COMBINED SPECIAL OPERATIONS
IN WORLD WAR II

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., Auburn University, Montgomery, Alabama, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

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**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE
   - 9 May 1993

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
   - Master's Thesis, 1 Aug 92-9 May

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
   - Combined Special Operations in World War II

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)
   - CPT (P) James C. Nixon

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
   - U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
     - Attn: ATZL SWD-GD
     - Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION: AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
   - Approved for Public Release; distribution is unlimited.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

   This study is an historical analysis of combined special operations units in the European Theater during World War II. The study examines the Dieppe Raid Force, the First Special Service Force, and the Jedburghs to determine common strengths and weaknesses in organization, training, command and control, and effectiveness. The study also analyzes the adequacy of current United States combined and special operations doctrine based on the results of the historical analysis. The study concludes that current U.S. doctrine does not adequately address the organization, training, and command and control of combined special operations. Current doctrine provides sufficient strategic guidance, but requires supporting doctrine at the operational and tactical level. One of the contributing factors is an over-reliance on Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The study provides planning considerations that should be incorporated into current doctrine. The historical examples illustrate the criticality of establishing clear goals and objectives and the use of training to achieve unity of effort.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
   - Combined operations, Special Operations, Jedburghs, First Special Service Force, Commandos

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
   - 142

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
   - UNCLASSIFIED

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
   - UNCLASSIFIED

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
   - UNCLASSIFIED

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

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Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

COMBINED SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II by CPT (P) James C. Nixon, USA, 140 pages.

This study is an historical analysis of combined special operations units in the European Theater during World War II. The study examines the Dieppe Raid Force, the First Special Service Force, and the Jedburghs to determine common strengths and weaknesses in organization, training, command and control, and effectiveness. The study also analyzes the adequacy of current United States combined and special operations doctrine based on the results of the historical analysis.

The study concludes that current U.S. doctrine does not adequately address the organization, training, and command and control of combined special operations. Current doctrine provides sufficient strategic guidance, but requires supporting doctrine at the operational and tactical level. One of the contributing factors is an over-reliance on Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

The study provides planning considerations that should be incorporated into current combined doctrine. The historical examples illustrate the criticality of establishing clear goals and objectives and the use of training to assist in achieving unity of effort. The study also identifies centralized control, clear communications, and coordination as fundamental to successful command and control of combined special operations units.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my thanks for the support provided by my research committee. Their comments and advice were invaluable to this project. I also want to thank my Academic Counselor/Evaluator, LTC Jose A. Rodriguez, DJCO, for his encouragement.

Finally, I want to express my appreciation for my wife, Debbie, without whose support and understanding I would never have completed this thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION

The United States military has frequently used combined special operations throughout its short history. A review of United States involvement in combined operations, special operations, and combined special operations demonstrate the scope of the topic.

From the Franco-American alliance in the American Revolutionary War to Operation Desert Storm, combined operations were central to American success. While researchers can trace special units and operations throughout United States history, they did not come into prominence until World War II. The role and use of special operations has continually grown since World War II. Special operations are currently used to accomplish strategic or tactical objectives with conventional forces or while acting independently.

Combined special units and operations extended throughout every theater of operation in World War II, and to varying degrees in every major conflict since World War II. Combined special units continue to exist today in organizations such as the United Nations Command Joint Security Force serving in Korea. Combined special
operations were conducted most recently during Operation
DESERt STORM.

In "The Challenges of Combined Operations" Major
General Waldo D. Freeman noted that World War II provided
the best conditions to study the political and military
ramifications of combined operations.¹

World War II also provides the best opportunity to
analyze the hybrid of combined and special operations. The
size and intensity of the war forced the Allies to form
coaLitions and alliances to defeat the Axis threat. Prime
Minister Winston Churchill's backing of special purpose
units and operations provided the backdrop for the evolution
of combined special operations. The units and operations
extended to all theaters of operation and resulted in the
formation of more than twenty types of combined special
operation units.

While all theaters in World War II conducted
combined special operations to varying degrees, the European
theater provides an opportunity to examine the full spectrum
of combined special operations. The units in the theater
ranged from permanent organizations like the First Special
Service Force; to units formed for campaigns (OSS
"Jedburghs"); to units formed for one mission (Dieppe Raid
force).

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Dieppe
Raid Force, the First Special Service Force, and the
Jedburghs to discover their strengths and weaknesses in organization, training, command and control, and effectiveness. In addition, an analysis of current United States military doctrine will be undertaken to determine if it is adequate to support combined special operations based on the results of this historical analysis.

These three units provide an opportunity to study a wide spectrum of combined special operations. Although limited to the same time span and theater of war, the units were formed and utilized in completely different ways. This wide difference in formation and use also provides for material to study current doctrine and its adequacy.

The Dieppe Raid force consisted of Canadians, U.S. Rangers, British Commandos, and French Forces. They conducted a controversial, large scale raid in August 1942 against strong Nazi fortifications, during an Allied debate over opening a "second front."

The First Special Service Force (FSSF) was a fixed organization consisting of Americans and Canadians. The unit was touted as a versatile assault group. Although it was formed for a specific mission, the unit remained as an entity for more than two years. It fought in the Pacific, Mediterranean, and European theaters before it was disbanded in 1944. This study will concentrate on the FSSF participation in Operation ANVIL.
Each Jedburgh team consisted of three specially trained volunteers from France, America, or Britain. In 1944, the ninety-nine Jedburgh teams parachuted into occupied Europe to cooperate with the resistance groups and aid with the advancing Allied ground forces. The Jedburghs conducted clandestine work with the Special Air Service (SAS) and individual agents organized the French guerilla bands (Maquis). This study will concentrate on the Jedburghs' participation in Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON.

World War II provided an extended period to develop doctrine for combined special operations units. Future conflicts are not likely to allow extended periods for training and doctrine development. As the world's military super-power, the United States must take the lead in combined doctrine.

There is no specific doctrine concerning combined special operations despite their wide historical use. The U.S. Army's recent use of coalitions, in Operation DESERT STORM, resulted in a resurgence of interest in combined doctrine. FM 100-8 (Draft) is the Army's first attempt at addressing the combined operations doctrinal deficit. Army special operations doctrine outlined in FM 100-25 (1990) addresses combined operations in the special operation imperatives. However, it lacks sufficient detail to assist planners in forming or using combined special operations.
A historical study of combined special operations will determine if current doctrine is adequate. If current doctrine is inadequate, the study could provide the basis for future doctrinal publications.

**Assumptions**

In conducting this study, the researcher has made the following assumptions: The United States will continue to form coalitions and alliances in the support of major wars, and the U.S. military will continue to use special operations in all levels of war. Security classifications and operation security are a problem but will not preclude the forming of combined special operation in major wars.

The First Special Service Force, OSS Jedburghs, Commandos, and U.S. Rangers represent other combined special operations units in the European theater during World War II. Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON and the Dieppe Raid represent the other combined special operation activities in the European theater during World War II.

**Definitions**

The following definitions will be used throughout the study:

*Adequate.* Enough or good enough for what is needed (Webster’s Dictionary, 1968).
Command. The authority that a commander, in the military service, lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, direction, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned mission. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel (JCS PUB 1, 1987).

Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction, by a properly designated commander, over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by the commander in planning, direction, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (JCS PUB 1, 1987).

Combined operations. An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission (JCS PUB 1, 1987).

Communications. A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another (JCS PUB 1, 1987).

Effective. Cause the desired result. The combination of mission accomplishment and casualties resulting from the operation (Webster's, 1968).
Intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas (JCS PUB 1, 1987).

Invasion. The process of entering or being entered by a military force (JCS PUB 1, 1987).

Operation. A military action or the carrying out of strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign (JCS PUB 1, 1987).

Operation Order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation (JCS PUB 1, 1987).

Operation Plan. A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumption and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order (JCS PUB 1, 1987).
Special operations. Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, or psychological objectives. These operations may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible (JCS PUB 1, 1987)."

Training. The instruction of personnel to individually and collectively increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks (FM 25-100, 1988)."'

Limitations

The records of the Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ), the organization that provided operational command and control for Jedburgh teams, remain classified and are not available for use in this study. The restriction influences the researcher’s ability to analyze external command and control structure for the Jedburghs. However, the after-action and observer reports from Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON, with the Jedburgh team records, will provide enough data to assess command and control for that operation.
Review of Literature


Publications on the Dieppe Raid focus more on the controversy surrounding the raid than the mix of forces involved in the operation. *Echoes of Disaster: Dieppe, 1942* by William Whitehead provides a recent account of the raid and details the political debate between the Allies over the feasibility of a "Second Front." In *Commando*, John Dunford-Slater provides an autobiographical account of his service with No. 3 Commando including actions at Dieppe. Adolphe Auguste Marie Lepotier provides a French account of the raids on St. Nazaire and Dieppe in *Raiders from the Sea*. Michael J. King conducted an analysis on the Rangers origins, training, and operations in *Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II*. 
Literature on the First Special Service Force includes several books by members of the FSSF. In *The First Special Service Force: A Canadian/American Wartime Alliance: The Devil’s Brigade*, Robert D. Burhans provides a firsthand account based on interviews and notes from the members of the FSSF. Burhan’s book documents the FSSF from origin until deactivation. Robert H. Adleman documents the FSSF, OSS, commando, and airborne operations in *The Champagne Campaign*. He details unit actions during Operation ANVIL-DRAGOON, the invasion of southern France in August 1944. Observer and after action reports from Operation ANVIL-DRAGOON provide primary sources on the FSSF and the Jedburghs’ actions with the French Maquis.

The Jedburghs have been the focal point for a large amount of research. *The Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944* is a study by S. J. Lewis documenting the Jedburgh’s organization, training, and operations in assisting the 12th Army Group. He uses the operational records of eleven Jedburgh teams, memoirs, and interviews to examine the operations, in support of 12th Army Group, from Normandy to the German border. M. R. D. Foot provides a look at the connection between the Jedburgh’s and the British chain of command in *SOE in France*.

U.S. doctrine on combined and special operations is evolving based on the experiences of Operation DESERT STORM.
The current major U.S. doctrinal publication on combined operations is JCS Pub 3, *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations*. The Army also provides guidance on combined operations in FM 100-5, *Operations*. Army FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*, is the primary unclassified special operations doctrinal manual. Two draft manuals, Army FM 100-8, *Combined Army Operations* (Draft), and Army FM 100-5, *Operations* (Draft), provide new guidance on combined operations and incorporate lessons learned from OPERATION DESERT STORM.

**Research Design**

The research design for this study is to conduct a historical analysis of the Dieppe Raid Force, the First Special Service Force, and the Jedburghs, to discover their strengths and weaknesses in organization, training, command and control, and effectiveness. Additionally, to analyze current United States military doctrine to determine if it is adequate to support combined special operations based on the results of this historical analysis.

The information used in this thesis is located in the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Unit reports and secondary sources provided data on the individual units organization, training, and command and control. Information on each unit's effectiveness was derived from after action reviews, observer reports, and secondary sources.
Significance of the Study

The importance of this study rests on the ability of military leaders to adequately form and utilize combined special operation with existing doctrine. The United States and its coalition partners recent success during Operation Desert Storm resulted in the proliferation of articles on combined warfare. While acknowledging the accomplishments, the various articles cite the requirement for additional doctrine. However, the minimal use of combined special operations in Operation DESERT STORM does not provide enough depth to examine the adequacy of current doctrine.

This does not alleviate the need for doctrine on combined special operations. The requirement for doctrine or an understanding of existing doctrine is as great or greater than for conventional forces. This study can assist future doctrine writers by determining if doctrine is needed and what the doctrine should consider.
CHAPTER TWO
DIEPPE RAID

On 19 August 1942, a 6100 man force of Canadians, British, and Allied personnel conducted a cross channel amphibious assault to seize the French Port of Dieppe, and capture German prisoners and equipment. After nine hours of fighting, the force returned to England, suffering over 50% casualties and accomplishing none of the stated objectives.

The raid was a tactical disaster, but the Chief of Combined Operations, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, and other prominent military and political leaders justified the losses. They believed the numerous lessons learned resulted in the Allies future success at Normandy in June 1944. Mountbatten prepared a detailed Combined Operations report and circulated it to military leaders of all Allied nations. It identified the major weaknesses at Dieppe: the fallacy of frontal assaults, weak intelligence, and poor inter-service and inter-arm cooperation.

The link to the eventual success at Normandy has been acknowledged by many as the major achievement of Dieppe, but the raid also resulted in other significant benefits. The use of combined special operations in the Dieppe Raid provided a spring board for special operations
in World War II. The actions by the British Commandos were a sideshow to the main assault by the Canadians, and the participation of the United States Rangers and the Inter-Allied Commandos was minimal. However, the political legitimacy, training value, and doctrine resulting from the raid were instrumental in the future use of special operations in World War II.

This chapter analyzes the organization, doctrine, training, command and control, and effectiveness of the Commandos during the raid on Dieppe. The Canadians' role and mission will be covered in only enough detail to provide a framework for the operation, although the Canadians were the main effort and provided the majority of ground forces. Additionally, the researcher will not try to solve the political controversy that continues to surround the Dieppe Raid.

**Organization**

The British Commandos were formed by Winston Churchill as the Germans were concluding the 1940 Campaign in France. They were based on the German Storm Troops of 1918 and named after the Boer mounted guerilla bands in the South African War. The goals of the unit were to kindle the spirit of the attack, gain experience, keep the Germans off balance, put Britain on the offensive, and develop tactics.
The Commando concept survived opposition from the political and military leaders that feared loss of Britain's best men.¹

The Commandos were organized into twelve independent companies in early 1940. The organization of the companies was based on the guerilla concept: small bands join together to form easily manageable units. Each Commando company was commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel and consisted of a force headquarters and six troops. Each Troop was commanded by a Captain and consisted of 62 enlisted men. The Commando Troops were divided into two sections led by Lieutenants.³

Figure 1. Commando Organization

Source: British Commandos, Special Series No 1 MID 461 (Washington, DC: Military Intelligence Service, War Department, 1943), 5-7.
The Commandos began a series of small scale raids in July 1940, after completing an intense training program. In the fall of 1941, Lord Louis Mountbatten replaced Admiral Sir Roger Keyes as the Commander of Combined Operations (CCO) and the Commando empire expanded rapidly. The Commandos conducted raids against the French coast, Syria, Crete, North Africa, and Vaagso, Norway, before three companies were assigned to the Dieppe Raid force in July 1942.

