The current Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) organization requires changes in command relationships, educational indoctrination, and structure in order to provide a quality service to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander. This paper examines the origins of the SRIG from its rocky beginnings to the present day. Issues involving doctrine, command relationships, and education are identified and discussed.
THE SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE GROUP
CONCEPT AND ORGANIZATION

Submitted to
Major L. G. Schneider
and Mrs. Cundick
at the Communication Officers School
Quantico, Virginia

Captain M. S. Grogan, USMC, (Editor)
Captain S. Lima
Captain D. J. Terando
Captain G. A. Winterstein

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THE SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE GROUP
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OUTLINE

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THE SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE GROUP
CONCEPT AND ORGANIZATION

Combat operations in Southwest Asia (SWA), coupled with foreseen force restructuring may have a great impact on the concept and organization of the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG). The SRIG's perceived unsatisfactory performance during the war has many in this era of defense draw-downs crying for a return to bygone days. As the SRIG undergoes even more scrutiny to survive, an examination of the contributing factors to this perception is overdue. The current SRIG organization requires changes in command relationships, educational indoctrination, and structure in order to provide a quality service to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force commander.

In this report we will examine the SRIG's creation from limited doctrinal guidance, the unclear command relationships which evolved from these beginnings, and the misdirected focus of Marine Corps' intelligence training. We will conclude by reviewing alternative models by which a restructured, stronger SRIG may evolve in tomorrow's Marine Corps.
IN THE BEGINNING

To fully understand the psyche of the SRIG and how it fits into today's Marine Corps a brief review of its genesis and history is required.

During the fall of 1988, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray, convened a Force Structure Study Group focusing on possible changes for reorganization of the Corps' force structure. (3:1-1) His goals were to streamline and improve both efficiency and mission readiness. Perhaps the most innovative thoughts were offered within the FSPG for a much-needed Marine unit specifically constructed around a command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) architecture. The directorate responsible for C3I matters, located at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), gave great insight to the initial development of this concept. The Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and Interoperability (C4I2) branch from HQMC was to serve as a major model for the introduction of C3I concepts into the active Fleet Marine Force (FMF). This model was to evolve into the present SRIG.

SRIG FOCUS

The plan called for the consolidation into one
organization of most intelligence gathering, special mission oriented, and communications units that were organic to the divisions, air wings, and Force Service Support Groups. The organization would be called the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group and was to become an integral part of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Command Element (CE) in order to provide the MEF Commander the ability to focus his intelligence efforts. (3:1-1)

Fielding of the SRIG in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was met with mixed enthusiasm. Opposition for the inclusion of units such as the Communications Battalion and Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) was great; however, Commandant Gray had a vision of the type of unit he wanted in the Marine Corps and was determined to get it. (24) Disparaging voices were quickly silenced and General Gray saw activation of the 2nd SRIG at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina (CLNC), in 1988.

NO DOCTRINE

In the new command much was left to the commander's interpretation of mission and employment. 2d SRIG was focused on C^3I matters within the MEF without the benefit of either published doctrine or definitive command relationships. (8:1) Commander's intent, in this case from
General Gray, was not as clear as it could have been from the beginning. (24) "After all," said Brigadier General C. C. Krulak, Director of the Personnel and Manpower Division at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), "no one really knew what the SRIG was to look like...nothing on paper [doctrine or concept of employment]...discussion was squelched by [Commandant] Gray who said 'make it happen.'" (24) This being the case, 2nd SRIG made its own interpretation of its basic mission statement and formulated a working concept of operations. No one can fault this fledgling command in taking the necessary initiative in lieu of any other guidance. And it is the lack of guidance and official published doctrine which invited fundamentally different interpretations of how the SRIG was to be employed upon the 1st SRIG's activation in 1989. This uncoordinated implementation of the SRIG concept led to a further disparity among commanders and associated staff officers regarding both administrative and operational management of SRIG assets. (20) (24)

