THE EVACUATION PHASE
OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN OF 1915

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

KEITH A. LAWLESS, MAJOR, USMC
B.S., Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York, 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This study examines the Allied evacuation of 130,000 men, nearly 10,000 animals, and huge quantities of weapons and equipment from the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915. A synopsis of the eight months preceding the evacuation illustrates the myriad problems facing the Allies during the ill-fated campaign to secure the Dardanelles straits. The study analyzes the decision to evacuate and the subsequent planning, preparation, and execution of the amphibious withdrawal. The Allies were able to conduct the withdrawal with no lives lost from enemy action and no man left behind. The study concludes that the successful evacuation of the Anzac, Suvla, and Helles beachheads was the result of close coordination, tactical ingenuity, disciplined troops, bold leadership, and good fortune: qualities essential to any amphibious operation. Though there is much to be learned from the Allied failures on the Gallipoli peninsula, so is there equally much to be learned from the brilliant success of its evacuation.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EVACUATION OF SUVLA AND ANZAC BEACHHEAD</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. EVACUATION OF THE HELLES BEACHHEAD</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Sketc of the Gallipoli Peninsula</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Evacuation of the Anzac-Suvla Beachhead</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Evacuation of the Helles Beachhead</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The 1915 Dardanelles Campaign stands as a classic example of disjointed combat operations, severe physical hardships, and marginal leadership. The Anglo-French military operation to secure the Dardanelles Straits joining the Mediterranean and Black Seas was labeled in hindsight, as "disastrous" by political and military leaders. The eight month campaign failed to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to control the straits. Allied losses for the entire campaign were forecast at 5,000 men. Actual casualties numbered over one half million on both sides. The campaign ended with a humbling Allied withdrawal. Although the operation itself was a dismal failure, the evacuation of Allied forces from Gallipoli ranks among the most impressive, imaginative, and audacious operational successes of the entire war.

The withdrawal of an army in the face of the enemy, with its subsequent evacuation by sea, is a complex and dangerous military operation of the first magnitude. No study of amphibious warfare is complete without examining the events surrounding the remarkable Allied evacuation of
the Gallipoli Peninsula. An amphibious withdrawal requires close coordination, tactical ingenuity, disciplined troops, bold leadership, and good fortune. The intangible qualities were noticeably absent during the eight months prior to the evacuation; yet, the evacuation was executed with no lives lost from enemy action and no man left behind. How could the Allies accomplish such a masterful feat after the woeful performances of the previous months?

In 1914, Turkey joined the Central Powers, creating a dilemma for the Allied powers of France, Russia, and Great Britain. The British had hoped the Turks would remain neutral. In fact, most Turks preferred the British over the Germans. However, joining forces with Germany appeared to provide Turkey its best chance of regaining territory, such as Egypt and Cyprus. Upon entering the fray, the Turks threatened the Balkans, cut off Russian access to the Mediterranean, and provided Germany with a base in the Near East. British attempts to entice the Greeks to assault Turkey proved fruitless. German cruisers and submarines stalked the contiguous waters of Turkey for Allied vessels attempting to resupply Russia or Egypt. The Russians were fighting the Turks in the Caucasus, were and doing poorly on the front. London and Paris feared a Russian collapse. Opening the Dardanelles would enable munitions to get to Russia and
Russian grain to get to the Allies. The British needed to wrest Turkey away from Germany's grasp.

In late 1914, discussions in London turned from the Western Front in France to Russia. The Russians wanted the Allies to conduct a military demonstration to divert Turkish attention from the Caucasus. Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener, British Secretary of State for War and hero of Khartoum, and Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, favored military action against Turkey to accomplish several political objectives: First, to provide relief for Russia; second, to open another, more successful front; and third, to seize Constantinople (Istanbul) and force the Turks to withdraw from the Great War.

British intelligence indicated a single Turkish division occupied the Gallipoli Peninsula overlooking the Dardanelles. The decision to move against the straits was based upon sound and reasoned judgment, yet the manpower required for the mission was not readily available. Kitchener was adamant that no ground forces could be spared from the Western Front to augment this expedition. The Allies attempted to bring the neutral states of Greece, Bulgaria, and Italy into the alliance. These various attempts failed, although Bulgaria and Italy later entered the war. The Allies finally endorsed a naval demonstration with no ground forces at all. Prior to the war, both Britain and Greece had contemplated such an operation as a
contingency measure. Both determined it infeasible. In 1915, much of the world believed the presence of the British fleet off Constantinople would topple the Turkish regime and remove the Turks from the War. Churchill initially opposed the idea of a purely payal operation. Eventually, he became a leading proponent of the plan after receiving assurances of its success from Vice Admiral Sackville Carden, commander of the naval forces operating in the Aegean Sea.

The demonstration required nearly two dozen Allied warships to run the straits, to bombard the Turkish forts protecting the straits, and to clear the mines in the channel. The naval task force, led by Carden, included the newly commissioned battleship HMS "Queen Elizabeth," a French squadron of four battleships, and thirteen pre-Dreadnought vessels. Carden believed the straits could be successfully forced, given sufficient minesweepers and warships. He proposed to neutralize the Turkish shore batteries, to sweep the mines within the straits, and to steam into the Sea of Marmara. The fleet would then threaten Constantinople.

The operation began on 19 February with a naval bombardment. The Turkish forts contained antiquated guns with limited ammunition. Minimal coastal battery fire was expected. Carden received limited fire from the Turks, but knew he needed to close on the coast to employ effective
fire on the forts. Turkish 6 inch howitzer field guns provided effective fire against the ships negotiating minefields.\(^8\) Intelligence now indicated one, possible two, Turkish Infantry divisions tasked with defending both the Gallipoli Peninsula and Asiatic side of the straits. Bad weather limited accurate spotting for naval gunfire, compelling the Allies to suspend the operation until the weather improved. Turkey used this respite to reinforce the peninsula.

On 25 February, hostilities resumed with the Allies forcing the straits in broad daylight, employing naval gunfire upon the Turkish defenders. Bombardment caused heavy damage to the Turkish guns and sent the enemy scurrying to the north. Royal Marines and naval shore parties landed to destroy munitions left behind by fleeing Turks. The operation appeared to be a smashing success. However, the lack of a sizeable Allied ground force enabled Turkish reinforcements to retake the gun positions and to force landing parties to withdraw by 4 March. Allied warships were plagued by the combination of accurate shore battery fire and mines. The tactical gains of the demonstration were nullified by poor weather and insufficient ground forces. Churchill advocated the dispatch of the British 29th Division, yet, pressure on Lord Kitchener from France kept the division in England as a potential reinforcement of the Western Front. The naval
demonstration was executed without a supporting ground force; consequently, it failed. Even so, the next phase of the Dardanelles Campaign was already being pondered by leaders in London and Paris.

The weather improved by 10 March, yet the Allied fleet still could neither silence the enemy guns nor clear the straits of the numerous Turkish mines. Time was of the essence, since the arrival of German surface vessels and submarines was inevitable. A full scale naval attack on the straits was planned for 18 March. The battle still consisted of an unsupported naval force against primarily shore-based artillery. The Turks desperately held the Narrows which were about a mile wide, five miles long, and about 14 miles from the entrance to the straits. The loss of this small stretch of water would allow Allied access to the Black Sea, and to Constantinople, only 150 miles from Gallipoli. The prospect of a Turkish defeat and a peace accord between the Turks and British concerned the Germans. However, Turkish defenses along the Narrows and within the straits had been vastly improved under the able command of German General Liman von Sanders, known by the Turks as "Liman Pasha."

On the morning of the 18th, the British and French squadrons moved on the Narrows. Admiral Carden, who suffered a nervous breakdown on the eve of battle, was replaced by Vice Admiral John de Robeck. Attacking in
daylight, several ships received direct hits from Turkish guns. As a deception, the Turks used pipes, belching black smoke, to draw naval gunfire away from the actual shore batteries. Allied minesweepers, manned by civilian fishing crews, panicked when engaged by artillery fire from the Gallipoli batteries. Three Allied warships, disabled or sunk by floating mines, were taken under fire by the Turks ashore. The naval assault had been doomed without a supporting ground effort to destroy the enemy artillery. Again, the Allies tasted defeat through a combination of poor coordination and Turkish resolve.

Kitchener finally realized the need for forces to land on the peninsula. The Greeks, approached to provide a ground force, were promised British and French troops at Salonika. However, the Russians balked at the prospect of a Greek presence within the straits. However illogical, the historic distrust between Russia and Greece outweighed the short term objectives. Great Britain and France would have to divert forces from Egypt and to employ the 29th Division to form an expeditionary force.

In London, the British War Council dispatched the "Mediterranean Expeditionary Force" (MEF) which contained the 29th Division, an Australian/New Zealand Corps (ANZAC), a French division, some Royal Marines, and a mix of Senegalese, Indian, and Gurkha forces. The total force numbered close to 75,000 men and 1,600 pack animals. It
was commanded by 62 year old General Sir Ian Hamilton, a Kitchener protege and friend of Churchill. Hamilton sailed to the mouth of the Narrows in mid-March. He quickly surveyed the enemy gun emplacements. Although unsure of his mission and the actual strength of the enemy, Hamilton surmised that a considerable land campaign was necessary to support the naval assault on the straits. Additional time was required to assemble the MEF and to plan an amphibious operation. Hamilton took a month before the MEF was ready to move against the peninsula. The fleet suspended operations along the Turkish coast while the army trained and rehearsed in Alexandria, Egypt. The Turks used the delay to regroup, to replenish supplies, and to reinforce defenses.