The Commando Companies, Number 4, 5, and 40, also received fifty United States Rangers and fifteen Inter-Allied Commandos under operational control for the mission. The Rangers and the Inter-Allied Commandos would accompany the British Commandos on the mission as active observers.

**United States Rangers**

The fifty Rangers accompanying the Commandos were part of the United States 1st Ranger Battalion. The 1st Ranger Battalion was formed on the Commando model from U.S. troops stationed in Northern Ireland. The concept was forwarded by Brigadier General Lucian Truscott, head of U.S. mission to Combined Operations, and approved by General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, in June of 1942.

The Rangers were part of Marshall’s program to gain actual battle experience for members in the American Army in
preparation for the eventual invasion of Europe. The concept placed the Rangers under operational control of the British for training and employment in combat. After completing training and combat operations, the Rangers would return to their original units and be replaced by new personnel.6

![Ranger Organization Diagram](image)

**Figure 2. Ranger Organization**


The Rangers were activated on 19 June 1942, and led by Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby, the 1st Ranger
Battalion began an intensive training program at Achnacurry, Scotland. While the majority of the 1st Ranger Battalion were conducting training under British supervision, the fifty Rangers selected by Darby became the first U.S. ground forces to enter the war on French land.

Inter-Allied Commandos

Number Ten (Inter-Allied) Commando was formed when Mountbatten decided to utilize the abilities and talents of the refugees from Nazi occupied countries living in England. Number Ten Commando ultimately consisted of Polish, Free French, Czech, and Norwegians and became one of the most highly decorated units in the war.

In July 1942, the initial group of Ten Commando was training at the Commando Training Center and consisted of the French Troop, forty Free French volunteers, and X Troop, a small number of Germans who had left their country. Fifteen soldiers from French Troop and five soldiers from X Troop were selected to accompany the Dieppe Raid force.

Recruitment and Training

Commandos were recruited from all regiments of the British Army, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Marines. Initial opposition was met from the various commanders resulting in inexperienced soldiers from recruitment.
centers. By the Dieppe Raid the opposition subsided and the majority of Commandos were seasoned veterans.

The criteria for selection to the Commandos included: physical fitness, intelligence, self-reliance, independence, ability to swim, and immunity to sea sickness. All soldiers had to volunteer and were interviewed by an officer.

Commanders of the independent companies were recommended by the Commanding Generals and approved by the War Office. The commanders were in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel or higher and were younger than forty years old. Commanders of the independent companies selected their troop commanders from the list of applicants, who in turn selected their two Lieutenants.

The Troop commanders and section leaders selected the 62 enlisted men by reviewing the files of soldiers that completed initial training. The process, although time consuming, resulted in a carefully screened unit.

The Ranger recruiting process closely resembled the Commandos. An all-volunteer force, the Ranger selection criteria for officers and non-commissioned officers were initiative, judgement, and common sense. Ranger enlisted personnel had to be fully qualified and of high quality. All Ranger personnel required good stamina, no physical defects, and athletic ability. There was not a published age limit, but the leadership noted the Commandos' average
The recruiting process for the Inter-Allied Commandos was conducted by various organizations. Governments in exile would screen and form the separate troops prior to training by the British. Troops were paid and disciplined by their own government, but they fell under direct command of the Inter-Allied Commander, a British officer. The recruiting process for X-Troop was conducted by the British. Forty-three soldiers were selected for X-Troop, after screening 350 applicants.¹⁰

Training

This section will focus on the Commando training at Acnacurry, Scotland, because it also influenced the Rangers and Inter-Allied Commandos. Additionally, it will analyze the Commando unit training, as well as the training conducted by Number 3 and 4 Commando preparing for the Dieppe Raid.

The Commando Depot was a three-month course at Acnacurry, Scotland. Commando training was designed to develop individual fighting initiative and is based on offensive principles. The course was designed for shock troops for the Army as a whole. Potential commandos were selected and conducted follow-on training at the Special Training Center.
The Special Training Center stressed physical efficiency, map reading, use of cover, canvas assault and recon boats, unarmed combat, tank hunting, grenades, and obstacle breaching. Students conducted numerous navigation courses that averaged forty miles in length. The Special Training Center was also home to the Inter-Allied Commando training section.11

Commandos also attended instructor training courses in Scotland covering combined training, and mountain training. Commandos special skills included: wall climbing, skiing, demolitions, city fighting, night marksmanship, and amphibious training.12

Unit Training

Individual Commando commanders were given wide latitude in conducting unit training. The training stressed stamina and endurance under all operating conditions in all climates. The unit would conduct airborne or other specialized training based on the operational mission assigned or the environment it was operating in. Commando companies conducted highly realistic training and accepted numerous casualties in training as the price to prepare for combat.13
Commando Equipment

The Commandos had no specified table of equipment. The amount and type of equipment was based on each operation. Commandos habitually carried their personal weapon and knife. However, each company maintained a store of weapons. The weapons store included: Brens, Thompson machine guns, .50 caliber anti-tank rifles, 2 and 3 inch mortars with smoke and high explosive rounds, grenades, and nonmetallic mines. Commandos' clothing was based on the mission and climate and varied as much as the weapons the weapons."
Commando. After-action critiques credited the Commando training program as the main reason for 4 Commando’s success at Dieppe.¹³

Command and Control

The chain of command for the Commandos ran from the British Minister of War/Prime Minister to the Commander Combined Operations (CCO) to the Commando Brigade Headquarters to the independent Commando Companies. The Commando companies were placed under the operational control of a division level commander, after assignment to an operational area.¹⁴

Upon assignment to the Dieppe Raid force, the Commando companies were placed under the operational control of Major General Hamilton Roberts, Canadian Army, the ground force commander. Roberts maintained control of the Commandos, but allowed the Number 3 and 4 Commanders to conduct their own planning. In addition to the specialized nature of the Commando companies, the isolation of the companies’ objectives facilitated the command and control arrangement.¹⁵

Dieppe Raid

The initial plan for the raid on Dieppe originated in the Combined Operation Headquarters, London in April 1942. The Combined Operation Headquarters had two main
functions: organize raiding operations for immediate damage to the enemy, and develop techniques for amphibious operations for the ultimate invasion of Northwest Europe.

Combined Operation Headquarters had been planning and conducting raids since Germany held the coasts facing Britain. The Dieppe Raid was the most closely related to the future invasion of the continent. The raid had two main objectives: acquire a port and test new techniques and procedures.

The outline plan for the Dieppe Raid was approved on 25 April 1942. The plan was to conduct a heavy air bombardment in preparation and supporting attacks on the flanks by airborne forces; and the main effort was a frontal amphibious attack on the port of Dieppe. On 30 April 1942, the 2d Canadian Division was selected to conduct the raid by Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery, the General Officer Commander in Chief South-Eastern Command.

The 2d Canadian Division and the other units conducted training at the Isle of Wright during May and June 1942. The training included two major exercises: Yukon I and Yukon II. Yukon I was a failure and resulted in the initial postponement of the raid. Yukon II also identified weaknesses but Montbatten and Montgomery were satisfied. The raid was rescheduled for 24 June, based on the weather and tide. The weather changed for the worse and resulted in
several postponements before the eventual cancellation of the mission on 8 July, 1942.

The Dieppe Raid did not die, due to numerous political and military actions. On 20 July, the plan was resubmitted with changes and approved. The major changes were the cancellation of the aerial preparation, due to fear of civilian casualties, and the replacement of the airborne soldiers with Commandos, due to weather conditions."

Commando Mission

The Commandos' mission was to conduct the outer flank attacks against German coastal batteries at Berneval and Varengeville. Number 3 Commando would secure the eastern flank of the main assault force by landing at Berneval and attack and destroy a German coastal battery. The mission of Number 4 Commando was to secure the western flank of the Raid force, and destroy a German coastal defense battery to prevent the suppression of the main assault force. Number 40 (Royal Marine) Commando was the Dieppe reserve.

Enemy Situation

During their two years of occupation the Germans had constructed formidable fortifications at Dieppe. Three coastal batteries flanked Dieppe along with a battalion of sixteen 17-cm howitzers. One division, the 302nd, was
responsible for the sector, and the 571st Regiment was near Dieppe."

The coastal batteries at Berneval and Varengeville were manned and protected with soldiers from the 302nd Division. German defenses around the batteries included wire obstacles, networks of trenches, and machine gun positions." The coastal battery at Berneval consisted of three 17-cm and four 105mm guns with 200 soldiers. Varengeville had six 15-cm guns and 120 Germans."

Commando Plans

On the eastern flank, No. 3 Commando, under Lieutenant Colonel John Dunford-Slater, planned to land at two locations: below the village of Petit Berneval and opposite a narrow defile at Belleville.

Lieutenant Colonel Lord Lovat, No. 4 Commando Commander, planned to conduct simultaneous landings at two beaches and to suppress the battery from the coastal side while the main force assaulted from inland. He organized his force into two groups."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group One (88 Pax)</th>
<th>Group Two (164 Pax)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Headquarters</td>
<td>No. 4 Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Troop (3/52 PAX)</td>
<td>A Troop (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Troop (-)</td>
<td>B Troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting personnel</td>
<td>F Troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Personnel</td>
<td>Supporting PAX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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26
Group One would land at Beach One, and led by Major Mills-Roberts, would provide suppressive fire for the main attack. Group One’s initial task was to form a bridgehead for the force and cover its advance and the withdrawal. Group One would then move to a support position and on order suppress the battery. Finally, Group Two would conduct a link up and assist with casualties, after Group Two’s assault on the battery.

Group Two, under Lord Lovat, would conduct the main attack with A (-), B, and F Troops. The group would land in two waves. A Troop (-) would lead, secure the beach, and cover the western bank of the beach for the assault and withdrawal. Three minutes after A Troop (-), the main body of the group would land, move 2900 yards and attack the battery position from the West.

No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commandos were with the main force and had two planning priorities. They were Roberts’s floating reserve and could be committed to exploit success in Dieppe. If No. 40 was not committed as a reserve, as soon as the harbor was clear, they would capture or destroy the German landing craft.”
Figure 3. German Dispositions at Dieppe.

Source: C.P. Stacy, COL, Official History of the Canadian Army: Six Years of War, Vol I (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1955), 353.
Figure 4. The Dieppe Operation.

Source: C.P. Stacy, COL, Official History of the Canadian Army: Six Years of War, Vol I (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1955), 386.
Execution

At 0347 hours, 19 August 1942, Number 3 Commando had crossed the Channel and was seven miles short of the objective when disaster struck. A small German convoy escorted by a few armed trawlers detected No. 3's landing craft. Heavy fire was exchanged between the ships, resulting in the loss of one gun-boat.

Although the flotilla destroyed two German trawlers and tried to stay on course, the exchange was costly. Only seven of the twenty-three landing craft in the flotilla succeeded in reaching the beach and landing the Commandos.

The first landing craft arrived at Yellow Beach II at 0450 hours, five minutes ahead of schedule. Major Peter Young, the second in command of No. 3 Commando, organized his 18 men, breached the wire obstacle and moved towards the top of the cliff. Young's group reached the top of the cliff at 0515 and could observe five landing craft arriving at Yellow Beach I under heavy fire.

The landing craft arrived at Berneval at 0515 hours, twenty-five minutes behind schedule. Captain R. L. Wills took charge of 50 Commandos, 14 Rangers, and 4 Inter-Allied Commandos, and attempted to break out of the beachhead, with daylight quickly approaching. Within minutes Wills was injured, and Lieutenant E. D. Loustalot, U.S. Rangers, assumed command. Loustalot became the first American to die in France when he was killed several minutes later. Heavily
outnumbered, the force sustained numerous casualties. Cut off and unable to withdraw, the Commandos surrendered.

Young's small group was unaware of the other Commandos plight and continued to move towards the rendezvous point. After receiving machine gun fire, he moved the force to a cornfield about 150 yards from the battery position and began to suppress the guns. Under heavy return fire and running low on ammunition, Young decided to withdraw before the Germans could conduct a counter attack. The group withdrew down the cliff, and although they incurred casualties from mines in the retreat, were able to evacuate all 19 men off the beach.

Although No. 3 Commando lost 120 men in the fight and failed to destroy the battery, they achieved some measure of success in the attack. Major Young's small force was credited with minimizing the fire delivered by the Berneval coastal battery on the main raid force.

No. 4 Commando could observe the naval battle occurring between No. 3 and the Germans, but they arrived at the designated landing site unopposed. Major Mills-Roberts and Group One landed at Beach One at 0453 hours, 19 August 1942, within yards of the planned point. After unsuccessffully trying to scale the eastern cliff, C Troop breached a wire obstacle with Bangalore torpedoes and scaled the western cliff. The group quickly established the bridgehead and a mortar OP and began to suppress the battery
position. At 0540 hours the support position was providing heavy suppressive fire on the battery. The group had received consistent but inaccurate fire from the enemy until a German 81mm mortar engaged the eastern mortar crew and inflicted three casualties.

The Commandos’ main body arrived at beach two under heavy mortar and machine gun fire. After receiving four casualties, Group Two breached the wire obstacles at the beach and continued the attack. The force came under fire from Saint Margueritte and Quiberville and received an additional 8 casualties. By 0515, in broad daylight, B Troop led the force at a run along the River Saane in accordance with the plan. Group Two arrived at the assault position at the designated time.

On Lord Lovat’s signal, the Commandos assaulted the battery with B Troop assaulting to seize the buildings adjacent to the guns and F Troop assaulting the actual gun sites. Although F Troop assaulted across 250 meters of open ground, the Commandos quickly overran the Germans in a sharp but short fight. The Germans, confused by direction of incoming fire, could not resist long. Of 100 German defenders, 30 were killed, 30 were wounded, and four were retained as prisoners.

