RETHINKING THE ROLE OF
SOVIET MILITARY POWER

Robbin F. Laird
Susan L. Clark

July 1991

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

IDA
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
Contract MDA 903 89 C 0003
Task T-K6-670
DEFINITIONS

IDA publishes the following documents to report the results of its work:

Reports

Reports are the most authoritative and most carefully considered products IDA publishes. They normally embody results of major projects which (a) have a direct bearing on decisions affecting major programs, (b) address issues of significant concern to the Executive Branch, the Congress and/or the public, or (c) address issues that have significant economic implications. IDA Reports are reviewed by outside panels of experts to ensure their high quality and relevance to the problems studied, and they are released by the President of IDA.

Group Reports

Group Reports record the findings and results of IDA established working groups and panels composed of senior individuals addressing major issues which otherwise would be the subject of an IDA Report. IDA Group Reports are reviewed by the senior individuals responsible for the project and others as selected by IDA to ensure their high quality and relevance to the problems studied, and are released by the President of IDA.

Papers

Papers, also authoritative and carefully considered products of IDA, address studies that are narrower in scope than those covered in Reports. IDA Papers are reviewed to ensure that they meet the high standards expected of refereed papers in professional journals or formal Agency reports.

Documents

IDA Documents are used for the convenience of the sponsors or the analysts (a) to record substantive work done in quick reaction studies, (b) to record the proceedings of conferences and meetings, (c) to make available preliminary and tentative results of analyses, (d) to record data developed in the course of an investigation, or (e) to forward information that is essentially unanalyzed and unevaluated. The review of IDA Documents is suited to their content and intended use.

The work reported in this document was conducted under contract NOA 9636 C 00023 for the Department of Defense. The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
This paper examines the changing role of the Soviet military and the military instrument in the Soviet system. It begins by identifying traditional Soviet foreign policy objectives and how they have changed under Gorbachev. In turn, these foreign policy shifts have played a part in redefining the role of the Soviet military.

Changes in the General Staff’s agenda are then examined, followed by an overview of the implications of the nationalities problem for the Soviet military. As the Soviet system faces a challenging time of change, the military must determine how it will participate in this change. This paper offers several alternative futures for the Soviet Union, with particular attention focused on the resultant alternative roles for Soviet foreign and security policy. This paper also argues that the security debates in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe will all affect each other. Within the Soviet Union, the most important debate is the one between the Union and the Republics. The challenges for the West is to develop new approaches to our involvement in these security debates.
PREFACE

This paper is the final report of a study performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Policy. This paper examines the effects of changing foreign policy objectives on the Soviet military and the military's current and future role in the Soviet system. The study as a whole has examined a range of factors influencing the Soviet force structure and security policy, such as arms control, changing threat assessments, and perceived security requirements.

This study was conducted under contract MDA 903 89C 0003, under the task entitled, "The Evolution of Soviet Thinking About Security Policy."

The authors would particularly like to thank the reviewers of this paper, Dr. Christopher Jones and Dr. Erik Hoffmann, for their helpful comments.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE .......................................................................................................................... iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... ES-1
A. The Changing Soviet Foreign Policy Paradigm ........................................................... 1
B. The Impact of the Changing Soviet Paradigm on the Soviet Military ...................... 4
C. Classic Military Issues ................................................................................................. 6
D. The Nationalities Issue ............................................................................................... 8
E. The Soviet Military and the Evolution of the USSR: Key Questions of Analysis .......... 9
F. Alternative Soviet Futures, the Role of Foreign Policy, and the Military .................. 10
   1. The Dominant Great Russian Center ..................................................................... 10
   2. Reform Alternatives .............................................................................................. 11
   3. Revolt and Fragmentation ..................................................................................... 13
G. The Military Role in Soviet Policy in a Changing Global Context .......................... 14
H. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 17

TABLES

Table 1. Dominant Great Russian Center ........................................................................ 10
Table 2. Reform Alternatives ......................................................................................... 12
Table 3. Revolt and Fragmentation ................................................................................ 14
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the changing role of the Soviet military and the military instrument in the Soviet system. It begins by identifying traditional Soviet foreign policy objectives and how they have changed under Gorbachev. In turn, these foreign policy shifts have played a part in redefining the role of the Soviet military.