Hamilton's delay was consistent with the method of planning landing operations of the day. The delay, combined with Allied actions to date, also suggested an overall lack of respect for the Turks as a credible fighting force. London expected the Turks would retreat once the MEF landed. The Turks, in fact, were serious about defending the peninsula, positioning six divisions to defend against Allied attack.

Von Sanders wasted little time in preparing his forces to repel the anticipated attack. Poor Allied operational security compromised surprise. Von Sanders knew of Hamilton's arrival and the buildup of Allied forces
on the nearby Greek Islands of Imbros and Lemnos. German
and Turkish agents in Egypt gathered critical information
on the operation. Allied seaplanes continuously flew
reconnaissance missions over the peninsula, a further
indication of an impending assault. The Allied attack
remained scheduled for Sunday, 25 April.\textsuperscript{14}

Gallipoli contained four beaches suitable for
landing a sizeable force: Bulair, at the neck of the
peninsula; Suvla Bay, about midway along the western
peninsula; Ari Burnu, south of Suvla; and Cape Helles, on
the tip (see figure 1). Hamilton chose to land along the
southern portion of the peninsula, near Ari Burnu and Cape
Helles. His forces would linkup to push up the peninsula,
capturing the prominent ridges along the way. As
diversions, the French would land at Kum Kale on the
Asiatic side of the straits and the Royal Naval Division
would feint at Bulair. Hamilton delegated full authority
for the tactical conduct of the operation to his corps
commanders. Lieutenant General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston
commanded the British corps destined for Helles and
Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood commanded the Anzac
forces bound for the Gaba Tepe area, near Ari Burnu:

At 0500 on 25 April, the Allied forces landed;
confusion beset them almost immediately.\textsuperscript{15} Most of the
officers and men who knew little about their objectives,
were disoriented by the darkness. In fact, many of the
officers had not seen a map of the peninsula, Anzac forces, mistakenly landed a mile north of the intended landing site, were hampered by sheer cliffs rising from the beach. Hamilton, aboard ship, did not intervene. He believed officers ashore better able to make critical decisions. The ensuing confusion allowed von Sanders time to contain the Allies on the beaches with the defending Turkish 5th Army of six divisions with 80,000 men spread along the peninsula and on the Asiatic side of the straits. The foundation of his defense was based on the ridges overlooking the coastline. These locations enabled his forces to identify main landings and to move quickly to block Allied advances off the beaches.

Anzac forces attempted to move inland toward the prominent ridge, Chunuk Bair (850 ft.). A young Turkish division commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal, quickly reacted to the Anzac landing by seizing Chunuck Bair and by bringing direct fire on the Allied force. A pitched battle ensued for the remainder of the afternoon. The Anzacs, exhausted and in need of water, fought tenaciously to establish a small beachhead in the face of withering fire. Birdwood, ashore throughout the fight, provided firm direction and inspiring leadership. Kemal’s forces, who suffered 2,000 casualties, were unable to counterattack Birdwood’s units before nightfall.¹⁰

Securing the high ground, Kemal kept Anzac forces from
moving inland. By campaign's end, nearly 50,000 men would die in attempts to either hold or capture Chunuk Bair.¹⁷

British forces landed at Helles throughout the day. Hunter-Weston's brigade commanders were either dead or wounded, yet he provided little guidance to his forces ashore. Unlike Birdwood, Hunter-Weston remained aboard ship through much of the day. Upon learning that nearly 30,000 men were on the beaches, he unexplainedly failed to order them inland. Warships eagerly awaited calls for fire, yet requests rarely came. The fleet provided covering fire when possible, but poor ship-to-shore communications contributed to fratricide. Hamilton still hesitated to intervene. Unknown to the Allied forces at Helles, only 2,000 Turks opposed the landing, nearly half of them casualties by the end of the day.¹⁸ Although they outnumbered the Turks by six to one, British forces at Helles accomplished little more than creation of a beachhead. Meanwhile, the French, after successfully performing their diversion at Kum Kale, were withdrawn as reinforcements at Helles.

The entire Anzac position, about a dozen miles up the peninsula from Cape Helles, was less than two miles long and not very deep. Dispersal was necessary, but fear of Turkish counterattack compelled the Allied troops to remain in place. Allied forces on the peninsula at the end of 25 April faced a night of harassing attacks by the
Turks. Heavy casualties were expected on the first day. Thousands were dead at Helles; ammunition was depleted. Anzac troops, fighting bravely, denied the Turks the ability to mass against the Helles beachhead. Corpses littered the battlefield; many remained unburied throughout the campaign. Battles raged through 28 April, ending in stalemates with no appreciable gain for either side. Frontal assaults by both sides, with horrendous casualties, characterized the fighting. The Allies failed to breach the Turkish defenses, but believed only a short matter of time before the enemy defenses would fold.

The primary Allied objective was to link up the beachheads by capturing high ground. The focus of fighting during the next several months was near the town of Krithia, at the base of Achi Baba (see figure 1). Achi Baba provided a magnificent overlook of the Dardanelles. Its capture would provide the Allies with the observation necessary to spot for artillery and naval gun fire. Turkish defenses in the southern portion of the peninsula would become untenable. Hamilton was confident that his forces, if augmented, could capture the Krithia area. He received reinforcements from Egypt, the British 52nd Division, and pulled elements from the Anzacs to assist the Helles forces during three battles against the enemy at Krithia. The battles in April, May, and June, were conducted in broad daylight with ghastly casualties on both
sides. British and French losses totaled more than 12,000, while Turkish casualties were estimated at 30,000. After much effort, the Turks maintained control of Achi Baba. The Allies were still three miles from its summit. Several smaller battles occurred during July. By month’s end both sides had suffered over 100,000 total casualties with no measurable gain.

The slaughter worsened with periods of extreme boredom, oppressive heat, putrefied corpses, and countless flies. Cases of dysentery multiplied daily due to poor nutrition, high humidity, and inadequate sanitation. The wounded and sick were evacuated by boat to hospital ships offshore, and then to Imbros Island for intensive treatment. The most critical cases were sent on to hospitals in Alexandria or Malta. The Turks also experienced horrific casualties and even greater losses to illness. Turkish troops were not inoculated and proper field hygiene was not practiced.

Hamilton, whose troops were suffering, knew time was of the essence. He requested reinforcements to renew the offensive. At the end of July, the British War Council dispatched five additional divisions to the region. Together, these divisions formed the IX Corps. Although numbering 120,000 men, they were nearly all raw recruits with inexperienced officers. Hamilton’s total land force numbered 250,000, although critical shortages of howitzers,
mortars, and bombs existed.\textsuperscript{22} The IX Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Francis Stopford, an aged, infirm officer with little command experience, was to expand the Anzac beachhead. Artillery in the Turkish inventory numbered 330 guns, of which 270 were in the Gallipoli region.\textsuperscript{23} The Anzac beachhead was far too cramped. Hamilton and de Robeck agreed to land the IX Corps at Suvla Bay, five miles north of Anzac Cove. The corps would linkup with forces at Anzac, create a single, enlarged beachhead and enable the Allies to mount an offensive to sever the peninsula at its center.

Hamilton scheduled the Suvla landing for 8 August. He ordered diversionary attacks at Helles and Anzac. The Helles attack, another futile assault on Krithia, failed to occupy the attention of the Turks. At Anzac, a division was infiltrated onto the already crowded beachhead during the nights of 4 and 5 August. The 40,000 troops at Anzac were ordered to take an area called "Lone Pine" to convince the Turks that this was the main attack.\textsuperscript{24} However, the main tactical objective was to seize Sari Bair Ridge, of which Chunuk Bair is a part. Lone Pine was seized after fierce hand-to-hand combat. The combination of intense heat, furious fighting, and a lack of water left the Anzacs thoroughly exhausted. They awaited the assault elements of IX Corps.
Stopford was primarily concerned with getting his forces ashore. Once ashore, these inexperienced troops failed to move rapidly inland, losing any opportunity for tactical success. Indecision and confusion again plagued the Allies. Stopford, still aboard ship, was satisfied his forces had landed. He felt no compulsion personally to provide additional direction. In fact, he did not go ashore nor did he accompany Hamilton ashore on 7 August. Hamilton personally ordered the troops to advance, but the tactical advantage had already been squandered. The Turks occupied a hasty defense on the surrounding hills under the splendid direction of von Sanders and Kemal. On 9 August the Allies attempted a final, frontal assault against the dug-in Turks. It failed.

The attack on Sari Bair of 6-10 August failed at a cost of 12,000 British from Anzac and Helles, with a comparable number of Turkish casualties. Stopford continued to hurl his troops at the Turks in desperate charges, through the remainder of August. These attacks produced over 5,000 additional British casualties.