At 0655 all guns were destroyed, and by 0730 the extraction of the force was underway. Number 4 Commando casualties were 12 killed in action, 20 wounded in action,
and thirteen missing in action. The losses included five officers. The execution of the raid was not perfect, but the raid at Varengeville resulted in the only complete success by the Allies at Dieppe. The success experienced by Number 4 Commando was the culmination of intensive training, detailed planning, and rehearsals."

At 0800 hours, as No. 4 Commando was returning, No 40 Commando was committed into action. MG Roberts committed the reserve to Dieppe beach. Conflicting reports led Roberts to believe the Commandos were approaching a beach under control. The reality was that the beach was not under control and the raid was already lost.

The true nature of the situation became apparent to No. 40 Commander, Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Phillips, as his flotilla approached the beach. Under heavy fire from the beach, Phillips ordered his landing craft to return to the cover of smoke. Phillips was killed while signaling to the other landing craft. Some marines had already landed, but the actions of Phillips saved the majority of the force from almost certain destruction."

Aftermath

The news of the Dieppe Raid was told to the public in three distinct slants. Each nation’s press praised the individual actions of their countrymen and minimized the actions of the others. The huge coverage given to the small
contingent of British and Americans created a long term controversy with the Canadians."

The long term controversy was outweighed by the immediate gains. The American public was delighted that ground troops had fought their first action with the Germans. The Ranger training project resulted in major propaganda for the home-front, but Dieppe became the only operation where Rangers fought as students of the British.

The plan for the invasion of North Africa, Operation TORCH, involved large numbers of American forces. The employment of Americans alleviated the necessity of Marshall's plan to "bloody" soldiers in Europe. However, the Rangers were not deactivated, but were selected to participate in TORCH and assumed the role as the American version of the Commandos."

The actions by the Inter-Allied Commandos were reported in the British press and resulted in an increase in recruiting country troops. Inter-Allied Commandos continued to grow and contribute to the Allied cause.

**Conclusion**

Although the Dieppe Raid was a tactical disaster, it provided long term benefits to Allied combined special operations in World War II. The decision to include Rangers and Inter-Allied personnel with the British Commandos
resulted in political legitimacy, training value, and doctrine for Allied special operations.

Organization

The organization of the British Commandos, Rangers, and No. 10 Commando was formed to accomplish a clear objective. The Rangers were completing the final phase of training in concert with Marshall's plan. No. 10 Commando was also in training as well as gathering intelligence from the French community.

The use of Rangers and No. 10 Commando, albeit minimal, provided legitimacy for the war in Europe for the respective governments. American participation was used as propaganda in the States and resulted in tremendous public approval. No. 10's actions were less publicized, but resulted in a much needed boost for the exiled governments and increased volunteers for the Inter-Allied project.

Training

The recruiting process instituted by the British Commandos resulted in an exceptional quality of soldiers. The success of the recruiting program is exhibited by the large number of future special operations units that adopted similar standards, including the Rangers. The Inter-Allied recruiting demonstrated the political diplomacy required in
forming combined units. Mountbatten’s diplomatic skills were instrumental in the success.

The Commando training program at Achnacarry, Scotland, also served as a model for future special operations units. The participation by the Rangers and No. 10 Commandos eased the problems associated with forming a combined unit.

The Commando unit training and Dieppe Raid preparation focused on live fire exercises, detailed rehearsals, and integration with all units. The training was credited for the success No. 4 Commando achieved at Dieppe.

Command and Control

The command and control of the Commandos was very centralized, ensuring proper use. Units were controlled by a Commando Brigade that worked directly for Mountbatten. This ensured the Commandos were used properly for operational or strategic targets. Later in the war this policy changed, and Commandos were used at the tactical level in support of conventional units.

During the Dieppe Raid the Commandos were placed under operational control of Major General Roberts. He retained control, but Commandos were allowed to develop their plans separate from the main force. The command and control structure helped to ensure the Commandos were
employed correctly, although the isolation of the targets facilitated the relationship.

Dieppe Raid

The Commandos met varying success during the Dieppe Raid. No. 3 Commando was only marginally successful due mainly to the naval engagement prior to landing. Although they managed to harass the battery in Berneval with a small force, they suffered a large number of casualties. No. 40 Commando was committed as the reserve but was forced to abort the landing due to heavy fire from the beach. No. 4 Commando accomplished its mission and served as the only real success at Dieppe.

In addition to the political legitimacy, the Rangers and No. 10 Commando benefitted in several other ways. The Rangers used the soldiers that deployed with the Commandos to train the remainder of the Battalion. Additionally, the Rangers revised numerous techniques based on the lessons learned at Dieppe. Those lessons were incorporated in the preparation and execution of the amphibious assault on North Africa, OPERATION TORCH.

No. 10 Commando lost a number of soldiers in the raid, but the soldiers attached to No. 4 were successful in acquiring valuable intelligence for the Allies. The use of the French soldiers in the raid indirectly assisted the
resistance movement, by demonstrating the exiled
government’s determination to fight to Dieppe population.

The use of combined special operations in the Dieppe
Raid proved to be a spring board for future special
operations in World War II. The legitimacy, training value,
and doctrine resulting from the operation far outweighed the
small numbers involved. As the Allies continued to prepare
for the invasion of Northwest Europe other combined special
operations units were being formed due to the Commandos
success.
CHAPTER THREE
THE FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE

One of the units formed using the Commando model was the First Special Service Force (FSSF). It was a combined Canadian and American special operations unit formed in 1942 and deactivated in 1944. Highly decorated during the war, many experts have pointed to the FSSF, also known as the "Devil’s Brigade" or Force, as a prototype for combined units. The words of Shalto Watt, of the Montreal Standard, illustrate this line of thought:

The significance of the Force is that it was the first joint force of its kind, drawn from two neighbor democracies, and that it was a brilliant success throughout. It is by no means fanciful to see in it the prototype of the world police of that world community which has for so long been the dream of men of goodwill . . . .

Other historians hold a lesser view of the precedence set by the FSSF. In Special Operations and Elite Units, 1939-1988, Roger Beaumont stated: "The symbolic value of Devil’s Brigade and Frederick’s charisma had kept the unit alive well beyond its utility."

The Force was not the U.S. Army’s first attempt at combined operations. Throughout its short history, the U.S. Army has formed coalitions and alliances to accomplish missions or win wars. The FSSF was different from the
previous coalitions and alliances, because it represented the U.S. Army's first attempt to create, train, and utilize a permanent combined special operations force.

Although the Force falls short of fulfilling Watt's claim as a prototype, there is utility in the research of the unit. The Force represents a highly successful experiment in organizing and training a combined special operations unit. To examine the unit's strengths and expose its weaknesses, this chapter covers the Force's organization, command and control, training, and effectiveness during Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON.

Organization

Establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, by Britain and America, and the development of the cross-channel invasion, Operation Bolero, provide the strategic backdrop when the First Special Service Force was formed.

Geoffrey Nathanial Pyke, an eccentric intellectual, convinced Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, of the feasibility of conducting guerilla style operations in Europe utilizing a well trained force and snow vehicles. Pyke claimed that his plan meant "... a thousand British soldiers can tie down a force of a half a million Germans." The plan hinged on development of an adequate snow vehicle. The concept, later known as the "Plough
Project was to attack strategic targets, before the Germans could react, by parachuting in a trained force and utilizing the snow vehicle. Mountbatten was sold on Pyke's plan and presented the concept at a strategic level meeting on April 11, 1942. Winston Churchill attended the meeting, along with Harry Hopkins and General George Marshall, representing President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The concept intrigued Churchill who noted in the minutes, "Never in the history of human conflict will so few immobilize so many." The meeting resulted in the decision that the United States would manufacture and produce the snow vehicle.

Upon his return to the States in April 1942, General Marshall posed two separate and distinct problems to the Army's General Staff: design and produce the vehicle; and organize, activate, and train the personnel while drawing up plans for the employment. The technical community started to work on the snow vehicle and Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Frederick as the project officer to supervise the project and the formation of the force. In his memorandum, Eisenhower allowed Frederick to utilize personnel from the United Kingdom, Canada, or Norway that were made available by their countries. Although the political implications of using Norwegians was obvious, the inclusion of the Canadians is not apparent. The Canadians were capable cold weather
fighters while British Commandos were committed and unavailable for employment.

Frederick's role in the development of the First Special Service Force cannot be overstated. As an officer on Eisenhower's staff, he published a memorandum strongly opposing participation in the "Plough Project." However, once assigned the mission to form the force, and possibly commanding a combat unit, he proved adept at creating, training, and politically saving the force.

Frederick utilized all of the power that he was given by Eisenhower and quickly went to work on establishing a headquarters from among officers in the War Department. The first task of his staff was to create a table of organization. "The inclusion of other nationals within the organic framework plus the unique mission demanded the task force to be a combination infantry-armored-engineer-parachute-mountain force." The table of organization (TO&E) formed the task force into two echelons: combat and service. This allowed the combat troops to concentrate on training in the short time available prior to employment.

The combat force consisted of three regiments with two battalions each. The TO&E of each regiment consisted of 32 officers and 385 enlisted men. The entire organization was built on 108 sections with four snow vehicles (Weasels) in each. Because of the many branches of service members,
and multiple countries, the Force was given its own branch. The unit was activated on 2 July 1942.

Figure 5. FSSF Organization.

From the unit formation in July until September, the Force continued to train for its mission in Norway. As Frederick continued to attend high level meetings concerning the project, he realized the possibility of the plan being executed was diminishing. In mid-September, Frederick presented the plan to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The "Plough Project" was canceled due to a lack of air assets, feasibility of the mission, and a lack of enthusiasm by the Norwegians. Three months after the formation of the FSSF, the reason it was created had disappeared. Facing termination, the Force was saved by Marshall, who convinced the Canadians that the project represented a highly successful experiment in teamwork between the two countries."

Frederick seized the second chance granted by Marshall, and reorganized the FSSF from a unit dependent on the snow vehicle to a light assault force. The force was organized into a combat element of 108 officers and 1,167 enlisted men and a service battalion of 25 officers and 521 enlisted men. The combat echelon included the Force Headquarters and three Regiments of two battalions each. Each battalion was divided into three companies, each company into three platoons, and each platoon into two sections, with nine men each. Officer and NCO appointments were integrated, without regard to nationality, on a proportionate basis to personnel of both countries. The
The service echelon was made up entirely of U.S. personnel and provided all supply, administrative, and messing.

The change in mission also resulted in a change of equipment. Frederick augmented the force with the Browning light machine gun, the then-new 2.36-inch antitank rocket launcher (bazooka), the Johnson automatic rifle, the 60mm mortar, and the flame thrower. While still lighter than the regular infantry units, the additions provided the force the firepower for sustained combat assault.

The experiment that Marshall wanted to save was not without problems. In addition to the training difficulties, the combined nature of the unit resulted in significant administrative and logistical problems. The problems tended to be greater for the Canadians than the Americans. Most of the difficulties were resolved during the development and training of the force, but several continued to exist throughout the war.

The major administrative arrangements were resolved by the two countries in January 1943. The Canadians provided pay for their personnel, transportation costs to Helena, Montana, and repaid the United States for the cost of rations. The U.S. agreed to house, equip, clothe, and provide transportation and medical services for the force.13

Two initial problems were the disparity in pay between the American and Canadian personnel and the question
of loyalties. Would a Canadian or an American accept an order from an officer from another country, and would refusal be considered punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice?"

Repeated attempts by the chain of command to resolve the problem of pay were disapproved by the Department of National Defense in Ottawa, because Canadians were currently serving alongside Americans without additional pay. In "The Devil's Brigade" the authors correctly state that the pay problem was insignificant because the Americans were paid once a month and the Canadians were paid twice a month, resulting in both sides borrowing money from each other."

The problem of command and the exercise of discipline for Canadians was resolved by a Canadian order in council that authorized:

(1) Every Canadian officer in the force to exercise the powers of a detachment commander with respect to Canadian personnel, (2) Canadian personnel to be commanded, but not disciplined or punished, by U.S. personnel of superior rank, and (3) detention of Canadians, if placed under arrest, in places provided by the United States."

The force encountered additional smaller problems in promotions, replacements, and awards throughout its existence. Promotions for the members of the force were based on ability, without regard to nationality. The system worked and resulted in an approximately equal division of promotions. Replacement problems originated during the training phase and continued throughout the war. Because
the force required trained parachutists, the Canadians decided on 20 April 1943 to provide no additional replacements. The decision reduced Canadian strength 40% below authorization by May 1944. General Kenneth Stuart, the First Canadian Army Commander, recommended Canadian withdrawal from the FSSF but was opposed by Eisenhower. Eisenhower felt the benefits of the combined unit were too positive to dissolve the unit. General Stuart changed his recommendation but adopted the U.S. practice of using ordinary infantry replacements.

Awards and decorations posed another problem during the existence of the force. By October 1944, FSSF Canadians had received 29 U.S. awards for valor but no British awards. The reason they had not received British awards was due to an administrative intricacy resulting in the FSSF Canadians competing with U.S. troops for British decorations. In October 1944, the problem was resolved and resulted in the Canadian personnel receiving seventeen British awards.¹⁵

Differences in culture overall between the U.S. troops and the Canadians were minimal. Sharing a common language and isolated from outsiders during training at Helena, the soldiers quickly resolved differences in customs and beliefs.¹⁶ One of the major reasons the force assimilated so quickly was the shared hardship of an intense training program. In addition to creating an extremely proficient unit, as evidenced by the inspection results and
combat record, the training program resulted in a cohesive fighting unit.

Training

A study of the FSSF training plan provides a researcher with a blueprint to train a unit for a specific mission. The FSSF training program conducted in Helena, Montana was focused, intense, and varied.

The "Plough Project" provided the initial focus for the training and also resulted in several key advantages to Frederick. Due to the political sensitivity of the project, the unit was provided with an isolated location to train, and the authority to select and release personnel.

