4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
The Role of Federal Troops in Quelling Civil Disturbance in Washington, D.C., April 1968

6. AUTHOR(S)
Captain Barry L. Price

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Does not supersede any published material.
See abstract on Theses. This Theses is submitted in accordance with the Student Handbook for fully-funded graduate schooling.

12A. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution: A
No limitation on availability or distribution as this document contains no sensitive data to Nat'l Security.

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
See pgs iii, and iv on report.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
Kerner Commission
FM 19-15
Detroit Riots of 1967
Posse Comitatus
Legal Basis for use of Federal Troops

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
155

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC ELECTED
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TAMU HISTORY DEPT PAGE 002
THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS IN QUELLING CIVIL UNREST
IN WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 1968

A Thesis

By

BARRYE LA TROYE PRICE

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 1994

Major Subject: History
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ABSTRACT

The Use of Federal Troops in Quelling Civil Unrest in Washington, D.C., April 1968. (May 1994)
Barrye La Troye Price, B.B.A., University of Houston
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Joseph G. Dawson, III.

The focus of this study will be primarily on the role of federal troops—Regular Army and federalized National Guard—during the unrest in Washington, D.C., immediately following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on 4 April 1968. This thesis will address a number of questions. Did federal troops perform their mission in accordance with the policies outlined in Field Manual 19-15: Civil Disturbances and Disasters? Were the lessons learned from the disturbance in Detroit, Michigan, integrated into doctrine? Was the use of federal troops considered as a last resort by the mayor of Washington, D.C., before he asked the President for assistance? Was "Garden Plot"—the operations plan for the rapid buildup of forces in an objective area—a contingency plan that identified specific units and a command and control structure, or was it an ad hoc amalgamation that met the military's needs at the time? In what ways, if any, was the Regular Army better prepared for intervention than the National Guard? Was
the Army's doctrine too comprehensive and thus, unrealistic?

Currently, the only published work on the 1968 Washington, D.C., riots is journalist Ben Gilbert's, *Ten Blocks from the White House*. A review of over fifty works on the 1960's revealed either no mention of the D.C. riots or very little discussion about the riot. A review of thirteen undergraduate history textbooks, currently being utilized across the country in college survey history courses reveals the same findings—either no mention or very little discussion. Indeed, the extracts of these thirteen textbooks would not comprise enough material to form a solid paragraph on the events that transpired in the United States of America's seat of power—Washington, D.C.

As there is very little substantive published material on the Washington, D.C., riots of 1968, this thesis will be the first to employ recently declassified primary source data from File 103, Civil Disturbance Operations, of Record Group 319, U.S. Army Staff, located at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. This thesis will incorporate military after-action reports, official correspondence, government documents, congressional reports, Army contingency plans, as well as newspapers, journals, and secondary sources.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I owe a special debt of gratitude to the many people that were instrumental during this process. Chief amongst those that have my eternal thanks are the members of my graduate committee, professors Joseph Dawson, Brian Linn, and James Burk. I would also like to express my thanks to Professor Roger Beaumont of Texas A&M, for his professional advice and assistance, Jo Ann Williamson and the staff at the National Archives, Hannah Ziedlik and the staff at the Center for Military History, Karen Mills at the Martin Luther King Library in Washington, D.C. and Mrs. Windsor at Total Army Personnel Command for her concern and kind support. I would like to thank Colonels Robert Doughty, Casey Brower, and James Johnson for this once in a career opportunity, and Doctor Andy Bacevich and Lieutenant Colonel Rick Lynch for their encouragement, moral support, and professional counsel. Finally, I thank my wife, Elaine, for her understanding, patience, strength, and support during this process.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................... v
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................... vi
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................ viii
LIST OF TABLES ................................................ ix

CHAPTER

I INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1
   Legal Basis ........................................... 2
   History of Army's Role ................................ 8
   Idiosyncrasies of a Civil Disturbance Task Force ......... 11
   Historiography ........................................ 14
   Focus of the Study .................................... 20

II ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY'S FORCES ................. 28
   Assessment of the Army's Performance ............... 35
   National Guard and Army Response to Detroit Riot .... 37
   Army Plans for Future Civil Disturbances .......... 40

III TASK FORCE WASHINGTON QUELLS THE RIOT .......... 50
   Profile of Washington, D.C. .......................... 50
   Violence Erupts After King's Assassination .......... 53
   Federal Intervention Requested by District Authorities ... 61
   Troops Arrive in D.C. .................................. 67
   Troops Leave Washington, D.C. ......................... 81

IV EVALUATING THE ARMY'S PERFORMANCE .............. 90
   Statistics .............................................. 90
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V CONCLUSION</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflections</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL ORDERS GIVEN TO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLDIERS ENGAGED IN</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL DISTURBANCES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOP BUILDUP AND PHASE</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOWN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP OF THE DISTRICT OF</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLUMBIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: THE U.S. EPIDEMIC OF NEGRO RIOTS</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: NATIONAL VIOLENCE FOLLOWING KING'S ASSASSINATION</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: MAIN RIOT CORRIDORS</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: PRECINCT MAP</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: COMPARATIVE STATISTICAL DATA</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE BY MILITARY</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: NUMBER OF TROOPS DEPLOYED DURING CIVIL DISTURBANCE</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. That I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same. And that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me in accordance with the Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military Justice."¹ This oath is taken by all that enter the military service of the United States. Whereas much has been written about the United States Army in its role against foreign enemies (both within the confines of the United States and abroad) scholarship is not as extensive with respect to the Army's role against the domestic enemies—with the exception of the American Civil War.

This thesis will examine the Army's role against a domestic adversary during the riots of 4 April 1968, in Washington, D.C., immediately following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. This chapter will provide an overview of the legal or constitutional basis for the Army's role in quelling

¹The journal model for this thesis is the The Journal of Military History.
civil disobedience; provide a brief history of the execution of this mission by federal troops; and examine the peculiarities of a civil disturbance task force with respect to other Army commands of comparable size. This chapter will also establish the historiographical debate over whether federal troops--Regular Army and National Guardsmen under federal control--or the National Guard under state control is best suited for this mission and offer additional analysis on the further study of this critical role. Subsequent chapters will cover the events that transpired during the period between the summer of 1967 and the spring of 1968. The Army's training management cycle, assessment, planning, execution, and assessment based on lessons learned, as outlined in Field Manual 25-100: Training the Force, will be utilized as the model for presentation. This thesis will not examine the morality of the riot or entertain the poor social, economic, and political conditions that could have contributed to the outbreak of violence in Washington, D.C., in 1968.

Legal Basis

The authority for the Federal Government to take action to preserve public civil order stems from the Constitution--specifically Article II, Section 2, Article II, Section 3, and Article IV, Section 4. Article II, Section 2 places the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Militia, when it is called into the actual service of the United States. Article II, Section 3, charges the President with the faithful execution of laws, and the commissioning of all officers of the United States. And Article IV, Section 4, requires that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion. On application of the state legislature, or of the state's executive branch, the Government shall protect the States against domestic violence.³

Federal military forces were first used to control a civil disturbance by President George Washington during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. At that time, because of violent resistance in Western Pennsylvania to a federal tax on the production of whiskey, the President requisitioned 15,000 militiamen from Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia, and placed Virginia Governor, General (Light Horse) Harry Lee, in command.⁴ According to Robert Coakley, Washington acted accordingly, "issuing a cease and desist proclamation and citing that acts of treason had been committed against the United States," which necessitated calling forth the militia.⁵

The precedent of using federal military forces to
enforce the law when local forces were unable to achieve that objective, established by President Washington, was reinforced by occasional repetition during the period up until 1860, but the use of troops for this purpose was neither frequent nor widespread. During the Civil War the military assumed many law enforcement functions normally performed by civil authorities. During the elections of 1862 and 1864, military personnel policed the polls and in many instances, required self-generated loyalty oaths from the citizens before judging their qualification to vote. Conservative congressmen and Democrats publicly charged that these measures were used to maintain the Republican party in power, claiming instructions given to the soldiers by their civilian superiors prevented many Democrats from voting in the elections. As a direct result of this public dissatisfaction, in 1865 Congress enacted the first laws restricting the use of federal armed forces in executing the laws. These statutes are now codified as Sections 592 and 593 of Title 18, U.S. Code.

The enactment of these laws was neither sufficient to discourage the Army from being used for political purposes, nor to silence criticism. Following the conclusion of the Civil War, the Army was used extensively as if it were a federal police force—not only in the South, where the Army routinely enforced laws
during the Reconstruction era—but also in the North. Governors, sheriffs, U.S. marshals, revenue agents, and other persons in authority frequently requested and received the assistance of detachments of troops, employed as a posse, to assist in carrying out their duties. According to Joan Jensen:

The role of the military in Southern reconstruction was always an ambiguous one. Sheriffs and marshals throughout the South called on troops to assist in law enforcement, a practice that resulted in hostility, law suits, and confusion on the part of officers over the extent of their powers. After military reconstruction ended in most states, orders from Washington about the proper role of the Army in law enforcement remained vague and contradictory. The secretary of war simply asked generals to use their discretion.

This use of the Army not only rankled citizens who feared that the United States was growing into a pattern of military rule similar to that found in some foreign countries, but also caused misgivings within the Army itself. Jerry Cooper, in his book, *The Army and Civil Disorder*, states that "the concern for clearly delineated guidelines to govern the Army's behavior in civil disorders indicated an unease in the officer corps. The uncertainty invariably connected with civil disorder was unsettling to a professional group that liked clear-cut orders and direct action."8

Due to the appearance of Army troops in many communities during the 1876 elections, Congress enacted, and the president signed in 1878, the Posse Comitatus
Act. This act states that "whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."\textsuperscript{9} The Posse Comitatus Act furnishes the basic legal restriction upon use of the Army in any law enforcement role. In order to avoid breaking the law, any use of the Army to enforce the law must be grounded upon a recognized and valid exception to the Act. There are three categories of exceptions.

First, there are those based on specific laws enacted by Congress—statutory exceptions. These laws date back to the early days of the Republic. They were first enacted by Congress in 1792 and have been little changed since that time. The procedure prescribed by these laws were first used by President Washington in suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion.