Hamilton relieved Stopford as corps commander. Although attacks continued for several months, the Suvla operation remained the high-water mark of Allied aspirations in the region. Kitchener denied Hamilton’s request for an additional 95,000 troops, therefore sealing the fate of the Dardanelles Campaign.
By October, talk in the British press and in Parliament turned to evacuation of Gallipoli. Kitchener asked Hamilton to provide an assessment of casualties in the event of evacuation. Hamilton, opposed to withdrawal, responded that nearly half of the force would be either wounded or killed in such an operation. The Dardanelles Committee, made up of British War Council members, informed Kitchener that Hamilton should be relieved of command. On 15 October, General Sir Charles Monro, a veteran of the Western Front sympathetic to the evacuation viewpoint, replaced Hamilton. Monro firmly believed the war could only be won on the battlefields of France, by killing Germans, not Turks. Prior to his departure, Monro was warned by Churchill that a withdrawal from Gallipoli would be disastrous. Monro arrived on 28 October. He immediately discussed the situation with subordinate commanders. The discussions centered on the ability of the Allies to maintain the offensive. Ammunition and weapons maintenance were chronic problems. Rifle triggers jammed from the effects of the increasingly colder temperatures. The water shortage worsened by drying wells and broken water pumps. Were these men capable of attacking and capturing Turkish positions? Could they hold out over the winter against both the elements and the enemy? The answer was quite obvious to him. On 30 October, he opted for evacuation.
On 1 November, Monro and de Robeck agreed to establish a joint naval-military committee to develop an evacuation plan. Monro formally advised Kitchener to evacuate the peninsula "in consequence of the grave daily wastage of officers and men . . . and owing to the lack of prospect of being able to drive the Turks from their entrenched lines." He estimated a loss of roughly 40 percent, 40,000 men, in an evacuation.

Kitchener refused to accept defeat, and the pessimistic casualty prediction of an evacuation, so quickly. On 15 November, Kitchener personally visited Gallipoli to discuss the issue with Monro and his commanders. Monro remained steadfast in his judgment to withdraw due to adverse weather conditions and enemy reinforcement. Birdwood, Anzac Corps commander, initially opposed evacuation; but he also was against rumored plans for an attack on Bulair. De Robeck, taken ill, returned to London. His replacement Admiral Sir Rosalyn Wemyss, strongly opposed evacuation. He favored continued pressure on the straits. Kitchener, observing the situation first-hand, sensing the futility of continuing the campaign, agreed to the evacuation of the Suvla and Anzac areas. Wemyss, with his deputy, Commodore Roger Keyes, successfully argued for delaying the withdrawal from Helles to provide a deterrent to German submarines attempting to transit the Dardanelles.
On 27 and 28 November, a blizzard swept the peninsula. Temperatures plummeted well below freezing. Gale force winds wrought destruction throughout Allied and Turkish encampments alike. The storm caused thousands of frostbite and exposure cases, and created a sense of despair among the troops. Its effects were felt in London, where the decision to evacuate was made official on 7 December. The decision was aided by the pressure placed on Britain, from France and Russia, to support a Salonika expedition. Forces withdrawn from Gallipoli could be used in that campaign. The few remaining proponents for continuing operations on the peninsula were said to be, "founded in conjecture and sentiment." Churchill had been pressured earlier to resign from the Admiralty because of his resistance to ending the Dardanelles Campaign.

Evacuation would be costly, but less costly if carried out on Allied terms. The planning needed to be rapidly completed without the Turk's knowledge. Helles troops would continue to hold the toe of the peninsula until the Suvla and Anzac evacuations were completed. They would then be evacuated. The British, with almost a half-million troops at Gallipoli, suffered nearly 120,000 combat casualties and thousands more to disease, heat stroke, and frostbite. Field artillery guns were down to two shells per day. Troops received one half gallon of water a day, exacerbating the effects of the already

18
countless cases of dysentery and dehydration. Could the remaining forces be safely evacuated given their condition, and the grave losses and incompetent leadership of the previous eight months? Would Monro’s frightening casualty estimates be realized? Ironically, Kitchener opined that the evacuation would come off, “without losing a man, and without the Turks knowing anything about it.” He was alone in this belief.
Endnotes


4 Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 34.


6 Ibid., 9.

7 Ibid., 8.

8 Ibid., 28.

9 Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 56.

10 Ibid., 84.

11 Ibid., 57.


13 Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 81.


15 Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 130.

16 Haythornwaite, *Gallipoli 1915*, 50.

17 Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 139.

18 Ibid., 149.

19 Haythornwaite, *Gallipoli 1915*, 52.


23 Ibid., 192.
24 Haythornwaite, Gallipoli, 1914, 71.
25 Ibid., 373.
26 Moorehead, Gallipoli, 300.
27 Ibid., 315.
28 Ibid., 315.

29 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1921), 836.
30 Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations: Gallipoli, 403.
31 Moorehead, Gallipoli, 319.
32 Ibid., 326.
33 Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations: Gallipoli, 427.
34 Moorehead, Gallipoli, 330.
37 Moorehead, Gallipoli, 315.
38 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War, 836.
39 Moorehead, Gallipoli, 333.
CHAPTER TWO

EVACUATION OF SUVLA AND ANZAC BEACHHEAD

As long as wars last, the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac will stand before the eyes of all strategists as a hitherto unattained masterpiece. Military correspondent, Vossische Zeitung, 21 January, 1918

On 8 December 1915 Gallipoli was occupied by 130,000 Allied troops, along with an estimated 15,000 animals and nearly 400 field guns. The day, as any other, was filled with the tedium and wretched living conditions of trench warfare. Troops kept busy, and warm, by improving fortifications, trenches, and dugouts. Engineers continued to improve roads, repair piers, construct shelters and hospitals with the limited building material available. Morale and health had markedly declined in the aftermath of the November storm. Dysentery had taken its toll on the combatants, making them miserable, dehydrated, and in terrible pain. Nearly 100,000 men were treated for this malady, over half of which died from its effects. All efforts focused on personal survival and on continuation of the campaign throughout the winter. The men knew nothing of the decision a day earlier to evacuate the peninsula.
In preparation for the evacuation, Lord Kitchener ordered Monro to remain at Lemnos as overall commander of forces at both Gallipoli and Salonika, the site of the newest Allied expedition. Kitchener envisaged sending troops from Gallipoli to Salonika in northern Greece to assist Serbia. The various Allied commanders at Gallipoli were responsible to withdraw, successfully and safely, as many troops from the peninsula as possible. Birdwood, considered the best general officer on the peninsula, was directed by Monro to oversee the evacuation. Ironically, Birdwood was initially against evacuation. Lieutenant General Sir Alexander Godley, elevated from commander of the New Zealand and Australian Division to ANZAC Corps commander, replaced Birdwood. Godley's reputation was that of "success at any price," too willing to accept heavy casualties in his habitual use of the frontal assault, regardless of the situation. He would soften his obstinacy during this delicate and complex operation, even predicting a smooth, casualty free evacuation.

Commanding forces at Suvla, Lieutenant General Sir Julian Byng, a competent officer, favored evacuation. He had not arrived until after the August Suvla landing. Lieutenant General Sir Francis Davies, a proponent of evacuation, commanded the troops at Helles. Admiral Wemyss, openly critical of ending the campaign, remained in command of all naval forces. Hamilton, Hunter-Weston,
Stopford, de Robeck, and Carden were gone. Churchill, a prime supporter while at the Admiralty, was serving as a lieutenant colonel on the Western Front. The new leadership sought to salvage the vestiges of an army that the old leadership, however unintentionally, had nearly destroyed.

Preliminary planning for the evacuation began shortly after Monro's 28 October visit to the peninsula. Monro, along with Birdwood, established a joint committee of naval and military officers on Imbros to lay a foundation for coordination between the various commands in the operation. The committee members responsible for producing an evacuation plan were: Colonel G. F. MacMunn, quartermaster and communications expert; Captain F. H. Mitchell, Royal Navy, senior naval representative on the committee; and Colonel Cecil Aspinall, Chief of the General Staff at Imbros. Monro and Birdwood directed the plan be divided into three stages; rapidly embarking all men, animals, guns, and equipment without being engaged by the Turks. The committee members drafted a plan which focused on dates, times, units, and joint issues. A naval issue was the stipulation by the Army that ship movements must be restricted to nighttime. Mitchell believed that night movement alone would not provide enough time for ships to move to staging areas off the coast, ingress towards the beach, embark troops and gear, and egress back to the
Islands prior to sunrise. The corps commanders convinced Birdwood of the merits of night operations to degrade the Turks' ability to discover the evacuation. Joint cooperation was an essential condition to achieving a successful evacuation.

The execution of the plan (routes, rendezvous points, etc.) was left to the corps commanders on the ground. Each corps commander submitted his tactical scheme for the withdrawal, to the joint committee. Godley wisely allowed his Chief of Staff, Colonel C.B.B. White, to develop the scheme for Anzac. White, with the campaign from its inception, believed the best course of action was to deceive the Turks of the Allied intention to withdraw. With Colonel Aspinall, he suggested a methodical shrinkage of forces, under cover of darkness, while convincing the Turks it was "business as usual." Frontline troops would withdraw last so as not to arouse suspicion. Byng argued for a feint, with significant forces, at the neck of the peninsula to divert Turkish attention from the Anzac-Suvla beachhead. He was concerned over the danger of evacuating rearward positions while frontline troops manned tenuous positions against overwhelming Turkish forces. Doctrinally, such an operation entailed the withdrawal of the most forward deployed forces to successive positions, followed by the next belt of forward troops, and culminating with the evacuation of the most rearward
forces. Birdwood ruled in favor of the less overt plan of White and Aspinall, although the Helles garrison would later be given the mission of a demonstration to distract the Turks. On 24 November, White instituted a "policy of silence" throughout the Anzac garrison, to condition the Turks to extended periods of complete quiet at night. The enemy came to view this "inactivity" as part of normal Allied preparations for winter.