DESERT SHIELD & DESERT STORM

Perhaps two major contributors to the dilemma concern education methods and undefined doctrine. (4:2-3) Nowhere are these shortcomings more evident than they were in Southwest Asian operations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
As I MEF deployed during Desert Shield, the 1st SRIG was determined to play an important role in its mission success. The 1st SRIG, a tyro to the game of operational employment compared with 2d SRIG, relied upon traditional concepts of employment of its assets. Over two years had elapsed since the conceptual activation of 2nd SRIG, and still neither general doctrine or specific concept of employment guidance had been provided. (8) As a result, I MEF and 1st SRIG failed to produce an innovative command relationship which worked. (20) The strain of administrative and operational command questions played an important role in the perceived SRIG inadequacies which unfolded during Desert Storm. In common opinion, the true failure of SRIG performance was not its concept on the battlefield, but the injustice of exposing these undefined concepts to combat. (8) Several contend that 2nd SRIG, a more mature and operationally developed command at the outbreak of SWA, could have formulated a better working relationship prior to combat operations than existed between 1st SRIG and G-2, IMEF. (20, 28) Whether this marriage could have been more productive for the MAGTF is academic at this point.

Complaints of the MAFC's performance during Desert Storm focus on several problems. The creation of the MAFC required drawing from existing unit force structure -- degrading subordinate unit capabilities. Further, the
MAFC's unreliable data-based management and insufficient national-level connectivity contributed negatively to its SWA performance. (8) Major General Jenkins, Commanding General of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), stated, "The MEF's intelligence [SRIG] did a marvelous job in collecting on the Iraqi's. We knew where every gun-emplacement was. The problem rested in its dissemination to the ground commanders who really needed it." (17) Thus, the re-examination by intelligence users of the present MAFC's ability to receive, process, analyze and distribute critical intelligence throughout the MAGTF with reliability.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

As in 1988, another study was made detailing estimates and recommendations to the Commandant concerning the future outlook of the Corps. Convened here in Quantico, Virginia, in the fall of 1991, the Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) was faced with a different set of demanding criteria. In addition to focusing on several lessons learned by the Marines Corps and services in general during operations in Southwest Asia, the group faced the reality of almost certain budgetary cuts in defense spending. These changes are to have sweeping effects on the structure and mission of the Corps. Hard choices in determining only the essential command, personnel, and equipment needed to sustain this future Marine Corps were addressed by the FSPG. (8, 24)
Thus, evaluations from combat operations in Desert Storm had great impact on those officers tasked with recommending a possible structure capable of projecting essential Marine Corps abilities regardless of upcoming defense cut-backs. The situation seemingly cut-and-dry, the FSPG approached this challenge as one of great opportunity to make much needed changes for a more effective Corps. Of course, the question of SRIG was a difficult one to answer. Should the Marine Corps of tomorrow retain a command which in fact had proved inadequate, by some standards, in the most recent combat? The FSPG rose to the challenge with far-reaching recommendations, not only for the SRIG, but for the parent C4I2 conceptual framework in general. (8:2, 20, 24, 27)

Former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Al Gray placed great emphasis upon the "...validity of the C'T2 concept..." in June of 1991. Through his CMC White Letter No. 01-91, Gray stated, " The Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Groups [were] the embodiment of the C'T2 concept for MAGTF commanders", and stressed, " It is imperative that we continue to refine our C'T2 and SRIG potential." (9:1) As the FSPG concluded, a common chord was struck concerning the SRIG. The battlefield was no place to experiment with a new concept which was not fully developed, and it would be ill-advised to judge the effectiveness of the SRIG solely from its performance in SWA. (8:3, 20, 24, 27) Therefore, the Group recommended retaining the basic
structure and concept of the unit as outlined in FMFM 3-22.
This would include continued support for presence of the
Communication Battalions in "...part of a larger
organization..." (8:2, 21) with added value in command
relations between SRIG and these units, as outlined in FMFM
3-22. The FSPG general consensus was positive. Yet, as the
FSPG findings were submitted and presented to the FMF for
review, feelings of uncertainty persisted from unclear
policy in the ever-changing defense draw-down. This
uncertainty has continued through the new year and continues
to be fueled by several notional changes circulating around
the FMF and HQMC. In whatever form, the restructuring of
today's Marine Corps is almost certain to have a lasting
impact on the framework and mission of the SRIG.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The command relationship between the SRIG and the MAGTF
CE is the next subject that must be examined. The
commanding officer of the SRIG reports to the MEF commanding
general in the same manner as the commanders of the Ground
Combat Element (GCE), Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and
Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). It can be stated
that the SRIG is in direct support of the MEF CE rather than
in general support of the MEF as a whole. However, at the
direction of MEF CE, the SRIG can be required to provide

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support to other elements of the MEF (ACE, GCE, and CSSE).

This being the case, the SRIG should be considered as a separate command within the MEF CE, not as a part of the MEF staff nor as a major subordinate command (MSC).