Fort William Henry Harrison at Helena, Montana provided the force a location that was close to mountains and suitable for parachute training. The Fort had an airfield, and, with the six C-47's that Frederick had included on the table of organization, they were self sufficient. Ninth Corps Area provided 200 men and a post commander to run the facilities at Fort Harrison." One of the major advantages the fort provided was isolation from other U.S. and Canadian troops. This isolation forced the FSSF troops to assimilate.

The Force received the authority to screen personnel and return to units those personnel that did not meet the established standards. The selection criteria for senior
officers included an age limit of 35, excellent physical condition, and the willingness to undergo parachute training. Frederick personally selected the junior officers, almost 90% from the various officer candidate schools. The criteria for enlisted soldiers was limited to a minimum of three years of school and that the personnel be unafraid of anything. The recruiting notices stated preference would be given to "Lumberjacks, Forest Rangers, Hunters, Northwoodsmen, Game Wardens, Prospectors, and Explorers." The force was a volunteer unit, so each individual had the option to leave at any time. Additionally, the soldiers could be released and returned to their former units if they failed to meet the standards. Once the initial weeding-out process had been accomplished, this policy resulted in a strong sense of pride for the survivors.

Frederick needed every advantage because the initial mission for the FSSF was targeted for December 1942, six months after the formation of the unit. The training plan for the unit was developed in three phases:

(1) August 3 to October 3 for parachute training, training in the basic subjects such as weapons, demolitions, small unit tactics, and constant attention to reaching the peak of physical fitness; (2) October 5 to November 21 for unit tactics and problems; and (3) the remaining time which would be given to skiing, rock climbing, living in cold climates and operations of the Force’s combat snow vehicle.
The scheduled training took place, but, with the rejection of the "Plough Project," the force received additional training time and also conducted amphibious training.

In general, the training of the force involved the use of individual experts and the establishment of higher than normal standards. The force created their own drill and ceremony, utilizing the best parts of the American and Canadian drill. The attitude of searching for the best technique, regardless of origin, illustrates one of the force's strengths. The force demonstrated this strength and the proficiency of training in numerous inspections.

The training proficiency of the force was displayed on both individual and collective tasks. Roadmarching times showed the fitness level of the unit. In a road marching competition, the First Regiment marched 60 miles, with normal loads, in twenty hours. Falling out of a road march meant dismissal from the force.²

The force exhibited its collective training proficiency at Norfolk while attending the Amphibious School. The force conducted simulated landings and night loadings faster than any unit that attended the school. A Naval ensign at the school described the event:

The best Army Division averages about one minute per platoon load .... The Marines did it in 52 seconds, which is the best we had seen until then. But these guys did it in thirty five seconds, with absolute silence, a minimum of commands, and carrying full combat loads."²
On June 15, 1943, prior to shipping out to the Aleutians Campaign, the force received an overseas inspection from Corps Headquarters. The inspection included roadmarching, physical fitness, and individual tests on military subjects. A grade of 75 per cent was required to pass. The force scored an average of 125%, and scored 200% on some of the tests. The inspectors reported to Army Ground Force Headquarters that the FSSF was ready for combat and reported to Frederick that the force demonstrated the co-ordination and teamwork of a championship professional ball club."

Command and Control

The internal command structure, discussed in the section on organization, was effective and did not contribute to the Force's problems. The initial care in establishing the chain of command and the complete integration of the force resulted in minimal internal command and control problems during the force's existence. However, the external command and control of the FSSF illustrates the problems with U.S. special operations forces throughout World War II.

From the Force's immediate superiors to the highest level of politics, the external command and control of the FSSF created numerous problems throughout the war. Three factors influenced the force's external command and control
problems: (1) High-level political involvement; (2) lack of theater control of Special Operation Forces; and (3) numerous cross-attachments.

High-level involvement, by military and political leaders, was instrumental to the forming of the FSSF. Without the involvement of Pyke, Mountbatten, Churchill, and Marshall the force would not have been created. The involvement of political and military leaders from Canada and the U.S. was also crucial to establishing the conditions that the force could operate under. Therefore, the initial political involvement was necessary because of the unique nature and strategic mission of the force. Unfortunately, the force could not exist without the high level political involvement that created it. Problems with replacements, awards, and pay continued to create work at high levels and a 2000 man unit conducting conventional operations did not warrant the attention.

The absence of theater level command and control for special operations was a systemic problem for the United States. David Hogan explained the poor overall use of U.S. special operation forces in World War II in *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II*. He stated: "... U.S. military and political leaders never envisioned that such activities would play a major role in any future war and thus never attempted to establish a doctrine or overall concept for their use." Hogan goes on to explain that the
result is that once provisional commando units performed the initial task, they lingered on, serving as line troops in conventional units."

The FSSF was a perfect illustration of this flawed policy. After the cancellation of the "Plough Project," the FSSF was passed from one conventional unit to another. They worked for commanders that did not understand or appreciate their unique abilities and, as a result, conducted missions better suited to a heavier infantry unit. Trained paratroopers, they never conducted an airborne assault and conducted only two amphibious assaults.

The numerous attachments increased the problems with the utilization of the force. After completing amphibious training in Norfolk, the force was assigned to Amphibious Task Force Nine as part of the Kiska assault force. The combined North American unit would spearhead the assault of the Aleutian Islands in defense of the continent. Although a dry run, the amphibious assault on the Kiska Islands proved to be one of the few times the force was properly employed. Following the completion of the mission, the force was reassigned to Mark Clark's Fifth Army in the Mediterranean in October, 1943.

The Force fought in major engagements throughout Italy, including Monte La Difensa, Monte Sammucro, Monte Majo, and the Allied right flank and spearhead at Anzio. The force was typically attached to infantry divisions and
used as conventional infantry. This use, and the lack of heavy weapons, resulted in heavy casualties for the force. The heavy casualties, almost 100% by the Anzio engagement, along with a poor replacement flow, threatened the existence of the force. Replacements were augmented when the Rangers were disbanded and reassigned to the Force.

In August, the unit was reassigned to the Seventh Army to participate in Operation Anvil, the invasion of southern France. The Force's mission was to seize the Iles d'Hyeres, three rocky islands on the left flank of the invasion beachhead. Although depleted from the conventional fighting, the Force would conduct a critical mission they were trained for and spearhead the invasion of France.

**Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON**

Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON, the Allied invasion of the French Mediterranean coast, was one of the largest operations in Europe, and it remains controversial. The controversy between the United States and Britain, over the necessity and the long term political ramifications of the operation, resulted in numerous postponements and near cancellation of the operation. In August 1944, Eisenhower's view that the operation was vital to the defeat of Germany outweighed D Churchill's and General Mark Clark's fears that it would result in most of Eastern Europe falling under Soviet control. The Allied assault of Southern France
involved 3000 aircraft, 1000 ships, and eventually over a million soldiers.

The final plan for Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON involved a massive assault along a forty-five mile of the Cote d'Azur between Cavalaire-sur-Mer and Agay. The beaches were east of the German-held fortress port of Toulon. The First Special Service Force would lead the Allied assault and protect the southern flank. The Force's mission was to land under the cover of darkness, around midnight of D-Day, and neutralize all enemy defenses on the Iles d'Hyeres. The Iles d'Hyeres consisted of Port Cros and du Levant, two small islands off the western flank of the assault beaches. Allied intelligence had reports that the Germans had a three gun, 164mm battery on Ile du Levant within range of the landing beaches.

The First Special Service Force had experienced considerable combat before this operation. As a result of the numerous casualties and the mass influx of Rangers, the Force needed training on amphibious operations prior to the mission. The Force underwent an intensive training program under the direction of the Invasion Training Center at Santa Maria del Castlemonte, 75 miles south of Salerno. Naval Beach marking parties and Naval fire control shore parties were attached to the force for training.
Figure 6. Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON.

The training, beginning on 5 August, included basic infantry training as well as amphibious operations. One of the forcemen, John Bourne describes the training: "Besides the amphibious training, we brushed up on our assault work and generally got in first-class shape for what lay ahead." The use of rubber boats and the scaling of cliffs were emphasized in day and night landing exercises against beachless shores. The training culminated with Operation BRUNO, a final rehearsal on the night of 7–8 August.

Operation BRUNO involved assaulting the islands of Ponza and Zanona. The two islands off the Italian coast closely resembled the Iles d'Hyères. The Force demonstrated their proficiency by quickly scaling the sheer cliffs and surprising the enemy from the rear." On 8 August, with less than a week before Operation DRAGOON, the unit returned and began loading transports.

At 1130, 14 August, the First Special Service Force departed Propraino, Corsica on the ships of Naval Task Force No 86. Against the advice of French officers and others familiar with the terrain, the Force's plan was to assault the cliffs on the seaward side. Colonel Edwin A. Walker, commander of the unit since 23 July, had selected the sites after studying aerial photographs and conducting a personal reconnaissance." The Force's mission was to destroy all enemy defenses, particularly the coastal guns that
threatened the landing sites. On order, the unit would withdraw to the mainland and link up with the First Airborne Task Force, commanded by now Major General Robert T. Frederick, their former boss.

On the night of 14 August, under perfect weather conditions, the force assaulted Port Levant and Cros.

The transports stopped approximately 8,000 yards offshore, and debarkation into 10 man rubber assault boats began at 2300 hours.... The 1st Regiment, approximately 650 men, landed on Port Cros, and the 2nd and 3rd Regiments, about 1300 strong, debarked at midnight on the island of Levant. The landings were unopposed and surprise was complete.

At 0130 15 August, the 2nd Regiment landed and worked up 80-foot cliffs behind BLUE and RED scrambles (the designations for the landing beaches) on Levant. 1st Battalion moved North towards Port del Avis and 2nd Battalion moved towards Port Arbousier. Within ten minutes, Third Regiment, along with the force Headquarters, landed at the Green scramble. After a short reorganization, Third Regiment’s 1st Battalion moved through heavy brush towards the coastal battery on the eastern point of the island. 2nd Battalion moved to cut off possible beach defenses behind Yellow beach. The force met moderate resistance on Levant. By daylight the force owned the eastern half of the island. The force discovered that the coastal defense battery was a German deception using camouflaged dummies. Enemy prisoners explained that the islands were defended by two companies.
from the 1st Battalion, 917th Regiment, an organic unit of the 242d Infantry Division. The companies had occupied the island for a year and had emplaced heavy fortifications, but they covered the northern approach to the island."

By 1000 hours, approximately 100 Germans had withdrawn to Port del Avis, and Second Regiment had moved into position to assault. After an hour long fire fight, the Germans surrendered. German 88mm batteries, from the mainland, began to shell Levant and Port Cros and continued throughout the night. The force continued to mop up throughout D-Day. By 2234 hours, D-Day, the force had stopped all resistance on Levant, although communication problems resulted in General Alexander Patch, the Seventh Corps Commander, sending his Aide "o the island for a report."

As with Levant, the First Regiment met little initial resistance on Port Cros. The 1st Battalion climbed over the Emerald Scramble and secured the Port Man area, while the 2nd Battalion climbed over rough terrain at the Scarlet Scramble. 2nd Battalion moved directly on the Port area to clean up resistance.
Figure 7. FSSF’s Assault of Iles D’Hyeres.

After the initial success, the regiment met heavy resistance. The Germans withdrew to three main strong points: the Chateau, a fortified building in the port area, and Forts de Lastissac and del Eminence overlooking the port. The regiment developed a plan to assault the three points. At 1600 hours, with 8" fire support from the cruiser Augusta, the regiment attacked. The 8" rounds were ineffective against the forts, and by midnight the regiment had only surrounded the three forts. The fight continued into the next day. Using close air support supplied by Seventh Army, the 2nd Regiment seized the Chateau and Fort Lesitassac but were unable to seize Fort del Eminence. Finally at 1300 hours on 17 August, using naval fire support, the 2nd Regiment convinced the remaining Germans to surrender. Twelve rounds from the 15" guns on HMS Ramillies were more than the Germans could handle.

After completion of their mission, the Second and Third Regiment, were replaced by French units and joined the First Regiment in the vicinity of Sylvabelle on Cavalaire Bay. Reunited, the force joined the 1st Airborne Task Force and guarded the right flank of Seventh Army's drive along the Riviera.

The assault on the Iles d'Hyeres was only a snap-shot of the First Special Service Force's participation in World War II, but it provides a good example of the unit's strengths and weaknesses. The Force's ability to
achieve complete surprise was due to the unique skills and intense training. By scaling the cliffs on the southern side, they achieved total surprise. The same technique was used in the unit’s most famous raid on Mounte La Difensa in Italy. However, once the Force was in close combat, their lack of heavy weapons resulted in heavy losses and an inability to dislodge fortified defenses. In the assault on Port Cros and Levant, they sustained numerous casualties, despite naval and air support. The Force accomplished their mission, but, as with the campaign in Italy, they suffered heavy casualties.

**Conclusion**

Although it existed for only two years, the First Special Service Force provides an excellent historical study on combined special operations. The Forces’ strengths and weaknesses in organization, training, and command and control provide doctrinal lessons for future attempts in combined special operations.

The complexity of creating and organizing a combined unit is illustrated by the administrative and logistical problems experienced by the Force. The unit’s ability to overcome the initial problems can be attributed to good leadership, good planning, and sharing a common language.

Frederick’s leadership was instrumental. Early in the process, he established a clear vision for the unit and carefully ensured that it was formed and trained to
carefully ensured that it was formed and trained to accomplish his vision. The planning of the table of organization and the administrative agreements provided a solid base for success. Additionally, the ability of soldiers to communicate in a shared language eased the minor cultural differences between the two countries.

The training program of the Force provides an excellent example in the establishment of standards and conduct of training. They conducted highly-focused, very intense training. The unit demonstrated its training proficiency in numerous inspections and eventually in combat. The Force's isolated location and release authority contributed to the success of the training program.

The external command and control of the unit was its most severe weakness. The Force's internal command and control did not cause a problem and highlighted the total integration of the unit. Leaders were evenly distributed between the two countries, resulting in minimal internal command and control problems throughout the war.

The external command and control created numerous problems throughout the war and was one of the primary reasons for the Force's deactivation. The problems were a result of two factors: high-level political involvement and lack of theater control for special operations.