The joint committee submitted the plan to Birdwood for his approval on 27 November, as the powerful storm pounded the peninsula. The weather, as well as the enemy, was a prominent factor in the planning for the withdrawal. Winds from the south, expected at this time of year, could destroy the piers and jetties needed for embarkation. The evacuation would then be conducted from the beach, slowing the embarkation and jeopardizing the entire operation. High winds could also disrupt ship to shore communications along the Anzac-Suvla beachhead. Birdwood, to strengthen communications between the two corps, directed that the northern-most troops at Anzac be evacuated with Suvla forces. Byng and Godley agreed on the procedures for effecting the withdrawal of the Gurkha unit located on the Anzac-Suvla boundary. The method of evacuation, if not its actual execution, was virtually the same for Anzac and Suvla beachhead. A combination of motor-lighters and pull-boats provided for both pier-side and beach
embarkation. The pull-boats were connected to ships offshore by ropes, effecting a pulley system whereby the boats could be beached, embark troops, and then pulled quickly out to sea to an awaiting vessel. Both Wemyss and Birdwood welcomed the retention of Helles which reduced the strain on available naval resources.

The eventual evacuation of Helles was taken into account during the planning for the Anzac and Helles operation. Birdwood realized that once the latter beachheads were cleared, the Turks would immediately turn to Helles, leaving little time to adequately plan for an uncontested withdrawal. Procedures established for the evacuation of Anzac and Suvla would also apply to the evacuation of Helles.

The evacuation plan called for a three stage operations. The "preliminary stage" entailed a reduction in manpower to persuade the Turks a routine winter troop rotation was underway. The Anzac garrison was scheduled to be reduced to 35,000 and the Suvla garrison reduced to 43,000 in the preliminary stage. Animals and field guns were also slated for evacuation during this period. This stage actually began during Kitchener’s visit on 22 November, well before the official directive from London to withdraw. The "intermediate stage" began on 8 December with a secret telegram from Kitchener to Birdwood stating "the cabinet has decided to evacuate . . . Suvla and Anzac
at once." This stage continued until troop strength was pared down to the absolute minimum force required to hold defensive positions against Turkish attack. The planning staff determined that "two rifles per yard and one-third of the present artillery," as well as support personnel, represented the minimum requirement for the defense. In the case of the Suvla and Anzac fronts, both 11,000 yards long, the required troop strength at the end of the intermediate stage was estimated at 26,000 men each. White recommended each garrison be reduced to 22,000 men by 18 December, increasing the risk to those remaining behind, yet hastening the overall withdrawal. The final, most perilous stage of the evacuation was scheduled for 19 and 20 December, requiring the swift and orderly withdrawal of all remaining men, animals, and equipment. The final night of the evacuation, 20 December, was designated as "Z" night for planning purposes. The full moon forecast for 21 December, with the possibility of adverse weather, heightened the sense of urgency to accelerate the evacuation. Fair weather, calm seas, and opaque skies were necessary for the operation to have a reasonable change of success.

Although most of the officers and men knew nothing of their impending evacuation, rumors of a possible withdrawal ran through every trench and dugout on the peninsula during the first week of December. Operational
security, lacking throughout the campaign, was vital for the evacuation. Parliament was openly debating the merits of withdrawal. British and French journalists wrote daily editorials on this issue. Luckily for the Allies, the Turks discounted this dialogue as propaganda, designed to mask preparations for a new Allied offensive at Gallipoli.12 The exhausted Turks continued to improve their fortifications.

On 8 December, only Birdwood, his corps commanders, and the planning staff knew of the plan to evacuate. Monro had directed Birdwood to divulge as little information as possible to his naval counterparts, further restricting "the need to know."13 Birdwood wisely disregarded Monro's directive and cooperated early with Wemyss and Keyes. Keyes later wrote "there can be no better example of naval and military cooperation in history, than that of General Birdwood and Admiral Wemyss and their respective staffs throughout the evacuation."14 Naval forces cordoned off the islands of Imbros and Lemnos. Fishermen and traders were restricted from entering the islands under the pretense of a smallpox epidemic.15 Secrecy was absolutely essential. A fighting withdrawal would prove disastrous, likely resulting in the catastrophic losses predicted by both Hamilton and Monro. The Allies had not experienced much luck during previous months of the campaign; however, luck is the point at which preparation
and opportunity meet. The necessary preparations were made, and the opportunity was at hand, as long as the weather cooperated.

The plan in the event of a Turkish attack during the evacuation was a fighting withdrawal to the beach, occupy preprepared positions along the beachhead, and break the attack through the use of enfilade fire and naval bombardment. The Allies would rely on darkness, barbed wire, mines, and the interlocking trenches as obstacles, to slow a Turkish advance. In the event of an attack, the severely wounded would be left behind. A flag of truce would be presented to the Turks the next day, in hopes of negotiating the release of the captured and wounded under humanitarian grounds. Naturally, avoiding a fight in the midst of the withdrawal was the overriding objective.

In the intermediate stage of the evacuation, the combined Anzac-Suvla beachhead contained over 80,000 men, 3,000 pack animals, 200 field guns, and 2,000 wagons. On 8 December, Birdwood informed Wemyss of the order to evacuate. The admiral immediately tasked vessels for specific missions. Three ships were identified as troop carriers; one ship was designated to carry animals; another to transport vehicles; and yet another to carry field guns. About a dozen smaller craft, called motor-lighters, would shuttle personnel and cargo from shore to
ship. In compliance with the troop reduction plan, up to
3,000 men per night were to be taken off the peninsula.

At Suvla, Byng divided his front into two sectors,
one to the south of Salt Lake and one north of the lake
(see figure 2). A system of banded defenses was prepared.
The preliminary stage of the evacuation significantly
reduced the five division garrison which occupied Suvla at
the beginning of the operation. Byng set forth that his
troops would proceed direct from the trenches to beach
embarkation points, occupying no intermediate positions
unless absolutely necessary. Many of his troops, as far as
three miles from the beach and five miles from the enemy,
were unlike the Anzacs who were extremely close to Turkish
defenders. The Turks looked upon duty at Suvla as less
stressful than both Anzac and Helles. Although Suvla
forces lacked cover and concealment, they had the better
chance of being successfully withdrawn than did their
comrades at Anzac and Helles.

At both Anzac and Suvla daily orders were issued to
divisions, assigning dates for evacuation and identifying
equipment or weaponry to be withdrawn. The divisions, in
turn, provided subordinate commanders with instructions
designating specific times, routes, and units to be
withdrawn. White successfully argues his case with
Birdwood against withdrawing the most forward deployed
forces first, followed by the next line of troops, and so
He feared the enemy would surmise something was afoot, since in places only a few yards separated the Turkish and Allied trenches. Instead, troops located nearest the front would be taken off last, giving the appearance of normalcy. A dilemma facing the division commanders was which men would remain until the last withdrawal. If the evacuation were discovered, these men would surely be killed or captured by the much larger Turkish force.

On 12 December, the troops were made aware of the plan to evacuate. Shock and anger, not elation, swept through the ranks at Anzac. The men detested leaving their fallen comrades, laid to rest in makeshift cemeteries, to the mercy of the enemy. They believed the Turks, not the Allies, were on the verge of defeat. In a gesture to retain their honor and dignity, hundreds of Anzacs implored their officers to allow them to be among the last troops to leave the beachhead. The dilemma of ordering men to defend to the last was averted. The difficulty was selecting from the multitude of volunteers.

Numerous small boats, combatant vessels, and support ships massed near the offshore islands on 13 December. Wemyss, concerned about the effects of bad weather on the sea state inside Kephalo Harbor at Imbros, requested permission from the Admiralty to sink one of his older warships as a "blockship breakwater" at the mouth of the harbor. In the event of strong winds and high surf,
the blockship would afford some measure of protection to sea-craft at Kephalo. The Admiralty asked that he wait until a special service vessel, a dummy battleship, arrived to be used as a blockship. Wemyss, not wanting to risk losing a portion of his fleet to weather, ordered the sinking of a collier, a coal carrier, in the harbor. Upon the arrival of the special service ship, the collier was pumped out and returned to service.

On 14 December, Birdwood issued an order that all subsequent embarkations would be conducted in complete silence. There would be no smoking or drinking. Several instances of drunken, boisterous behavior enroute to the beach threatened the security of the entire operation. Discipline must be countenanced by all. Rum rations and other alcoholic beverages, less those used by hospital personnel, were ordered destroyed. Liquor had a way of loosening the tongue, an effect Birdwood would not chance.

Among the first to be withdrawn to Imbros and Lemnos were the noncombatants. The sick and injured, routinely evacuated to the islands for treatment, no longer returned to duty. Prisoners of war were transferred to encampments on the islands. Infantry units followed shortly thereafter. Many field hospitals were disassembled and withdrawn; however, hospital tents remained standing so as not to arouse the Turks’ suspicions. Field guns were only fired every other day, in compliance with White’s concept.
of conditioning the Turks to periods of tranquility.22 Turkish defenders undoubtedly enjoyed the respite as they endeavored to keep warm within their trenches. Many of the troops at Anzac and Suvla believed they were bound for the Salonika expedition.23 Birdwood and his corps commanders did little to dispel such rumors because of their uplifting effect on morale.

Hospital ships moved to positions off the peninsula while supplementary field hospitals were organized on Lemons to accommodate up to 10,000 casualties.24 An estimated 12,000 hospital beds were prepared in Alexandria, Egypt, to receive the expected wounded and ill.25 Engineers, under harassing fire from the enemy, worked diligently to repair and construct piers and jetties along the beachhead. Turkish observers believed the engineering activity was associated with reinforcement, vice evacuation. Allied troops rigged booby traps inside their trenches and dugouts, while "sappers" burrowed underground to lay mines and other explosives to be detonated upon completion of the evacuation or to counter a Turkish attack.