THE "SRIE"

It should be noted that there is a movement within the Marine Corps to consider the SRIG as a Major Subordinate Element (MSE), similar to the ACE or GCE. (6) Administratively, the SRIG can be considered about equal to an MSE, meaning that the commanding officer of the SRIG is responsible for the administration and logistics of the group just as the commanding general of the division is responsible for the administration and logistics of the GCE. When providing forces in direct support of the MEF CE, the commanding officer SRIG maintains command of his forces less operational control. If the SRIG was considered as an MSC, the commanding officer would retain operational control of his forces. This is not a good idea because nothing will be gained from the added level of command that would be introduced, and it could possibly further confuse staff relationships. (21) As was previously stated, the SRIG commanding officer maintains administrative control of his forces; however, operational control of the forces within the SRIG should flow from the MEF commanding general through his special staff officers.
SRIG AND THE MAGTF STAFF

The MAGTF cognizant staff officers should assume the following responsibilities when the SRIG is operationally employed. The G-2 is responsible for the overall intelligence support of the MAGTF, from the direction of the intelligence effort, to the dissemination of the final product. In order to accomplish his responsibilities, the G-2 needs to assume operational control of the Radio Battalion (RadBn), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Company (UAV Co), Force Reconnaissance Company (ForReconCo), elements of the Intelligence Company (Intel Co), such as Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP), Force Imagery Interpretation Unit (FIUU), Counterintelligence Teams (CIT), Topographic Platoon (TOPO), Interrogator-Translator Platoon (IP), and the Marine All-Source Fusion Center (MAFC) as depicted in Figure 1. (3:B-1) The G-3 should have operational control of such elements as ANGLICO, Tactical Deception Platoon (TAC-D), the Direct Action Platoons (DA Plt) of the Force Reconnaissance Company, and the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) as graphically shown in Figure 2. In addition the G-3 should have influence over other elements of the SRIG such as UAV Company, Radio Battalion, Force Reconnaissance Platoons, Counterintelligence Teams, Interrogator-Translator Platoon and the Topographic Platoon. (3:C-1) The G-6/CEO is responsible for communication support for the MEF CE. The G-6/Communication-Electronics Officer (CEO) should assume operational control of the
Figure 1. MAGTF G-2 Operational Control

G-2

- RadBn
- UAV
- Intel Co
- ForReconCo
  - SCAMP
  - FIU
  - CIT
  - TOPO
  - IP
  - MAFC

Figure 2. MAGTF G-3 Operational Control

G-3

- ANGLICO
- TAC-D
- Force Recon Co
- SARC
  - DA Plt x 5
Communication Battalion and task them with the required support missions. SRIG units will keep the SRIG commanding officer informed of all missions, and their status, that are assigned by the staff section exercising operational control over them.

Although the SRIG commanding officer relinquishes operational control of some of his subordinate units to MEF CE staff officers, he still retains a number of important responsibilities. He is a primary advisor to the MEF commanding general in the area of C4I². In addition, the SRIG commanding officer continues to exercise administrative and logistical control over the elements of the SRIG. With the help of his staff the SRIG commanding officer can relieve some of the burden of his subordinate commanders by monitoring operations to help resolve problems, anticipate needs, and plan future operations. He can also assist in the coordination of operations in order to deconflict commitments and insure efficient use of assets.

When dealing with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or a Marine Expeditionary Force Forward (MEF FWD), a task-oriented SRIG detachment will be employed with the MAGTF. This detachment within a MEU or MEF-FWD size MAGTF is both operationally and administratively the same as the SRIG within the MEF. These detachments should be established

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with the same basic organization as the SRIG itself, meaning that they should always have an Officer-In-Charge (OIC) with a small staff overseeing the detachments from the subordinate SRIG units. It is imperative that a detachment OIC be assigned in order to have some unity of command, especially when embarked aboard ship, rather than having a number of smaller detachments independent of one another -- although, a SRIG unit detachment commander or OIC should not be dual-hatted as the overall SRIG Detachment commander. The SRIG Detachment OIC will follow the same command relationships with the MAGTF CE as the SRIG commanding officer follows with the MEF CE.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

One of the major complaints against the SRIG's performance in SWA was the untimely and inefficient dissemination of Intelligence. A better understanding and a well-defined concept of employment of the SARC and MAFC will help remedy some of the problems the SRIG encountered.