Changes in the General Staff's agenda are then examined, followed by an overview of the implications of the nationalities problem for the Soviet military. As the Soviet system faces a challenging time of change, the military must determine how it will participate in this change. This paper offers several alternative futures for the Soviet Union, focusing particular attention on the resultant alternative roles for Soviet foreign and security policy. This paper also argues that the security debates in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe will all affect each other. Within the Soviet Union, the most important debate is the one between the Union and the Republics.

The challenge for the West is to develop new approaches to our involvement in these security debates.
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER

The role of the Soviet military and of the military instrument within Soviet foreign and domestic policy is changing dramatically because of the new international and domestic conditions of the 1990s. Within the Soviet Union, the long period of reform initiated by the de-Stalinization process of the mid-1950s has culminated in the Gorbachevian Revolution of the 1990s. The Revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany in 1990 have created fundamental changes in the foreign policy environment of the Soviet state as well.

As a result of these shifts in domestic, foreign, and security policies, Western analysts of the Soviet Union are faced with new challenges. The purpose of this paper is to identify the shifting analytical dynamics surrounding Soviet military issues. Among the major questions that seem to be emerging from the dynamics of change are the following:

- What is and might be the role of the Soviet military in the evolving Soviet political system?
- How should the role of the Soviet military today be analyzed?
- What are the major factors shaping the role of the Soviet military?
- What role might the military play in shaping a new system?
- How might domestic and foreign policy variables interconnect in shaping the political-military system in the Soviet Union today and in the future?

A. THE CHANGING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PARADIGM

In the wake of the Revolution of 1989, the classic elements of Soviet foreign policy, which had been designed and implemented by the Communist Party and the Soviet state, began to crumble. What are those classic elements, how have they changed, and what new elements seem to be emerging for Soviet foreign policy? In retrospect, the traditional Soviet foreign policy paradigm has consisted of 10 key elements. First, there has been an ideological basis to Soviet foreign policy, whereby the core allies of the USSR have been regimes that embrace Soviet-style socialism. The Soviet Union has chosen its allies at least partly on the basis of ideological affinity with the Soviet model of socialism.
Second, Soviet foreign policy has been defined with regard to the interests of what has been the "leading force" in Soviet society: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPSU embodies the general will of the Soviet people, and the party leadership frames current definitions of the national will.

Third, the goal of foreign policy has been to aid the development of the Soviet model of socialism. The Soviets believe that it is necessary to protect this model from contamination by outside forces, but limited involvement with the outside world is necessary for reasons of global economic development and competition.

Fourth, Soviet policy has incorporated geopolitical considerations, as well as ideological and Communist Party objectives. Hence, the Soviet leadership has selected its allies on the basis of the importance of the given state or its political forces, not just on the basis of ideology alone. Any contradictions between ideological and geopolitical definitions of state interest were to be resolved by the party leadership. To a large extent, geopolitical considerations have been considered temporary, whereas ideological ones have been considered permanent factors dictating alliances.

The fifth element of Soviet foreign policy has been the belief that defense of the socialist commonwealth is critical to the vitality of the Soviet Union. The construction of an interdependent socialist system, especially with countries in Eastern Europe, gradually supplanted the notion of socialism in one country.

The sixth element is related to the previous one: the defense of the empire in Eastern Europe was conjoined with defense of the empire at home. The objective of the Soviet leadership was to build a new "Soviet" people. Moreover, just as nationalism was to be overcome within the USSR's borders, so too was it supposed to be overcome as a new commonwealth of socialist nations was created. This experience at home was to be the basis of change in the Soviet-East European relationship. As history has shown, this was not accomplished either at home or in Soviet relations with its satellites.

Seventh, Soviet foreign policy allowed for pragmatic compromises with the West. It was believed that contradictions between the socialist and capitalist systems could be overcome by peaceful means, but that it was necessary to have a substantial military capability to defend the interests of socialism against imperialist pressures.

Eighth, the Soviet system established a centralized elite capable of formulating a coordinated national policy. Diplomatic, economic, political, and military instruments were
combined through a highly centralized party-state system. Objectives set by the highest level of Soviet leadership were enforced throughout the socialist community.

Ninth, the power of the Soviet Union was enhanced by a combination of centralized control at home and an ability to drive wedges in alliances comprised of class enemies abroad. By pursuing an anti-coalition strategy against the West, the Soviet Union could hope to compete effectively with a far more powerful Western system.