Bustling activity filled the nights of 15 through 17 December as barges and small lighters shuttled men, equipment, and animals from the Anzac-Suvla beachhead to Imbros. Troops from specified commands departed their positions as scheduled to make their way along designated
routes to rendezvous points where they were organized into groups of six to twelve and assigned an officer or senior non-commissioned officer to lead them to forming up points on the beach. At the behest of White and Aspinall, the men wrapped their feet in burlap sacks. Blankets were placed along the piers to muffle the sounds of embarkation.26

The Turks probably heard noises from the beach, yet they did not discern evidence of a withdrawal. White-washed sandbags were laid along the withdrawal routes so troops could find their way through the often fog-filled darkness.27 Biscuit boxes, with white lights covered by red lenses, were placed near junctions along the routes and at rendezvous points.28 Thousands of cooking fires were kept burning through the night, as was routinely done for the past eight months.29

During daylight hours, Allied vessels actually unloaded men and stores on the shore, adding to the illusion of a build-up on the peninsula. Turkish defenders were unaware that the same men were cast in this role each night and that the boxes and crates being disembarked were, in fact, empty.30 As the ranks thinned, men walked mules along dirt trails near the coast, kicking up dust clouds visible to the Turks along the ridgelines. Gunners fired often and from varying positions. Allied airplanes flew daily missions over the peninsula to deter Turkish observation aircraft from flying over the Anzac-Suvla
garrisons. The Turks suspected the aircraft were flying reconnaissance missions in preparation of an Allied attack. Clothing, foodstuffs, ammunition, and other stores were readied for destruction in preparation for the final stage of the operation. The destroyer "Rattlesnake" was positioned near Anzac Cove on 17 December, periodically switching its searchlight onto the cliffs, diverting Turkish attention from the shoreline and the embarking troops. Although "Rattlesnake" was occasionally shelled, the Turks quickly became used to its presence and the bright glare of the searchlight. By the morning of 18 December half of the force, about 40,000 men, had been evacuated from the Anzac-Suvla beachhead. Another 20,000 were withdrawn that evening, leaving an imperiled beachhead of slightly more than 20,000 men. The intermediate stage of the evacuation had ended.

Establishing adequate command, control, and communications was absolutely essential through each stage of the evacuation, but especially during the final stage. Confusion, lack of discipline, or misinterpretation of orders would bring calamity upon the Allied forces. Naval commanders and beachmasters had to be kept apprised of any deviations in the withdrawal. Each corps commander was provided a sloop from which to direct operations at Suvla and Anzac. The sloops maintained communications with the shore through cables running from each beach area to the
Wireless communications, reserved for naval gunfire coordination, formed a vital requirement now that most of the field guns had been evacuated.

Orders continued to be disseminated from the corps command sloops to headquarters elements ashore, then to subordinate units, either by courier or wire. As operations progressed, headquarters elements were manned by a handful of men. A senior staff officer in each division was identified as acting division commander. Godley departed Anzac for his command sloop, accompanied by White, at 2300 on 18 December. Command at Anzac was passed to Major General A. H. Russell, commander of the New Zealand and Australian Division, who was designated as "Rear Guard Commander (R.G.C.)." Remaining headquarters personnel of an already withdrawn division were attached to the staff of the R.G.C. They constituted the command and control apparatus for forces ashore until the last man was taken off Anzac. Similar activity was occurring at Suvla; however, Byng had not gone to his command sloop. The Allies anticipated the need to evacuate about 10,000 troops during the waning hours of the operation, on "Z" night.

On 19 December, the remaining 20,000 men with less than 20 field guns were positioned along a frontage that required twice that many. They worked feverishly during the day to ready the residual provisions for destruction. Thousands of unopened ration boxes and nearly five million
rounds of ammunition were tossed into the sea.\textsuperscript{37} Wagon wheels were sawed in half and tarpaulins made useless by pouring caustic acids over them.\textsuperscript{38} Final touches were made on booby traps and mines, including the placement of over a ton of explosives in a tunnel running underneath Turkish trenches at the base of Chunuk Blair.\textsuperscript{39} Birdwood directed that all weapons left on the peninsula be stripped of usable parts and disabled to be worthless to the enemy "even as a trophy."\textsuperscript{40} Seventy mules, retained for transporting artillery pieces and hauling wagons, were silently slain and lined up along the beach.

The troops developed ingenious deception techniques and firing devices, such as using candles to burn through string tied to the trigger of a rifle, or the use of water powered weights fabricated from kerosene cans to accomplish the same task.\textsuperscript{41} One can was filled with water which dripped through a hole in the bottom into an empty can below. The bottom can became heavier as it filled with water, creating tension on the string tied to the firing mechanism, causing the weapon to discharge almost a half-hour after the soldier's departure. A variation of this "trick" using buckets of sand was also devised. Men paraded back and forth in the trenches with periscopes, misleading the Turks into believing the positions were still fully manned. Adding to the deception, men
conspicuously loitered in the normal smoking areas, out of
sniper range, but within a binocular's field of view.

In the afternoon of 19 December, Birdwood toured the
lines a final time, both consoling and encouraging his men
with whom he had served the past eight months. Known as
the "Soul of Anzac," Birdwood departed the peninsula by
boat, leaving the rest of the operation to his subordinate
commanders. The Helles garrison, supported by limited
naval gunfire, assaulted Turkish defenses as a means to
draw attention from Anzac and Suvla. Turkish and German
accounts dispute whether this action served to distract the
defenders from Anzac-Suvla or to alarm them of a possible
evacuation attempt. If they were alarmed, the Turks did
little in response. By dusk, the guns at Suvla had fired
for the last time and large formations of men silently
withdrew to the beach to await embarkation. A similar
scene was repeated at Anzac where forward positions were
held by the 2nd Australian Division and the 29th Indian
Infantry Brigade. At 2000, the flanks of these units were
gradually withdrawn to the beach of embarkation. At 2200,
less than 1,500 troops manned the forward positions, many
of which were within several yards of the Turks.42 By
0300 on 20 December, only 800 Anzacs waited at the piers
for evacuation.43 The last two hundred men to leave
Anzac Cove were veterans of the 25 April landing.44 They
justifiably received the "honor of being nominated to fight

39
the rear guard action" if necessary.\textsuperscript{46} It was not necessary. The last Anzac left the peninsula prior to 0400 on 20 December.

Shortly after 0500, the last boat pulled away from Suvla Bay, carrying the naval beach party and the corps commander, General Byng.\textsuperscript{48} Byng occasionally moved between the beach and the command sloop during the evacuation, desiring to be among the last to depart the beachhead. Every man, animal, and gun was successfully evacuated from Suvla. Provisions were covered with fodder, doused with oil, and set afire. The entire area was rocked by a tremendous blast near Chunuk Bair, destroying a substantial portion of the enemy’s front line and killing at least 70 Turks.\textsuperscript{47} The Turks, finally realizing something was afoot, wildly swept the beaches with machine gun and artillery fire. Still thinking an Allied attack imminent, the Turks did not attack the beaches until dawn, too late to disrupt the evacuation. Evidence of the withdrawal was clear as Turkish troops entered the abandoned Anzac-Suvla positions. Trenches and dugouts were booby trapped and obstructed by barbed wire. Provisions lay burning on the beaches. Mines continued to explode around the Turks. Naval gunfire from Allied ships proved effective against Turks in the open along the beach. The ships fired at targets of opportunity for several hours until rumor of a German submarine in the area forced them
to retire to the safety of Imbros and Lemnos. The final stage of the evacuation had come to a close with no Allied losses.

All provisions had been successfully destroyed at Suvla; however, the same could not be said for Anzac. Excess boxes of biscuits and cans of meat lay unopened in dumps, from which the hungry Turks took advantage. Large stores of various items were left at Anzac including boats, tents, lumber, clothing, and ammunition. The Anzacs had been directed not to gamble with destruction because of the close proximity of Turkish positions. Massive piles of booty and prepared bonfires had been considered far too great a risk. Instead, Allied naval bombardment attempted to destroy the provisions on the beach with minimal success. Some of the Anzacs left meals on tables within their dugouts in tribute to the "fighting Turks." The Turks believed the meals and abandoned provisions were evidence that the withdrawal was a hurried, not a well organized venture. Although the Allies experienced no casualties, the abandoned stores and equipment on the Anzac beach provided the Turks at Gallipoli with welcomed food and equipment. Each Turkish division assigned a Special Booty Commissioner to account for the vast quantity of stores left behind.

Monro dispatched a message to Kitchener informing him of the successful evacuation of Anzac and Suvla. He
urgently requested the immediate evacuation of Helles. On 21 December, a powerful gale swept across Gallipoli, destroying much of the now abandoned Anzac and Suvla beachhead. The Allies were fortunate the gale did not hit the peninsula earlier. The chaos created in the Turkish lines by the withdrawal, as well as bad weather, temporarily delayed a Turkish attack on the Helles garrison. Admiral Wemyss, Keyes, and Birdwood agreed with Monro's recommendation for immediate withdrawal of remaining forces from the peninsula. On 27 December, London ordered the evacuation of the Helles.52

The Turks defending Cape Helles rebuked their compatriots at Suvla and Anzac to the north for allowing the Allies to withdraw so easily. The rejoinder of the Anzac-Suvla area defenders was "you now know that there will be an evacuation at Helles. Let us see what steps you propose there."53 Could the Allied forces at Helles repeat the astounding success of those at Anzac and Suvla without the element of surprise? The Turks did not intend to permit a repeat performance. General von Sanders, however, was unsure of Allied intentions at Helles. He believed that Helles might be continually held by the Allies in similar fashion to Britain's occupation of Gibraltar.54 Preparations began for a final, massive attack on the Helles garrison.
Endnotes


2 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1921), 854.


