Book Reviews

Martin Blumenson on The Patton Mind: The Professional Development of an Extraordinary Leader,
Julius Becton reviews With a Black Platoon in Combat: A Year in Korea,
Richard Halloran on Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War,
Anthony Cordesman on Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned,

Special Feature—Somalia and Operations Other Than War

A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War ........ S. L. Arnold and David T. Stahl
Law and Anarchy in Somalia ........................................ F. M. Lorenz
Testing the World’s Resolve in Somalia .............................. Walter S. Clarke

The DOD Role in African Policy ............................ Kent H. Butts
Churchill, The Victorian Man of Action .......................... David Jablonsky
Macedonia and Albania: The Missing Alliance ................... Michael G. Roskin
Lessons from El Salvador ............................................. Victor M. Rosello

NOT TO PROMOTE WAR, BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE
Parameters is a journal of ideas and issues, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.
From the Editor

In This Issue...

This issue features three articles on the United States' involvement in Somalia. Each examines an aspect of the operation—military, legal, or political—from the perspective of those who helped to shape the strategy and make the policies, and then saw at firsthand the consequences of those policies.

Major General S. L. Arnold and Major David T. Stahl describe and analyze the two operations other than war in which the 10th Mountain Division has participated in the past year. Their analysis of the planning process that culminated in deployment to Somalia and their careful examination of the implications of operations other than war for the Army are particularly timely.

Colonel F. M. Lorenz, USMC, looks at legal issues related to deployment and operations of the US Joint Task Force in Somalia between December 1992 and May 1993. He reviews those issues, such as rules of engagement, in a context that includes the international laws that shaped the policies adopted by US forces as well as the specific needs of US and coalition forces operating in that country.

Mr. Walter Clarke, who served as deputy director of the US Liaison Office in Mogadishu from March to June 1993, examines political issues in Somalia in the context of UN Security Council Resolutions, UN peacekeeping traditions, Somali political factions, and the implications of policy issues for future peacemaking operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Kent H. Butts analyzes the strategic importance of Africa to the United States. His wide-ranging survey of the political, defense, social, environmental, and humanitarian issues that shape US policies in Africa provides a context for understanding current problems in Somalia. He also provides insights into the potential for similar problems elsewhere in Africa.

Dr. David Jablonsky offers a sweeping view of the cultural, social, and political influences that helped to define and shape the character and personality of Winston Churchill. Dr. Jablonsky describes the contributions of Victorian and Edwardian England to the outlook and the policies of the man who led England to victory in World War II.

Dr. Michael Roskin examines current political, social, and ethnic problems in Albania and Macedonia. His article analyzes and places into perspective bilateral and regional issues as well as the policies which have led the United States to establish contact with the military in those countries and to commit soldiers to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Macedonia.

Lieutenant Colonel Victor M. Rosello reviews the United States' support of the government of El Salvador, through a military advisory mission, during the 12-year FMLN insurgency. He provides a candid assessment of that type of direct support to a government under attack by domestic forces.

Commentary and Reply features exchanges between Major Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC, and Dr. Martin van Creveld on fourth generation warfare; Colonel Anthony Hartle and James T. Currie on the former's review of Oliver North's biography that appeared in our Summer 1993 issue; and David Tucker and several readers on "Facing the Facts: The Failure of Nation Assistance," also in our Summer 1993 issue.

Reader Survey...

Analysis of the results of the most recent reader survey, and comparison of the results with previous surveys, indicates little in the way of changed reader perceptions. Three features of the current responses are worth a moment of reflection. Year-to-year, about half of our respondents tell us that they "read some, skim some" of the articles. We have started adding brief summaries of each article in this section to help busy readers identify the articles that most interest them. It is a technique that at least one other reputable journal has recently introduced. Let us know if it makes a difference. Second, based on your reports of the number of hands through which copies of *Parameters* pass, we estimate that each issue (including copies sent to 520 libraries by the Government Printing Office) reaches about 57,000 readers before the copies presumably become too dog-eared to be legible. Third, a number of readers expressed their satisfaction with the low cost of *Parameters*. We hope that the recent price increase directed by the Government Printing Office (to $10 per year, US domestic) will not dissuade them from renewing their subscriptions.

Continuing Education...

A number of those who included written comments on the reader survey referred to the value of the book reviews and the "Off the Press" section in each issue for additional reading and research. The US Army War College Library prepares and maintains bibliographies based on the Library's holdings on topics of interest to the students and faculty. While the Library cannot respond to requests for copies of the bibliographies, those interested in learning more about the bibliographies may contact the Library at 717-245-3660. The bibliographies may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), at 703-487-4780, or from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) by members of the federal government research community who are registered with DTIC. Call DTIC at 703-274-6871 or DSN 284-6871.

Information on another source was provided by an Army officer who is a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Michigan. He has been working with the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) to establish a national archive of computerized data on military and veterans' issues. The value of this initiative is indicated by the fact that the ICPSR, founded in 1962, includes more than 360 colleges and universities in the United States and 16 other nations. Those interested in learning more about this source should contact the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research at 313-764-2570 or by fax at 313-764-8041. This information is provided explicitly for the purpose of fostering research on topics of interest to the Army and the Department of Defense, and for continuing the professional education of *Parameters* readers. The information does not constitute an endorsement of the products or of the organizations that produce them. — JJM

Winter 1993-94
A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War

S. L. ARNOLD and DAVID T. STAHL

The experiences of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) since August 1992 have begun to put a human face on the concept of employing the US Army as a power projection force in operations other than war. Less than six weeks after sending more than 6000 soldiers and their equipment to southern Florida for Operation Andrew Relief, the division was alerted for deployment to Somalia. Approximately 90 days after its first troops had arrived in Florida, elements of the division began to leave the division's garrison at Fort Drum, New York, for Operation Restore Hope.

Tactical and operational lessons learned from Operations Andrew Relief and Restore Hope will be analyzed and reported in Military Review. This article examines activities associated with those two deployments at the strategic level and at the boundary between the strategic and operational levels of Army activities. Where activities in the domestic operation helped to prepare the division for deployment overseas, the relevant experiences are highlighted.

The intense period of activity to be analyzed in this article produced a number of challenges. They have been grouped around three kinds of strategic and doctrinal issues: mission planning and deployment; the inherent complexity of operations other than war, and preparations for similar missions. Analysis of the challenges can—and should—influence the development of Army policy and doctrine. How the Army responds will reflect its adaptation to the implications of conducting operations other than war with a power projection force.

Operational Contexts

On 31 August 1992, the 10th Mountain Division began to deploy to southern Florida. The division's mission was to conduct disaster relief operations in support of civil authorities in Florida, thereby assisting in the recovery from the effects of Hurricane Andrew. Relief operations drew to the
region personnel from the active and reserve components of all the services, from other federal government departments and agencies, from state and local governments, from non-governmental service organizations, and from religious organizations, as well as thousands of contractors. Division personnel worked closely with representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Transportation, with members of the Red Cross, the United Way, and the Salvation Army, and with tens of thousands of individual volunteers, all of whom were committed to helping the citizenry of southern Florida recover from the hurricane. When the division became the operational headquarters for all active and reserve Army units providing relief services in the operation (the ARFOR) near the conclusion of the operation, total assigned and attached strength exceeded 12,000.

Less than six weeks after returning from Florida, the division was alerted for operations in Somalia. The division’s mission was to serve as the headquarters for all Army forces in Somalia (the ARFOR), and to conduct military operations to provide security for operations in support of the relief effort being conducted in Somalia. The commander’s intent was to ensure that relief supplies could get to those who needed them. The division planned to accomplish its mission by monitoring lines of communications, providing security for the storage and distribution of relief supplies, developing effective coordination with coalition forces and non-governmental organizations, and establishing liaison with local clan leaders, elders, and UN forces.

In December 1992, 90-odd days after deploying to Florida, major elements of the division were again on the move, this time into a region in which the populace suffered from a combination of natural and man-made problems. Warlords and faction leaders (sometimes the same individuals, 

Major General S. L. Arnold was the Commander, 10th Mountain Division (LI), and ARFOR Commander during the relief operations conducted in Florida following Hurricane Andrew and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. He has been a company commander in combat, a battalion commander in a mechanized division, and a brigade commander in the 82d Airborne Division. He has served as a staff officer at every level from battalion to brigade, division, corps, and army level, culminating with his assignment as the ARCENT G3 during Operation Desert Storm. Major General Arnold is a graduate of the US Military Academy, the Air Force Command and Staff College, and the US Army War College, and he holds master’s degrees from Auburn University and the University of Southern California. Major General Arnold is presently assigned as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Major David T. Stahl was the G3 Plans officer for the 10th Mountain Division (LI) where he served as the ARFOR plans officer during relief efforts in Florida and Operation Restore Hope. He has been a company commander in the Airborne School and a company commander and battalion operations officer in the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT). He served in the 25th Infantry Division, the Infantry School, the 101st, and the 10th Mountain Division. He is a graduate of Lehigh University, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He is presently assigned as the operations officer for 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (LI).
sometimes not) were in a state of endless conflict. Bandits and warlords drove farmers from their fields, then stole the relief supplies that were intended to offset the decline in agricultural production and commerce in the country. Somali citizens, displaced by years of civil war, had been pouring into camps established by relief agencies to prevent mass starvation. The forms of a society as we know them had disappeared. There was no justice system, no police force, no transportation system, no electricity, no infrastructure to speak of. Nearly all markets had ceased to operate. Schools were closed and businesses operated sporadically. Somalia was in chaos.

US and other national forces entered Somalia, under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, to “establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” US and coalition forces were to break the cycle of starvation in

Figure 1. UNITAF Area of Operations, February 1993.
Somalia by ensuring that humanitarian relief operations could be conducted without interference. The division identified 49 non-governmental agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE, Save the Children, Doctors without Borders, and Irish Concern operating in the country. They were the only agencies in Somalia trying to feed the starving and care for the sick and dying. It was their selfless, sometimes heroic, efforts that the division and its coalition partners were there to support.  

During Operation Restore Hope the division was assigned the area of operations shown on the map in Figure 1. The size and composition of the forces for which the division assumed command or operational control in Somalia are shown in the chart in Figure 2.  

This article identifies and discusses some of the significant challenges that the division encountered during the conduct of two operations other than war, one domestic, the other in a frequently hostile, sometimes lethal operating environment.

**Mission Planning and Deployment**

This section covers five issues integral to mission planning and deployment: planning assumptions, parallel planning, mission and end state development, force caps, and “mission creep.” Note that both of the operations other than war described in the paper were initiated as crisis-response operations. Some of the challenges described below are directly related to that circumstance.

**Planning assumptions**

As planning assumptions take shape at the strategic and operational levels, they should be communicated early and often to operational commanders. Courses of action at the strategic level are frequently expressed simply, generally in terms of alternative task organizations with the associated troop ceilings. Operational commanders need a clear mission statement for the operation; the desired end state, conditions, and measures of effectiveness; strategic-level intelligence preparation of the battlefield; and applicable planning constraints, including troops available.

There obviously will be times when the information required for operational planning will not be available, in the desired detail or at all, when the commander needs it. In such situations the operational-level commander will have to provide the restated mission, the intent, and the intended end state for approval at the strategic level. The strategic planner must then remain alert to political or diplomatic developments that could change the operational commander’s planning assumptions, and notify him as soon as such changes appear possible. In operations other than war, it is imperative that strategic, operational, and tactical-level commanders reach closure quickly on exactly what each is trying to accomplish. This link is currently missing from our crisis action planning process.
Parallel planning

Parallel planning implies concurrent planning and simultaneous coordination among planners from the strategic to the tactical levels. Even though the XVIII Airborne Corps was clearly the division's next higher headquarters early in the planning process, the division staff maintained contact with four headquarters to determine the forces required and the mission to be accomplished. Parallel planning is especially necessary in the early days of crisis response planning, when headquarters tend to filter information as it travels to subordinate commanders.

By the time the division was alerted on 30 November for possible deployment to Somalia, strategic analysis for the operation had been in progress for some time. Had strategic planning been conducted as parallel planning, the joint task force commander and his Army component commander would have had opportunities to influence task organizations, mission statements, intelligence requirements, and end state conditions. Instead, decisions related to those planning functions were made at the strategic level with little input from those who would carry them out. The manner in which force caps were established is representative of this process. Planning at the operational and tactical levels was constrained by the force cap even before missions or courses of action had been established. Army operational and tactical planners were plagued by the consequences of this part of the planning process until well after units had reached Somalia.

Early parallel planning also would have provided access to the strategic aspects of intelligence related to preparation of the battlefield. The information needed by subordinate commanders includes more than classical intelligence data. The operational commander needs a synthesis of data from all Army operating systems for his own use and for analysis by the planning staff. This information should not be filtered out between headquarters. It should be flashed to the operational and tactical headquarters simultaneously to facilitate detailed planning at all levels. A deeper appreciation of the needs of a division staff that has assumed the ARFOR role may help to improve this aspect of crisis action planning.

Other information required during an operational commander's preparation of the battlefield for operations other than war includes, but is not limited to, non-traditional categories such as:

- Continuous, real-time information on diplomatic and political aspects of the proposed operation;
- Identification, location, and intent of local military organizations, militias, guerrilla bands, and irregular armed groups (in Florida, the gangs; in Somalia, the warlords and factions);
- Intent of the population regarding the proposed intervention, whether known or assumed for planning;
- Status of current or proposed coalition operations and forces, as appropriate;
- Detailed information on terrain, weather, disease and other aspects of the country, comparable to the information available in State Department country handbooks;
- Identification, location, and intent of non-governmental organizations; and
- Number, location, and intent of refugees inside and outside the country.

Some of the information listed above may be available during the planning process. Some of it, however, can only be obtained once on the scene. In Florida, the intent of the local gangs and the division's plans for the security of the force had to be balanced against the need to help people who truly required assistance. The problem in Somalia was quite different. If it was the intent of the factions to oppose the introduction of coalition forces, then combat operations could have been required upon arrival. If the population was believed to be at worst neutral, the initial task organization and mission of tactical forces would reflect that assessment. Lives hang in the balance of such assumptions.

Parallel planning would help close the gap in our crisis-action system related to end state planning. In both operations, division plans officers were required to identify and define the conditions believed essential to meet the military end state. Operational planners first had to obtain and understand the political, economic, and social objectives of the operation. Only then could the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force Mountain — Restore Hope Troop List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 87th Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Kismayo (10th Division Artillery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Battalion, 14th Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Aviation Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-25 Aviation (Assault)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-17 Recon Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-168 Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Co. (Assault)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-25 Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Co. (Assault)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Division Support Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210th Forward Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>710th Main Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200th Supply Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th Chemical Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Signal Battalion (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110th Military Intelligence Battalion (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations Support Element/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th PSYOP Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Teams/96th Civil Affairs Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st Engineer Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Military Police Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>511th Military Police Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>711th Postal Company (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th Postal Company (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Personal Services Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280th Military Police Detachment (CID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Military Police Detachment (CID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Finance Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Public Affairs Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Public Affairs Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Target Acquisition Detachment (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Liaison Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Range Surveillance Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>548th Supply and Services Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th Engineer Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>696th Combat Support Equipment Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63d Combat Support Equipment Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>720th Military Police Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>571st Military Police Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>976th Military Police Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Moroccan Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Paratrooper Battalion (Belgium)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.
military conditions that would be required to support the strategic end state be identified and a plan developed to meet them. The planning process would have been more efficient had parallel planning—concurrent planning and simultaneous coordination of the various strategic alternatives—been authorized at the time that the division received its warning order.

**Mission and end state development**

Army mission planning begins with the definition of what is to be done and a description of the conditions that will indicate that the mission has been completed. Officers and senior noncommissioned officers are well trained in the procedures for developing such guidance at the tactical level. At the strategic and operational levels of command, however, mission definition and the development of end state conditions pose significant challenges to all those involved in developing them.

End state definitions and end state conditions are necessary, but not sufficient, for operational planning for operations other than war. The final set of information that the operational commander needs is the measures of effectiveness for the conditions. Simply stated, measures of effectiveness allow the commander to assess progress toward establishing the conditions essential to reaching the end state. Operational and tactical commanders need to know the non-military features of the conditions and how to measure them in order to take them into consideration as they plan for, conduct, and evaluate the effectiveness of operations. Consequently, there appears to be a requirement for a process to develop measures of effectiveness for operations other than war which reflect diplomatic, political, and strategic aspects of such operations.

The reasons for this requirement are fairly obvious. Domestic operations will always have political features that the military does not necessarily consider in tactical and low-level operational planning. Operations outside of the United States will have political dimensions significantly different from those associated with a domestic relief operation. The diplomatic implications of operations in a foreign country involving coalition forces must be clear to senior Army operational commanders from the outset of planning. All of these non-traditional dimensions of operational planning will be important in domestic and foreign operations other than war. Efforts to disarm the populace in Somalia show how the end state, necessary conditions, and measures of effectiveness—the latter ranging from strategic to tactical—become integrated into end state planning and execution.

Commanders at the operational level provide the essential link between strategic aims and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield. The relationship applies equally to operations other than war. In Florida the division considered end state conditions for each of its areas of involvement (food distribution, water supply, shelter, and similar relief functions) and determined what needed to be accomplished prior to handing off the function
to local governments or relief organizations. In Somalia, operational-level planners established end state conditions for each mission in terms of the commander’s intent, expressed early in planning as ensuring that relief supplies could get to those who needed them. The ARFOR commander had to provide guidance to tactical commanders for disarming the warlords and the general civil population; assessing and dealing with varying levels of criminal activity in the his area of operations; managing the availability of relief supplies, and coordinating the availability of UN peacekeepers. These represent the kinds of conditions which had to be met if the non-governmental organizations were to safely resume operations after the Army departed.

End states, conditions, and measures of effectiveness should be developed cooperatively at all operational levels and, as appropriate, in conjunction with State Department specialists. Once established, the conditions must be evaluated periodically, using the agreed measures of effectiveness. Operational commanders should be prepared to redefine end states, conditions, and measures of effectiveness in conjunction with the State Department in light of experience on the ground. Early and continuous dialogue among strategic, operational, and tactical commanders could streamline the process of defining and managing end states, their essential conditions, and measures of effectiveness associated with each condition, to the benefit of commanders on the ground in operations other than war.

**Force caps**

The term “force caps” describes a planning constraint developed at the strategic level. A force cap, based on political and economic realities, identifies the number and types of units available to conduct an Army operation. Once force caps have been established, commanders and staffs at all levels must understand that they exist and be able to account for the forces within the cap. For Operation Restore Hope, the force caps had been developed rapidly, early in the operation, and were not adjusted to reflect the situation on the ground as the operation began. Significantly, the caps failed to acknowledge the large number of personnel required to support operations in a “bare-based” environment like Somalia, where nothing could be purchased, acquired or seized to support the Army contingent at the time the division deployed.

Tactical planners tend to use worst case scenarios to define force requirements. The differences between supply and demand for units had to be managed carefully at the operational level during planning for deployment to Somalia. This was particularly important because the ARFOR staff was fully engaged at the same time in developing mission statements, assessing unit capabilities, and developing preliminary time-phased deployment lists. It was not immediately apparent to the staff that a cap existed; the staff was not sure which forces were included in the numbers they received, and any leeway that the staff might have had for deploying additional forces was not clear. As a
consequence of the convergence of the cap and these planning requirements, and with no slack in the planning schedule, operational force planning at the division took more time than it should have.

Force caps made planning difficult at the operational level for deployments to both Florida and Somalia. To support the mission in Florida all division leaders—brigade, battalion, and company commanders, and their command sergeants major or first sergeants—deployed ahead of their units to conduct reconnaissance and to assess requirements within their assigned areas of responsibility. It was not until these division personnel had been in Florida for several days that force requirements were completely known, although the division did start to deploy forces while the on-scene assessment was in progress.

Deployment to Somalia had been scheduled to begin on 19 December 1992, ten days after D-day. On D+1, however, it was decided that the first elements would deploy on D+2, to arrive on D+3 (12 December). From that beginning, missions assigned to the ARFOR during deployment remained in a state of flux. The following incident is representative. On D+12, as the lead element of what would become an entire battalion task force was en route from the United States to its planned destination (Baledogle airfield), it was diverted in flight to Kismayo, over 300 miles farther south, to operate with Belgian forces.

The types of forces deploying from the United States and their deployment sequence changed for a number of reasons: increasing troop strength commitments from coalition forces, changes in intelligence estimates, and the availability of airfields and seaports. Because each change to the force structure or task organization required detailed justification from the ARFOR staff, the hastily-developed force caps, established at the strategic level with little input from the operational level, plagued the ARFOR staff until well after all division and attached forces reached Somalia.

In both operations, deployment preparation and execution succeeded because commanders and staffs remained flexible and focused on the commander’s intent. Force protection was established as essential to the division’s success during deployment to Somalia. Equipment began deploying rapidly, many times before the exact mission or transportation availability was known. Forces and equipment levels had to be evaluated continuously as the situation changed. The same flexibility was needed during operations on the ground. If a unit or set of equipment was not required in theater, even if it had just arrived, it was redeployed. In a force projection Army, staffs and leaders must remain flexible if they are to find solutions to the planning uncertainties that will inevitably arise during execution of the operation.

Mission creep

Mission creep is a phenomenon that must be considered in operations other than war. In Florida, division soldiers built and repaired schools, established polling sites for elections, helped to clean up neighborhoods and
parks, and were otherwise involved anywhere people needed help. None of these activities was identified in the mission; they evolved naturally as an outgrowth of the division's mission and the desire of individual soldiers to do whatever they could to alleviate the suffering of fellow citizens.

In Somalia, the initial mission for Army personnel was to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. While the mission did not include rebuilding the country, many American and allied soldiers performed a number of tasks generally associated with nation assistance: revitalizing local governments and security forces, rebuilding and repairing schools and orphanages, teaching English in schools, building and repairing roads, and similar tasks. These activities were undertaken in addition to removing mines, disarming warring factions, and remaining fully ready and capable of conducting full-scale combat operations.

If it is true that the less clear the mission the greater the potential for mission creep, then some change can always be expected in operations such as Restore Hope. Broad mission statements with unclear end states may be necessary in a crisis; they certainly provide the maximum flexibility to the operational and tactical commanders. However, if it is important to the US government and the US Army to conduct a limited operation and rapidly redeploy, then a clear mission statement with end state criteria is an absolute requirement.

Each of the operations had a turning point at which US forces began to disengage. In Florida, the opening of schools created a sense of normalcy. Within weeks of school opening, all Army forces had redeployed. In Somalia, access to the main roads was essential if non-governmental organizations were to conduct relief activities. Access to those roads was symbolized by opening the "Somali Road," which linked the humanitarian relief sectors throughout the country. With the Somali Road open, Army forces were able to redeploy, leaving support units and a quick reaction force to continue operations with the second UN force, UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

Complexity of Operations Other Than War

The complexities inherent in operations other than war made both of these missions unusual. Such operations are complex for soldiers to carry out and difficult for leaders and staffs to synchronize. The involvement of soldiers in local communities, whether removing trees blown down by Hurricane Andrew or delivering food to refugee camps in Somalia, ensured the success of both operations. In Florida it was necessary to limit the type and amount of help our soldiers could provide; individual soldiers of all ranks became ambassadors for the Army and US government. In Somalia, individual soldiers and units found it difficult to determine who the enemy was. Soldiers who were well trained and ready to take the initiative, while acting with compassion and restraint, ensured that each mission was accomplished.

Winter 1993-94
following paragraphs describe some of the complexities that will be inherent in future domestic or foreign operations other than war.

Adapting standard battlefield operating systems

One of the division’s first planning tasks was to establish the context within which planning would be performed. The Army’s standard seven battlefield operating systems—maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility, survivability, and combat service support”—were used as the basis for developing the nine operating systems used to synchronize operations in Somalia.

The new operating systems were established early in the planning process, well before forces were deployed. The air defense system was removed from the doctrinal list, since there was no air threat, and the remaining six standard operating systems were focused on requirements for peace enforcement operations. Three new operating systems were created: external coordination, force protection, and information dissemination. The resulting nine systems were used throughout the operation, beginning with pre-deployment planning, to analyze and synchronize ARFOR operations in Somalia.

The first operating system added was external coordination. Coordination with other governmental and non-governmental organizations appeared during planning to be essential to success. The division established coordination procedures with the State Department, humanitarian agencies through their participation in the civil military operations center, elders in each village and town, and emerging security committees in the local communities. Coordination was also important to the success of our coalition operations and to the support provided by logistics contracting (LOGCAP) efforts in Somalia. Force protection was added as a separate operating system because of its importance in each mission we accomplished. The force protection operating system included a constant review of the rules of engagement and the building of limited infrastructure in the theater where no infrastructure existed for the support of our soldiers. Finally, information dissemination became the ninth operating system. The first part of information dissemination focused on the Somali people. It included the print media, radio, interpreters, and direct contact with elders in each community. The second part of this operating system involved the accurate and timely dissemination of information to worldwide media representatives. The third part emphasized dissemination of information to ARFOR soldiers. All commanders were to ensure that their soldiers understood their roles in the operation, and that each knew how individual success contributed to unit success.

Joint and combined operations

Although operations with other service and coalition forces were absolutely essential for these operations, they clearly added to operational complexity. When the JTF headquarters established by the commander of the
I Marine Expeditionary Force became the division’s higher headquarters, upon notification of deployment, liaison teams from Fort Drum moved immediately to Camp Pendleton to conduct parallel planning with the JTF. While in Somalia the division coordinated daily with Marine Corps forces concerning operations throughout the country.

Operations with forces provided by the more than 20 nations that responded to the UN appeal, while adding to the complexity of ARFOR activities, were extremely successful. The ARFOR served as the command and control headquarters for the 1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, Royal Moroccan Forces, 1st Belgian Parachute Battalion, and for a short time, the 1st Canadian Airborne Battle Group. Each of these forces worked well with 10th Mountain Division units, demonstrating once again the potential inherent in coalition operations. Other coalition forces operated as adjacent units and conducted operations throughout the theater. The success of these coalition operations can be attributed in large measure to the exchange of liaison officers and to a detailed understanding of ARFOR requirements and coalition capabilities.

Liaison teams with foreign language capability, tactical satellite communications equipment, and transportation joined each force assigned to the ARFOR. Each coalition force in Somalia not only had a tactical force conducting operations on the ground, but also a national headquarters organization that communicated with their defense establishments or, as appropriate, directly to national political leadership. These circumstances meant, for example, that ARFOR provided two liaison teams to the Moroccan forces, one directly to the tactical unit assigned to the ARFOR, in this case in Baledogle, and the other to the Moroccan national headquarters in Mogadishu.

The ARFOR developed an extensive checklist to help integrate coalition forces into its operations. The checklist, which covered all staff functions and all battlefield operating systems, helped to establish a dialogue between the ARFOR and the responding coalition unit scheduled to operate under ARFOR tactical control. Subjects ranged from personnel accountability procedures to organizational matters to combat service support issues to communications capabilities to their understanding of the rules of engagement. The checklist review process identified the expectations of the ARFOR headquarters and helped to identify assistance that the coalition force might require.

Significance of social structures

Operations in Somalia were characterized by the presence of 21 clans and sub-clans in the division’s area of operations, banditry throughout the country, operations with joint and coalition forces, support of non-governmental agencies, the need to conduct political negotiations, the complications of disarmament, and the essential daily coordination with UNOSOM and the State Department. Activities required to reinstate Somali self-governing local councils
illustrate some of the effects of social structures on the other aspects of operations in that country.

Each of the clans and sub-clans in Somalia has its own leadership and unique goals for the future of Somalia. Although many of the clans are related—some even have common leaders—their ultimate goals were usually based on what appeared to be best for their specific clan or sub-clan. Soldiers, leaders, civil affairs teams, and negotiators had to deal with many different clans and elders in each town and village in Somalia.

Banditry and its link to self-appointed governments throughout the country made stopping the bandits a high priority for the division. Local security forces had to be organized once banditry had been reduced and security for the non-governmental organizations had been established, in order to relieve coalition forces of the responsibility to provide security for relief operations.

In order to establish local security forces, local councils and governments not linked to the bandits had to take control in each community. One successful technique was to identify the elders of each community and empower them to once again control their communities. These councils of elders could then establish security forces which would protect the community and the relief providers. Company and battalion commanders, as well as their attached civil affairs teams, became negotiators and advisors to these emerging local governments.

Before the councils could be organized, however, it was often necessary to decide from among multiple claimants who were the rightful local elders. Somalis are very territorial and clan-oriented, yet determining which clan was the right group to govern a community became a difficult proposition. Inter-clan fighting and changes of the ruling class spanned centuries of Somali history. Sometimes a series of meetings, often over a period of many weeks, helped to produce a functioning local government; sometimes it did not. What was important was to keep the process going.

Army leaders at all levels conducted negotiations and informal discussions with Somalis on many issues besides local government. Political negotiating skills were tested during direct negotiations with warring clans and factions. Senior Army leaders conducted talks with warlords, most of whom who had spent the preceding months or years devastating their country. Social structures in Somalia exerted a profound influence on mission planning and execution.

Non-governmental organizations

The real heroes of operations in Somalia were the non-governmental organizations conducting relief operations throughout the country. These organizations could not be dealt with as if they were parts of a larger, homogeneous group. Each had a specific agenda, its own operating procedures, and its own preferred level of assistance. Most provided unique types of relief; many provided more than one service or operated in more than one area of the country.
Close coordination with each organization and an effort to understand its uniqueness helped the Army to support the needs of all such groups.

Civil-military operations centers were established throughout the country to coordinate military operations with those of the non-governmental organizations. The central civil-military operations center in Mogadishu was jointly sponsored by UNOSOM, the Unified Task Force (the JTF), and the US State Department. Participants met daily at the central civil-military operations center to share intelligence information, discuss current operations from military and civilian perspectives, and provide a forum for humanitarian agencies to request military support for their operations. Each humanitarian relief sector in Somalia developed its own humanitarian operations center, which served as the focal point for coordination among the non-governmental organizations, town leaders, and the military in that relief sector. This management concept should be evaluated and recorded for use in similar operations. The map on page six identifies the humanitarian relief sectors in the ARFOR area of operations.

Disarming the populace

As operations progressed, the ARFOR assumed the added responsibility for disarming some of the Somalis, which quickly proved to be a very demanding task. Plans took considerable time to develop and could not be enforced uniformly throughout the country. Some weapons had to remain in the hands of Somalis who needed them either to protect their own people or to guard non-governmental organizations or other groups. Authorized weapon storage sites, established at the political level, allowed Somalis to retain considerable numbers of weapons and amounts of ammunition. Disarmament was complicated by frustrating talks with Somalis and by the difficulty encountered in developing an effective process. Any future mission of this type must take into account the extraordinarily complex and difficult process of disarming the citizens of the country if that is part of the mission.

Coordination with the State Department and UN personnel

Interaction with the State Department and UNOSOM was of paramount importance throughout the Somalia operation. Ambassador Robert Oakley, who was assigned as the US Special Representative there, and the ARFOR commander regularly coordinated the efforts of State Department personnel and military operations in the ARFOR area of operations. The Ambassador’s support for ARFOR operations was superb, and he played a key role in communicating with the leadership of the Somali clans. The ARFOR followed his lead in operations and fully supported State Department operations. Unfortunately, there were not sufficient State Department personnel in Somalia to work in every humanitarian relief sector. Army leaders and civil affairs teams filled the void.

Planning for the turnover of operations to the United Nations and interaction with UNOSOM made daily coordination with the UNOSOM staff
a necessity. As transition drew near, the ARFOR staff also coordinated with representatives of the forces that were to serve under UNOSOM II. The support and quick reaction forces that remained after the division left Somalia were placed under the operational control of the US Central Command. Tactical control of those US Army units remained with the commander of US forces in Somalia.

**Common features of the two operations**

Operations in Florida provided a preview of the complexity the division would encounter in planning for, deploying to, and operating in Somalia. Although the two locales and their inherent requirements were fundamentally different, many of the planning factors used during hurricane relief operations in Florida were applicable to planning for and operating in Somalia.

- The division was in Florida to support the operations of private volunteer organizations (Red Cross, Salvation Army) and not to replace them. A similar relationship developed with the non-governmental relief organizations in Somalia.

- Operations in Florida confronted the world of politics. Individual community governments, state governments, and the federal government did not always have the same end state in mind for the community. Competing expectations, which were evident also in Somalia, have to be understood by the force on the ground.

- The path to interagency coordination is not always a smooth one, whether in domestic or foreign operations. Many of the division's missions were assigned by FEMA through the Defense Coordinating Officer to the JTF headquarters in Miami. The process for coordinating with FEMA is sometimes difficult for soldiers to understand. The division eventually collocated its major and subordinate unit headquarters with the leaders of the local communities: city managers, mayors, and others. This decision enhanced direct contact between the military and the communities, which accelerated responses to requests for assistance. FEMA was kept informed of all operations, as appropriate.

- Joint operations were the norm in Florida, and the ARFOR task force there included a special-purpose Marine Corps task force. Operations in Somalia were joint from the outset. Coalition forces added the complexity of combined operations.

- Special operating forces disaster assistance teams, civil affairs units, and psychological operations units were used extensively in Florida. Civil affairs and psychological operations units later played key roles in Somalia.

- The division headquarters had the opportunity to serve as an ARFOR headquarters for the first time in Florida, which provided experience for assuming a similar role in Somalia.

- Division staff sections synchronized and then carried out a variety of non-standard missions in both operations.
The quality of maps complicated both operations. In Florida the best maps available were road maps produced by rental car companies. In Somalia the difficulty arose from the fact that data from the Russian maps used by ground forces did not match data taken from the US maps that were used by pilots. The differences made it impossible to use map grids for fire support. The common system of latitude and longitude markings on both kinds of maps had to suffice until updated maps could be printed.

