recommendations that result from my study are:

Codify changes to CHINFO organization by updating the Navy Office of Information Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM).

Revise SECNAVINST 5720.44A to allow nationally distributed publication requests for embarks and information to be initially screened at CHINFO, then subsequently managed at the NAVINFO/Operational Commander (Fleet or Numbered Fleet) level.

Continue formulation of coordinated communications strategy, like The Playbook, and periodically modify as a "living document."

Continue development of an unlimited access computer bulletin board (BBS), like the CNO BBS, that is capable of
keeping pace with the requirements for information dissemination to interested press or public.

Form a research branch of CHINFO that uses a TQL approach to customer satisfaction and institutes periodic surveys to measure CHINFO effectiveness.

Constitute an intern position at the Navy Office of Information for interested college journalism students (both undergraduate and graduate) and solicit applicants for this position from major colleges. Possible tasks associated with this position might be public opinion research, internal quality management, or future policy development.
ENDNOTES

Chapter 1


Chapter 2


2. Ibid., 6.

3. Ibid., 7.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 9.


10. Ibid., 379.

11. Ibid.


13. Ibid., 388.


15. Ibid., 114-5.

16. Ibid., 122.

17. Ibid., 211-12.


20. Ibid., 87.
Chapter 3


9. Ibid.


Chapter 4


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.


11. Ibid., 1-5.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 1-3.

14. Ibid., 3-64.
15. Ibid., 3-64.


18. Commander Mark Van Dyke, USN, (Assistant Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Strategic Command) interview by author, 8 January 1993, notes, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska.

19. Ibid.


21. Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5720.44, with Change 1, "Department of the Navy Public Affairs Policy and Regulations," 8-16C.

22. Ibid.


25. Ibid., enclosure (2), 15.


27. Ibid., 1.

28. Ibid.


32. The Playbook.

33. Ibid., 5.

34. Ibid., 4.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., 14.


40. Ibid., 7.


42. The Playbook, 9.

43. Ibid., 18.

44. Klauer interview, 19 March 1993.

45. Ibid.

46. The Playbook, 18.


49. Ibid.


53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.


58. Van Dyke interview, 8 January 1993.
60. Ibid.
61. Media opinion survey and white paper, enclosure (1), 5-6.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Van Dyke interview, 8 January 1993.
65. Media opinion survey and white paper, cover memorandum.


69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.


72. Commander Ned Lundquist, USN (Director, Fleet Hometown News Center), interview by author, 29 March 1993, Norfolk, Virginia, telephone interview, tape recording, Fleet Hometown News Center Offices, Norfolk, Virginia.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.


76. Ibid., 6.

77. Commander Steve Burnett, USN (Executive Director, Navy News This Week, Navy Office of Information), interview by author, 3 November 1992, Washington, D.C., telephone interview, Navy Office of Information, Washington, D.C.

78. Ibid.


80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Boyle, 20.


86. Bob Brewin, (Editor-At-Large, Federal Computer Week), interview by author, 18 March 1993, Falls Church, Virginia, telephone interview, tape recording, Falls Church, Virginia.

87. Commander Craig Quigley, USN (Assistant Chief of Information for Media Operations (OI-2), Navy Office of Information), interview by author, 21 October 1992, Washington-
ton, D.C., telephone interview, Navy Office of Information
Washington, D.C.


89. Brent Baker, (Dean of College of Journalism,
Boston University), interview by author, 25 March 1993,
Boston, Massachusetts, telephone interview, tape recording.
College of Journalism, Boston University, Boston, Massachu-
setts.

90. Reporting the Next War, ed. by Nancy Ethiel,
with forward by Neal Creighton, Chicago: Robert R. McCormick

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., 53.

93. Department of Defense, Public Affairs Handbook,
seventh edition., Department of Defense Information School,
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, 1992.


96. Ibid.


99. Boyle, 43.

October 1987), 16.

101. Mark Thompson, "With the Press Pool in the
Persian Gulf," Columbia Journalism Review, November/December
1987, 43.

102. Ibid., 41-42.

103. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, ed., The
Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, (New York:
Report What We’re Told", (article from 4 February 1991, The
Independent), 379.
105. Thompson, 371.
108. Thompson, 43.
109. Ibid., 44.
111. Ibid.
112. Thompson, 40.


116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Doubleday interview, 2 April 1993.
119. Ibid.

Chapter 5

1. Commander Mark Van Dyke, USN (Assistant Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Strategic Command) interview by author, 8 January 1993, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, notations, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska.