5 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War, 853.

6 Ibid., 860.

7 Ibid., 843.

8 Ibid., 853.

9 Ibid., 883.

10 Ibid., 854.

11 Ibid., 854.

12 Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (Annapolis, Md: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1982), 341.

13 Roger Keyes, The Flight for Gallipoli (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1941), 322.

14 Ibid., 322.

15 Moorehead, Gallipoli, 341.


17 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War, 863.

18 Haythornwaite, Gallipoli 1915, 86.

19 Keyes, The Fight for Gallipoli, 323.

20 Ibid., 323.


23Ibid., 227.

24Ibid., 240.


29Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 343.

30Ibid., 342.

31Ibid., 343.

32Haythornwaite, *Gallipoli 1915*, 86.


34Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War*, 859.

35Ibid., 889.


37Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 345.


40Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War*, 884.


42Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 346.


46 Masefield, *Gallipoli*, 237.

47 Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War*, 897.

48 Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 348.


50 Ibid., 902.


52 Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 349.


54 Kannengiesser, *The Campaign in Gallipoli*, 256.
CHAPTER THREE

EVACUATION OF THE HELLES BEACHHEAD

To me the evacuation of the Army is so much more frightening than the forcing of the Straits, because so much depends on chance and weather, and there are such appalling possibilities of a ghastly failure.¹

Commodore Sir Roger Keyes, Royal Navy. December, 1915

The nearly 40,000 Allied troops at Helles were now the focus of Turkish attention. The element of surprise was virtually gone. General von Sanders had twenty-one divisions, over 120,000 men, at his disposal.² He would undoubtedly move on the four remaining British divisions at Helles with overwhelming force; but when? Time was of the essence, especially in light of the deteriorating weather and unpredictable sea state. By 21 December, the bulk of the two French divisions were evacuated (less artillery) to alleviate potential command and control problems. Their positions along the Helles line were filled by elements of the battle worn 29th Division of the Royal Naval Division. General Monro, named on 28 December to command the First Army in France, departed the peninsula for points west. Prior to his departure, he provided guidance concerning the
final evacuation of Gallipoli. The guidance, on the whole, duplicated Birdwood's instructions for the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac, with the majority of the garrison withdrawing secretly over a series of nights, culminating with the final evacuation on the night of 8 January.

Lieutenant General Sir Francis Davies, commander of the Helles forces, was concerned that the Turks would quickly concentrate their entire effort against his divisions, turning the evacuation into a chaotic bloodbath. Moreover, the Turks would assuredly place the preponderance of their artillery within range of the already precarious Helles beachhead. In fact, the duration and ferocity of Turkish shelling along the toe of the peninsula had shown a marked increase since the 20 December evacuation of the northern beachhead. Resupply of heavy ordnance from German and Austro-Hungarian factories was enroute to the region. Davies realized his position could soon become untenable by reason of artillery bombardment alone.

Naval forces were once again commanded by Admiral de Robeck. Admiral Wemyss had been offered command of the East Indies fleet, a position he had long coveted. Roger Keyes remained de Robeck’s Chief of Staff, even though the two men disagreed on the decision to evacuate Helles.
Keyes, a staunch opponent of evacuation, now favored a speedy withdrawal since forcing the straits was no longer an option. De Robeck maintained that the “holding of Helles is of great naval importance.” He believed that the evacuation of the Helles garrison should be delayed for as long as possible, even though casualties were mounting daily. Monro and Birdwood impressed upon him the importance of affecting a rapid, organized and stealthful withdrawal from Helles, before the weather and the enemy could interfere.

The situation at Helles was different from that of Suvla and Anzac. Helles offered more embarkation sites that were better protected from the elements. Troops could withdraw directly to their rear, negating the need for hazardous flank marches to the beach. The embarkation sites, located in the same areas as the initial landing sites, consisted of Gully Beach, X Beach, W Beach, V Beach, and Morto Bay (see figure 3). The latter three areas provided greater protection against adverse weather than the embarkation sites at Anzac and Suvla. The trench system at Helles was far more elaborate, presenting a significant obstacle to Turks attacking toward the beach in darkness. Any impediment to an assault against the withdrawing force was certainly desirable since the garrison was greatly outnumbered and outgunned by the Turks. Arguably, the most important difference between the
situations at Helles and Anzac-Suvla was that Davies and de Robeck profited from the lessons learned during the evacuation of the northern beachhead.

The Helles evacuation plan, developed by Monro, Birdwood, and the joint committee, called for an intermediate stage and a final stage, similar to the earlier evacuation plan. Preliminary actions at Helles, such as pier construction and boat repairs, were taken during the Anzac-Suvla evacuation. The intermediate stage "officially" began on 1 January 1916 with the publishing of Dardanelles Army Order No. 2, setting forth instructions for the execution of the Helles evacuation. Scheduled to end on 6 January, the intermediate stage directed the withdrawal of nearly 20,000 troops as well as most of the animals, supplies, field guns and ammunition. The final stage was planned for the nights of 7 and 8 January, weather permitting. On 28 December, Birdwood and de Robeck decided to evacuate 7,000 men on the 7th and the remaining 15,000 men on the 8th. All abandoned equipment, stores, and weapons were ordered destroyed in the same fashion as at Anzac and Suvla.

On 29 December, two brigades of the previously evacuated 13th Division were dispatched to Helles to replace the weary 42nd Division. These two brigades, led by 13th Division commander Major General Maude, experienced in a disciplined withdrawal, were inserted in

49
the Helles line near the Aegean coast and adjacent to the 29th Division. To avoid arousing Turkish suspicion, Birdwood published orders indicating the unit rotation was part of a general relief associated with a winter campaign. Most Turks, as well as Allied troops at Helles, apparently believed the garrison would remain on the peninsula indefinitely. A cease fire was implemented at 2330 each night to accustom the enemy to periods of silence as in the case of Anzac and Suvla.

On the right flank of the 13th Division was the respected 29th Division, whose right flank was occupied by the 52nd Division. The extreme right flank of the entire line remained the responsibility of the Royal Naval Division, along with a small contingent of French infantry not yet evacuated. Dardanelles Army Order No. 2, the evacuation order, directed the remaining French infantry "be relieved in their trenches by troops of the VIII Corps on the night of 1st/2nd January" and removed from the peninsula by motor-lighter. The French artillery left behind would become the responsibility of the corps commander. He would require as much artillery and naval gunfire support as possible during the last few critical nights on the peninsula.

Command and control was a problem area during the Anzac-Suvla operation because of the rapidity of the withdrawal to the beaches and the subsequent embarkations.
Accordingly, Birdwood designated Major General Sir H. A. Lawrence as the General Officer Commanding (G.O.C.) the Helles embarkation operations of the ground troops during the final evacuation, while the naval arrangements were the responsibility of the Primary Beach Master, Captain C. M. Staveley, Royal Navy. General Davies would be assigned a command sloop to observe, and influence if necessary, operations ashore on the final night of the evacuation. Staff officers from the Anzac and Suvla evacuation were assigned to work with Davies, Lawrence, and Staveley to add valuable experience to the effort. Should the plan unravel, or the Turks attack, the 11th Division, as the reserve force, could be dispatched ashore from its position on Imbros Island.

As in the previous evacuation, the engineers busily repaired facilities and constructed piers at each of the beaches for the embarkation. A couple of blockships were sunk near the breakwater pier extending out from Cape Tekke, the location of Davies' headquarters, providing protection for "W" Beach from the strong western current. The engineers connected the pier to these submerged vessels by use of a floating bridge, which would soon assist withdrawing troops in boarding awaiting motor-lighters. By 2 January, a superb network of jetties had been established throughout Helles and various blockships were artfully placed offshore in an effort to
accelerate the actual embarkation of men, animals and supplies.

Except for a half-dozen worn out artillery pieces and their crews, all of the French troops were evacuated from Helles by 3 January.¹¹ The French had fought valiantly on the peninsula, suffering 47,000 killed or wounded out of 79,000 soldiers.¹² Officially France now retired from the ill-fated campaign. The final days of the Dardanelles debacle belonged solely to the men of the British Empire.

Most of the noncombatants, such as the Greek Labor Corps personnel, the sick and wounded were evacuated by 4 January. Combat troops then began withdrawing from their fighting positions each night, to the embarkation sites, one battalion at a time. Evacuating the animals however, proved not to be a smooth operation. Bad weather on 3 January created problems in embarking anything but troops. On the night of 4 January, only 197 of the scheduled 1,000 mules were embarked, primarily due to a collision between a steamer destined to pickup the animals and a French battleship.¹³ The steamer was sent to the ocean bottom. Stampedes, and just the ornery nature of many of the beasts, caused lighters to either capsize or back away from the pier, resulting in a number of the animals drowning, creating delays in the operation. Ominous weather was becoming the primary threat to further embarkations of
troops and animals. Birdwood called an urgent meeting on 6 January to discuss an altering of the plan.