The second category—nonstatutory exceptions—consists of two exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, and both are based on "the inherent right of the sovereign to respond when emergency, premature action is required to preserve public order, and to use necessary force to protect its own property and functions."\textsuperscript{10} Paragraph 6 of \textit{Army Regulation 500–50}: 
Emergency Employment of Army Resources--Civil Disturbances, establishes the authority for the military commander to respond in emergency situations when he is unable to contact higher headquarters in time to take necessary action during a public crisis.\textsuperscript{11} General Frederick Funston's actions taken to prevent looting, to provide medical aid, and to restore order following the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 furnish an excellent example of this exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. Additionally, all instances where a state governor calls out the National Guard serve as an illustration of the right of the state government to preserve public order. The U.S. Constitution describes the right of the state government to protect its own property by using military forces and paragraph 11 of AR 500-50 describes the process by which state governments and the National Guard may request military equipment from active forces.

The last category of exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act is based on a joint resolution of Congress. In the summer of 1968, Congress passed a joint resolution directing all departments of the government, upon request of the Secret Service, to assist that service in carrying out its statutory duties to protect certain government officials and candidates for high public office. Military resources were used to assist the Secret Service
in this way during the Republican and Democratic party conventions of 1968.

In summary, the authority to use military forces to enforce the law must be based upon a valid exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids the use of the Army to enforce the law.

**History of the Army's Role**

The Regular Army's role in quelling civil unrest during the first eighty-nine years of the Republic was sporadic. During this period some American citizens opposed a standing Army. This resistance was based on the intrinsic fear that the Army would be utilized by the government to tyrannize its people. A standing Army, according Robert Coakley, "could be the instrument only of a monarchy, not a democratic state." Despite the concern on the part of many Americans for one hundred years after the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, the U.S. Army did not usurp power or turn out to be putty in the hands of potentially malicious presidents to harass their opponents or suppress dissidents. During this period federal troops quelled civil unrest during the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, Fries' Rebellion in 1799, Dorr's Rebellion in 1842, at the Kansas Border in 1854, during the Mormon Troubles in 1857-58, and quelled the unrest at Harper's Ferry and captured John Brown in 1859.
During the Civil War the Army became involved in developing the freedmen's place in society. According to Allan R. Millett, "Lincoln appointed military governors with civil and military powers for occupied states, hoping they could mobilize loyal electorates, and Army officers initiated educational programs for ex-slaves. To support the Army's work with blacks, in March 1865 Congress created the Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees, and Abandoned Lands in the War Department." Southerners responded to Reconstruction with such white supremacist groups as the Ku Klux Klan, which evolved in Tennessee as an arm of southern resistance. The klansmen not only employed such violent and coercive tactics as beating, whipping, and murdering black and white Republicans, but they also terrorized and killed militiamen charged with protecting blacks during Reconstruction. Despite the Army's help in several instances, by 1877 blacks had won their basic freedom, but lost the struggle for equality.

In the post-Reconstruction era, the Army was heavily involved in quelling violence associated with labor disputes and enforcing court injunctions against striking union workers. The Army's intervention in the railroad strikes of 1877, the labor disputes at the Coeur d'Alene Mines in Idaho in 1892, and the Pullman strikes of 1894, created the most turbulence within the officer corps.
The predominant problem that existed during this period was clarity of instructions and policies. According to Jerry Cooper, "officers wished they could have avoided involvement in riot duty because of the lack of defined policy and law." Policy decisions that should have been made at the federal level were left vague or unanswered leading local or state authorities in charge. Invariably, their decision supported management's position and pitted soldiers against strikers. During the eleven year period between 1885 and 1895 military forces were mobilized 328 times for riot duty; 118 involved labor conflicts.

During the twentieth century the Army's role in quelling civil disturbances was both more frequent and more diverse. The Regular Army suppressed civil unrest at the Nevada gold mines in 1907; at the Colorado coal mines in 1913 and 1914; at the Winston-Salem, North Carolina, riots in 1918; at the Washington, D.C., riots in 1919; at the Omaha, Nebraska, riots in 1919; at the West Virginia mines in 1921; and thwarted the activities of Army veterans during the Bonus March in Washington, in 1932.

During the 1950's and early 1960's the Regular Army's civil disturbance mission changed from a "strike busting" role to the role outlined in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, the faithful execution and
enforcement of laws as mandated by the U.S. Congress or Supreme Court. The Regular Army performed this law enforcement mission in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 and 1958 as it enforced desegregation at Central High School; in Oxford, Mississippi, in 1962 and 1963, as it protected James Meredith—the first black student at the University of Mississippi—during the integration of public schools throughout the state of Alabama in 1963 and 1964; and during the "freedom rides" and civil rights marches in Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, in 1963–1965.

By 1967 the Regular Army's civil disturbance role shifted from that of enforcing legislation to one of protecting States against domestic violence, as outlined in Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution. The employment of federal troops during the Detroit riots of 1967 was the transitional point for the Army. Although the Watts riots of 1965 was a pivotal point for the Army as a whole, only California National Guard troops were utilized in quelling the unrest in Watts.

Idiosyncrasies of a Civil Disturbance Task Force

Prior to the outbreak of violence in Detroit in July of 1967, the Army's response to riot control was reactive. Although doctrine and contingency plans existed, they lacked specifics such as: what units would deploy to designated cities; how units would be transported to riot areas; and lacked detailed written
instructions for the task force commander. The post-Detroit riot Army remedied the problems of old and focused on organization, planning, and detailed instructions for the task force commander.

The Army task force in its civil disturbance role is undoubtedly one of the most diverse organizations within the military structure. This diversity does not originate from the fact that it is a joint organization—combining more than one service within the composite task force. Nor does its diversity evolve from the fact that it requires non-organic forces—forces not normally assigned to the unit—within its task organization. The task force assigned to civil disturbance operations is diverse from the perspective that detailed instructions for the commander, staff, officers and soldiers alike are spelled out in painful detail, leaving very little room for individual initiative or exploitation. For the commander, directives are provided in the form of a seven page "Letter of Instruction". This letter specifies the mission, task organization, location for establishment of the command post, options for how troops will carry weapons (bayonets fixed or unfixed, sheathed or unsheathed, weapons in the ready position or at sling arms on the shoulder), provisions for the actual necessity for loading a weapon, use of riot control
agents, authorization for use of force (Rules of Engagement), methods for dealing with and apprehending snipers, rules on civilian detention, search and seizure procedures, cooperation with civil authorities, communications, reporting procedures, and designation of task force or operational name.\textsuperscript{16}

In addition to the commander's Letter of Instruction, detailed special orders are issued to every officer, warrant officer, and enlisted person participating in the operation. Special orders are given in the form of a laminated Special Orders card that has listed eight special orders that require strict compliance. These Special Orders include such things as ensuring individual actions reflect positively on the Army, maximum restraint in the use of force, and full cooperation with local police. A complete listing of these Special Orders is at Appendix A.

The doctrine, \textit{Field Manual 19-15: Civil Disturbances and Disasters}, published in March of 1968, was the most comprehensive and definitive document in the history of the civil disturbance mission.\textsuperscript{17} This doctrine detailed required procedures such as: the employment of troops, formations to be used, preferred weapons for specific situations, crowd dispersal and sniper control techniques, psychological factors, and command
responsibilities. It even gave specific commands for soldiers to recite as they dispersed a crowd and outlined methods for separating agitators from onlookers. This is the level of detail that was given to a task force commander of a civil disturbance operation—vastly different from all other forms of command, but considerably more challenging in that the object of the use of force is an American citizen, thus placing American service personnel in a potentially, extremely awkward and confusing position. The Washington disturbances of April 1968 presented such a difficult and challenging position for the Army.

Historiography

The historiographical debate that will be considered within this thesis, rests within the question: Who is better suited for the civil disturbance mission, the National Guard under state control or federalized troops—both Regular Army and National Guardsmen under federal control? Prior to the era commonly known as the Civil Rights Movement of 1955-1970, little debate existed as to who was best suited for the civil disturbance role. The National Guard had primary responsibility for riot control duty and it had performed this duty admirably since 1794. Occasionally the escalation of violence and destruction by rioters required that both the National Guard and the Regular Army perform this role, both
individually and collectively. However, this was the exception and the National Guard, due to its state control, had performed this mission hundreds of times throughout its history in their home states. Guardsmen from the cities, towns, and rural areas across the state were at the beck and call of state legislatures and executives.

With the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement there evolved a different challenge for National Guardsmen, that of protecting African-Americans and enforcing Civil Rights legislation. From this challenge the historiographical debate evolves. After the guard's poor showing in Newark and Detroit during the summer of 1967 numerous questions arose about the professionalism of the National Guard. It was believed that not only were they poorly trained, but they were also too close to the problem to be separated from it. In other words, they, for the most part, shared the prejudices and discriminatory practices of the local populace. Thus, they were an extension of the segregated society, with vast arsenals and permission to impose as much force as was deemed necessary.

A review of literature published in the latter half of the 1960's, reveals consensus amongst historians Robin Higham, Martin Blumenson, Paul Scheips, Stephen Ambrose, and Roger Beaumont; amongst sociologist William C.
Cockerham; and amongst writers Charles P. Stone and Lewis L. Zickel. These men agree that the Regular Army was better suited for fulfilling the civil disturbance mission because of its comparative tolerance, unit cohesion, and responsiveness to orders. Moreover, they conclude that the Regular Army maintained an impersonal outlook with respect to local prejudices.

Robin Higham contends that the "the Regular Army had a better record in restoring order than the National Guard, because its outlook is more impersonal and its personnel are not as well read in local newspapers and as filled with local prejudices." Higham concludes that perhaps the greatest factor that led to the poor performance of the Michigan National Guard in Detroit was the fact that it had not been trained for riot control until after the Detroit disturbance.