Above all, the classic approach of Soviet foreign policy rested upon a careful balance between competitiveness and cooperation with the West, especially in the late-1970s and early-1980s. The West offered a model of progress in the economic sphere, but not in the cultural, political, or military spheres. In other words, the West provided elements to emulate for economic, scientific, and technological progress, but at the same time posed challenges to the viability of the socialist system from a security and cultural standpoint.

Each of these elements of classic Soviet foreign policy has been challenged and reassessed today. Most important, the viability of the Stalinist model of development became subject to widespread doubt within the Soviet Union, perhaps especially among the Soviet elite. The clear ideological guideline of the past no longer seemed relevant; and if the autarchic model was not relevant, then what was the point of a separate socialist commonwealth? What is the meaning of a Soviet socialist model today? Gradually, the belief in a unique Soviet socialist model gave way to a search for a new model.

Next, the Communist Party organization began to crumble. The old system whereby the CPSU and its leadership embodied the will of the proletariat gave way to fragmentation of the political system. The will of the people seemed to dissipate into tribal political warfare. No longer believing in the superiority of the Soviet model, elites began searching for new alternatives. Such intellectual and political quests require interaction with the outside world rather than defensive reactiveness. So while geopolitical objectives remain important for the new USSR, they have been overshadowed by the need to transform the Soviet polity. In short, the quest for partners to develop the USSR has become more significant at the beginning of the 1990s than the pursuit of the classic ideological or geopolitical objectives.

Not only have Soviet objectives shifted, but the old USSR itself is disappearing. The pressures for disintegration inside the USSR, combined with the crumbling of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, mean that the socialist commonwealth is collapsing at
home and abroad. New elites are emerging within the USSR at the union, republic, and sub-regional levels; and it is the interaction of these new elites with the outside world that is helping to shape the new Soviet system. The patterns of interaction between the emerging national and sub-national elites in the USSR and their Western counterparts will become increasingly central to the definition of Soviet foreign policy itself.

Yet although ties with the outside world have been vastly expanded, the power instruments available to Soviet leaders to develop their country remain distinctly unclear. Military power certainly remains important. But how will the Soviet elites develop the economic power to participate in their own reconstruction within a global economic setting? How will the Soviets develop a culture compatible with 21st century modernization?

B. THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGING SOVIET PARADIGM ON THE SOVIET MILITARY

Within the context of these fundamental shifts in Soviet foreign policy, four developments have been especially important in redefining the role of the military and the military instrument. First, the geopolitical Soviet elite which sat above society on the throne of party-state domination is being pulled apart. There is currently a serious struggle over who makes foreign policy and what the role of foreign policy is in the newly emerging Soviet political system. Nowhere was this struggle more apparent than in the war of words between conservative/reactionary forces (including many in the military hierarchy) and former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze over the course of Soviet foreign policy, the loss of Eastern Europe, etc. Shevardnadze repeatedly emphasized that the Foreign Ministry had no power to make such decisions unilaterally; however, faced with a constant barrage of criticism and finding insufficient overt support from Gorbachev, Shevardnadze ultimately opted to resign his post in anger and frustration.

Second, the demands of cultural, national, political, and economic development are superseding those of pure foreign policy as well as the role of the military instrument in foreign policy. To be more explicit, there is no foreign policy within which the military instrument could be used as the sole instrument. The basic problem is that the military wants to be a professional, not political, force. However, a professional role is possible only once the broad political questions have been resolved. Put bluntly, the military cannot be a technocratic instrument of the political order when no political order exists. What must still be answered is for whom and for what will the military be professional, and to what extent will the military participate in answering these questions. This dynamic creates a
fundamental change in the role of the Soviet military as a professional power tool in the hands of the centralized elite.

Third, the USSR's central state apparatus is not only being pulled apart by demands for change in the role of the unitary state, it is also being challenged more fundamentally by the republics and other non-centralized organs of power. All these actors are involved in a struggle to create power, and the republics are major claimants in trying to generate a new system. The future shape of the union poses many fundamental questions for the military, notably will there be several militaries within the former USSR or will a centralized military emerge as an instrument to create a new unitary state?

Finally, in the process of change, the USSR is finding itself open to greater outside pressures and influences as different factions within Russia and the USSR try to capture outside support. Various groups and individuals seek to use this outside support to legitimate their role within the domestic system. Among those engaged in this dialogue are the top Soviet military leadership and a number of military reformers.