The SARC

The SARC is the single entity responsible for the organization, planning, control, and monitoring for all the SRIG collection assets. The SARC is not responsible for processing intelligence; its role is more one of collecting "combat information" and passing this information on to the MSC's so they can act upon it. (20) At the same time, this
information is passed to the MAFC so it can be processed. An example would be a sensor from SCAMP monitoring movement in a particular location. This information would be checked with other collection agencies, such as Force Recon or UAV, in an attempt to verify it. Once this combat information is verified as an enemy unit, this information can be passed on to the GCE for targeting and passed to the MAFC so it can be processed into refined intelligence. The SARC should be under operational control of the G-3, with recommendations on employment from the G-2. Another way to look at the functions of the SARC is to divide it into two parts: (1) collection requirements management (what information is needed), determined by the G-3; and (2) collection operational management (how to get the information), determined by the G-2. (26)

The MAFC

The MAFC is responsible for providing fused, all-source intelligence to MAGTF commanders and subordinate commanders as required. In other words the MAFC will process information collected by organic and external agencies into refined intelligence and disseminate this intelligence to the appropriate commanders. Using the scenario mentioned above, when the SARC passes the information on the enemy unit to the MAFC, it will be fused with information received from other collection agencies. It will then be analyzed, processed as intelligence, and disseminated. A single
bit of information, once processed into intelligence, could provide the MAGTF with clues to possible enemy intentions. The ability to predict these intentions gives the MAGTF commander a tremendous advantage over the enemy because the commanding officer is able to enter the enemy's Orientation, Observation, Decision, Action (OODA) loop. For maximum effectiveness the MAFC should be under operational control of the G-2.

Proper gathering of information and intelligence by the SARC and MAFC is useless without proper dissemination. Placing the SARC under operational control of the G-3 will facilitate the dissemination of combat information to subordinate commanders. One possible solution to the problem of dissemination of refined intelligence from the MAFC to the MSC's is to establish a six-man dissemination cell in the G-2. This cell would consist of two representatives from the ACE, the GCE, and the CSSE who would act as liaison in order to return to their respective commanders any required information or intelligence. (20) The representatives will have a vested interest in operations toward their respective command, thereby adding a sense of urgency to the support. This concept, in conjunction with utilizing the required communication links, should ensure proper dissemination of intelligence.
INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION

No matter how well the flow of information and intelligence from the SARC and MAFC works, the quality of that disseminated intelligence is inevitably based upon the quality of education invested in the officers and enlisted personnel who analyze it. Traditionally, the Marine Corps has not placed the same weight behind formal training of its intelligence personnel as do the other services. After all, the Marine commander was usually only concerned with what was beyond the next hill. However, with the proliferation of high-technology weapons of far-reaching range, today's Marine commander needs sound intelligence.

The Marine Corps needs to place greater emphasis on, and allocate a larger portion of its future budget toward, the education and training of a professional intelligence community. As violence becomes more prevalent throughout the world, and monetary restraints continue to shrink our present military force, a greater quality and ability will be required of those remaining in the intelligence community. The Marine Corps can no longer ignore the need to cultivate a professionally educated intelligence community. Failing to do so will negatively influence the SRIG's ability to successfully fulfill its assigned mission for the MAGTF.
PRESENT SHORTFALLS

The training of Marine Corps intelligence personnel has been substandard as a whole, with the preponderance of its emphasis focusing on naval and amphibious operational needs rather than on tactical ground operational intelligence. A major factor in the shortcomings of our analytical/fusion capability in the Marine Corps today is our approach towards educating our intelligence personnel. (20)

In order to operate in the joint battlefield in the days to come, priorities need to be refocused, and appropriate schools need to be made available to our intelligence people in order to better prepare them to operate alongside their better trained sister service counterparts. Without discarding our naval intelligence training, the Marine Corps' focus of effort needs to be on tactical intelligence education and training for ground combat.

REFOCUSED INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

The Marine Corps needs to act now to reorient its focus on intelligence needed to fight the land battle. At present, this can best be achieved by the courses given at the Army's Intelligence Training Facility at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, or by upgrading the Naval Marine Corps Intelligence Center's (NMITC) curriculum. (20)
In the past, the Marine Corps intelligence officer was frequently an infantry officer in disguise, who for one reason or another had been assigned duties as the unit's intelligence officer without any formal intelligence training. Despite his well-intentioned efforts, such an officer could rarely provide his commander with the anticipated product, thus perpetuating the myth that the intelligence community cannot deliver. We can no longer afford these practices, nor do we have the luxury we once had of waiting a couple of years and expecting the intelligence person to learn his trade on the job.

