THE FUTURE OF THE AIR FORCE
Best Available Copy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
<th>CADRE PAPER SPECIAL SERIES</th>
<th>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EAST ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>LAWRENCE E GRINTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>CADRE/PT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAXWELL AFB AL 36112-5532</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td>SS-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>SAME as #7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</td>
<td>PUBLIC RELEASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. SUBJECT TERMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. PRICE CODE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</td>
<td>UNCLAS</td>
<td>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</td>
<td>UNCLAS</td>
<td>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSN 7540-01-280-5500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
East Asia and the United States into the Twenty-first Century

Planning Future American Policy and Strategy Options

by

LAWRENCE E. GRINTER

Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

November 1991
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment and in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Trends in East Asia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Transformations: Less Ideology, More Territorial and Ethnic Problems</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Economics</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Liberalization</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 UNITED STATES INTERESTS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Interests to Policies/Strategies of Balance of Power and Containment</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searching for a Post-Containment Rationale</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 US PRESENCE AND DEPLOYMENT</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FUTURE US POLICY/STRATEGY/FORCE OPTIONS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for Evaluating Options</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Options in East Asia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Kind of Future East Asia?</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluating US Policy/Strategy/Force Options against the Future</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Illustrations

1  Evaluating US Policy/Strategy/Force Options in East Asia  ........................................... 23
Foreword

The stunning changes in the complexion of international politics that began late in the decade of the 1980s and continue today will profoundly affect the American military establishment as a whole, and the US Air Force in particular. Decisions about the future course of the military will be made in the early part of the 1990s which will essentially determine the course of the US Air Force well into the next century. Decisions of such importance require thoughtful consideration of all points of view.

This report is one in a special series of CADRE Papers which address many of the issues that decision makers must consider when undertaking such momentous decisions. The list of subjects addressed in this special series is by no means exhaustive, and the treatment of each subject is certainly not definitive. However, the Papers do treat topics of considerable importance to the future of the US Air Force, treat them with care and originality, and provide valuable insights.

We believe this special series of CADRE Papers can be of considerable value to policymakers at all levels as they plan for the US Air Force and its role in the so-called postcontainment environment.

DENNIS M. DREW, Col, USAF
Director
Airpower Research Institute
About the Author

Lawrence E. Grinter is a senior research fellow, Current Doctrine Division, Airpower Research Institute, at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He previously was a member on the faculties of the National War College, Air War College, and Air Command and Staff College. Dr. Grinter has served as a research consultant at the National Defense University. He has published widely in such professional publications as *Air University Review*, *International Security Review*, and *Orbis*. He has undertaken numerous studies for the National Security Council and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and is coeditor of *Asian-Pacific Security: Emerging Challenges and Responses* (1986) and *East Asian Conflict Zones* (1987).
Acknowledgments

This study would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of some outstanding people.

The Airpower Research Institute at Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE) has always been a very special place to work. I owe real thanks to the Airpower Research Institute’s director, Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, whose encouragement and facilitation of trips to East Asia, to US Commander in Chief Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), and to Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) headquarters has allowed me to stay current on Pacific developments and strategy.

Also at AUCADRE, within the Air University Press, Dorothy McCluskie and her production people and Tom Mackin and his editors have greatly added to the quality of this product.

Finally, I am most appreciative to the USCINCPAC J5 staff for excellent discussions and information over the years, especially Rear Adm William Pendley (USN), David Haut, Karl Eulenstein, and Bud Henry.
Executive Summary

A perceived decline of the Soviet threat in East Asia and the Pacific, reductions in the US defense budget, and changes in US-Asian relations require a fundamental reexamination of current and future US security policy toward East Asia. The region itself is changing as the ideological causes of tensions decrease, territorial-ethnic-political squabbles increase, and market economics and political liberalization assert themselves. Numerous proposals for future US policy and strategy are being discussed—from insisting that our allies pay much more for defense, to keeping or relinquishing bases in the Philippines, to phased US troop reductions, to involving the Soviets in Pacific arms control negotiations. Some of these proposals are motivated by narrow concerns: trade deficits, the perceived Soviet decline, nationalism, budget problems, or other special interests. Seldom do they acknowledge the large and growing US stake in East Asia.

By contrast, this study argues that US policy and strategy toward East Asia over the next 10 to 15 years must be planned with the whole spectrum of US interests and East Asia’s evolving potential in mind. The United States remains East Asia’s most trusted and most powerful external influence. Our policy and strategy planning must reflect that fact.

Developing systematic criteria for evaluating future US options in East Asia is part of the challenge. Long-term US policies must be consistent with our global security interests, maintain our access to the region, ensure that we protect our interests and our friends, and ensure that we win if it comes to war. A second challenge is to envision the kind of East Asia we want to see emerge, the trends we want to foster, and the dangers we want to preclude.

Accordingly, this study argues that it is in the US interest, as well as that of East Asia and the Pacific, to encourage these long-term trends:

- A quadrilateral balance of power in East Asia underwritten by policies that promote a stable People’s Republic of China, strengthen the US-Japanese security partnership, reward the Soviet Union for constructive behavior, and keep the US military presence in both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia at very near current levels.

- Big four (US, USSR, China, and Japan) policies toward the Korean Peninsula that:
  - end the introduction of new offensive weapons and technology into both Koreas,
  - emphasize Korean force reductions and confidence-building measures,
  - prohibit acquisition of nuclear weapons by either country, and
  - encourage a permanent peace treaty between Seoul and Pyongyang and the admission of both Koreas into the United Nations.
• Strong UN involvement in a Cambodian cease-fire and neutralization that reduces outside arms flows and rewards peaceful competition.

• A broadening ASEAN security role in Southeast Asia, with all ASEAN countries having comparable defense doctrines and equipment but no missile, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and in which the US and Australia remain the principal external facilitators.

• A US arms control strategy that seeks verifiable arms and technology reductions on the Korean Peninsula, a neutralization of Cambodia, and a cap on weapons and technology going to the ASEAN countries. The US should also be receptive to structural arms control arrangements between the US and the USSR in the Pacific.

Given these desirable trends and policies, how do the currently discussed US policy/strategy/force options evaluate for benefits and risks?

**Major US Retrenchment from East Asia**

A major US retrenchment would have US forces leave Northeast and Southeast Asia. Support for retrenchment might result from prolonged economic conflicts with Japan and/or South Korea, irritation with Philippine demands, or single-issue pressures in the US Congress. A total US pullout would endanger East Asia’s future stability and security, and it would be inconsistent with US global interests.

**Leave the Philippines**

A complete exit from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base would leave the US forces forward deployed only in Northeast Asia and Guam. This would risk Southeast Asia’s stability, reduce US deterrent power, jeopardize Indian Ocean access, and create security vacuums into which Chinese, Japanese, or Soviet power might enter.

**The East Asia Strategy Initiative**

The East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI) is current US security policy. Under EASI, US forces in East Asia will experience a 10-percent reduction by 1993 (Phase I). “Proportionally greater reductions in combat forces” may occur between 1993 and 1997, with further reductions up to the year 2000 “as circumstances permit.” The long-term implications of this initiative are troubling. US bombers have already been removed from East Asia and the Pacific, and less than 7 percent of US forces are now stationed there. If EASI is implemented past Phase I, US deterrence and East Asian stability could well be jeopardized.
Accelerated Burden Sharing

Burden sharing in East Asia is emphasized in current US policy. Certainly the Japanese and the South Koreans can pay more; and the Philippines may push the US too far in demanding compensation while also being defended. But money is only part of the picture. Maintaining military interoperability and technical interdependence between the US and its allies also counts.

Arms Control

As US-Soviet tensions decrease, other conflicts become more evident. US and other initiatives could encourage solutions.