3. Ibid.


6. Brent Baker (Dean of College of Journalism, Boston University), interview by author, 25 March 1993, Boston, Massachusetts, telephone interview, tape recording, College of Journalism, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts.


8. Van Dyke interview, 8 January 1993.

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT NAVAL MEDIA EVENTS
1985-1992

July 1987-- USS STARK is mistakenly attacked by Iraqi Air Force in the Persian Gulf; media pool embarks to cover reflagged Kuwaiti tanker escort operation (Operation "Earnest Will"); N/V Bridgeton hits mine.

14 April 1988-- USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS hits a mine in the Northern Persian Gulf.

18 April 1988-- U.S. reprisals against Iranian oil platforms (Operation "Praying Mantis") for mining of the Persian Gulf commence; the first surface-to-surface Naval combat action since WWII.

19 April 1989-- Forty-seven crewman on the USS IOWA are killed when a gun turret explodes off Puerto Rico during training operations.

2 August 1990-- Iraq invades Kuwait.

5 August 1990-- Operation "Sharp Edge," noncombatant evacuation operation, authorized by the United States State Department to remove U.S. citizens caught in civil war in Liberia commences.

8 August 1990-- President Bush orders U.S. Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia.

16 August 1990-- Multi-national maritime interception force begins intercepting ships going to or from Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 661.

4 December 1990-- Navy and DOD Inspector General release information about inquiry into the Navy's A-12 attack aircraft program.

10 December 1990-- Secretary of the Navy Garrett testifies before House Armed Services Committee; DoD Inspector General announces criminal investigation initiated into overpayment on Navy A-12 program.
12 December 1990-- Under Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for Acquisition, John Betti resigns effective 31 December 1990 in response to A-12 inquiry.

7 January 1990-- SECDEF Cheney announces canceling the A-12 program.


16 January 1991-- Offensive war against Iraq commences; Operation "Desert Storm" begins with over 100 TOMAHAWK missiles and 228 Navy combat sorties from six aircraft carriers on the first day of war.

18 January 1991-- First combined helicopter missile and surface ship gun engagement of Operation "Desert Storm," in which five Iraqis are killed, 3 wounded, and 23 taken prisoner, the first enemy prisoners of war, by USS NICHOLAS (FFG-47), and embarked SH-60/USA helicopters.


24 January 1991-- Helicopters and SEALs from the USS LEFTWICH (DD-984), USS NICHOLAS (FFG-47), and USS CURTS (FFG-38) capture the island of Jazirat Qurah, first liberated Kuwaiti territory.

29 January 1991-- Eleven U.S. Marines killed north of Khafji, the first ground combat casualties of Operation "Desert Storm."

3 February 1991-- USS MISSOURI (BB-63) fires her guns for the first time since the Korean War, eight 1.25 ton shells from her 16-inch guns that destroy prefabricated concrete command and control bunkers, and also mark the first combat use of a Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) for gun fire spotting in a hostile environment.
6 February 1991-- USS GERMANTOWN (LSD-42), with four embarked air cushion landing craft (LCAC), arrives in Arabian Gulf, first combat use of new amphibious vehicle in Navy history.

18 February 1991-- Former SECNAV Lehman writes in Los Angeles Times that cancellation of A-12 program was right decision.

23 February 1991-- President Bush announces that he has directed General Schwarzkopf to use all available force to eject Iraqi soldiers from Kuwaiti soil. The ground offensive commences.

27 February 1991-- U.S. and coalition forces declare Kuwait liberated, ceasefire, and give terms of ceasefire to Saddam Hussein.

3 March 1991-- Iraq formally accept all terms of ceasefire.

7 September 1991-- Eighty-three women (21 of whom are Naval Officers) and seven men are assaulted or harassed at "Tailhook" convention at the Las Vegas Hilton Hotel.

10 October 1991-- Lieutenant Paula Coughlin, USN, a female aviator, complains of sexual harassment during the annual "Tailhook" aviator's convention held in September 1991 at the Las Vegas, Nevada Hilton Hotel.

26 June 1992-- Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett III resigns, citing "for the good of the service" over "Tailhook" incident as reason.

27 October 1992-- Alan Schindler, a Navy sailor attached to the USS BELLEAU WOOD, stationed in Sasebo, Japan, is beaten to death by two of his shipmates. Petty Officer Schindler was an avowed gay who has proclaimed his sexual preference publicly.

30 October 1991-- Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso II sends a strongly worded message to all commanders, commanding officers and officers-in-charge reiterating the policy of no tolerance of sexual harassment.