The drawing of military boundaries and assignment of unit areas of responsibility was a lesson well learned in Florida. The experience helped commanders and staffs to understand that when assigning unit areas in operations other than war, they should consider superimposing military boundaries on existing civilian political boundaries. In Florida, a brigade-sized headquarters collocated and dealt directly with a city government. The same principle was followed in Somalia, where the areas being served by non-governmental organizations and historical clan boundaries were added to the equation. For instance, the boundary for Army forces operating in Baidoa was adjusted so that the unit area of operations corresponded to the area served by the non-governmental organizations that worked there. In Marka, the unit's sector was modified to take into account traditional affiliations between clans in the Lower Shabeelle River Valley. Other boundaries were adjusted as required.

Planning and Training for Operations Other than War

To the extent that the experiences of the 10th Mountain Division are representative, operations other than war promise to be exceptionally complex to plan and carry out. Some have suggested that the Army should develop special units, trained and equipped for operations other than war, particularly for peace support operations. This section addresses that suggestion in three respects. The first deals with the suitability of standard Army training programs for such operations. The second looks at the adaptability of soldiers to tasks outside their specialty areas, and the third considers the implications of experiences in Florida and Somalia for Army institutional training.

Are current Army training programs suitable for operations other than war?

The issue has two distinct parts. Some believe that the training Army units receive to carry out their wartime missions will not prepare them for operations other than war. Others believe that placing Army units into operations such as those in Florida and Somalia will cause warfighting skills to deteriorate because of the dissimilarities between the requirements of the two kinds of activities. The division's experience to date finds that neither concern is warranted.

Individual and small unit training prepares soldiers well for the kinds of missions recently encountered in Florida and Somalia. At the squad, section, platoon, company, and even battalion levels, division units conducted specific tasks that could readily be accomplished because of standard battle-focused
training. Intermediate staffs performed all of the tasks inherent in commanding, controlling, sustaining, and employing their units in field operations. The division staff performed planning and coordinating functions that are part of the peacetime and wartime missions of the headquarters. The challenges of assuming the missions of an ARFOR headquarters were met without exception, albeit they required a great deal of work by the officers and noncommissioned officers in the staff. The headquarters exercised the decisionmaking process daily, conducted deliberate and crisis action planning, and conducted ARFOR current operations. Individuals, units, and staffs continued to perform as integral parts of a well-trained, cohesive organization in both operations without special situation-related training.

The corollary issue relates to the presumed inability of units to perform those parts of their individual and unit annual training requirements known as mission essential tasks. The belief is that tactical units employed in operations other than war, particularly peace support operations, will lose their fighting edge. Again, experience indicates the contrary. In Florida and Somalia, within each battlefield operating system, the division conducted missions that were derived directly from mission essential task lists, as the following examples indicate.

- Infantry battalions, companies, platoons, and squads conducted their mission essential tasks daily in Somalia. Infantry units conducting humanitarian operations were flexible enough to shift rapidly from assisting refugees and
performing nation assistance tasks to conducting full-scale combat operations. They conducted combat operations at night and in urban environments. Units provided security for humanitarian agencies, operated checkpoints and roadblocks, conducted cordon and search missions, and performed convoy security operations. Patrolling, defensive operations, and offensive operations were all conducted by infantry units during Restore Hope.

- Aviation units in Florida provided lift support and served as a command and control headquarters for relief efforts. In Somalia, they provided lift and attack support during Restore Hope.
- Engineer units in Florida had plenty of work cleaning up debris and doing construction. In Somalia, they built bridges and roads and conducted countermine operations.
- Military police in Florida established liaison with local police forces and conducted traffic control throughout the area of operations. In Somalia, they provided area security, convoy escort, and law enforcement support.
- Signal units set up an entire mobile subscriber communications grid in Florida that provided voice communications until civilian phone systems were restored. In Somalia, the 10th Signal Battalion provided theater communications support with over 600 personnel assigned from 12 different signal battalions.
- In Somalia our counterintelligence agents were our major source of the intelligence information that shaped maneuver operations.
- Combat service support units provided services and support for both operations. They supported relief efforts in Florida and the work of non-governmental organizations in Somalia. In Somalia, they did the jobs that they had been trained for, and did them in an extremely austere environment, over extended distances. Individual and unit training programs had prepared them well for these operations.
- Special operating forces—psychological operations, civil affairs, and operational teams—provided exceptional support during both operations.

Obviously the troops did not perform all of their mission essential tasks every day. They do not do so under normal training conditions either. Unit operations in Florida, but particularly in Somalia, provided frequent opportunities to review and practice most mission essential tasks.

Can soldiers adapt readily to duties for which they were not specifically trained?

An answer is evident from the following representative examples:
- The military intelligence battalion operated a life support center for homeless people in Florida.
- Air defense soldiers served as helicopter door-gunners in Somalia, and they augmented the transportation assets of the infantry battalions.
- The division artillery headquarters formed the staff for Task Force Kismayo, and directed the activities of two infantry battalions (one US and one Belgian) during operations in Kismayo.
Army units must retain the versatility that allows them to be employed in whatever manner is most appropriate for the current operation. The tasks encountered during recent operations other than war are not so different from tasks that soldiers are already trained to do that we need to develop new mission essential tasks for such operations. Nor have our soldiers lost the knack for improvising, and for transferring knowledge and skills to tasks other than those for which they were specifically trained. One of the key elements the Army brings to operations other than war is an ability to organize for the mission, arrive ready to go to work, and adjust as requirements change.

What are the implications for institutional training?

The complexities highlighted in this article—and many more like them—should start to make their way into our institutional training programs. Leader development programs at noncommissioned officer schools and at officer professional courses should begin to address such topics as negotiating skills, cultural considerations, and managing rules of engagement. A sense of the complexity of operations other than war should be introduced at combat training centers and in other training exercises. However, none of these suggestions can be allowed to detract from the principal purpose for which the Army exists and trains. Army soldiers and units must maintain their warfighting ethic and continue to focus on combat-oriented skills.

Specific training in operations other than war should be focused at the staff and senior leader level. Staffs at all levels can conduct training to plan these types of operations. Leader training is needed to focus on such requirements as negotiations, UN operations, integration of all services and coalition forces, interagency operations, and operating with non-governmental organizations. Staffs and leaders in units with short-notice deployment missions need to continue to conduct routine staff exercises based on trouble spots throughout the world. Such exercises enhance staff performance and provide insight into areas where operations may occur. Predeployment training should include situational training exercises focusing on rules of engagement for all forces to be deployed. Theater-specific training will be required to identify cultural issues, dangers unique to the region, other participants in the operation (military and civilian), and the types of operations that may be conducted.

During training and planning activities, units should try to enlist the help of experts who have served in the area previously or who have conducted similar operations. Lists of regional specialists, functional experts, linguists, experienced negotiators, former commanders and key staff officers, whether active or retired, should be readily available to contingency force units.¹⁴

To provide another perspective on US Army training requirements, consider an alternative concept for preparing for operations other than war. The Polish army has more than 30 years of extensive experience in peacekeeping operations. Every Polish soldier who deploys on a peacekeeping mission is a
volunteer from his parent unit. The Polish peacekeeping school at Kielce trains each provisional peacekeeping unit formed from the volunteers.

Members of the US Army (including a 10th Mountain Division representative) visited Poland in June 1993 to tour their peacekeeping training center. The general belief of the US team was that US Army units do not require a specific training center for these operations. What works well for the Polish army is not necessarily required for US Army units.

Our unit training for operations other than war should continue to focus on mission essential tasks. We must find innovative ways to integrate the experiences of recent operations into our training and include operations other than war in staff and leader training in units and schools. We should consider adding to that training topics such as coalition warfare, negotiations, civil disarmament, extensive urban operations, operating with non-governmental organizations, interagency operations, coordinating with State Department and UN personnel, and dealing with the complexity brought about by operations other than war. Experience to date indicates convincingly that the Army requires neither special units nor pre-operational team-building training to prepare for operations other than war.

**Conclusion**

This article has focused on three common themes identified during operations other than war conducted by the 10th Mountain Division since 1992: mission planning and deployment challenges, the complexity of operations other than war, and the training and preparations required for future such operations. We also have gained a great deal of experience in other aspects of a power projection Army that were not discussed in detail. The challenges for the Army include the following:

- **Parallel planning.** Our crisis action procedures need to involve operational and tactical commanders and planners from the outset of a deployment planning process. Operational and tactical planners must have access to data provided to strategic planners and decisionmakers. An 18-hour alert requirement does not mean that required planning information should be held until units are within 18 hours of leaving their garrisons.

- **Anticipate and prepare for complexity.** Our combat training programs prepare our soldiers and leaders to deal with complex situations. They also need time to acquire, understand, and prepare to react to intelligence information related to preparation of the battlefield. They need information on indigenous forces in their destination area as well as access to information on friendly forces involved in the operation. This information includes the roles and concepts of operation for the non-governmental organizations, the structure and contributions of coalition forces, and the roles of organizations such as the UN and the State Department.
Flexibility and adaptability. The Army must remain prepared to carry out missions that do not fit into the definition of mission essential tasks or that fall outside of doctrine. Our units must maintain the versatility required to meet diverse challenges, shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role to another rapidly and efficiently.

- Battlefield operating systems. Each operation should be analyzed to determine which battlefield operating systems can be used most effectively. Additional systems should then be defined and developed, based upon the mission at hand, and used as the basis for planning and operations.

- Operations as an ARFOR headquarters. In many circumstances a division headquarters can assume the role of an ARFOR headquarters, provided that the number of Army and coalition ground forces in theater remains within the command and control ability of a division headquarters.

- Force management. A power projection Army will require that operational and tactical commanders manage the deployment sequence of forces in order to build combat power in theater to support the concept of the operation. When a division is tasked to become an ARFOR headquarters, a staff element must be identified to manage strategic-level force structuring processes to ensure that forces required are identified and deployed in the proper sequence. This requirement is critical to success if the society at the destination indicates hostile intent toward the intervention.

- Deployment means. Revitalization of our strategic lift, both air and surface, is essential to provide the capability to move and sustain a power projection Army.

- Command and control of all Army forces in theater. During Restore Hope, the JTF Support Command consisted of Army forces drawn primarily from the division. The support command was not, however, under the direct command and control of the ARFOR commander. Division support organizations are sized to manage the support of division forces. Some alternative must be developed to preclude detaching an organic division unit to constitute a JTF support element.

- Implications of follow-on tasks after an operation other than war. The long-term consequences for readiness, training, and the quality of life for soldiers and their families created by maintaining a major element of the division on detached operations—for example, rotation of units to support operations in Somalia—is of growing concern to the division and to the Army.

- Rules of engagement. The development of effective rules of engagement was a key feature of the operation. The process by which they were developed, promulgated, and managed, and particularly the effectiveness of coalition operations using the rules of engagement, should be developed as a model for future operations.

- Liaison requirements in coalition operations. There was an extensive requirement for liaison officers to support higher headquarters, coalition
forces, and civil-military operations requirements. Many of those who performed liaison duties were drawn from division elements whose battlefield systems were not fully engaged in the operation. This solution met the requirement for liaison teams during operations in Florida and in Somalia, where operating environments were predominantly friendly or neutral. Some other solution will be required in an environment that demands full operation of all standard battlefield operating systems.

- *Operations in bare-based environments.* Somalia confronted the Army with an environment devoid of infrastructure from which US forces could purchase required goods and services. The acquisition of the “Force Provider” or similar systems will greatly enhance our power projection capability by providing the required protection in environmentally hostile locales for deployed forces.

These subjects all will require a great deal of study. Their significance derives from the need to prepare the Army for its next deployment. In most instances solutions designed to meet the test of combat will also satisfy requirements for operations other than war. The Army’s challenge is to debate and study the issues raised in the aftermath of domestic and foreign operations other than war so that subsequent missions can benefit from the experiences of the 10th Mountain Division (L1). The US Army War College and the Army school system can make significant contributions to meeting the challenges identified in this section.

The tasks ahead of us were described a number of years ago by the noted British historian Michael Howard. In a speech entitled “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” he described the opportunities and challenges that armies face during peacetime:

I am tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. . . . Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.\(^\text{15}\)

Our doctrine is about right. The United States Army should remain versatile enough to adapt to any situation. We can do that best by discipline, flexibility, and foresight, hallmarks of an Army trained and ready for combat.

**NOTES**

1. Florida National Guard units were kept under the command and control of the state to support the law enforcement mission in Florida, which federal forces cannot do by law. The doctrinal designation “ARFOR” defines the responsibilities of the division with respect to all organic and attached Army units in a joint task force area of operations. The 10th Mountain Division was designated the ARFOR for Andrew Relief and Operation Restore Hope.

2. The division’s mission statement: “Task Force Mountain deploys, serves as ARFOR, and conducts military operations in Somalia to secure the airfield at Baledogle as well as other key installations and to provide..."
security for operations in support of relief distribution sites in assigned humanitarian relief sectors in order to provide secure passage of relief supplies."

3. The Charter of the United Nations, dated 26 June 1945, provides for several types of operations. Chapter VI identifies "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," which imposes very restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) for forces assigned, usually limiting the forces to basic self-defense tenets and use of force to disengage from hostile acts. Chapter VII provides for UN "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," and as such provides ROE that allow offensive operations, giving commanders flexibility to implement governing Security Council Resolutions. The difference between these two types of operations is extremely important to commanders on the ground and this difference will guide the rules of engagement. UNITAF ROE followed the guidelines of Chapter VII, as do the ROE for UNOSOM II. DA PAM 27-24, p.3-5 to 3-8; The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945.

4. The 10th Mountain Division (LI) was alerted on 30 November 1992, began deployment to Somalia on 11 December, and served as the Army forces headquarters (ARFOR) in a joint task force (JTF) under the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) until relieved on 4 May 1993. Most division personnel and equipment began to return to the United States at that time. Support units and a reinforced infantry battalion remained in Somalia, under the operational control of the US Commander in Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT), and under the command of the commander, US Forces, Somalia. The detached division units provide logistics support and the quick reaction force for UNOSOM II. The battalion has been replaced twice. The fourth rotation is in the planning stage.

5. The concept of parallel planning calls for the simultaneous development of mission essential information at all levels in the planning chain during crisis response operations. Parallel planning implies that any risks assumed by developing such information through rapid successive approximations is preferable to the alternative: withholding crisis response information from lower planning echelons prior to a predetermined date, time, or event. In one sense a violation of the principles of the chain of command, this concept illustrates what Michael Howard might have had in mind when he asserted that it is "flexibility, both in the minds of the Armed Forces and in their organisation, that must be developed in peacetime." "Military Science in an Age of Peace," The RUSI Journal, 119 (March 1974), 7.

6. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a systematic and continuous process that describes the tactical environment and the effects of that environment on operations and what the enemy can accomplish. FM 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 14 June 1993, Glossary 4.

7. XVIII Airborne Corps was the division's higher headquarters early in the planning process. The JTF (I Marine Expeditionary Force) assumed that role shortly after the division was notified of the operation. The division staff also worked on a daily basis with Army Central Command (ARCENT) and Forces Command (FORSCOM).


9. The construction of the Somali Road was one of those accomplishments that received little notice in the media. Approximately 2100 km in length, it was built or improved by US Army Engineers (1100 km), and USMC and US Navy Seabee units (1000 km). The Somali Road connected all the humanitarian relief sectors in Somalia. Its completion and security were integral to end state planning conducted by the JTF and the ARFOR.

10. FM 100-5 describes battlefield operating systems as, "The major functions performed by the force on the battlefield to successfully execute Army operations (battles and engagements) in order to accomplish military objectives directed by the operational commander." FM 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 14 June 1993, Glossary 1.

11. LOGCAP is the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program. The primary contractor in Somalia for this program was Brown and Root, which hired Somali workers to provide services to US forces.

12. Colonel Mark Hamilton deployed to Somalia to help the ARFOR and UNITAF headquarters establish a disarmament policy and a workable plan to disarm the factions. His help was instrumental in designing a workable program, although the program was never completely enforced.

13. The Defense Coordinating Officer provides the link between FEMA and the military task force assigned to an operation.

14. Mr. Andy Natsios (US Agency for International Development expert on Somalia) and Colonel John Abizaid (Commander, 3-325 Infantry during Operation Provide Comfort) contributed significantly to our preparation. Colonel Mark Hamilton (experienced negotiator in El Salvador) joined the division and provided essential help during negotiations with the warlords and factions. The generous efforts of these individuals are representative of the kind of support that can be made available to units with rapid-deployment missions.

Law and Anarchy in Somalia

F. M. LORENZ

© 1993 F. M. Lorenz

On 20 November 1992, the US Central Command issued a warning order to the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) at Camp Pendleton, California. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had just approved a plan for a large-scale humanitarian intervention in Somalia, designating the 1 MEF as the nucleus of a combined task force consisting of forces from 20 nations. The plan would soon be submitted to the National Command Authorities and the United Nations for approval. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC, the 1 MEF Commander, was chosen to lead the force that would be known as Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF). I MEF Headquarters entered a period of intense predeployment activity as the elements of the task force were assembled.

Initial intelligence reports from Somalia painted a grim picture. The country had been devastated by nearly two years of civil war, and the government had ceased to exist. Bands of looters and gunmen roamed freely. Media coverage centered on the tremendous suffering and starvation in the interior of the country, where armed bandits thwarted efforts to deliver relief supplies. The faces of starving children on the evening news were important factors behind the deployment of UNITAF to Somalia.

Legal planning for the deployment presented unique challenges. The lack of a government and a system of laws made it difficult to plan in several important areas. The term “host nation support” had no real application in Somalia, so UNITAF would have to be entirely self-sufficient. At issue were such questions as these:

- What traditional responsibilities of the sovereign government (e.g., police, courts, public services) would have to be assumed by US forces?
- What would be the “status of forces” with respect to US personnel in Somalia in the event of criminal violations?
- How would offenses of local nationals be handled?

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) issued the first draft of the mission statement during the last week in November. The mission was brief and to the point: provide security for the delivery of relief supplies in
As each I MEF staff section developed implied taskings in preparation for the development of the operation plan, it became clear that US forces would be operating in an austere environment where the rule of law had been replaced by the law of the gun. Advice and innovative planning in a variety of nontraditional functions and activities would be needed as the UNITAF Commander entered uncharted waters.

Reports of armed individuals and so-called "technical vehicles" (essentially trucks modified to carry a crew-served weapon) in Somalia required special planning measures. Virtually every male over the age of 12 in Somalia was armed. This circumstance was aggravated by the widespread use of the narcotic substance khat, which gave the gunmen a feeling of invincibility. Clearly, specialized rules of engagement (ROE) would have to be drafted to cover the abundance of small arms in the hands of potentially unstable persons and the proliferation of technical vehicles. The ability to deal successfully with these and similar challenges would require a solid foundation under international law.

The UNITAF Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) was formed around the I MEF OSJA, adding an Army lieutenant colonel as deputy, an Army major as claims officer, and a Marine major as an international law specialist. Five lawyers were part of the UNITAF staff, providing advice on a wide range of issues in the emerging field of "operational law." This article will provide an overview of the significant legal issues and policy decisions unique to Operation Restore Hope. The first step will be a discussion of the underlying legal principles applicable both from a national and international perspective. Thereafter, the article looks at rules of engagement, a key element in the operation; guidance on the use of force, both deadly and non-lethal; women and children as combatants; and UNITAF weapons control policy, one of the most difficult issues faced in Somalia. The last topic is the issues faced by the UNITAF staff during the transition to UN operations.

**Legal Authority**

Chapter Six of the United Nations Charter provides the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations, while Chapter Seven is the authority for the rarely used "peace making" or "peace enforcing" operation. UN Security Council Resolution 794 provided the legal authority for Operation Restore Hope.

Colonel F. M. Lorenz, USMC, was the Staff Judge Advocate and senior legal advisor for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. He is currently the Staff Judge Advocate for the First Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton, California. He holds A.B. and J.D. degrees from Marquette University, and in 1982 he completed the Master of Laws degree at George Washington University. He has served as a prosecutor, defense counsel, and military judge during a 22-year career in the Marine Corps. In 1978-79 he served as a rifle company commander and staff officer with First Battalion, First Marine Regiment.
authorizing the use of “all necessary means” to provide security for the delivery of relief supplies in Somalia.

There was little precedent for Operation Restore Hope, in large part because there was no sovereign nation to call for, or object to, the proposed intervention. Since this was an expedition with little precedent, legal planners had to consider the authority for the operation under international law. To provide the underlying legal philosophy for all actions taken by UNITAF, CENTCOM determined that Restore Hope would be a humanitarian operation and not an “armed conflict” under international law. The legal status and responsibilities of UNITAF would flow from the UN Security Council Resolution; they would not be those of an “army of occupation.”

Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement are the means by which the US National Command Authorities and the military chain of command authorize subordinate commanders to employ military force. Nothing in the rules of engagement negates the commander’s right and obligation to act in defense of his unit. The same right of self-defense applies to individuals, and rules of engagement must never interfere with that fundamental right. The basis for the rules of engagement for Operation Restore Hope was the CENTCOM peacetime rules of engagement. With that as a starting point, the UNITAF rules of engagement were drafted to account for the hostile circumstances in Somalia. Special language was developed to deal with the threat posed by armed individuals and technical vehicles, giving commanders maximum flexibility to challenge individuals and confiscate weapons. The object was to enhance mission accomplishment without detracting from the inherent right of self-defense.

As soon as the classified rules of engagement were established, unclassified versions of the rules were issued on a card for all personnel of Unified Task Force, Somalia. Thirty-five thousand unclassified cards were printed at the base printing shop at Camp Pendleton on 3 December, and copies were flown to the Amphibious Ready Group to be provided to the first Marines to go ashore on D-Day, 9 December. The unclassified rules of engagement card is replicated in Figure 1, on the following page. The full text of the UNITAF rules of engagement was part of the Operation Plan and classified secret, but it has since been declassified. Key parts of the UNITAF rules of engagement have been incorporated into the rules of engagement now in effect for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).?

The absence of host-nation law made it imperative to set out the basic rules and standards applicable to UNITAF personnel. General Order No. 1, issued just before departure from Camp Pendleton, was patterned after the one issued in Southwest Asia for the Gulf War. Most of the order was applicable only to US personnel serving with UNITAF; coalition forces were responsible for setting their own standards of conduct. The general order prohibited, among
other things, the consumption of alcohol and the possession of personal weapons. The substance khat was declared contraband for military personnel; this portion of the order could be punishable as a violation of a lawful general order under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

**Weapons Incentive Program**

The Somali lifestyle is marked by independence, self-reliance, and violence. Constant fighting over political and ethnic differences has marked Somali society through its history. The Somali tendency toward violence and factional warfare has been aggravated over recent years by the tremendous proliferation of weapons in East Africa. During November 1992, with Somalia in a state of anarchy, every adult male and most teenagers carried a weapon openly in the streets. In December 1992 US Special Envoy Robert Oakley, who had been stationed previously in Somalia, said, "There are three things that are most important to a Somali male—his wife, his camel, and his weapon." In late December, UNITAF opened discussions with Ambassador Oakley concerning an arms reduction program. At this point, some of those involved were concerned about whether such a program would be within the mission of UNITAF. Security Council Resolution 794 called for the creation of a "secure environment for the delivery of relief supplies," but the UNITAF...
Commander had stated on numerous occasions that disarming Somalia was not his mission. He maintained this position despite several statements to the contrary by the UN Secretary General.

Planners considered several incentive concepts, variations of “food for guns” or “cash for guns,” and evaluated the US experience with disarming the civil populace in Panama. However, Somali social and political dynamics were considerably different from those encountered in Panama, as illustrated by Ambassador Oakley’s comment. The large quantity of weapons in the region created another challenge. There would be little incentive for the bandits to turn in their best weapons, and the program potentially would have disarmed the hungry people who needed protection from the bandits. A cash-for-weapons program also would have run the risk of creating more crime by encouraging bandits to steal weapons to turn in, or providing incentives for arms dealers to import more weapons from other parts of East Africa. An informal, small-scale weapons incentive program was used during the third week in January when UNITAF Marine forces began giving a receipt for the turn-in of weapons or for information on where to find weapons. These receipts were then exchanged for bags of wheat provided by the humanitarian relief organizations. This informal program was never expanded beyond a single sector of Mogadishu, however, and it had limited effect on the number of weapons in circulation. In late January, a decision was made by the UNITAF Commander not to implement a nationwide weapons incentive program. An aggressive UNITAF weapons confiscation policy made such a program unnecessary.

**Weapons Confiscation Policy**

The initial UNITAF weapons confiscation policy directed the confiscation of all crew-served weapons, as well as individual weapons that were displayed openly or brandished with hostile intent. Commanders were justifiably reluctant to issue complex confiscation rules that required the use of a reference book or a legal interpretation before a weapon could be taken. From the beginning of the operation, UNITAF forces were called upon to exercise their individual judgment in the confiscation of weapons. This outcome not only made the policy relatively easy to understand, but it protected the individual rifleman who had to make quick decisions under dangerous conditions.

The most contentious weapons confiscation issue arose in the implementation of the policy for the humanitarian relief organizations (HROs). The HROs are the heart of the Somali relief effort, and the mission of UNITAF was to make the environment secure for the relief organizations to do their work. Before the arrival of UNITAF, conditions in Somalia made it necessary for HROs to have a system of “security guards” to conduct business. In Somalia there is a fine line between honest labor and extortion, so it was often difficult to distinguish security guards from bandits. What little economy was left in Somalia was based on the delivery of relief supplies, and security was
a large part of the cost of doing business. The most reliable security personnel worked and lived in the walled compounds of the HROs. Other security personnel were “day hires”; they reported for duty in the morning and left before dark. There was some concern among UNITAF commanders that many of the day hires turned to banditry at night. If so, the HROs were unwittingly contributing to a system that rewarded extortion and made banditry profitable.

One of the primary complaints of the relief organizations was the apparent inconsistency in the application of weapon rules in different sectors of Somalia. If a relief vehicle traveled between sectors and different rules were in effect in each sector, the relief organization faced the risk that its weapons would be confiscated in one sector and its personnel would be defenseless when entering the adjacent sector. Although security in Somalia improved with the arrival of UNITAF, it remained impossible to guarantee the security of the HROs, particularly in the outlying areas beyond UNITAF control.

It took time to achieve evenhanded implementation of the UNITAF weapons confiscation policy. Military checkpoints were operating throughout Mogadishu, and all civilian vehicles were required to stop for inspection. Problems arose early in the operation when weapons of some of the HRO security guards were confiscated by UNITAF personnel. HRO officials registered their complaints with the Civilian-Military Operations Center (CMOC), a part of the UN Humanitarian Operation Center. By mid-January 1993 the CMOC looked like an armory, as improperly confiscated weapons were identified and returned to the HROs.

In February 1993 a nationwide UNITAF weapons program was implemented, incorporating the issue of blue identification cards that were valid in all sectors. The identification card system helped to solve the problems described above. Even greater progress was made in April 1993, when a concise weapons policy card in English and Somali was printed and distributed widely to UNITAF and HRO personnel. This card spelled out clearly in words and pictures the few rules that governed who could possess a weapon, what weapons were prohibited, how weapons could be carried, and what acts would result in confiscation of a weapon. The card finally cleared up most of the confusion, significantly improving relations between UNITAF and the HROs.

Use of Deadly Force

The UNITAF rules of engagement gave commanders and soldiers maximum flexibility to use force—deadly force if necessary—to defend themselves and their units. Rules of engagement must always be viewed in the context of the principles of international humanitarian law and the “law of armed conflict.” In other words, rules of engagement may not override basic principles that limit force to the minimum degree necessary to accomplish the objective, and that require it to be proportional to the threat. For
example, an entire building occupied by civilians should not be destroyed in a response to a sniper attack from the roof.

Nonetheless, UNITAF forces in Somalia faced difficult choices of when to use deadly force in response to a perceived threat. Two unfortunate incidents illustrate the seriousness of the problem. Both were widely reported in the US media and resulted in hearings based on allegations of the use of excessive force. In the first case an American noncommissioned officer shot an individual who had just stolen his sunglasses. In that case the claim of self-defense was rejected, and a conviction at a general court resulted. In another case, another noncommissioned officer shot and killed a youth who ran up to his vehicle carrying a small box. The situation at the site of the shooting was tense, and there had been warnings the day before of hand grenade incidents. In that case the charge was dismissed based upon legitimate self-defense.

Operation Restore Hope placed US personnel in difficult and dangerous situations, requiring split-second judgment. Rules of engagement provide the basic guidance, including the inherent right of self-defense. All reported shooting incidents were followed by a command review of the facts to determine if there had been excessive use of force. When necessary, criminal investigations were conducted to determine if charges should be brought. Article 32 investigations were convened in four cases involving seven individuals, two of which were discussed above. Two cases were recommended for trial by general court-martial, and convictions resulted in both cases.

Use of Non-lethal Force

Few, if any, US personnel had experienced the conditions that existed in Mogadishu in January 1993. Verbal warnings and a show of force were inadequate to protect convoys from crowds of youths who approached UNITAF vehicles to snatch personal gear and weapons. At busy intersections, young thieves would approach and rip the glasses off the faces of the passengers. Crowds of young Somalis closely followed vehicles screaming for handouts. The UNITAF rules of engagement provided limited guidance in these situations. The key language was contained in the rules of engagement card: “When . . . attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.” Although this guidance was designed
to cover civil disorders, it contains two important principles: first, the concept of minimum force; and second, the rule of proportionality. These concepts were not new to Operation Restore Hope; they apply broadly to occasions when deadly force is not authorized.

The question in Somalia became the definition of “minimum” non-lethal force. UNITAF forces promptly developed preventive measures in an effort to deal with the problem. The UNITAF Psychological Operations Branch made announcements in its Somali language daily paper and radio broadcasts, describing the local nationals and UNITAF forces that were hurt as a result of these activities. Assistant drivers and passengers carried tent stakes or similar sticks to use to keep the children at a distance. Barbed wire was strung along the side of some of the vehicles as an additional deterrent. Although some of these measures may seem a bit heavy-handed, the UNITAF forces were remarkably restrained in their use of force against unarmed crowds stealing from convoys. The undesirable effect of this restraint, however, was that it encouraged those in the crowds to continue their behavior.

Riot control agents could not be used in Somalia without prior authorization. The authority to employ riot control agents had been delegated from CENTCOM to the UNITAF Commander. Riot control agents were available in Somalia. Their use, considered several times, was never authorized.\textsuperscript{3} Early in the operation it became clear that some type of incapacitating spray, such as Mace, could be an answer to the problem of theft from moving vehicles. Commercially produced cayenne pepper spray would work, but the logistics of acquiring and getting it to Somalia proved formidable. Another delay occurred while the guidelines for using the spray were reviewed at higher headquarters. When the cayenne pepper spray was finally approved in April 1993, it proved to be highly effective.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Detention of Civilians}

From the outset of Operation Restore Hope, it was clear that we would need authorization to detain civilians. Again, the unclassified rules of engagement card was designed to provide the basic guidance: “Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense.” Although this rule was in effect on the first day of the operation, additional guidelines on the conditions permitting detention had to be developed in the theater.

When UNITAF forces arrived in Somalia there was no functioning police or court system, with the exception of a very limited system in South Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{15} Courts had not been conducted in nearly two years. During the first days of the operation it became obvious that UNITAF could not rely on the Somali system to effectively handle prisoners detained by UNITAF. A military detention facility with a capacity of 20 prisoners was established at the US Support Command Headquarters. It never held more than six prisoners at once, and was not equipped to handle long-term detainees.
During the first few weeks of Restore Hope, a large number of Somalis were apprehended by UNITAF forces. In most cases the period of custody was relatively short. Individuals were often disarmed, questioned, and released. It became apparent quickly that a uniform standard for continued detention had to be adopted. The UNITAF Commander decided to establish a high threshold for the types of offenses warranting continued detention. The basis for this approach lay in the limited US detention facilities and the absence of a reliable Somali confinement system. The UNITAF standard permitted detention only in “exceptional circumstances.” This policy was designed to prevent the apprehension of individuals for minor offenses, such as simple assault or making a threat. UNITAF forces had neither the capability nor the responsibility to care for large numbers of civilian detainees. Furthermore, the mission statement of UNITAF did not include the responsibility to police the entire Somali population. Security Council Resolution 794 limited the responsibility to providing a “secure environment” for the delivery of relief supplies. This was interpreted as a limited mandate for apprehension of civilians, generally limited to those who attacked or threatened the force.

Questions arose quite often regarding the scope of the UNITAF detention authority. For example, should soldiers apprehend a Somali who was caught raping another Somali? UNITAF commanders had the authority, and in some cases the responsibility, to protect the population from violence, theft, and other forms of crime. Still, Operation Restore Hope was not an armed conflict under international law, nor were the UNITAF forces considered an army of occupation. Had UNITAF been an occupying force, it could have been responsible for the health, welfare, and safety of the Somali people. The responsibility of the UNITAF Commander extended only to areas of Somalia within his control. This responsibility included military posts and their immediate environs, and areas patrolled or regularly used by UNITAF forces.

In the closing days of Operation Restore Hope, situations arose that tested the limits of the apprehension and detention authority. In one incident a civilian relief worker was killed by a Somali national. Investigation by UNITAF revealed the name of the Somali assailant and the fact that he had fled from an area in southern Somalia controlled by UNITAF. This incident was widely publicized, and there was a call by several groups to hunt down and apprehend the assailant. A decision was finally made not to conduct a manhunt with the limited resources available to UNITAF. It was determined that the assailant was likely to be in an area outside military control and therefore outside the responsibility of UNITAF under international law.

**Women and Children as Combatants**

On 16 March 1993 fighting broke out in Kismayo, Somalia, that would have serious repercussions throughout the country. On that day, forces loyal to warlord Mohammed Siad Hersi (known as General Morgan) defeated
the forces loyal to warlord “Colonel” Omar Jess. As a result of this incident, the Somali peace conference then underway in Addis Ababa came to a halt. General Aideed accused Morgan of truce violations, and the Belgian UNITAF forces were blamed for the defeat of Jess. Moreover, there were reports that women and children had been used as shields in the fighting. The deliberate use of noncombatants to shield military objectives from enemy attack is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions, and this prohibition is broadly accepted. On 18 March the UNITAF Commander ordered an inquiry into the events of 16 March.