- On the Korean Peninsula—Soviet, American, and Japanese pressure on Pyongyang to forego nuclear weapons could be coupled with US removal of alleged nuclear weapons in South Korea while the two Koreas move toward force reductions, a peace treaty, and admission to the United Nations.
- In the Sea of Japan—The US could encourage Japan and the Soviet Union to demilitarize the Northern Territories while pledging "no increase" in our military operations.
- In Indochina—The US should continue to support a UN-supervised cease-fire as well as free and fair elections in Cambodia while working toward a demilitarization of the country and a sharing of power in Phnom Penh.
- In the South China Sea/Malacca Straits—Working with ASEAN and Australia, the United States and other arms suppliers should restrict the proliferation of military technology and discourage any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons development in the area.
- Toward the Soviet Union—The US could promote measures to reduce the chances of accidental military confrontations and notify all parties of intended military exercises. Longer-term measures, which would test Soviet sincerity, might involve reduced Soviet operations in the Sea of Japan and reduced US antisubmarine warfare activities in the Sea of Okhotsk, or reductions in Soviet nuclear attack submarine threats to US carrier battle groups in return for reduced US ASW threats to Soviet fleet ballistic missile submarines.

Careful consideration of the five broad categories of US policy/strategy/force options just discussed suggests these near-term US actions:

- Halt the drawdowns of the US forward deployed troops in East Asia at 10 percent or an approximately 14,000- to 15,000-man decrease.
- Retain the US basing arrangements in the Philippines as long as politically and operationally feasible.
- Press the Japanese and the Koreans for greater contributions to mutual defense.
• Promote arms control and tension reduction measures on the Korean Peninsula, in Indochina, and in the South China Sea, while also testing the Soviets' sincerity on structural arms control.

Longer-term US policies, planned as part of a desired East Asian future, should encourage a quadrilateral balance of power, an end to the arms race on the Korean Peninsula, a neutralization of Cambodia, more collaborative ASEAN security arrangements with controls on weapons, and US-Soviet structural arms control arrangements in East Asia and the Pacific.
Chapter 1

Introduction

THIS STUDY analyzes future US security options in East Asia and the Western Pacific region. The study begins by presenting and projecting the trends in East Asia, then examines how US interests have influenced and are adapting to those trends. Options for US policy/strategy are presented next, and their utilities are evaluated against the kinds of East Asian futures the United States should encourage. The study concludes with recommendations for long-term US security policy and strategy in the region.

Regional Trends in East Asia

EAST Asia and the Western Pacific cover approximately one-quarter of the world's land surface and contain about one-third of the world's population. Traditionally dominated by the great continental landmass and the population of China—and today the Chinese constitute 70 percent of the region's people—East Asia contains 20 major countries, the Soviet Far East, and three important dependencies, for a total of 25 key political entities.¹ Four major countries most influence East Asia: China, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. China is the heart of East Asia, and her massive size, population, and cultural-political impact are felt throughout the region. However, China's long-term political/economic stability cannot be assumed. Japan is East Asia's premier economic power, with trade and investment influence evident across the region. But her possible future political/military role and degree of autonomy concerns Asia. The United States' strategic stake in the area is supported by prominent political, economic, and military interests. Nevertheless, the longevity and scope of the future US military presence in the area is under reexamination. The Soviet Union, with its sizable territorial and military presence in the area, lacks economic influence and political acceptance in East Asia—difficulties Moscow is energetically seeking to overcome. And there are other important countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, and several ASEAN countries—particularly Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia. All these smaller states are showing vibrant market economic systems and established or emerging democratic polities.

Security Transformations: Less Ideology, More Territorial and Ethnic Problems

EAST Asia remains a heavily armed region; seven of the world's largest military establishments (China, the Soviet Union, Japan, the two Koreas, Vietnam, and the United States) operate here. Large armed forces in Asia reflect in part a legacy of war and conflict. In this century, East Asia has seen the collapse of China and its descent into civil
war; the rise of Japanese militarism and colonialism: Japan's invasion of China, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific during WWII; the Korean War; and three Indochina wars. Other violent conflicts have occurred in the Philippines, Malaysia, Burma, and Indonesia. Currently, there are armed struggles in the Philippines, Cambodia, and Burma, and there is still no peace treaty between the two Koreas.

At the strategic military level, three East Asian players—the United States, the Soviet Union, and China—deploy nuclear weapons in the region. In addition to tactical nuclear systems, the Soviets also station about 490 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and 24 fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) in their Far Eastern territories. The Chinese deploy eight ICBMs, 60 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), and one SSBN, in Asia. The United States keeps about eight SSBNs as well as two or three aircraft carriers on station in the Western Pacific. We also have targeted a portion of our ICBM fleet against Soviet targets in Asia and are reported to store tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and with the Seventh Fleet.² All three countries also deploy major conventional military forces in East Asia. Additionally, Moscow and Washington have provided some of their most sophisticated conventional military systems to allies and client states in the area: Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and selected ASEAN countries.³ Despite recent Soviet and American force drawdowns, both sides continue to replace 1960s and 1970s equipment with 1980s and 1990s systems and to provide friends with the same; Soviet MIG-29s and Su-27s, and American F-16s, are prominent examples.⁴

Nevertheless, the area also shows tangible signs of tension reduction. The Soviets and the Vietnamese have extricated their regular forces from their respective quagmires in Afghanistan and Cambodia. The two Korean governments are talking to each other about reducing tensions on the peninsula although no actual force reductions have occurred. China's armed forces have been reduced by one-quarter over the past five years. And the Soviets have drawn down forces in Mongolia, along the Sino-Soviet border, and in Vietnam, although not yet on the Northern Territories adjacent to the Japanese island of Hokkaido⁵ or in the Soviet strategic bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk. And modernization is compensating for the retirement of older equipment. As a 1990 Rand Corporation study observed, "The Soviets see very unlikely to jeopardize their core regional security interests, especially protection of Soviet nuclear and maritime assets deployed in and around the Sea of Japan; barring Soviet-American agreements, this may impose limits on future Soviet force reductions, especially Moscow's highly capable air and naval assets arrayed against the United States and Japan."⁶

In the absence of major arms reductions in Asia to date by Moscow and Washington, the patterns of tension and conflict in East Asia have reverted to more traditional forms: the continuing standoff in Korea, and the civil wars and dissidence suppression or counterinsurgency campaigns in Burma, Cambodia, the Philippines, Tibet, Irian Jaya, and Papua New Guinea. Territorial problems also continue on the Sino-Soviet border, between Japan and the Soviet Union, and between the Burmese government and its ethnic minorities. And other territorial disputes have risen to new prominence: in the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam claims but China occupies; and in the Spratly Island area, which is occupied by Vietnamese, Taiwanese, Chinese, Malaysian, and Filipino forces. In short, the patterns of conflict in East Asia are shifting from ideological to territorial and ethnic.
Market Economics

THE economic structure of East Asia and the Pacific continues to move toward market systems, with some notable exceptions—particularly in China where, since the June 1989 Tiananmen Square debacle, central planners have been predominating while the economy stagnates. Vibrant market economies continue to perform well in South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan. Japan's phenomenal gross national product (GNP), which constitutes over half of East Asia's productivity, doubled in the past six years. The Philippines, recovering from 20 years of the Marcos regime's economic kleptocracy, shows a GNP growth of about 6 percent. Even traditional socialist economies like those of Vietnam and North Korea have seen some limited foreign investment and relaxation of central controls. South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are leading the growth rates while Japan's GNP, trade, and investment policies remain the most critical economic factors influencing the region. The total GNP of East Asia and the Western Pacific was estimated to be $4.3 trillion in 1990-91, up from $2.61 trillion in 1987-88. At a conservative 7-percent growth rate, the region's GNP will be about $8 trillion, or 40 percent of global productivity, by the year 2000.

East Asia's mounting economic engagement with other regions is also remarkable. For example, two-way US/Pacific trade reached over $300 billion in 1989 and has been growing at about 8 percent per year. At that growth rate, US-Pacific trade could push $600 billion by the year 2000—an extraordinary contrast to tiny Soviet trade in the area. However, the size of the US trade deficit with East Asia, a majority of it accountable to imports from Japan, continues to create serious political problems.