3 December 1992-- United Nations votes to use force to restore order in Somalia; U.S. designated lead agency in international military operation to ensure relief agencies may distribute food to starving civilians.

8 December 1992-- Navy Sea Air Land (SEAL) detachments and Marines go ashore near Mogadishu, Somalia to restore order; Operation "Restore Hope" commences.
February 1993-- Acting Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Kelso urges Defense Secretary Les Aspin to completely integrate women into Navy ships, submarines and aviation squadrons.

23 April 1993-- "Tailhook" final report is released to the public, detailing the sexual abuses of both men and women at the convention; 117 officers are implicated for sexual harassment and other misconduct, and 51 for lying.

5 May 1993-- U.S. forces relinquish lead role in Somalia to United Nations force; completion of Operation "Restore Hope."
NAVY-WIDE INTERNAL INFORMATION PRODUCTS

The following is a list of Navy-wide information products, followed by the originating command in parentheses, which receive general distribution within the DON (from appendix A of "Telling the Navy Story; A Handbook for the Collateral Duty PAO"):

All Hands: a general information magazine distributed monthly (Navy Internal Relations Activity (NIRA)).

"Navy News This Week": weekly, CNO-sponsored TV (video) news program of significant national/international and DON-related news shorts (Navy Broadcasting Service).

"Navy News Service": similar to the AP or UPI wire service, is a weekly message transmitted to all commands which highlights Navy-significant events, personnel developments and achievements, Navy milestones (NIRA).

"Captain's Call Kit": an information kit for Commanding Officers which provides resources for answering questions about media visits, requests for information, etc. (NIRA).

Navy Family Lifeline: a quarterly publication for Navy families which addresses needs and concerns, other pertinent issues for Navy spouses and children (NIRA).

"Public Affairs Planning Guide": a guide for the collateral duty PAO which outlines unit public affairs matters (NIRA).

"Report to the Congress": formal "white paper" which outlines significant operations, missions, and accomplishments for the previous stated period (NIRA).
LINK and Perspective: two bi-monthly periodicals that inform enlisted and officer personnel, respectively, of job and career issues and opportunities (Bureau of Naval Personnel).

Navy retention ads: short articles, designed to advertise the Navy as a career (Navy Recruiting Command).

Naval War College Review: quarterly journal of scholarly articles (Naval War College).

Navy Fact File: brochure, published periodically outlining statistics for the previous year achieved by Naval commands (CHINFO).

Navy Talking Points: "white paper" published intermittently to emphasize new strategy or policy within the DON (CHINFO).

Surface Warfare: bi-monthly magazine with articles relevant to surface ship operations and safety (OPNAV).

Naval Aviation News: bi-monthly magazine, the aviation counterpart to Surface Warfare (OPNAV).

Approach: bi-monthly safety magazine with current safety issues, lessons learned, etc. (Naval Safety Center).

Sea Legs: (Bureau of Naval Personnel)
STATEMENT OF DOD PRINCIPLES FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DOD OPERATIONS

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity — within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rule and result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journa-

---

ists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmissions of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases where government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

We believe these principles should govern future arrangements for news coverage of the United States military in combat.

ATTACHMENT ON SECURITY REVIEW

The news organizations originally proposed ten principles. One dealt with security reviews and said: "News material -- words and pictures -- will not be subject to security review."

The Pentagon proposed instead a principle that said: "Military operational security may require review of news material for conformance to reporting ground rules."

The fundamental disagreement could not be bridged.

News media statement

The news organizations are convinced that journalists covering U.S. forces in combat must be mindful at all times of operational security and the safety of American lives. News organizations strongly believe that the record in Operation Desert Storm, Vietnam and other wars supports the conclusion that journalists in the battlefield can be trusted to act responsibly.

We will challenge prior security review in the event that the Pentagon attempts to impose it in some future military operation.
Department of Defense statement

The military believes that it must retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that would endanger troop safety or the success of a mission.

Any review system would be imposed only when operational security is a consideration; for example, the very early stages of a contingency operation or sensitive periods in combat. If security review were imposed, it would be used for one very limited purpose: to prevent disclosure of information which, if published, would jeopardize troop safety or the success of a military operation. Such a review system would not be used to seek alterations in any other aspect of content or to delay timely transmission of news material.

Security review would be performed by the military in the field, giving the commander's representative the opportunity to address potential ground rule concerns and file it, or file it and flag for the editor whatever passages were in dispute. The editor would then call the Pentagon to give the military one last chance to talk about potential ground rule violations.