Martin Blumenson notes that "the National Guards' activities were marked by slow response, tangled lines of authority, uncertain deployment, insufficient training, disruption of the military units, and isolation of individuals." He also attributes the fact that the "Michigan National Guard was 98.7 percent Caucasian as a contributing factor in Detroit." Blumenson notes that in all instances Regular troops were better trained, led, more experienced and rarely lost their composure, no matter how difficult the situation became.
Historian Paul Scheips, who examined the Army's performance in Oxford, Mississippi, and Detroit, Michigan, concluded that "the restraint with which the active Army conducted itself at both places, restraint that to this day has become its hallmark in civil disturbances, as befits the Army of a democracy." He contends that the first order of business for the XVIIIAirborne Corps commander, General John L. Throckmorton, upon arrival in Detroit, was to bring about "the disciplined use of weapons by federalized guardsmen." 

Stephen E. Ambrose posits, perhaps, the most critical assessment of the National Guard in a 1972 essay. He believes that the guard was poorly trained, lead, and undisciplined. He concludes that the Guard could only be effective when it is coupled with Regular Army forces.

Roger Beaumont, though critical of the National Guard's performance in 1967, looks also at causal factors, environmental factors, and reactions by participants--protagonists as well as antagonists. Beaumont notes that "most obvious, as the dust settled, after Detroit, was the gap in existing military doctrine and training between riot control and all-out-street-fighting. The degree of restraint necessary in the intermediate ground of civil conflict
required far more deft handling and better training than the police or National Guard had been prepared for."²⁵

Sociologist William C. Cockerham teamed up with Lawerence E. Cohen to write an intriguing study on Regular Army paratroopers' attitudes toward riot duty. Their approach was quantitative and they conclude that the Regular Army was better suited for civil disturbance than the National Guard. They assert "the area of Detroit assigned to the brigade of paratroopers rapidly became the quietest part of the city, thus prompting their commander to state that the key to quelling civil disorder is to saturate an area with calm, determined, and hardened professional soldiers."²⁶ They contend that with the exception of the Pullman Strike of 1877, federal troops have encountered little opposition when they have intervened in domestic civil disorders. Moreover, "unlike some police and National Guard units, federal troops have not been accused of engaging in indiscriminate violence against rioters and demonstrators."²⁷

Yet still there are those who contend, such as Roger Beaumont, that the folly of the National Guard rests with its training, or lack thereof. Charles P. Stone, who served as the deputy commander of Task Force Detroit, asserts that the National Guard's doctrine was sound. However, he argues that "what was needed was different
emphasis on training, imaginative employment of
techniques, better leadership, and better command and
control." Stone contends that military leaders at
every level of command must continually circulate in the
areas for which they are responsible . . . "they must
have firsthand information about what is going on; they
need to correct deficiencies on the spot, anticipate
problems that are developing, and insure that their
orders are understood and properly implemented."29

Army officer Lewis Zickel identifies yet another
aspect of poor training in the National Guard,
overreaction. Zickel quotes General Throckmorton: "it
appeared that the National Guard had not been warned
regarding the danger of overreaction and the necessity of
great restraint in using their weapons. The young
troopers could not be expected to know that their lack of
fire discipline made them a danger not only to the
civilian population but to themselves." Zickel
concludes that the focus of a civil disturbance force
must be restoration and not suppression. This thesis
will show conclusively that each of the aforementioned
historians, though differing in conclusions, were
essentially correct; and will argue that realistic
training, good leadership, rapid response, and an
overwhelming show of force makes the difference in
preparing federalized troops for deployment in civil
disturbance situations.

Focus of the Study

Currently, the only work on the 1968 Washington, D.C., riots is journalist Ben Gilbert's, *Ten Blocks from the White House*. A review of over fifty works on the 1960's revealed either no mention of the D.C. riots or very little discussion about the riot. A review of thirteen undergraduate history textbooks, currently being utilized across the country in college survey history courses reveals the same findings—either no mention or very little discussion. Indeed, the extracts of these thirteen textbooks would not comprise enough material to form a solid paragraph on the events that transpired in the United States of America's seat of power—Washington, D.C. Perhaps one of the more alarming quotes is found within the 1993 text entitled *The Enduring Vision*: "In Washington, D.C. more than 700 fires illuminated the night sky. Rampaging blacks there forced Army units in combat gear to set up machine-gun emplacements outside the Capitol." This passage creates the illusion that blacks were storming the Capitol, which was not true. As for the set up and emplacement of machine-guns, an Associated Press photo captured on the front page of the *New York Times*, clearly depicts a small machine-gun emplacement on the steps of the Capitol building, but there is no ammunition belt protruding from the side of
Moreover, the Army's Civil Disturbance doctrine, \textit{FM 19-15}, calls for machine-guns, no larger than .30 caliber, stating "the psychological effect produced by the sight of machine-guns, serves as a strong deterrent against rioters challenging the application of force by the disturbance control troops."\textsuperscript{33}

The focus of this study will be primarily on the role of federal troops—Regular Army and federalized National Guard—during the unrest in Washington, D.C., immediately following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on 4 April 1968. This thesis will address a number of questions. Did federal troops perform their mission in accordance with the policies outlined in \textit{Field Manual 19-15: Civil Disturbances and Disasters}? Were the lessons learned from the disturbance in Detroit, Michigan, integrated into doctrine? Was the use of federal troops considered as a last resort by the mayor of Washington, D.C., before he asked the President for assistance? Was "Garden Plot"—the operations plan for the rapid buildup of forces in an objective area—a contingency plan that identified specific units and a command and control structure, or was it an ad hoc amalgamation that met the military's needs at the time? In what ways, if any, was the Regular Army better prepared for intervention than the National Guard? Was
the Army's doctrine too comprehensive and thus, unrealistic?

As there is very little substantive published material on the Washington, D.C., riots of 1968, this thesis will be the first to employ recently declassified primary source data from File 103, Civil Disturbance Operations, of Record Group 319, U.S. Army Staff, located at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. This thesis will incorporate military after-action reports, official correspondence, government documents, congressional reports, Army contingency plans, as well as newspapers, journals, and secondary sources.


5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 42-226.


9 Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces, 344.

10 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 500-50: Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources--Civil Disturbances (Washington: Department of the Army), paragraphs 6 and 11.

11 Ibid.

12 Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces, 3.


15 Cooper, The Army and Civil Disorder, 259.

16 Department of the Army Message Number 858668, Chief of Staff to Vice Chief of Staff, 060139Z April 68, Subject: Designation to Command Task Force Washington, 1-7, File 103, RG 319, NA. This entry is a brief synopsis of the letter of instruction issued to General Ralph Haines as he assumed command of Task Force Washington. Of note is the fact that this is one of the few command situations were the commander is not afforded to impart his vision on the organization, as described in Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-103:
Leadership and Command at Senior Levels (Washington: Department of the Army, 1987), 41.


21 Ibid., 513.


23 Ibid., 187.


27 Ibid.

28 Charles P. Stone, "Lessons of Detroit, Summer 1967," in Higham, ed., *Bayonets in the Streets*, 191. Of significance to the argument posited by Charles P. Stone is the fact that his view of the situation in Detroit is based on his actual experience in the city during the turbulence. During the Detroit riots Charles P. Stone was a major general in the U.S. Army, and was the deputy corps commander of XVIII Airborne Corps and the deputy commander of Task Force Detroit.

29 Ibid., 192.


CHAPTER II

ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY'S FORCES

The violence that erupted within the community of Watts, California, in 1965 brought riots to the forefront of U.S. consciousness. There appeared to be an atmosphere of denial of the social, economic, and political ills that continued to exist throughout the country. "Black Power" and increased racial militancy was permeating throughout the country, as Martin Luther King's nonviolent philosophy had seemingly reached its apex and had begun its downward spiral. This descent was evidenced by forty-three disorders and riots during 1966. Despite the numerous disturbances of 1966, the country and its citizens remained in denial, adopting a "if we do not talk about it, it will not happen" philosophy. As the country braced for the hot summer of 1967, there was little indication of the level of violence that would ensue. In total the summer of 1967 hosted disorders in over 150 cities across the nation--the worst of which occurred in Detroit, Michigan.

This chapter will assess the Army's performance during the civil disturbance in Detroit. It will also examine the lessons learned and actions taken, if any, by the Army and Federal Government immediately following the
riots, to remedy internal deficiencies. Figure 1 depicts the states across the nation in which riots occurred in 1967.

FIGURE 1

The U.S. Epidemic of Negro Riots

![Map of the U.S. showing states affected by Negro Riots with major and minor riots indicated.]
On 23 July 1967 Detroit police conducted an early morning raid on a club in the black section of town. This raid drew a crowd of curious onlookers, which became enraged as police began carting off the club's patrons. Violence erupted as the last police squad car drove off into the night; "fires, looting, and general violence followed until there was rioting over many miles of the city." At the outset of violence, city officials were somewhat apprehensive about calling out the National Guard and opted to handle matters with local and state police. However, the situation quickly escalated beyond the capabilities of local and state law enforcement officials. A Newsweek account contends that "the trouble burst on Detroit like a firestorm and turned the nation's fifth largest city into a theater of war. Whole streets lay ravaged by looters, whole blocks immolated in flames."3

As chaos ensued, the Michigan National Guard's, 46th Infantry Division, was mobilized by Governor George Romney. Governor Romney instructed the commanding general of the 46th Infantry Division, Major General Cecil L. Simmons, to use whatever force was necessary to restore order in Detroit. As Guardsmen deployed throughout Detroit's riot corridor they brought the full power of their vast arsenal to bear on the citizens of Detroit, employing the very same weapons that were being
utilized by the Regular Army in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Rifles, machine guns, chemical agents, and armored tanks were used against the rioting citizens of Detroit. Guardsmen were issued ammunition and were ordered to fire when fired upon and to shoot looters if they could not find an alternate means of stopping them. As Simmons later put it, "this was in accordance with custom from time immemorial." As instructed, the untested and fearful soldiers of the Michigan National Guard took to the streets and, literally, executed their orders. Detroit was soon a veritable battle ground in which supposed representatives of law and order--the Michigan National Guard--acted as if looters were a foreign enemy. What transpired was comparable to the legendary vigilantes of Dodge City of the 1860's--lawlessness, chaos, and a total disregard for restraint by the National Guard.