For the Soviet military and, indeed, all of Soviet society, the current process of interaction with the outside world represents a dramatic break with the past. The impact of the West on the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s was to stimulate modernization without fostering liberalization. During that period, the Soviet leadership repeated historical patterns, whereby the czarist autocracy sought to use an opening to the West to bolster key elements of the system it ruled. But in contrast to earlier times, influential segments of the Brezhnev leadership recognized the need to maintain an opening to the West in order to foster an ongoing process of modernization.

The need for various continuing ties to help modernize the Soviet system meant that a number of problems nurtured by Western contact (such as ideological subversion) were prices to be paid over the long term. The Soviet leadership recognized that the constant need to control the "negative effects" of exposure to the West was a key policy problem. Thus, managing the ambiguity surrounding the West's influence on the Soviet system was a significant policy problem for the Soviet leadership as it sought to accelerate the modernization of the Soviet system in the 1970s and 1980s.

In the current environment, the Soviets perceive interaction with the West to be central to redefining a model of political and economic development in the USSR. Rather than merely trying to contain or limit the "negative tendencies" that ties with the West create, the paramount task today is to encourage innovation. The Soviet state is doing
nothing less than redefining its objectives, in part through interaction with the Western world. This process challenges the state apparatus to define a new relationship with the West—one designed to promote innovation, not merely to control interaction.

The new East-West interactive dynamic signals changes and challenges to the traditional role of the Soviet military as well. No longer the protectorate of either the nation or the empire against outside influences, the military must now participate in a nationwide process of redefining the role of Russia and the USSR in the world today and tomorrow. The military is forced to participate in a political process of change whether it wishes to cling to a purely "professional" role or not.

C. CLASSIC MILITARY ISSUES

The process of change does not mean that all of the classic issues of analysis of the Soviet military are now irrelevant. It simply means that they are no longer first-order issues for the Soviets, although they remain of first-order relevance to the outside world. In fact, this difference in priorities is one of the most disconcerting aspects of the dynamics of change. Thus, issues that the outside world considers critical are slipping to the backburner of history for the Soviets as they struggle to cope with more fundamental problems of cultural identity, political development, and economic change.

Nevertheless, a number of classic military issues remain central, including in the new context. They are the following:

- What is the role of the General Staff?
- How is the General Staff framing critical military issues?
- What military-technical options seem to be preferred by the General Staff?
- How does the General Staff define its role in the Soviet foreign and domestic systems?

But even here the absence of a unifying domestic and foreign policy framework makes it difficult to determine the meaning behind General Staff behavior in certain areas. The General Staff has been moving forward on a number of doctrinal and organizational issues, but these positions should not necessarily be equated with the policy of a unitary state. Rather, the military leadership is developing these positions within the context of profound domestic change; the General Staff has become only one claimant among many arguing for the right to establish the legitimate positions on military issues for the Soviet state.
Among the positions it has articulated, the General Staff has come to promote a notion of defensive doctrine and reasonable sufficiency. Whereas before the Revolution of 1989, their discussions seemed part of an effort to entrap the West in a process of military decline, now the General Staff sees the need to define defensive defense in a way that places a floor under Soviet military requirements. In this connection, they viewed earlier conventional arms control as a means of leveraging German military power and the Western Alliance commitment to Germany, but they now see CFE as providing an international guarantee for minimum force requirements. In short, now that the Soviet military finds itself alone, not only facing the West but also its former allies, the desire is to be able to codify some acceptable, minimum level of conventional forces. Having the level identified may prove useful to the General Staff as it fights domestic battles as well against efforts to significantly reduce its force size.

Second, the General Staff may even move toward grudging acceptance of a minimum nuclear deterrence requirement. One of the few issues which Soviet conservatives and reformers seem to agree upon is the need for the Soviet Union, or more accurately Russia, to possess some nuclear weapons. The General Staff has shown some willingness to discuss a minimum nuclear force posture (albeit one as high as possible) in part to participate in several internal debates and to gain as much political support as possible from other players in the security arena.

Third, the threat assessment is changing as well. No longer confronted with a clear threat from NATO, the General Staff is seeking to justify its role by providing forces for dealing with subversion from the South and perhaps with resurgent nationalism in Eastern Europe. It is not seeking to justify its role in terms of maintaining or creating domestic order within Russia or the USSR. Nevertheless, the force of events might well push the General Staff in this direction, making it look more like the Brazilian military of the 1970s than the Russian military of the Cold War.