The fighting in Kismayo must be viewed in the context of traditional methods of warfare in Somalia. Alliances are complex and probably cannot be understood by someone who is not native. Somalis are a nomadic people organized into an extensive clan structure that has existed since the middle ages. The tactics used by the opposing factions were not new. They were developed over hundreds of years and have only recently reached a high degree of destructiveness owing to the availability of modern weapons. All these factors made it difficult to place culpability for the events of 16 March on a single party to the conflict. Both sides used women and children as active participants, with a mix of carefully coordinated infantry tactics. Since women and children were willing participants in the conflict, there was no apparent violation of international humanitarian law.

**Transition to UNOSOM II**

From its outset, Operation Restore Hope was to be of limited duration, with the United Nations assuming responsibility for long-term assistance to Somalia and the functions normally associated with nation-building. I MEF received no clear definition during predeployment planning of the end state for the operation. Since the mission was to provide security, there was an assumption that the mission would end when security had been restored to a level sufficient to permit a successful turnover to the United Nations. The level of security was not explicitly defined before the operation started. This lack of an objective standard would prove troublesome during the transition phase of Restore Hope.

During the initial stages of Restore Hope, UNOSOM I forces were in place in Somalia; they had deployed as a result of an earlier Security Council Resolution. They played a minor role and acted essentially as observers and coordinators of UN efforts. During late February the United Nations began to make the first significant moves to prepare for the transition from US control. Upon his assignment as UNOSOM II Commander, Lieutenant General Cevic Bir of Turkey visited UNITAF Headquarters in Mogadishu. Soon thereafter, the staff of UNOSOM II began to arrive to begin the work of transition.

Lieutenant General Bir’s visit also offers an insight into the fragile nature of peacekeeping operations in Somalia. His visit coincided with a
series of violent demonstrations in Mogadishu as a result of the 21 February defeat of forces loyal to Colonel Jess (an Aideed ally) in Kismayo. At a briefing in Lieutenant General Johnston’s office in Mogadishu on 26 February, the Italian commander in Mogadishu briefed Lieutenant General Bir on the conditions in his sector. As he presented his slide that listed “conditions in Mogadishu: calm and secure,” smoke from burning tires wafted through the room and a machine gun on the roof fired a burst at a suspected sniper across the street.

During March and April 1993, the transition process for the UNITAF staff was a slow and frustrating experience. The UN staff arrived piecemeal, and during March the UN military headquarters was located about two miles from the UNITAF Headquarters. The UNITAF staff had to travel across town for meetings at UNOSOM.22 Realizing that the requirements for a successful transition (and their departure from Somalia) hinged upon a trained and capable UN staff, the UNITAF staff worked hard to provide the necessary support and training for their successors.23 At times during the final month of transition, some UNITAF staff members must have felt as if they were being held hostage by UNOSOM. Each day new requests were made for support, weapons, or equipment to be left for UNOSOM use.24 One of the final items at issue was the US expeditionary force’s air control facility, which had controlled all flights at the Mogadishu airport since early December 1992. There was some concern that the United Nations would not be able to provide basic air control services (creating a potentially dangerous situation) without the US equipment and personnel. With satisfactory resolution of all these issues, the UNITAF/UNOSOM II change of command occurred on 4 May 1993. A US ground-based Quick Reaction Force of about 1500 remained, and a Marine Expeditionary Unit was to be available on call during regularly scheduled deployments.

Several limitations inherent in UN operations made the transition difficult. United Nations decisionmaking is divided between the military and civilian leadership, and it is sometimes not clear who is in charge. In late March, General Bir stated he would be ready to conduct the turnover on or about 1 May 1993, a date proposed publicly by the Secretary General sometime earlier. Nevertheless, Jonathan Howe, the new UN envoy, refused to agree to that date. This was despite the fact that all the humanitarian relief sectors, including Mogadishu, had been successfully turned over to coalition forces by the United States, and the UN military commander had stated that he was ready to assume command.

Another inherent limitation of UN forces was the lack of logistical and intelligence support. The United States agreed to leave about 3000 US troops in a logistics support role, as well as additional intelligence personnel at UNOSOM II Headquarters. Yet in July and August 1993, UNOSOM II operations were reportedly hampered by an inadequate intelligence capability.25

Winter 1993-94
The turnover to UNOSOM was particularly frustrating for the lawyers on the UNITAF staff. Legal support for UNITAF had been an important factor in the operation, with lawyers providing advice at each component headquarters. Although some of the UNOSOM staff asked the UN as early as January 1993 to provide attorneys, legal support positions on the UNOSOM staff were not filled before the change of command on 4 May. And when the attorneys finally arrived, the new arrivals had little experience in international law. During April 1993, the UNITAF Staff Judge Advocate assisted UNOSOM staff in the development of the UNOSOM rules of engagement. United Nations staff responsibility for rules of engagement fell to a Belgian lieutenant colonel in the operations section who had no prior experience working with rules of engagement. After the departure of UNITAF, a US Army Judge Advocate General Corps lieutenant colonel remained on the US forces staff to provide legal advice to Major General Thomas Montgomery, US Army, who was simultaneously the US Forces Commander and the deputy for UNOSOM. During the first critical weeks of its operation, UNOSOM II was not able to assemble legal support of the kind and quality available to UNITAF during Operation Restore Hope.

Conclusion

Operation Restore Hope presented a unique array of legal and policy issues in military humanitarian operations. A number of conclusions and recommendations may be useful to commanders and planners who are confronted with a similar situation.

Rules of engagement must be promptly developed and widely disseminated to the personnel who will need them in the field. US performance has improved tremendously in this regard in the past few years. Rules of engagement need to be simple, and an unclassified version should be distributed in card format to all personnel. This procedure will ensure that the troops receive the basic guidance for the use of force during the operation in a form that they can have readily at hand.

Commanders should promptly develop a clear policy concerning weapons confiscation and promulgate it as widely as possible among US forces and the local populace. Individual soldiers should be trained in the proper identification of those persons entitled to carry weapons. The command should be prepared to promptly introduce a system of identification cards to permit designated persons to carry weapons for self-defense. Finally, the policy should be carried out in a manner that ensures the safety of US and coalition personnel.

Relations between the humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) and UNITAF were reasonably good; certainly they were adequate for mission accomplishment. Nevertheless, there was much room for improvement, and future operations of this nature should place a high priority on maintaining a good working relationship with the HROs. Much of the problem seemed one...
of perception. Many UNITAF officers viewed the HRO workers with suspicion, considering them inefficient or even dishonest, politically liberal, and anti-military. At the enlisted level, many troops were poorly informed about the mission and functions of the HROs and the role of HROs in the delivery of relief supplies. In future operations there should be increased emphasis on troop information—for example, an information booklet on HROs could be developed and distributed. If we can train our troops on the identity and capabilities of the T-72 tank, we certainly can educate them about the mission and functions of humanitarian relief organizations.

Problems in UNITAF/HRO relations were not limited to the military. Many HRO officials were poorly organized and did in fact have negative views of the military. In many cases representatives of the HROs expected UNITAF to solve all their problems, or were resistant to breaking the self-imposed cycle of paying fees to security guards in what amounted to extortion. In the long term we need to identify good working relations with HROs as a major objective for US forces. In those areas where Civil-Military Operations Centers were established at the local or battalion level, rather than just at the Joint Task Force Headquarters, coordination was greatly improved. Effective teamwork with the HROs was essential to mission accomplishment in Somalia and may well be the case in other such operations.

The use of women and children as combatants presents a troubling prospect. Reports from Mogadishu after the departure of UNITAF indicate that it has become more common. This tactic will certainly provide a challenge for future UN peacekeeping efforts. It is easy to provide a legal opinion that women and children willingly participating in hostilities are not protected, but this does not eliminate the natural reluctance of troops to fire on women and children, nor does it prevent the events from inflaming local public opinion and becoming the subject of international media attention. Dealing with this problem will require the utmost in training, skill, and measured judgment at every level.

End state conditions for future US-led humanitarian operations must be set before the US commits forces to such operations. End state conditions include not only the circumstances that will permit the United States to withdraw from the commitment, with its mission complete, but also the terms for completing the transition to whatever force will follow the United States. The United Nations will have to improve its ability to deploy forces and fill vacancies on the transition staff. Legal support should not be neglected, and the UN rules of engagement should be designed to track as closely as possible with the US rules of engagement. Finally, there should be a detailed list, agreed to in advance, describing the support and equipment to be provided by the United States at the time of transition.

Operation Restore Hope was a success. It will not be remembered for the number of weapons confiscated or the amount of food delivered.
Success was properly measured by the improved security for the Somali people at the time of transition, 4 May 1993.

The challenges facing UNOSOM II in Somalia are much more formidable than those faced by UNITAF. UNOSOM II has assumed responsibility for disarmament and nation-building tasks that were outside the scope of the UNITAF mission. The challenge for UNOSOM II is to accomplish the expanded mission without becoming embroiled in the factional fighting to the point of backing one faction against the others. Whether the United Nations will succeed can best be expressed by a phrase common in the Moslem world: “En Sh’Allah,” —If it is willed by God.

NOTES

1. The town of Baidoa in south central Somalia became known in the media as the “city of death.” The reported death rate in November 1992 from starvation in this district was over 400 per day. In addition to problems of starvation, the local hospital admitted an average of 30 gunshot victims daily.

2. The full text of the mission statement read as follows: “When directed by the National Command Authority, USCINCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia, to secure major air and sea ports, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for relief convoys and relief organizations, and to assist the United Nations/nongovernmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.”

3. The term “technical vehicle” came from the humanitarian relief organizations, which justified expenses for gunmen and security guards as “technical assistants.” The “technical” became a symbol of mobile destructiveness in Somalia.

4. Intelligence reported that the substance, also known as chat or quat, was chewed by a large percentage of the young male population. It was imported from Kenya and sold in the street markets. Some claimed it helped Somalis cope with hunger and adversity. By late afternoon, as the armed khat chewers took to the streets, the danger of violence escalated noticeably.


6. The CENTCOM peacetime rules of engagement are contained on USCINCENT Order 525-11 and are classified secret.

7. UNITAF (and UNOSOM) rules of engagement concerning armed individuals and technical vehicles stated in part that:

   Crew served weapons are considered a threat to UNITAF/UNOSOM Forces and the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons in their area of operations. . . . Within the areas under the control of UNITAF/UNOSOM Forces armed individuals may be considered a threat to UNITAF/UNOSOM and the relief effort whether or not the individual demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to disarm individuals in areas under the control of UNITAF/UNOSOM. Absent a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles will be released after any weapons are removed/demilitarized.

8. See the Restore Hope Soldier Handbook, produced by the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (USAITAC).

9. The proposal was based upon the successful “weapons for cash” plan in Panama, which recovered over 4000 weapons at a cost of about $800,000.

10. In Mogadishu, the price for vehicle rental in January 1993 was about $2,500 (US) per month, which included the driver and two gunmen armed with Kalishnikovs. HROs were forced to pay extortionate fees for security services. Many of the HROs were paying over $100,000 per month for their guards.

11. On some occasions all weapons in a vehicle were confiscated; on other occasions only weapons that were openly brandished were taken. At times, all occupants of the vehicles, including HRO officials, were required to exit and stand back from the vehicles while a detailed search was conducted.

12. The writer saw this firsthand, losing a Nikon camera and a Marine Corps cover (hat) to young thieves on separate occasions.

13. During Restore Hope, thieves and trespassers posed a greater problem than general civil disturbance. The UNITAF Commander considered the potential for subsequent adverse reaction to the use of riot control
agents, because the threats arose in areas of pedestrian congestion. The effect of riot control agents such as "CS" (tear gas, whose powdery substance can persist for days under hot and humid conditions) would have been indiscriminate. Furthermore, the use of CS on a civilian population that was hungry and in poor health could have had major public relations consequences.

14. After the first use of the device, the word spread promptly to the gangs, and there were reports that thieves could be deterred simply by waving an aerosol shave-cream can.

15. In early December 1992 the main Somali prison was still operating with a cadre of volunteer guards, but the few prisoners that remained were subject to release by armed gangs who would come to retrieve their imprisoned members.

16. Detention of civilians was authorized only for crimes of a serious nature such as murder or rape, for crimes against UNITAF forces, or for persons whose release would threaten UNITAF forces.

17. The responsibility did not extend, for example, to parts of Mogadishu, a city of more than one million people, that were away from main supply routes and not patrolled by UNITAF forces. Neither would the responsibility extend to remote parts of Somalia which were outside the control of UNITAF.

18. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 recognizes the special protection accorded to noncombatants in "the case of armed conflict not of an international character." Although Operation Restore Hope was not defined as an "armed conflict," the Somali civil war and the clan warfare that ensued clearly falls under the cognizance of Common Article 3. This principle of special protection accorded to noncombatants is so fundamental that it is also an accepted normative value of customary international humanitarian law.

19. The forces of Jess and Morgan were determined to be equally at fault for the violence that occurred in Kismayo. See Report of Inquiry into the Events of 16 March 1993 at Kismayo, Somalia, dated 21 March 1993.

20. In early December, President Bush predicted that most US forces would be home by Inauguration Day, 20 January 1993. At the I MEF planning level, it was clear that an operation on the scale proposed by the President could not be concluded in 41 days.

21. UNOSOM, as with all major UN operations, has distinct political and military wings. UNOSOM I had a Pakistani brigadier general and an Iraqi diplomat in charge. They did not present a model of efficient coordination, and UNOSOM I suffered from a lack of manpower and resources to conduct assigned missions. This was particularly true during January and February 1993, the second and third months of Operation Restore Hope.

22. In late March it was agreed that the UNOSOM staff would take over the former US Embassy/UNITAF Headquarters. The collocation of UNITAF and UNOSOM improved coordination immensely. Approval for this action was required from the US Department of State.

23. Having lived in an austere and expeditionary setting for four months, it was fascinating for the UNITAF staff to watch the UN bring in air-conditioned trailers and other trappings of civilization. The UNITAF staff generally felt they had accomplished their mission and were anxious that the UN staff take charge.

24. As an example, since the Pakistani vehicles had not yet arrived, the United States was asked to leave about 20 vehicles "on loan" for the Pakistani forces. This presented some novel legal questions, including the possible violation of a federal law (the Pressler Amendment) that placed limitations on US support for Pakistan.

25. During July and August 1993, UNOSOM II forces conducted operations designed to capture fugitive warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. Alleged faulty intelligence resulted in several well-publicized commando raids that failed to net Aidid. "U.S. Faults Intelligence in Failed Somalia Raid," Los Angeles Times, 31 August 1993. Subsequent assertions of a deception operation by those forces have raised other questions about the quality of intelligence information.

26. After the change of command from UNITAF, the UNOSOM II legal staff eventually evolved into an office headed by a Pakistani lieutenant colonel, with a Bangladeshi major and a Zambian captain assigned. All these individuals had criminal court or administrative backgrounds, but no real experience in international or operational law.


28. An excellent independent assessment of this subject was conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis. See Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope, draft of 22 July 1993, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Va. See also, elsewhere in this issue of Parameters, the article by Major General S. L. Arnold and Major David T. Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War," on the experiences of Army forces operating in Somalia.

29. UN Security Council Resolution 814 provides a broad charter to UNOSOM II. Responsibilities include providing humanitarian assistance, rehabilitating political institutions and the economy, promoting national reconciliation, completing the disarmament process, establishing a national police force, and reconstituting the courts and legal system.
Testing the World’s Resolve in Somalia

WALTER S. CLARKE

© 1993 Walter S. Clarke

In mid-1993 the American public wrestled with the spectacle of its forces engaged in seemingly continuous hostilities against insurgents in the southern part of the city of Mogadishu in Somalia. As Americans were killed and wounded, strong pressures developed in Congress and the public to withdraw from Operation Restore Hope. One of the arguments made by critics was that somehow the original humanitarian focus of the intervention had been diverted to “nation-building.” Complaints about a change in the mission are unjustified. By its very nature, Operation Restore Hope was always more than a simple humanitarian operation.

The introduction of a substantial international force into Mogadishu and southern Somalia in December 1992 directly affected the internal lines of communication and balance of political forces of local leaders who had been at war with one another for nearly two years. It was only a matter of time before a violent response developed to the intervention, unless, of course, the warlords could satisfy their political ambitions by working with the foreign forces. It is as true now as it was then that the only way to ensure Somalia does not revert to massive starvation is to find a means to divest the country’s war chiefs of their pretensions to political legitimacy. From the outset, it was clear that the success of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) would be judged not by how many people it helped to feed, but by the political situation it left behind.

Contrary to the assertions of certain Bush Administration officials indicating disbelief in the existence of legitimate political forces in Somalia, US diplomats in Mogadishu continue to receive pleas for action against the warlords. UNITAF’s seeming neutrality on issues of “Somali-on-Somali” violence, and prudence in the use of its substantial force, was a serious disappointment to those Somalis who wanted nothing more than a return to law and order and an opportunity to rebuild their lives after years of war.
Chronology of the United Nations Intervention in Somalia

As the consequences of the Somali civil war became inescapable, the United Nations decided early in 1992 to intervene on behalf of the Somali people. That intervention, identified as the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 751, dated 27 April 1992. UNOSOM (subsequently named UNOSOM I) represented UN authority in Somalia from that date until 4 May 1993, at which time its missions were taken over by UNOSOM II.

It was soon evident that UNOSOM I forces would not be able to establish the secure environment that the humanitarian relief organizations needed in order to provide food and medical assistance in Somalia. After a series of debates on the problem, the UN issued Security Council Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992. This resolution, developed as a number of nations decided to launch a powerful military intervention in Somalia to support humanitarian relief activities, was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The coalition that was created to carry out the intervention, led by the United States, included the forces of 18 other nations. UNITAF coexisted with, but was independent of and equal to, UNOSOM I.

The fundamental difference between the philosophies and activities of UNOSOM I and UNITAF is comparable to the distinction that many fail to make between peacekeeping and operations variously called peacemaking or peace enforcement. The former assumes that sovereign nations, having agreed to end hostilities, agree also to the presence of a UN force on their territories to monitor compliance with the terms under which the nations had agreed to end their belligerency. Some have defined this type of operation as one that could be carried out by a civilian police force. UNOSOM I, as were most UN peace support operations prior to 1989, was intended to be this type of intervention, and was authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

---

Professor Walter S. Clarke is a Senior Foreign Service Officer in the US Department of State, with more than 25 years of experience in African affairs during a 35-year Foreign Service career. He now serves as Professor of International Relations in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. He was State Department Advisor to the President and Professor of International Relations at the US Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, 1987-89. He opened the Embassy and served as Chargé d’Affaires, a.i., at the American Embassy in Djibouti from 1977 to 1980. Professor Clarke also served at diplomatic posts at Abidjan, Bogota, Bujumbura, Douala, Lagos, Madrid, and San José. He has authored several works on the Horn of Africa, including A Developmental Bibliography for the Republic of Djibouti in 1978, "The 'Essai' Dream: A Footnote to the Ogaden War," in Northeast African Studies (No. 1, 1991), and Somalia: Background Information for Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 1992. From March to June 1993, Professor Clarke was detailed to the United States Liaison Office in Mogadishu, Somalia, where he served as Deputy Director. As with all Parameters articles, the opinions expressed are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Department of State, the US Army, or the US Army War College.

Winter 1993-94 43
By contrast, operations authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter recognize that hostilities, even if suspended, remain a real threat to peace operations. By inference, forces sent to intervene under UN direction and control in a Chapter VII operation should be warfighters—organized, equipped, trained, and supported for combat operations. The nations that established the coalition made it a condition of their participation that UNITAF would be organized under the more robust and flexible terms of Chapter VII. The arrival of UNITAF in early December 1992, led by the forces of the United States and under the command of Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC, put the Somali warlords on notice that a new game with new rules had begun. UNITAF carried out its mandate within that part of Somalia to which it was assigned (approximately 40 percent of the country, primarily in the central and southern regions) until 4 May 1993, when it transferred its responsibilities to the forces assigned to UNOSOM II. Historians will have ample opportunity to debate the manner in which the coalition carried out its mission.

This article is concerned with the political aspects of the operation in Somalia. UN Security Council Resolution 794 stated that the Security Council was “DETERMINED FURTHER to restore peace, stability, and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political settlement [in Somalia] under the auspices of the United Nations.” A careful reading of the resolution suggests that UNITAF was correct in determining that its mission statement was contained in paragraph 10 of the resolution: “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [the Security Council] AUTHORIZES the Secretary-General and member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” No one denies that UNITAF completed that mission, and did so ostensibly without disrupting the balance of power among the warlords who had spent the previous two years ravaging their country. However, simply by making it harder for some of the gangs of thugs to do business, UNITAF, and by extension the United Nations, earned the enmity of the warlords so affected.

It seems self-evident that conditions conducive to the desired political settlement might have followed the establishment of the secure environment needed for humanitarian activities. That they did not is no indication of failure on the part of the forces sent to Somalia to ensure that humanitarian aid could be distributed to the starving citizens and refugees in that country. Those forces did what they were asked to do. What was missing was a strategic vision for Somalia, one that could have integrated political goals with the missions assigned to the military. The failure of the United Nations to foster from the outset such an integrated strategy for Somalia may have reversed the gains made by the military in at least part of the country.

UNOSOM II, which assumed responsibility for operations in the country on 4 May 1993, was also established under Chapter VII. In authorizing
UNOSOM II, UN Security Council Resolution 814 greatly expanded the number, variety, and specificity of the tasks assigned to UNOSOM II and its attached forces, creating what was in effect a mandate for an extended period of "nation-building" in Somalia. Both Security Council Resolutions—794 and 814—side-stepped the crucial issue of forcibly disarming the warring Somali factions. This default, combined with the lack of a clear political agenda for Somalia, greatly reduced the likelihood that UNOSOM II could ever have attained its political and nation-building objectives. The specific circumstances that contributed to the policy impasse, which enabled the warlord Aideed to seize the initiative from the UN, are the subject of this article.

Establishing the Unified Task Force in Somalia

The November 1992 decision to respond to the dramatic pictures of human desolation in Somalia by sending US troops at the head of an international coalition was an unexpected initiative from an Administration about to leave office. From a humanitarian point of view, the gesture was in the finest American tradition of responding to man-made and natural disasters around the world. This humanitarian effort was distinguished from previous instances of US military involvement in disasters—the floods in Bangladesh, earthquakes in Costa Rica—in that this was an armed intervention into a region without a central political structure, carried out under a UN Chapter VII mandate. The US-led intervention in Somalia also had a different quality from the decision to deploy forces to northern Iraq to protect the Kurds. In the latter case, the United States had been at war with Saddam Hussein, and there was hope that the humanitarian effort could contribute to his downfall. Although the United States had been a suitor of the fallen Somali dictator Siad Barre after he was abandoned by the Soviet Union in 1977, there was no apparent interest in securing a favorable relationship with Somalia as an outcome of our decision to intervene in that country.

The decision to use military force to support food distribution in Somalia recognized that peace support operations might be contested. The warehouses of Mogadishu contained ample food stocks, and good rains in 1992 provided hope that domestic food producers would have some food to sell in the cities. Force, or a credible threat, was needed to break the stranglehold on food distribution exercised by the leadership of certain armed bands operating in the south-central part of the country. The starving of Somalia were primarily minority clans or refugees displaced during 18 months of civil war. Away from their home areas and rejected by the warlord leaders of opposing clans, hundreds of thousands had succumbed to starvation and disease, and thousands more were expected to die unless conditions changed. The mandate of the US-led UNITAF was to secure food storage sites and to open lines of communication through Mogadishu into the interior so that humanitarian relief organizations could distribute food to the needy and
provide medical care to the sick. In the absence of an initiative from Europe or elsewhere, the United States led the way.

The area of Somalia covered by Operation Restore Hope was divided into nine humanitarian relief sectors (HRSs), and eventually accommodated military forces from 18 UN states, including a fair proportion from Africa and Western Europe. South central Somalia—the "triangle of death"—was selected as the UNITAF area of operations because it had the highest rates of death from starvation. It appears on the map as the area within the triangle formed by the cities of Mogadishu, Bardera, and Kismayo. By no coincidence, this area was largely under the control of General Mohamed Farah (hereafter referred to as Aideed) and his allies.

As straightforward as the UNITAF plan of operations appeared, it created conditions that would lead to confrontation. With its overwhelming military force, UNITAF gained the operational initiative and initially caused
the warlords to back off. The Bush Administration hoped to leave all political initiatives to the United Nations, and to "such participants as the French, the Italians and the Pakistanis," who were judged to have "political, economic and religious ties . . . far more substantive and longstanding than ours." Despite this apparently clear indication of Administration desires, the first public hints of operational ambiguities in the UNITAF mission can be found in former President Bush's original announcement of Operation Restore Hope to the American people:

This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary. Let me be very clear: Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation. [CENTCOM Commander] General Hoar and his troops have the authority to take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives of Somalia's people."

The dilemma for US policymakers developed from the different levels of authority granted to UNOSOM I and UNITAF. Under Chapter VI, UNOSOM I forces were limited to defensive military actions and were severely constrained in their political options. The Bush Administration formula meant that any decisions considered to be "political" were deferred to the entity that represented the UN directly—UNOSOM I—which lacked enforcement powers, while UNITAF held its much stronger Chapter VII mandate in reserve. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali believed that the US commitment would inevitably lead to "nation-building," a prospect fully consonant with the enlarged role of the United Nations laid out in his 1992 report to the Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace.* The United Nations was to encounter great difficulties in putting together a military force comparable to that of UNITAF.

**UNITAF Achievements**

Quite apart from its narrow political mandate, the UNITAF operation was a flawless military exercise. The number of US troops committed to UNITAF on the ground or afloat peaked at 25,426 on 15 January 1993. Total US and foreign forces deployed to UNITAF peaked at 38,301 on 23 January 1993. The logistical and social achievements of the UNITAF coalition in nearly five months on the ground in Somalia are truly impressive:

* the daily death rate in Bardera fell from more than 300 in November 1992 to five or less in April 1993;
* the number of daily gunshot victims admitted to Mogadishu hospitals fell from about 50 to five or less;
* the street price of an AK-47 rose from $50 to $1000, while the price of a 50-pound sack of wheat fell from $100 to about $10.

*Winter 1993-94*
Demilitarization figures for confiscated weapons were in the thousands, and while this represented only a fraction of the number of light weapons available in the country, UNITAF succeeded in having a good portion of the heavier weapons stored in fixed cantonment sites. Little known to critics of the original decision to deploy troops to Somalia are the facts that UNITAF repaired more than 1800 kilometers of roads, restored two airfields (Mogadishu and Kismayo) to C-5 standards and seven others to C-130 standards, and reworked 14 water wells. For a relatively brief deployment, these are truly impressive figures.

Some political initiatives did take place during the UNITAF period. Spurred by UNITAF and the US Liaison Office (USLO), southern Mogadishu warlord Aideed and northern Mogadishu leader Ali Mahdi signed a cease-fire and a general truce on 11 December 1992. Their seven-point agreement called

Figure 2. Principal warlords of southern Somalia, March 1993.
for reconstitution of their fractured political party, the United Somali Congress, disarmament of all irregulars, including the so-called "technicals," and the removal of all internal city barriers, including the "green line" separating the two forces. This political activity produced a number of joint committees, one of which, the political committee, met regularly at the USLO offices. For a while these committees served as effective fora for airing grievances and for peaceful settlement of disputes. The police committee almost single-handedly took on the responsibility of setting up a police constabulary in Mogadishu. It soon had enrolled 5000 former policemen, a group that had largely escaped the scandals of the Siad Barre era. A judicial committee also was formed, with an equal number of magistrates and judges named by the Aideed and Ali Mahdi factions. This group had a less-than-desirable effect on the legal system, however, because neither group would permit its own members to remain in jail.

In a larger sense, the policy of letting the appointees of Ali Mahdi and Aideed provide political, police, and judicial liaison with UNOSOM and UNITAF proved to be a very ineffective expedient. When a group of Aideed henchmen attempted to resume extortion operations against the largest humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) in early March, the task of protecting the Mogadishu offices of CARE and the World Food Programme was turned over to Pakistani forces in UNOSOM I. No effort was made to arrest the offending thugs. UNITAF forces were always available in the event that UNOSOM I forces could not maintain control of any given situation. UNITAF, for operational reasons that can well be understood, declined to define the readiness of its forces. This ambiguity was felt strongly by the various HROs in Mogadishu, whose contract guards had been disarmed shortly after UNITAF arrived. So long as the international authorities (UNOSOM I and UNITAF) deferred to the warlords and their followers—or appeared to do so—there was little likelihood that effective political processes would be established by Somalis not associated with them.

Political Action Under UNOSOM I

A Chapter VI mandate implies that the UN force has the approval of all local authorities. Lacking such approval—there was no central government in Somalia—the United Nations decided to assist in the creation of a national authority. As a first step, a UN-sponsored planning meeting was held in Addis Ababa on 4 January 1993, with 14 Somali factions represented. It immediately ran into problems. Aideed refused to accept any delegation which had been associated with former dictator Siad Barre or which had not been involved in the fight against Siad Barre. This exclusion was primarily directed at Siad Barre's son-in-law, Mohamed Siad Hersi (Morgan). Morgan's forces were at the time threatening the vital southern port city of Kismayo, which had changed hands several times during the 1991-92 civil war. Only the personal intercession of Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi
“By its very nature, Operation Restore Hope was always more than a simple humanitarian operation.”

prevented the UN-sponsored meeting from breaking down. In the end, Aideed succeeded in establishing the principle that the warlords were to control the political agenda.

At the 15 January conference that followed these negotiations, the 14 Somali factions agreed to surrender all heavy weapons to the UNITAF/UN cease-fire monitoring group, to place the militias of all political movements in encampments, to disarm all bandits, and to return all properties unlawfully taken during the previous hostilities. Contrary to their solemn agreements, there was very little disarmament, clashes occurred when one or another of the participants felt his interests were at stake, and travel remained possible only with armed UNITAF convoys. The principal achievement of the first reconciliation conference was an agreement by the warlords to meet again, with the option of selecting those with whom they would discuss the future of the country.

When the second national reconciliation conference convened in Addis Ababa on 15 March, a significant changeover in UNOSOM I civilian leadership had just been completed. Ambassador Kittani—the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and a career UN official of Iraqi nationality—was ailing. US Admiral (Ret.) Jonathan Howe, former deputy national security advisor in the Bush Administration, was named to take his place. Howe’s deputy, the Guinean Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Lansana Kouyate, arrived in Mogadishu two weeks before the second Addis Ababa reconciliation conference, which he subsequently chaired.

The second conference was not easy to follow because much of it was held behind closed doors. Diplomats on the ground in Mogadishu believed that the goals of the conference should be modest and incremental, with local bodies to be established throughout the country before the creation of a central authority. There was also a general belief that individuals or groups excluded from any political process out of fear of the warlords (elders, women, humanitarian group representatives, intellectuals, and professional people) should be given a voice. It would not be the role of the United Nations or any outside authority to dictate the form of government for the Somalis. The UN could, however, sponsor and protect public gatherings, which the
Somalis call *guurti*. Somali cultural traditions and political attitudes place a high value on dialogue and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

The results of the second Addis Ababa conference were quite different from the expectations of its sponsors. The warlords first agreed to a modest project to empower regional political organizations and to advance the peacemaking process. This was evidently not sufficiently strong for the United Nations, which rejected the agreement after it had been signed by the warlords. The first response of the warlords was to walk out in protest over this intervention. They were induced to return by an offer that effectively gave them the opportunity to dominate a national transitional body. To buy their approval, each warlord was provided a guaranteed seat in a Transitional National Council (TNC).

One encouraging outcome was entirely unanticipated. A conference of aid donors was in progress in Addis Ababa at the same time as the warlords were meeting. Upon its completion, the building in which the warlords were meeting was surrounded by a group of very vocal and insistent women who had been attending the aid donors meeting. Their intervention produced a guarantee that one-third of the seats in the TNC would be reserved for women. The Addis Ababa agreement gave no hint how the remaining unencumbered seats were to be contested. This agreement, which guarantees a seat at the table for all warlords and other self-declared political leaders, remains at this writing the basic political planning text in Somalia. UNOSOM subsequently took the position that the international arrest warrant issued for Aideed made him ineligible to sit on the TNC.

**Transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II**

When UNITAF transferred its responsibilities to UNOSOM II on 4 May 1993, there were great expectations for improvement in the administration of law and justice in central-south Somalia. The Security Council Resolution that established UNOSOM II strengthened the UN mandate in Somalia and removed some of the ambiguities that had persisted throughout the UNITAF deployment. With the assistance of USLO, which provided a US Agency for International Development study outlining steps for reintroducing the pre-Siad Barre legal system, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Admiral Howe, declared the 1962-63 Somali penal code the law of the land.

During the first week of its new mandate, UNOSOM II took a series of decisive actions to demonstrate that it had the situations in Mogadishu and Kismayo under control. Show of force operations were initiated on 5 May in all areas of operations, including the city of Mogadishu. On the following day, a number of warning letters were delivered to various troublesome factional leaders, including General Morgan, whose confederates were at the time still causing trouble in Kismayo. Osman "Atto," Aideed's deputy, armorer, and principal financier, was also told to stay away from Kismayo.

*Winter 1993-94*
UNOSOM II thus sought to demonstrate an even-handed approach to solving political issues by putting General Morgan on notice at the same time in May 1993 that Aideed and his confederates received warning letters.

A period of rapidly rising tensions followed the turnover from the US-led UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The warlord-controlled radio station in Mogadishu immediately stepped up its anti-colonial diatribes. Additional US forces were deployed to Kismayo, the southern port city where most observers believed the first test between the UN and the frustrated warlords would take place. It seemed likely to those in Mogadishu that a confrontation between the international forces and the local "authorities" was inevitable, although no one could predict what form it would take.