Political Liberalization

THE third major trend in East Asia, a political one, is also generally encouraging: The politics of Asian-Pacific countries continue evolving toward multiparty practices and more freedom as generational changes and leadership successions occur. South Korea and the Philippines are the most prominent recent examples, although the emergence of true democracy in both countries is under challenge from the far right; in the Philippines, from the far left as well. The Republic of China government on Taiwan now has a confident political opposition—and martial law has been terminated there. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are, of course, full democracies. Singapore and Malaysia, despite some recent slippage, have relatively open political systems. Thailand's political stability and economic competitiveness remain hostage to a military veto. Indonesia, while still an authoritarian state, is showing signs of more open political competition. Burma, however, is a tragic case; courageous adherers and students have stormed the barricades of army/regime power only to be repressed.

Among the East Asian Marxist-Leninist states, we see limited variations of Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost. China is still stalled in a post-Tiananmen Square period of repression; but in Mongolia, the traditional Communist party has weakened. Stirrings of a multiparty system are evident in Vietnam, although the leadership is badly fragmented. Even North Korea, so long locked into Kim II Sung's totalitarianism, is seeking greater contact with the West. The North Koreans are talking to South Koreans about trade and reunification, and they are negotiating a normalization of relations with Japan. Nevertheless, strong central controls remain the political norm in East Asia's Marxist states: perhaps the best we can anticipate in the future are
mixed or "authoritarian-pluralist" systems. To summarize East Asia's regional trends: the security situation shows a relaxation of ideological confrontations as traditional territorial and ethnic-political issues become more prominent; economic systems continue to evolve toward market practices although government intervention often remains strong; and political pluralism and democracy are growing stronger.

Notes

1. For purposes of this paper, East Asia and the Western Pacific include: Australia, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, North Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the Soviet Far East, and the dependencies of Hong Kong, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Macau. Of course the United States is also included.


3. With the exception of the Philippines, which cannot provide its own external defense, ASEAN states have been acquiring a panoply of Western high-tech military equipment. Notable are Malaysia's $3 billion British buy, and Thailand's, Singapore's, and Indonesia's US buys. See "Power Game," chap. 2, Asia 1990 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong: Review Pub. Co., Ltd., 1990), 14; see also "Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia," Special Focus, Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, no. 3 (December 1988).


5. In December 1988, at the United Nations, President Mikhail Gorbachev announced a planned reduction and deactivation of 200,000 military personnel in Soviet Asia. 0.000 of them are estimated to be coming from the Jino-Soviet border and Mongolia. "Power Game," 16. See also speech by Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Vladivosoky, 4 September 1990, FBIS-SOV-90-172, 5 Sep-


7. Bernard K. Gordon, New Directions for American Policy in Asia (London: Routledge, 1990), 25-26. With so much excess capital—about $80 billion in foreign reserves—Taiwan's new frontier may be mainland China; Taiwan investment has created something of an economic colony in China's Fukien Province.


9. See comparisons of The Military Balance, 1990-1991 and 1987-1988, showing that the combined GNPs for East Asia (minus the Soviet Union's Far East territories) in these periods were $4.329 billion and $2.608 billion. In that four-year time period the largest changes were Japan's GNP, which doubled from $1.430 billion to $2.875 billion, and South Korea's GNP, which almost doubled.


Chapter 2

United States Interests

The United States has been involved with East Asia and the Pacific since the 1780s, when our commercial ships joined into the China trade. However, we did not begin to supplement those early economic interests with military and political interests and obligations until the mid-nineteenth century when our Pacific territorial acquisitions began. These acquisitions, followed by the 1898 war with Spain, catapulted the United States into a strategic role in Asia—a role that has continued ever since.

The 1898 war with Spain, and America’s colonization of the Philippine Islands, added strategic interests and responsibilities to what had been largely economic involvement in the Asian-Pacific region. The Philippines became the furthest western thrust of US power across the Pacific. It had begun over one hundred years earlier with the China trade, and had accelerated after 1854 when Commodore Perry “opened” Japan for American trade. As US trade with East Asia burgeoned, so did our territorial acquisitions in the Pacific: Alaska (1867), Midway Island (1887), Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam (1898), Wake Island (1899), and American Samoa (1900). Washington backed up these new interests with naval power, ports, and army garrisons on these territories that stretched out into the Western Pacific. And in three major wars—WWII, Korea, and Vietnam—those facilities proved critical to US efforts. By 1991 the United States was doing over $320 billion in two-way trade with East Asia and the Pacific, approximately 35 percent more than its trade with Western Europe and three times the volume of US-Latin American trade.

From Interests to Policies/Strategies of Balance of Power and Containment

The final US interest in East Asia, encouraging democracy, emerged during our Philippine acquisition, but did not become prominent in American diplomacy until after President Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic “Fourteen Points” proposal of 1917 and the Versailles peace treaty, which ended World War I in June, 1919. Making the world “safe for democracy” and creating a “balance of power” in East Asia, the US supported decolonization in the region and later opposed Japanese fascism and aggression. However, after WWII, when Communist revolutions threatened governments friendly to the United States and the stability of the region, US “balance of power” notions translated into a strategy of “containing” those revolutions: and Washington supported anti-Communist authoritarian governments of the right as buffers against the Chinese, the North Koreans, the North Vietnamese, and the Soviets.

With some inevitable inconsistencies, US balance of power and containment policies in Asia saw Washington opposing any major destabilization or rearrangement of power in the region. Thus, under
President Theodore ("Teddy") Roosevelt, the US arbitrated an end to the 1904-05 war between Russia and Japan. In 1917, US troops went into Vladivostok to support stability operations during the Bolshevik revolution. As Japanese power grew, the US sought to restrain Japanese armaments with the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922. We opposed Japanese aggression in the 1930s and 1940s, sought to arrange a coalition government in China after WWII, worked to contain the Chinese Communists in the 1950s and 1960s, and opposed North Korean and North Vietnamese aggression in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Recently, the US has supported a United Nations proposal for elections and a coalition government in Cambodia.

Searching for a Post-Containment Rationale

Today, in the so-called post-cold war era of the 1990s, the Soviet threat in Asia is believed to have diminished. Nevertheless the US still pursues its interests and seeks to promote stability in East Asia. The problem, states Richard Solomon, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, is that the "new [global] economic and political realities have yet to be institutionalized in the emerging international order of the coming century. And as this process unfolds in Asia, it will be shaped by the region's unique political rhythm, its own history, cultural diversity, and particular geopolitical architecture." Not surprisingly, there has been a search for a new vocabulary to describe our Asian policies and strategy.

If "containment" is no longer an appropriate descriptor, or an overarching framework, what should be the substitute? Given that the United States is still generally seen as a nonthreatening and stabilizing influence in East Asia and that our interests have not reduced in the region, how do we justify and codify our continued engagement in the area? Assistant Secretary Solomon argued in an October 1990 speech that the US should be seen as the "balancing wheel" of East Asia. First, Solomon emphasized, "Asia is evolving toward a multipolar pattern of power relations"; second, "the core of Asian security has been, and will continue to be, the US-Japan security relationship"; and third, "no power other than the US is now able or welcome to play the role of regional balancer." While a variety of labels can summarize why continued US military, economic, and political engagement with East Asia is necessary, one label that clearly fits the region's emerging trends and is compatible with US interests is "stability and prosperity." Thus the US must stay militarily involved in the region to help ensure the kind of stability that underwrites and safeguards economic prosperity and maturing democratic institutions. As an April 1990 Defense Department study stated, "A diminution of U.S. commitment to [Asia's] regional stability, whether perceived or real, would create a security vacuum that other major players would be tempted or compelled to fill."

Notes


2. In 1987 the figure was $240 billion for Asia and the Pacific compared to $170 billion for Europe. International Monetary Fund data as cited by June Teufel Dreyer, "Regional Security in Asia and the


5. Former Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze demurred, not unexpectedly, from embracing this regional perception: "No single country, however powerful... can pose as 'the only guarantor' of stability the champion of freedom and safety of sea lanes." Shevardnadze's speech at Vladivostok, 4 September 1990, as reprinted in *TASS*, in English, 4 September 1990. FBIS-SOV-90-172. 5 September 1990.