Governor Romney requested federal intervention after the first day of violence in Detroit and President Lyndon B. Johnson issued his Executive Order for federal employment of troops during the late hours of 24 July 1967, almost 48 hours after the violence began in Detroit. Concurrent with the issuance of the President's order, came the deployment of two Regular Army brigades, one from the 82d Airborne Division located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the other from the 101st Airborne
Division located at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. "This marked the first time that federal troops were deployed to assist in a racially motivated disturbance outside the South in a quarter century." The President's order also brought the Michigan National Guard into federal service. Thus, control of all military personnel in Detroit fell under the designated commander for Task Force Detroit, Lieutenant General John Throckmorton, upon his arrival on the scene.

According to Paul J. Scheips, "when the 82d Airborne Division was deployed to Detroit one of the first problems that Lieutenant General John L. Throckmorton, the commanding general of XVIII Airborne Corps, faced was that of bringing about a disciplined use of weapons by the federalized Michigan National Guard, who had been making frequent use of them." The absence of restraint by the Michigan National Guard was illustrated by an incident captured by a report in Newsweek: "Guardsmen fired fourteen shots into a car, wounding its four passengers. A search of the car revealed two empty wine bottles and a half-pint of whiskey, but no arms, no loot." Of the military professional officer Samuel P. Huntington wrote, "it must be remembered that the peculiar skill of the officer is the management of violence not the act of violence itself." Surely the
Guard's acts of uncontrolled violence ran contrary to Huntington's argument.

As a consequence of reports of extreme violence by the National Guard, General Throckmorton took steps to improve control over them. In accordance with his instructions and assessment of the situation, "Throckmorton issued on July 25, as one of his first orders after federalization, a directive to General Cecil L. Simmons, the Michigan National Guard commander, to have all Guardsmen unload their weapons and put the ammunition in their pockets." Thereafter they were not to fire their weapons except when authorized by an officer. "They [Guardsmen] were also instructed to stop shooting looters and to cease shooting out streetlights, which they had been doing because of their fear of snipers." "Major General Charles P. Stone, the Deputy Corps Commander XVIII Airborne Corps, discovered that 90 percent of the approximately 500 guardsmen that he spoke with still had loaded weapons as late as the 27th and 28th of July—four days after General Throckmorton's order." This violation of Throckmorton's order indicates the lack of supervision and the failure to follow through on the part of the National Guard's officers and noncommissioned officers.

Throckmorton, a seasoned and battle-tested veteran, unlike the commander of the Michigan National Guard,
assessed the situation before deciding on the best course of action for bringing about a truce between belligerents and authorities. After touring the riot area and evaluating the situation Throckmorton determined that the city was saturated with fear stating: "the National Guardsmen were afraid, the police were afraid, and numerous persons were being injured by gunshots of undetermined origin. . . . From the time of our arrival in the city, our major task was to reduce fear and restore an air of normalcy." He sent his Regular Army forces into the hardest-hit areas of the city to establish contact and rapport between the troops and the residents. The result of this effort was cooperation by all involved: "troops...began helping to clean up the streets, collect garbage, and trace persons who had disappeared in the confusion. Residents in the neighborhood responded with soup and sandwiches for the troops."13

Ten days after violence erupted following a routine police raid at a night club in the black community, federal troops withdrew from Detroit and the Michigan National Guard was released from federal service and returned to state control. It took an additional fifteen days before the city of Detroit was returned completely to civil authorities. When the violence in Detroit subsided, forty-three people had been killed,
thirty-three of them African-Americans. Police officers had shot and killed twenty-one, the National Guard had killed nine, and the Army had killed one. Store owners had killed two looters, and four persons had died in accidents. Authorities determined that rioters were evidently responsible for three of the deaths, and a private security guard had shot one of those who died.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Assessment of the Army's Performance}

The after action reports from the units conducting riot control duty in Detroit served as the mandate for both reform and continuity of the Army's policies and standing operating procedures. Whereas, active duty forces performed admirably during the disturbance, National Guardsman did not fair so well. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Adam Yarmolinsky, contended that "the experience in Newark and Detroit in 1967 has disclosed a lack of training, indiscriminate firing, inadequate discipline, a low proportion of blacks, and frequent lack of equipment among National Guardsmen."\textsuperscript{15} An examination of the post-riot statistics bears out Yarmolinsky's statement.

During their seven days of commitment the 4,000 men of the Michigan National Guard (46th Infantry Division) expended 156,391 rounds of ammunition. In the Newark, New Jersey, riots during the same period the National Guard expended 10,414 rounds of ammunition during their
first three days of commitment. Although each member of the Michigan National Guard had received written special instructions ordering restraint and fire control, the orders were either poorly enforced or ignored. The after action report recommended that the National Guard provide intensive training in the control and employment of weapons in civil disturbances.

Within the realm of training, the after action report showed that both the Regular Army and the National Guard were deficient. The report found that there was an urgent need to train National Guard and Regular Army forces in the apprehension and handling of rioters, looters, and arsonists. The National Guard fell short within their training for combat in cities. The report recommended that the Department of the Army take the lead on assuring that the requisite number of hours be dedicated to National Guard units during Annual Field Training. Moreover, the report concluded that less training emphasis should be given to riot control formations.

Considerable controversy arose in the aftermath of the Detroit riots. The military's deployment in Detroit brought consensus amongst historians Robin Higham, Paul Scheips, and Martin Blumenson, while Army Major General Charles Stone considered that the Guard was salvageable. Each historian held the basic belief that the Regular
Army was better suited for fulfilling the civil disturbance mission because of its restraint, cohesion, and responsiveness to orders. Moreover, they believed that the Regular Army maintained an impersonal outlook with respect to local prejudices and manifested superior training. Charles P. Stone, on the other hand, believed the National Guard's doctrine was sound. However, he argues that "what was needed was different emphasis on training, imaginative employment of techniques, better leadership, and better command and control." Martin Blumenson viewed the Michigan National Guard's 98.7 percent Caucasian population as a contributing factor to the level of violence experienced in Detroit. Blumenson, Adam Yarmolinsky, and Roger Beaumont are in concert on the issue of race and the potential positive impact that an integrated Michigan National Guard could have made.

National Guard and Army Response to Detriot Riot

The unrest in Detroit during the summer of 1967 caused the Army and the nation to look inward for solutions to the mounting unrest within the nation's urban populaces. Detroit was the catalyst that caused the Army to reassess the role and effectiveness of the National Guard and its ability, or rather its inability, to handle civil unrest. The Detroit disturbances galvanized President Lyndon B. Johnson to create a
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both the Regular and the National Guard, coordinated planning between civil police, the Regular Army, and the National Guard, and established a Department of the Army Task Group to study every aspect of the Army's role in civil disturbances.

A major role of the Department of the Army Task Group was to consider and, if necessary, redefine its standing policy on the use of regular military personnel, equipment, and facilities in connection with civil disorders and disturbances. Prior to the Detroit riots, "soldiers--other than National Guardsmen under state control--could not be used in connection with civil disturbances or related activities without the direct personal approval of the Secretary of Defense, his deputy, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."24 All requests for authority to use military personnel in connection with civil disturbances were to be forwarded through proper channels with appropriate justification and recommendations. Likewise, any requests from local officials for the loan of military equipment such as weapons, ammunition, chemical agents, or vehicles, were to be forwarded to the Department of the Army on a case-by-case basis regardless of the specific source of the equipment in question, whether it be from the Regular Army, United States Army Reserve, or Army National Guard stocks. "The Department of the Army was the executive agent for the Department of Defense in planning for
military support to civil authorities in civil disturbances.”

**Army Plans for Future Civil Disturbances**

Following the major disturbances in Detroit, the task study group investigated preparedness for civil disturbances, with the stated objective of solving problems as they were encountered, rather than developing requirements and presenting for approval one neat package of recommendations. By the time the study group completed its recommendations, the Army had began acting upon and implementing several of the proposals. "The results of the study were presented to the Chief of Staff of the Army on 12 December 1967, and by 18 December he had acted on each of the sixty-six recommendations contained therein." "The Department of the Army dissolved the task group on 22 January 1968, and replaced it with a Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Committee to monitor and supervise the completion of actions begun by the task group." Additionally, this new committee assured the adequacy and consistency of Department of the Army responses to immediate requirements regarding inquiries concerning the Army's involvement in the suppression of civil disturbances and also served as the Army's planning group when civil disturbances seemed imminent."
As the group pursued its study, it also developed a set of plans nicknamed GARDEN PLOT, one, for the Continental Army Command, and another, designated the Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan. GARDEN PLOT provided detailed plans for deploying federal forces to any of the major cities in the United States, utilizing Military Airlift Command and Tactical Air Command aircraft, and directed coordination between military forces planned for the objective cities and municipal, county, and state officials. According to a Chief of Staff memorandum dated 4 August 1967, "this task group was not only to develop recommendations for appropriate changes in existing Army policies and procedures, but was also to serve as a committee to assure the adequacy and consistency of the Department of the Army's response to all immediate requirements regarding inquiries concerning involvement in the suppression of civil disorders." 27

The Department of the Army's plan developed for Task Force Washington provided for the execution of civil disturbance operations in three distinct phases: preparation and deployment; employment; and redeployment. Phase one was to begin when the President directed federal intervention in a civil disturbance situation, at which time the Army Chief of Staff would initiate civil disturbance control operations and direct the Commander
in Chief, United States Strike Command (CINCSTRIKE), to deploy appropriate task forces to an objective area within a specified period of time. During phase two, the Army Chief of Staff was to employ the military forces under his control to restore law and order in the objective area. When law and order were restored and the situation could be left in the hands of local law enforcement agencies, the Chief of Staff would initiate phase three by directing CINCSTRIKE to redeploy the forces to their home stations. The Department of the Navy had responsibility for coordination with the Commanding General, Continental Army Command, (CONARC), for the preparation and employment of appropriate Navy and Marine Corps forces stationed near the objective area, and for providing installations in or near objective areas for use by military forces participating in civil disturbance operations.²⁸

Washington, D.C., a high priority city under the Department of the Army's Civil Disturbance Plan, required a separate plan for its protection.²⁹ The staff of Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, wrote this plan at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The plan called for Task Force Washington to exercise command and control of federal forces when committed to assist the civil authorities of the District of Columbia in suppressing civil disturbances, designating for possible use selected
tactical units at installations within a one hundred-mile radius of Washington, each falling under the operational control of the commanding general, Military District of Washington. Other major task forces earmarked for the capital under the Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan included Task Force 82, from the 82d Airborne Division stationed at Fort Bragg, and Task Force 5, from the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado.  