The Defense Department believes that the advantage of this system is that the news organizations would retain control of the material throughout the review and filing process. The Pentagon would have two chances to address
potential operational security violations, but the news organization would make the final decision about whether to publish the disputed information. Under principle four, violations of the ground rules could result in expulsion of the journalist involved from the combat zone.
NAVY REORGANIZATION PLAN

Acting Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe today approved a plan which will reorganize the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the staff assigned to support the CNO, by January 1, 1993. The plan, developed by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, aligns the OPNAV staff along the lines of its counterpart in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The plan will allow better interface with the Joint Staff; improve coordination among the OPNAV staff, the Navy Secretariat and the Office of the Secretary of Defense; place warfare community leadership roles at the fleet level; improve coordination among warfare communities on program planning decisions; reduce the number of flag officer billets in the Navy without cutting senior leadership in the fleet; allow requirements to be generated from the fleet level; and, reduce personnel and funding requirements for Washington headquarters.

The reorganization will eliminate four three-star flag billets and cut a total of about 150 officer, enlisted and civilian billets from the OPNAV rolls. Exact personnel cuts and dollar savings will be determined in the coming weeks. Under the new organization, staffs of the current Assistant

---

Chiefs of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare (OP-02), Surface Warfare (OP-03) and Air Warfare (OP-05) and the Director of Naval Warfare (OP-07) will merge into one staff under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessment, a three-star flag officer. This change supports Secretary O'Keefe's stated objectives to improve coordination among warfare communities in program planning decisions and to achieve a truly qualified and capable base force within the Navy which will support the President's national security strategy.

The current Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06) will become the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Policy, Strategy and Plans, with a one-star in charge of Operations and Plans and a two-star in charge of Strategy and Policy. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training (OP-01) will become the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel. The Chief of Naval Education and Training will assume responsibilities as Director of Naval Training and Doctrine. Staffs of the current Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (OP-04); Director of Space and Electronic Warfare (OP-94); and Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) will essentially maintain their current responsibilities.

Individual staff assignments, including those for flag officers, will be announced in the coming weeks. Personnel
losses will occur largely as result of normal rotation and attrition.
The Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps signed a new Navy/Marine Corps strategy on Tuesday, September 28. The strategy, entitled "...From the Sea" and developed in response to the challenges of today's world, shifts the focus from a global threat to a focus on regional challenges and opportunities, and concentrates on littoral (near land) warfare and maneuver from the sea.

The principal elements of the new direction of the naval service are strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. This new course will provide the nation with naval expeditionary forces and operating forward from the sea, that are sharped for joint operations and tailored for national needs.

The new strategy is a fundamental shift from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations form the sea. Changing the naval forces to an enabling force, the strategy will allow the Navy and Marine Corps to respond to global crises and to provide an initial capability for joint operations in conflict.

---

The naval service will continue to emphasize nuclear deterrence through the use of nuclear ballistic submarines, as well as the traditional naval mission of sealift.

Increased attention to command, control and surveillance; battlespace dominance; power projection; and force sustainment is required to successfully execute this new strategy. Flexibility is also a key factor -- naval forces will be tailored continuously to anticipate and support national needs.

To ensure the successful implementation of the new Navy/Marine Corps strategy, the service is establishing a Naval Doctrine Command to develop doctrine for expeditionary warfare.
APPENDIX B

FIGURES

Diagram Of Research Design

PRE-DESKTOP SHIELD/
STORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE I</th>
<th>MEDIA MANAGEMENT POLICIES/METHODS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHASE II</td>
<td>MEDIA MANAGEMENT POLICIES/METHODS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE III</td>
<td>MEDIA EVENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE III</td>
<td>MEDIA EVENTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POST-DESKTOP SHIELD/
STORM

| MEDIA MANAGEMENT POLICIES/METHODS |
| MEDIA MANAGEMENT POLICIES/METHODS |
| MEDIA MANAGEMENT POLICIES/METHODS |
| MEDIA EVENTS |
| MEDIA EVENTS |

FIGURE 1

113
CURRENT OPNAV STAFF

FIGURE 3

115
Navy Office of Information (OI-1)
Administration/Resource Management Dept.

FIGURE 4

Headquarters Organization (as of 4/20/9)
Navy Office of Information (OI-2)
Media Operations Department

FIGURE 5

Headquarters Organization (as of 4/20/9)
Navy Office of Information (OI-3/20)
Field Activities/Training Department

OI-3/20
Dir. Field Act/Train

Field Activities
Fleet PA Training

Headquarters Organization (as of 4/20/9)
Navy Office of Information (OI-4)
Internal Relations Department

OI-4

ACI for Internal Rel.