The Split With Aideed

The turning point that eventually led to open conflict between Aideed and UN forces began innocently enough. On 13 May, only nine days after the United Nations assumed responsibility for all military operations in Somalia, Aideed sent a letter to UNOSOM II headquarters requesting UN support for a conference to disengage forces in the central region, immediately north of UNITAF's original area of operations. The conference was ostensibly to settle the political issues between Aideed's Habr Gedir clan, dominant in the south central zones of Somalia, and the Mijertain clan, which controls substantial parts of the northeast region of the country.

On its face, this was an attractive initiative. The three militia forces ranged around the town of Galcayo in the central region controlled the largest collection of heavy weapons remaining outside of UN cantonment sites. Disarmament of Galcayo would permit UNOSOM II to extend its area of responsibility from the Kenya frontier through the central region to Bosaso, the capital of the northeast, nearly doubling the size of its area of responsibility. It would have opened land communications with the northeast, which for months had been clamoring for a UN military presence. Because it still pursued a policy of accommodating the warlords, reflecting its Chapter VI habits, UNOSOM II hastened to reply affirmatively to Aideed's offer.

Within a week, however, UNOSOM II and Aideed were quarreling openly about the rules for the conference. UN officials had assumed that the "Galcayo Conference" would take place under their leadership. Aideed insisted that because it was his idea, he should be in charge. At first, he would not even agree to a UN presence. His propaganda organs augmented their vituperative condemnations of UNOSOM II and of Admiral Howe. The UNOSOM II staff belatedly realized that it had been duped; in fact, the international organization had agreed to sponsor a conference designed to raise the political profile of Aideed, its primary antagonist, at the expense of its own authority.

In the end there were two conferences on Galcayo. Aideed's rump conference moved around town, from site to site, hoping to avoid any hint of
UN supervision. The UNOSOM II Conference on Galcayo never got off the ground; at one point, Aideed’s supporters stole the tables and chairs from the UN site and frightened away most of UNOSOM II’s Somali supporters. The Aideed-sponsored conference concluded on 4 June, the day before the attack on the Pakistanis that killed 24 peacekeepers and severely wounded another 50. Some observers believe that the whole Galcayo conference exercise represented an effort by Aideed to humiliate the UN and to mobilize potential allies for a military confrontation with UN forces.

Ambiguity in Handling Aideed Left Unresolved

It remains unclear whether the series of uncertain tactics and awkward missteps by UNOSOM II after it took over on 4 May were caused by micro-management from UN Headquarters in New York or were simply miscalculations based on faulty reading of Somali politics on the ground in Mogadishu. It is apparent, however, that in either case, the United Nations had no plan for handling the warlords. Aideed astutely held on to the political initiative and continually threw UNOSOM II off balance. Even after the public disagreement between Aideed’s people and the UN had reached a fever pitch, Admiral Howe paid a well-publicized call on Aideed at his headquarters on 22 May. Howe evidently hoped to reach a last-minute accommodation with Aideed on the critical Galcayo meeting. For those Somalis who hoped that the United Nations would finally stand up to the warlords, the call by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Aideed was an acute disappointment. Aideed apparently believed that he had no particular reason to cooperate with the UN. He saw UN efforts to accommodate him as weakness; he hoped to strengthen waning support in his own faction and to draw followers from other clan groups by portraying UNOSOM II as anti-Islamic, and by emphasizing xenophobic and anti-colonial issues in his broadcasts. These remained his primary themes as he evaded UN efforts to arrest him.

Aideed demonstrated considerable skill in exploiting the weaknesses of Operation Restore Hope. He used both UNITAF and UNOSOM to gain stature and enhance his prospects for being declared the legitimate future leader of Somalia. Aideed did not attack American troops in UNITAF directly. He simply waited UNITAF out, preparing actions to be used against UNOSOM II in the event that his political position was not respected. He astutely kept himself in the center of any potential political settlement. He was keenly conscious of the importance of the media and staged attacks, sometimes gunning down his own Habr Gedir women and children in order to have bodies to show on US evening news broadcasts. Aideed has exploited command and control problems within UNOSOM II. With allies in that headquarters, he managed to keep abreast of tactical plans and to split UNOSOM II cohesion.

Winter 1993-94
Aideed has weaknesses that UNOSOM II has shown little skill in exploiting. His center of gravity is his relations with the Hawiye/Habr Gedir sub-clan, which accepted him as its leader so long as he could defend them and maintain his credibility as the country's next leader. The Habr Gedir, who are one of the largest sub-clans in the country, perhaps 800,000 out of a pre-civil war national population of 7.5 million, have been political outsiders since before World War II. They were particularly mistreated by Siad Barre, who brutally suppressed them. It is easy to understand why, in the context of the times, the Habr Gedir wanted Aideed to be "their dictator," the next Siad Barre. If the Habr Gedir finally realize that he is a lost cause, a leader who would have no standing in the world, he probably would be eliminated by his own clansmen.

**Political Features of Chapter VII Peacemaking Operations**

There are numerous examples, particularly in West Africa, in which the peoples of largely failed states held national conferences of reconciliation. Among the prime examples are the national conferences of Benin, Niger, Congo (Brazzaville), and Mali. In each of these cases, national authorities were established that were based on compromises among regional and ethnic groups. These conferences sometimes lasted for months. As noted, such gatherings are also part of the Somali cultural tradition. Meetings of elders and their communities became widespread after the defeat of Siad Barre; their very popularity caused these guurti to be largely suppressed when the warlords asserted control over regions in which clan groups other than their own predominated.

A four-month conference of elders in Boroma, in northwest Somalia, ended in early June 1993, having produced a provisional president and a national charter. Although this gathering resolved to seek recognition of national independence, largely as the result of genocidal atrocities of the Siad Barre administration in the north, it serves as a recent example of the Somali tradition of compromise and practicality. The optimal political goal for Somalia would be to create a body in which all Somalis could meet and decide what form their political future should take. At a neutral site, and protected by forces from UNOSOM II, such a gathering might also last for months. However, the process could be a lot less expensive in human lives and military hardware than what happened in Somalia between May and October 1993. The ability to provide the people of Somalia an opportunity to act politically without coercion would constitute a success for the various international groups in Somalia. Although few facts are available, the United Nations sponsored a successful reconciliation conference recently in Kismayo, confronting the same range of issues that would have arisen during the abortive Galcayo conference.

The organization of a national conference should become a fundamental component of every United Nations Chapter VII operation. If this were to become general practice—the price that national communities in distress would be obliged to pay for international peacemaking assistance—a model could be
developed for integrating political and military goals, objectives, and methods in Chapter VII operations. The model would facilitate the development of appropriate end states for military forces committed in support of such operations, and just might eliminate many hours of empty debate in the UN Security Council. If the New World Order is to continue to be such a messy affair, it should be the business of the world community to establish some elementary ground rules before attempting any more Chapter VII operations.

**Issues Raised by Operation Restore Hope**

One cannot deploy more than 26,000 troops to a country the size of Somalia without becoming a major force in the domestic political situation of the country where they are deployed. It is not realistic to plan a humanitarian operation that includes such an overwhelming force without a well-defined political agenda. Nearly all Somalis who were in contact with the US Liaison Office in Mogadishu, including Somalis not necessarily sympathetic to the UN deployment, were incredulous that the UN seemed to have such limited objectives.

When there is no central government, the occupying force in a Chapter VII operation can become the de facto government. The strongest criticism leveled at the UNITAF intervention in Somalia is not that it did so much, but that it did so little. UNITAF did not disarm the warlords or establish law and order.

The five-month UNITAF occupation of south-central Somalia created an appearance of normalcy. In retrospect, it appears that the warlords simply decided to wait for the coalition to leave. As soon as UNITAF left, the warlords sharply increased their bullying and extortion of fellow Somalis and international assistance agencies.

When UNOSOM II, armed with its strong Chapter VII mandate, began operations in early May 1993, much of the international coalition's credibility had dissipated. Experts in the field of international military operations claim that “the average UN mission has about six weeks from initial deployment to demonstrate its competence and win local trust. If that trust is lost, or never fully realized, an operation can be crippled and its personnel put in jeopardy.” The nonconfrontational approach taken by UNITAF during the five months that its forces operated in Somalia created a credibility gap that the United Nations has never been able to fill.

Command and control of UNOSOM II is very much more complicated than it was for UNITAF. For many UN military forces, the chain of command runs through their respective national capitals.

The United Nations must assure itself that all coalition partners agree with the basic purpose and the goals for which the coalition was created. This is as much a function of credible leadership in New York and national capitals as it is in the area where units are deployed.
It is as true today as it was in December 1992 that “victory” in Somalia will be defined by the political situation that the United Nations—and by direct implication the United States, because we dominated the original operation—leave behind.

Restore Hope was always more than a simple humanitarian operation. A narrow mandate can be pursued in future such operations, but in the end someone must pay the price of earlier short-term successes.

Conclusions

It is not too early to reach judgment on a situation which saw the UN engaged in combat against part of the population that its forces were committed to save. Serious policy miscalculations preceded the breakdown of Operation Restore Hope and led to the attacks by Aideed’s forces on Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993.

The UN was unable to fill the political vacuum that existed in the UNITAF area of operations. Although there were points of open dispute with the warlords, particularly in keeping the peace in the southern port city of Kismayo, UNITAF forces generally followed a policy of nonconfrontation with them. In the end, this policy was interpreted by some of the warlords and their allies as weakness.

The UN appeared uncertain about the transition from the constraints of a Chapter VI operation to the greater freedom and authority of a Chapter VII mandate. Unable to look beyond the warlords, it failed to develop coherent political goals for the entire population of Somalia. Consequently, UN-sponsored conferences in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993 created a process which ultimately escaped UN control, creating significant impediments to peace enforcement.

Aideed’s megalomaniac ambitions were encouraged, inadvertently or by design, by both UNOSOM I and UNITAF. He was accorded virtual chief of state status by various diplomatic and business delegations. He was permitted by UNOSOM I to determine the membership of police and judicial committees, some of which became extensions of his broad-based criminal organization.

If the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) were to be ended precipitously, no one familiar with the political situation there doubts that the humanitarian crisis that sparked the original UNOSOM I and UNITAF operations would recur.

There must be common understanding among the partners of a coalition regarding its military and political goals and objectives, and the measures to be taken to attain the goals. There can be unity of purpose in an operation even as coalition partners maintain direct links with their ministries of defense.
In future peacemaking or peace enforcement operations, the United States and its coalition allies must develop a strategy for meeting the terms of their mandate that integrates military end states with effective political action. Failure to do so will invariably provide local Rambos the opportunities they seek to get inside UN and coalition decision processes and turn events to their own advantage.

Although it seems unnecessary to state it explicitly, never commit to a peace support operation within a political structure or a geographical region if the force is constrained by the UN to operate at different levels of authority. The entire structure or region must be under the same chapter of the UN charter to preclude the kinds of problems that all forces in Somalia have had to contend with since early 1993.

While important mistakes and omissions have occurred throughout the conduct of Operation Restore Hope, the purpose of this article has not been to assign blame, but to point out certain fundamental issues inherent in managing peacemaking operations. The crisis in Somalia may be a paradigm of the New World Order. There are many more Somalias out there, especially in Africa, where debt, drought, disease, and politics threaten states with political implosion. If the United Nations, in partnership with the United States and other peacemaking coalition partners, fails to learn from the lessons of Somalia how to manage those operations, and fails to develop the unity of purpose and coherent political strategy required to bring such operations to successful conclusions, the prospects for multilateral peacemaking in this troubled new era look very bleak indeed.

NOTES:

1. Operation Restore Hope was selected by President Bush as the name of the operation. Admiral Jonathan Howe, the retired American Admiral who assumed command of the UN peacemaking operation in Somalia on 4 May 1993, rechristened the exercise as Operation Continue Hope, which has not been broadly adopted. We will continue to refer to the Somalia humanitarian intervention as Operation Restore Hope. Other members of the UN coalition have their own designations for the Somali relief exercise (e.g., France: Operation Oryx; Italy: Operation Ibis).


3. See Alberto Coll, "For U.S., Hidden Risks in Somalia's Feudal Chaos," The Wall Street Journal, 7 September 1993, p. 12. Professor Coll was a senior official in Pentagon during the Bush Administration. This article provides a lucid glimpse into the thinking of the policymakers of the period.


6. The United States invested something close to $200 million in improving the port and airfield of Berbera in the northwest. When the agreements to use these facilities came up for renewal in 1988, the United States declined to renew them. Siad Barre’s genocidal depredations in the northwest made continuation of the agreements out of the question.

7. Coll.
9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992). 53 pages. Also see Sidney Blumenthal, "Why Are We in Somalia?" The New Yorker, 25 October 1993, p. 58. Blumenthal's thesis is that President Clinton's "political authority is threatened by miscalculations that began when Somalia was made the proving ground of [President Bush's New World Order]."
10. All of these figures are derived from information provided by UNITAF in Mogadishu and are valid as of 3 April 1993.
11. The US Liaison Office (USLO) was established in early December 1992 by Special Presidential Envoy, Ambassador (Ret.) Robert Oakley. A "Liaison Office" is necessary when there are no diplomatic relations between the United States and the country in question. This was the situation in Somalia, where there was no government or anything resembling a central authority. Ambassador Oakley was replaced in early March by Robert Gosende, a career diplomat who, like Oakley, had previously served in Somalia. USLO was first located in a compound sub-leased from an American oil company. Because of its extreme vulnerability in the center of Aideed's neighborhood, it relocated to the devastated former American School property, next to the former US Embassy compound, in early June 1993. Aideed opened hostilities against UN forces on 5 June, and USLO moved on 7 June. The neighboring property, owned by Aideed deputy Osman Atto, was destroyed two weeks later by US AC-130 gunfire.
12. Several approaches were made to Aideed during this episode, which nearly caused the 3-6 March Addis Ababa Donors' Conference to run aground. It is significant that Aideed did not disavow the efforts of his henchmen at that time. From the author's point of view, this incident represented a turning point for Aideed: he chose not to demonstrate statesmanship but to continue to be an extortionist.
15. There were 18 regions in Somalia when Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. Each region was to have three representatives on the Transitional National Council (TNC), with Mogadishu accorded an additional five seats. Five regions are located in the self-declared "Republic of Somaliland," which declared its independence in March 1992. Although it was represented in Addis Ababa, everyone assumed that "Somaliland" would not participate in the TNC. With 15 seats so unencumbered, minus the 16 seats stipulated for the warlords and minor party leaders, only 43 seats remained for democratic contest. Aideed propagandists immediately claimed that his henchmen controlled ten regions. He hoped to have a comfortable majority of 37 seats in the council.
17. This April 1993 study, financed by the US Agency for International Development, was written by Martin Ganzglas, a Washington attorney, who served as advisor to the Somali Police while a Peace Corps Volunteer in the 1960s. He is the author of the only English-language study of the Somali penal code, The Penal Code of the Somali Democratic Republic, With Cases, Commentary and Examples (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1971).
18. When the Ogadeni clan allies of Aideed were chased out of Kismayo in March 1993—an event that nearly caused the breakdown of the Addis Ababa National Reconciliation Conference—Aideed had accused the United Nations of bias in favor of General Morgan, his rival for dominance in Kismayo and the surrounding region. Aideed and his followers had demanded that the United Nations return Kismayo to the status quo that prevailed on 9 December 1992, the date when UNITAF forces began arriving.
19. There are three competing clans in the Mudug and Galgadug provinces of Somalia's central region. The Somali National Alliance represents the Hawiye/Habr Gedir and possesses a substantial inventory of arms, including a large portion of the heavy weapons which Aideed evacuated from Mogadishu before the arrival of UNITAF. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) is the faction representing the Majertain clan which dominates the northeast. The SSDF is led by Abshir Musa and Abdullahi Yusuf, the latter an ally of Aideed. The Marehan are represented in the Galcayo area by the Somali National Front led by a former Siad General, Mohamed Hashi Gani. UNITAF's decision not to deploy north of the Shabelle River left the Galcayo situation in limbo.
20. This observation was repeated several times to the author during his four months in Mogadishu, March-June 1993, by Somalis belonging to diverse clan families.

Parameters
The DOD Role in African Policy

KENT H. BUTTS

Africa's role in US national security policy has fluctuated between episodic importance in times of East-West tensions to relative unimportance since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Crises in Liberia and Somalia, and the domestically important issue of South African governance, are rare instances of US attention being focused on the region.

Economic development, political reform, and conflict resolution are the focus of congressional interest and dominate discussion of US African policy. These largely humanitarian interests overshadow strategic security interests. Unfolding global and regional events, however, portend an increase in Africa's importance to US national security interests and warrant greater Department of Defense (DOD) participation both in the region and in the policy debate.

This article examines the current African policy environment and its effects on US strategic and humanitarian interests. The article also suggests a strategy whereby DOD might contribute markedly to US humanitarian policy initiatives while furthering US strategic security interests. DOD should play a major role in Africa policy formulation for several reasons: the contributions of current DOD programs, the likelihood of future peace enforcement missions, and Africa's strategic importance to the United States.

The Importance of Africa to the United States

Africa's importance to US strategic security interests is more pronounced than is popularly believed. US relations with Africa affect the principles of forward presence, power projection, reconstitution, and maritime superiority contained in the National Military Strategy. With the drawdown of American forces overseas, US security will increasingly depend upon the ability of the Department of Defense to project power. To do so, the United States must have base and overflight access agreements, staging areas, and naval retrofitting facilities in distant points of the globe. Recent events in the Middle East, moreover, call into question the continued use of Saudi Arabia.

Winter 1993-94
as a staging area for US Central Command forces and suggest that Africa's strategic importance to the United States may be increasing.

In addition to its use as a staging and basing area, Africa provides some 20 percent of US petroleum imports. An additional 40 percent reaches the United States via the strategic and easily interdicted Southern Cape route, a vital sea line of communication. Given the unsuccessful efforts of the Bush Administration to produce an energy strategy that reduced consumption of cheap imported oil, and given the vulnerability of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf to the saber-rattling of a rejuvenated, belligerent, and perhaps nuclear Iran, African oil may become more important in the near term. Finally, in an era of increased economic competition among the mineral have-not industrial powers of Europe, the Pacific Rim nations, and the United States, access to and continued uninterrupted production of African strategic minerals will remain essential to economies seeking to expand and gain market share in the interdependent global economy.

With the Cold War behind us, the United States now faces a global economic war for market share and national economic vitality. We face an era likely marked by unpredictable regional conflicts that will severely test DOD's ability to project power to distant points of the globe. The United States needs access to Africa if we are to meet these challenges. If political support for strategic interests is weak, then DOD should maintain its ties to African militaries by increasing those peacetime roles that support what Congress currently defines as the dominant US interests on the continent—democratic reform, economic development, conflict resolution, military downsizing, and environmental sustainability. DOD should ensure that Congress remains aware of DOD's unique capabilities in these areas and show how limited but sustained resources can support strategic objectives in the region.

The United States and the Department of Defense would benefit substantially from continued military-to-military contacts regardless of their form or the types of programs executed. Africa is no different from the rest of the world in having military forces; military forces there are arguably more influential, however, in determining the behavior of their governments than are those in countries in the developed world. African military forces should

---

Lieutenant Colonel Kent H. Butts is the African Strategic Research Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. He is a 1973 graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point, holds a master's in business administration from Boston University, holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in geography from the University of Washington, and was a John M. Olin post-doctoral fellow in national security at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. A former Associate Professor in West Point's Science Research Lab, Lieutenant Colonel Butts spent three years in Africa, where he served as the Defense Attaché and Security Assistance Officer to Uganda and Malawi and initiated Tanzania's security assistance program. He is the coauthor of the book Geopolitics of Southern Africa: South Africa as Regional Superpower, published by Westview Press.
be carefully integrated into the US African strategy through increased funding for military-to-military contacts. If democratization is to succeed, African militaries must understand and support a reduction in both their size and their ability to influence domestic events. The Department of Defense has a unique ability to facilitate this process and should be included regularly in policy formulation. Two key documents explain why.

Both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy stress the importance of security interests and objectives directly influenced by African events. These documents recognized the end of the Cold War and a future marked by economic competition, regional conflict, and democratic reform. The documents established the following US national security strategy objectives for the 1990s:

- Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.
- Undertake humanitarian assistance in the midst of civil war and anarchy.
- Foster open and democratic systems that secure human rights and respect for every citizen.
- Ensure that no hostile power is able to dominate or control a region critical to our interests.
- Avoid conflict by reducing sources of regional instability and violence.
- Strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights.⁴

These objectives make it clear that humanitarian and security interests are interrelated. They are synergistic and should be treated as such by Congress and DOD in formulating US African policy. However, such is currently not the case.

The Clinton Administration policy toward Africa appears substantially different from policies little more than a year old in that it emphasizes humanitarian interests over strategic security interests. American foreign policy toward Africa has long included the tenets of economic development and the promotion of democracy. However, the simultaneous need to counter the spread of Soviet influence and to maintain access to strategic minerals and key bases oftentimes overshadowed them. Today the primary tenets of democratic reform and economic development remain, but they are accompanied as dominant US interests only by conflict resolution. The need to counter the spread of Soviet influence has ended, and with it the perceived importance of maintaining access to bases and mineral and petroleum resources.

Access to Strategic Bases and Minerals

The demise of the Soviet Union suddenly and dramatically ended the bipolar competition on the African continent and called into question Africa's strategic importance. For example, the strategic importance of US basing and
access agreements seemingly was reduced. In the Cold War milieu there was an easily articulated need for a US capability to project power into the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and the South Atlantic. We required key installations, overflight agreements, and prepositioning points to meet this strategic objective. The United States has access agreements with Djibouti, Kenya, Senegal, the Seychelles, Liberia, and Gambia, and during the Cold War supported the Angolan rebels from Zaire. Moreover, Africa was looked upon as a key geostrategic location from which to stage operations into the Middle East because it was considered politically unacceptable to preposition equipment and supplies in the Middle East or to land US forces on Middle Eastern soil.

The Gulf War established the precedent of basing forces in or operating forces from the Middle East, and current policy depends upon stable or reliable access continuing into the near term. Thus, the Horn and East Africa — where locations such as Berbera, Somalia, were used to preposition petroleum stocks, and the port of Mombasa, Kenya, was useful for naval retrofitting — were of little significance in the Gulf War, and may now appear to have decreased in geostrategic value. Planners and policy analysts citing the example of “the last war” and the absence of a global Soviet threat have been quick to dismiss the importance of maintaining African basing and access agreements. This may be a shortsighted view of US strategic requirements.

Recent events in the Middle East are particularly disturbing. Iran’s purchase of submarines and reported attempts to purchase nuclear warheads from foreign-currency-starved Russia and Kazakhstan are altering the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Iran is aggressively pursuing a central role in the Middle East security architecture. It has underscored its determination by establishing exclusive control over the strategically situated oil-producing island of Abu Musa, and by challenging the Gulf Cooperation Council’s efforts to recruit Syria and Egypt into the council’s security structure. Intimidated by fundamentalist and assertive Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have refused US requests to preposition heavy equipment for US brigades on their soil. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also rebuffed the US Central Command’s request to establish a formal headquarters on the Arabian peninsula.

The foregoing events have profound implications. The US use of Middle East bases is increasingly suspect at a time when a powerful Persian Gulf state, diametrically opposed to the US Middle East role, is arming itself with weapons of mass destruction and initiating the same behavior, seizure of land, that precipitated the recent Gulf War. As former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s remarks in the 1992 Annual Report to the President and Congress make clear,

Access to facilities in the nations of sub-Saharan Africa made an important contribution to the Coalition effort during Operation Desert Storm, both for the United States and for the other Coalition forces. Such access would have been even more important had the conflict been prolonged.
In an era of reduced forward deployment, the United States needs base access; the increasingly important requirement to project power in order to influence regional events depends upon it. However, to sustain its own economy and produce the weapons and equipment necessary for power projection, the United States must have access to Africa's strategic minerals.

The United States viewed access to these minerals as a major geopolitical interest during the Cold War. The Soviet Union also saw Africa's minerals as a strategic issue, but with a twist. As former Soviet President Brezhnev is often quoted as saying, for the mineral-rich Soviets, a major geopolitical objective was to deny the United States access to the "treasure house" of strategic minerals found in southern Africa. The presence of Soviet and Cuban forces in the Marxist regimes of Angola and Mozambique underscored this potential strategy of denial and did pose a potential threat to mineral production in South Africa and Zaire. In 1978, for example, Angolan rebels, with Soviet support, launched the short-lived invasion of Zaire's copper- and cobalt-producing Shaba province from Angola.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Cold War-related threat to US access to these minerals has waned, but the US need for them has not. They remain critically important to US industry, weapons production, and military reconstitution. African deposits of cobalt, chromium, platinum, and manganese are essential to the US production of automobiles, tanks, and fighter aircraft. Except for small quantities of platinum, the United States does not produce these minerals indigenously; neither do its chief competitors for world market share: Japan, the Pacific Rim, and the European Community. The major non-African reserves of these minerals are found in the fragile former Soviet states. Economic competition for these imported minerals and the need to maintain secure access to them should continue to influence US strategic thinking about Africa.

This particular threat is difficult to see or to plan for because the stagnant world economy has delayed potentially acrimonious competition among industrial giants. The Japanese, however, recognize the importance of these minerals to their industrial strategy and are establishing joint ventures with mineral-producing countries to ensure sources of supply. The United States should similarly take policy action to protect these sources. Access to these minerals otherwise may soon be lost because of long-term contracts with our competitors or political or economic problems in the handful of mineral-producing countries.

Political instability or economic collapse threatens Africa's major mineral-producing countries. Approximately 75 percent of world cobalt production comes from Zaire and Zambia. It is no understatement to say that Zaire is in economic and political chaos; Zambia's destitute economy brought down long-term President Kenneth Kaunda and threatens the struggling government of Frederick Chiluba. Uncertainty in these countries drove cobalt...
prices on the stock market upward from $11 a pound in 1991 to $35 a pound in 1992.\textsuperscript{10} South Africa, beset by black-on-black violence, killings, and general strikes, accounts for 82 percent of the world’s chromium reserve base, 75 percent of the manganese reserve base, and 90 percent of the platinum reserve base; it also largely controls the export of cobalt and copper from Zaire and Zambia.\textsuperscript{11} The long-sought change from white to multi-ethnic rule is now imminent; despite its desirability, it will occur in a milieu of violence and mistrust that calls into question the continued availability of these essential South African mineral supplies.

Access to southern African minerals is arguably less secure today than at the height of the Cold War, yet their importance to the US economy and the defense industrial base remains high. Policymakers seem to be paying little heed, however, partly because their attention has been focused on the humanitarian interests left unattended during the Cold War. In addition, there is a longer-term focus in US policy on seeing in place democratic governments that would serve as a more solid foundation for economic development and reliable trade partnerships.

**Dominance of Humanitarian Interests**

While our strategic interests may be substantially reduced from their Cold War preeminence, US interests in economic development, democratization, and conflict resolution are not. These humanitarian interests are guiding US policy toward Africa. All three are reflected in the 1991 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, which seeks: “A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.”\textsuperscript{12} Freed from the need to pursue policies that traded off democracy and human rights against the often more-important interest of controlling the spread of Soviet influence, the United States and, in particular, the Congress are moving aggressively to ensure that human rights, democracy, and economic development guide US policy in the future.

Poverty remains the chief cause of political instability. The legitimacy of any government, particularly that of a democratically elected government, often turns upon its ability to provide for the economic well-being of its people. Two thirds of the world’s lowest-income countries are in Africa, where the per capita income averages less than $200 per person, the population growth rate exceeds three percent, and market prices for the continent’s commodity exports are low.\textsuperscript{13} In sub-Saharan Africa, nearly half the people live in poverty.

Most African countries have pursued inefficient and often counterproductive economic policies since their independence. Many African countries experimented with socialism; still others witnessed the abuse of political power for economic gain by long-term or lifetime presidents. Africa’s total debt is over $250 billion, with annual interest payments requiring almost
The winds of democratic change that have swept across Eastern Europe have been felt by African elites. The concept of multiparty democracy has spread across the continent and is of particular interest in countries such as South Africa, Kenya, and Zaire, long bastions of single-party or minority rule. It is likely that democratic forces will have to struggle mightily to surmount the multi-ethnic composition of states created by colonial fiat. Nevertheless, foreign lenders and many influential observers in Congress and in European governments who have watched single-party states pursue counterproductive economic policies in the past believe that multiparty democracy is the best hope for Africa's long-term political stability. If democracy is indeed the political system best suited to cultural diversity, then it should flourish in Africa. The United States should therefore strengthen programs, such as security assistance, that can enhance political stability while encouraging economic development.

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution, in which DOD's participation is essential for success, is another major area of interest to the United States in Africa. Chronic conflicts in Africa resulted from the combination of the Cold War and the colonial boundaries that included multiple ethnic groups within the same artificial country. The United States experienced initial success in conflict resolution by cooperating with the Soviet Union on the Angolan conflict. The success of this American foreign policy initiative, termed Constructive Engagement, was tied to solving the Angolan conundrum and bringing independence and democratic rule to Namibia. Beyond US-Soviet cooperative efforts, the United States has been actively involved in seeking solutions to conflicts in other countries, such as in Liberia and in post-Mengistu Ethiopia.

Other regional conflicts abound and beg for resolution. Somalia, the Sudan, and Mozambique are debilitated by civil war, and Angola, Uganda, and Ethiopia still struggle with the aftermath of conflict. Solving most of these conflicts will require the downsizing, demobilizing, and retraining of sizable military forces. Because conflict will continue, conflict resolution may be expected to remain a major US interest in the future, and one in which DOD should have an active role, particularly in the area of demobilization.

During the Cold War, security assistance frequently determined the form and political orientation (East or West) of African governments; African military assistance and armies tended to be disproportionately large and accounted for dysfunctionally sizable portions of government budgets. As a result, Congress is scrutinizing and often criticizing military-to-military ties and DOD spending in African countries. Senator Alan Cranston represented
the perspective of this critical element of Congress when he wrote: "We must be very careful to ensure that the aid we offer does not reinforce this trend by feeding the virus of militarism." 

The United States and Europe are seeking to discourage African spending on heavy military equipment and to encourage demobilization. This is a sound objective that should not mean eliminating US security assistance programs, which can be used to manage the demobilization process and provide a model of military subordination to civilian authority.

Another important issue, frequently subsumed under economic and political interests, is the environment. Environmental factors are increasingly recognized for their contribution to political instability and poverty. Africa’s burgeoning population exacerbates the need for energy and cultivated land, promotes overgrazing and deforestation, and places suffocating demands on an already overburdened social infrastructure.

Once a net food exporter, the continent is now unable to feed itself. When the land can no longer sustain the people, they are forced to migrate, often across national borders. Millions of refugees now erode the ability of their host countries to manage their own already-strained economies and maintain control over their own territories. The growing population is also encroaching upon the habitat of Africa’s unique wildlife. This encroachment, in addition to regionally specific and problematic poaching of certain wildlife species, has greatly reduced much of Africa’s population of such animals as the elephant and the rhino, economically important to Africa’s tourism industry. Environmental degradation contributes to political instability and places additional strains on an already fragile economic system.

Opportunities for Solutions

The key to maximizing US interests in Africa lies in synergy, in using all US assets to maintain stability. The Defense Department can do much to support the US humanitarian objectives in Africa, and by successfully promoting these objectives the United States serves its strategic security interests as well. As former Secretary of Defense Cheney noted, "Failure by the Western nations to promote stability in Africa could result in disruption in the production or distribution of strategically important resources [minerals and oil] and could reduce access to facilities important to regional contingencies." 

Given the fact that militaries in the developing world play a considerable role in the governance of their countries and in regime longevity, DOD involvement would seem to be a natural way to encourage democracy and political stability in Africa. To do so, however, DOD needs to maintain its ties with the African militaries, which is increasingly difficult to do as US security assistance budgets decline worldwide, particularly in Africa. The US military has a potentially important role to play in facilitating democratiza-
tion, economic development, and conflict resolution. Promoting awareness in Congress of the value of the military in supporting US interests could result in increased funding for DOD African programs. In any event, DOD should put its own resources into maintaining these ties because they benefit US strategic interests.

**Humanitarian Interests**

One approach of the Bush Administration was to send Special Forces teams and other specialized units to Africa to conduct small-unit tactical or medical training. Reserve and National Guard units have also performed significant work with the military forces of developing countries, and their medical and engineering unit capabilities lend themselves to the support of environmental and nation-assistance programs.

As the history of Nigeria demonstrates, when governments make the transition to multiparty democracy, they may have to cut military spending to ameliorate their almost inevitable economic problems, and their military forces may rebel. Continued DOD involvement with the militaries of such countries, however, can dampen such a reaction. The Defense Department can provide a role model of military support to civilian government and through military-to-military communication may even be able to forestall military takeovers of democratically elected governments.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the Expanded IMET program, for example, support the democratization process remarkably well. Approximately 500 African officers and noncommissioned officers annually receive US military education. This education exposes them to the American system of democracy and to civil-military relations that emphasize the role of a nonpolitical military professional and the principle of civilian governance. Congress initiated the Expanded IMET program to address judicial systems, military codes of conduct, international human rights standards, and the management of military systems and budgets. Expanded IMET also provides formal training in these subjects to civil as well as military officials at a time when African militaries are being pressured to downsize, to give up political power, or to accept a greater role for civilian, multiparty forms of democratic government.14

As good as the IMET program is, it could be improved. A block of democracy and human rights instruction should be added to every IMET course from the infantry officer advanced course to the most basic motor vehicle maintenance course. This would make clear to Congress the value of the basic IMET program to humanitarian interests, as well as better inculcate these values at a time when IMET faces an approximate 50-percent cut by Congress. Increased contact with the US military makes good sense.