Although this was the plan, the rapid escalation of disorder on Friday, 5 April 1968, and the proximity of the Headquarters, Department of the Army, to Washington led the Army Chief of Staff to activate a Task Force Washington staff from his own organic resources rather than wait for Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, to deploy from Fort Bragg. This twenty-nine member staff was austere compared to the 150-man staff called for in the plan. The augmented staff, made up of Department of the Army operations, logistic, communications and electronics, provost marshal, intelligence, legal, and information officers, together with liaison officers from subordinate task forces, functioned quite smoothly, although remaining shorthanded throughout the disturbance.

The Army truly covered a great deal of ground during the period 2 August 1967 and 4 April 1968. It faced the
reality of a nation angered by increased racial tensions and protest of the Vietnam War. The riots in Detroit—a city that was regarded amongst the nation's very best in improving racial harmony—caused the Army and nation to look inward, and placed civil disturbance operations as a top priority. The Army's assessment of the lessons learned from the Detroit riot of 1967 and its implementation of focused training and contingency planning paid off; and helped the federal government respond to the domestic violence that erupted after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on 4 April 1968.
10 Ibid., 187-88.
11 Ibid., 188.
12 Lewis L. Zickel, "The Soldier and Civil Disorder,"

13 Ibid.

14 For statistics see Scheips and Cocke, Army and Operational Intelligence Activities, 65. See also Scheips, "The Army and Civil Disturbances," in Ryan and Nenninger, eds., Soldiers and Civilians, 189.


16 Scheips, "The Army and Civil Disturbances," in Ryan and Nenninger, eds., Soldiers and Civilians, 188.


18 Ibid., 195. This note is a brief synopsis of Stone's assessment of the status of riot control training within the Guard and Regular Army.

19 Ibid., 191.

The Kerner Commission's membership included U.S. Representatives such as James C. Corman (Democrat of California), and William M. McCullough (Republican of Ohio); U.S. Senators Edward W. Brooke (Republican of Massachusetts) and Fred Harris (Democrat of Oklahoma). John Lindsay, Mayor of New York City, and Hubert Jenkins, Chief of Police in Atlanta, Georgia, gave their views on urban administration. Offering the view of labor and technology were I.W. Abel, President of the United Steelworkers of America and Charles B. Thorton, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Litton Industries, Inc., respectively. The group was rounded out by Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and Katherine Graham Peden, Commissioner of Commerce, State of Kentucky.

Ibid., 1-15. The pages are a brief synopsis of the Kerner Commission's stated purpose and findings as to the cause of domestic riots within U.S. cities.

Jean R. Moenk, "USCONARC--Participation in the Suppression of Civil Disturbances, April 1968," (Fort Monroe, Va.: USCONARC, October 1968), 14, copy located in File, USCONARC-2, Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.
25 Ibid.
26 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Memorandum Number 67-316, Subject: Preparedness in Civil Disturbance Matters, File 103, RG 319, NA.
27 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Memorandum Number 000.5, For the Department of the Army Staff, dated August 4, 1967, Subject: Preparedness in Civil Disturbance Matters, File 103, RG 319, NA.
29 Ibid.
30 Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan, February 3, 1968, Annex I, Appendix 1, File 103, RG 319, NA.
31 Department of the Army Message Number 858668, From: Chief of Staff, To: Vice Chief of Staff, 060139Z April 68, Subject: Designation to Command Task Force Washington, File 103, RG 319, NA.
32 Department of the Army, "After Action Report, 4-17 April Civil Disturbances," (Washington: Department of the Army, 13 August 1968), 6, File 103, RG 319, NA.
CHAPTER III

TASK FORCE WASHINGTON QUELLS THE RIOT

Profile of Washington, D.C.

The prevailing conditions that existed within Washington, D.C.'s, black community during the 1960's made the nation's capital a prime candidate for civil unrest. Like many other cities, plagued by civil unrest, the District's Negro community was amongst the nation's leader in negative statistics. Over one-third of D.C. Negroes were educated in facilities of World War I vintage. Only one out of every three black high school students would graduate. Seventy-five percent of African-American students read below the national average. The District was second only to the state of Mississippi for the highest infant mortality rate in the nation. Rates for sexually transmitted diseases were amongst the country's highest, and 25 percent of D.C.'s black residents lived below the poverty line. Unemployment rates within the District's black community soared—often tripling the rate experienced within white communities. Additionally those blacks that were employed were often underemployed, working below potential and skills.¹

The 1960's found segregation and institutional racism obsolete on paper, but prevalent in practice in
the nation's capital. "Poorer Negro's were largely confined to virtually all-black areas, where high rents, congestion, and substandard conditions prevailed." Their inability to secure credit and loans only further reduced their plight in a world where credit was synonymous with opportunity. Inadequate public transportation routes through the black neighborhoods precluded job opportunities and thus created the necessity for public assistance for many residents.

As Martin Luther King's "nonviolent" philosophy began to lose its fervor to Stokley Carmichael's "black power" philosophy, the struggle for black equality became increasingly more aggressive. In November of 1963, the first of a series of near riotous confrontations between local blacks and District police occurred. Violence followed the annual Thanksgiving Day football game between two prominent high school teams. According to Ben Gilbert "trouble was narrowly averted in September of 1965 when two white officers detained four [black] boys ages 12 to 16, for playing ball in an alley. A police station...in Southeast Washington was stoned in August 1966 to protest an arrest. A near riot occurred on August 1, 1967 after rumors of an impending disorder had circulated for days." Armed with the lessons of the summer of 1967, Washington, D.C., civil and military authorities began preparing for anticipated violence
during the summer of 1968. Major General Charles L. Southward, commander of the D.C. National Guard, confirmed "that some of his key men were attending anti-riot training based on the lessons of Newark and Detroit, being given at the military police school at Fort Gorgon, Georgia." An April 1968 article in the Washington Post contended that black power advocates were planning to burn the city on 18 and 19 June. Perhaps the best illustration of the frustration in the black society of Washington, D.C., was captured in a 3 March sermon by Reverend Julius Hobson of Saint Stephen and the Incarnation Episcopal Church. In a message to the 400 people assembled Hobson asserted "we need a revolution to change what's wrong. . . . While we might be forced to make a revolution, it would fall this summer, because the authorities are ready and eager to quell it."

A reflection by Washington Post staff writer William Raspberry captured the essence of the mounting tensions and worsening conditions that existed in Washington, D.C., in 1968. He argued:

housing discrimination continued apace, turning the Capital Beltway into a white noose around an increasingly black central city. Police brutality at the hands of a predominantly white force was commonplace. Job discrimination, actual and imagined, kept the Human Relations Commission and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People busy investigating complaints. Militant black leaders were commanding new respect, and the nonviolent King was at pains to defend his left flank. The dream was dying.
 Violence Erupts After King's Assassination

On 4 April 1968 the news that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., had been felled by an assassin's bullet in Memphis, Tennessee, spread across the nation like wildfire, sparking some of the most severe episodes of violence in American history. According to reporter Edward Kosner, "it was Pandora's box flung open--an apocalyptic act that loosed the furies brooding in the shadows of America's sullen ghettos." The news of King's death resulted in the mobilization of National Guard troops across eighteen states and thirty-six cities.

FIGURE 2

National Violence Following King's Assassination

| NUMBER OF NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS USED | 68,915 |
| NUMBER OF STATES IN WHICH USED | 18 |
| NUMBER OF CITIES IN WHICH USED | 36 |

(number includes Washington, D.C.)

NOTE 1 – 6,973 OF THE ILLINOIS FIGURE ABOVE WERE FEDERALIZED ON 7 APRIL.
NOTE 2 – 6,765 OF THE MARYLAND FIGURE ABOVE WERE FEDERALIZED ON 7 APRIL.
NOTE 3 – 1,848 OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FIGURE ABOVE WERE FEDERALIZED ON 5 APRIL.
Federalized troops—a combination active duty and National Guard troops under the control of the Federal Government—were deployed in Baltimore, Maryland (11,086), Chicago, Illinois (11,978) and Washington, D.C., (15,530).

The intersection at 14th and U Streets, Northwest was a hub within the local black community.
Centered around this intersection was the Southern Christian Leadership Conference office, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee office, the office of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, as well as a myriad of small proprietorships and businesses. According to the *George Washington Law Review* the intersection was in the heart of the community and doubled as both a business center and as "a focal point for gatherings, demonstrations, and trouble."\(^1\)

Washington Post editor Ben Gilbert also noted that "police considered this intersection [14th and U Street] the most volatile in the city's crowded Negro section."\(^2\)

Shortly after 8:00 P.M. on Thursday, 4 April, when the news of King's death arrived in Washington, people began to congregate in the vicinity of 14th and U Streets N.W. The mood was ugly: "Betty Wolden, a reporter for NBC News, who appeared to be the only white woman in the predominantly black crowd, said to the black newsman [Holli West] that the sudden quiet in the area just then struck her as ominous—like before a hurricane strikes."\(^3\) As the crowd, encouraged by black activist Stokely Carmichael, grew in excess of 300 persons, it began moving along 14th Street. Its members urged local businesses to close their shops in honor of Dr. King's memory. Just south of 14th and U Streets, the swelling crowd encountered Walter Fauntroy, an SCLC Official and
newly appointed chairman of the City Council. Fauntroy told Carmichael, "let's not get anyone hurt, let's cool it."\textsuperscript{14} Carmichael allegedly responded: "all we're asking storeowners to do is close the stores."\textsuperscript{15}

It is difficult to assess what Carmichael's role actually was in instigating the riots. Reports in the \textit{Washington Evening Star}, the \textit{Washington Post}, and \textit{The New York Times} alleged that Carmichael instigated the violence that erupted in Washington, D.C. Familiar scenes of Stokely Carmichael telling blacks to "go get your guns" on NBC's \textit{Meet the Press}, further reinforced what many believed, that Carmichael played an instrumental role in the D.C. riot. But did he? Ben Gilbert depicts Carmichael as an advocate of peaceful protest during the evening of 4 April 1968. He contends that Carmichael scolded a teenager for punching out a window on the Republic Theater, shouting "this is not the way so that others could hear him."\textsuperscript{16} As the crowd became increasingly more anxious and uncontrollable Carmichael departed the area. Moreover, Carmichael was never charged either with inciting a riot or any other riot-related charges. Perhaps he was not charged to limit further violence, as the activist was very popular and very well respected by local blacks. Could it have been, as Gilbert contends, that his actions were not malicious?
Violence erupted at approximately 9:30 P.M., when a marcher smashed the window of a People's Drug Store located at 14th and U Streets, Northwest. Prior to this incident it appears that the spontaneous memorial march was one of peaceful citizens. Shocked and saddened by the death of a man who had achieved world wide recognition as a spokesman for the oppressed, it is probable they were moved to march as a testament of their love and allegiance to the memory of their martyred hero. Certainly there is no indication that they intended to turn a memorial march into an orgy of looting and destruction. However, once the violence began, a chain reaction occurred and, normally law abiding citizens began looting, burning, and destroying their neighborhood. Lawlessness escalated as members of the crowd began breaking windows, setting fires, looting businesses, and pulling occupants from their vehicles and beating them.