Navy News Editor

All Hands Editor

Headquarters Organization (as of 4/20/9)
Navy Office of Information (OI-5)
Plans/Policy/Community Programs Dept.

Headquarters Organization (as of 4/20/9)
Navy Office of Information (OI-6)
Navy Broadcast Service Department

OI-6

ACI Navy Broadcast Svc

Fleet Support

Navy News This Week

Headquarters Organization (as of 4/20/9)
Navy Office of Information (OI-7)
Navy Imaging Command

FIGURE 10

OI-7

Naval Imaging Command

Headquarters Organization (as of 4/20/9)
Navy Office of Information
Naval Information/Public Affairs Centers

Field Activities (as of 4/20/93)
Navy Office of Information

Headquarters Organization (as of 4/20/9)
APPENDIX C

MEDIA OPERATIONS SURVEY

(01-20)

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Using either a pen or a pencil, please answer the following questions by simply placing a circle around the letter indicating your response. Additional comments may be attached to the survey, if desired. Please return the survey by mail or by FAX (703) 695-5318 by January 20th, 1992.

1. Which term best describes the type of media you represent?
   32% a. Newspaper/wire service
   6% b. Television
   4% c. Radio
   10% d. Book
   2% e. Freelance Writer
   12% f. Freelance photographer
   28% g. Trade paper/magazine
   6% h. Other

2. Which phrase best describes the media you represent?
   50% a. Located within the Washington, D. C. area, covering defense issues (i.e. Pentagon correspondent)
   14% b. Located outside D. C. area, covering defense issues
   26% c. Located outside D. C. area, covering a variety of issues
   10% d. Other

' Survey is unpublished and listed in Selected Bibliography. Results from 50 respondents of 100 surveyed are in bold.
3. What type of request do you most often make from the Media Operations Department of the Office of Information (CHINFO)? Circle the category that reflects your normal request.

10% a. Embark on Navy ship
10% b. Interviews with Navy personnel inside the D.C. area
6% c. Interviews with Navy personnel outside the D.C. area
6% d. Visits to base facilities
64% e. Media queries (requests for information)
4% f. Other __________________________

4. How often do you request assistance from CHINFO?
6% a. Daily
30% b. Weekly
26% c. Monthly
10% d. Every 6 months
3% e. Once a year or longer
12% f. Other __________________________

5. How long ago was our last request for assistance?
64% a. Within past month
14% b. Within past 3 months
14% c. Within past 6 months
2% d. 6 months to one year
4% e. More than one year ago
2% f. Other __________________________

6. How would you rate your ability to gain access to the appropriate News Desk action officer?
28% a. Easy
52% b. Somewhat easy
10% c. Somewhat difficult
10% d. Difficult
e. Other

If difficult, why?
aa. Telephone lines busy
50% bb. Referred from office to office
50% cc. Action officer not available
dd. Other

126
7. How do you best describe the telephone courtesies extended by those with whom you initially come into contact in CHINFO?
   54% a. Always courteous
   36% b. Usually courteous
   8% c. Neutral
   2% d. Abrupt/abrasive

8. Does a CHINFO action officer maintain adequate communication with you while your request is being processed?
   18% a. Always
   22% b. Usually
   24% c. Sometimes
   4% d. Rarely
   2% e. Never

9. Are your media requests accommodated?
   18% a. Always
   46% b. Usually
   24% c. Sometimes
   12% d. Rarely
   0% e. Never

10. Are your requests answered in a timely fashion (quick responses, meeting deadlines)?
    14% a. Always
    44% b. Usually
    24% c. Sometimes
    18% d. Rarely
    0% e. Never

11. Do you think you give the CHINFO action officers adequate lead time to complete your request before the deadline?
    12% a. Always
    62% b. Usually
    20% c. Sometimes
    4% d. Rarely
    2% e. Never
    f. Not applicable

12. What is the average amount of time you allow the action officer to complete your media inquiry?
    6% a. Within the hour
    16% b. 2 - 3 hours
    4% c. 3 - 6 hours
    10% d. Same day
    30% e. 2 - 3 days
    34% f. More than 3 days
13. If you think that your request has not received appropriate attention, what do you think best describes the delay in processing?
   4% a. Lack of action by the desk officers in CHINFO
   20% b. Lack of support from offices within the Pentagon, other than CHINFO
   30% c. Lack of support from senior Navy/military leadership
   6% d. Lack of support at the local level, where the embarks and interviews take place
   16% e. My requests have always received appropriate attention
   24% f. Do not know