Many familiar names were present at the meeting to discuss concerns and solutions. Aspinall (representing Birdwood), Davies, Mitchell (joint committee), Lawrence, Staveley, Keyes (representing de Robeck), and Admiral Fremantle (in charge of naval gunfire support) concluded that fair weather could not be counted on for the two consecutive nights of the final stage of the evacuation. The ground officers believed that a sufficient number of troops and guns required to hold off the enemy for a week must remain until the last night of evacuation. The Navy would need to embark an estimated 17,000 men and 64 guns on the night of 8 January.

Keyes and Staveley concurred with the change in the embarkation plan proposed by their Army counterparts but they were concerned about the lack of boats available to evacuate the increased number of personnel and guns in a single night. Staveley boldly suggested making three round trips vice the previously planned two trips to Imbros and from the embarkation sites with the same motor-lighters. Keyes pondered the possibility of bringing destroyers close to the beach to embark additional men on the final night. Davies was prepared to destroy 17 of the 64 guns planned for withdrawal, including the six French guns left in his possession. He decided to limit the number of
embarkation sites used to enhance both speed and security of the operation. "V" and "W" Beaches were designated as the primary embarkation sites because of concealment from Turkish observation. Gully Beach would be used only by the more than six hundred troops of the 13th Division holding the left flank.

Meanwhile, motor-lighters were being laden with supplies, animals, and men throughout the afternoon of 8 January. Artillery batteries were horse drawn to the beach by individual gun and embarked at night. Remaining guns were fired occasionally to convince the Turks all was normal. These weapons would be evacuated the next night. Enemy airplanes flew near the toe of the peninsula with much more frequency since the withdrawal of the Anzac and Suvla garrisons. Upon hearing the approach of an airplane, Allied troops and animals would reverse course, appearing as though they were disembarking from the boats instead of boarding them.

Keyes and de Robeck decided to implement the option of using destroyers as troop carriers. They conveyed to Birdwood, Davies, and Lawrence the need for construction of a causeway near "W" Beach in order for the destroyers to close on the shore and the troops to walk on the vessels. Each of the six destroyers designated for this duty could easily accommodate a thousand men, whereas a motor-lighter carries a maximum of 400 troops.17 All other destroyers
would be positioned on the flanks of the beach, ready to deliver fire support if required. The order was given for the engineers to rapidly develop a causeway as outlined by the Navy. A small steamer was sunk in an attempt to connect the beach to the blockship previously submerged in the area months before. The gaps in this quickly assembled causeway were filled with excess crates of bully beef and biscuits. The area was accessible to destroyers by the morning of 7 January.

The morning calm of 7 January was interrupted by a Turkish artillery bombardment along the areas held by the 13th Division and Royal Naval Division. The shelling lasted nearly 5 hours, the heaviest of the campaign. Turkish forces made a tentative advance on the Allied stronghold. They were repelled by withering enfilade fire, as well as extensive naval gunfire. Von Sanders had believed the Allied evacuation of Helles was in progress and, that by assaulting the garrison, he would severely maul the remaining British forces. The failed Turkish attack made the employment of elements of the 11th Division from Imbros unnecessary. The tangible result of the engagement was significant damage to Allied shore communications and defenses, while the Turks suffered heavy casualties. The intangible result of the engagement, and one of great benefit to the British, was the belief by Liman von Sanders that the Allies had not yet begun their
evacuation of the Helles garrison. The night of the 7th was relatively quiet and over 2,000 troops, 9 guns, and 880 mules were evacuated without incident.

Between the night of 31 December and the morning of 8 January, about 16,000 men, 86 guns, over 2,600 mules and horses, and vast quantities of supplies were taken off the peninsula. The earlier delays in the embarkation schedule for the animals now created a logjam of the beasts at Helles. Birdwood was loathe to kill the animals or to leave them for the Turks. He directed de Robeck and Keyes to embark as many as feasible in accordance with the evacuation timetable. Any animals remaining ashore during the final hours of the withdrawal would be slain.

Preparations were made throughout the 8th for the final stage of the evacuation that evening. The remaining elements of the 29th and 13th Divisions were to embark from "W" Beach, less a small contingent of the 13th which would remain as a security element until the final hour and would then embark at Gully Beach. The last vestiges of the 52nd and Royal Naval Divisions would embark from "V" Beach. As was the case at Anzac-Suvla and the previous eight days at Helles, each division was responsible for ensuring its subordinate units adhered to the withdrawal routes, forming-up points, and embarkation times prescribed by higher headquarters (see figure 3). In late afternoon, Birdwood, de Robeck, and most of their respective staffs
embarked aboard HMS Chatham, located at Imbros, destined for the coastal waters off the peninsula. Around 1900, General Davies took up his position aboard his command sloop, "HMS Triad," located off Cape Tekke, which was cabled into shore for communications connectivity with his divisional commanders and General Lawrence. Lawrence remained on the peninsula in charge of the final embarkation of Allied forces from Helles. He dutifully communicated with Davies, keeping the Corps Commander apprised of the progress of the operation. Nearly 9,000 troops were to be taken off at "W" Beach, about 7,600 at "V" Beach, and over 600 taken off at Gully Beach during the night of 8 January. Any significant increase in wind velocity would make embarkation at these sites extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Prior to dusk, about 1,000 men from the 29th Division and the Royal Naval Division occupied specially constructed defensive positions overlooking "W" and "V" Beaches. Equipment and supplies not withdrawn from the peninsula were placed in dumps near the beaches and prepared for destruction in the manner of Anzac-Suvla. The movement of troops from fighting positions to the beaches commenced around 2000. The winds picked up at 2100. The sea state became choppy, making the floating bridge at "W" Beach unusable for embarkation. The motor-lighters used the available piers at "W" Beach to successfully continue
the evacuation. Embarkation activity at "V" Beach was fast paced and nearly flawless, with many of the remaining artillery pieces successfully evacuated from this site. Troop ingenuity at Helles was similar to that experienced at Anzac and Suvla, with firing devices affixed to rifles and booby traps placed throughout trenchlines.

The last units to be evacuated arrived at their forming-up points at 0130 on 9 January. Mines were set by these troops as they passed through the lanes in the barbed wire enroute the beach. By 0200 the weather was extremely poor, yet the enemy was very quiet. Rumors of a German submarine in the area proved unsettling for de Robeck and Keyes. An erroneous report of a torpedo hit on an Allied vessel served to heighten tensions. The fleet remained committed to completing the evacuation. The motor-lighters were sent in to windswept Gully Beach to pickup the detachment of troops from the 13th Division. In order to curtail the engine noise of the motor-lighters, Keyes directed they be towed to the embarkation sites by picket boat. One of the motor-lighters ran aground amid the swirling seas and the troops aboard were forced to disembark. General Maude, commander of the 13th Division, personally marched his men through the maze of obstacles leading to "W" Beach where a determined boat crew took them off the peninsula. The six destroyers assigned to embarkation duty fought valiantly against the choppy surf.
as they moved in out of the shallow coastal waters, ferrying men and equipment from Gallipoli to Imbros. By 0345 all ground forces had been successfully evacuated from Helles. Bonfires were lit on the beach to signal that fact to the afloat command. Members of the naval beach master unit, led by Captain Staveley, then boarded their boats and departed Gallipoli. Staveley was the last man to depart Anzac and Suvla, and now Helles. Tragically, a sailor was killed when a shipboard magazine accidentally exploded. Otherwise, only a few minor injuries occurred during the entire Helles evacuation.

At 0400, the supply dumps left on the beaches were aflame and the fused mines began to explode. The Turks, now well aware of Allied intentions, shelled the abandoned positions for two and a half hours before venturing down to reconnoiter the area. Allied naval guns continued to pummel the coast to keep the Turks from capturing stores and equipment left behind. German after-action reports commented on "the enormous masses of munitions and provisions" which took some time to count. Even if this is true, it does not detract from the splendid joint effort made under arduous conditions by the Allied forces in the evacuation of Helles. The only sour note of the entire operation was the inability of the Navy to evacuate all of the animals as Birdwood desired. Over 500 horses and mules had to be killed prior to the departure of the
last units. The earlier disruption in the embarkation schedule, combined with dismal weather, contributed to the deaths of the beasts.

The evacuation of the Helles garrison is truly an operation to behold, especially on the heels of the surprisingly successful evacuation of the Anzac and Suvla beachhead. The ingredients which worked so well in the latter operation were again used in the former. Magnificent officership, insightful planning, admirable seamanship, and disciplined troops all played dominant roles in this splendid performance. Although the Army contributed greatly to the successful outcome of the operation, the Navy perhaps won the day with its motor-lighters, destroyers, naval guns, and the brave sailors who manned them. A German staff officer recalled after the final withdrawal, "had it not been for the ever active hostile fleet, not an enemy would have left the soil of the peninsula alive." The aforementioned comment illustrates the exceptional coordination between Allied naval and ground forces in conducting a successful amphibious withdrawal in the face of the enemy.
Endnotes

1 Roger Keyes, *The Fight for Gallipoli* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1941), 334.


6 Callwell, *The Dardanelles*, 311

7 Ibid., 311.


10 Callwell, *The Dardanelles*, 311.


12 Alan Moorehead, *Gallipoli* (Annapolis, Md: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1982), 381.


14 Ibid., 337.


16 Keyes, *The Fight for Gallipoli*, 337.

17 Ibid., 338.

18 Ibid., 338.


21 Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 352.