Fourth, the General Staff clearly sees the need to keep its focus on professional military issues, even when the political and foreign policy context within which these issues have operated over the past 50 years is changing dramatically. For the military leadership, personnel problems are paramount, including the challenges of significantly paring down the size of the general officer corps, creating a much smaller and more professional Russian military, and improving military leadership and overall officer morale. Yet even with regard to professional issues, the context is changing so dramatically that the meaning of outcomes is changing as well. Thus, maintaining a large professional military
in the dynamics of the 1990s is already an important political statement. Breaking it up into regional components is quite a different political reality.

D. THE NATIONALITIES ISSUE

One of the most important factors in shaping not only the Soviet military but the country as a whole is the rise of nationalism within the USSR. Indeed, nationalism has become the most likely force leading to the dissolution of the USSR. As such, it clearly influences the fate of the Russian or Soviet military.

For the military, more overt manifestations of nationalism in recent years have had several direct consequences. First, nationalism is fundamentally undermining the long-standing principle that the Soviet armed forces should be a multinational organization. More and more young men are evading the USSR's military draft due to such factors as increasing cases of hazing, the military's role in quelling nationalist unrest throughout the Soviet Union, and encouragement by many of the republic leaderships to avoid union-level military service. As a result, the conscript-based system has grown increasingly unviable, and nationalism has fueled the debate about professionalizing the armed forces and about creating national and/or territorial formations. Second, the use of the military to suppress nationalist demonstrations has led to the belief that more reliable (probably pure-Russian) units must be developed and used in such circumstances. Redefining the military's domestic role in this way, however, only contributes to further domestic conflict.

Looking to the future, it is apparent that nationalism will be a determining factor in the way the Soviet military evolves. The primary uncertainty is whether the Soviet military will remain a unified force, linked to the central leadership, or whether it will fragment into a number of national forces. Assuming that the Soviet military remains a unified force, nationalism will continue to influence its character—the size and shape of the forces, its domestic role, and perhaps even relations among various military units (for example, might fights even break out between units, largely due to ethnic tensions).

The second scenario would be for the Soviet military to splinter into multiple militaries in a fragmented Soviet Union. The effects of national differentiation would be profound in this case. One question would be whether there would still be some form of central control over the new militaries, or perhaps some residual central forces would be retained. All the militaries would be faced with trying to identify relevant models for their development. As they elaborated force structures and doctrine, in addition to defining new
relationships—and possible tensions—with other counterparts, the nationalism factor would undoubtedly prove a vital consideration.

Finally, all these developments at the military level will have important consequences for the state's foreign policy objectives. How these changes will be perceived by the United States and the European nations presents another factor for Soviet policymakers to consider as these difficult choices are made.

E. THE SOVIET MILITARY AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE USSR: KEY QUESTIONS OF ANALYSIS

No matter how hard the professional soldiers in the USSR try to circumscribe their efforts to deal with their professional role, the collapse of the Soviet domestic system forces them to participate in political change. The central issue is exactly how they will participate. Experience of Third World polities underscores that the military, or parts of the military, can become powerful forces for political intervention once a conservative or reformist agenda has been articulated by political leaders. The military is not a good force, however, for developing these agendas itself.

A number of key questions clearly are emerging concomitant with the question about the role of the Soviet military in the political evolution of the USSR. These questions are the following:

- How does the evolution of the Soviet military as an institution connect with the evolution of the Soviet system itself?
- As political institutions weaken, what roles can be defined for the Russian or Soviet military?
- In other political systems, the weakness of civilian institutions has invited greater participation by elites commanding instruments of coercion. Will this pattern be repeated in the Soviet Union or will the military adopt a different role?
- In other words, are there comparative examples more relevant to the Russian military than its own past?

Simply posing these questions raises a challenge to the analysts of the Soviet military. If the international and domestic contexts are changing dramatically and making the USSR more open to outside influences than in the immediate past, how can the learning cycle be analyzed? What are the relevant outside influences? What are the relevant models from cultural and political development in the Third World or among developed nations?
F. ALTERNATIVE SOVIET FUTURES, THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE MILITARY

A number of broad alternative Soviet futures can be identified as a basis for discerning alternative roles for Soviet foreign and security policy. This section briefly describes several possible scenarios and outlines the main variables for each: the role of foreign policy; the focus of the state, policymaking locus; and the tenor of economic, military, and diplomatic dynamics. For each scenario, the role of the military is a key focus.