In the future the intelligence community must be capable of providing the advanced warnings needed to employ our smaller MAGTFs at the appropriate time and place. At the same time intelligence personnel will be required to represent the Marine Corps within the very high visibility of the joint environment. Consequentially, the performance of intelligence personnel in the joint environment can have direct effects on the Marine Corps' reputation in other joint functions -- such as a Joint Task Force (JTF). This being true, it is imperative that the Marine Corps endeavour to refocus its goals for training and education of its intelligence personnel. Further, when this is accomplished, the Marine Corps should assign Marines with such professional intelligence credentials to intelligence policy billets.
Historically there have always been more funds available to train the combat MOSs than there have been to train other supporting occupational specialties. This lack of funds has directly affected the quality of intelligence provided to commanders -- epitomized by the SRIG. This policy has left the 0202 MOS critically undermanned, forcing the community to attempt to fill the void with people involuntarily transferred into the intelligence field. These transferees are expected to perform at their rank level without the benefit of irreplaceable training experience. This is why representation by experienced intelligence MOS-trained senior officers in any billets that can affect policy has been minimal to nonexistent. This trend goes hand-in-hand with the absence of the crucial funds needed to pay for more appropriate education as discussed earlier.

TWO ANSWERS TO ENTRY-LEVEL TRAINING

There are two immediate answers to improving our intelligence training at the entry level. First is an improved curriculum at NMITC. NMITC serves as a good medium to orient the new candidate to the intelligence field; however it falls short in providing an intelligence officer with the necessary tools he will need to provide the Marine air or ground combat commander the proper intelligence service he requires for ground combat. This is due to the meager amount of instructional time NMITC devotes to its
ground intelligence package. For example, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a tool which, if properly utilized, affords the commander the ability to conceptualize the enemy's most likely avenues of approach. According to NMTC's 1991 syllabus the school allotted only one-and-a-half hours of training in this technique, whereas the U.S. Army's intelligence training course devotes three to six months to it.

The second answer rests within the curriculum taught at the United States Army Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. This course of instruction offers its intelligence students tactical and strategic career-level intelligence training. The focus of the intelligence course of instruction at Fort Huachuca is the same focus the Marine Corps' intelligence community requires -- on the ground battle.

If we are truly committed to improving the education and training of our intelligence personnel and in creating a professional intelligence service for our Marine Corps, we need to improve intelligence education. The best solution would be to reallocate funds in order to acquire appropriate school seats at the U. S. Army's Fort Huachuca Intelligence School. Otherwise, we should significantly upgrade NMTC's curriculum for Marine intelligence students to orient study not only on naval amphibious operations, but also on
tactical ground operations. Through these actions the Marine Corps can provide its MAGTFs with an SRIG manned with truly professional intelligence personnel.

THE FUTURE SRIG: VARIED OPINIONS

What will a SRIG, or similar organization look like in the future Marine Corps? There seem to be at least three popular opinions in the Marine Corps today with regard to the question of command relationships between MAGTF and SRIG commanders.

First, the SRIG concept should evolve and be introduced within the MAGTF structure as a major subordinate element. As discussed earlier, a new SRIE would gain leverage with the equivalent GCE and ACE, and do for intelligence and communications what Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) has done for logistics and maintenance.

Second, an organization modelled after the U. S. Army's Military Intelligence (MI) Group could hold the answer for the SRIG. This solution has potential for the Corps since it lies comfortably between the two previous positions, taking elements of each while addressing the critical questions both of command relations and operational control on the battlefield. The U. S. Army's MI Group model would leave the MAGTF staff preeminent during management of
requirements and missions, while relinquishing management of the SRIG assets to the SRIG commander.

Third, the relationships between MAGTF commanding officer, the MAGTF staff, and SRIG commander should remain as intended in FMFM 3-22 -- with the SRIG commanding officer training and equipping SRIG subordinate units for the MAGTF commanding officer. As such, all but the operational control of assets during combat would rest with the SRIG commander. The MAGTF commander, through his staff officers, would continue to control and task SRIG assets operationally as might be required by the MAGTF concept of operation.