US military programs also can facilitate economic development and environmental sustainability. The US Military Civic Action program provides
funding and construction equipment for local militaries to maintain economically important road networks or to build irrigation schemes, bridges and dams, and small hospitals. Such projects promote much-needed economic development, health, and national integration. They make the population of frontier areas feel more a part of the country and enhance the legitimacy of the civilian government. Other donor countries sometimes support these projects and extend the value of the DOD programs. The United States has cooperated with Portugal, France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom on joint civic action projects relating to health and the environment in countries as diverse as Djibouti, Malawi, Ghana, Niger, and Botswana. More significantly, the DOD Coastal Security Program has promoted regional cooperation among West African states in managing fisheries and controlling foreign distant-water trawler fleets that aggressively plundered African waters.

These nonlethal forms of assistance are not directly related to combat missions, yet they promote communication between US forces and the host government's military. Such cooperative relationships on economic and environmental issues serve two important purposes. First, they encourage the military to contribute in nontraditional ways to the improvement of their own country. This is of great potential benefit to governments with very limited resources seeking to demonstrate their concern for a multi-ethnic population. Second, this century's cyclical history of global conflict, and particularly recent events in the Persian Gulf, indicate that strategic US military interests on the African continent may increase in the future. If they do, the good will of the African militaries will be an important asset in accomplishing US strategic objectives, such as providing forward combat equipment storage points, access to ports and bases, and overflight clearance.

The Department of Defense also should promote the fact that its security assistance program has made significant contributions to such African environmental issues as biodiversity, conservation, and fisheries and wildlife management, and it should seek further funding for these missions. Emphasizing DOD’s role in facilitating environmental improvement could secure increased support from Congress and from the increasingly influential environmental community.

Indeed, funding from the environmentally conscious Congress already helps to maintain the withering security assistance program. In FY 1991, for example, Congress earmarked $15 million for DOD environmental, biodiversity, and conservation projects in Africa. This money supported antipoaching efforts, reestablished game parks, and purchased patrol boats, aircraft, and other equipment used by coastal security forces to prevent overfishing in exclusive economic zones. Irrigation schemes, which allowed fertile but dry land to be brought into cultivation, and game park revitalization were also included. So successful was the program that Congress earmarked
an additional $15 million in FY 93 for African biodiversity and conservation projects. US military involvement in such projects benefits the recipient country in economic as well as environmental ways. Such efforts further the African interests and objectives of both DOD and the Congress.

Additional humanitarian roles that the US military must be prepared to play in Africa in the near term include the rescue of Americans and other Western nationals endangered as a result of violence associated with political transition and, quite possibly, the breakup of African countries into smaller states. In addition, the chronic internal conflicts of Mozambique, Liberia, and southern Sudan may result in calls for the use of US combat forces for humanitarian interests, replicating our experience in Somalia. For such operations, base access, overflight clearances, and logistical support of security assistance partners are invaluable.

Conflict Resolution

The US military may be required to send peacekeeping and cease-fire verification forces to the continent to support conflict resolution processes. However, DOD should steadfastly discourage unilateral peace-enforcement roles. Although these may offer a quick, temporary solution to a problem of foreign policy inattention (as in Somalia) such roles rarely involve vital US interests. They offer little in the form of long-term conflict resolution or continued popular support in the United States. African solutions must be found for African problems. In the recent Liberian conflict and overthrow of the Doe regime, a regional military force from African countries constituted the peace enforcement group. Although the group’s success has so far been mixed, the United States was thus able to be a facilitator and not a direct participant in the on-the-ground peace-enforcement efforts. The United States is also backing Organization of African Unity (OAU) efforts to facilitate the conflict resolution process in Rwanda. These basically African efforts have the potential for creating lasting peace and represent precedents that should be reinforced. The United States should assume peace enforcement missions only in support of coalition-based UN initiatives or, in the future, those of the OAU.

One requirement of conflict resolution is the demobilization and downsizing of often inordinately large military forces. This process is critical to the success of efforts to establish the new multiparty democratic governments. Thus far, DOD has been asked to contribute little in this area; it has the potential to do far more. The US military could take advantage of existing humanitarian and security assistance programs to construct demobilization camps, establish health care and training facilities, dispose of weapons, and provide basic skills education that would facilitate the reintroduction of former soldiers to civilian society. Such a program would complement State Department and Administration initiatives in Rwanda and Angola, and in Uganda, where the government is seeking to reduce its army by some 40,000 men.
Strategic Interests

While it is important for DOD to support humanitarian interests, it is essential that DOD proactively point out to Congress and the policymaking community the importance of supporting strategic security issues. Two national security interests that DOD should encourage despite their current lack of popular support are strategic terrain and access to minerals. At the geo-strategic level, DOD should encourage both Congress and the Department of State to define and recognize the importance of strategic terrain. Although this is a medium- to long-term interest, military strategists cannot lose sight of the importance of chokepoints, lines of communication, and distant bases from which to project power to the extreme corners of the globe. (See Figure 1.) As a nation that depends upon free and open sea lanes and a powerful blue-water navy for its raw materials imports and economic vitality, the United States must always concern itself with choke points and access to ports where major retrofitting and fueling can occur. While at this time there may not be an international adversary willing or able to threaten the United States by taking advantage of Africa's strategic position, the rapid changes in the world's international political equation in the last five years should be ample evidence that such a potential exists. The vulnerability of resource imports to political variables and the will of countries that control choke points was demonstrated by the refusal of South Africa (and others) to allow Japanese plutonium imports to pass through territorial waters. Nor should we forget
the sudden spike in the Sudan’s geopolitical importance that occurred during
the Gulf War when it was thought that Iraqi Scuds were in that country for
possible use against neighboring Egypt.19

For all these reasons, and others like them, the Department of
Defense should insist on geostrategic variables being included in the decision
process for US policy and interests toward Africa, regardless of whether a
current crisis exists to provide easy justification. If DOD fails to champion
this cause, there will be no champion.

Also at the strategic level, the Department of Defense should certainly
concern itself with continued mineral production and access to strategic minerals
and petroleum. The United States cannot reach surge capacities during a mobi-
lization without continued access to sizable quantities of African minerals. US
domestic deposits could not make up for a shortfall should access to these sources
of supply be lost, a particularly salient fact given the Department of Defense plan
to sell down the National Defense Stockpile from its $8 billion level to an
ineffectual level of approximately $400 million.21 Of the more than 50 African
countries, only a handful are directly involved in the production of strategic and
critical minerals. These producing countries should be on a short list of African
countries that are of special interest to the United States above and beyond
humanitarian concerns. DOD should insist upon factoring in mineral production
capacities as a contributing element in the maintenance of US industrial base
productivity and surge capacity. Such inclusion would seem a minor investment
and good judgment considering the economic competition that is predicted by
the United States’ own National Security Strategy.

Conclusions and Recommendations

- The DOD strategy toward Africa should recognize current con-
gressional and Administration emphasis on humanitarian interests, but should
not fail to advocate the importance of geostrategic issues. Moderate funding
of existing DOD programs can lend meaningful support to salient US interests
in Africa: democratic reform, economic development, environmental sustain-
ment, conflict resolution, and military downsizing, thus reducing the likeli-
hood of other Somalias while enhancing US geostrategic interests.
- DOD should proactively seek congressional and Administration
support by proposing humanitarian initiatives, which could result in addi-
tional funding for security assistance programs. Moreover, such proposals
would demonstrate to the new Congress the peacetime value of the military,
and would help to sustain military-to-military contacts that would otherwise
be lost as Congress reduces security assistance programs that are oriented on
the combat arms.
- The Somalia operation will cost the United States at least $830
million, to be paid by DOD.22 Somalia set a precedent for using large numbers
of US troops for humanitarian reasons in mid-intensity conflicts. The result-
ing financial—and roles and missions—costs to DOD are substantial. It is far
wiser and much cheaper to head off these events before they occur in such
likely places as Liberia, Western Sahara, Mozambique and southern Sudan.
Therefore, DOD should adapt in the following ways:

* Recognize that humanitarian missions, such as relief opera-
tions, may be forced upon DOD by media coverage and public pressure, and
be seen as a new element of US foreign policy.
* Aggressively participate in the shaping of foreign policy
initiatives to insure that the use of military forces is not considered without
meaningful input from DOD.
* Use security assistance, National Guard and Reserve train-
ing, and nation assistance programs to support political stability and maintain
influence that can dissuade intemperate African military behavior and help to
secure important base and overflight access agreements.
* Increase DOD funding of relevant programs and insure that
the administration of these programs by the combatant commanders (CINCs)
closely supports the foreign policy initiatives of DOD, the State Department,
Congress, and the Administration.
* The main source of expertise to design and manage these
programs, and to maintain communication and understanding with influential
Third World militaries, is the Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. For
the program to survive, it must be managed as a functional area, like the Army
Acquisition Corps. Former battalion commanders with a brief stint in language
school cannot provide the understanding of foreign cultures that insures clear
communication between military governments and the United States. 21

* In an era of scarcity, the DOD strategy toward Africa must be
focused and discriminate. Beyond humanitarian concerns, a relative few
African countries are of strategic interest to DOD. Therefore, DOD should
concentrate its efforts upon countries that influence minerals and petroleum
production, bases, sea lines of communication, and the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction: South Africa, Kenya, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and
Ethiopia. By doing so, DOD will dramatically enhance the National Military
Strategy foundations of forward presence, power projection, reconstitution,
and maritime superiority.

* DOD cannot take a short-term view of crisis management or
disregard the importance of Africa to the defense industrial base, upon which
operational readiness depends. The cyclical nature of world conflict rewards
those who recognize a region's strategic potential. Given Africa's desperate
economic condition and the absence of Cold War benefactors, US influence
with African countries of strategic importance could be developed at little
cost. DOD should, therefore, support peacetime engagement roles for its
forces and focus their participation upon countries of strategic importance.
NOTES


3. In a scenario alarmingly similar to events leading up to the Gulf War, Iran is pressuring Saudi Arabia (which alone supplies 25 percent of US oil imports and is OPEC’s largest producer) to cut its oil production in order to tighten the market and drive up oil prices. Iran needs higher oil revenues to pay for its $10 billion arms buildup and is being forced by the low oil prices to overproduce and exceed its OPEC quotas. See, for example, “Iran: The New Red Alert in the Persian Gulf,” Business Week, 26 October 1992, p. 53; and “OPEC Chief Aims to Stem the Oil Flow,” Sunday Patriot News (Harrisburg, Pa.), 26 September 1993, p. A16.


17. Cheney, p. 16.


23. The Army’s most experienced FAOs are being eliminated by the Army’s current force reduction policies, leaving DOD and the United States vulnerable to a lack of understanding of regional political-military events during a period when regional conflict will dominate US foreign policy.

Winter 1993-94 73
The most common public image of Winston Churchill may be the wartime picture taken by the famed photographer, Yousuf Karsh. The British leader glowers out from that photograph, truculent and combative. Never mind that the menacing look was reportedly caused by Karsh’s insistence that Churchill remove his ever-present cigar from his mouth. What remains is that quintessential aura of resistance and defiance against all odds that came to symbolize the spirit of the nation Churchill led throughout World War II. Paradoxically, this image of a modern warlord in the greatest of all 20th-century conflicts owes its existence to the late Victorian era into which Churchill was born in 1874. For it was during those years in the Indian Summer of Queen Victoria’s reign that the future British Prime Minister developed his singular traits of character and formed his concepts of war and personal leadership that were to endure throughout his long life.

Foremost among the Victorian influences on the young Churchill was a pervasive sense of historical continuity that stretched beyond the Victorian years. To begin with, there was Blenheim with its obelisks of victory, its grand vistas that created a sense of drama, and the great achievements carved ubiquitously in stone, woven in tapestries, and painted on canvas. It was a monument, in short, to one man, John Churchill, first Duke of Marlborough, whose exploits fed into the unique Whig legend devised by the British in the intervening centuries to underpin their imperial ambitions. It was in that castle that Churchill was born, and it was among the patrician descendants of the great Whig aristocracy from Stuart and Georgian England that he spent his formative years. It was thus no accident that he never deviated throughout his life from what the British historian J. H. Plumb has described as “that curious ideology of the Whigs, half truth, half fiction; half noble, half base.”

In pursuing that course, Churchill was doing no more than accepting the historical assumptions of his fellow patricians in the late 19th century. For them, English history was an evolutionary development by trial and error in which the Englishman’s inherent national characteristics such as love of liberty
and justice were gradually matched by the appropriate institutions of government. There were problems throughout this process, of course, ranging from the Stuarts and Civil War to the loss of America and the threats posed to institutions by industrialization. But the Empire that emerged from those travails was the greatest and most just in history, founded on the richest and freest democracy the world had ever known. In this interpretation, to which Churchill fully subscribed, it was the play of time working on natural genius that produced Great Britain and its institutions. Finally, it was the landed Whig squirearchy, the "great Oaks" as Edmund Burke referred to them, who had been through the centuries England's natural rulers, the guardians of her destiny, and who had brought that miraculous historical development to fruition.

British imperialism, in the later Victorian era, was an extension of the Whig version of England's development. Two years before Churchill's birth, Disraeli had confirmed this in his Crystal Palace address, in which he denounced the Liberals for viewing colonies simply from an economic viewpoint, ignoring "those moral and political considerations which make nations great, and by the influence of which alone men are distinguished from animals." It was these higher considerations that caused Victorians to venerate the soldiers on the Imperial frontier, those men of action who maintained the British Empire, which by the time of Churchill's formative years was an engulfing red splash on the world map, three times the size of the Roman Empire.

The young Churchill was extremely susceptible to such hero worship. On 14 February 1885, he wrote to his father in India commenting on the death of Colonel Frederick Gustavius Burnaby, Royal Horse Guards, who had been killed in action the previous month "sword in hand, while resisting the desperate charge of the Arabs at the battle of Abu Klea." The letter was indicative of the name recognition concerning the heroic Victorian men of action. Burnaby had ridden through Asia Minor to Persia, served as a war correspondent for The Times, and had undertaken a solo balloon flight from Dover to Normandy. It never occurred to the 11-year-old Churchill that his father would not have heard of the colonel.

But if the daily exploits of such heroes were not enough, there was always the prolific pen of George Alfred Henty. In 1876, Henty published the first of his 80 novels on English and Imperial history. Whether it was with Wolfe
at Quebec or with Clive in India, young Victorians like Churchill could relive vicariously every British triumph throughout the Empire. In 1898, the year that Churchill participated in Kitchener's victory over the Mahdi at Omdurman, it was estimated that Henty's annual sales were as high as 250,000. Added to this was the wide variety of nonfiction dealing with the same subject. Between 1852 and 1882, the increasingly literate British masses purchased 31 editions of Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, at least partially, according to Herbert Spencer, to "revel in accounts of slaughter." Equal success awaited the Macmillan series entitled "The English Men of Action," each story of 250 pages being immediately sold out. By 1891, such stories were the staple of the popular press. That year, a new series entitled "Story of the VC: Told by those who have won it" appeared in the new *Strand Magazine* and enjoyed as much success as the Sherlock Holmes short stories that also began in the magazine that year.

From these influences, Churchill created an inner historical world in which there were only the grand and the grandiose. Progress was measured through politics and war, rarely in terms of economic, intellectual, and social issues. Throughout his long life, he was always conscious of the continuity in this world and of his place in it. At one point in June 1940, for instance, General Ismay, his Chief of Staff, urged him to delay sending troops to organize a redoubt in Brittany. "Certainly not," was the Prime Minister's immediate reply. "It would look very bad in history if we were to do any such thing." And in December 1943, while Churchill was recovering from pneumonia at Eisenhower's villa at Tunis, his physician reported that the British leader was well enough to mutter with his lifelong lisp: "I shpposhe it ish fitting I should die beshide Carthage."

Like the great heroes of old, Churchill was at stage center in his inner world, at all times, as he had written of Pitt the elder, "a projection on to a vast screen of his own aggressive dominating personality." Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's envoy in World War II, recognized this early in the war. "Churchill . . . always seemed to be at his Command Post on the precarious beachhead," he wrote; "wherever he was, there was the battlefront—and he was involved in the battles not only of the current war but of the whole past, from Cannae to Gallipoli." That romantic outlook was captured in 1913 in an astonishingly prescient biographical sketch of Churchill in A. G. Gardiner's *Pillars of Society*:

He is always unconsciously playing a part—an heroic part. And he is himself his most astonished spectator. He sees himself moving through the smoke of battle—triumphant, terrible, his brow clothed with thunder, his legions looking to him for victory, and not looking in vain. He thinks of Napoleon; he thinks of his great ancestor. Thus did they bear themselves; thus, in this rugged and most awful crisis, will he bear himself. It is not make-believe, it is not insincerity; it is that in that fervid and picturesque imagination there are always great deeds afoot with himself cast by destiny in the Agamemnon role."
School life only accentuated these tendencies. The British public schools were an integral part of the 19th-century English patrician life. The spirit of those select institutions was captured in Thomas Hughes' *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, the 1856 fictional account of life at Rugby under that school's famous headmaster, Dr. Arnold. The book provided an ideal of life for two generations of British schoolboys, best summed up in Squire Brown's parting thoughts concerning Tom: "If he'll only turn out a brave, helpful, truth-telling Englishman, and a gentleman and a Christian, that's all I want."13

Underlying that ideal in Tom Brown was a tradition of manliness from the English squirearchy with its cult of games and field sports and its emphasis on physical strength and prowess. It was also a morally righteous manliness to be used against bullies—usually older, if not stronger—in defense of the small and the weak, the downtrodden fags that seemed to populate Hughes' Rugby. Allied to this theme, but even more fundamental to the manly tradition, was the concept of combativeness, the love of a good fight. "After all," Tom Brown conjectures, "what would life be without fighting, I should like to know! From the cradle to the grave, fighting, rightly understood, is the business, the real, highest, honestest business of every son of man."14

By the time Churchill entered Harrow in 1888, the manliness cult in the public schools was an essential element of the new imperialism, as fresh generations of military men of action and civilian ruler administrators were produced for the Empire. The school experience reinforced the future British leader's determination to make himself physically and mentally tough, to mold himself in more courageous, heroic, and manly terms than were naturally his in physique and temperament. "I am cursed with so feeble a body," Churchill wrote his mother from Sandhurst in 1893, "that I can scarcely support the fatigues of the day."15 His frustration was understandable. He stood five feet, six and a half inches at the time, with a chest measurement of 31 inches, inadequate by Sandhurst standards. He had extremely sensitive skin and, as has been noted, suffered all his life from a difficulty, like his father, in pronouncing the letter "s." As a young man, he would walk up and down attempting to remedy this problem by rehearsing such phrases as: "The Spanish ships I cannot see for they are not in sight." Later on the lecture circuit, he began to cure his lisp and to lose the inhibitions that it had caused. "Those who heard him talk in middle and old age," his son commented later, "may conclude that he mastered the inhibition better than he did the impediment."16

Despite these physical disadvantages and a temperament that was not naturally courageous, Churchill emerged as a mentally tough, physically brave man. In fact, it was precisely because he lacked the very mental and physical traits that were the quintessential staples of the British public schoolboy and the Victorian man of action that Churchill persevered, forcing himself to go against his inner nature. It would be a lifelong and successful effort to compensate, to keep, as he termed it, from "falling below the level of events."17
As a consequence, the history of Churchill’s involvement in the late Victorian wars was one of continual search for physical danger, whether it was with the Malakand Field Force on India’s northwest frontier in 1897, with Kitchener’s forces in the Sudan in 1898, or with Lord Roberts’ troops in the Boer War at the turn of the century. “I am more ambitious for a reputation for personal courage than [for] anything else in the world,” he wrote early on in the Malakand Field Force campaign, and the remainder of his first combat experience was involved in achieving that goal. It required constant test and examination—a matter, in other words, of finding situations which afforded “opportunities for the most sublime forms of heroism and devotion.” “I am glad,” he wrote his mother, “to be able to tell you . . . that I never found a better than myself as far as behaviour went;” no one, he pointed out a month later, would “be able to say that vulgar consideration of personal safety ever influenced me.”

Churchill’s experience in 19th century wars also confirmed a ruthless rationality and pragmatism in Victorian combat. Under the new imperialism, there was in all classes almost a religious faith in Britain as the great force for good in the world. That England could be in the wrong in any one of the countries splashed with red on the world map was almost inconceivable, particularly against itinerant natives. Those tribesmen would often mutilate the British wounded and dead, as Churchill discovered in India. In return, he noted, the British “do not hesitate to finish their wounded off. . . . I have not soiled my hands with any dirty work—though I recognize the necessity of some things.”

It was a rationale that could also be applied to weapons, such as the new Dum-Dum bullet fired from the Lee-Metford rifle. Churchill had nothing but praise for the expansive character of the new round, “a wonderful and from the technical point of view a beautiful machine,” since it “tears and splinters everything before it, causing wounds which in the body must be generally mortal and in any limb necessitate amputation.” Results and effectiveness were the ultimate criteria. “I would observe,” Churchill concluded on the Dum-Dum, “that bullets are primarily intended to kill, and these bullets do their duty most effectively without causing any more pain to those struck by them than the ordinary lead variety.”

That pragmatic approach to weapons and technology gained further ascendancy as the young Victorian continued to encounter the realities of military life on the Imperial frontier. In late 1897, Churchill and a small group of British and Indian troops from the Malakand Field Force were being pursued by a band of Swati tribesmen. The lead warrior paused to slash at one of the British wounded, and Churchill, as he later recounted, decided to kill him.

I wore my long Calvary sword well sharpened. After all, I won the Public School fencing medal. I resolved on personal combat à l’arme blanche. The savage saw me coming. I was not more than twenty yards away. He . . . awaited me, brandishing his sword. There were others waiting not far behind him. I changed my mind about the cold steel. I pulled out my revolver, took . . . most careful aim, and fired.
In a similar manner, at Omdurman in 1898 during the initial charge of the 21st Lancers, Churchill used a ten-shot Mauser pistol instead of a saber. After the battle, Churchill walked among the thousands of Dervish bodies stacked on the battlefield and found "nothing of the dignity of unconquerable manhood." Those feelings were reinforced by a steadily mounting British casualty list that included many of his closest friends. "The realization came home to me with awful force," he wrote later, "that war, disguise it as you may, is but dirty, shoddy business which only a fool would undertake. Nor was it until the night that I again recognized that there are some things that have to be done, no matter what the cost." Duty was something that late Victorians could understand. And with duty would come the romanticizing of what had to be done. The brave deeds of Omdurman, Churchill told his readers in the Morning Post, "brighten the picture of war with beautiful colours, till from a distance it looks almost magnificent, and the dark background and dirty brown canvas are scarcely seen." Such sentiments did not survive the First World War. That conflict was a gradually evolving shock not only to Churchill, but to the British public who also approached it with Victorian idealism and optimism compounded by romantic public school notions of chivalry and combat. "War declared by England," a schoolboy destined to die in that conflict wrote in his diary on 5 August 1914. "Intense relief, as there was an awful feeling that we might dishonour ourselves." Disillusion began to creep in as the carnage mounted. But the horror of modern warfare was generally concealed well into the conflict from the British public by a conspiracy of silence in the form of stiff upper, if not sealed, lips. That tendency was supported by the popular literature of the time. There was, for instance, a rear-guard fictional movement for most of the war in which a band of brothers continued to protect the weak and vanquish the villains under the leadership of such heroes as Bulldog Drummond and Major-General Richard Hannay. And in 1917, Conan Doyle ended His Last Bow, the final volume of Sherlock Holmes, by observing that after the war, "a cleaner, better, stronger land will lie in the sunshine." For Churchill, the full impact of the conflict came midway through the war after his resignation from the Asquith government when he moved to the Western Front. There, from January to May 1916, he commanded the 6th Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, located at the village of Ploegsteert on the Ypres-Armentieres road. Even then, Churchill's command experience at "Plug Street" only confirmed his ambivalence about war in the modern era. On the one hand, no matter how grim the troglodyte world of the trenches, there was the visceral, combat exultation that had not changed since the days of the Malakand Field Force. "My beloved," he wrote to his wife in January, "I have just come back from the line, having had a jolly day." In that context, even the grimness of attrition warfare could be viewed through the romantic
prism of death's grandeur in a Victorian "last stand" for men of action. In a letter written while an offensive was in progress, Churchill referred to "the bloody & blasted squalor of the battlefield," noting of a battalion that had lost 420 men out of 550 in that battle: "I shd feel vy proud if I had gone through such a cataclysm."29

On the other hand, there was the daily proof offered by the ongoing carnage of Verdun. "Do you think we should succeed in an offensive," he wrote to his wife in April, "if the Germans cannot do it with all their skill & science?" And that same month, he wrote to a friend that Verdun seemed "to vindicate all I have ever said or written about the offensives by either side in the West."30 Churchill returned to the subject of Verdun in May 1916 after his release from the army. In a speech to the House of Commons, he reminded his listeners that every 24 hours, nearly a thousand men, "English, Britisheers, men of our own race, are knocked into bundles of bloody rags."31

The effect of all this for the men of action, Churchill observed as he looked back during the first decade after World War I, was the "obliteration of the personal factor in war, the stripping from high commanders of all the drama of the battlefield, the reducing of their highest function to pure office work." For him, the modern commander had become "entirely divorced from the heroic aspect by the physical conditions which have overwhelmed his art.

No longer will Hannibal and Caesar, Turenne and Marlborough, Frederick and Napoleon, set their horses on the battlefield and by their words and gestures direct and dominat, the course of a supreme event. No longer will their fame and presence cheer their struggling soldiers. No longer will they share their perils, rekindle their spirits and restore the day. They will not be there. They have been banished from the fighting scene, together with their plumes, standards and breast-plates.32

The general in such an environment was, for Churchill, no more than a "high-souled speculator," who would in the future "sit surrounded by clerks in offices, as safe, as quiet and dreary as Government departments, while the fighting men in scores of thousands are slaughtered or stifled over the telephone by machinery." It would be efficient, but not heroic. "My gardener last spring," he commented in that regard, "exterminated seven wasp's nests... It was his duty and he performed it well. But I am not going to regard him as a hero." It would be, as Churchill envisioned it, a pale, lifeless, unromantic, unemotional world of the masses, without the splash of color and the verve of great deeds and individual heroism.

The heroes of modern war lie out in the cratered fields, mangled, stifled, scarred; and there are too many of them for exceptional honours. It is mass suffering, mass sacrifice, mass victory. The glory which plays upon the immense scenes of carnage is diffused. No more the blaze of triumph irradiates the helmets of the chiefs. There
is only the pale light of a rainy dawn by which forty miles of batteries recommence their fire, and another score of divisions flounder to their death in mud and poison. The wars of the future will be even less romantic and picturesque."

Nevertheless, the Great War could not completely destroy Churchill’s reverence for such abstractions as glory, honor, and courage, which remained for him permanent and reliable, no matter what had transpired in the grim world of the Western Front. After that conflict, someone remarked in his presence that nothing was worse than war. “Dishonour,” he immediately replied in full voice, “is worse than war. Slavery is worse than war.” It was not that Churchill failed to see the conditions of modern war, as he experienced them. “Never for a moment,” he could write to his wife in 1917, “does the thought of this carnage & ruin escape my mind.” But he would not allow the squalor to penetrate fully his inner Victorian core. His romantic perception of what conflict had been for men of action and therefore what it should be remained a dominant counter-weight to his realistic assessment of total war. It was a perception so powerful that it influenced even the disillusioned like Robert Graves and Siegfried Sassoon. Sassoon later recounted how he wondered if Churchill, during their September 1918 meeting, had been entirely serious when he said that “war is the normal occupation of man.” Churchill had gone on to add “war—and gardening” as a qualifier. “But it had been unmistakable,” Sassoon concluded, “that for him war was the finest activity on earth.”

It was, of course, not as simple as Sassoon described. Churchill’s portrayal, for instance, of the French General Mangin reflected the ambiguity of his feelings. On the one hand, there was the incredibly brave and resourceful general personally leading the men at Verdun and along the Chemin des Dames “like a hungry leopard.” On the other hand, there was “Mangin the Butcher,” relieved temporarily for the losses his leadership had inflicted on his own troops. In a similar manner, there was his mixed analysis of General Hubert Gough, the Fifth Army commander. “He was a typical cavalry officer, with a strong personality and a gay and boyish charm of manner,” Churchill wrote. “A man who never spared himself or his troops, the instrument of costly and forlorn attacks, he emerged from the Passchendaele tragedy pursu-ed by many fierce resentments.”

Amidst this ambiguity, Churchill could still find the heroic men of action as he looked back on the Great War in the late 1920s. There was, for instance, Bernard Freyberg, the New Zealander, whom he had befriended as a sub-lieutenant at the beginning of the war, commanding elements of four divisions in 1918 while successfully holding a front of 4000 yards. And there was General Tudor and his Ninth Division, whom he visited just before the Ludendorff offensive in March 1918. “The impression I had of Tudor,” Churchill wrote, “was of an iron peg hammered into the frozen ground, immovable. And so indeed it proved.” Before he left the battlefield that day, Churchill turned and
once again looked back on the men of the Ninth Division. “I see them now, serene as the Spartans of Leonidas on the eve of Thermopylae.”

Strength, in other words, even in total war, was not enough for Churchill. There must also be the valor and steadfastness of the men of action that he had known in his early years in a previous era. Marshall Foch, in this view, despite disastrous errors, was redeemed by his “obstinate combativeness.” “He was fighting all the time,” Churchill wrote of Foch, “whether he had armies to launch or only thoughts.” Such characteristics, Churchill came to believe, were even more important at the political level of total war, when national survival was the stake. That lesson was provided by Georges Clemenceau, whom he met many times during the war and who, he considered, “embodied and expressed France. As much as any single human being, miraculously magnified, can ever be a nation, he was France.” It was the fiery French Premier’s indomitability and willingness to take any measures on both the home front and the fighting front in order to emerge triumphant that most impressed Churchill. “Happy the nation,” he wrote of Clemenceau, “which when its fate quivers in the balance can find such a tyrant and such a champion.” And in a passage that presaged his own emergence in the spring of 1940, Churchill described Clemenceau’s final call to public life, which marked the beginning of the end for France’s misfortunes: “He returned to power as Marius had returned to Rome; doubted by many, dreaded by all, but doom-sent, inevitable.”

In the 1930s, as he researched and wrote his history of Marlborough, Churchill returned again and again to his ancestor’s “combination of mental, moral, and physical qualities adapted to action which were so lifted above the common run as to seem almost godlike.” His studies renewed his faith in the man of action, whose every word “was decisive. Victory often depended upon whether he rode half a mile this way or that.” Such a man could make a difference in any type of conflict, particularly if he combined valor with common sense. In the fourth volume of his biography, Churchill lingered over the aftermath of the battle of Elixem in which Marlborough had pierced the Lines of Brabant with almost no Confederation casualties. Even as the battle neared its end, his grateful troops responded with spontaneous mass affection. As Marlborough rode up sword in hand to take his place in the final cavalry charge, the soldiers and their officers broke into cheering, extremely unusual considering the formal military etiquette of the time. And afterwards, when Marlborough moved along the front of his army, the veterans of Blenheim, as Churchill described it, “cast discipline to the winds and hailed him everywhere with proud delight.”

Surely there was still room in modern warfare for men like Duke John, who, in order to seal the victory at Ramillies, personally led a cavalry charge on the left wing, in Churchill’s words “transported by the energy of his war vision and passion.” A world without emotional romanticism, without heroic men of

82 Parameters
action, did not have to be the fate of total war. "There is a sense of vacancy and of fatuity, of incompleteness," he wrote as he observed disillusioned Britain in the interwar years. "We miss our giants." If the British people, Churchill warned, quit "the stern, narrow high-roads which alone lead to glorious destinies and survival," there would be nothing left but a "blundering on together in myriad companies, like innumerable swarms of locusts, chirping and devouring towards the salt sea." Despite modern forces and trends, despite the stark realities of modern life and warfare, there must still be the indefinable, romantic aspirations of Victorian times. Britain had emerged victorious from the Great War on a new and higher plateau, Churchill concluded,

but the scenery is unimpressive. We mourn the towering grandeur which surrounded and cheered our long painful ascent. Ah! if we could only find some new enormous berg rising towards the heavens as high above our plateau as those old mountains down below rose above the plains and marshes! We want a monarch peak, with base enormous, whose summit is for ever hidden from our eyes by clouds, and down whose precipices cataracts of sparkling waters thunder.\(^4\)

That mountain peak appeared when Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940. Immediately his rich, romantic historical sense of continuity dominated the scene, allowing him to proceed with what appeared to many an obstinate irrationality against overwhelming forces in the darkest days of the war. But he knew with an absolute certainty that it had been done before, not the least successfully by the first Duke of Marlborough.

This perception of historical continuity also fueled Churchill's sense of personal destiny as a man of action, a key ingredient of his success as a leader in the Second World War. "The statesman . . . must behold himself," Hans Morgenthau has pointed out in this regard, "not as the infallible arbiter of the destiny of men, but the handmaiden of something which he may use but cannot control."\(^4^6\) And so it was with Churchill, who believed that he was the servant of a historical entity called England, and that he was destined to maintain that entity and its Empire on the upward path that reached back to Alfred the Great. It was this belief, this inner certainty, that could inspire the masses in general, and his civilian and military subordinates in particular.

One scientist described the effect whenever he met Churchill during the war as "the feeling of being recharged by contact with a source of living power."\(^4^7\) On another occasion, the Permanent UnderSecretary of War in 1940 urged the Prime Minister to meet with a general about to leave on an urgent arms purchase mission to the United States, "in order that he may have the glow of Mount Sinai still on him when he reaches Washington."\(^4^8\)

To his feeling of destiny, Churchill brought an absolute sense of combativeness from his Victorian heritage as a man of action. On 10 June 1940, as an example, in another one of the increasingly dismal Anglo-French meetings,
French Premier Reynaud asked the Prime Minister what would happen if France capitulated and all of German strength were concentrated upon invading England. Churchill replied instantly that he had not thought out his response in detail, but that basically he would drown as many as possible of the invaders on their way over to England, leaving it only to "frapper sur la tête" anyone who managed to crawl ashore. At the end of that meeting, the increasingly emotional British leader once again reassured his French counterpart that Britain "would fight on and on, toujours, all the time, everywhere, pas tout, pas de grace, no mercy. Puis la victoire!" That such emotions were also governed by Churchill's Victorian concept of the heroic last stand was illustrated in a conversation he had with President Roosevelt's Special Envoy, Averell Harriman, while sailing to the United States on the Queen Mary in spring 1943. When that conversation turned to the U-boat menace, the Prime Minister informed Harriman that he had arranged for a machine gun to be added to his own lifeboat, should it be necessary to abandon ship. "I won't be captured," he concluded. "The finest way to die is in the excitement of fighting the enemy."