1. The Dominant Great Russian Center

Under the first alternative future, a dominant Great Russian center, the unitary state would be preserved but its role would change. An important point is that the new unitary state could serve either conservative or reformist goals. Hence, there are two variants of this alternative future, as reflected in Table 1, below. In the conservative variant, a coalition of forces would emerge and successfully exploit traditional Russian preferences for order and a unitary state. The conservative variant would emphasize the use of the unitary state to promote conservative Russian values or to develop further Russian nationalist values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Conservative Variant</th>
<th>Reform Variant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Irredentist Nationalism</td>
<td>Nationalism as Means of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Restarting the Engine of Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Sense of the Nation</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policymaking Locus</td>
<td>Moscow-centric</td>
<td>Centrism; Diversification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Dynamics</td>
<td>Limited Economic Reform</td>
<td>Participate in European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Dynamics</td>
<td>Brazilian Model</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Dynamics</td>
<td>Protect the National Character</td>
<td>FRG Model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The role of foreign policy in this alternative would be to promote the sense of the nation and to rebuild the unitary state. Foreign policy would be a key instrument in reinforcing domestic cohesion. Policymaking would be concentrated in Moscow, with the emphasis on an inward-looking approach. The outside world would essentially be excluded. Economic development would be promoted only to a limited extent, while in the
diplomatic arena the primary objective would be to protect the national character from untoward outside influences.

The role of the military in the conservative variant would be to participate as a key force promoting a Russian conservative national alternative. The army would become more political, perhaps along the lines of the Brazilian model in the 1970s and early-1980s. The army might intervene in the government from time to time to protect conservative values from the threat of weak civilian leaders.

The other option under a dominant Great Russian center is reform. This alternative would emphasize the reform of the unitary state so that it could sponsor change from above in fostering a new Russian system. The focus of the state would be upon nurturing a new progressive development model.

The role of foreign policy in this model would be to enlist outside support in the reform process. Thus, in contrast to the conservative variant, which adheres to a nationalism that excludes the outside world, the reform variant develops a nationalism that emphasizes interdependence with the world community. The state would encourage foreign investment and perhaps diversification on an economic regional basis. By encouraging foreign investment, the state would open the door to greater integration in the world economy and, hence, to participation in European reconstruction and development. Given this expanded role in the international community, the state, on the diplomatic level, would seek to participate in global changes; such efforts would have the additional objective of helping to sponsor domestic change.

The role of the military would be to support the emergent development model. The military would aid and protect the unitary state but would not be so large as to subvert it. The West German model of civilian-military relations might be adopted whereby the military's role would be clearly limited to territorial defense. The military would be participants in the process of legitimizing the new development model rather than enforcing order.

2. Reform Alternatives

As with the dominant Great Russian center scenarios, the reform alternative could have two variants: the federal union and confederation (Table 2). In the federal union model, a federal system would be built from the republics up. After a process of
successful challenge to the unitary state by the republics and other regional organs, some power would be returned to the central state organs now operating as a federal government.

Table 2. Reform Alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description/Purpose</th>
<th>Federal Union</th>
<th>Confederation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Used to Bolster Process of Change</td>
<td></td>
<td>Networking of Separate Entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Legitimization of New Change</td>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimization of Role of Confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policymaking Locus</td>
<td>Developmental Model</td>
<td></td>
<td>Central Institutions as Change Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Dynamics</td>
<td>Central: Legislative and Executive Balance;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultative Coordinators; Change Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Dynamics</td>
<td>FRG Model</td>
<td></td>
<td>Regionalization (Within USSR and Without)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Dynamics</td>
<td>Priority on Political Development and Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Priority on Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restoration; Security Tasks as Residuum</td>
<td></td>
<td>Development and Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reconstruction;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security as Internal Control for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Purposes of Stabilization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The central government would be responsible for developing a foreign policy whereby the outside world gained confidence in the new governmental arrangements. Interactions with the outside world would also be used to give impetus to the changes being implemented. There would be a single currency and set of overall laws governing economic investment, but beyond this, diversification and regionalization would be encouraged. A single overarching security and defense policy would prevail, even if some regional military elements obtained. Thus, policymaking in these areas would remain largely the purview of the central leadership, but regions would have much greater responsibility for implementation of policy and considerably more room for maneuver.

The role of the military would be to nurture the federalist option. The military would develop a national framework for shaping regional military elements into a relatively cohesive instrument. Again, a variant of the FRG model might be pursued. Military issues would clearly be residual ones under the federal union variant; the priority would be placed on political development and economic reconstruction.