(3:2-2)

Each of these positions holds some merit. And perhaps it is within these parts that we can find an answer. Focus on consolidation of effort, union of similar functional areas, and smaller, tailored forces of C'T^2 unique abilities should now take priority. In order to produce a definitive SRIG structure we must scrutinize each of these three models -- and take what works well from each -- while leaving room for the expansion of the SRIG's capabilities should the future dictate. In light of defense draw-downs, the choices the Marine Corps makes now can develop into quite an opportunity for the SRIG's evolution.
THE SRIE MODEL

The evolution of the SRIG to MSE standing holds several merits. The Marine Corps has enlisted a detailed Intelligence Systems Architecture (ISA) assessment from the Atlantic Research Corporation (ARC). (6) Based on doctrinal publications, this study advocated the creation of the SRIE. A critical drawback in implementation of this concept is its requirements to fundamentally change the current command relations and structure of a MAGTF. The issue of who actually controls SRIG assets is complex. ARC's study brings out valid points on a variety of topics: assessing the blame for operational failure; the need for greater control of ACE intelligence assets; and a detailed assessment of information flow and responsibility through each MAGTF C3I agency. Several positions on SRIG's role within MEF structure are addressed, everything from the "one-stop-shop" approach of organizing and training detachments (15) to the growing popularity of including MEF ACE efforts in aerial observation and electronic warfare. (13) Yet, ARC's study was unfortunately conceived in times of national economic prosperity. The reality of defense economic cut-backs and need to streamline in every area may derail the Corps' effort to adopt the SRIE concept.

Currently, the coordinating draft for FMFM 3-22 projects the operational control of SRIG assets through
MAGTF staff cognizant officers. The question of command relationships is addressed in depth during the first three chapters. A central concept in purpose for the SRIG's is "...dedicating itself solely to the task of organizing, equipping and training detachments to meet the intelligence, special operations and communications requirements of the MAGTF Commander." (3:1-1) Interestingly enough, FMFM 3-22 outlines minor structural changes in the Group (MAFC to MEF G-2), yet offers no real alternative in the remaining chapters with regard to structural streamlining of its subordinate units. Again, as with the ARC's ISA, only portions of the overall SRIG dilemma are addressed. The reality of certain MAGTF changes in framework must be considered. FMFM 3-22 relegates the SRIG commander to special staff, with tasks of "assisting in development of intelligence and communications issues." (3:2-2) Although both the ARC and FMFM 3-22 approaches to the SRIG problem touch mainly on command relations, both offer no real-time solution to possible Group restructuring as well. There must exist a comfortable medium between the two -- one which resolves questions of command relations and the ever-pressing defense draw-down. Certainly, other services have similar structure and capability which the Marine Corps can draw upon and adapt to meet the unique needs of our mission.
THE MI BRIGADE MODEL

Lying comfortably between these positions is the relationship of the Army's MI Brigade. Although the MI Brigade commander has "operational control of most [brigade] resources," (1:6-1) he does not hold the same distinction as viewed towards Division/Corps commands. Much as artillery units are tasked, the MI Brigade is levied one of four standard tactical missions: general support, direct support, reinforcing, and general support reinforcing. (1:6-2) This tasking provides only the MI Brigade commander the flexibility to manage his assets while the cognizant staff at corps/brigade level focus their efforts on management of requirements and needed missions. (2:3-1)

Additional similarities exist between the Army's MI Brigade and the MAGTF SRIG. With minor differences, the MI Brigade has many of the same capabilities in reconnaissance, signal intelligence (SIGINT), electronic warfare (EW), communications, and counter-intelligence. As with the exception of several other intelligence related C3I agency similarities, it is here the relationship changes. In many ways, the SRIG has evolved beyond the MI Group due to its additional ties with several other Marine-unique C4I2 related units. Regardless, the distinction between who manages overall requirements and who controls the execution of assets clearly provides potential for a possible restructured SRIG.
Another model for the SRIG of the future can be found in the more familiar realm of the Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). The MAW has been wrestling with the inherent problems of moving command and intelligence information around the battlefield for a long time. Perhaps in adopting an approach like that of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS), the SRIG can find a usable C^3I^2 framework.

The concept of the MACCS is embodied in the Marine Air Control Group (MACG). The family of units which comprise the MACG are "in many ways comparable to the SRIG" (21) not so much by specific function as through organizational framework. The MACG is structured around the very concept of Command and Control (C^2) through establishment of the MACCS. Individual units within the MACG structure have specific functional area which are executed through independent C^2 agencies. Thus, one unit equals one agency; one agency equals one functional area.