Chapter 3

US Presence and Deployment

AT THE end of WWII, the United States was the predominant power on the Asian-Pacific rim, a position the US held, not without challenge, for about 25 years. In the words of a 1990 Defense Department report:

Our national security objectives centered on defending American territory as far forward as possible, containing the Soviet Union and protecting strategic allies. Our military strategy to accomplish these objectives, dictated largely by time-distance factors, has been to forward deploy forces to permanent base infrastructures, primarily in Japan, Korea and the Philippines. We have complemented our presence through the development of strategic security relationships.

For the most part, US strategy to secure these objectives has been successful. The Soviets, partly because of their incompetence and the imbalance in their instruments of influence, have been contained. No new war has occurred on the Korean Peninsula, the Vietnamese did not invade Thailand, and East Asia shows remarkable economic growth. US involvement and strategy in the Second Indochina War, a tragic exception to American successes in Asia, reduced future US willingness to commit military forces in certain situations. But major new factors are complicating future US strategy in Asia. They include the region’s nationalism and prosperity, US budgetary constraints, and a reluctance in some areas to host as many US forces as in the past.

Despite a reluctance to host large US forces, numerous Asian-Pacific governments signal a desire for the US to stay militarily involved in the region. Since the completion of US troop withdrawals from South Vietnam in 1973 (at the war’s height, the US had 855,000 troops in East Asia), the US forward-based force in East Asia and the Western Pacific (including Guam) has been about 145,000 personnel on shore and afloat, less than 7 percent of total US armed forces. The American military presence has been concentrated at three main geographic points in the Pacific. The first leg of this triangle, Hawaii, is the point through which significant US military and commercial traffic moves to the Western Pacific. Hawaii also hosts the senior US military commands for the Asian-Pacific region: USCINCPAC Headquarters at Camp H. M. Smith, Pacific Fleet Headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Pacific Air Force Headquarters at Hickam AFB, and US Army Pacific Headquarters at Schofield Barracks. The second leg of the US military triangle in the Asian-Pacific region is Northeast Asia, where American facilities in Japan and Korea position us close to or opposite the Communist regimes which have been our traditional concern. Critical here are US Seventh Fleet Headquarters at Yokosuka Naval Base, Fifth Air Force at Yokota AB, Seventh Air Force at Osan AB, and 2d Infantry Division at Camp Casey. The third leg of our regional military presence is Southeast Asia, where there are critical US facilities in the Philippines, principally at Clark AB and Subic Bay Naval Base, and where military exercises are conducted in the Philippines and in other ASEAN countries; for example, Thailand and Singapore. These arrangements
have allowed the United States to maintain a stabilizing presence in the South China Sea while also projecting power into the Indian Ocean, across which is strung the oil lifeline from the Persian Gulf to Asia’s most productive economies. (A fourth, less obvious, but not unimportant leg is Australia, another US treaty ally, whose military facilities allow the US to monitor potential adversaries’ strategic assets.)

This basic triangular structure of American force deployments gives the US a forward presence in East Asia’s North-east Asian and Southeast Asian corners with backup and resupply at the mid-Pacific in Hawaii. US forces in the Philippines/Southeast Asia can reinforce our forces in Northeast Asia and out into the Indian Ocean, and our Japanese- and Korean-based assets can reinforce the Philippines, the South China Sea, or the Indian Ocean. Hawaii is the ultimate US fallback point as well as the communications hub and major supply depot for the whole Asian-Pacific region. Guam, in the northern Marianas, is also a fallback point for US forces.

Notes

1. Department of Defense, "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century," Report to Congress, Department of Defense, April 1990. 2. In 1990 there were 143,000 US military personnel forward deployed in East Asia, 8,000 of whom were on Guam. Ibid., 5.
Chapter 4

Future US Policy/Strategy/Force Options

GIVEN Defense Department budget constraints, the widely shared perception of a declining Soviet threat, and an emerging multipolar Asian-Pacific region, alternative US policy, strategy, and force options for the Pacific are being discussed.

The rapid changes underway in the Pacific basin have spurred greater attention to formulating a viable American security strategy beyond the year 2000. The need is not necessarily for a new grand design or comprehensive security structure (neither has existed in the Pacific in the past), but for crafting a security role appropriate to the regional conditions the United States seems likely to face, and to secure the interests that derive from these conditions.1

The US goal for East Asia and the Pacific was articulated in mid-1990 by the US Commander in Chief Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), Adm Huntington Hardisty: "Our overall goal is to provide a security umbrella for Asia and the Pacific under which U.S. national interests can be protected, democracies can flourish, free trade and commerce can prosper and basic human rights can be preserved." More specifically, USCINCPAC seeks:

- In peacetime to influence the area
- In crisis to deter aggression
- In war to terminate in a position favorable to the US.2

To help achieve these goals, US Pacific strategy has focused on forward deployment and strong alliances. As the Defense Department pointed out in an April 1990 assessment, the principal elements of US strategy have been "forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements."3

However, congressional budget cuts and new political realities are inducing changes in the US military position in East Asia. First announced by Defense Secretary Cheney in Tokyo in February 1990, the United States began implementing a force deployment adjustment in the region—principally a reduced US military presence—referred to as EASI. Concurrent with EASI's first phase (a 10-percent drawdown of US forces in Asia) was another development forced upon the Air Force and US policy by congressional budget cuts: the removal of all B-52s from Guam. By the fall of 1990, that retraction was complete and the United States, unlike the Soviets and the Chinese, had no strategic bombers left in East Asia.

Criteria for Evaluating Options

All these changes have prompted numerous competing schemes on how US military power and commitment in Asia should look over the next 10 to 15 years. It is important, therefore, to develop systematic criteria by which the proposals may be evaluated. Because what occurs in one region affects other regions, the first criterion we offer is whether the option is consistent with US global security interests. For example, does a given option for East Asia violate either the freedom of the seas or the US "neither
confirm nor deny" nuclear policy? Does it preclude or erode the US “swing strategy,” whereby we can reinforce our presence in one region from another?

A second criterion is whether the proposal maintains US access to the region. US access to East Asia can be measured in various ways: use of indigenous bases and military facilities; storing munitions and war supplies—such as oil and gas—in an East Asian country; regular training exercises with Asian militaries; and so forth.

A third criterion is whether the option promotes stability. Any US initiative that creates security vacuums or unproductive political or economic stresses in East Asia, or encourages arms races, or prompts unilateral military buildups by Japan or other countries, would be destabilizing.

Other criteria involve does it deter war and, if deterrence fails, could the US prevail in war on favorable terms? Criteria can always change or be refined. What is important is that some systematic standards be used to make informed judgments about the proposals. Otherwise, policy and strategy will be vulnerable to politically expedient, even whimsical, schemes that are likely to have damaging effects.

**US Options in East Asia**

The many proposals, schemes, and suggestions for future US policy and strategy in East Asia can be grouped into several broad options. Not all of these options are mutually exclusive, but we have divided them into five broad categories for purposes of clarity. The first category focuses on current US policy—a 10-percent force reduction under EASI. Two other options involve a complete withdrawal from the Philippines or from Northeast Asia as well as the Philippines. Two final options re: in the US forward presence in both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia but include new burden-sharing or arms control initiatives.

Option 1: East Asia Strategy Initiative. As announced in February 1990 and elaborated in the Defense Department’s April 1990 Report to Congress, EASI is current US security policy toward Asia. With 143,000 US military personnel forward deployed in East Asia and the Pacific in spring 1990, the Defense Department is implementing an initial 10-percent force reduction by the start of 1993. The basic triangular structure of our Pacific deployments is retained, although the US military presence in the Philippines is being reduced as a result of negotiations with Manila and volcanic damage to Clark Air Base. EASI keeps all US treaty commitments in the Asian-Pacific region.