The high-level involvement in the creation of the force is understandable. The strategic nature of the
"Plough Project" and the initial administrative difficulties required the attention. However, the inability of the Force to divorce the need for high-level involvement to solve problems was its downfall. The unit’s small size, and its use in conventional operations, prohibited continued involvement by politicians and generals. The Force simply became more trouble than it was worth.

The absence of theater control for special operations has been documented. Like the Rangers, the Force was thrust into costly conventional operations. This resulted in high casualties and improper employment for the majority of special operation units in World War II.

The amphibious assault on the Iles d’Hyeres provided an opportunity to examine the unit’s capabilities in combat. Although the mission was not the Force’s most famous or difficult, the ability to surprise the enemy and accomplish the objective were trademarks of the Force. Their inability to dislodge the enemy from heavy fortifications demonstrated one of the unit’s weaknesses.

While the Force is not the prototype proclaimed by Shalto Watt, it was a successful experiment in organizing, training, and employing a combined special operations unit. Future doctrine must capitalize on the strengths and minimize the weaknesses experienced by the Force.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE JEDBURGH TEAMS

The ultimate triumph of the Jedburgh project, ..., was in the successful formation of teams of professional and nonprofessional soldiers from different nations who worked together toward a common goal.¹

While the First Special Service Force was leading the invasion of southern France, the Jedburghs, another combined special operations unit, were operating deep inside of France. The Jedburghs were three-man teams, consisting of French and American or British soldiers, tasked to organize the French resistance and support the Allied invasion of France.

The Jedburgh teams parachuted behind German lines and with the resistance conducted unconventional warfare in the German's rear area. The teams conducted sabotage, interdicted enemy lines of communication, and protected high value facilities for future use by the Allies.

The Jedburgh concept was not limited to southern France: over 93 teams deployed to France in support of Operation OVERLORD and ANVIL; and six teams deployed to Holland in support of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The varying degrees of success achieved by the Jedburgh teams has been outlined in numerous publications.

65
This chapter will determine the strengths and weaknesses of the Jedburgh concept in the areas of organization, training, and command and control. Additionally, it will analyze the effectiveness of the Jedburgh teams that supported the invasion of southern France.

**Organization**

The Jedburgh concept was the result of collaboration between the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The SOE was the senior partner and provided the foundation for the concept.

The SOE was formed in the wake of the collapse of France in July 1940. Neville Chamberlain tasked the SOE to "co-ordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas...." The formation of the SOE augmented but did not supersede the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Special Air Service (SAS).

Two years later, William "Wild Bill" Donovan established the OSS, the American equivalent of the SOE. The OSS mirrored the functions of the SOE, while consolidating all covert functions. In September 1942, the SOE and OSS merged to form the SOE/SO. While striving for an equal partnership, the British maintained the lead on all
planning concerning France. The Jedburgh concept was not an exception.

The SOE initiated the Jedburgh concept to support the future Allied invasion of Europe. In July 1942, Major General C. McV. Gubbins, head of SOE London Group, presented the following concept to the Chief of the SOE Security Section:

A project is under consideration for the dropping behind enemy lines, in cooperation with an Allied invasion of the Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to carry out guerrilla activities against the enemy’s lines of communication. These men are to be recruited and trained by the SOE...

The concept continued to develop during the fall of 1942. The SOE determined that the mission required at least 70 teams, evenly distributed between the British and Americans. Additionally, each team would have an officer from the nation they were operating in. As the year ended, the SOE prepared to participate in "SPARTAN," a General Headquarters exercise, to validate the Jedburgh concept.

"SPARTAN" was conducted in March 1943 by SOE staff personnel; it identified several flaws in equipment and reporting but validated the overall concept. The lessons learned were incorporated a few weeks later in another exercise: "DASCHUND." The two exercises served to identify procedures for training and equipping the Jedburghs.

OSS involvement with the Jedburgh project also derived from the exercises. Lieutenant Colonel Franklin O.
Canfield, SO Planning Section Chief, observed "SPARTAN" and recommended to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations that the Jedburghs be a "joint SOE/SO action."

The combined SOE/SO team continued to refine the Jedburgh concept in the summer of 1943. The Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces (SCAEF) would use the Jedburghs to lead, or assist resistance groups at least 40 miles behind German lines. The operations would include sabotage, assassination of key commanders, interdicting lines of communication and protecting key bridges and ports.

The SOE/SO submitted their personnel requirements to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in May of 1943. The request proposed that the British and Americans provide personnel for 35 teams plus 15 reserve teams. Additionally, it requested the Free French Committee, or other Allied governments, to supply the third man for each team. The total personnel requirement was 300 men for 100 teams. By October, all three governments had approved the request.

With the recruitment underway, the SOE/SO finalized the initial planning and developed the Basic Jedburgh Directive. It stated:

JEDBURGHS are specially trained three-man teams. They will be dropped by parachute at prearranged spots in France, Belgium, and Holland on and after D-Day. Each JEDBURGH team consists of two officers and a radio operator with his W/T set. One officer is a native of the country to which the team is going, and the other is British or American. The members of the team are soldiers and will normally
arrive in the field in uniform. They will make contact with the resistance groups, bringing them instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander, W/T communications, supplies, and, if necessary, leadership.¹⁰

Training

The training exercises, "SPARTAN" and "DASHUND," identified the requirement for soldiers with specific qualities. Lieutenant Colonel Canfield was the OSS officer responsible for recruiting personnel to fill those requirements. Canfield met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, on 9 September 1943, and secured their approval on the Jedburgh concept and recruiting requirements.¹¹

Initial screening of candidates was conducted by G2 Division, War Department, and the Army Ground Forces. After volunteering, soldiers were sent to Washington, D.C., for interviews. The SOE/ST had established selection criteria for officers and enlisted men. The qualifications for officers were:

Officers recruited as leaders and seconds in command should be picked for qualities of leadership and daring, ability to speak and understand French, and all-round physical condition. They should be experienced in handling men, preferably in an active theater of operations, and be prepared to be parachuted in uniform behind enemy lines and operate on their own for some time. They must have had at least some basic military training and preferably have aptitude for small arms weapons.¹²

Enlisted soldiers were recruited from Army Signal Corps schools at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and Camp Crowder,
Missouri. The qualifications for enlisted soldiers revolved around their communications ability. The published requirements were:

Qualifications for radio operators are not so high as for leaders and seconds-in-command and a fair working knowledge of French is sufficient. In addition to normal requirements for good radio operators they must be of exceptionally good physique to stand up to training and be prepared to be parachuted behind enemy lines to operate their sets in open under war conditions. They should attain a speed of 15 words per minute before being shipped to the U.K.13

Jedburgh recruits were interviewed at the OSS headquarters, in Washington D.C., and then underwent an initial screening program in October and November 1943. The indoctrination was conducted in the Northern Maryland hills and at the Civilian Conservation Corps near Quantico, Virginia and focused on physical fitness, individual marksmanship, and demolitions. The OSS selected 55 officers and 62 radio operators for the Jedburgh mission. They also selected another 54 officers and 27 enlisted soldiers for the Army staffs to accompany the Jedburghs and continue training in the United Kingdom.14

Initial Training

The Jedburgh officer recruits arrived in Great Britain, in late December, 1943, and underwent an intensive screening program. Only 35 of the American officers qualified to continue the training program.15 During January, the officers conducted the initial phase of
training. They rotated between British Special Training School (STS) 45 in Gloucestershire, STS 46 in Lancashire, and STS 6 at Surrey. The training emphasized hand-to-hand combat, marksmanship, foreign weapons, and radio operations. The 62 American radio operators were assigned to the SOE communications school at Henley-on-Thames. A month of psychological testing, parachute training, small arms training, and communications training resulted in the cadre selecting only 46 soldiers to continue training.

The final phase of the initial training was a three-day parachute training school at Ringway. All officers and enlisted men conducted five qualifying jumps from a balloon. The balloons were outfitted to simulate the small hole (joe hole) in the RAF bombers, the infiltration technique for agents and clandestine operatives. With the initial screening complete, the Jedburgh officers and enlisted men reported to Milton Hall in Peterborough, about ninety miles north of London. Combined with the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch personnel, the American Jedburghs would conduct team training and stage for their operations.

Although the SOE and OSS had both agreed to the Jedburgh training procedures in September 1943, the training, like the concept, was weighted with British influence. The training at Milton Hall began with expert instruction on demolitions, small arms, guerilla tactics,
and French language. A prime example of the quality of instruction was Major Fairburn's classes on small arms. The techniques for instinctive firing and clearing buildings are still used by special operations forces today. As the training shifted from individual to collective, the Jedburgh officers formed teams.

Team "Marriages"

The OSS War Diaries stated teams were formed by the SOE/SO leadership at Milton Hall, but surviving Jedburghs insist that they formed their own teams through a concept called Team "Marriages." The Jedburgh officers convinced the leadership that they should create teams through mutual consent, thus ensuring maximum compatibility.

The flaw in the concept was a shortage of French officers. This scarcity created competition between the American and British officers for a French partner. Although an officer's ability to speak French fluently was the main skill advertised by the Americans and British, other techniques were employed to gain approval from the French officers. Combat qualifications, personality, and extravagant weekends in London were used to court French officers. Although some Jedburghs engaged themselves to several teams and some engagements were broken in arguments, the process appears to have been successful. The concept of selecting your team members appears to promote anarchy;
however, surviving Jedburghs believe that the process established mutual respect between team members."

Team Marriages were approved by SOE/SO training staff and published in the daily Milton Hall orders. The majority of teams were formed by the end of March, but teams continued to change until D-Day. Radio operators were not part of the process and were screened for compatibility by the teams during the initial training exercises."

Operational Training

In March, as teams were beginning to form, the emphasis shifted from individual to collective training. Training continued on language, intelligence, and communications, but a series of demanding field exercises dominated the phase. The field exercises were based on the operational scenario and served to verify the tactical procedures for the Jedburghs teams and the Special Forces Detachments. The Jedburghs conducted one field training exercise: "SPILL OUT," and two command post exercises: "LEVEE," and "SALLY.""

"SPILL OUT," a six-day exercise in late March, focused on the tactical procedures of the Jedburgh teams. The exercise evaluated the Jedburghs' ability to contact a reception committee, establish and maintain communications, conduct ambushes, and evade enemy agents." While discovering various problems with tactics, the exercise did
not concentrate on the essential Jedburgh task. The exercise trained and tested the ability of the Jedburgh teams to accomplish their missions independently, instead of utilizing guerrillas or agents. As a result, the Jedburgh teams did not adequately practice leading and coordinating guerilla troops.15

The command post exercises, "LEVEE" and "SALLY," were designed to exercise coordinating procedures, but the exercise was focused on the Special Forces Detachment. The exercise structure was to evaluate the SF detachment's ability to coordinate Jedburgh teams. In "LEVEE," Americans assumed the role of SF Detachments at field army headquarters, and SOE was evaluated on coordinating the teams. In "SALLY," they switched assignments.16 The command post exercises revealed deficiencies in the briefing procedures and identified the inexperience of staff personnel in the Country Sections. The Country Sections were personnel assigned to the SOE/SO Headquarters representing France and the Low countries.17

This training completed the essential phase of Jedburgh training, but, the delay of the Normandy invasion by SHAEF provided the Jedburghs additional time to train. The Jedburghs continued individual and collective training throughout April and conducted another exercise on 24 and 25 April. Operation "SPUR" was a partisan ambush on a German general staff. Although the exercise was staged to
demonstrate the Jedburgh’s capabilities to General Koenig, Commander EEMFI, it served to improve the Country Sections’ procedures."

At the end of April, SOE/SO began to select teams for operations. Fifteen teams were selected to deploy to Algiez for subsequent infiltration into France. The remainder of the teams were subjected to a series of fitness tests. Teams conducted extended foot movements, 100-200 miles, and attended the British Commando Small Boat Course. The formal training concluded with "LASH," a ten day exercise lasting from 31 May through 8 June."

"LASH" required the teams to contact a resistance group and direct attacks on rail communications. Overall the exercise was viewed as a success by the SOE/SO. However, it identified several operational failures that were exhibited later in combat. The failures included vague orders to the Jedburgh teams and poor hide procedures by the teams during evasion from the enemy."

Problems

Like the First Special Service Force, the Jedburghs experienced several administrative obstacles after their arrival in England. Pay, promotions, food, and morale highlighted the major problems.

During recruitment, OSS Headquarters in Washington had promised Jedburghs that they would receive jump pay.
Additionally, they promised Army non-commissioned officers promotion to officer rank upon arrival in England. Repeated requests by Lieutenant Colonel Canfield to eradicate the difficulties were denied by the OSS, European Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA).”

Although minor, the food problem involved the quantity, type, and times for meals. Initially the British ran the mess at Milton Hall, and the Americans were unaccustomed to the frequency, quantity, and preparation of the meals. The problem was resolved when the French and Americans assumed a portion of the responsibility for preparing meals.”

Jedburgh morale was cyclic during the training phase at Milton Hall. Although morale and discipline for training were high during the early months, Lieutenant Colonel Frank V. Spooner’s leadership technique caused friction between the British and Americans. Spooner was an Indian Army veteran and a true disciplinarian. His schedule of daily roll calls and morning parades resulted in resentment by the Americans. The problem was resolved in April when Lieutenant Colonel G. Richard Musgrave replaced Spooner and installed more relaxed methods.” Morale stayed high until D-Day. Jedburgh teams at Milton Hall after D-Day believed they had missed the war and would not be eyed.
Team Equipment

The Jedburghs' equipment was developed throughout the training phase and included both American and British equipment. The key component for each team was the radio. Each team had two radios. The A Mark III (Jed Set) weighed 5.5 pounds and had a range of 500 miles. When longer range was needed, the Jedburghs used the B-2, weighing 32 pounds.

Radio operators encoded all messages using a silk handkerchief and ten microfilmed pages of lists. The silk handkerchief contained more than 500 four letter codes and the microfilmed pages contained more than a thousand groups. The key-lists were one time pads and were never decoded by the Germans although several were captured.