This idea can best be illustrated by the Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS), which is responsible for the establishment of the Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) -- MACS as the unit and TAOC as the agency. The TAOC in turn is primarily concerned with air defense and airspace management. Likewise, the Marine Wing Communication
Squadron (MWCS), through several Operational Systems Control Centers (OSCC), provides the necessary connectivity required throughout the ACE. The Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS), through the Direct Air Support Center (DASC), provides offensive close air support.

The principle of the MACCS is then fostered through a responsive unit structure forming dedicated C\(^2\) agencies. Analogies based on organizational framework can now be drawn between the MACG and the possible SRIG of the future: responsive C\(^4\)I\(^2\) related units should be tasked with the mission to form dedicated C\(^3\)I unique agencies.

THE HYBRID

The combination of three perspectives -- (1) great merit in MI Group/SRIG comparison, (2) operational success behind the organizational framework that exists in the MACG, and (3) certain FMF MAGTF restructuring due to defense cut-backs -- all now point to a logical evolution in the C\(^4\)I\(^2\) concept which is the SRIG. An adaptive SRIG restructuring which not only retains the fundamental concept, but now streamlines the family of units based on these three perspectives is needed.

Consolidation of effort is paramount. In fact, it is the essential ingredient behind a remodeled SRIG. This means changes in the traditional structure and command
relationships within the Group. Common functional areas now can be consolidated under unified commands. Some can even expand in both personnel and required systems due to valuable C³I lessons learned from SWA. Overall, the Group restructuring must be acceptable to all involved, and operational command shared in many ways between cognizant staff and Group commander. An increased emphasis on joint operations and interoperability must permeate the Group and continue to be a driving force in its new operational framework. So what will this structure look like and how will it maximize the opportunities presented by three very differing perspectives? In one word, it must be a hybrid.

Remodelling is perhaps the proper tone set here because it suggests improvement as the old SRIG framework changes. Restructuring on the other hand suggests nothing more than a rearrangement of players accomplishing only a new look. This potential SRIG for the future has been remodeled in four crucial areas:

1. A new shared operational concept between MAGTF staff and group commander.
2. Consolidation of units into four separate battalion organizations.
3. Integrated and in some cases improved capabilities based on C³I functional areas.
(4) Improved focus of existing and new functional agencies.

Operational Dilemma

The power of operational control can be a mixed blessing. A critical question asked in the ARC ISA was "who do we blame for operational failures -- staff officer or commander?" (6) Clearly, a commander's authority is undermined when he loses all but administrative control of units in combat. Staff officers can become "pseudo-commanders" (6), never having to worry about logistics, morale, and discipline but only operations. A comfortable medium has been formed in the Army's MI structure between staff officer and commander. This example of shared operational responsibility should now be adapted for the changing SRIG. The MAGTF cognizant staff officer should retain operational focus of requirement and mission management. The close relationship with the SRIG commander's asset management based on these requirements must continue to reflect an interdependency on each other. The refinement of these requirements can now be translated into assignment of assets by the SRIG, through close coordination with the respective MAGTF cognizant staff.

A Remodelled SRIG

From a defense draw-down perspective, the family of SRIG units should now take a streamlined approach to
consolidation of like functional areas. The MI example shows efficiency through a simple command framework much like the MACG. The remodeling of the SRIG can now be reduced to four independent and functionally related units. As depicted in Figure 3, a Headquarters and Service Battalion (H&S Bn), Surveillance and Reconnaissance Battalion (S&R Bn), Radio Battalion, and Communications Battalion (Comm Bn) can now provide the same, if not improved, C4I2 services.

Figure 3. SRIG Functional Units

![SRIG Functional Units Diagram]
Doctrine can support the standardization of this simplified framework among the three active FMF SRIG units. Only III MEF would have a tailored Group framework due to its potential MAGTF makeup in relation to the remaining MEF's. Yet, the similar format of the three should be identical to include continued support for both a Communications Battalion and the ANGLICO presence. Evolution of the SRIG to include those air assets which are certainly C3I assets within the MEF is probable in the future. Although this remodeled Group has no "Aerial Exploitation" element, it should sponsor and develop the potential for one in the future. The ARC's ISA emphasized the shortcomings of tapping the ACE C3I assets. This could well be the next logical evolution for the SRIG.