The details of Defense Secretary Cheney’s plan call for a first-phase (1 to 3 years) reduction of 14,000 to 15,000 US military personnel in East Asia by January 1993. About half, or 7,000 (5,000 Army and 2,000 Air Force personnel) will come out of South Korea. In general, the US will shift from a “leading to a supporting role” in Korea and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is expected to underwrite more of the costs involved in maintaining US troops in Korea. In addition, US troops in Japan, mainly on Okinawa, will be reduced by 5,000 to 6,000, and more Okinawa facilities will revert to Japan. Finally, negotiations with the Philippines point to at least another 2,000-man reduction there and possibly more. Second- and third-phase force reductions under EASI, while not specific in details, are described as “proportionately greater reductions in combat forces” between 1993 and 1996 with still more reductions possible between 1997 and 2000 “as circumstances permit.” It would all seem to point to force
levels eventually dropping to under 100,000.  

**Option 2: Leave the Philippines.** A further extension of EASI, this option involves the eventual loss of US naval facilities at Subic Bay as well as everything at Clark Air Base. Concurrent with EASI, this option could produce a 30- to 35-percent reduction in US forces in the East Asian region (from 143,000 forward deployed forces to perhaps 110,000)—and neither Singapore nor Thailand, nor Australia for that matter, could take up the slack if the whole US presence in the Philippines was lost. However, an expansion of our force presence on Guam might partially offset Thai and Singapore problems. Mount Pinatubo’s eruption accelerated the EASI-scheduled redeployment to Alaska of the US combat fighter wing at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. This option also assumes loss of access to the Subic Bay Naval Base as well, whether by insistence of the Manila government or by pressure from the US Congress or public. Option 2 would thus eliminate the Southeast Asia leg of our basing structure in East Asia, leaving the US dependent on Northeast Asia and Hawaii/Guam facilities.

**Option 3: Accelerated Burden Sharing.** As EASI points out, burden sharing is an emphasis in US security policy in East Asia. However, an accelerated burden-sharing effort could represent a major option in its own right. The Japanese argue that they already pick up over 40 percent of US military costs in their islands while also compensating local communities for the disruption caused by US forces. The South Koreans imply a 20- to 25-percent figure. In contrast, the US pays the Filipinos for the opportunity to defend them. Accelerated burden sharing would see the Japanese and Korean figures significantly increased, the Philippine situation readjusted. Other likely initiatives under an accelerated burden-sharing option might include establishing a combined US-Japan-ROK military committee or command to defend Northeast Asia, granting ROK control of the Combined Force Command, fostering increased ASEAN military cooperation, and promoting more US-Asian military production arrangements. These initiatives would prompt more Asian involvement in Asia’s defense but retain US linkage.

**Option 4: Arms Control.** Arms control is a “menu” with numerous possibilities on the agenda. However, it is worth noting that there have been few actual arms control negotiations or arrangements in East Asia. Compared to Europe, where both superpower and European arms control discussions and agreements are common, East Asia—which is heavily armed—has seen almost nothing of arms control so far. Nevertheless, likely elements in a serious Asian arms control option would include asymmetrical US-Soviet force reductions, confidence-building and tension-reduction measures, and restraint in provisions of arms to allies and friends. A sea of Japan arms control regime is another candidate, as would be a peace treaty, force reductions, and no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Also being talked about are the neutralization of Cambodia, the establishment of a South China Sea regime, and other nuclear-free zones.

**Option 5: Major United States Retrenchment.** Giving up US basing in Japan and Korea, as well as losing our Philippine facilities, would define a major US retrenchment. Obviously, it is the most extreme proposal among the group. It would leave Hawaii as the only major US military position in the entire Pacific and, with the exception of Guam, eliminate all US forward basing in the area. While our five alliances in Asia might still remain “on the books,” their credibility would clearly suffer. The US
Navy might periodically visit Japan and Singapore, but there would be no permanent forward deployed US forces or equipment in the Pacific other than on Guam.

What Kind of Future East Asia?

Before we can evaluate the utility of these various policy strategy options for US interests in East Asia, it is necessary to think about long-term future alternatives for the region. As the East Asia Strategic Initiative is being implemented, and the Philippine base negotiations wind down, the time is ripe to speculate on Asian-Pacific "futures" and what the US can and should do to help bring them about or adjust to them. Critical here will be thinking and planning by the USCINCPAC and the Department of State East Asia Bureau, since they are the principal agencies involved in Pacific developments and the official "stewards" of American interests in East Asia. Within the US government, USCINCPAC and State have the most expertise about the region and are the most appropriate agencies for informing the rest of the government, and the American public, about future trends and power relations in Asia as they affect US interests.

One way of designing an effective long-term US policy strategy for East Asia is to look at the kinds of Asian futures and developments we do not want to see occur—the dangerous changes or "strategic nightmares" which would destabilize the region and harm US interests. In this regard a 1990 Rand Corporation study is particularly useful.

Our discussion now elaborates on trends identified in the Rand study and on other developments which would be dangerous to East Asia and US interests.


"The US-Japan relationship remains the critical linchpin of [US] Asian security strategy." Japan anchors the US strategic position in the region: the US is Japan's largest trade partner, and the two countries together account for over 30 percent of global trade. A breakdown in the alliance or relationship will frighten East Asia and set in motion uncontrolled events on both sides of the Pacific. A breakdown might be based on or influenced by:

- Rise to power in Tokyo of an ultra left-wing or right-wing government.
- Economic warfare between the US and Japan.
- Loss of US credibility due to a major military retrenchment possibly followed by Japanese rearmament or development of nuclear weapons.
- A far-ranging Japanese-Soviet détente.

2. The rise of an expansionist China or, alternatively, China's descent into chaos.

China's stability and development affect all of East Asia. Historically, when China has been in chaos the other major countries in the area have been impacted. A dangerous China, whether expansionist or unstable, might be prompted by:

- Overthrow of the centrist by either the military (possibly aligned with Soviet hardliners) or by new post-Maoist radicals.
- Rekindling of a Sino-Soviet alliance.
- A Chinese move against Taiwan, or a mishandling of the Hong Kong or Macao reversions.
- Collapse of the Chinese economy.

3. Revival of the Soviet threat.

Gorbachev's eastern policies have begun to benefit the Soviet position in Asia without harming US or allied inter-
ests. The so-called end of the cold war in Asia has not, however, seen a fundamental reduction in Soviet military capabilities. While there have been some Soviet force reductions on the Chinese border and retirement of obsolete equipment, force modernization continues. Should new Soviet leaders threaten US interests or renew tensions in Asia, the entire region would be affected. The following developments could aid such a scenario:

- The overthrow of Gorbachev or nullification of his earlier policies.
- The Japanese succumbing to Soviet blandishments.
- US-Soviet arms control agreements that so reduced forces or restricted their movements that US or allied interests were damaged.

4. A new Korean war or instability.

A new conflict on the Korean Peninsula, or major instability in North or South Korea, would threaten the composure of all Northeast Asia. The peninsula remains a military flashpoint. Dangers could occur as a result of:

- Preemptive war by either the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or the ROK.
- Radical revolutions, military coups, or prolonged succession struggles in North or South Korea.
- Advent of a “now or never” psychology in Pyongyang.
- Accidental war, possibly via a nuclear mistake.
- North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

5. Closure of the Malacca Straits.

With at least half of Pacific seaborne trade and much of its military traffic utilizing the straits, instability in Singapore, Malaysia, and especially Indonesia could be very damaging for the straits area. Closing of the straits could be provoked or aided by:

- Serious instability in Indonesia, whether via a new armed leftist uprising or Muslim fundamentalist action.
- A radical Malaysia-Indonesia alliance bent on taking control of the straits.
- Terrorist activity aimed at disrupting shipping.
- Hostilities in the Spratly Island area spilling over into the straits area.

6. Other dangerous Southeast Asian developments.

A serious threat to Thailand and/or the breakdown of Philippine stability are two developments which would ripple across Southeast Asia and harm US interests. Arms races in the area also endanger stability. Problems might be exacerbated by:

- Continuing intractability of the Cambodian conflict, creating more refugees and prolonged Vietnamese/Chinese meddling.
- A renewed Vietnamese threat to Thailand.
- A rise to power in Manila of the extreme left or extreme right.
- Substantial anti-Americanism in the Philippines.
- Arms races among the ASEAN states.
- Introduction of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or technology into Southeast Asia.