The remainder of the teams kit consisted of the following: national uniform, web gear and pack, American jump boots, the American M1911 .45 caliber pistol, the American M1 carbine, a British Fairburn fighting knife, a British oil compass, and British survival equipment. Additionally, each Jedburgh carried various false documents and identity cards allowing the teams the flexibility of staying in uniform or wearing civilian clothes.

Command and Control

The internal command and control of the Jedburgh teams was established by the team leader. The team leader was the senior officer on each team. In OSS to Green
was the senior officer on each team. In *OSS to Green Berets*, Aaron Bank described the responsibilities for his team. As team leader, he was responsible for the formation, training, arming, and operational planning. Additionally, Bank was responsible for contacting the regional resistance leaders and receiving and distributing airdrops.

He charged his French officer with the following:

A. Handling all political problems endemic to the French resistance and the Maquis (active guerilla groups), mainly between de Gaulle's Forces Francaises de l’Interieur (FFI) and the Franc-Tireurs Partisans (FTP) - Communists.
B. Supervising the formation of clandestine networks and their operation.
C. Assisting me (Bank) in training the networks.
D. Maintaining liaison with networks in adjacent areas and cooperating with friendly municipal(sic) and other officials.\textsuperscript{34}

The Jedburgh teams' control over the resistance was limited. Teams presented a letter from General Koenig, Chief of the FFI, to the resistance leaders explaining the Jedburghs' role. However, the real control was the ability to resupply the resistance with weapons and ammunition through the air drops.\textsuperscript{35}

External Command and Control

Two organizations evolved to provide command and control over the Jedburgh teams. The Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) conducted the initial briefing and dispatch of the teams; conducted liaison with SHAPE and the
The Special Forces Detachments were attached to the field armies to coordinate resistance actions with conventional operations and linked the field army with SFHQ.  

The SFHQ was formed on 10 January 1944 when the heads of the SOE and the SO signed a memorandum formally integrating the two organizations. The change from SOE/SO to SFHQ occurred on 1 May 1944, when SHAEF directed the headquarters to adopt a common name and mailing address. The Jedburghs were only a small part of the overall operation; the SFHQ also controlled the French Country Sections: P (Independent Section) and RF (Gaullist Section). On 1 July 1944, SFHQ operations in France were subordinated by SHAEF to the Etat-major des Forces Francaises de l’Interier (EMFFI). The head of the EMFFI was the French General Koenig, a personal friend of de Gaulle’s. However, this proved to be political as the transfer of control was not complete until August 1944 and the SFHQ continued to maintain control of communications and supply.  

The evolution of SFHQ and the changes of command and control throughout the war were directly responsible for many of the organizations’ failures. In SOE in France, M.R.D. Foot described the organizations’ effectiveness. He stated: "That it worked at all was a triumph ..., the capacity for muddling through; and it worked exceptionally badly."
The SFHQ's inability to coordinate effectively with the SAS, French resistance, field armies, or even the various organizations under its control is documented by numerous researchers. Although the Special Forces Detachment's role was to coordinate resistance activities with the field armies, two factors limited their effectiveness. The SF detachment could not communicate directly with the Jedburghs or resistance groups and the field armies did not understand the capabilities of the SOF.

**Operation DRAGOON**

One of the considerations affecting the final decision to invade southern France was the expectation the FFI would play a critical role. This was based on the experience of Eisenhower during Operation OVERLORD and the influence of the French, specifically General Giraud.

The Seventh Army ANVIL planners realized the French Maquis or FFI were scattered over a large area and their capacity for guerrilla warfare varied based on location. The planners estimated the FFI strength at 15,000 to 20,000 armed with an additional 30,000 to 40,000 mobilized but unarmed. Two particularly strong resistance areas were in the vicinity the Rhone river and the area east of Grenoble in the high Alps.
Team Packard, a Jedburgh team led by Captain Aaron Bank, operated in the Rhone river valley. Bank’s team was responsible for organizing, supplying, and arming the resistance and providing maximum support once the invasion of southern France began.

Team Packard was one of the fifteen teams that deployed from Milton Hall to Algiers in late April 1944. The team arrived in Algiers in the middle of May. The Jedburghs settled in at Algiers and conducted training throughout May, June, and July. On 31 July, Bank and Henri, his French second in command, received the order to deploy to the Lazare compartment of southern France.

Prior to deployment, the team was briefed by a member of the Algiers staff. The briefing was short and covered a minimum of information. It included reference maps of the area and a detailed terrain and target review concentrating on lines of communication. The briefing failed to cover restrictions on times or targets and provided no guidance on Operation Anvil. After the briefing, the Team received 20,000-25,000 Francs and a code book and encrypted scarf for communication. Within hours they loaded the plane and deployed.

All members of Team Packard survived the airdrop and were met by the French resistance leader, Raymond, and several guerrilla leaders. The team recovered their equipment and were taken to a safe house and briefed.
Team Packard discovered the resistance was organized, had support from the local populace, and was providing intelligence. Raymond had established a supply system, located enemy positions, and was currently operating and escape and evasion circuit for downed flyers."

The resistance was preparing to enter the overt warfare stage based on approval from EMFPI. Bank’s letter from General Koenig impressed Raymond, but the main control over the resistance was supplies. The resistance was short of arms and ammunition, and they realized the Jedburgh team had the capability of providing supplies."

Team Packard began its work based on Raymond’s assessment and the guidance from Algiers. After establishing a command post, Bank conducted reconnaissance and conducted training for local guerilla leaders. Concurrently, Henri reorganized the networks into compartmentalized cells."

During this period no guerilla activity was permitted, and only the intelligence, escape and evasion, and security net were operational. Two factors influenced this course of action: (1) the guerrillas were still poorly armed and trained, and (2) without invasion forces the Germans could conduct large scale anti-guerrilla operations."

In mid-May, Bank allowed Raymond to start limited guerrilla attacks. The change was to increase Maquis
morale, recruit non-communist members of the FTP, and reduce the coastal defense forces by diverting the Germans' attention. The action was focused on the Rhone Valley to harass the traffic flow that was currently assisting the Normandy defense.

Over the next month the Maquis conducted numerous small scale ambushes, and disrupted the road and rail system. The largest ambush was against 20 German vehicles and resulted in 60-70 German casualties. By early July, the flow of supplies and reinforcements to Normandy and Brittany had stopped partly because of the ambushes, but mainly because the Germans were preparing for a Mediterranean invasion.

The resistance slowed the guerilla activity, but increased sabotage, intelligence, and escape and evasion activities. The increased activity resulted in harsh responses by the Germans, who would seize dozens of males from the local towns and summarily execute them.

The Germans were successful in capturing several of the maquis; however, the loss was minimized for several reasons. Henri's reorganization of the network cells made it difficult to gather information, and the resistance was successful in assisting numerous prisoners to escape.

In early August, Algiers requested specific details on the coastal defenses and the enemy order of battle, prompting Team Packard to begin preparations for the
invasion. The team helped Raymond establish a Regimental staff and a basic table of organization for the eventual linkup with Allied forces.

Figure 8. Team Packard Area of Operations.

Within days, Team Packard received notification of Operation ANVIL and were tasked to keep the Germans in the Rhone Valley when they started their retreat North. The purpose was to not allow the Germans to use secondary roads forcing them to concentrate their forces in the valley and provide targets for the Allied Air Corps."

Raymond organized the resistance into a regiment of three battalions. Two battalions occupied blocking positions on the roads that ran northward through the Ales, and one battalion was posted on another entrance route farther North. The resistance successfully blocked the German units that attempted to retreat on the secondary roads until they were overrun by the Seventh Army.

Seventh Army directed the resistance to mop up bypassed units while they continued the pursuit of the main body. This allowed the Seventh Army to continue movement, but it also resulted in a competition between the FFI and FTP resistance. Each group was trying to liberate communities and install its own form of government.

Team Packard’s plan was to avoid direct conflict with the FTP but liberate as many communities as possible before the FTP could intervene. Despite the plan there was several encounters. Team Packard had to confront the FTP in Nimes. The FTP had arrived first, but the local government was Federalist and would not recognize the communist FTP. They called the FFI resistance for help. Eventually faced
with an angry town and armed resistance members, the FTP withdrew; however, they did achieve a large measure of success in other areas of Southern France.

In three months Team Packard had made a significant contribution. They had organized a 3000 man resistance force that resulted in German losses of 1000. The French resistance was the main reason for the success, but the airdrops, training, and leadership provided by the three man team was a distinct multiplier.

Conclusion

The Jedburghs provide significant lessons learned although the concept may have been ahead of its time and the technology. Looking at the Jedburgh concept as a whole the effectiveness of the individual teams, like Packard, was minimized due to technology, sheer newness of the organization, and a lack of doctrine covering Special Operations capabilities and command and control of Special Operations Forces.

Organization

When analyzing the organization of the Jedburghs, it is easy to focus on the confusion of multiple and competing organizations and discount the relative infancy of SOE and OSS. While the lack of coordination with SAS and other organizations resulted in overlapping functions and
friction, SO/SOE made many significant contributions, including the Jedburghs.

The Jedburgh concept had several strengths. It was based on a clear goal and evolved in a clear direction. Each member of the tripartite organization contributed to the success of the project. The British provided organization and training. The Americans provided an increasing amount of supplies and equipment, and the French participation resulted in language skills, legitimacy with the resistance, and political knowledge.

A major weakness with the organization of the teams was the size. Three man teams proved to be too small for the mission. Simple injuries or casualties from engagements rendered several teams combat ineffective.

Training

The training program of the Jedburghs mirrored that of the Commandos and FSSF in focus and intensity. Individual training ensured capable teams were deployed. The training in building clearing, marksmanship, and demolitions has remained in the current special operations curriculum fifty years later.

The collective exercises gained mixed results. The initial exercises helped define the Jedburgh directive, training, and equipment. However, exercise "SPILL OUT's" focus was on the teams conducting the mission instead of
leading partisans. This did not effect Team Packard, but one of the criticisms of other Jedburgh Teams was their willingness to fight.

   Administrative problems for the Jedburgh were similar to the FSSF and Dieppe Raid force. Unlike the FSSF, the Americans were unable to receive jump pay, and the promise of commissions for the noncommissioned officers was not honored. British food was an issue until the French and Americans assisted in the preparation. Culture differences influenced morale, such as when Lieutenant Colonel Spooner tried to enforce strict discipline on the American and French Jedburghs.

   The equipment was developed and improved throughout the training period. The Jedburghs used the best equipment available from each country. However, radios were evolving and became a problem for a large number of Jedburgh teams. They could not stand the airdrops and were easily damaged.

   Command and Control

   The intense training and team "marriages" contributed to the strength of the internal command and control. Team members knew and respected each other prior to deployment. Simple delineation of duties, like Bank’s, served to provide adequate details for the teams.

   The Jedburghs’ control over the resistance was enhanced by the association with EEMFI and the inclusion of
a French national on the team. However, the major factor was the ability to resupply the resistance with airdrops.

The external command and control was affected by the newness of the organization. The creation of SF detachments and the SFHQ was a good concept that worked poorly in reality. Competing organizations and a lack of knowledge by the Army staffs concerning SOF resulted in shortfalls in coordination, intelligence, and dissemination.

Operation DRAGOON

Operation ANVIL incorporated the resistance and the Jedburgh concept from the start. Using the lessons learned from Overlord, planners counted on the Resistance to assist the invasion.

The actions by Team Packard in ANVIL provide a very small picture of the overall operation, but it does serve to demonstrate some of the capabilities and limitation of the Jedburgh concept. Team Packard received a sketchy briefing, despite the Seventh Army planners' incorporation of the resistance.

The local resistance had already organized before the Team's arrival, but the Jedburghs had a significant impact on the eventual success. Bank and Team Packard efficiently trained, armed and controlled the resistance prior to the invasion. Problems occurred with the FTP, but were minimized in part because of the French team members.
The resistance provided support for the initial invasion by restricting the Germans to the Rhone Valley. They also allowed the Seventh Army to continue the pursuit by conducting rear operations, after linkup.

The actions by Team Packard serve to verify the Jedburgh concept. Unfortunately the effectiveness of the individual teams was minimized for a variety of reasons. An experienced organization to provide command and control, better technology to communicate, and doctrine to increase inter-operability with conventional forces may have increased the Jedburghs' effectiveness.
CHAPTER FIVE

DOCTRINE

The preceding chapters on the Commandos, First Special Service Force, and the Jedburghs demonstrated the critical role of the British in organizing, training, and doctrine on the American special operations in World War II. As the world’s current major power, the responsibility falls on the United States to assume the lead in providing future doctrine on combined and special operations.

Combined doctrine is unique and difficult to develop. It is influenced by politics, culture, and security concerns. Additionally, there is no guarantee that Allies will agree to follow the doctrine. This difficulty has resulted in the United States entering each new coalition or alliance on an ad hoc basis, relearning old lessons and working through the difficulties. However, the United States is currently developing doctrine designed to describe how to conduct combined operations based on their historical lessons.

This chapter analyzes current United States combined and special operations doctrine to determine the strengths and weaknesses in organization, training, and command and control. The documents analyzed are: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS PUB 3.0 Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations

JCS Pub 3.0 is a test publication that contains joint doctrine to guide the activities and employment of the United States Armed Forces during unified and joint operations. Chapter Four provides guidance to US Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs) serving as combined commanders and participating in planning and conducting combined operations. CINCs will frequently conduct operations using alliances, coalitions or other international arrangements during peace, conflict, and war.

It identifies requirements and implications of combined operations in peace and war by listing the CINC’s responsibilities and providing organizational considerations. It specifically addresses organization, training, command and control, and doctrine for combined operations.

JCS Pub 3.0 lists organizational considerations for combined operations as geographic, infrastructure, and the economic and political cohesion of nations within the alliance or coalition. Additionally, the CINC determines
the most significant military planning factors: the threat, composition of friendly forces, or the types of operations to be conducted."

Planning for and conducting combined training exercises is listed as part of the peacetime requirements. It states:

Training exercises are necessary to practice combined warfighting, certify interoperability, and evaluate DTTP (Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures). Combined exercises also reassure allies of commitment while deterring aggression.