Each of the four battalions will simplify this remodeled SRIG focus on the "one agency equals one functional area" concept, as shown with the MACG. Although both the Radio and Communications Battalions stay relatively untouched in structure, increased emphasis in both radio reconnaissance (RadBn) and data communications (Comm Bn) must adhere. The real consolidation of like functional areas is reflected in the Headquarters and Service and Surveillance and Reconnaissance Battalions. An H&S Bn can focus on the command, control, and interoperability area of C4I2. Its structure could include a Headquarters Company, ANGLICO, and possibly an Intelligence Dissemination Company.
The ID Company structure could have merits with regard to the proposed Dissemination Cell at MEF. Such a unit, if staffed and trained properly, could show potential in the timely identification and distribution of combat information within the MAGTF. If component commands are willing to provide operational augmentation to this ID Company, they may be serving their own best interests. Certainly, with proper commander's intent as a guideline, these Marines could fill a crucial role in pushing information at critical times to their parent commands.

This could also be an alternative in terms of further integration of the MEF H&S Co. With the addition of ANGLICO, ID Co. and a HQ Co., this SRIG H&S Bn may form a nucleus for the desired levels of interoperability and joint focus in the future, as shown in Figure 4.

A Surv & Recon Bn can now focus closely on many related intelligence functions currently within the SRIG. Its structure could include a Headquarters Company, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Company, Force Reconnaissance Company, and Intelligence Company as shown in Figure 5. Such a unit, again staffed and trained properly, would streamline duplication of efforts and force its member companies to cooperate in planning and execution of missions required by the MEF.
Figure 4. Headquarters & Service Battalion

H&S Bn

HQ Co  ANGLICO  ID Co

Figure 5. Surveillance & Reconnaissance Battalion

S&R Bn

H&S Co  UAV Co  ForReconCo  Intel Co
Finally, the SRIG can be remodelled on a "one agency equals one functional area" concept; then several possibilities exist for streamlining the conduct of C^3I^2 related agencies. As mentioned earlier, the SRIG commander could now concentrate on the management of his assets with close operational coordination through the cognizant MAGTF staffs. SRIG functional agencies can plan, deploy, and manage their assets based on this shared operational control concept. Each unit within the Group could also install, operate, and maintain (IOM) its respective functional C^3I^2 agency under direction of a Group Command and Control Center (GC^3). A similar GC^3 concept (GCC) was proposed by 3rd SRIG in October 1991. More administrative and logistics oriented, a GC^3 could provide the SRIG Commander an operative center much as the MACG utilizes the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC). This concept is portrayed on the following page in Figure 6.

These functional agencies are formed from each of the four battalion units to include MIDC (H&S BN), SARC (S&R BN), OCAC (RADB BN), and OSCC (COMM BN). Their relation to MEF is based on direct interface of like functional area during operations and fostered by the shared concept between SRIG Commander and cognizant staffs. Now, as Figure 7 outlines, the SRIG C^3I agencies directly correspond with MEF functional agencies.
Figure 6. SRIG Group Command & Control Center

SRIG GC3

SARC  OCAC  MIDC  OSCC

Figure 7. MEF Combat Operations Center

MEF COC

MAFC  S/EWCC  MIDC  OSCC

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With this evolution of the SRIG, certainly a revision of the mission statement is in order. 2nd SRIG has considered the proposed emp basis of $C^IT^2$ within a mission statement. (21) For example:

**Group Mission**

To provide combat ready command, control, communication, computer, intelligence/information, and interoperable ($C^IT^2$) forces to support the requirements of Marine Expeditionary Forces and smaller Marine Air-Ground Task Forces.

Only through remodeling of the current SRIG framework, placing more attention upon doctrine of shared operational command, and immediately revising our education systems will such an evolution be realized. This SRIG "Hybrid" may just be the answer.

**CONCLUSION**

We have examined the origins of the SRIG from its rocky beginnings to the present day. We identified early problems in doctrine, command relationships, and education as they related to the SRIG's performance in SWA. Finally, we discussed alternate models for SRIG evolution and how this future SRIG might be structured. The answers are elusive; however, the SRIG concept is still a sound idea. The SRIG's
performance in SWA should not be used as an inflexible yardstick for measuring its future value to the Marine Corps. If we decisively answer the problems identified, a new SRIG can be cultivated which will provide the critical C^4I^2 services for the MAGTF commander.
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