7. Unwise arms control agreements.

The Soviets have consistently sought to restrict and erode US military presence and flexibility in the Asian-Pacific theater. Essentially a land power with shrinking military budgets and resources, the USSR under Gorbachev has sought to trade off its force reductions for comparable reductions and base closings by the United States. Soviet proposals include force “freezes,” “nonaccess”
zones, antisubmarine warfare-free zones, exercise contraints, "standoff" zones, and limits on US forward basing. Developments which could provoke unwise arms control agreements include:

- A far-ranging Japanese-Soviet détente.
- An invigorated Soviet peace offensive in Asia.
- A nuclear accident in Asia.
- Radical left governments in Tokyo, Beijing, or Seoul.
- Arms control negotiations that leave the Soviets' land presence and reinforce-

ment capability intact while eroding US naval/air access to the area.

There are other potentially damaging trends in East Asia's future, but these seven should be sufficient to provoke critical long-term thinking and planning in the US government. USCINCPAC and the State Department need to define those scenarios and the "potential paths leading to them." These kinds of scenarios and contributing events should provide a basis for long-term policies and strategies taken to avoid or prepare for these possibilities.

Notes

3. From the Defense Department's EASI as cited by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon in his 30 October 1990 speech at San Diego, California. See also plenary address by Adm Charles R. Larson, USCINCPAC, to the National Defense University Pacific Symposium on 2 March 1991, Honolulu, Hawaii.
5. EASI, 9-11.
6. Ibid., 7-8
9. See Pollack and Winnefeld.
Chapter 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

The previous considerations of historic United States interests in East Asia, and the current and foreseeable challenges to those interests, strongly point to an important US role in East Asia’s future. As the region experiences critical changes in the next 10 to 20 years, US policy and security planners need to get out in front of events and work to actively shape the region’s future. From that perspective, various near-term and long-term policy/strategy/force options can be seen in a new light. Either they will help produce a desired East Asian future or they will contribute to undesirable, even dangerous, trends. Since avoiding strategic nightmares becomes the ultimate regional and contextual criteria for US options, describing those nightmares and the paths and scenarios by which they could occur is the kind of critical, candid thinking and planning that must precede the choice of options. Choosing policy/strategy/force options that avoid the strategic nightmares and encourage positive long-term Asian-Pacific futures is then the basic action choice. In short, fashioning an East Asian structure of peace, prosperity, and stability should be the long-term United States goal in the region. Such an East Asian future would have as its components:

- A quadrilateral balance of power in East Asia, among the big four countries, emphasizing:
  - A stable China that is increasingly market-oriented and politically pluralistic.
  - A cooperative Soviet Union whose Far Eastern territories are engaged with East Asia’s prosperity.
- A nonideological Japan, security-partnered with the United States and contributing to East Asia’s prosperity.
- A confident United States that has military flexibility and access to both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

  - A less dangerous Korean Peninsula where force redeployments and then reductions, arms control agreements, and, ultimately, a permanent peace treaty, also encourage a nuclear-free area.
  - A neutralized Cambodia which, with sufficient international guarantees and prohibitions on outside arms flows, recovers and prospers under a stable power-sharing arrangement in Phnom Penh.
  - A broadening ASEAN security role in Southeast Asia in which enhanced military interoperability, exchanges, and combined training exercises become the norm while prohibitions are put in place on chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
  - Continued US security access to both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, such that the US both plays the regional “balancer” role and maintains its logistics and operational linkage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
  - Arms control agreements that focus on decreasing the lethality and dangers on the Korean Peninsula, on moving from violence to peaceful competition in in-
An American withdrawal could lead to the rise of regional powers and a destabilizing naval arms race in the region. Historical antagonisms make the ASEAN nations most concerned about Japan—fears led by US policies pressuring Japan to assume a large defense role. But they are also concerned about the rapid growth of Chinese and Indian naval powers.

The United States will not stay in any country where it is not wanted. However, there are indications from the Philippines that some leaders there do understand the requirements of regional security and see the utility of a continuing long-term US military presence in the islands—perhaps until ASEAN evolves into more of a security organization. As a Defense Department report stated,

The US presence in the Philippines clearly serves US and Philippine interests. It is not a panacea. It will not prevent the erosion of the containment of the Soviet Union (emphasis added).

Thailand and Singapore are helping the US redistribute some of its security responsibilities and its presence in Southeast Asia. If the US pulls out of the Philippines, whether because negotiations for the use of Clark and Subic Bay facilities fail or because the damage inflicted by Mount Pinatubo is too great, some further redistribution of that presence in the subregion—on a rotational or training/exercise basis—seems possible. In the breach, it will help to preclude (if not guarantee the absence of) large security vacuums in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, US policy should be to stay in the Philippines as long as possible, and to multilateralize the security presence at Subic and Clark and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, either via more ASEAN military participation or by making limited US redeployments out to Singapore and Thailand, or both.

And the US military can and should do more to reduce military personnel’s off-duty offenses to Filipino sensitivities.

The other three options presented earlier contain both benefits and risks to long-term US interests and Asia’s future,

_evaluating US policy/strategy/force options against the future

One of the options presented earlier in this section, namely Option 5, “Major United States Retrenchment,” clearly works against East Asia’s future stability and prosperity, promotes dangers, and is inconsistent with US global interests. By leaving both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, the US would create major security vacuums in the region and throw developments open to destabilizing competition between China, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Without the American security presence, fears would multiply on the Korean Peninsula and in the ASEAN area. The American departure would likely prompt subregional arms races and other dangerous unilateral actions.

Option 2, “Leave the Philippines,” while not as damaging as Option 5, carries risks to Southeast Asia’s stability, reduces the US deterrent capability, and opens security vacuums in that area into which Chinese and Japanese power, or a reinvigorated Soviet Union, might return. As a Hudson Institute commentary argued,

dochina, and on putting a cap on weapons going to the ASEAN states without restricting essential US military access to and flexibility in the East Asia region.

This kind of long-term structure of peace, prosperity, and stability in East Asia reinforces US interests and the interests of the region at large. A future East Asia of this kind becomes a road map and referent by which near-term and long-term US policy/strategy/force options must be evaluated.
For example, Option 1, the "East Asia Strategy Initiative," seems to have been prompted primarily by congressional budget pressures and some burden-sharing notions. Yet it is difficult to see how budget reasons can be compelling or should drive strategy in a huge, and strategic, geographic expanse like the Pacific, which no longer has any US strategic bombers (another congressional decision made for budget and political reasons) and where only 6 percent of US military personnel are now stationed. The implied EASI projections of reductions to possibly under 100,000 US troops by the end of this century are troubling. The United States has not had a force presence lower than 130,000 in East Asia since 1940. Planners and Congress need to recognize that the US economic stake in East Asia is enormous and is increasing, not decreasing. Moreover, as the former director of the US National Security Agency wrote in the winter of 1988–89: "No state in the world rivals the USSR in its combination of size, sophistication, and command and control of military forces." It is not prudent—strategically—to further erode the US deterrent and war-fighting ability and presence in East Asia as long as Soviet capabilities, North Korean intentions, and the stability of the Indochina and South China Sea areas remain unchanged, unknowable, and uncertain. Consider this Hudson Institute commentary, for example, about US planning toward Southeast Asia:

Soviet cuts in Cam Ranh Bay are predictable and irrelevant to American interests in Southeast Asia... While Soviet reductions benefit US interests, they don't justify a major US reduction. A US presence in Southeast Asia preceded and is independent of the Soviet presence. American interests in the region are growing; new challenges are appearing [emphasis added].