City officials, not expecting such disorder, had removed most of the police from the area after King's death in an effort to avoid provocation. Once the looting began, police units were immediately redispached to the troubled area. These units were overwhelmed by the mob and—dodging rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails—they were forced to retreat and await reinforcement. As a result of mounting violence and
numerical inferiority, the police Civil Disturbance Unit was activated and deployed along 14th Street by 11:30 P.M. By midnight, 500 policemen had cleared the lower end of the 14th Street shopping strip, but looting continued. The D.C. Police acted as quickly as they could, but their 500-man force proved no match for the angry mob. By 1:00 A.M. they were forced to mobilize 2,500 of its 3,000-man Civil Disturbance Unit. By the time order was restored, about 3:00 A.M., 200 stores had broken windows, 150 had been looted, more than 150 adults and nearly 50 juveniles had been arrested, 30 people injured, and one riot-connected death had occurred.17

In the aftermath of the violence of 4 April, city officials assessed that 14th Street had suffered the most damage, with only scattered looting and broken windows in other parts of the city as well. As the sun rose on 5 April, policemen lined 14th Street, burned out buildings continued to smolder, and persistent tear gas hung in the moist morning air. The looting and burning during the previous nine hours left the 14th Street corridor full of broken glass and rubble.

Police officials believed that the violence experienced on Thursday night had burned itself out and anticipated no further rioting until Friday evening. As a result, at 5:30 A.M. the Civil Disturbance Unit was dismissed. D.C. officials made preparations to activate
the District of Columbia National Guard for riot duty Friday evening. Friday morning, however, revealed worsening tension in the ghetto, as many residents skipped work and school and gathered in large groups along city streets. Shortly after noon a fire broke out in the Safeway market, a half block south of the intersection of 14th and U Streets, N.W. Window smashing, looting and more fires followed in the area.

Police were caught totally off guard for this resurgence of violence. Elsie Carper wrote, "District police were caught by surprise when looting and arson broke out . . . yesterday. There was only one patrol car at 14th and Harvard Streets, one of the early trouble spots. One policeman radioed, 'We need gas masks, gas and more troops. We are getting bricks here.'" Police were significantly outnumbered by looters, who were coming and going at will. As a result, police began removing unprotected merchandise from store windows and securing the items at police headquarters. Local fire departments mobilized the majority of their personnel but lacked sufficient equipment to utilize the additional fire-fighters. Nearby counties began sending fire-fighting equipment to help the D.C. fire department. During the renewed violence fire-fighters were prevented from fighting the fires by rock-throwing crowds. The contagion of rioting created a "carnival-like euphoria"
with rioters looting and setting fires without fear of police reprisal. Pandemonium continued as downtown shoppers and office workers, not fully cognizant of the previous night's activities, were captive witnesses to the worst traffic jam the capital had ever experienced. To Judge Alfred Burka, "the April rioting resulted from an apparent breakdown, lack of respect or lack of fear of officers of the law. It seems that the public has come too believe that what is done in a group is alright, although the same act committed by an individual would be punished."20

By the afternoon of 5 April, 1,272 persons had been arrested, eight had been killed, and 350 injured. These actions led the mayor of Washington, D.C., to impose a daily curfew from 5:30 P.M. to 6:30 A.M..21 An examination of the minutes of the District Council meeting reveals that the establishment of curfew hours, though an important feature of the joint decision made by the mayor and city council, was only one factor in the city's attempt to take away its citizens' tools of dissent. The city's "Proclamation of Emergency" also strictly prohibited the sale alcoholic beverages, the dispensing of gasoline and other flammables, and the sale or exchange of any firearms or ammunition.22 In order to ensure compliance with the imposed curfew by city workers the mayor invoked a provision that he had gained approval
for only one month before the outbreak of violence in Washington, D.C., that "allowed District Government employees whose services were not essential," both a later start and early release from work without loss of leave or pay.  

Concurrent with the events of the evening of 4 April and the following morning, the District's Director of Public Safety, Patrick Murphy, the Undersecretary of the Army, David McGiffert, and the Deputy United States Attorney General, Warren Christopher, met to plan and assess the situation. At approximately 2:00 P.M. on 5 April a senior Army officer, General Ralph Haines, Jr., the Army Vice Chief of Staff, joined Christopher and Murphy on a tour of the areas hit by the riot.

Federal Intervention Requested by District Authorities

General Haines described the overcrowded streets and rapidly spreading disturbance area as evidence to himself, Washington, Christopher, and Murphy that the situation warranted troops. Thus, Mayor Washington forwarded a memorandum requesting federal intervention and Haines directed that an operations center be set up in the Municipal Building. Haines concluded, "I am certain that on the basis of our recommendation, corroborated by reports from the area, the President issued his Executive Order at 4:03 P.M." The Executive Order was sent through proper channels and resulted in a
seven page letter of instruction from the Army Chief of Staff and invested in General Ralph E. Haines the authority to command troops in Washington. Haines received his written instructions at about 5:00 P.M. Born of this episode of violence and the President's Proclamation 3840, was the Continental Army Command's contingency civil disturbance unit for Washington--Task Force Washington—which, contrary to plans; was commanded by the Army Vice Chief of Staff.

Proclamation 3840 represented the President's demand for law and order in the Washington Metropolitan Area. The procedure, unchanged since the Whiskey Rebellion, entailed a request for intervention by the state legislature or executive, the mayor in the peculiar case of Washington, D.C.; an order to cease, desist, and disperse by the President of the United States to belligerents, followed by an Executive Order by the President to commit troops to the requested area. In the D.C. riots the President followed proper procedures and also brought the District of Columbia's National Guard under federal control, which vastly limited how the guard could be utilized due to the constraints of Posse Comitatus.26

Questions may arise as to why the Army appointed the Vice Chief of Staff, General Haines, to command Task Force Washington. What qualifications and experience did
Haines have that made him the Army Chief of Staff's choice? Perhaps first and foremost in the mind of the Chief of Staff was the rapidity of the escalation of violence in Washington, D.C., and the subsequent necessity to act to contain the violence before it spread even further. The Chief of Staff realized that he could not afford to wait for the XVIII Airborne Corps command and control element to deploy from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He thus turned to a seasoned veteran of proven quality and ability. Haines, a 1935 West Point graduate, was uniquely qualified, perhaps better than any other officer within the Army, for the task. First of all, he was readily available and was intimately familiar with the city, local commanders, and national and local politicians. Second, Haines, a cavalryman and four star general, had commanded troops at all but one level of command--company, battalion, regiment, division, and corps, and he had served in the Army's number two position, Vice Chief of Staff, for over a year.²⁷

At approximately 5:00 P.M. on 5 April 1968, General Haines was designated the commander of Task Force Washington, and directed to establish a headquarters at the District Metropolitan Police Station. He and his staff occupied a large conference room and two offices on the fifth-floor wing of the Municipal Building, near the offices of the chief of police and his assistants. Close
proximity to police officials simplified the liaison, the release of information, and the exchange of intelligence, and provided quicker response to mutual assistance requests.\textsuperscript{28}

General Haines' mission, set forth in the letter of instruction, was to restore and maintain law and order in the Washington metropolitan area. Under its terms, he was directly responsible to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, had authority to communicate directly with commanders of Army, Air Force, and Navy installations in his operational area, and was required to be responsive to requests from Cyrus Vance, a presidential representative. As he assumed command, General Haines also received seven pages of detailed instructions on the conduct of the operation, which directed him to use minimum force whenever possible, so long as this was consistent with accomplishing the mission. The major mission of intervening federal forces was to restore law and order to the level permitting local and non-military law enforcement officials to take over. This mission, as outlined, is mandated by Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution.

The authority to use riot control agents could be delegated to commissioned officers at General Haines' discretion and such agents were to be used to accomplish the mission in lieu of standard rifle ammunition.
Military personnel were not to load or fire their weapons except when authorized by an officer or to save their own lives. The aforementioned policies were the direct result of lessons learned from the Detroit riots of 1967, and federal officials expected them to prevent loss of life both military and civilian. The Army's aim was to minimize the use of force and to maximize restraint, while still being able to quell the disturbance and restore order. Although General Haines was directed to use force to prevent looting, strict limitations were placed on the use of firearms. The Army Chief of Staff emphasized the lack of satisfactory criteria for using weapons to stop looting, while stressing the absolute necessity of using minimum force, with weapons used only as a last resort. If weapons had to be used to stop looting, the soldiers were instructed to wound looters rather than to shoot to kill. The neutralization of snipers was potentially complicated by limitations placed on the use of weapons; this, however, did not prove to be a problem. Although federal intervention had been directed, arrests and detention remained the responsibility of local law enforcement agents, federal marshals, or Department of Justice personnel.29

Communications support for Task Force Washington consisted of telephone and radio facilities, which were installed at the Metropolitan Police headquarters.
Direct telephone lines connected Task Force Washington with the White House, Department of Justice, the Headquarters of the Military District of Washington (Task Force Inside), the Army Operations Center at the Pentagon, and the armory command post of the District of Columbia National Guard. Private telephone lines also ran to the command posts of subordinate units at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland, Bolling Air Force Base and Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., Fort Myer in Virginia, and the Anacostia Naval Air Station in Washington, D.C. Radio communications were provided by expanding the Task Force Inside radio command network to include Task Force Washington's operations center, mobile ground station, aircraft, and each major subordinate task force. A special pre-planned network of General Electric portable radios connected established headquarters with mobile stations in leased automobiles. This arrangement afforded the operations center increased range and permitted General Haines to contact his operations center from any location within the city.