But it was in Hitler that Churchill found a perfect outlet for his combative nature—a threat on which he could bring to bear the full brunt of his command of the English language. When, for instance, he spoke of the "Na-sies," the very lengthening of the vowel carried a stunning message of his contempt. Moreover, there were always the visual images invoked by his vivid descriptions of the enemy. Von Ribbentrop was "that prodigious con-tortionist," and Mussolini was a "whipped jackal, frisking at the side of the German tiger—this absurd imposter." And when Barbarossa was unleashed on Russia, he brought the event, which Hitler considered would cause the world to hold its breath, down to its basic level. "Now this bloodthirsty gutsersnipe," Churchill announced, "must launch his mechanized armies upon new fields of slaughter."

Against this threat and despite the realities of a newer, even more complicated total conflict, the British leader returned in the Second World War to his Victorian concept of the heroic man of action. Closely allied to Churchill's ingrained hero worship was his Victorian sense of honor. How men conducted themselves in crisis was all-important to him. The Czechoslovak legionaries after World War I, for instance, "forsook the stage of history" in their dishonorable treatment of the White Russian leader, Admiral Kolchak. In World War II, Pétain was a similar example. Admiral Darlan, on the other hand, redeemed himself in Churchill's eyes with the 1942 scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon. It was an outlook that often per-etrated the remoteness necessary to send masses of heroic men to their deaths in total war. The German sinking of the Royal Oak in Scapa Flow in October 1939, for instance, triggered Churchill's overactive imagination concerning the 800 "heroes" who had lost their lives. "Poor fellows, poor fellows," he muttered after receiving the news, "trapped in those black depths...." And in the later stages of the war, General Eisenhower witnessed
a meeting at Chequers when a logistics briefer struck a nerve in the normally
imperturbable Prime Minister by using the phrase "so many thousand bodies"
in referring to British reinforcements. "Sir," Churchill broke in with great
indignation, "you will not refer to the personnel of His Majesty's Forces in such
terms as 'bodies.' They're not corpses. They are live men, that's what they are."

This sensitivity to the soldier was complicated by the ambivalence about
conflict that had dogged Churchill since the era of total war began. "War
is a game played with a smiling face," he told his daughter Sarah at Tehran
in 1943, "but do you think there is laughter in my heart?" And yet he was
still fascinated by it. Captured German combat films, for instance, often
marked the evening's entertainment. He also loved newsreels of the war and
took particular delight if he was featured, often shouting to General
Ismay: "Look Pug, there we are." And, finally, there was his pride in Desert
Victory, the film history of the Eighth Army, which he viewed over and over
again, even sending a copy to Stalin.

J. F. C. Fuller touched upon a major reason for Churchill's ambiva-
lence in a description that he eventually excised from his classic The Conduct
of War. "The truth would appear to be," he wrote of the British leader, "that
throughout his turbulent life he never quite grew up, and like a boy, loved big
bangs and playing at soldiers." Certainly, Churchill felt more intense ex-
hilaration in battle than most professional soldiers. At one point early in
World War II, enemy bombing commenced as he was being conducted around
antiaircraft sites in Richmond Park. Only after great difficulty and many
protests could the commander persuade the Prime Minister to take cover.
"This exhilarates me," Churchill gleefully explained. "The sound of these
cannons gives me a tremendous feeling."

It was a pattern that was to be repeated many times in the war. Only
George VI's intervention, for instance, kept Churchill from sailing with the
assault forces on D-Day. "There is nothing I would like better than to go to sea," the
King wrote his Prime Minister, "but do you think there is laughter in my heart?" Such
restraint could last only a short time. A week later, Churchill crossed the Channel
and had, as he wrote Roosevelt, "a jolly day... on the beaches and inland."

In another example, Churchill also described in his memoirs how he had gone
to view a railroad bridge over the Rhine in March 1945 and how incoming
artillery rounds had forced him and his party, escorted by the American General
Simpson, to move off the bridge. General Alanbrooke also described the scene,
detailing how urgently Simpson had requested that Churchill evacuate the
bridge. "The look on Winston's face was just like that of a small boy being called
away from his sand-castles on the beach by his nurse!" he wrote. "He put both
his arms around one of the twisted girders on the bridge and looked over his
shoulder at Simpson with pouting mouth and angry eyes. . . . It was a sad wrench for him; he was enjoying himself immensely."

Churchill’s presence at the Rhine crossings demonstrated a key advantage offered him by the British constitution which ideally suited his temperament and views on leadership as a man of action. Unlike Roosevelt, constrained because of his special position as President, or Hitler, who elected to isolate himself increasingly in command posts, the British Prime Minister traveled freely within the war zones. This allowed him to solve major military issues by face-to-face contact with his operational commanders. Moreover, the fact that his constitutional role did not prevent him from visiting the front lines meant that he could fulfill his romantic conception of a war leader at the scene of action. Wherever he went, whether in the fighter control rooms of 1940, in the Egyptian desert, on the beaches at Normandy, or at the Rhine crossings, Churchill’s visible, inspirational presence in the most outrageous of ad hoc uniforms was a key factor that contributed not only to the prosecu-

Visiting the US Ninth Army at the front, Churchill views an artillery barrage on the east bank of the Rhine at Wesel, 25 March 1945. With him are General Alanbrooke (left) and General Montgomery (center).
tion of the war, but to the genuine affection in which he was held by the officers and men throughout the services.62

Such visits also renewed Churchill, allowing him to escape from the pressures of his office and exercise the degree of personal leadership that he associated with the great men of action from previous eras. Writing to his wife in August 1942 from Egypt, he recounted his visit to the front lines where he “was everywhere greeted with rapture by the troops,” the same words he had used in his Marlborough biography to describe the great commander in 1705 after the battle of Elixem.63 And on 3 February 1943, Churchill flew to the forces just outside of Tripoli. In a small natural amphitheater, he told the assembled soldiers and airmen that “after the war when a man is asked what he did it will be quite sufficient for him to say, ‘I marched and fought with the Desert Army.’”64 The next day, he drove in an armored car into Tripoli, moving past the assembled forces, who were amazed to see the Prime Minister among them but recovered sufficiently to remove their helmets and give three cheers. A short time later in Tripoli’s main square, surrounded by veterans of the Eighth Army, Churchill took the march past of one of the desert divisions, the tears streaming down his face.

But leadership in total war goes beyond that exercised on the battlefield. Ultimately, it depends on the people. And it was here that Churchill’s background as a Victorian man of action made its most lasting contribution to World War II. For it was primarily because of national will that Britain survived that conflict. And that national will owed its existence to a 19th-century man in his seventh decade, who in his dealings with the British people returned to his Victorian inheritance and allowed his emotional, romantic picture of his country and its citizens full rein. It was a picture that did not reflect the contemporary world of 1940. Instead, Churchill created an imaginary world of action steeped in Victorian visions with such power and coherence and imposed it on the external world with such irresistible force that for a short time it became reality. Imagination can be a revolutionary force that destroys and alters concepts. But as Churchill demonstrated, imagination can also fuse previously isolated beliefs, insights, and mental habits from an earlier time into strongly unified systems. In those systems he created romantic ideal models in which by dint of his energy, force of will, and fantasy, facts were so ordered in the collective mind as to transform the outlook of the entire British population.

Those facts were firmly grounded in the British leader’s sense of historical continuity which had always engendered in him high expectations for the British people. “I hope that if evil days should come upon our country,” he wrote after contemplating the thousands of Dervish dead at Omdurman, “and the last army which a collapsing Empire could interpose between London and the invader was dissolving in rout and ruin, that there would be some... who would not care to accustom themselves to the new order of things and tamely
survive the disaster." And so it was in 1940 when he molded the people’s aspirations to fit his by recognizing no other mood in them than what he felt. During the Blitz, while walking with Churchill in the garden at Chequers one evening after dinner, General Ismay remarked how the Prime Minister’s speeches had inspired the nation. “Not at all,” was the almost angry retort from Churchill, who could see the glow of London burning in the distance. “It was given to me to express what was in the hearts of the British people. If I had said anything else, they would have hurled me from office.”

This was the essence of Churchill’s power. If his fellow citizens were not initially with this man of action in their hour of danger, that soon changed. Because he idealized them with such fevered intensity, in the end they approached his ideal and began to view themselves as he saw them with their “buoyant and imperturbable temper.” It was the intense eloquence in his speeches that caught the British people in his spell until it seemed to them that he was indeed expressing what was in their hearts and minds. As a consequence, Churchill created in 1940 a heroic mood in which his countrymen conceived a new image of themselves as acting in a larger litany of great deeds ranging from Thermopylae to the Spanish Main. He imposed those responses through his speeches and through his expectations of the people, which in turn caused the British people to impose upon the present, however momentary, the simple virtues they believed had prevailed in the past. The combination of his personality and powerful imagery focused through the medium of radio invested the squalid and fearful circumstances of those days with overtones of glory.

In the end, Churchill accomplished all this, not by catching the mood of his country, which in Isaiah Berlin’s estimate was “somewhat confused; stout-hearted but unorganized,” but by being obstinately impervious to it, as he had always been to the details, to the passing shades and tones of ordinary life. For him, the Battle of Britain was “a time when it was equally good to live or die.” His busy imagination, imposed on his countrymen, lifted them to abnormal heights in their nation’s supreme crisis and allowed Churchill to enjoy a Periclean reign. But it could last only a short time. It was a climate in which people normally do not want to live, demanding as it does a violent tension, which if not soon ended, destroys normal perspectives, over dramaticizes personal relationships, and distorts normal values to an intolerable extent. Nevertheless, for a time in the 1940s, by dramatizing their lives and making them seem to themselves and to each other as acting appropriately for a great historic moment, Churchill transformed the British people into a collective, romantic, and heroic whole—a supreme optimization for total war.

It was natural, then, that at the moment of victory, Churchill should turn again to the people whose faith, which he had unconsciously brought forth, had done so much to sustain him. “This is your victory!” he told the vast VE-Day crowds assembled before him as he stood on the Ministry of Health balcony overlooking Whitehall. The crowd immediately roared back:
"No—it is yours." Later that night, Churchill addressed another crowd stretching far up Whitehall to Parliament Square. "My dear friends, this is your hour.... It is a victory of the great British nation as a whole. We were the first... to draw the sword against tyranny.... There we stood alone. Did anyone want to give in?" "No," the crowd shouted. "Were we downhearted?" "No," was the response to the greatest of all Victorian men of action. 

NOTES

21. Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War (New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green, 1901), p. 288. In Churchill’s only novel, Savrola, when told that it will be necessary for government troops to fire on a crowd in order to create a diversion, the officer in charge replies: "Excellent, it will enable us to conclude those experiments in penetration, which we have been trying with the soft nosed bullet." Winston S. Churchill, Savrola, A Tale of the Revolution in Laurania (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 11.
27. Ibid., p. 29 and Phillips, p. 189.
33. Ibid., pp. 198, 200.
36. Ibid., p. 151.
40. Ibid., pp. 302, 310, 312.
43. Ashley, p. 152.
44. W. S. Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures, pp. 196, 201.
48. Gilbert, VI, 697.
49. Ismay, p. 141, and Gilbert, VI, 507.
52. Ashley, p. 230.
53. Gilbert, VI, 672.
57. Excised section of Fuller's manuscript provided by Professor Jay Luvaas, US Army War College.
58. Gilbert, VI, 828.
64. Ibid., p. 330.
65. Ashley, p. 49.
66. Ismay, p. 156.
Macedonia and Albania:
The Missing Alliance

MICHAEL G. ROSKIN

In his first novel, Typee, Herman Melville portrayed a South Pacific island inhabited by two tribes, one kindly and generous, the other wild and murderous. Two sailors jump ship, hoping to land on the nice side of the island. They do and are well treated. Then they must leave for the other side of the island—something to do with a chief’s daughter—and take their chances with the savages they have been warned about. When they arrive, they are treated well by friendly natives, who turn out to be identical in disposition to those of the previous side. There really were no beastly cannibals on the island; that was just what the opposing tribes said about each other.

Melville could have been writing about the Balkans today, where visitors are welcomed in each country with warm hospitality and the warning to be careful if they must visit other Balkan lands, for people aren’t so nice there, especially Albanians. Once in Albania, however, the visitor quickly discovers that Albanians, within their straitened economic circumstances, are the most hospitable people of the region. “The devil isn’t as wicked as people say,” goes an Albanian folk saying, “and neither is an Albanian.” In the Balkans now, a climate of mistrust—over irredentist hopes, minorities, and just plain racism—precludes regional cooperation and could conceivably pave the way to a Third Balkan War. The great hobby of the Balkans is to bad-mouth neighbors.

There are, to be sure, some areas of agreement that bring together two or more Balkan states, but they are hardly conducive to peace. Serbia and Greece, for example, are historical and current allies and agree that an independent Macedonia should not exist. Actually, Bulgaria in candor would share that view with an eye toward eventually absorbing Macedonia, which was once, long ago, part of a strong Bulgarian kingdom and where the language is very close to Bulgarian. Likewise, all of Albania’s neighbors—rump Yugoslavia, Macedonia, and Greece—treat Albania with racist disdain and hostility. Serbia and Romania face a common problem with Magyar
minorities that could lead them to reconstitute (with Slovakia) the anti-
Hungary Little Entente devised by Paris in the 1920s.

The Missing Alliance

But where the Balkans really needs a defensive alliance—between
Albania and Macedonia—that could help stop the horrors of Bosnia from
spreading southward, there is none and no hope of one. In international relations
one is fond of quoting the old Arabic dictum “The enemy of my enemy is my
friend,” because it makes such obvious logical sense. Unfortunately, that little
exercise in rational self-interest breaks down in both the Middle East (Iran’s
hatred of Israel when they have a common enemy in Iraq) and in the Balkans.
Macedonia and Albania have precisely the same hostile neighbors on the north
and south, Serbia and Greece, who would happily erase them from the map.

But instead of drawing together, Macedonia snipes at Albania, figu-
atively and literally. On the afternoon of 26 June 1993, Albanian army Major
Hajrulla Tollja, on routine horseback patrol along the border with Macedonia,
was shot dead by a sniper and his body dragged across the boundary. Sergeant
Vehbi Berzhilla, who was with him, was badly wounded and also dragged across
but managed to crawl back even though he came under fire again. Skopje
charged that the pair had violated Macedonian territory, which, even if true,
would be no excuse for deadly force. Tirana says shooting incidents occur all
the time, that in 1992 nine Albanians were killed and 13 wounded on the border
with Macedonia. There are no charges of Albanian forces shooting Macedonians.

Actually, the situation could be more complex—and worse—than
this already deplorable incident (which was unreported in US newspapers).
The shooting occurred just south of where the boundaries of Albania, Mac-
donia, and Serbia’s Kosovo meet. Some sources in a position to know say the
sniper was not Macedonian but Serbian. If so, it would indicate Serbian forces
can infiltrate that corner of Macedonia with impunity, and that Macedonia,
which is practically unarmed, is helpless to stop them. It might also suggest
that Serbia is preparing positions for military action in the region.

Macedonia needs Albania and knows it but doesn’t act like it. Maced-
onia is landlocked and has only the skimpiest transportation lines to the outside
world. Macedonia’s longstanding north-south highway and rail links are now of
limited utility. Serbia to the north is under international embargo—which, to be

Dr. Michael G. Roskin is a visiting professor of foreign policy in the Department
of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. He took his A.B. from
the University of California (Berkeley), M.A. from the University of California (Los
Angeles), and Ph.D. from American University. A former USIA Foreign Service officer,
with postings in Munich and Bern, and a former AP world desk editor, Professor Roskin
is the author of five books on international relations and comparative politics. He speaks
Serbo-Croatian among his six languages, and has traveled extensively in the Balkans,
including Bosnia-Herzegovina.
sure, is widely ignored in the region. Greece, to Macedonia’s south, unofficially blocks their common border. According to Athens, Macedonia has no right to a Greek name. Athens is virtually allied with Belgrade, and freight traffic continues unabated from Greece to Serbia, transshipped through Macedonia but not destined for Macedonia. Business is business, even for the beleaguered Macedonians; besides, why risk angering the Serbs?

In place of north-south lines, Macedonia had to turn abruptly to east-west links, which were almost nonexistent. During the Cold War, Tito’s maverick communist Yugoslavia wished to have little connection with its hostile neighbors, Albania and Bulgaria. Consequently, highway routes east and west were unimproved and painfully inadequate; there never was a rail line. High in the mountains on Macedonia’s border with Bulgaria, trucks that form Macedonia’s chief lifeline back up for kilometers on narrow switchbacks waiting to clear customs.

The solution, now supposedly in planning, is to develop a major east-west highway and rail corridor across Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania, stretching from the Adriatic Sea on the west to the Black Sea on the east. A protocol to this effect was signed in May 1993 by the three countries. An Albanian outlet to the sea for Macedonia would be especially desirable, as it would be shorter than the current alternative: The distance from Skopje to Durres on the Adriatic is only half that from Skopje to Burgas on the Black Sea. Turkey is interested in plugging into this corridor, which would then connect Europe’s only two Muslim-majority countries. Greece is outraged at the thought, fearing not only a Turkish-led Muslim conspiracy to isolate Greece but also the loss of

Winter 1993-94 93
revenues from Thessaloniki’s role as a major shipping point on the north-south corridor. The limiting factor in constructing an east-west corridor, however, is money—billions of dollars will be required—and international investors are not keen on risking capital in the most unstable corner of Europe.

Militarily, a Tirana-Skopje tie makes even more sense. The armies of the two countries are weak. Impoverished Albania’s defense budget is not much more than $3 million (that’s with an “m”) a year, barely enough to feed the conscripts and pay the officers a low salary. Funds for training, live-firing, fuel, and new equipment do not exist. In the xenophobic fantasy of longtime dictator Enver Hoxha (1944-85), Albania would defend itself from prefabricated, ten-foot-diameter pillboxes. An estimated 400,000 to 700,000 of these concrete mushrooms are scattered, with little military rationale, across the country. Albania’s tanks, jets, and artillery are few in number and antiquated, either 1950s Soviet equipment or 1960s Chinese, but hidden in elaborate bunkers. Hoxha liked bunkers.

Albania knows it is no match for Serbia. A big majority of Albanians fear Serbia and would like to see an independent Kosovo, but only three in ten would intervene militarily to protect the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Tirana’s official policy is to avoid conflict at all costs. At the end of World War I, a Serbian army occupied northern Albania, and Albanians fear it could happen again. Officials in Tirana claim that Serbian “ethnic cleansing” of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo (these Kosovo, as they are called, form close to 90 percent of Kosovo’s population) has already begun. Tirana’s only reply is to set up, with Saudi financial help, refugee camps in the north of Albania. However, Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhulali, a former mathematics professor, admits that among the refugees would be partisan fighters, who would make armed forays back into Kosovo that Albania could not control, even though they would provoke Serbian wrath. Despite its best intentions, then, Albania could get drawn into war with Serbia.

For its part, Macedonia inherited some beat-up AK-47s from the old Yugoslav army and territorial defense forces, leaving it the least-armed country in the region. Many Macedonians worry about a coming war and are grateful for the arrival of even a small force of UN peace observers, mostly Scandinavian and American. In the event of hostilities, this UN force could do nothing.

Logically, everything points to a coalition. Macedonia and Albania need each other economically, militarily, territorially, and psychologically. With their small populations (Albania’s is 3.2 million; Macedonia’s, 2 million), they are nearly helpless before their common, hostile neighbors. Together, they are a much more serious proposition.

The Despised Albanians

But they won’t get together, and for a very basic, primitive reason: Macedonians, like most Balkan peoples, hate and fear Albanians, especially the
large and territorially concentrated Albanian minority in northwest Macedonia. Albanians are perceived much as some Americans perceive Mexicans: poor, dirty, passionate, and criminal. Even worse, they are seen to breed like rabbits and push into and take over neighboring lands. Some Macedonians believe that Albanian women are required to bear ten children. One Macedonian economist called Albanian population growth "demographic imperialism." Official 1991 census figures say 22 percent of Macedonian citizens declared themselves to be ethnically Albanian (65 percent declared themselves Macedonians). Many believe the actual Albanian count is higher, possibly double the official percentage, and, given the difference in birthrates, Albanians may in a few decades constitute a majority of Macedonia's population.

The Western traveler passing through northwest Macedonia—specifically, Tetovo and Gostivar opštinas (communes)—is surprised at the general level of prosperity. Houses are large, new, and modern; many are under construction. Rest stops and bus terminals are outfitted at West European levels. Farmers work their fields with tractors. The minarets that protrude from each village indicate this is the area where ethnic Albanians are concentrated. If Albanians are so poor, how can they be so wealthy? Most families have fathers working in Switzerland, Germany, or elsewhere in Western Europe, and they remit sizable sums. As former citizens of Yugoslavia, these Macedonian Albanians had no problem leaving Yugoslavia to work in Western Europe. The Albanians of Albania, on the other hand, were until recently locked in.

The ethnic Macedonians, masters on their own turf, felt less pressure to seek work in Western Europe and fewer did so, leading to the paradox that on average they are poorer than the Albanians of Macedonia. The point is that the Albanians of Macedonia are neither poor nor criminals, but hard-working, high-saving people who look after their families. But they are still despised and feared by the Macedonians.

Ethnic polarization is extreme. In politics, Albanians do not vote for Macedonian parties; they vote largely for the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP), which has 22 (out of 120) seats in the Macedonian parliament and is a junior partner in the coalition led by the Social Democrats, as the communists renamed themselves. Some observers call this coalition ineffective and crooked, dedicated chiefly to preserving the fortunes of the former apparatchiki who are the Social Democratic stalwarts. Skopje critics charge that these ex-communists cling to power by trying to appease their Albanian coalition partners with bad compromises, which simply postpone major internal conflict.

The PDP wants to federalize Macedonia to give the Albanian areas virtual self-rule. Many Macedonians are convinced this is just a first step toward breaking away the Albanian areas of Macedonia and their joining a Greater Albania. This exactly parallels Serbian fears about the Albanians of Kosovo, which adjoins Tetovo and Gostivar communes on the north. Indeed, during World War II, Albania, with Fascist Italy's blessing, did annex these
Albanian areas of Macedonia and Serbia. History supports Macedonian and Serbian fears of Albanian irredentism.

Macedonian attitudes seem to support Samuel P. Huntington's recent proposal that the post-Cold War world is fracturing along "civilizational" lines. Especially difficult is the clash between the Muslim civilization and the Western and Slavic/Orthodox civilizations. The Macedonians are Orthodox Slavs; the Albanians are largely Muslims of local stock that long antedates the arrival of the Slavs in the Balkans in the sixth and seventh centuries. Few of either group, however, are serious believers. In Albania itself, to be sure, there are Christians; about 20 percent are Eastern Orthodox and ten percent Roman Catholic. Only the Catholics of Albania really practice their faith, a point that has convinced American evangelists that Albanian souls are ripe for saving.

Huntington's schema does not concern the degree of religiosity; religion merely contributes to the sum total of attitudes, usages, philosophies, and lifestyles that make up a "civilization." Among the nations of a given civilization, people can understand and empathize with each other; between civilizations this is much harder. Huntington's unhappy theory—which I instinctively want to reject as racist—helps explain why the European Community will admit Poland but not Turkey, why Russians come to the aid of Serbia, why Arabs complain bitterly about the West's inaction on Bosnia, and why Americans object to Japanese investment but not to Dutch.

To Macedonians, as to most Balkan peoples, the Albanians, along with the Bosnian Muslims (and the less-heard-of Pomaks of Bulgaria), are a remnant and reminder of the Turks, a different and despised civilization that blanketed the region for centuries, snuffed out its original civilization, and stunted its development. Painfully, the Ottomans were driven out, mostly during the 19th century. What rights then have their religious offspring? How can they be trusted? Could they be a fifth column for the return of the Turks?

**Who Will Save Us?**

Encumbered by these rarely spoken, partly irrational fears, the Macedonians are simply not inclined to make common cause with Albanians. Pity, for that is their best hope. To whom, then, can Macedonians turn? Their Slavic big brothers, the Bulgarians, would like to save them and tacitly envision the eventual joining of the two lands, which, before the Ottomans, were part of one kingdom. Sofia recognized Macedonia when it declared independence in 1991, but as a separate state, not as a separate nation, thus leaving the door open for eventual unification. The prime cause of the Second Balkan War of 1913 was Bulgarian retention of Macedonia, which Bulgaria had just won from the Turks in the First Balkan War, in the face of Greek and Serbian desire to divide Macedonia between them. Bulgaria lost, and most of Macedonia was taken by Serbia, which called it South Serbia.
"The US soldiers now serving as UN peace observers in Macedonia could get shot in defense of a country we don’t even recognize."

Now, however, Macedonians do not wish to be part of Bulgaria. They argue that the languages have evolved apart over the centuries so that now they have trouble understanding spoken Bulgarian. Bulgaria, then an Axis junior partner, occupied most of Macedonia during World War II and treated Macedonians harshly. Most Macedonian families have stories of relatives who suffered. Bulgarians have no such negative memories of their wartime occupation of Macedonia. Sofia is sophisticated enough to know that any move to unite with Macedonia now would trigger Greek and Serbian rage, so Bulgaria is content to bide its time. Its trade ties with Greece largely cut, Macedonia has quickly made Bulgaria its chief trading partner. Another factor: Bulgaria is the region’s low-cost producer, and Macedonia imports a great deal of Bulgarian foodstuffs and construction materials (as does Albania).

By the time you read this, there may be official US recognition of Macedonia and a US embassy in Skopje. At the time of this writing, however, our diplomatic relations are unofficial and slightly bizarre. There are American officials in Skopje from the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and the US Information Service, but, should you ask, they aren’t there, at least not in a public sense. Inquiries for interviews are coldly deflected. Macedonians must journey to Sofia for US visas. The reason for this charade is not hard to discern: the sensitivities of Greece and Greek Americans and their congresspersons. Full US diplomatic recognition would anger them, so our officials are there but not there. The 300 US soldiers, drawn originally from the Berlin Brigade, now serving as UN peace observers in Macedonia could thus get shot in defense of a country we don’t even recognize.

All Balkan countries are wracked by insecurity and turn with pleading eyes to the United States for protection, as if we were some kind of regional savior. Virtually no Balkan country trusts the West Europeans; their debacle over Bosnia is clear for all to see. Each Balkan capital, with the possible temporary exception of Skopje, has a small group of US military officers engaged in military-to-military relations. Operating apart from and outside of the US embassy (and therefore more flexible and effective), these temporary (one- to two-year) missions are given office space in host-country military buildings in order to render candid, friendly advice. The idea is to build cordial relationships between officers of the two countries and then turn the job over to the more staid confines of the military attachés’ offices in the US embassy.

Winter 1993-94
The US military mission to Albania is housed in the Defense Ministry just down the corridor from the minister. The American colonel in charge is welcome to drop in on the minister or chief of staff any time. No European official, including the Italians, who supply a great deal of food to Albania, has access like that. The American colonel may go everywhere and photograph anything. He is assigned an Albanian colonel as full-time interpreter. He and his small staff are encouraged to wear US uniforms at all times; the Albanians like the Americans to be seen. It's a little disconcerting to see a US Special Forces sergeant, in camouflage fatigues with bloused trousers and a snappy beret, pop in and out of the Defense Ministry in the center of Tirana. A few years ago, the Albanians would have shot an American military man for attempting to enter their country.

These “mil-to-mil” missions are generally rousing successes, maybe too successful. It is easy and fun to establish friendly contacts between officers of two nations; both sides are eager for them. But they are eager for very different reasons, and in this lies the seeds of serious misunderstanding. The Americans are simply happy to see the host-country army reorient itself to the West, to learn English instead of Russian, to support democracy and civilian control, to entertain visiting military delegations, to purchase US equipment (some of it bargain-priced surplus left by the US drawdown in Germany), and perhaps eventually to participate in UN multilateral military activities. The very general US motivation is that friendship is better than enmity.

The Balkan host countries have something more specific in mind. They are frightened and want help. The violence in ex-Yugoslavia could spill over their borders. Said Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov in an August 1993 interview: “There is currently only a small number of Americans here, but they carry weight. It is a signal to all those who want to destabilize this region.” The West Europeans talk about Europe but do not define the Balkans as part of Europe. Comically, the Macedonian and Albanian parliaments debated whether to join NATO, as if NATO wanted them. Only the Americans can save us, the Balkan lands calculate. And look, they would add, the Americans are eager to come here. Why else would they be so friendly? They probably regret not having taken the Balkans in 1944 and now want to make sure the region is firmly on their side. Well, that’s fine with us; we happily accept the protection of a benevolent superpower.

These sharply contrasting motives could lead to a colossal misunderstanding. Officially, US policy contains no promises or suggestions of military help. The excellence of mil-to-mil relations suggests otherwise to the Macedonians and Albanians. President Bush’s noble vow to prevent a massacre in Kosovo, seconded by President Clinton, could be carried out only by a US force in northern Albania. Such an engagement would bring us, de facto, into supporting Albanian annexation of Kosovo. Greater Albania has never been a US national interest. Should the United States do nothing in the event...
of Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, our inaction would seem to violate the
pledges and understandings we have built up.

And what precisely will US peacekeeping forces do in Macedonia? Is
their purpose to preserve a territorially intact Macedonia? If the Albanian areas
of Macedonia attempt to secede, will we stop them in order to preserve Mace-
donia's territorial integrity? Would we alienate Greece in order to preserve Macedonia? Macedonia, too, has never been a US national interest. If fighting
erupts between Albania and Macedonia, could there be US troops on both sides?

How far should the United States go in support of Macedonia, or indeed
for any Balkan country? Do we in fact have a policy? Pious wishes for peace and
accommodation are not a policy. A credible statement of US national interests
in the Balkans supported by sufficient military power might be a policy. But such
a position will be difficult to establish and sustain; declaring the Balkans a US
interest is inherently incredible if the West Europeans declare it a non-interest.

A first step might be to make it clear to the Balkan lands that
no outside power is going to save them. They must do it themselves. We must
tell them, "If you cannot overcome your ancient mistrusts to construct an
alliance among yourselves, then nothing, certainly no power from the other
side of the globe, will save you. The only thing that can save you from you is
you." Any other message would be terribly misleading.

Natives of the Midwest have vivid descriptions of the coming of
tornadoes. Weather reports warn of them, and the sky turns slate black, but no
one knows precisely when or where the whirlwind will carve its destruction.
Neighbors stand around outside and chat to relieve the tension; there is little
else they can do. If they try to drive away, they are just as likely to run into
the storm. A few may go into a storm cellar. Basically, though, all they can
do is wait and worry. So it is with the terrible storm that is brewing in the
Balkans today. It cannot be averted, no one can say where or when it will hit,
and no one knows what to do once it does.

NOTES
1. See Michael G. Roskin, "Slovak Separation and Central European Security," East European Quarterly,
2 July 1993, Tirana. Also FBIS East Europe, 28 June 1993, p. 3.
3. Carol J. Williams, "Macedonia Sees Highway as Its Route to Recovery," Los Angeles Times, 6 July
Inclined to Come to the Military Aid of Kosovars," 26 August 1993.
5. Interview with author in Albanian Defense Ministry, Tirana, 5 July 1993. Chief of Staff Lieutenant
General Ilia Vasho was also present and agreed on the danger.
7. Macedonia’s largest party, for example, the nationalistic Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organiza-
tion-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, warns against the formation of an Islamic political bloc
within Macedonia composed of parties "that do not originate in Macedonia." FBIS, 25 August 1993, p. 57.
8. In October 1993, US-Albanian military cooperation got more specific with an agreement for "expanded
contacts" between military officials of the two countries. See David Binder, "U.S. and Albania Sign a Military
Lessons From El Salvador

VICTOR M. ROSELLO

© 1993 Victor M. Rosello

Serving in El Salvador was prestigious duty. In fact it was downright exciting. For some periods of time during the American involvement there, from 1981 to 1992, it was the only war in town, so to speak. US Army Special Forces officers and NCOs stood in line to sign up for positions as military advisors. Hundreds did sign up. Unaccompanied one-year assignments brought a nonstop flow of volunteers.

The tempo of controversy was equally fast-paced. Despite White House attempts to downplay the threat to the military advisory mission, 20 American military and civilian personnel lost their lives in service there, including one Special Forces NCO who died from enemy fire in an obscure corner of the country when his base camp was attacked by guerrilla sappers.1

It was a fact of life for those who served there that danger lurked around every corner. Standard “defensive” issue for all military advisors included a Colt CAR-15 5.56mm assault rifle, an H&K MP-5 9mm submachine gun, a Colt .45 caliber or Beretta 9mm pistol, and M-67 fragmentation grenades. All military advisors were assigned an official vehicle, normally an armor-plated, bullet-proof Jeep Cherokee. A personal bodyguard also came with this security package, along with the requirement to monitor a Motorola hand-held radio 24 hours a day. Since the term “advisor” carried connotations of Vietnam, the term “trainer” was used instead—it seemed less menacing, more benign. Even at the height of the conflict, “hostile fire pay” was referred to as “imminent danger pay.” For political reasons El Salvador was never declared a combat zone.

Away from the battlefield bigger battles raged. Every year, heated congressional debates erupted over the certification of Salvadoran government improvement in human rights as a condition for the authorization of higher levels of military assistance. Outside, opponents of US policy defiantly
screamed from the Capitol steps, protesting US support to an alleged corrupt government and a foreign military accused of war crimes. The specter of another Vietnam became their rallying cry.