23 Ibid., 320.
24 Ibid., 321.
25 Ibid., 321.
26 Keyes, The Fight for Gallipoli, 341.
27 Callwell, The Dardanelles, 326.
28 Ibid., 326.
CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

Amphibious power is a wonderful possession, but it is very hard to get its value recognized and made full use of, and combined operations, with the conflicting interests and responsibilities of the respective services, are infinitely difficult to organize and execute successfully.¹

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, 1934

As the Allies abandoned the Dardanelles venture, the Turks remained in the conflict for another three years; whereupon the Ottoman Empire crumbled from the exhaustive effects of the war. The successful Allied evacuation of Gallipoli tempered harsh popular reaction throughout Britain, France, and the British Dominions against the failure of the campaign with its brutal toll. More than half of the 500,000 Allied troops who fought on Gallipoli were casualties.² Considering the forecasts of forty percent losses during an evacuation, the few accidental injuries experienced during the operation were indeed astonishing. The amphibious withdrawal of forces from Gallipoli was successful because of close coordination between the army and navy, tactical ingenuity, troop
discipline, bold leadership, and luck—assets rarely exhibited during the campaign's previous operations.

The Allies first committed military force to the Dardanelles endeavor, then examined the ramifications after involvement. The initial effort to secure the straits with naval assets alone contradicted previous studies indicating the need for a joint, army-navy operation. The naval demonstration and naval assault on the straits evolved into a land action in support of the navy, then into a naval action in support of the army, and finally into a withdrawal from the peninsula. The Allied campaign strategy lacked direction. Consequently, coordination between the Army and Navy was infrequent and cursory during the eight months preceding the evacuation. The failure of the Allies to eventually develop a joint plan for the Gallipoli operation contributed to the poor collaborative effort displayed throughout the campaign. Beset by coordination problems at the operational and tactical levels, the Anglo-French commanders had difficulty in clearly defining and, ultimately, securing objectives. The Turks took full advantage of Allied indecision through quick counteraction, keeping Allied gains to a minimum. Problems in coordinating naval gunfire support for ground assaults further illustrated the Allied need for the establishment of a committee to address coordination issues of a joint nature. The designation of a joint committee
for the evacuation of the peninsula was the key to overcoming coordination problems and averting disaster.

Both the army and naval officers assigned to the joint committee enhanced the planning phase of the evacuation with their experience and knowledge regarding joint operations. Concerns of divisional commanders were handled by joint committee members with the same vigor and professionalism as those of naval squadron commanders. Birdwood and de Robeck were kept fully apprised of any alterations to the withdrawal plan. They, in turn, maintained close relations throughout the operation. Ground commanders were given considerable latitude in developing withdrawal schemes and timetables, submitting their plans to the joint committee for detailed coordination with their naval counterparts. The plan was coordinated throughout in its formulation and its execution.

A critical element in a successful evacuation was the element of surprise. The Turks had to be convinced that a general Allied withdrawal from the peninsula was not in progress, even after the evacuation of the Suvla and Anzac beachheads. Imaginative deception techniques were implemented with great effect. Weapons rigged to fire automatically, uniformed dummies positioned in trenches, and staged troop "landings" along the coast fooled the Turkish defenders into believing the Allies would continue
to occupy the peninsula. Maintaining steady rates of artillery fire during the day, coupled with nightly periods of silence, further conditioned the Turks to believe that ordinary operations were being conducted. The stubborn Allied responses to Turkish attacks, including the Helles attack on 7 January, indicated to the Turks the resolve of the Anglo-French force to remain at Gallipoli. The imagination and foresight exhibited by Allied forces during the well-coordinated evacuation had gone unrevealed during the proceeding months of poorly orchestrated operations.

Among the essential factors contributing to the accomplishment of the evacuation was the remarkable discipline of the men involved. Monro summarized the withdrawal by lauding the "skilled disciplined organization" of the participants. The evacuation was based upon the stipulation that it must be uncontested by the Turks. A deception plan was developed to accomplish that particular requirement. The self-discipline exercised by the troops regarding operational security, noise discipline, illusory actions associated with the deception plan, and punctuality was realized with the unchallenged exodus from the peninsula. The tenacity and discipline of the individual Allied soldier was never an issue throughout the entire campaign. Senior leadership was the problem. Quality soldiers led finally by competent senior officers
was a primary determinant for the successful completion of the evacuation.

The designation of Sir Charles Monro to replace Sir Ian Hamilton as commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force proved fortuitous for the Allies. Hamilton, an able and courageous officer, appeared far too pliant and good-natured for the mission assigned to him. He remained somewhat detached from activities ashore, rarely questioning the actions of his commanders. On the other hand, Monro viewing the so-called peripheral campaigns (i.e., the Dardanelles, Mesopotamia, etc.) as misguided ventures, diverting precious resources from the main theater of action: France. Although this viewpoint obviously effected his prompt decision to evacuate Gallipoli, it nonetheless helped to preserve the remainder of his army against an inevitable Turkish counteroffensive. Troops withdrawn from Gallipoli could at least be employed elsewhere. Monro’s decision to evacuate was made after consulting his subordinate commanders. His direct approach and clear intent quickly gained the confidence of the officers who would be called upon to execute the final operation of the campaign.

Perhaps Monro’s most important decision was placing Birdwood in overall command of the planning and conduct of the evacuation. Birdwood, a sound tactician, had proved his mettle in earlier operations. He was far superior to
Stopford and Hunter-Weston in terms of talent, clarity of vision, and moral courage. The establishment, by Monro, of a joint committee to plan the evacuation solved many of the difficulties associated with joint naval and ground operations. Inquiries by commanders were forwarded to the joint committee for immediate resolution, whereas during previous actions, the commanders planned and performed operations in relative isolation. Strict adherence to withdrawal routes, embarkation timetables, and deception methods, by all participants, was of paramount importance to mission accomplishment. Accordingly, Birdwood held frequent face-to-face meetings with commanders to ensure his guidance was clearly understood. He firmly encouraged his corps commanders to discuss between themselves, as well as with their naval counterparts, any issues related to the evacuation. If "Birdie," as he was known by the Anzacs, had been named commander of the MEF several months earlier, the Allies might have achieved greater tactical success at Gallipoli. He was more adept than the older Hamilton at improvisation and displayed greater flexibility on the battlefield than his former commander. Even Hamilton lionized Birdwood by calling him "the Soul of Anzac."

Superb leadership was not restricted to ground officers during the evacuation. The naval tandem of Admiral Wemyss and Commodore Keyes displayed extraordinary skill and professionalism under arduous conditions. Close
coordination with those ashore, coupled with daring seamanship in rough waters, enabled thousands of Allied troops to escape the peninsula. The iron will of Keyes played a significant role in the amphibious withdrawals from both the Anzac-Suvla and the Helles beachheads. Although adamantly opposed to withdrawal, Keyes consistently met with Birdwood, as well as corps and division commanders, to understand better the requirements for evacuation. When barges and motor-lighters became scarce, he used destroyers to embark troops and animals. When the sea state worsened, he unhesitatingly sank colliers to create the necessary blockship effect. Full of pluck, he was the heart of the naval effort in the evacuation. It was fortunate for the Allies that both Wemyss and de Robeck relied on him heavily, for Keyes truly grasped both the complexity and the crucial details of amphibious operations.

A final contributing factor to the success of the evacuation was “Lady Luck.” Poor weather, a constant problem, rapidly eclipsed the enemy as the primary threat to the withdrawal. The November storm, with its disastrous effects, was still vivid in the minds of Birdwood and his planning staff. However, the strong winds and treacherous currents on the heels of the Anzac-Suvla evacuation were evidence of the good fortune experienced by the Allies throughout the operation. The lack of a Turkish response
to two separate withdrawals from Gallipoli conjured up notions of divine intervention. Yet, luck can be defined as the point at which preparation and opportunity meet. The officers and men of the Allied forces at Gallipoli were well prepared for the hazards of a withdrawal in the face of the enemy. They seized the opportunity and carried out a splendid operation, salvaging what they could from an otherwise tragic campaign.

The failure of the Dardanelles campaign had important consequences for modern amphibious warfare. Contemporary military theorists of the day branded amphibious operations obsolete based upon the Gallipoli experience. The amphibious option, although contemplated, was not exercised for the remainder of World War I. Studies of Gallipoli during the early twenties interpreted the failure as one of execution vice design. The United States Marine Corps. during the 1920's and 1930's molded a doctrine of amphibious warfare out of the lessons learned from the Dardanelles campaign. Though there is much to be learned from the Allied failures on the Gallipoli peninsula, so is there equally much to be learned from the brilliant success of its evacuation. A study of the evacuation reveals many of the essential ingredients of amphibious warfare: unity of command, with Birdwood assigned overall responsibility for the operation; close joint coordination; detailed planning; clear objectives;
constant, flexible supervision during the operation; operational security; and disciplined forces. Projecting offensive power against a hostile shore is the principle intent of amphibious warfare. However, an amphibious withdrawal possesses many of the same characteristics as other amphibious operations. The evacuation of Gallipoli preserved the remainder of the Allied expeditionary force and terminated a disastrous campaign which held little prospect for victory.
Endnotes


4 Ibid., 285.


6 Ibid., 36.


9 Ibid., 252.

10 Macdonald, *The Roses of No Man’s Land*, 220.

11 Ibid., 221.


13 Ibid., 275.
Figure 1. Sketch of the Gallipoli Peninsula
Figure 2. Evacuation of the Anzac-Suvla Beachhead
Figure 3. Evacuation of the Helles Beachhead
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