As a halfway house toward federation, a confederal solution might be pursued; this would be the second variant under a reform alternative. Here the regions would lust for as
much power as possible, and severe struggle against a central state would be the order of the day.

The key challenge and vital element in legitimizing the role of the confederation would be to develop a network among the separate regional entities. Regionalization would be highlighted as the means toward economic development and cultural renaissance, while central institutions would serve only as consultative coordinators. Foreign policy would emerge from overlapping regional political entities.

The military would be broken up through a process of regionalization. Emphasis would be placed on territorial defense, defined on a regional or subregional basis. The military would reflect the pressures for decentralization and fragmentation, and whatever national-level forces that remained would have only a residual role. Whereas in the federal model the military would be one of the key instruments involved in transforming the unitary state, in the confederal model intra-military tensions would aggravate the effort to develop a more regionally dynamic USSR. In addition, whereas both reform alternatives would place priority on political development and economic reconstruction issues, the confederal scenario would focus more on security issues than would the federal option. Given the inherent tensions between the center and regions (and perhaps between regions) in the confederal model, military forces would be an important means for establishing internal control to stabilize the situation.

3. Revolt and Fragmentation

A final alternative scenario might entail revolt and fragmentation. In this model, the unitary state would collapse over a long period, and no clear alternative framework for governing would emerge. The result might resemble warlord China in the 1920s, or perhaps something more benign. In that type of environment, a mixture of newly independent states, de facto alternative regional governments, republic governments, and a residual central state would coexist.

As Table 3 indicates, foreign policy would waver between an attempt to deflect outside pressures and an attempt to draw in outsiders as a way of legitimating some particular government entity. Domestic considerations would clearly overwhelm the ability of the Russians and non-Russians to define a national agenda to be promoted externally. Indeed, preoccupations would be focused at a much more rudimentary level as the various actors struggled between development and law and order issues. Political development
would be severely hindered by the lack of a policymaking locus. Economic development would similarly be limited by the struggle to determine who has ownership over what.

Table 3. Revolt and Fragmentation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description/Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of Foreign Policy</td>
<td>To Deflect External Interference; To Seek Outside Sponsors for Internal Development and Legitimation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Struggle Between Development and Law and Order Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policymaking Locus</td>
<td>In Flux; Absence of Locus as Part of Struggle for Political Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Dynamics</td>
<td>Struggle To Define Ownership of Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Dynamics</td>
<td>Military as Tools in Domestic Struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Dynamics</td>
<td>Domestic Considerations Overwhelm Ability to Define National Agenda to be Promoted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Externally; Struggle Over Opacity and Closure of USSR to Outside Influences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The military would clearly reflect these pressures for disintegration and reintegration. The military itself would probably fragment, and that fragmentation might translate into civil war if the military failed to maintain a monopoly on the instruments of armed violence. Bargains reached between civilians and the military and among military factions themselves would be critical to defining the level of violence in the society and the character of the meta-state, with which instability is associated. If the military refrained from direct intervention either for or against any particular force, it might become the caretaker for the future nation. If it became embroiled in internecine warfare, military factions would form important components of resultant political arrangements.

G. THE MILITARY ROLE IN SOVIET POLICY IN A CHANGING GLOBAL CONTEXT

As this paper has shown, the role of Soviet foreign policy is becoming dramatically different from what it was in the postwar period. It differs in four important ways. First, the geopolitical elite has collapsed and with it the centrality of a "neutral" military power instrument. Second, foreign policy contacts with the outside world have become components of the internal power struggle. Third, this new dimension to the power struggle has spawned lobbies in the foreign policymaking process. Fourth, the emergence of lobbies has in turn led to the emergence of a very uncertain agenda in Soviet foreign policy.
Again the analytical challenges for those who study the Soviet system are formidable. Instead of examining the actions of a clearly defined elite in a unitary state, the task has now become to identify the elite, to define what context they are operating in, and to determine what positions should be supported for what type of political and security outcomes.

Especially with regard to European security issues, there is a complicated process of interaction among the debates in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States. In fact, the new European security environment is being defined by the intersection of three security debates. The first is the one going on in the Soviet Union about the future of the USSR and the role of the present Soviet military in the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union or its successor states. The second security debate is that of the East Europeans who are currently trying to establish their identity in the new Europe. The third debate pertains to the West European process of rethinking the West's traditional collective defense posture. While each of these debates has a dynamic of its own, the terms and outcomes of the debates will be shaped largely by the interaction of each with the other two. The key debates in the USSR and Eastern Europe are focused on the nation-building issues of the post-communist era—that is, issues of an intra-national, national, and regional nature. What has also become evident is that the United States is primarily a spectator in the emergence of a new European security system.