Politically, the region was in turmoil. Fidel Castro was actively fanning the flames of discontent generated by years of political abuse and social neglect. But the United States stood firm in support of more constructive change. The Reagan and Bush Administrations were committed to the idea that revolution would not be exported from Nicaragua. The line against communism in the Central American region was drawn in El Salvador.

Interestingly, by 1990, with the conflict in its tenth year, El Salvador began to lose its US media appeal. With the war virtually stalemated, the number of exploitable news events declined. As a result, El Salvador faded from the attention of the American public. Only during brief, sporadic periods, generally when the peace accord was breached by the Marxist FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional) or the Salvadoran government, did public interest refocus on this country.

Why 1990? Although a devastating FMLN urban campaign, followed by the Jesuit priest murders in November 1989, propelled El Salvador back onto the front pages, these events were short-lived. Operation Just Cause, which began just one month after the murders, replaced El Salvador in the media’s focus. Then, before war stories from Just Cause had even had a chance to make their rounds, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm moved into the limelight. From there the media’s attention has panned to operations involving Kurds, Haitians, Los Angelenos, Floridians, Hawaiians, Iraqis, Kuwaitis, Somalis, and Bosnians. Events in El Salvador wound up in Section B, if they were reported at all. Quiet progress didn’t make the front page. Effective counterinsurgency doesn’t sell newspapers.

Lessons From 12 Years of Conflict

The Salvadoran conflict may fade quickly from public memory. The entire experience could easily get archived in the annals of history as just another American military intervention in Latin America’s internal affairs. Before this occurs, we ought to assess carefully what lessons from this involvement—political and military—are worth recording. After all, in terms

Lieutenant Colonel Victor M. Rosello is Commander, 313th MI Battalion, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a graduate of the University of Puerto Rico, holds an M.A. in Latin American studies from the University of Chicago, and is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His assignments have included tours as a Central America Regional Analyst, J2, USSOUTHCOM, in Panama, USSOUTHCOM Liaison Officer with the American Embassy in San Salvador, and Senior US Military Intelligence Advisor, USMILGP, El Salvador.

Winter 1993-94
of US regional objectives, El Salvador presently appears to be an unqualified success. What good has come from this $6 billion US venture?"2

What follows is not an inclusive study or in-depth analysis of what was achieved. That work needs to be done. What follows, rather, are largely observations drawn from personal experience, supported primarily by notes from a weather-beaten pocket notebook carried while assigned to El Salvador. In light of the latest trend to portray US service members as the Marvel Super Heroes of the 1990s, some of these observations may be worth noting early in the assessment process, especially with problems in Bosnia, Iraq, or North Korea looming on the horizon.

The El Salvador experience generally validated the US Army's Foreign Internal Defense doctrine in countering insurgency: El Salvador demonstrated the merits of relegating US involvement to a strictly supporting role. In this business, success is not measured by what we do, but by the initiatives taken by the host government to end its internal conflict. Although it is tempting to take credit for success, US military and economic assistance did not win the war in El Salvador. US military assistance helped to create stable political and social conditions in which the leading actor, the host country's government, could function productively. In turn, that promoted public confidence in the government's ability to govern well.

A case in point regarding these roles is worth mentioning. The US government initially expressed reservation—sometimes outright apprehension—over the 1989 Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena) presidential candidate, Alfredo Cristiani, who represented a political party historically linked with ultra-right-wing extremists and death squads. His election, however, proved to be the most important catalyst in initiating talks between the guerrillas and the government, an outcome that far exceeded the expectations of US political analysts. Cristiani's effective and moderate leadership style proved to be decisive in ultimately bringing the war to a negotiated settlement. Had the US government taken a stronger or more active role in opposing his candidacy, El Salvador might have floundered for an indeterminate period of largely inept and US-backed Christian Democratic Party politics.

This point reminds us that the supported government and its people must be allowed the freedom to shape their own future. Although laden with political conditions, assistance—military or economic—does not give the United States the right to govern the host country. US policy conditions inherent in military assistance may be used as political leverage, but only when both parties agree to the conditions set forth. Most important, US military assistance is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The US political objective should be clearly articulated and must be in line with the host country's own goals and objectives. From this standpoint US military assistance serves as another foreign policy option available to the President.
Additionally, the Salvadoran experience is testimony to the importance of resisting the temptation to try to solve the problems of the world through direct US military combat intervention. The no-combat-involvement restriction placed on US military trainers and the 55-person limitation placed on the overall US military advisory effort by Congress proved to be judicious in the long run and should be studied as a model for future interventions of this nature.

We need to understand that in an insurgency every participant suffers. In El Salvador, 12 years of conflict left about 10,000 Salvadoran military dead, 25,000 wounded, and 7000 permanently disabled. FMLN combatant deaths are estimated in the tens of thousands. And approximately 15,000 unexploded FMLN antipersonnel mines remain buried throughout the Salvadoran countryside. That fact will doubtless add to the estimated total of 75,000 Salvadoran deaths from this conflict.

Despite the highly restrictive nature of the US military advisory and training role, we took casualties. If US military advisors had been permitted to more actively pursue their roles and missions in direct support of the Salvadoran armed forces on the battlefield, this casualty count could have been dramatically higher.

If any single piece of advice can be extracted from the Salvadoran insurgency, it is this: Direct US combat intervention in foreign civil wars should always be the last option exercised. As demonstrated in El Salvador, there are other novel uses of military assistance which may take longer but may benefit all parties in the long run, and may far outweigh the risks incurred from direct US combat intervention. This point is hardly new. It echoes from Vietnam. The loss of life entailed in trying to use direct US combat intervention to speed up the course of events must not be overlooked. Nor can we allow that lesson to be blurred by our current affinity for high-tech hardware.

US experience in Beirut and Somalia and the potential involvement of US forces in Bosnia illustrate this lesson from El Salvador. The obverse of the US experience in El Salvador may be represented by the ill-fated US peacekeeping operation in Beirut in 1983. There feuding sides were still at war and had no intention of negotiating or bringing the conflict to a peaceful settlement. The hopeful US view of politico-military conflict settlement, we discovered to our dismay, had no productive application there. A comparable situation may exist in the former Yugoslavia and in any number of other regions where long-suppressed nationalist, ethnic, religious, or cultural issues have provoked conflicts of varying intensity.

Both the United States and the United Nations need to spend some time sorting out the conditions for interventions in such conflicts. And while the Gulf War demonstrated the merits of coalition warfare as perhaps the most palatable form of future conflict, the scale of coalition warfare doubtless exceeds most if not all of these regional challenges. On the lower end of the
scale, military assistance and support may be the least bellicose of all alter-
atives and the only form of direct military intervention which keeps the
burden where it belongs, on the shoulders of the host country.

Assessing US Military Advisory Effectiveness in El Salvador

How effective was US military assistance in improving the Sal-
vadoran armed forces (ESAF)? The answer depends on the level of assistance
being assessed. At the basic level, US military assistance vastly improved the
ability of the ESAF to use their equipment and perform combat operations:
zero M-16s, conduct patrols, and command battalion-sized units. The US
contribution clearly resulted in putting an improved Salvadoran military on
the battlefield. In turn, ESAF combat and civic action performance improved
sufficiently to undercut FMLN combat capabilities and popular support.

The greater contribution of the US military advisory effort, however,
must be measured by a different set of standards. A case can be made that it was
the ESAF’s institutional conversion to a professional military and the dramatic
improvement of its human rights record that constitute the most dramatic success
story of this conflict. These two radical changes affected how the populace, the
international community, and even the FMLN ultimately viewed changes in
Salvadoran political conditions. The ESAF’s professionalization served to leg-
itimize the gains made by the Salvadoran government in its creation of a climate
in which the political left could voice opposition without fear of military reprisals
or death-squad murders.

The Salvadoran government’s own reform in shaping this new Sal-
vadoran political reality was remarkable. The year 1984 was pivotal in the
development of the new political climate under the leadership of democratic-
cally elected President José Napoleón Duarte. By 1987 the two most impor-
tant figures of the FMLN’s political wing, Guillermo Ungo and Rubén
Zamora, had left the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR, or Dem-
ocratic Revolutionary Front) to reestablish their residences and political
practices in El Salvador. This represented major progress in enhancing the
government’s credibility, and a tremendous blow to the FMLN. Ungo and
Zamora astutely recognized that the FMLN could no longer maintain its
military campaign and popular support; both conclusions depended on the
belief that political conditions in El Salvador were still stuck in the climate
of the late 1970s and early 1980s.4 Ungo and Zamora’s message to the FMLN
command was clear: The FMLN was seriously mistaken if it still believed
that by 1987 no significant changes had taken place in El Salvador. The
government had reformed to a degree that permitted the leftist opposition to
have a place at the political table. The FMLN military leadership, meanwhile,
either failed to recognize or refused to acknowledge that the government and
its military had undercut the FMLN’s own popular support through govern-
ment reform. Although the handwriting was on the wall, the FMLN needlessly
continued the armed struggle for another four years. Government reform while under direct attack, thought to be an unattainable goal by most political analysts, had become a political reality.

This point is key and worth repeating. For although improving the combat capability of a foreign military is an important reason for providing military assistance, the long-term goal of this effort is to legitimize, institutionalize, and professionalize the host country’s military organization. Improved combat performance on the battlefield is one indicator of success; it should not, however, become the only measure of effectiveness. Military assistance must be packaged in a way that not only guarantees an improved combat capability for the host country, but also institutionalizes the values that personify the US armed services as guardians of democratic principles.

This point leads the discussion back to an assessment of the US military advisory effort in general and the measurement of its true effectiveness. Without taking anything away from the ESAF's own institutional and organizational improvements, the US military advisory and training program should be credited with improving the basic combat skills of the ESAF. Far more important, however, was the influence—direct and indirect—of advisors in guiding the professional transformation of the ESAF. Viewed from this perspective, US military trainers may have been the most positive and effective part of the US military assistance program to El Salvador. It appears that the day-to-day exposure of the ESAF to US military professionalism, respect for human rights, and apolitical attitudes may have had a lasting influence on ESAF behavior. Unfortunately, no studies have been conducted to assess this seeming transfer of values, so it is difficult to prove.

Interestingly, the FMLN appears to have a similar view of the US military presence. During initial meetings and discussions with American Embassy and US Military Group personnel before the signing of the peace accords, one FMLN Comandante commented that it was the presence of US military advisors throughout the countryside that made the difference in the improvement of the ESAF's human rights record and professionalism.

Until the military history of the Salvadoran conflict is written, it may be too early to assess the extent of the US military advisory influence. The level of performance of the military advisory effort was not consistent enough to warrant taking complete credit for the improved ESAF, and it would be wrong to suggest that the ESAF had no desire to become more professional other than that derived from US pressure or influence. Indeed, many ESAF-proposed initiatives reflected their own desire to develop into a professional organization.

The ESAF received some high-quality US military advisors and trainers. However, they also got some marginal performers whom they openly criticized. Many self-sacrificing professionals totally devoted to the advisory effort served there, but the US team also contained over the years some
self-serving individuals whose motives were questionable. The conclusion is
that the ESAF got some of the best and worst that our profession had to offer.
ESAF officers who served during the war almost invariably can rattle off the
names of one or two military advisors they especially remember, American
officers and noncommissioned officers who gave it their best, who contrib-
uted heart and soul toward improving the ESAF. It was such men who
delivered whatever successes the US military advisory effort achieved.

It may be obvious that the only way to get the best performance is
to choose the most qualified and motivated. Early in our involvement in El
Salvador, duty there attracted some of the most capable US military advisors
and trainers. Most went back to serve a second time. Unfortunately, as the
war dragged on and less recognition was bestowed on those who served,
enthusiasm began to wane, as did the quality of the volunteers. Midway
through the conflict, when the pool of volunteer field-grade officers began to
dry up, many who served in El Salvador were not given the option to turn
down the assignment. The results of such personnel policies were quite
damaging to the general effectiveness of the advisory program.

That opinion is consistent with one of the most controversial assess-
ments of the US effort in the Salvadoran conflict, *American Military Policy
in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador.* Because of its four military
coauthors, this study has come to be referred to as the "Four Colonels' Report." Although it is highly unpopular within the ESAF and generally
critical of the US military advisory program, this report focuses on some of
the key issues that characterized the US effort in El Salvador. The uneven
quality of US military advisors is one of the issues it discusses, and in terms
similar to the above observations.

*Strategic Vision: Fact or Fancy?*

Another key point made in the Four Colonels' Report is the criticism
that US policy lacked any strategic vision. If one were to believe, as suggested
in a recent *Parameters* article, that in reality "there was never any comprehen-
sive national strategic plan developed as a result of close coordination between [Salvadoran] civil and military leaders," then this may reflect a
failure by the United States to clearly articulate its own strategic vision to the
Salvadoran government and its military.

If any one aspect of US involvement in El Salvador deserves criti-
cism, it is the failure to integrate US political and military objectives into a
coherent and feasible strategy. The hallmark of US policy was durability—if
we threw enough money at it long enough, eventually the problem would go
away. Luckily, it did. Although resolve is certainly an important aspect in
supporting counterinsurgency, it is no substitute for strategic planning.

This lack of a clear US national strategy impeded ESAF planning by
forestalling the unity of effort necessary to plan and carry out militarily
significant actions. Rarely were long-range military plans developed that incorporated strategic goals and objectives. Consequently, for want of strategic guidance the prosecution of the war was left in the hands of the infantry brigade commanders. For the most part each operated independently within his own military zone (there were six), except for the occasional times when the Salvadoran Joint Command Headquarters supported a military zone with an Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalion.

Because of the development of an improved, more efficient, and militarily stronger ESAF, the FMLN was not able to achieve its strategic objective, that of toppling the Salvadoran government and assuming power through purely military means. This problem for the FMLN was compounded by the fact that, as previously mentioned, its political window of opportunity closed by 1987. Despite many tactical military successes, the FMLN could never exploit them strategically. If it had, today we might be assessing the El Salvador experience as a US policy failure.

On the other hand, although the ESAF was not defeated on the battlefield, it never achieved military victory either. Without a negotiated settlement, the best that either side could hope for was the prolonged stalemate that in essence characterized the war after 1987. In effect, both prize fighters fell in a heap from exhaustion. We in the United States now regard this draw as both a US and a Salvadoran military success resulting from effective US policy. But in the eyes of some international groups, the failure of the US-supported ESAF to defeat the underdog FMLN made the guerrilla movement the undeclared winner of this bout.

Had the Salvadoran Joint Command prepared a strategic plan that integrated strategic, operational, and tactical objectives, coordinated into multiple inter-zonal operations, the military might have defeated the FMLN on the battlefield. Part of the blame for this shortcoming must be shared by the US military advisory mission for not providing more professional advice at the operational and strategic levels. For whatever reasons, training and advice remained predominantly tactical. The military advisory mission might have influenced ESAF attitudes in this respect through more aggressive support at the level of national and military strategy.

**Conclusion**

Among the many slogans generated in protest of the US involvement in El Salvador, one bumper sticker proclaimed that "El Salvador is Vietnam in Spanish." But if our involvement in El Salvador was at times extremely controversial, highly unpopular, and largely misunderstood, for much of the American public the war in El Salvador came and went without much notice. Perhaps that is because most of what the US military achieved there was kept relatively low key, accomplished behind the scenes, and carried out with little media fanfare.
When the Reagan and Bush Administrations focused on Grenada, Nicaragua, and Cuba, El Salvador became the showcase of US government resolve and commitment to the region. But the end of the Cold War also seems to have signaled the end of US involvement and interest in El Salvador. The Clinton Administration will be challenged by other threats, as El Salvador briefing charts and maps are replaced by new Bosnias and Somalias.

Unfortunately our experience in El Salvador may be forgotten before its significance for future US military assistance missions or interventions can be fully absorbed. We should guard against that. El Salvador was not "Vietnam in Spanish." There is much to be learned from our good efforts there.

NOTES
1. William Branigin, "American Killed in El Salvador," The Washington Post, 1 April 1987, pp. A1, A18. Staff Sergeant Gregory Fronius gave his life in service to his country on 31 March 1987, while assigned as a military trainer to the Salvadoran 4th Infantry Brigade in El Paraíso, Chalatenango Department. He was killed while attempting to rally Salvadoran military personnel in defense of the brigade compound during the FMLN attack. This surprise attack resulted in 69 Salvadoran military dead and approximately 79 wounded.


3. The figures of total Salvadoran military casualties during the 12 years of conflict were released by the Salvadoran Ministry of Defense following the 16 January 1992 signing of the peace accords between the FMLN and the government of El Salvador. Because of sensitivities to human rights violations and media criticism of the prosecution of the war by government security forces, the actual number of FMLN dead and wounded during the conflict remains a mystery.

4. The author obtained this statement from Dr. Rubén Zamora during an interview sponsored by the American Embassy in June 1992 at the Hotel Presidente, San Salvador.

5. Lee Hockstader, "US Envoy, Colonel Meet Salvadoran Rebels," The Washington Post, 13 September 1991, p. A33. It was during this first historic visit to Santa Marta, Cahuas Department, on 31 August 1991, that Colonel Mark Hamilton, US Military Group El Salvador Commander, first met with FMLN Comandantes. During this first encounter and subsequent meetings with FMLN military representatives, Colonel Hamilton learned that the FMLN assessed the US military advisory effort as having had a most positive influence on the ESAF.


7. Michael J. Henelly, "US Policy in El Salvador: Creating Beauty or the Beast?" Parameters, 23 (Spring 1993), 66.

8. Ibid., pp. 59-60.

9. The insurgents continue to receive support from a host of internationalist, socialist, religious, or radical organizations. Read J. Michael Waller, The Third Current of Revolution: Inside the North American Front of El Salvador's Guerrilla War (Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1991) for a more detailed and intriguing account of this support structure.

10. Some sporadic, inconsistent efforts were made to correct this. The US military assisted in the development of one long-range strategic plan. The 1983 National Campaign Plan is one example of these efforts. Beginning in San Vicente Department, this plan called for a concerted counterinsurgency effort, one department at a time. The key to success was to focus valuable resources, while each department was cleared and brought under government control. However, in executing the Plan, the ESAF failed to coordinate with the various governmental support agencies necessary for success. By the end of 1984 the plan was already dead. After the National Plan came Unidos Para Reconstruir (UPR) in 1988. In essence this operational concept gave each Salvadoran military zone commander the latitude to conduct his own counterinsurgency operations and programs separately from those of other zone commanders. Consequently, six separate programs were in effect, while the FMLN continued to operate and cause havoc among the military zones. Limited resources were further spread thin among the military zones as each commander competed for success. Like the National Plan, UPR slowly died from lack of interest.
FORHT GENERATION GAP?

To the Editor:

When the English set out to besiege the Island of Rhe in 1627, they took their longbows along. The weapon had been obsolete for a century; no wonder the expedition, commanded by the Duke of Buckingham, failed.

Major Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC, characterizes fourth generation, or nontrinitarian, warfare as an "elegant irrelevance" (Parameters, Autumn 1993). By so doing he ignores the fact that every one of the 20 to 25 armed conflicts now being fought all over the globe is of this kind.

As their current bungling performance in Somalia shows, America's armed forces—or, for that matter, the armed forces of other modern nations—do not have a clue about how to deal with nontrinitarian war. Either, unlike Major McKenzie, they face the problem head on, or else they will pile additional defeats on top of those already suffered in Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and any other number of places. And the next nontrinitarian war may well be a lot closer to home, and more important, than Somalia.

Professor Martin van Creveld
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

The Author Replies:

I wasn't aware that in my small contribution to the debate over nontrinitarian warfare I was refusing to deal with the problem head on. I had the very real privilege of listening to Dr. van Creveld as a lecturer in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and in seminars in the School of Advanced Warfighting. His brilliant reasoning and unorthodox perspective were certainly refreshing and were largely responsible for sparking my own personal exploration of nontrinitarian or fourth generation warfare theory. I have come to fundamentally disagree with many of his conclusions, and Dr. van Creveld has said nothing new in his response to make me reconsider. His theory beckons true believers, but leaves the skeptic cold and doubting. Parameters readers can weigh the history, the competing analyses, and world current events for themselves to draw their own conclusions.

Major Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC

LIES: PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE

To the Editor:

I read with great interest Colonel Anthony Hartle's review of Oliver North's biography in the Summer issue of Parameters.

Winter 1993-94
I believe that Colonel Hartle is right on target when he suggests that North’s story “raises questions about loyalty, morality, and professional conduct.” As one who lived through the days of Iran-Contra as the Latin American specialist on the staff of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I would go further and suggest that North showed an incredible lack of knowledge of the US Constitution—a document which he professed to serve—and an arrogance and an “I know what is right; don’t bother me with the law” attitude that crossed the line of debatable conduct into behavior of which we as military officers should be both ashamed and appalled. The fact that North escaped punishment because of what many would term a “legal technicality” only compounds the problem.

I suppose that if I were summarizing Oliver North’s ethical standards I could do no better than to quote the colonel himself. During the trial of Admiral John Poindexter, North was asked by the prosecutor: “You thought you could go in front of those twelve Congressmen, sit there, and lie and lie and lie?”

To which North replied: “I was not under oath. I have never lied under oath. It was an informal, off-the-record meeting.”

And this is the man that many make out to be a hero.

Lieutenant James T. Currie, USAR
Alexandria, Virginia

The Author Replies:

Reportedly, about the time Lieutenant Colonel North began to take aggressive action to pursue political objectives in his NSC activities, another officer from another branch of the military, working on the NSC, went to a senior military official and requested a transfer to a new assignment. The officer explained that the NSC was becoming increasingly involved in operational activities and straying from its purported role of providing foreign policy advice. In doing so, that officer apparently believed that staff members were becoming involved in activities inappropriate for commissioned officers. One wonders what aspect of that officer’s education and character prompted him to respond so differently to the NSC environment that existed at that time.

The issue of lying in itself should not have been the difference. Should a commissioned officer ever lie? Some time ago in a presentation, I answered my own rhetorical question by saying, “Yes, of course,” to the consternation of some in my military audience. Truth-telling has long been an essential characteristic of the profession of arms, a fact that explains the audience’s reaction. As Richard Halloran noted in an August 1987 New York Times article, “A senior officer who lies to subordinates about the dangers of their mission may condemn them to death. A junior officer who lies about his unit’s readiness can mislead a superior into a disastrous decision.”

Nonetheless, if we accept that a lie is the communication of a falsehood for the purpose of deceiving the recipient, we must go on to say that sometimes members of the military should lie. Deception in war, after all, is not only condoned when it is necessary to military success, we in fact expect deception and honor it when it succeeds. During World War II, as the Allies prepared to invade Fortress Europe, an elaborate deception plan called Bodyguard went into effect. The purpose of the plan was to deceive the Germans about the main D-Day landing area,
which was to be the Normandy beaches. To that end, through a complex series of activities, the Allies spread false information and deceived the Germans—and we took considerable professional pride in that success. Lying to the enemy in such circumstances has never been morally problematic.

Sissela Bok presented an example of lying that appears justified without any reference to military roles and responsibilities. She described a situation in which a Nazi patrol boat has stopped a freighter smuggling a Jewish group out of Germany during World War II. The Nazi commander asks the captain of the freighter if he has any Jews aboard. How should he reply, knowing that the Jews aboard will be facing death—or worse—if they are discovered? Most respondents would not insist that the captain avoid lying at all costs.

The point is that lying is not always obviously unacceptable, even for a professional military officer committed to a code of ethics that requires truth-telling as a practice and a character trait. But having made a case for exceptions to truth-telling, I must note that lies always cause some harm. Whenever we tell a lie, we face the burden of justifying or excusing the action. Whenever people make statements to others, as Charles Fried once noted, they invoke one of the most fundamental of human institutions: the linguistic practice of inviting belief based upon reliance on the assumption of truth-telling. Every lie that masks itself as a communication of truth undercuts this vital, fundamental human institution, necessary in every viable society. All lies to some degree also weaken the disposition of the speaker to be truthful habitually. Such ubiquitous harms require justification.

One common excuse for lying in perilous circumstances is the preservation of human life or the protection of vital social interests. Whatever standard we choose for evaluating lies, however, we must be stringent if we are to resist our almost limitless capacity to rationalize and the swiftness with which practices of deception can spread. With these thoughts in mind, we can confidently say that lying is wrong unless it is a practice recognized by all involved in an activity, such as deceiving the enemy. Sometimes lying can be excused because of particular circumstances, as in the case of the Nazi patrol boat. But when we turn to Lieutenant Colonel North’s case, I find I agree with Lieutenant Colonel Currie. If we carefully analyze the circumstances under which Lieutenant Colonel North apparently deceived officials of his own government as well as others with whom he was ostensibly cooperating—the circumstances as he himself presents them in his book—we find no adequate excuse for lying within the framework I have suggested. If we can find no justification or excuse, we cannot accept the argument that Lieutenant Colonel North adhered to the requirements of his profession for loyalty, morality, and professional conduct, or to his obligation to uphold the Constitution.

Colonel Anthony E. Hartle

ON THE FAILURE AND FUTURE OF NATION ASSISTANCE

To the Editor:

David Tucker ("Facing the Facts: The Failure of Nation Assistance," Parameters, Summer 1993) evokes well the halcyon days of 1961, when Walt

Winter 1993-94
Rostow and other New Frontiersmen could wax enthusiastic at Fort Bragg about nation-building as part of US counterinsurgency strategy for developing nations. Tucker also describes well the current revival of interest in nation-building schemes as potential Army missions in the post-Cold War era.

Our Army is very much smaller now, however, and is slated to shrink even more. Maintaining our readiness just to deploy and fight the likely major regional contingencies described in JCS planning documents is itself a tall order.

Let the State Department, the Agency for International Development, the UN, the World Bank, and international humanitarian groups (as in Somalia) assist developing countries that want to build democratic institutions. These latter are much better prepared than soldiers will ever be to fight through the kleptocracy and pervasive nepotism in those governments.

I agree with David Tucker that "expunging nation-assistance from low-intensity conflict doctrine" will remove "a distraction."

Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Fairchild, USARNG
Ft. Monroe, Virginia

To the Editor:

In the Summer 1993 issue of Parameters, David Tucker argued for "expunging nation assistance from low-intensity conflict doctrine." He based his argument on the inadequacies of W. W. Rostow's 1960 The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. After demonstrating "there is no reason to believe... that improving socioeconomic conditions will necessarily decrease or mitigate conflict," he concludes that nation assistance is "a waste of time and resources." We take exception to this viewpoint and invite Dr. Tucker to consider alternatives to nation assistance that embrace military civic action.

Admittedly, Tucker's criticism of the incorporation of an outmoded sociological theory into contemporary low-intensity conflict doctrine is valid. The idea that people are ready to die in battle simply to acquire more manufactured goods is anachronistic at a time when racial and religious wars are the primary causes of human misery. Today's most threatening source of political-military instability, Islamic fundamentalism, first emerged in Iran, the Islamic country which had received the most US military assistance civic action funding during the 1960s (Edward Glick, Peaceful Conflict, 1967). Similarly today, such instability is endemic to the Islamic country receiving a large share of US military aid, namely Egypt. In short, there seems to be a danger in discarding one of the important techniques in nation assistance—military civic action. In focusing on the logical inconsistencies in Rostow's justification for military-civic action, Tucker failed to address the stronger justifications of Glick, Harry Walterhouse, and Hugh Hanning.

As defined in JCS Pub 1-02, military civic action is

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)
This definition includes activities endorsed by Tucker, such as assisting “by giving technical electoral advice or by supporting public works projects and psychological operations intended, again, not to remove the causes of conflict but to build goodwill toward the government and encourage participation during the difficult transition toward more representative government.” This definition is also compatible with the vision of the use of military forces that emerged at the end of World War II and may be emerging again in the military strategy of the Clinton Administration.

Any discussion of current US military strategy is hampered by the failure of a clear written statement on that strategy. However, if actions speak louder than words, the vision might be phrased as following: A world in which every military force is configured as a defense force, and most, if not all, attack forces are under the control of the United Nations. This statement was deduced from five recent actions:

- The President attempted to achieve a consensus among European nations to join with the United States for military intervention in the racial war between Bosnia and Serbia.
- When consensus could not be achieved, the President refrained from unilateral military action.
- The President labeled the unilateral attack on the headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence agency as “defense,” and Administration officials conducted a coordinated political and media campaign to convince the community of nations of the appropriateness of this definition.
- The President authorized the use of US combat forces to attack General Aideed in Somalia, but only under the authority of the United Nations.
- The President dispatched US combat troops to Macedonia wearing the blue beret of the United Nations.

If, in fact, this vision of military strategy represents the underlying thinking of the Administration, then discarding military civic action is the wrong response at this time, for it is a primary technique in assisting other nations in helping their militaries to evolve into defense forces supportive of and integrated into democratic structures. Drawing upon a 200-year tradition of nation-building within our own borders, the US military is in a strong position to serve as a role model to other nations on how to work effectively within a democracy. Moreover, the position of the US soldier as the most successful warrior in today’s world makes our troops into enviable role models for any soldier who wants to know how to become a more effective warrior.

This is not to mean that military civic action is a panacea. As we have discussed at length elsewhere, the criteria for effective military civic action lead to severe constraints on its applicability. Another constraint is that military civic action loses effectiveness when not applied by skilled practitioners.

In short, David Tucker is to be commended for raising questions about nation assistance. Unfortunately, we believe that he misses the importance of nation assistance in today’s post-Cold War world, particularly utilization of those techniques incorporating military civic action.

Colonel George A. Luz, USAR, Ph.D.
Colonel John W. DePauw, USAR, Ph.D.
Arlington, Virginia

Winter 1993-94
The Author Replies:

Lieutenant Colonel Fairchild raises an essential point. As budgets and force structure decrease and we try to sort out policies and strategies appropriate for the new situation in which we find ourselves, we must think as clearly as we can about what we are doing and why. As my article indicated, I believe that one result of such an effort will be the conclusion that "nation assistance," as an effort to prevent or reduce conflict, is a waste of time. As Lieutenant Colonel Fairchild puts it, there is no reason to believe that we can turn kleptocracies into democracies.

I believe that Colonels Luz and DePauw offer no arguments to the contrary in their lengthy letter but am not sure, since I have not been able to extract a consistent argument from it. They begin by accepting my criticisms of nation assistance, offering military civic action (MCA) as an alternative. They then cite approvingly the JCS Pub 1-02 definition of MCA, which describes projects "contributing to economic and social development" and so makes MCA indistinguishable from nation assistance rather than an alternative to it. They continue in this vein by referring to the US military's "200-year tradition of nation-building" as the basis of our ability to use MCA in assisting aspiring democracies. They conclude by writing of "the importance of nation assistance in today's post-Cold War world."

In response, I can say only that if, as Colonels Luz and DePauw first admit, my analysis of nation assistance is valid and, as they imply, MCA is nation assistance, then MCA is as much a waste of time as nation assistance. Colonels Luz and DePauw offer no reasoning to make me think my analysis is invalid.

Colonels Luz and DePauw may be trying to argue that MCA can make a civilian population feel better about supporting a military establishment. This may be correct but ignores the question of whether the United States should be trying to persuade foreign populations to support their militaries. It was once thought that these militaries were modernizing, nation-building forces and so deserved the support of the people they supposedly served and of the US government. No one can seriously maintain this now.

This brings us to a final point. Colonels Luz and DePauw contend that the US military helped build the United States and that we can pass this experience on to other nations. Compared to the initiative and hard work of the American people and the investment of British capital, the military's role in building the United States was insignificant. What it contributed, it contributed because it consisted of Americans, people willing and able to build a democratic nation. Even if the US military had had a larger role in building our nation, MCA would still not be of use in building other nations, since there is no evidence that democratic impulses can be transmitted by military-to-military contact.

I conclude again, at least for now, that nation assistance is a waste of time. MCA may be good public relations but it will never be anything more than that, no matter how skilled its practitioners.

David Tucker
Book Reviews


Those who know anything at all about General George S. Patton, Jr., understand that there was more to him than his elegant and highly polished exterior. His impeccable dress, his ivory-handled pistols, his baleful glare or charming smile, as well as other appurtenances and habits, belonged to his showmanship. All of it projected his warrior image, carefully designed and cultivated to impress his beholders with immense wonder, awe, and thrill, plus the immediate wish to do his bidding.

Behind the facade, behind the war mask, a powerful intelligence was at work. What took place, so to speak, behind the scene—what transpired in Patton's mind—provided substance to the outer trappings. Otherwise, his appearance would have no doubt been meaningless, perhaps comical, his existence empty of achievement.

Roger Nye, a West Point graduate, retired colonel, and former professor of history at the Military Academy, has looked into Patton's mind. He has brilliantly traced and described the evolution of Patton's military thought and philosophy, whence they came, how they developed, and the manner in which Patton applied them to the problems he encountered throughout his career.

The start of Colonel Nye's inquiry came from a belief. "Those who achieved greatness [in war]," he says, did so because of "a very intense and lifelong self-study of their profession." Patton, Nye discovered, "left behind the most complete record of exhaustive professional study of any World War II general—or any general in American history." Using that record "to explore" and to document "the dimensions of Patton's professional self-development," Nye has extended and coupled Patton's knowledge and tenets to reality, the reality not only of Patton's expressions on the nature of things military but also of Patton's actions on the battlefield and elsewhere.

Throughout his life, Patton absorbed information from military writers. Colonel Nye lists the authors and their works and discusses the most important. Patton sometimes approved, sometimes argued with their positions, then reached his own conclusions, noting his reactions on the margins of the books he read or on file cards he maintained. Patton then applied the lessons he had learned to the problems he faced as he progressed to ever-increasing responsibilities. It was thus that he became a sound and spectacular leader.

In other words, Patton's inner growth began by acquiring a military library and using it almost every day for reading and self-study. He employed a system combining written notes in the margins of the books he read and a series of file cards on which he wrote the ideas he derived on tactics, strategy, leadership, and military organization. He expressed his own thoughts in lectures, staff papers, magazine
articles, diary entries, poems, and a book-length manuscript. Carrying out the precepts he had fashioned, Patton became a legend in his lifetime.