Logistics representatives had the arduous task of moving and housing troops utilized in Washington, D.C. The Baltimore District of the Corps of Engineers real estate liaison representative coordinated for the use of District of Columbia school facilities by troops deployed in various precincts. Generally the troops used
gymnasiums and adjoining locker rooms for sleeping and latrine accommodations, and in some cases cafeterias for meals. These actions greatly increased troop comfort and allowed a degree of privacy not available in tent cities. Making use of such facilities allowed for well-coordinated logistical support of the deployed troops.

**Troops Arrive in D.C.**

Once the President authorized employment of both Regular Army and federalized National Guard troops in the District of Columbia, the Department of the Army took immediate necessary actions to commit forces to riot control duty. The rioting that was experienced on the evening of 4 April and during the day of 5 April had ceased, the Army's primary mission was to contain looting, protect property, and prevent any further escalation and spread of riotous activities. The first unit ordered into the District, the 2d Squadron, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, proceeded from Fort Meade to its assembly area at the United States Soldier's Home at 3:19 P.M. on 5 April. After the entire squadron had arrived at its assembly area by 4:00 P.M., the 3d and 1st Squadrons proceeded to the assembly area at 7:00 P.M. and 9:30 P.M., respectively. By 10:35 P.M., all three squadrons had been committed to riot control operations in the central city. The entire 1st Battalion
(Reinforced), 3d Infantry Regiment ("Old Guard"), entered the heart of Washington at 4:15 P.M. One company was assigned to the White House for a show of presence; one to the Capitol; and two companies to H Street, N.E., between 1st and 15th Streets, where serious disturbances had broken out. Captain Leroy Rhode, commander of D Company, 3d Infantry Regiment, recalled the sight as he led his 150-man outfit from Fort Myer, Virginia across the Memorial Bridge into the burning District of Columbia. He stated: "there I was, 26 years old, and with a hell of a responsibility, especially since those were fellow Americans we might have to face out on the streets." At the same time, the United States Marine Corps Student Battalion at Quantico, Virginia, reached its assembly area near the Naval Station Annex from which it was committed to riot control operations by 10:30 that evening. By midnight on 5 April, 6,600 troops were on guard in Washington.

The 6 April edition of the Washington Post captured the deployment of local area military units during the evening of 5 April 1968. Post reporter Robert C. Maynard reported that the sector of 14th Street was sealed-off by soldiers of the 6th Cavalry. He observed that the men were professional, firm, and courteous as they cleared the area of curfew violators. He further observed that six troops were at every intersection. Of importance to
this discussion is the readiness of those soldiers present in the city. Maynard noted that "some of the troops carried clubs in lieu of rifles. Bayonets hung on the soldiers' belts." Troops located, outside of the 13th Precinct Police Station, "in the 1600 block of V Street had bayonets fixed but sheathed on their...rifles. Magazines were not installed in the rifles." District National Guardsmen "were deployed among the city's eight fire battalions, fire alarm headquarters in the 900 block of R Street Northwest, and the headquarters of the Military District of Washington at Fort McNair" in accordance with their operations plan.33

The 91st Engineer Battalion at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, arrived in East Potomac Park by 7:15 A.M. on the morning of 6 April and by that afternoon, three of its companies were committed to riot control operations in the 1st, 2d, and 3d precincts, respectively.

A series of actions, in accordance with contingency plans, occurred simultaneously for Army's civil disturbance units earmarked for Washington, D.C. Units were in one of three categories: they were either deployed throughout the District, deploying to the District, or alerted for potential deployment to the District. Both the 544th Supply and Services Battalion at Fort Lee, Virginia, and the 714th Transportation Battalion (Railway Operations) at Fort Eustis, Virginia,
were placed on two-hour alert status at their home stations during the afternoon of 5 April and were ordered into Washington later that same day. The 544th arrived just outside of Washington, D.C., by 4:00 A.M. on 6 April. One company entered the 1st precinct by 6:40 A.M., with the remainder of the battalion in reserve at Fort Myer. The 714th Transportation Battalion arrived at Anacostia Naval Station by noon on 6 April, where it was also held in reserve. Rioting on 6 April never reached the proportions of Friday afternoon, but fires were again a major problem as arsonists set 120 more blazes. Looting occurred generally in areas not protected by police and troops. The curfew was set to begin at 4:00 P.M. on Saturday to assist authorities in establishing order before dark. Between 5:30 and 9:30 P.M. 600 people were arrested for curfew violation and ten for looting.34

Critical to any Army intervention is the role played by its military police. The military police school, located at Fort Gordon, Georgia, was the proponent for the Army's civil disturbance doctrine, as well as the trainers of Army Reserve, National Guard and civil law enforcement personnel. An essential element in the Army force structure in Washington, D.C., was the highly regarded 503d Military Police Battalion located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. At the time the 503d was alerted for deployment to Washington, D.C., its Company C, was at
Fort Gordon, conducting a scheduled demonstration of riot control techniques. Company C was alerted at 2:15 A.M. on 5 April by USCONARC to return to Fort Bragg immediately after completing its demonstration scheduled for that day. By mid-afternoon of 5 April the 503d was placed on two-hour alert at Fort Bragg even though Company C had not returned. After Company C landed at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, at 7:45 P.M., twenty-one aircraft were released for the immediate move of the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, to the Washington area. Later that evening, the Department of the Army determined that the 503d Military Police Battalion should be prepared to move up in sequence prior to the move of the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. At 1:00 A.M. on 6 April Department of the Army directed that the 503d move out immediately after the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. Although it was estimated at that time that the battalion would reach Washington by 3:00 P.M. that day, the final aircraft carrying elements of the battalion did not leave North Carolina until 3:23 P.M. This was the first of only a few missteps on the Air Force's part in the entire operation.

Why was the 503d Military Police Battalion so critical to the Army's deployment? The answer to this question is experience. The 503d had participated in riot control operations in Washington, during the Vietnam
protest at the Pentagon in October of 1967; it had
protected demonstrators and marchers in Selma, Alabama,
during racial unrest in 1965; it was the battalion sent
to Oxford, Mississippi, when James Meredith was admitted
to the University of Mississippi in 1962; and finally,
it was one of the Army's primary training outfits for
civilian law enforcement and National Guard personnel.
Naturally, there had been considerable turnover in
personnel since these other deployments, but the 503d was
one of the few military units with such institutional
experience and with such a proven record in such
crises.36

After Task Force Inside--local units within the
local D.C. metropolitan area--were committed to riot
control operations, the United States Continental Army
Command (USCONARC) began making airlift preparations to
move the brigades of the 82d Airborne Division and XVIII
Airborne Corps headquarters element to the Washington
area. Although there seemed to be sufficient forces on
the ground to meet mission requirements, one of the
recommendations that was adopted after the Detroit riot
was to saturate the area with troops. At 6:45 P.M.,
USCONARC alerted the entire 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne
Division to prepare to deploy to Washington. After the
initial alert of the two brigades from the 82nd Airborne
Division, Department of the Army directed USCONARC to
dispatch the 1st Brigade to Washington beginning at 9:00 P.M. with aircraft departing at five-minute intervals thereafter. Due to misunderstandings at both Third Army and XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, the first aircraft transporting the main body did not depart Pope Air Force Base until 11:45 P.M., approximately three hours after the time initially established for their take off. While USCONARC estimated final arrival of the entire 1st Brigade by 9:05 P.M. on 5 April, the last aircraft actually touched down at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, at 8:35 A.M. on 6 April. In the interim, Department of the Army directed 1st Brigade to proceed immediately after landing to an assembly area at Bolling Air Force Base, from which it was committed to operations in the 11th and 14th Precincts. By mid-afternoon on 6 April Washington, D.C., was the only city east of the Mississippi River where federal or federalized National Guard troops had been committed to riot control operations.

Since taking command of Task Force Washington, General Haines had spent most of his time with the troops on the streets and in coordination with civil authorities. His report of the situation, at 9:00 A.M. on 6 April was that the two large precincts east of the Anacostia River, though relatively calm at the time, might pose problems if invaded by determined looters.
Two battalions patrolling precincts 11 and 14, the 1st and 2d of the 504th Infantry Battalion of 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, were directly under Haines' command, while Task Force Inside was commanded by Major General Charles S. O'Malley, Jr. O'Malley was responsible for the city west of the river, and deployed his men as called for in the operation plan of Task Force Inside. Haines observed that federal buildings, foreign embassies and residences had not been bothered by the rioters, and that no calls for help had come from the police concerning government buildings. While the soldiers had not fired any standard rifle ammunition by this time, and no troops had been wounded by snipers, tear gas was used to force looters out of several stores and businesses. Haines closed his report with an estimate of damage. Precincts 2, 9, 10, and 13 were the hardest hit; a generally lower order of damage prevailed in Precincts 1, 5, and 11; Precinct 14 showed marginal effects; and property destruction was negligible in Precincts 3, 4, 6, and 12.40

Shortly after 7:00 A.M. on 6 April, after looting increased in Precincts 9, 12, and 13, three infantry companies were committed to Precinct 9, where crowds began to gather. The situation remained under control and reserve forces of Task Force Washington did not have to be committed. At 10:05 A.M., the 2d Brigade, 82d
Airborne, was alerted to move to Washington, D.C., following the 503d Military Police Battalion and the division’s command group to command both brigades.\textsuperscript{41}

With troops deployed in all precincts, the situation was substantially under control. As more troops arrived from Fort Bragg, General Haines was free to tour the city and inspect it from the air. After Mayor Walter E. Washington, presidential representative Cyrus Vance, and Haines inspected the city by helicopter for forty-five minutes, they returned to police headquarters to pick up John W. Heshinger, chairman of the Washington City Council, and Police Chief John S. Hughes. Then they toured Precincts 1, 2, and 10.