By contrast, some turnovers of US roles and missions to the South Koreans and the Japanese seem to make political sense in a regional context. From "a leading to a supporting role" is the current US characterization for security relations with South Korea. As long as that turnover is conducted carefully and very gradually, and ROK elements do not see it as a green light for independent action against the DPRK, it can continue. But it also carries risks that Pyongyang might misjudge US intentions. When the first phase of EASI brings American military personnel in East Asia and the Pacific down to 128,000, the US will be at the minimum force structure necessary to maintain its credibility while underwriting stability in the region. Anything less contributes to a lack of confidence in the United States and could set in motion other dangerous trends.

Option 3, "Accelerated Burden Sharing," has some advantages that should be built into long-term US planning for East Asia and the Pacific. It should not jeopardize stability or US access to the area. Moreover, our allies' and friends' prosperity, compared to continuing heavy US global security responsibilities, compels higher Asian levels of effort in the trans-Pacific security equation. This is, however, a delicate process:

We must avoid the temptation to "decr ease that certain levels of [other countries'] Gross National Product or other specific criteria are a "fair share" of the defense cost sharing. Arithmetic formulas for increases based solely on the premise that there are significant trade imbalances... will likely be met with stiff resistance.

Moreover, burden sharing involves more than simply financial compensation among allies or offsetting the cost of US protection and presence. Current US policy toward Japan on maintaining military interoperability and technical interdependence makes sense, although
there have been problems with US and Japanese consistency. As we have seen, keeping Japan's security tied to the US is a key element of a stable East Asian future. Toward Japan, the US stresses the importance of maintaining interoperability in our weapons systems by encouraging maximum procurement from the U.S., increasing technology flowback, and discouraging the development of non-complementary systems.\textsuperscript{10}

On the Korean side, the US is pushing Seoul to increase its share of costs associated with supporting US forces in-country. Specific emphases are on the ROK assuming more indigenous labor costs, helping US forces relocate out of Seoul, and increasing ROK contributions to military construction costs.\textsuperscript{11} Regarding the Philippines, while there is no reverse flow of Filipino burden sharing with the US, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) does provide land and/or harbor space at two important bases; in Manila's view, this is a major concession to the United States. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Raul Manglapus addressed the issue in a March 1988 speech, "Accommodating the US Bases 1898–1991."

By offering the US use of Philippine bases, it is estimated that we have saved that country billions, tens, perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars that would have to be spent to replace the facilities with additional carrier battle groups and communications establishments.\textsuperscript{12}

The US has clearly served notice, however, that unrealistic Philippine expectations for increased compensation will not be met. Richard Armitage, the chief US negotiator in the 1990–91 base discussions, commented in January 1991:

In the unhappy event that we would have to exit the Philippines, we would make do. [The bases] are valuable to us [but] they're no longer irreplaceable.\textsuperscript{13}

Going into the February round of talks, Armitage stated: The United States, as a Pacific power, can survive, prosper and, when faced with aggression, prevail without having to station a single soldier, airman or sailor on Philippine soil.\textsuperscript{14}

By June 1991, differences between the two sides had significantly narrowed. A possible $700 million per year aid-plus-grant-plus-debt-reduction agreement and a six- to nine-year base phaseout plan seemed on the horizon, prior to Mount Pinatubo's eruption.

Option 4: East Asian "Arms Control," is in many respects the most interesting because of the way it both illuminates and affects US, Soviet, and other countries' interests. Compared to Europe, East Asia has paid little attention to arms control.\textsuperscript{15} The reasons include Asia's highly diverse land and sea configurations, its cultural makeup (which often operates informally), and the sheer variety of conflicts, not just East-West, around the region. As direct US-Soviet tensions decline in East Asia, other conflicts in corners of the region make themselves evident: \textsuperscript{16}

- The Korean Peninsula—still lethally armed and politically antagonistic, but experiencing an opportune foreign policy environment.
- The Sea of Japan—adjacent to the Soviet Pacific Fleet headquarters, and now witnessing negotiations between Moscow and Tokyo and Pyongyang and Tokyo.
- The Sino-Soviet border—recently the focus of important Chinese and Soviet force drawdowns and confidence-building measures.
- Indochina—where armed conflict continues as diplomatic pressure seeks to rechannel the violence to peaceful competition.
- The South China Sea/Spratly Island area—where the Straits of Malacca and the Spratly area constitute critical maritime choke points and resource zones that are vulnerable to sabotage and naval/air action.
Each of these East Asian conflict zones has its own peculiar history, force complexities, and external involvement. The ones where the United States can best play an arms control option are Korea, the Sea of Japan, Indochina, the South China Sea, and, of course, directly with the Soviets.

**Korea**

The peninsula is the most promising potential arms control zone in East Asia because of its comparability to Europe, where major agreements have occurred. As Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon stated in January 1991, "As the North-South dialogue proceeds, there is great potential for the Koreans to apply to their circumstances the arms control experience gained in Europe." And the external powers can also help. Two critical actions by Moscow and Washington would be useful on the Korean Peninsula:

1. Heightened pressure by Moscow, Tokyo, and Washington to make North Korea accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and inspection of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon comparable to US influence on South Korean nuclear facilities and programs. (Japan could also make its eventual recognition of North Korea contingent upon responsible DPRK nuclear behavior.) Once IAEA compliance has been accepted by North Korea, the US and South Korea might reward Pyongyang with an announcement of a nuclear weapons-free South Korea.²

2. Agreement by the US and USSR not to provide more advanced offensive military equipment to either Korea until a permanent peace treaty or unification occurs.

**The Sea of Japan**

In the aftermath of President Gorbachev's mid-April 1991 visit to Japan, Tokyo and Washington need to study carefully Soviet proposals for a "zone of cooperation" in the Sea of Japan and a direct Soviet-Japanese "concrete dialogue on military matters."³ They could complicate US-Japanese relations or constrain US operational flexibility in the absence of meaningful Soviet capability or operational reductions. As a recent study indicated,

Potential constraints on U.S. military forces in Japan which might be proposed as part of a Japan-USSR Northern Territories agreement pose a more varied problem for USCENTPAC. The Soviets have long sought an ability to constrain U.S. military deployments in Asia which is unacceptable to the US on both principle and merit.⁴

While avoiding Gorbachev's call for US involvement in negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow, US policy might nevertheless pledge an operational "no increase" and highlight the US force reductions under the East Asia Strategy Initiative. These actions would help nurture the atmosphere between Japan and the USSR while preserving US interests. Demilitarization of the Northern Territories would not harm US interests, provided that it did not extend to Japan's main islands or restrict US naval/air activity.⁵

**Indochina**

US policy is currently promoting a cease-fire, demilitarization, and free and fair elections in Cambodia under UN auspices.⁶ Accordingly, the US could consider additional measures:

- Provide logistic, administrative, and economic support to a UN peacekeeping presence.
- Consult with Moscow, Hanoi, Beijing, and Bangkok on reducing, then ending, outside military assistance to all Cambodian factions.
South China Sea/Malacca Straits

Any US arms control initiative in this area must be factored through our policy toward ASEAN. With the exception of the Philippines, the ASEAN states have converted their defense doctrine and military buying patterns to external defense. Some results are F-16 buys in Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, and Tornado and Hawk purchases by Malaysia. Cruise missiles and submarines are also being sought. Thus, in an area bubbling with territorial and economic squabbles, the lethality of arms is increasing. The US can:

- Signal its desire to stay in the area as a way of forestalling security vacuums and arms races.
- Seek to control proliferation of high technology equipment and military technology into ASEAN states.
- Encourage observation of IAEA and other safeguards against development or introduction of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons into the area.

US-Soviet Arms Control

Given the vastness of the Pacific theater and the comparatively small US force presence there, US access and operational flexibility are keys to maintaining our interests, maintaining the Japan-US partnership, and heading off dangerous trends. Despite some encouraging debate in Soviet circles, nothing so far in actual Soviet behavior, or in the emerging East Asian security environment, suggests that US interests will be served by acceding to Soviet proposals to limit US military access or operational flexibility in the Western Pacific. As Ambassador Richard L. Armitage writes, "The United States is not responsible for Soviet [problems of geographical access to the Pacific] but only for maintaining its own security." US negotiators must keep in mind the essential geographic, mission, and capability asymmetries in Asia between the continental power of the USSR and the maritime/air power of the US.