The most critical debate is the one underway between Russians in the two Moscows—the Soviet center presided over by Gorbachev and the Russian republic presided over by Boris Yeltsin. The course of this debate is being profoundly influenced by several related debates. One such debate is that between the two Moscows and the six republics—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia—that have declared their intention to seek full independence rather than to join the Russian Republic in the creation of a new federal state. This debate in turn is closely linked with the emerging security policies of the new regimes in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Zagreb, and Lublijana.

At the same time, the central European regimes and some of the rebel republics of the USSR have joined with the former neutral and non-aligned states, including Albania, to open a new security dialogue with the NATO/European Community nations. The Charter of Paris explicitly recognized the potentially catalytic role of the central Europeans by choosing central Europe as the site of three new CSCE institutions: a secretariat of a CSCE
Council, based in Prague; an office for free elections, based in Warsaw; and a military crisis center based in Vienna, now an active partner with Prague and Budapest.

At the center of the series of interactive security debates outlined above is the most problematic participant in these debates. This is the Soviet military. The future of the Soviet military as an institution, the future of the USSR as a state, and the future of the security system in the region between the Urals and the Oder-Neisse are all different aspects of the same basic question: will the multinational Soviet military, led by a predominantly ethnic Russian officer corps, come to the armed defense of the ethnic/territorial branches of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the various union republics?

The Russian officer corps constitutes the most important jury currently hearing the arguments of different political movements in Russia on the future of the CPSU and the USSR. By definition, all of these movements have a "nationalist" component, but the movements range enormously in their conception of Russian national interests. At one end of the spectrum are the neo-Stalinist "nationalist Bolsheviks," who are conservative Slavophiles intent on preserving the empire. At the other end, there are parties envisioning free choice by the non-Russian republics and close cooperation with the West, such as the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, the Democratic Party, and the Social Democrats.

In its emerging capacity as the jury of the political debates in Moscow, the Russian officer corps of the Soviet military will increasingly focus not only on the internal Russian debate, but on the political and security debates of the non-Russian USSR republics and the non-Soviet members of the former Warsaw Pact. In turn, the new regimes in the capitals of the union republics and Eastern Europe are conducting their debates with as much attention to reaction in Moscow and Brussels as they are to their domestic audiences.

In practical terms, the central issue common to all these security debates is whether the Soviet military will continue its historic alliance with the CPSU and pursue national, regional, and all-European security policies designed to preserve and possibly restore the non-Russian client branches of the CPSU.

The question is also central for the great powers on the outermost circle of the European security debate. For Bonn, Brussels, Paris, London, and Washington the question is whether the series of treaties and agreements signed in 1990 can provide external incentives for the Soviet military as an institution to abandon the armed defense of the CPSU. Such a course of breaking the 74-year alliance of the CPSU and the Soviet
military would permit the peaceful disintegration of the USSR, the democratic reorganization of its components into new polities, and the emergence of a post-Warsaw Pact security zone compatible with the principles endorsed by CFE and the Charter of Paris.

H. CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the role of the Russian and/or Soviet military is central to the changes occurring in the USSR and in the European security order. But the domestic changes in the USSR as well as in Eastern and Western Europe make it difficult to know exactly how to proceed in a process of interactions with Russian and non-Russian elites.

First, how should Americans proceed in connecting with the Soviet military within the context of the various circles of debate in the USSR? Second, how should we try to influence the internal debate within the USSR? Which lobbies should we favor? How does the Soviet military figure into the lobbying dynamics favorable to our interests? Third, how should we try to arrange meetings with the Russian military: on a bilateral or multilateral basis? Who should we seek to engage in dialogue? Fourth, how should we seek to organize multilateral Western interactions with the Russian officer corps?

In other words, the Russian and/or Soviet military is and will be a critical player in redefining the Soviet and Russian political systems. Nonetheless, the interactive quality of the redefinition of the European security system complicates the influence process. But in order to determine how to play in this process, we must think differently, orient our actions differently, and sort out our basic national interests. Nothing short of a profound historical shift is facing us. It would be tragic if we failed to move history forward in ways compatible with democratic values and interests.