Command and control is a central issue in JCS Pub 3.0. It tasks the CINC's to determine appropriate command relationships and levels of authority among US and Allied subordinates. It provides organizational options -- area or functional -- and identifies the need for information flow. It recommends the use of language-qualified liaison officers to assist in the flow of information.

The need to establish combined doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures is also identified in JCS Pub 3.0. It states:

The blend of forces, cultures, and objectives within an alliance requires DTTP peculiar to each theater or areas within a theater. Alliance and national DTTP should be complementary and provide a common set of definitions to alliance forces.... DTTP and definitions should be codified into standard agreements, SOP's, MOUs, or other appropriate means.

JCS PUB 3.0 provides adequate guidance for CINCs to organize, train, and command and control combined operations. The guidance provides enough latitude for CINCs
to adjust, based on theater requirements. However, the guidance is necessarily general and requires supporting doctrine to plan and conduct combined operations at the operational and tactical level.

**FM 100 - 5 Operations**

FM 100-5 is the U.S. Army's keystone warfighting manual. It explains how the Army will plan and conduct campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements with other services and allied forces. However, only nine pages are devoted to combined operations.

FM 100-5 stresses the need to maintain the political cohesion of the coalition as a prerequisite for maintaining the military effectiveness and cohesion of the allied military organization. To accomplish that goal, the accommodation of differences in the political military objective is the highest importance. Similarly, the differences in allied capabilities and logistical support also must be accommodated.

Organization, training, command and control, and doctrine are addressed by FM 100-5 in varying degrees. It identifies the main considerations for planning and conducting combined operations as command and control, intelligence, operational procedures, and combat service support. FM 100-5 does not identify why or how to organize
a combined unit. It covers the remaining organization considerations under command and control.

Training of combined forces is covered indirectly under the section on coordinating combined operations. FM 100-5 recommends training, in addition to liaison and equipment exchanges, to help offset dissimilar tactical control measures, tactical methods and operating procedures, and varying organizations and capabilities of the units.'

The major areas covered under command and control are unity of command, liaison arrangements, personalities and sensitivities, and multi-national staffing. Unity of command is the goal and is based on the political and strategic leadership of the alliance. National contingents will usually retain command of their own forces and relinquish operational command or control of the forces they commit to a combined operation.

Special communication and liaison arrangements are needed when command relationships are established between US units and allies. FM 100-5 recommends considering personal and national characteristics, establishing multi-national staffing, and exchanging liaison officers to help overcome problems.10

It identifies current doctrinal arrangements in US alliances: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United States-Republic of Korea (US-ROK). It also states the need for other theaters to develop procedures for
combined operations, but it does not provide specific guidance on developing doctrine.

FM 100-5 was published before JCS PUB 3.0 and fails to support the joint doctrine on combined operations. Weighted heavily on command and control, and coordinating combined operations, it does not adequately cover organizing or training combined units. Additionally, there is no guidance on developing combined doctrine.

**FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces**

FM 100-25 is the integrating manual for U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and serves as the doctrinal manual for subordinate ARSOF units. It describes the roles, missions, capabilities, organization, and command and control of subordinate units.

It does not have a separate chapter for combined operations; however, guidance is provided in the special operations imperatives. Several imperatives impact directly on the organization, command and control, training, and doctrine of combined special operations. Three imperatives are extremely sensitive to combined operations: engage the threat discriminately, ensure legitimacy and credibility of SO, and apply capabilities indirectly.

FM 100-25 directs SOF operators to educate conventional commanders on when, where, and how to employ SOF, due to limited resources and political implications.
* Understand the operational environment
* Recognize political implications
* Facilitate interagency activities
* Engage the threat discriminately
* Consider long-term effects
* Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations (SO) activities
* Anticipate and control psychological effects
* Apply capabilities indirectly
* Develop multiple options
* Ensure long-term sustainment
* Provide sufficient intelligence
* Balance security and synchronization

Figure 9. Special Operations Imperatives.


When? Employ SOF when nonmilitary options are insufficient and other military (conventional) options are inappropriate or infeasible.

Where? Employ SOF where the results required are beyond the influence of conventional military forces.

How? Employ SOF-
* With surgical precision to minimize collateral effects.
* In a concealed or covered manner so only the effects are detectable.
* Indirectly through the military forces of foreign power.

Figure 10. SO Employment Criteria.

FM 100-25 identifies legitimacy as the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. SO needs legitimacy to gain the support of indigenous elements, as well as the US population, and the international community.\textsuperscript{12}

The primary role of SOF in combined operations is defined under the imperative, apply capabilities indirectly. SOF advises, trains, and assists indigenous military and paramilitary forces. SOF operators are directed to avoid taking charge, but, to reinforce and enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy, and credibility of the supported foreign government or group.\textsuperscript{13}

FM 100-25 provides additional guidance for combined operations in Chapter Three, Army Special Operations Forces Missions. The SO missions in accordance with Public Law (10 USC 167) are:

- Direct action
- Strategic Reconnaissance
- Unconventional warfare (UW)
- Foreign internal defense
- Civil affairs
- Psychological operations
- Counterterrorism
- Humanitarian assistance
- Theater search and rescue

Figure 11. Special Operations Missions.

All missions can be conducted in a combined environment, but, direct action and unconventional warfare provide the most detail on combined operations. The distinguishing characteristic between DA and UW is command and control. DA operations are directed by a SOF chain of command to achieve SOF objectives. Unlike UW operations that involve the support of an indigenous chain of command to achieve objectives of mutual interest.

Direct action operations are short-duration, small-scale offensive actions by SOF. Designed to inflict damage, seize, or destroy a specific target, or to destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or material. FM 100-25 uses historical examples to illustrate successful unilateral and combined DA operations.

Unconventional warfare covers a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations. It is normally of long duration, usually conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. Again, FM 100-25 uses historical examples from the OSS in World War II to illustrate successful UW operations.

As the integrating manual for ARSOF, FM 100-25's focus is on the roles, missions, capabilities, organization, and command and control of subordinate units. It does not specifically address combined special operations. However, the manual provides combined considerations through the SO
imperatives. The successful planning and conduct of combined special operations requires additional doctrine.

**FM 100-5 Operations (Draft)**

FM 100-5 (Draft) is a product of a deliberate process by the U. S. Army to revise the keystone doctrine to capture wisdom and knowledge in recent combat experiences such as Operation URGENT FURY, Operation JUST CAUSE, and Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. It expands the information on combined operations and dedicates a chapter to the subject. Chapter Fourteen covers the subject in two sections: principles and conduct of combined operations.

* Goals and objectives
* Military doctrine and training
* Equipment
* Cultural differences
* Language
* Role of personalities

**Figure 12. Combined Principles.**


The combined principles in FM 100-5 (Draft) provide considerations to prevent potential inhibitors to forming and sustaining a combined force." They also provide
specific guidance on organizing, and training a combined unit.

The section on goals and objectives provides guidance on organization, and why to form a combined unit. Additionally, it identifies the problems with the length of formation and unequal risk and burden sharing.

Different nations strategic aims and doctrine vary resulting in the need for combined doctrine. FM 100-5 (Draft) recommends using great care in selecting units for particular missions, because training, equipment and technologies vary. It also covers considerations for planners in accommodating, equipment, cultural and language differences. Those considerations with the role of personalities are incorporated in the conduct of combined operations.

FM 100-5 (Draft) covers the conduct of combined operations in the areas of command, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and liaison. Command and control, or unity of effort is identified as the overarching consideration for successful combined operations.

The authority of command is used to unify alliance or coalition members into providing for common needs before self desires of national issues. FM 100-5 (Draft) acknowledges that national contingents will normally retain command of their own forces, but, theater commanders will retain some functions of command. It recommends
establishing a combined headquarters if nations are similar in culture, doctrine, training, and equipment or they have extensive experience working together. However, for dissimilar nations with language barriers, doctrinal variance, and equipment limitations it suggests an indirect approach. The indirect approach incorporates the use of a primary staff to conduct planning and a secondary staff to absorb, translate and relay executable instructions to coalition members.

Under maneuver, FM 100-5 (Draft) recommends assigning selected functions to forces of a smaller group of allied partners to overcome differences in training, doctrine, and equipment. It provides home defense and rear area security as examples. Additionally, it suggests liaisons, equipment exchanges, and training to offset the inherent problems of combined operations.

FM 100-5 (Draft) incorporates the guidance provided in JCS PUB 3.0 and utilizes many of the lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. It addresses organization, training, command and control, and doctrine for combined operations. However, the focus of the manual is on the strategic level requiring supporting doctrine at the operational and tactical level.
FM 100-8 Combined Army Operations (Draft)

FM 100-8 (Draft) is designed to address combined army operation at the operational level of war. It contains four chapters: introduction, combined environment, combined army command and leadership, and combined operations across the continuum.

The introduction covers the future strategic environment, and provides a historical background. It also identifies current and future alliances and explains the methodology. The manual adequately identifies the scope of the subject, through historical precedence, and describes the method of analysis.

Chapter two provides insight into the combined environment by discussing the US structure, defining combined command structures, and explaining combined army functions. Additionally, it illustrates factors that affect combined operations and identifies combined planning considerations.

The section on US structure is primarily at the strategic level and is covered in JCS PUB 3.0. Combined command structure is oriented on the operational level and defines parallel and unilateral command structures. Combined Army functions are analyzed using the US battlefield operating systems: maneuver, fire support, command and control, intelligence, logistics, air defense, and nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC).
Figure 13. Parallel Command Structure


Figure 14. Unilateral Command Structure.

Guidance for command and control is expanded in the section on combined army functions. FM 100-8 (Draft) identifies politics as the key to smooth command and control. It addresses the need for unity of command, and establishing rules of engagement (ROE) and identification of friend or foe (IFF) procedures in the combined force.

The section on factors affecting combined operations provides a strategic perspective on why coalitions and alliances are formed, but provides little guidance on why the US should form coalitions. The combined planing considerations listed in FM 100-8 similarly, provide little guidance. Combined planing considerations were reduced to doctrine, cultural and religious differences, and host nation support. The manual identifies some of the problems with combined operations; however, it provides the planner minimal options to overcome the problems.

Combined army command and leadership is covered in chapter three. This chapter uses historical lessons to illustrate the importance of understanding the capabilities, training and personal and professional habits of senior allied commanders. Understanding personalities is important and is covered in JCS PUB 3.0 and FM 100-5 (Draft); however, it may be overstated in this manual. Predominately an issue of leadership, the majority of the options offered by FM 100-8 (Draft) apply equally to unilateral operations.
The final chapter discusses combined operations across the operational continuum. It uses historical examples to illustrate what worked and what did not work in the combined environment. FM 100-8 (Draft) uses Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM to illustrate combined operations across the continuum of war. Additionally, it provides two historical examples to illustrate future combined operations.

Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM provides a good example of what worked well but FM 100-8 (Draft) cautions readers when drawing conclusions from the effort. The uniqueness of the operation identified in the manual is the reason other operations should be incorporated into the analysis.

The other historical examples are also questionable. The United Nations Joint Security Force Joint Security Area (UNCSF-JSA) is a combined Korean/American peacekeeping force under United Nations Command control. As a combined battalion, it provides a better example to determine strengths and weaknesses in combined peacekeeping operations.

The hostage rescue example is a joint operation. Aside from minor planning issues, the combining of Belgian Commandos and US aircraft provides minimal guidance for conducting combined operations.
FM 100-8 (Draft) incorporates many of the US lessons learned, but fails to provide adequate guidance in organization, training, command and control, and doctrine for combined operations.

**Conclusion**

This analysis reveals that current US doctrine on combined and special operations doctrine has improved but remains inadequate in the areas of organization, training, and command and control. JCS PUB 3.0, FM 100-25, and FM 100-5 (Draft) provide sufficient guidance; however, they require supporting doctrine to conduct combined special operations at the operational or tactical level. FM 100-8 (Draft) requires major revision to adequately address combined warfare at the operational level.

JCS PUB 3.0 and FM 100-5 (Draft) provide the CINC with strategic considerations and options for organizing combined operations. Special operations considerations, but few options, are presented in FM 100-25’s SO imperatives. FM 100-8 (Draft) presents several command structures, but few organizational considerations.

Training of combined units is covered by the different manuals in varying degrees. JCS PUB 3.0 and FM 100-5 (Draft) provide the most detail. FM 100-25 defines training indigenous forces as one of the key SOF tasks.
However, the doctrine lacks detail in addressing how training is conducted.

All of the manuals place major emphasis on command and control. The doctrine, while detailed at the strategic level, does not provide sufficient depth at the operational and tactical level.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters provide both an appreciation of the benefits, and the political and military ramifications of conducting combined special operations. These brief vignettes point out the complexity of organizing, training, and controlling special units from various countries. They also identify successful concepts and techniques to incorporate into current doctrine and future combined special operations units.

The basic question addressed in this study was whether current US doctrine was adequate based on an analysis of combined special operations units in the European Theater during World War II. Sufficient doctrine, specifically for a combined environment, is difficult to write. Combined doctrine is influenced by politics, culture, and security concerns. It is also based on the broad assumption that Allies will agree to follow the doctrine. Therefore, it is not surprising that current US doctrine on combined special operations is insufficient. However, recent publications are moving to address the
critical problems and considerations of the combined environment.

**Doctrine**

The analysis revealed that current US doctrine has improved, but remains inadequate to organize, train, and command and control a combined special operations unit. JCS PUB 3.0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, and FM 100-5, Operations (Draft), provide good strategic guidance; however, they require supporting doctrine at the operational and tactical level.

FM 100-8, Combined Army Operations (Draft), does not provide the supporting doctrine and would require major revision to adequately address combined operations. One of the contributing factors is an over-reliance on Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. FM 100-8 uses Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM as the historical example for crisis response, peacetime competition, transition to hostilities, and post hostility operations. The analysis of the combined special operations units in World War II identified several critical considerations for planners that are not prevalent in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, but should be incorporated into current doctrine.
Combined Special Operations in the European Theater
During World War II

The analysis revealed that although the units were formed for a variety of reasons they were generally effective. Their effectiveness resulted, in part, from achieving unity of effort. The units achieved unity of effort because of good organization, and excellent training, in spite of poor command and control.