14. What do you consider adequate response time for the Navy to schedule an embark on a Navy ship?
   22% a. 2 weeks
   38% b. Less than a month
   18% c. 1 – 2 months
   22% d. More than 2 months
   e. Other ____________________________

15. For embarks, how much time do you normally need on a Navy ship in order to complete your story?
   6% a. One day
   46% b. Two days
   10% c. Three or more days
   6% d. Week or less
   4% e. Week or more
   28% f. Not applicable

How would you rate the CHINFO action officers on the following traits. Please circle your response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>1 = Poor</th>
<th>10 = Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>16. Courteous</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>17. Timely</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>18. Accurate</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>19. Honest</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>20. Effective</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>21. Sincere</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3  22. Please circle the number which best indicates your overall confidence level in Navy Public Affairs:

1 = Lowest confidence  10 = Highest confidence

NAVY  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10

6.2  23. In your opinion, how would you rate Navy public affairs in comparison with other services, organizations and agencies which deal with public relations/affairs? (Consider responsiveness, timeliness, completion, accuracy, validity, integrity).

1 = Worst  10 = Best

NAVY  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10

19. What suggestions do you have for improving CHINFO’s responses to your media requests? Please write responses in order of priority.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________________________

Name and organization (Optional) ____________________________

Additional comments may be included on separate paper.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Congressional Proceedings


Sherman, Mike, Captain, USN. "Informing Through the JIB." U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1991, 59-61.


**Theses/Papers**


Benson, Kevin C. "Reporting Live From Planning Principles for War in the Information Age." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.


Peterson, G. I. "Public Affairs and the Commander." Student research paper, Naval War College, 1983.


Unpublished Materials

Other Sources

Baker, Brent (Dean, College of Journalism, Boston University). Interview by author, 25 March 1993, Boston, Massachusetts. Telephone interview, tape recording. College of Journalism, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts.


Brewin, Bob (Editor-at-Large, Federal Computer Week). Interview by author, 18 March 1993, Falls Church, Virginia. Telephone interview, tape recording. Falls Church, Virginia.


Doubleday, Michael, Captain, USN (Director of Defense Information (DDI), Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)). Interview by author, 2 April 1993, Washington, D.C. Telephone interview, tape recording. The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.


Lundquist, Ned, Commander, USN (Director, Fleet Hometown News Center). Interview by author, 29 March 1993, Norfolk, Virginia. Telephone interview, tape recording. Fleet Hometown News Center, Norfolk, Virginia.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

2. Defense Technical Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, Virginia 22314

3. Defense Information School
   Library
   Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana 46216-6200

4. Naval War College Library
   Hewitt Hall
   U.S. Navy War College
   Newport, Rhode Island, 02841-5010

5. Mr. Michael D. Baker
   Center for Army Leadership
   USACGSJ
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

6. MAJ Anne P. LeGare, USA
   210 South Kaw
   Junction City, Kansas 66441

7. Dr. Lowndes F. Stephens
   College of Journalism
   University of South Carolina
   Columbia, South Carolina 29208

8. LTC Theodore Davis, USA
   Department of Joint and Combined Operations
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

9. Chief of Information (2 copies)
   Department of the Navy
   Office of Information
   Washington, D.C. 20350-1200
10. Dean Brent Baker  
College of Journalism  
Boston University  
640 Commonwealth Ave.  
Boston, Massachusetts  02215

11. BGEN. Charles W. McClain, Jr.  
Chief of Public Affairs  
1500 Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.  20310-1500

12. BGEN. Walter S. Hogle, Jr.  
Director of Public Affairs  
1690 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.  20330-1690

13. Commander Mark Van Dyke, USN  
Deputy Chief, Public Affairs  
U.S. Strategic Command  
Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska  68113

14. Rear Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Jr., USN  
Department of the Navy  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington, DC  20350-2000

15. Captain Edward E. Hunter, USN  
Destroyer Squadron FOURTEEN  
FPO AA 34099-4716

16. Captain John N. Petrie, USN  
National War College  
Fort Leslie J. McNair  
Washington, D.C.  20319-6000

17. Lieutenant Commander Betsy Jenkins Bird, USN  
Assistant Public Affairs Officer  
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet  
Honolulu, Hawaii  96860