Colonel Nye's monumental book is always lucid and convincing. It presents the best, the most significant insight into Patton's success as a soldier. It is worthy of inspiring, as Colonel Nye hopes, General Patton's "successors" to "develop their own patterns of professional study."


Reviewed by Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr., USA Ret., President, Prairie View A&M University, Prairie View, Tex.

I picked up this book with a bit of skepticism because I too commanded black platoons, two of which were in combat—one in the 93d Division after "VJ" day on Morotai, and another one assigned to the 2d Infantry Division in Korea—and I wanted to compare notes. While the motivation for this book appears to be Rishell's desire to debunk the then-held perceptions, often repeated by some historians, "that the black soldiers and noncommissioned officers were undisciplined and even cowardly in battle," Rishell's treatment of this particular subject is almost a side issue. There is precious little to differentiate between a black platoon and any other platoon. As a matter of fact, by his description he could well have been talking about a 1st Cav Division platoon in Desert Storm. That said, however, it is clear that we share the same bottom line: a soldier is a soldier is a soldier, and with good leadership he will do what is expected.

The details are from notes Rishell made at the time, some 40-plus years earlier, linked with his personal recollections and, I suspect, some facts from other historians, which takes nothing away from his dialogue. He joined Company A, 24th Infantry Regiment, shortly after the all-black regiment landed in Korea. Actually "all-black" is a misnomer; the 24th Infantry Regiment was made up of black soldiers and mostly white commanders. Since the black soldiers were accustomed to having white commanders, it was no big deal when Rishell joined his unit.

Early in the book Rishell describes the attitudes of the occupation forces in Japan as well as the stateside views about Korea, the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world. He frequently speculates on the general situation as perceived at General MacArthur's headquarters and elsewhere on the battlefield. The absence of sketch maps, or maps of any variety, tends to detract from having a better picture of locations within Korea. For the novice reader this would be academic and somewhat of an inconvenience, but for veterans of that war, it is frustrating trying to recall personal experiences and locations and fitting them into Rishell's situation.

As a tutorial—and I strongly recommend it to all young combat arms lieutenants—Rishell's book is loaded with tidbits about leadership and survival in combat. For example, "When I traveled in a vehicle, I constantly surveyed the route we were taking. Where was the best spot for an ambush? How could I react if we were hit? What side of the road offered the best defense? Was there a way out of the trouble spot?" Lieutenant Rishell had an opportunity to experience the answers to such questions, and in one of the most brutal actions in his tour, near Yonchon, his unit paid dearly for its failure to execute.
This passage is probably the best description of what Rishell and many others faced when they had their first contact: "We were green and untested, and with the exception of the noncoms and the more senior officers, most had not experienced combat before. In those early days there were many of us, black and white alike, who were young and innocent, who had never seen death or dying, and who were afraid of it. Yet for all that, we fought a strange war right from the outset, a filthy war of formidable mountains and scarred ridges, of twisting trails, of hunger and disease and heat."

What about the black soldier? Did he "bug out?" Rishell's response is this: "The fact that troops 'bugged out' cannot be denied, but in my judgment the soldiers of all units early in the war had that propensity. The men of the 24th Regiment performed no better and no worse than those of other units, and it is unfair to judge them otherwise because they were black. It is ludicrous to suggest that troops sang around a campfire, and even more that roadblocks had to be established. There was never a time when my troops left a position without an order to withdraw."

Veterans from the Pusan Perimeter to the Iron Triangle will read this account with a twinge of discomfort because of their vivid memories. Those fortunate ones who were medically evacuated out of North Korea and back through the medical chain—Tokyo Army General to Sendia—will also recall a steady diet of steak and eggs for breakfast, steak and fries for lunch, and steak and whatever for supper, with generous amounts of ice cream sodas. Lieutenant Rishell's odyssey with his Silver Star and two Purple Hearts helps many of us to reexperience that journey.

Rishell is also able to relate a truth without appearing preachy: "Command leadership is something many have attempted to describe. Talking about it in a military classroom is different from exercising leadership in a combat unit." He describes in soldier terms the relationship between the leader and the led, and the ultimate requirement to kill on the battlefield.

*With a Black Platoon in Combat* is an excellent portrayal of life at the front lines in what Clay Blair called *The Forgotten War*. Lyle Rishell's account is easy reading and, if followed by some young lieutenant in some future war, might mean the difference between victory or defeat in some small action on some far-off mountainous battlefield. It's worth an evening away from the television.


Some of the generals quoted in this volume about relations between the military service and the press have good advice for American officers. Some utter balderdash. And occasionally a bit of both comes from the same speaker.

Hear General Michael J. Dugan, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force who was sacked by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney for supposedly talking out of turn to the press during the Gulf War: "The easiest way for defense establishments to manage the media is to generate a compelling story."

Or Major General Sir Jeremy Moore, who commanded British ground forces during the invasion of the Falklands: "I do believe in the dissemination of information as soon as it can be given; in adhering, as far as is possible, to the truth; and in being blunt about what one is not prepared to discuss."

*Winter 1993-94*
And Brigadier Adrian D'Hage, director of public information for the Australian Defence Force: "We need to maintain our credibility at all costs."

In addition, Allan J. Behm, a senior official in the Attorney General's Department in Canberra, presents an excellent plan for press relations during a terrorist incident, always a tough call on all sides. "One of the chief objectives of government in managing a terrorist incident is to ensure that it is the government and not the terrorists that are in charge," he said. "Clearly, this cannot be achieved if the media are excluded. Rather, it requires a positive public communications strategy and a facility to brief comprehensively and well."

Lastly, several speakers scored hits when they criticized the lack of experience, preparation, and professionalism of many American correspondents in the Gulf War. As a viewer and reader of the coverage of that conflict, I could only agree, unhappily. All too often I thought I was listening to Major Bowes Amateur Hour, a popular radio program of my youth.

General Peter Gration, the Chief of the Australian Defence Force, pleaded for "some sort of quality control over the correspondents reporting the conflict, desirably exercised by the profession itself." He argued: "It is not good enough that any cub reporter can roam unrestricted around a theater of operations understanding little of what he sees, but nevertheless turning out copy that presumably will be read or viewed by someone." No quarrel.

Beyond that, however, this collection of speeches and papers given during a 1991 conference in Brisbane, Australia, has limited value for American officers. The deck was stacked from the beginning with senior officers and academicians, the latter having had little journalistic or military experience. The words of only two correspondents are included: Terry O’Conner of the Australian Associated Press, who had limited exposure to the Gulf War, and David H. Hackworth of Newsweek, a retired Army colonel who is considered by many in the American press to be a self-promoting gadfly.

The misconception of press operations began with General Gration, who asserted that television and print correspondents argue for "untrammeled access and uninhibited reporting of conflict." General Dugan echoed that belief, saying, "American reporters were not accustomed to externally imposed 'rules.'"

Not so, generals. Any correspondent worth his salt will push for as much access as he or she can get and will drive for as much candor in the copy as possible. But correspondents accepted censorship in World War I and World War II and guidelines imposed in Korea and Vietnam. No professional American correspondent believes he has the right to file a story that will put another American’s life in jeopardy. Nor does the Supreme Court, which has ruled that freedom of speech does not permit a newspaper to cause "a clear and present danger" nor to publish troopship sailings during wartime.

Sir Jeremy appears to have been an advocate of "the positive use of media coverage to aid my operations by judicious use for the purposes of deception." That may be permissible in the British tradition, but it is not in the American. An officer who misleads the press to fool the enemy deceives Americans, the very people he has sworn to defend. General Colin L. Powell, then the President’s national security adviser, told the National Press Club in 1988 that a public official was not permitted "in any set of circumstances to lie, either to Congress or to the press."

The danger of having academicians speak for newspapermen and women was underscored in a paper by Professor Clem Lloyd, who teaches journalism at.
Wollongong University. He said reporters need "access to the battlefield; mobility on the battlefield; and reasonable access to military information."

That assessment overlooked, among other things, the vital need for communications. The first thing a foreign or military correspondent looks for when he lands is a way to communicate with his home office. The second is backup communications. And the third is still another channel of communications. Without commo, the correspondent with the most telling story in the world will do nothing, as we say in the trade, but wrap fish.

Two old and tired themes pervaded the conference. Some offices and academicians spent time fighting the ancient battle between soldiers and scribblers over the Vietnam War. Carlyle A. Thayer III, a professor of politics at the Australian Defence Force Academy, tried to lay that to rest: "There is no simple direct connection between American media coverage of the Vietnam War and the loss of America's national will to persist and to win that conflict."

Professor Thayer quoted the Army's official historian, William M. Hammond, who came to the same conclusion after an exhaustive study in 1988. Dr. Hammond asserted that soldiers who were emotionally tied to America's 'ailed policy fixed their anger upon the news media, the most visible exponent of the society that appeared to have rejected them.'

The other weary proposition was the red herring of operational security that military officers have often drawn across the track of real issues. The Governor General of Australia, Bill Hayden, in an address that opened the conference, said a prime military concern was "the overall security of operations to ensure the advantages of secrecy and surprise."

Fair enough. The record shows, however, that rarely has that been a problem. Barry Zorthian, a respected public affairs officer in Vietnam, says he knows of only a half-dozen instances in which a correspondent violated ground rules on operational security, and three were inadvertent. In the other three, the correspondents, rightly, had their accreditations yanked.

Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, who commanded US naval forces during the invasion of Grenada and won no plaudits from the press for helping to obstruct coverage of that campaign, was candid at this conference: "Concern for operational security was not a factor in our media guidance."

To be sure, no one should ever become complacent over this question. But the real issues lie elsewhere. As another admiral said at the Naval War College in Newport some years ago: "Operational security is not the issue. The issue is that when you write about us, you make us look bad."


Books on wars follow a cycle. They begin with instant books, ones that come right after the fighting and are usually filled with personal impressions and half-truths. They are followed by policy books arguing special causes, self-glorifying biographies, and strident revisionist attempts to reinterpret history and turn victory into defeat. Then, and only then, come solid analyses. Years later, we get decent histories.
Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned is one of the first books on the Gulf War that rises above the race to publish and the race for attention. It is heavily dependent on the initial reporting on the results of the war by the Department of Defense, but it brings a solid mix of policy and military expertise to reporting on the history of the war and the failures of deterrence and diplomacy that led to the conflict.

Its summaries of the air and land campaigns are largely strategic and tactical in character—avoiding detailed discussions of weapons and technical issues—but solidly written. They reflect genuine military expertise and avoid the tendency to glorify every decision or play armchair general. Some of the discussion of what took place would almost certainly be rewritten today on the basis of recent reporting on the history of US command decisions, the role of our allies, and a better understanding of Iraqi actions, but this is the price of any current book on the war.

This is not a book that takes radical sides on issues like the proper balance between air power and land forces. It quite correctly stresses the importance of combined operations, and it finds the same solid middle ground on most issues. It neatly balances its discussion of tactics and technology with insights into the importance of the human factor, logistics, and support. This balance is a key strength of the book. If most of the lessons drawn from the actual fighting are now familiar and expected, this is exactly what they should be.

In any case, the authors clearly recognize that the Gulf War is a prelude to the post-Cold War era, and not a paradigm. They realize that the success of our tactics in fighting Iraq is not the most important lesson to be drawn from the conflict. Rather, they focus on the fact that the war revealed the need to find new answers to the problems of conflict termination, the linkage between policy and deterrence in the post-Cold War era, future US force levels, and new arms control policies tailored to securing American interests.

The concluding chapter does a particularly good job of summarizing these issues. It is useful reading for anyone coming to grips with the practical problems in adapting American power to the challenge of peace enforcement and nation-building. At the same time, two other chapters illustrate the fact that history tends to repeat itself whether we remember it or not.

Our threats to use force in Bosnia have already ignored many of the lessons in the chapter on the failure of deterrence. Our attacks on Aideed have ignored many of the lessons in the chapter on the failure of compellence.

But then, the growing wisdom of policymakers has never threatened to be a major cause of unemployment among military officers. Machiavelli pointed out more than 500 years ago that success in war is determined by the political advantages gained, and not by victorious battles. The authors are all-too-prescient in pointing out that we still do a much better job of winning battles than giving them meaning.


This book offers an engrossing account of the role of intelligence in American history. Contrary to its dust-jacket billing, however, it is not the first comprehen-
sive history of US intelligence. Two other recent books—Charles Ameringer's *U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History* and Nathan Miller's *Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence*—can claim priority of publication, and both of these volumes bring the story up through the Iran-Contra affair, whereas O'Toole ends with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

While it is extensively researched, the O'Toole volume is fundamentally a popular account. It makes little use of documentary sources, offers few novel interpretations, and eschews serious analysis. Moreover, while certain episodes are presented at what seems unnecessary length, there are a number of unexplained omissions. For example, O'Toole does not even mention the role of covert-style activities in the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 (or the confrontation this created between President Cleveland and his congressional opposition over the use of secret executive agents), and only barely mentions Teddy Roosevelt's engineering of Panama's secession from Colombia in 1903, although admitting it qualifies as a covert action. (Both of these matters are dealt with much more satisfactorily in the Ameringer volume.)

O'Toole's inadequacy here reflects a larger failure to define more carefully the scope of covert action and to distinguish it from secret diplomacy. This is an operational as well as a theoretical problem that has an interesting past (and present relevance, as Iran-Contra showed), and plainly deserves more thematic treatment.

All this having been said, *Honorable Treachery* is nevertheless both highly readable and worth reading. It goes some way toward restoring what the author calls a "missing dimension" of American history, not so much by introducing new material as by identifying and arranging odd fragments of existing historical information in a newly recognizable form. What emerges is a picture of the historical place of intelligence in American statecraft that is surprisingly similar to today's. O'Toole makes a strong case, contrary to a certain mythology of American innocence, that America's political elite has generally recognized the importance of intelligence, accepted the harsh compromises it involves, and performed intelligence tasks with gusto, if not always competently. From George Washington, "the most important intelligence officer of the American Revolution," and other leading figures of the founding generation (Franklin, Jefferson, Madison) to our own day, "clandestine activities are as American as apple pie or the bald eagle."

From a contemporary perspective, what is perhaps most striking in O'Toole's account is the rich pre-World War II history of covert propaganda and political action. Covert paramilitary operations—today often identified in the popular mind simply with covert action—were rare in the early years of the Republic and usually bungled, as in the case of the coup organized by an American naval officer against the pasha of Tripoli in 1804 or the Madison Administration's meddling in Spanish Florida in 1811-12. Intelligence collection, analysis, and counterintelligence were often spectacularly weak. But Americans seem to have been adept from the very beginning at propaganda and subversion. The Sons of Liberty and the Committees of Correspondence "comprised the insurgent infrastructure of Patriot America in the decade before the Revolution; they were a cadre of dedicated revolutionaries who propagandized against British rule, indoctrinated the uncommitted, organized the Whigs, terrorized the Tories, procured arms and munitions, trained farmers and tradesmen in the military arts, and generally prepared for an armed conflict with the
British government"—all in addition to carrying out acts of espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Less well known but equally interesting is the history (much of it unfortunately now lost) of subversive organizations on both sides during the Civil War, and of the covert propaganda and influence operations conducted by Union agents in Europe.

On balance, however, the evidence of history seems less reassuring than O'Toole appears to find it. Even by the time of the Civil War, military intelligence was a makeshift affair, and the eventual establishment of permanent and effective intelligence organizations in the Army and Navy was a painfully drawn-out process. It is not clear that the United States would have succeeded in defeating the surprisingly sophisticated covert operations mounted by the Germans in North America during World War I without the help of a private network of Czech-Americans as well as British intelligence. Endemic amateurism has characterized American intelligence until recently. However, O'Toole does not bring the story far enough to provide us a sense of the bureaucratization and technicalization of the contemporary American intelligence community, or of the paralytic effects of recent congressional intrusion into what had been an exclusively executive sphere. For these and similar issues, readers must look elsewhere.


William Gregory, formerly Editor-in-Chief of Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine, has written an excellent book, and I highly recommend it for anyone interested in the problems of defense downsizing in the post-Cold War era.

The book is written in an easy-to-read, reporter's style, and it presents many excellent case studies. It is based upon extensive interviewing with leaders in the military industrial complex, many of whom—in both government and industry—Gregory has known on a personal basis. So he is able to draw out from them experiences and opinions that have not been previously published.

Gregory takes on some of the most difficult and yet most critical problems to be addressed in the early years of the Clinton Administration, namely:

- How to restructure the defense industrial base in order to achieve efficiency, effectiveness, innovation, and responsiveness with a far smaller defense budget.
- How to change the military mind-set from a focus on nuclear war and high-intensity, central European conflicts to the uncertain but more likely, and still highly dangerous, regional conflicts.
- How to handle the clear shift from a concentration on new large weapon platforms (ships, planes, and tanks) to the coming era of information and electronics-based defense systems.

Throughout the discussion, Gregory emphasizes the needed defense industrial base shift toward an integrated military and civilian structure. As a result, not only would the Defense Department employ far more commercial components and subsystems, but there would be dual-use developments of new technologies and
particularly dual use of factories for differing military products (which could use the
same production processes and the same workforce).

Consistent with this, Gregory highlights the fact that the commercial world
has dramatically changed its new product development process in order to remain
internationally competitive—introducing such concepts as concurrent engineering—
in order to focus on the production process at a level equal to that of the historical
emphasis on product technologies. He then goes on to discuss how these industrial
structural changes are also taking place in Europe and the Soviet Union, with numer-
ous examples drawn from Japan as well.

Finally, and most appropriately, Gregory brings up the extreme barriers
presented by the “unique way of doing defense business”—as required by Congress
and the Department of Defense in legislative and regulatory demands. He properly
emphasizes the need to remove these barriers to civil/military integration—such as
specialized cost accounting standards, unnecessarily exacting military specifications,
unique procurement practices, and requirements for proprietary data rights.

While hoping and expecting that the Clinton Administration will take on the
challenge to remove these barriers in an effort to implement many of his recommenda-
tions, Gregory realistically observes that making the needed transformation will be
extremely difficult at best. In fact, if any criticism of Gregory’s work is to be made, it
is that he may not go far enough in detailing the specific prescriptions for how the needed
cultural changes can be encouraged to take place, i.e. what incentives the government
can create to push industry into making the needed transformations more rapidly.

Nonetheless, the numerous case studies, expert opinions, and arguments
presented by Gregory in this book are essential reading for those involved in this
critical transformation. It is a change that is absolutely necessary for the Department
of Defense and the defense industry to make over the next few years if the United
States is to maintain its strong military posture with a far smaller defense budget.

Military History and the Military Profession. Edited by David A.
Reviewed by Colonel John R. Elting, USA Ret., author of Amateurs
to Arms!: A Military History of the War of 1812-1815.

Reviewing this book is a bit like being a broody hen set to hatch a clutch of
mixed duck, hawk, ostrich, alligator, and buzzard eggs.

This is a gathering of 15 essays with a practical forward by Anne Forman,
former US Air Force undersecretary, on the uses of military history in policymaking.
Six contributors are Canadian, as are the three editors; five are American, three
British, and one German. All are civilian historians; most are or were associated with
their national armed forces. Apparently only three are combat veterans.

Allan Millett, ex-Marine, opens with “American Military History . . .” a
general review of the evolution and present state of the official and academic branches
of that discipline, applying a certain dry wit to the birth pangs and growing pains of
its new “institutional-cultural” approach. Particularly impressive is Millett’s expla-
nation of the overwhelming “civilianization” of our armed forces historical divisions
and schools.

Winter 1993-94 123
Tim Travers' "Development of British Historical Writing" is written more in terms of personalities involved, with sketches of Napier, Creasy, Henderson, Fortescue, Oman, Fuller, and that still-somewhat-mysterious Welsh adventurer Henry Lloyd.

"Naked Truths for the Asking" by Donald Graves introduces a variant of the "new" military history—the "combat narrative" which examines combat operations from the viewpoint of small units and the individual soldier. Included is a scientific dissection of S. L. A. Marshall, isolating a few virtues amid the general fraud.

The three essays on naval military history are repetitious, but show a surprising unanimity, differing in emphasis rather than concept. In "Naval History: The State of the Art," W. A. B. Douglas surveys its development and present state from a generally Canadian perspective, noting with wry humor that until recently navies tended to ignore history—except when spread-eagle publicity would produce higher naval appropriations. He also shows the continuing debate concerning World War II naval strategy, especially its anti-submarine warfare. Donald Schurman uses his "Search for Principles and Naval Strategy" to explore the insular/pragmatic development of British naval policy, and how Jomini and Clausewitz came to influence (or, in England, failed to influence) naval thinking in general. Eric Groves' "Utility of History to Modern Navies" pays much the same song, with grace notes and variations. All three, Douglas and Groves especially, give overdue recognition to Julian Corbett, student of Clausewitz and England's major naval theoretician who has been too long overshadowed by Mahan.

Air power history has Richard Kohn's "History As Institutional Memory," which provides a detailed description of the organization and functioning of the US Air Force's historical program. This dovetails with Anne Forman's foreword. Robin Rlgham's "Air War History" is a general survey, stressing that serious military air history is a recent growth which began only in the 1960s—and that, however much is being done now, much more remains to do.

Something different is Keith Jeffery's "Intelligence and Military History," an excellent cautionary essay tracing the development of modern military intelligence, the difficulties of properly inserting its doings into standard military history, and the gradual rewriting of existing history that this may require.

Less research and more indignation characterize Ian Beckett's "Low-Intensity Conflict," but then Englishmen often have trouble with American military history. (This reviewer has just edited an English text which had Lee commanding all the Confederate armies in 1862, with Jackson as his second-in-command.) Beckett has missed the mass of "revolutionary warfare" material built up by the US Army since 1950, possibly because it was largely embodied in Department of the Army pamphlets and studies. And, incidentally, that "West Point Military History Series" is not the USMA's "Military Art" curriculum! Conversely, however, Beckett's closing summary of still untapped sources on low-order conflicts is very good indeed.

"The Soldier and the Battle," by Bill McAndrew, appears somewhat at odds with the other essays. An unsparing description of morale and replacement problems in the Canadian forces during the two world wars, it seems more of an invitation to further research than an example of the use of such research.

Don Higginbotham's "The New Military History," based on a study of applicants for a position in military history at the University of North Carolina, is an excellent inside picture of the academic practice of that discipline—frequently opposed
by senior faculty members who were once anti-Vietnam protestors and remain ossified 
in their juvenile prejudices. The portion on women in war must be faulted for not 
including opposition viewpoints such as Brian Mitchell’s excellent Weak Link.

The rescue of an “abused” military history is analyzed in Roland Foerster’s 
“Military History in the Federal Republic of Germany.” Foerster finds the reconcili-
ation of pre-1945 German military tradition with the Bundeswehr’s present place and 
mission in a democratic Germany—a task complicated by its absorption of the former 
East German Volksarme—the major problem. (It is a puzzle how Scharnhorst could 
have initiated General Staff historical studies in 1816 after dying of wounds in 1813.)

Unfortunately, David Jones’s “The Napoleonic Paradigm,” dedicated to 
proving the defensive the decisive form of warfare, contains considerable bad history. 
Probably the outstanding essay is ex-gunner Dominick Graham’s “Stress Lines and 
Gray Areas,” a no-nonsense prescription of how military history should be written. 
If some of his conclusions on Eisenhower’s strategy are debatable, he does drive home 
basic truths that too often are lost in blizzards of academic footnotes. The military 
profession is different: “historians who are not prepared to attain the intimate know-
ledge of [its] organization and function and their interaction at all levels at headquar-
ters and on the battlefield . . . . will write only military nonsense.”

For better or for worse (probably a good deal of both) our armed forces’ 
military history has become largely civilianized, and probably will be more so in the 
future. These “new historians” work honestly but, having never “set a squadron in 
the field,” will have trouble understanding soldiers. Their introduction of political 
and economic factors can give richer books, but also can introduce new errors or 
reduce actual military operations to vulgar noises from the sub-basement.

Meanwhile, thousands of people (if we are lucky) read our books—and 
hundreds of thousands are indoctrinated with history as it never was by TV and motion 
pictures. We all have work to do!

Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence. 2d ed. Edited by 
Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach. Boulder, Colo.: West-
view Press, 1992. 205 pages. $49.95. Reviewed by Brigadier Gen-
eral Howard T. Prince II, USA Ret., Dean, Jepson School of 
Leadership Studies, University of Richmond.

A recent query of a computerized bibliographic search service yielded over 
3000 responses to the cue of “leadership” from 1990 to the present! The explosive 
growth of published work on leadership during the 1980s has continued into the 1990s, 
and we face a real challenge to manage this almost overwhelming expansion of 
information on such an important subject.

Fortunately there are at least two good trail-watchers out there, scanning 
and culling this burgeoning mass of books and articles on leadership. Two retired Air 
Force officers, both of whom were important leaders at the US Air Force Academy 
during the 1970s and 1980s, have given us a new edition of a useful collection of 
pieces on leadership. The component articles either were written by military leaders 
such as Matthew Ridgway and others or have significance for military leaders. 
although they might have been written for a more general civilian audience. Including 
three editions of the companion piece to this work, Contemporary Issues in Leader-
ship, Bob Taylor and Bill Rosenbach have now published five volumes containing 

Winter 1993-94 125
some of the better and more useful articles on leadership. In doing so they have done us all an invaluable service by helping us to manage what has become an almost overwhelming literature, even for the scholar who is familiar with much of it.

The second edition of Military Leadership contains 21 articles organized into four sections, with original introductory remarks for each section by the editors. Only nine of these articles appeared in the first edition; 12 are new. The other big difference between the first and second editions is the disappearance of a section on the leadership-versus-management debate. This reflects, perhaps, a growing awareness that such a debate, which raged in business as well as the military during the 1980s, may not be particularly useful. Indeed, there is a growing recognition among theorists and serving leaders and managers that these two domains are not necessarily mutually exclusive and, in fact, are often practiced by the same person at different times, depending upon the circumstances.

The editors have succeeded in choosing articles that pursue three very timely themes that seem to run throughout the book. The first theme addresses the tension between leadership as art and leadership as science. Anyone who has held any leadership position that matters knows that we are never fully prepared for any leadership situation we might encounter and that many situations seem unique as we attempt to lead others. And yet there can be little doubt that the emphasis on leadership theory and research which guides current Army leadership doctrine and leader-development policies has paid off in recent combat and is likely to sustain us as we redesign the force to meet the new global and budget realities.

The second important theme is the relationship between leadership and ethics and values. Though our Army has made much progress in this area since the mid-1970s, we can hardly afford to become complacent in either the schoolhouse or the unit when it comes to leading in ethical ways and developing a sound ethical climate for others. Perhaps the most important articles in this collection are those by General John Wickham (USA Ret.), Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer (USA Ret.), and Major John Shephard, which address this theme in various ways.

A third theme present is that of the relationship between leaders and followers. Leadership theory is discovering the importance of the follower and trying to uncover more about just what happens when a leader influences a follower so that leaders can do this better. The great leaders at all levels have always known somehow that followers cannot be taken for granted and that command authority is not the same as leadership. One of the Army’s biggest leader-development challenges for years has been to help commanders to understand and accept that they are also followers embedded in a complex system of interdependence with other leaders and peers as well as their own followers or subordinates. There is much in this collection that could benefit anyone assigned to a leadership position in becoming a better follower while they develop others both as followers and as leaders. Good followers don’t happen just because of good leadership—there is an art to being a good follower as well.

Finally, Taylor and Rosenbach call attention to the importance of some of the ways our armed forces are being affected by social changes in contemporary America. Among their selections in this regard are articles on women and leadership, minorities, and changing leadership styles.

This book is a useful addition to a professional collection because it helps us to cope with the growing problem of information overload about an important topic.
The editors have skillfully selected a set of articles that offer insights into critical and timely themes affecting the practice of military leadership in changing times.


From cover to cover this book provides an excellent discussion and analysis of the emerging post-Cold War foreign policy of the United States. This foreign policy is based in part on an international environment “in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice.” What are the risks to American principles, the authors ask, should the nation assume an international policy of creating a “putative universal alliance against aggression, enforced by American military power?” Tucker and Hendrickson’s work provides insights into this core question.

The Imperial Temptation implies that the Bush Administration elevated military force to a position in our statecraft that is excessive and disproportionate. The authors skillfully develop this theme against the backdrop of the Persian Gulf War, a campaign made possible only by the victory won by NATO in Europe. It is the authors’ view that Desert Storm was a campaign to punish, a campaign to show the world that regional aggression would not be tolerated in the New World Order. Desert Storm was a campaign largely paid for by other nations; does that mean, the authors ask, that the United States now provides mercenary forces? Another question centers on our responsibility in the aftermath of the campaign. Traditionally, and with the exception of Vietnam, the United States has planned, provided, and assisted in the recovery of its opponents. Not so in the case of Iraq. Was our policy toward Iraq an anomaly or is this an emerging pattern?

Tucker and Hendrickson do not underestimate the results achieved by the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf. However, the authors clearly advocate that the lessons learned from the outcome of the Cold War are infinitely more important to the world at large. Challenging ideas appear on nearly every page. Should the United States pursue its image as the role model for freedom-seeking nations? If so, then what is the worth of foreign aid designed for nation-building? And how does the United States provide needed foreign aid when America is faced with a huge debt?

The authors also discuss the effects of international economics on the New World Order. During the Cold War years, our allies were conditioned by the security shield provided by America. But if, as some believe, this shield is no longer needed, leverage exercised by the United States since the end of World War II also is no longer operative. Does America’s waning economic position increase the temptation to use its military power? And what is the effect of the peace dividend, funded by the drawdown of America’s armed forces, on its ability to exercise leadership and exert power in the international arena? Again, the authors identify exciting issues that informed citizens should ponder.

This book is the third the authors have written together; it requires more than one reading. A supplemental reading is also encouraged: Alvin Toffler’s *Power Shift* provides a futurist view of the elements of power—knowledge, wealth, and...
violence. Toffler’s point is that only knowledge will be a global element of force in the future; Tucker and Hendrickson, however, advance the continued role of violence (military power) but with the caution that it need be exercised as a last resort.

The authors have made a significant contribution to the political literary world. This book should be included in the library of those who are concerned with America’s position in the global body politic.

Off the Press . . .

Cooke, James J. 100 Miles from Baghdad: With the French in Desert Storm. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 223 pp. $45.00.


---

Parameters
Index, Volume XXIII, 1993

Articles

(Author, title, seasonal issue, pages)
Blumenson, Martin. “A Deaf Ear to Clausewitz: Allied Operational Objectives in World War II.” Summer. 16-27.
Cancian, Mark F. “The Wehrmacht in Yugoslavia: Lessons of the Past?” Autumn. 75-84.
Currie, James T. “Congressional Oversight Run Amok: Ball’s Bluff and the Ruination of Charles Stone.” Autumn. 96-104.
DeAtkine, Norvell B. “The Middle East Scholars and the Gulf War.” Summer. 53-63.
Fitz-Simons, Daniel W. “Sendero Luminoso: Case Study in Insurgency.” Summer. 64-73.
Guthrie, General Sir Charles. “Managing the Post-Cold War Watershed—An Ally’s View.” Autumn. 4-16.
Hartle, Anthony E. “The Ethical Odyssey of Oliver North.” Summer. 28-33.
Hennelly, Michael J. “US Policy in El Salvador: Creating Beauty or the Beast?” Spring. 59-69.
Kretschmer, Stephan D. “Germany’s Unification and Its Implications for US Strategy.” Autumn. 24-38.
Reed, James W. “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning.” Summer. 41-52.
Strain, Frederick R. “Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence: A Policy Conundrum.” Autumn. 85-95.

Book Reviews

(Book author, title, seasonal issue, pages, reviewer)

Winter 1993-94


132

Parameters

*U.S. G.P.O.:1993-504-118:1
From the Archives

General Washington: An Enemy Perspective

Private Johann Döhla was a member of the Bayreuth Regiment, one of the Hessian mercenary units employed by the English to assist in putting down the revolt of the American colonies. In his diary entry for 4 January 1779, Döhla recorded an impression of George Washington gained from a “believable” source:

This great General Washington is of medium but respectable height, has a martial face, and although already old, namely more than fifty, he is still in good, blooming health. His entire bearing is very reserved and careful, not profuse in words, and more loving of loneliness than great sociability, in order to use the time for thought and speculation. Therefore, he often rides out entirely alone on a favorite white horse. Outside the camp he has no more than a single servant, and when he returns to camp, he is accompanied up to his tent by only a few riders of his Light Horse, or Light Cavalry. At New York he often visits his field and camp posts all by himself, and often converses with a sentry a full quarter of an hour. When he has something great and important on his mind, he allows, even then, only a few, but [they are] the best and most intelligent officers whom he trusts to come to him, and [he] sends his suggested plan at the same time around to a few others in order to solicit, in this manner, the advice of each individual without having superimposed his judgment. He is not the least bit proud or arrogant; often speaks kindly and in a friendly manner with a sentry just as with a staff officer. Toward strangers he is reserved, even if they are recommended to him by Congress. He sharply punishes all negligence in duty, but toward recruits he is kind and forgiving until they have mastered the exercises and the Articles of War. Toward spies he has a great abhorrence, although he himself must often employ the same. The Indians and savages, because of their cruel barbarities, are disgusting to him. He is soft-hearted and seldom attends military punishments, and then with displeasure, and he either pardons the criminal or takes another way to avoid such unpleasant sights. The art of war is his primary study. His suggestions are well thought out. He is especially careful in all situations to ensure a retreat. His chief characteristics are decisiveness, stability, patience, and secretiveness. He rewards good conduct on the spot. Toward the prisoners who fall into his hands, he is very humane and attentive to their good treatment. In eating and drinking, supposedly he is very moderate, and his relaxation and pleasure consists of having a few glasses of punch. Also, he is married and has a beautiful wife, who accompanies him at all times with the army in the field. He also has a son, seventeen years old, who is already a lieutenant colonel in the French service.

NOTE