The study of the Commandos, FSSF, and Jedburgh organization's identified several significant factors. The reason the units were formed and the period they stayed together were critical to the success of the units. Combined special operations units should be formed to accomplish a clear objective that all participants have agreed upon. This concept is commonly accepted for combined operations; however, this analysis revealed that special units may also be formed for non-typical reasons.

Historically, coalitions and alliances were formed for several basic reasons: Provide sufficient combat power to resist or carry out aggression, identify alignment of powers to adversaries to deter aggression, and transform common goals to formal commitments. In "The Challenges of Combined Operations," the authors also stress the formation of coalitions to achieve political and public legitimacy.

The military units in this study were formed for a variety of reasons. Training, political and public legitimacy, expertise, and language capabilities were all
factors in the formation of the units. The Dieppe Raid force was formed to provide the final phase of training for the Rangers and Inter-Allied Commandos. The use of Rangers and No 10 Commando had no real effect on the operation but resulted in long term benefits for both units. In addition to the training value, the operation also resulted in political legitimacy for the US and governments-in-exile. The First Special Service Force (FSSF) was formed to conduct a raid in Norway. The Canadians provided cold weather and arctic experience, while the Americans provided facilities, logistics, and equipment.

The Jedburgh teams also were formed with a clear objective: to assist in Operation OVERLORD. Each of the nationalities brought capabilities to the Jedburgh concept. The British provided special operations experience and training. The US provided equipment and a growing logistics base; while the French provided language capability and legitimacy with the resistance.

Another significant factor identified in the analysis was the duration of formation. The ability to focus on initial objectives and maintain unity of effort decreased the longer the units remained combined.

The relative short existence of the Dieppe raid force resulted in clear, unchanging military objectives. The Rangers and No. 10 Commando conducted an extended training program with the British Commandos, but returned to their
units, after completion of the mission. The Jedburghs were formed for a longer duration, but remained focused on one campaign: the invasion of Northwest Europe. The Jedburghs remained focused on the initial objective, although cultural and administrative problems did occur. Following the successful invasion of France, the Jedburgh concept was dissolved and team members were reassigned.

The FSSF was formed initially with a clear purpose; however, after the cancellation of the Norway raid, the objective became obscure. The process of conducting combined special operations became the product. The prolonged partnership created numerous administrative problems, eventually overcoming any positive benefit resulting from continued existence.

The analysis of the units' training identified an often overlooked key to developing unity of effort within a combined unit. The intense, isolated nature of the training created an atmosphere where the unit assumed more importance than nationalities or even cultures. In every example, the units conducted difficult training isolated from all other forces. In addition to superb training, this isolation forced soldiers from different backgrounds and cultures to develop as a team. The recruiting process, initiated by the Commandos and adapted to varying degrees by each of the units, insured competent, motivated soldiers were selected.
Additionally, other techniques used by the different units assisted the eventual unity of effort.

The Rangers and the First Special Service Force adopted a "return to unit" policy. Soldiers that could not meet the unit standards were returned to their initial unit. Former FSSF soldiers claimed that it was a dreaded form of punishment. In units with multiple chains of command this policy ensures that equal punishment is attainable. Another technique used to ensure unity of effort was the Jedburgh Team "Marriages." This helped to establish mutual respect between the team members before operations.

The FSSF provided the best example of establishing mutual training standards. The Americans and Canadians were both still untried in combat and were willing to accept the best techniques from each country resulting in an exceptionally trained unit. The training records demonstrate that they scored well above other US units in their pre-deployment inspections.

The command and control of US special operations units in World War II has drawn deserved criticism from numerous researchers. The combined special operations units analyzed in this thesis are no exception.

The FSSF and the Jedburghs demonstrate several common command and control problems. Both were new organizations trying to overcome a lack of special operations knowledge in the conventional Army. Poor
planning and utilization of combined special operation units minimized their effectiveness. In contrast, the British Commandos enjoyed a more successful command and control arrangement.

The Commando chain of command was very centralized and ensured the proper use of the Commandos, when under the operational control of conventional units. Backed by Churchill, and controlled by the Chief of Combined Operations, they were placed under operational control of senior ground force commanders for strategic missions. No. 3 and 4 Commando were placed under the operational control of Major General Roberts for the Dieppe raid. Roberts maintained control of the Commandos but allowed the separate commanders to plan the raids on Varengeville and Berneval. The mission’s short duration minimized internal command problems between the Commandos, Rangers, and Inter-Allied Commandos. Unity of command was also assisted by the intense training at Achnacarry and rehearsals in preparation for the mission.

The FSSF provided both positive and negative considerations for planners. The internal command and control was highly successful for a fully integrated unit. The complete integration of the organization, intense training, and combined administrative agreements resulted in minimal problems. The external command and control was not as successful. The FSSF was placed under the operational
control of numerous conventional units, opposed to the central control of the Commandos. The conventional units lack of knowledge regarding special operations force's capabilities and limitations was understandable but still resulted in poor utilization of the unit. The FSSF's eventual use as a conventional infantry unit resulted in high losses, analogous to the Rangers.  

The Jedburghs also had effective internal command and control, due to training and Team "Marriages." Their control over resistance forces was assisted by the formation of the Etat-major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (EMFFI), but rested more on their ability to resupply the Maquis.

A new organization, and lack of knowledge of Special Operations Forces by Army Staffs were primarily responsible for the Jedburgh's external command and control problems. Two organizations, the Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) and Special Forces Detachments, evolved to provide command and control over the Jedburgh Teams.

The SFHQ conducted the initial briefing and dispatched the Jedburgh Teams; conducted liaison with SHAEF and the Free French; and operated the combined SOE/SO radio station. Special Forces Detachments were attached to the field armies to coordinate resistance actions with conventional operations and linked the field army with SFHQ.
The framework to provide command and control was well planned but poorly executed. SFHQ was unable to coordinate effectively with the French Resistance, Field Armies, SAS, or even organizations under its control. Two factors limited the effectiveness of Special Forces Detachments coordination with the field armies. The SF detachments could not communicate with the Jedburghs or resistance directly and they failed to educate conventional planners on the capabilities and limitation of Special Operations Forces. The combined result was shortfalls in coordination, intelligence, and dissemination. ³¹

The role of special operations in the European Theater was small, but supported the eventual success of the conventional forces. The effectiveness was minimized by a lack of centralized control. This led to poor coordination of special operations assets, and misuse by conventional forces. Despite these problems the Commandos, FSSF, and Jedburghs achieved enough success to demonstrate the possibilities of combined special operations. ³⁷

The effectiveness of the Commandos cannot be measured against the failure of the Dieppe Raid. The Commandos achieved the goals of combining the unit by increasing the training level of the Rangers and Inter-Allied Commandos. Additionally, they achieved political legitimacy for the US and exiled countries. The future success of the Rangers and Inter-Allied Commandos rested on
the training conducted by the Commandos and tested in the Dieppe Raid.

The First Special Service Force was another highly decorated unit in World War II. Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON was one of the First Special Service Force's final missions, but it demonstrated their capabilities as a SOF unit. Their training and effectiveness as an assault force were illustrated when they spearheaded the amphibious assault on the Iles d'Hyeres. This brief vignette also identified one of the Force's major weaknesses: the inability to dislodge heavy fortifications.

The Jedburgh teams achieved varying degrees of success in support of the Allied invasion of Northwest Europa. Team Packard's effectiveness in support of Operation ANVIL demonstrated the capabilities and some limitations of the Jedburgh concept. Seventh Army incorporated the use of resistance forces early in planning the operation. The resistance, assisted by the Jedburghs, was an effective force multiplier for the Allies. Team Packard organized, trained and armed the resistance. They assisted conventional units by drawing Germans away from the invasion beaches, and disrupting the flow of supplies. After the invasion of southern France, the resistance restricted German withdrawal routes, and stabilized the area, allowing the conventional forces to continue the exploitation.
Team Packard was effective, but suffered from several common Jedburgh Team problems. They deployed late, after the resistance had organized, and received a poor briefing from the headquarters at Algiers. Additionally, the inability to coordinate with other SOF assets (SAS) minimized the effectiveness in their area of operations.

Planning Considerations

Combined special operations units like the Commandos, FSSF, and Jedburghs will be effective if they are organized for the right reasons and trained correctly. However, to maximize effectiveness of the units several considerations are critical and should be incorporated when establishing the goals and objectives of the unit.

Planners should consider two critical factors before organizing a combined special operations unit: why it is necessary; and how long the organization should exist. This analysis identified political legitimacy, individual capabilities-expertise, or training as reasons to form a unit. The length of existence is another critical consideration during organization. The unit must spend enough time together in training to accomplish the mission. However, the FSSF demonstrated that focusing on military objectives, and maintaining unity of effort is difficult over an extended duration. Defining the need for a combined unit and how long it should exist will assist planners in
developing an integrated strategy to train and employ the unit.

Training was shown to be a critical factor in achieving unity of effort and complementary tactics. All the units conducted intense training, isolated from other forces. The unit standards and training techniques were adopted from all participating countries; and soldiers unable to accomplish the standards were returned to their original unit. The isolation, standards, and "return to unit" policy helped to alleviate cultural and language problems and assisted in achieving unity of effort. Additionally, the combined training developed complementary tactics and doctrine for the participating forces.

The planning considerations derived from the analysis of command and control reinforce the common base of knowledge on the weakness of special operations in World War II. A comparison of the Commandos and the FSSF revealed the benefits of centralized command and control over special operations units. Control by the Combined Operations Headquarters ensured the Commandos were properly utilized, in contrast with the poor use of the FSSF in the Mediterranean Theater, before Operation ANVIL.

The efforts by the SOE and OSS to establish a combined headquarters with the resulting problems demonstrated the difficulties inherent in combined staffs. Their ability to achieve a measure of success with a new
organization during war identify the plausibility of the concept. However, planners must control the organizational confusion and bureaucratic competition illustrated in the SFHQ.

This study provides several planning considerations that could be incorporated in US doctrine. However, the units analyzed represent only a small percentage of the combined special operations in World War II. Further study of combined special operations in the other theaters of war, in addition to more current operations, such as Operation DESERT STORM, will assist the development of future US doctrine.
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Chapter Four

1. Lewis, 66.


3. Ibid, 31-32; Lewis, 1-3.


5. Ibid, 8-9.

6. Ibid, 9-10; OSS/London Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, Microfilm Publication), (Hereafter OSS/London SO Branch micro.), Reel III, Vol IV, JEDBURGHS, Preamble to 1 January, 1944, i,x.


10. Ibid, ii.


17. Gutjahr, 33.


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20. Ibid, 13; Bank, 18.
21. Ibid, 13; Bank, 18-19; Gutjahr, 40.
22. Gutjahr, 40.
24. Ibid, 12.
25. Bank, 22.
27. Ibid, Reel I, Vol II, Planning, January-September 1944, 5-6, 30; Gutjahr, 37.
29. Ibid, 5-6, 31; Reel III, Vol IV, 31.
32. Bank, 16-17; Gutjahr, 42-43.
33. Ibid, 14.
34. Ibid, 20.
35. Ibid, 36.
36. OSS/London SO Branch micro, Reel V, Vol V, i, xx; Reel I, /ol II, xxv, 17-18; Lewis, 8-11; Gutjahr, 14-19.
37. Foot, 32-33; Lewis, 6-7; Gutjahr, 16-17.
38. Ibid, 33.
40. Lewis, 8, 60.
41. Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combine Chiefs of Staff on Operations in Southern France, August 1944, 18-20.


43. Bank, 34-35.

44. Ibid, 37.

45. Ibid, 41.

46. Ibid, 41.

47. Ibid, 44-47.


49. Ibid, 52-54.
Chapter Five


3. Ibid, IV-5.

4. Ibid, IV-3.

5. Ibid, IV-2, IV-5.


8. Ibid, 164.


10. Ibid, 165-166.


12. Ibid, 2-17.

13. Ibid, 2-17.


15. Ibid, 3-11, 3-12.

16. Ibid, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5.


19. Department of the Army, FM 100-8, Combined Army Operations (Draft) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January, 1992), 1. The researcher received an updated copy of FM 100-8 (Draft), undated, but was unable to include an analysis in this thesis.

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22. Ibid, 3-1.
23. Ibid, 4-1.
Chapter Six

1. Freeman, 11n7; FM 100-8 (Draft), 4-1 – 4-5. Freeman states that Operation DESERT STORM is the historical exception rather than the rule. Yet, FM 100-8 (Draft) uses Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM as the historical example for crisis response, peacetime competition, transition to hostilities, and post-hostility operations.

2. JCS PUB 3.0, IV-5; FM 100-5, 164; FM 100-5 Operations (Draft), 14-2. All of the manuals address the need for clear objectives, but the concept is stressed in FM 100-5 (Draft). It lists goal and objectives as the first principle for combined operations.

3. Freeman, 3-7.

4. Bank, 37. Banks states that the letter from General Koenig, EMFFI, impressed the resistance leader; however, he explains later that the ability to resupply was the main control over the resistance.


6. Adleman and Walton, 11. The "return to unit" policy is currently used in many of the U.S. special operations units. This researcher observed the same sentiments in young enlisted soldiers in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

7. Ibid, 95-96; Burhans, 57-58.

8. Lewis, 60-61, 64-66; Foot, 20-35, 433-437; Hogan, 135-139.

9. After the Dieppe Raid, larger numbers of Commandos were used in Madagascar, Tunisia, Burma, and Germany. The Commandos were eventually used as infantry in sustained combat operations.

10. Burhans, 303-314; Beaumont, 10. The FSSF suffered 329 killed or missing in action during their existence. The Rangers lost 1051 of 1500 soldiers at Cisterna and the drive on Naples.

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11. Foot, 390-393, 402; R. Harris Smith, 185-190; Lewis 63-65; Gutjahr, 238-241.

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