Nevertheless, there is a case to be made for acting in ways that help reduce Soviet perceptions of threats from the US and Japan. The Soviets are legitimately concerned about protecting their SSBN fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk, defending Vladivostok, simultaneously having to fight the US, Japan, and China, and a potential US "horizontal escalation" strategy linking different regions of the world.

Accordingly, the US could first direct a variety of short-term confidence-building and tension-reducing measures toward the Soviets in the Pacific. This would mollify both regional and congressional critics. Second, we could carefully test the Soviets on long-term, and more fundamental, structural arms control measures in the area. Short-term measures include:

- Announcing unilateral reductions in weapons systems or platforms that may have been motivated for budget reasons but which can mollify anti-US sentiment.
- Reducing the chances of accidental confrontation in the air and at sea (expansion of the 1972 US-Soviet agreement on "Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas" is one avenue).
- Notifying and forecasting among all parties—the Soviets, Chinese, Japanese, US, and the two Koreas—intended exercises with invitations to all to observe.
- Pushing the Korean dialogue more energetically.

Long-term strategic measures, carefully proposed to the Soviets, and in line with US interests, might include:

- Removal of US nuclear weapons reportedly deployed in South Korea in return for a verifiable IAEA nuclear safeguard inspection regime on the peninsula and a peace accord between North and South Korea.
• A trade-off between reduced Soviet naval operations in the Sea of Japan and diminished US antisubmarine (ASW) activities in the Sea of Okhotsk.
• Reduction of the Soviet nuclear attack submarine (SSN) threat to US carrier battle groups and Western Pacific sealanes of communication (SLOC) in return for a reduced US ASW threat to Soviet SSBNs.¹⁰

Thus, the US would grasp the public relations initiative, be seen as reasonable, and in due time probe the possibilities of structural bilateral arms control in East Asia and the Pacific. Table 1 summarizes the evaluation of the policy/strategy/force options.

Table 1
EVALUATING US POLICY STRATEGY-FORCE OPTIONS IN EAST ASIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES</th>
<th>ACCELERATED ARMS CONTROL</th>
<th>MAJOR US RETRENCHMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Car 1. Consistent with US global security goals?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain US access to region?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote stability?</td>
<td>Phase 1 is OK</td>
<td>Risks stability in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Unless US demands are unreasonable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deter war?</td>
<td>Phases 2 and 3 reduce deterrence</td>
<td>Provided interoperability is maintained</td>
<td>Provided US access/flexibility is unhampered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If war, US prevail?</td>
<td>Provided phases 2 and 3 not implemented</td>
<td>Provided likelihood of prevailing</td>
<td>Provided US access/flexibility is unhampered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommendations

This study documents how in the course of 200 years the United States emerged from an era of Yankee traders off China’s coast to become the ultimate arbitrer of East Asia’s prosperity and stability. Now, with resources stretched thin and a new Asian-Pacific region emerging, American decision makers must intellectually reach into the twenty-first century and plan for the kind of East Asian regional structure we want to encourage. Evaluating current US policy/strategy/force options for the region against strategic visions and desired futures is an intellectual and planning exercise with practical payoffs. Not doing this, and not doing it on a systematic and long-term basis within the US government, intellectual and business communities, and appropriate congressional offices, will guarantee that our policies will remain reactive and increasingly at the mercy of events or single-issue proponents with axes to grind. If USCINCPAC, the State Department, and the White House will do the required long-range thinking and planning for this strategic region, and if they will discipline the other US government agencies involved with East Asia to follow a coherent
vision for the region’s future, then US interests have a good chance of being realized as the twenty-first century unfolds.

From the kind of thinking and imaginative planning that this study advocates comes a series of policy/strategy/force directions already suggested in the preceding sections. Over the next 10 to 15 years, the US should:

- Plan for a quadrilateral balance of power in East Asia and the Pacific, and for policies which promote a stable China, retain and strengthen the US-Japanese security partnership, and reward the Soviet Union for constructive behavior while keeping the US military presence in the area at very near current levels.
- Promote big four policies on the Korean Peninsula, whether formal or informal, which:
  - End the introduction of new offensive weapons and technology to both Koreas.
  - Emphasize Korean force reductions and confidence-building measures.
  - Prohibit acquisition of nuclear weapons by either country.
  - Encourage a permanent peace treaty between Seoul and Pyongyang.
  - Sponsor the admission of both Koreas to the United Nations.
- Encourage strong UN involvement in a Cambodian cease-fire and neutralization which, with big four and ASEAN concurrence, gradually terminates all outside arms flows to the various Cambodian factions and provides economic rewards for peaceful competition among them.
- Encourage, on an informal basis, a broadening ASEAN security role in Southeast Asia. There should be comparable external defense doctrines and equipment, but no chemical, biological, or nuclear capabilities. Finally, there should be multilateral training and exercises in which the US and Australia periodically participate.
- Discourage arms control arrangements or area regimes in East Asia and the Pacific which fundamentally inhibit US military access to or flexibility in the area. The Pacific Ocean, its various zones and SLOCs, are to US support of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia as the Soviets’ Trans-Siberian railroad and Far Eastern territories are to the USSR. However, the US can pursue equitable and verifiable arms control on the Korean Peninsula, a UN peace arrangement in Cambodia, and control of weapons and technology going into the ASEAN states. Finally, we can also test Soviet sincerity regarding serious bilateral structural arms control arrangements in the Pacific.

As Rome was not built in a day, so too, a new structure of peace, prosperity, and stability in East Asia and the Pacific will require years of painstaking intellectual and policy efforts. But it is worth the effort and, frankly, it is the only way to realize and safeguard United States interests as the Asian-Pacific era unfolds.

Notes

2. See, for example, the comments of the Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Rodolfo Blazon about more emphasis on external defense in connection with the November 1990 Pacific Air Forces deployment of F-5 aircraft to Palawan Island and a subsequent inspection of Spratly Island in The Straits Times, 26 January 1991, 11.


7. EASI, 7.


9. EASI 8.

10. Ibid., 10.

11. Ibid., 9-10.


15. As recently as 1984, a prominent Japanese security specialist noted that "the student is scarcely able to find even one article dealing with the topic of arms control in East Asia." See Hiroshi Kimura, "Arms Control in East Asia," in Global Perspectives on Arms Control, ed. Adam M. Garfinkle (New York: Praeger, 1984), 83. We might define arms control as "reductions in numbers, types, qualities, and effectiveness of weapons so as to reduce the potential likelihood and damage of a conflict." Confidence-building measures (CBM) and tension-reduction measures (TRM) are included in this definition. Adapted from Thomas L. Wilborn, "Arms Control and ROK Relations with the DPRK," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1990, 132.

16. For details, see Lawrence E. Grinter and Young W. Kihl, eds., East Asian Conflict Zones: Prospects for Regional Stability and Deescalation.


21. Ibid., 35.


25. See, for example, the commentary by Yevgeny Bazhanov, a former Soviet diplomat in Presha, 16 January 1990. He argued that the United States has long-term interests in East Asia that are independent of the US-Soviet problem. A similar view has been expressed by Shevardnadze regarding the US military facilities in the Philippines.


29. Ibid., 172-75, see also SAIC, "Tension Reduction Measures in the Pacific," 52-63. Senior US Navy reluctance to consider these measures remains evident. See, for example, the interview with Adm Charles R. Larson, CINCPACFLT, in US Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1990. Admiral Larson became the new CINCPAC in February 1991.

30. This proposal was recently elaborated by retired Adm William Crowe and Alan Romberg, who argue that asymmetrical reductions of Soviet and US attack submarines in the Pacific would have a stabilizing effect. See William J. Crowe, Jr., and Alan D. Romberg, "Rethinking Pacific Security," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1991, 129-30.
Selected Bibliography


"Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia: Special Focus." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 10, no. 3 (December 1988).