\textbf{FIGURE 4}

\textit{Precinct Map}\textsuperscript{42}
General Haines left the group to investigate a complaint from Senator Richard B. Russell (Democrat of Georgia) that troops deployed at the Capitol were not issued ammunition prior to assuming their positions. Finding no shortage of ammunition, Haines further discovered that each Marine, then guarding the Capitol, had been issued two full magazines of ammunition before being deployed. Senator Russell's complaint was the only Congressional criticism against Task Force Washington. At approximately 10:00 A.M. on 6 April, after the 2d Battalion, 508th Infantry, the last element of the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, arrived at Andrews, the airlift stopped. The 503d Military Police Battalion, which Haines was anxious to employ, did not arrive because the Air Force had used the same planes and pilots to lift the entire division from North Carolina to Washington, and crew fatigue, "crew rest," had become a problem. By 10:55 A.M. the operation center reported to task force headquarters that the Air Force was doing all that it could to provide an uninterrupted airlift of the 503d and the 2d Brigade to the city; General Haines could do nothing but await their arrival. Throughout the day on 6 April as the increasing presence of troops in the city began to restore law and order. As military strength grew, riot-related problems decreased. Isolated looting and fires now became the
Army's major concern coupled with an evolving new problem, as thousands of automobiles, filled with curious suburbanites, poured into the city. Many soldiers became traffic controllers as these sightseers flowed through parts of the fire-devastated sections of the city. With the 6:03 P.M., 6 April arrival of the 503d Military Police Battalion in its assembly area at Bolling Air Force Base, troop strength in the city had reached 12,000. The 503d was placed under the command of Task Force Inside to use its mobile patrols to assist the police and provide a mobile response to reports of incidents.

Along with the 503d was the headquarters for Task Force 82. Arrival of the 82d command element allowed General Haines to relinquish direct control of the 1st Brigade. At 6:00 P.M., Haines issued his second fragmentary order since assuming command of the troops in the city, which reflected the arrival of the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne, the assignment of a larger area of responsibility to Task Force 82, and the shifting of Task Force Inside units toward the western part of the city. Now given responsibility for Precincts 4, 5, 9, and 12, Task Force 82 also retained one battalion as a reserve force for Task Force Washington, while Task Force Inside was responsible for the remainder of the city. Haines directed units in Precincts 1, 2, and 3 to shift
positions to assure tactical integrity of battalion-size units.

As darkness fell on 6 April the 2d Brigade began landing at Andrews Air Force Base. At 8:30 P.M., Major General Richard J. Seitz, commanding general of the 82d Airborne Division, assumed command of the 1st Brigade from Haines. Task Force Washington had two subordinate operational headquarters--Task Force Inside and Task Force 82. By the late evening of 6 April, there were 13,600 federal troops on duty in the streets of D.C.\textsuperscript{45} While the Army's focus on Sunday, 7 April, was to maintain the order that began to return to the city on Saturday afternoon, it also assisted civil authorities in cleaning up debris along main traffic arteries and helped sanitation, grocery store, and public utility employees restore essential services in fire devastated areas. Palm Sunday parades, planned long before the disturbances, were allowed, but kept under close military observation. Traffic direction became a problem again, as even more visitors from outlying parts of the city and suburban areas glutted Washington's streets by driving into damaged sections of the city.\textsuperscript{46}

On Sunday afternoon, 7 April at 4:45 P.M., General Haines, Mayor Washington, and other city officials conferred to plan for partial restoration of normal city life.\textsuperscript{47} The resulting decisions made by Mayor Washington
included setting modified school hours, reestablishing work hours for federal and District employees, reopening businesses, and extending the curfew from 5:30 to 6:00 P.M. Mayor Washington also agreed to minimize troop requirements in District schools. Immediately after this meeting, Haines began inspecting the city and his troops. Although his 7 April report to the Army Chief of Staff stated that the police and federal military forces had worked well together, he was not so pleased about the military intelligence effort, and commented that some intelligence units' over-reporting tended to cause over-reaction on the part of the military. He also initiated a change in the mission of the federalized District of Columbia National Guard, reporting that it had been relieved from its "area responsibility" and assigned to patrol duty.48

Throughout the night of Sunday, 7 April and the early morning of the next day, additional forces landed at Andrews Air Force Base. By 9:30 A.M. on 8 April, 1,882 men from the 197th Infantry Brigade of Fort Benning, Georgia, arrived at Andrews and were sent into Baltimore, Maryland. The 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) arrived at Andrews by 6:00 P.M. On the evening of 8 April Task Force Washington issued fragmentary order number 5 directing Task Force 2/5, (2d Brigade/5th Infantry Division, Mechanized), to send one
battalion to both Task Force Inside and Task Force 82, and to prepare contingency plans for its deployment to Fairfax County, Arlington, Alexandria, and Falls Church, between the District line and the Washington Beltway. Because General Haines wanted to avoid military presence in the suburbs, reconnaissance by members of Task Force 2/5 was restricted to the District.\textsuperscript{49} Haines also had no legal authority to commit federal forces into the state of Virginia, as the state governor had not requested military intervention.

\textit{New York Times} reporter Ben A. Franklin captured the refocus in Washington, D.C., from quelling a riot to returning the city to a state of normalcy. Franklin observed that "the 48 hour ordeal of Washington's Negro section appears to be ending tonight. Attention in the capital turned to a struggle to regain a semblance of normalcy. Authorities said schools, stores, and federal agencies would open as usual tomorrow."\textsuperscript{50} Although widespread violence had subsided, tension in the District of Columbia remained until Tuesday, 9 April, when Dr. King was buried in Atlanta. No violence followed Dr. King's funeral. No large troop units arrived on 9 April, although the last units of the 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division deplaned at Andrews Air Force Base early that morning and by the evening of the 10 April federal officials considered phasing down the troop strength in
Washington. The next day was also quiet. No fires were attributed to civil disturbances and looting arrests had virtually stopped. Troop strength in Washington, D.C., reached its apex—15,530 on 10 April. Curfew hours were reduced daily until Friday 12 April, when they were eliminated altogether.

**Troops Leave Washington, D.C.**

On Friday 12 April Mayor Walter Washington wrote to the President asking for the orderly withdrawal of troops from the city. General Haines, Police Chief Layton, Mayor Washington and Public Safety Director Murphy then agreed on a plan to phase down the troops committed to Washington, D.C. Upon the President's concurrence, the plan was executed. At 3:00 P.M. on Friday 12 April General Haines relinquished command of Task Force Washington to Lieutenant General A. S. Collins, Jr. 51

On Saturday 13 April the troops began leaving the city. Calm continued during the next day, which caused the Army Chief of Staff to grant permission to release a limited number to troops. By midnight, the 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division was headed back to Fort Carson, Colorado, the 544th Supply and Services Battalion departed for Fort Lee, and two companies from the Marine Provisional Student Battalion returned to Quantico. As the 6th Cavalry departed from Washington and returned to Fort Meade, the roving patrols seen throughout the city
were the only evidence of an active military presence. By 6:00 P.M. Sunday, 14 April, the Metropolitan Fire Department had released its military guards.

On Monday, April 15th, the mayor issued a proclamation terminating the state of emergency. While officials held discussions concerning total withdrawal of troops from the city on Monday, 15 April, the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne, was pulled into an assembly area at Bolling Air Force Base. The final agreement that phased out Task Force Washington was signed by General Collins, Mayor Washington, Police Chief Layton, and Public Safety Director Murphy on the morning of 16 April. The District of Columbia National Guard units called to riot duty returned to their armories by noon, and were defederalized by midnight, while Headquarters, Task Force Washington, closed out its affairs at noon, and Headquarters, Task Force Inside, closed out at midnight. Thus federal military assistance ended at noon, April 16, 1968, twelve days after it began.52
Ben W. Gilbert, *Ten Blocks from the White House: Anatomy of the Washington Riots of 1968* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 44. This book is a synthesis of the *Washington Post* coverage of the Washington riots. Gilbert, who was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper, and the staff members of the newspaper examined all the reporter accounts of the riots and produced an hour by hour, day by day account of what transpired. The book also covers the Poor People's Campaign and provides in-depth interviews taken with residents of the riot area five months after the riots.

2 Ibid., 5.


9 Department of the Army, After Action Report, 4-17 April Civil Disturbances, 13 August 1968, 17, File 103, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, D.C., (henceforth, RG 319, NA).


15 Ibid., 19.


19 Ibid., 44.


21 Military District of Washington Message Number 6814, the Commanding General, Military District of Washington to Commanding General United States Continental Army Command, 051650Z April 68, Subject: M ও W Situation Report (SITREP) 01/051200Z April 68, File 103, RG 319, NA.

22 Minutes of the District of Columbia Council Special Meeting, 8 April 1968, 12:00 P.M., File 103, RG 319, NA.


24 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Memorandum For Record, Subject: Interview with Investigators from Senator John L. McClellan's Senate Government Operations Committee, Inquiry on Riots. interview taken at 1000 hours, 24 April 1968, between Messengers Dunne and Morgan, Investigative Staff for Senator McClellan's Government Operations Committee, and General Haines, Vice Chief of Staff and Commanding General Task Force Washington, 4. See also Memorandum to
the President of the United States from the Mayor, Director of Public Safety, and the Chief of Police, of the District of Columbia, Subject: Request for Federal Troops to Restore Order in Washington, D.C., dated 5 April 1968. File 103, RG 319, NA.

25 Ibid.

26 It is important to note that National Guard forces under state control are not bound by the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. The D.C. Guard, under the control of the District mayor, could operate as "special police", possessing the same authority to enforce laws, arrest, and detain law breakers as their civil law enforcement counterparts.

27 The biographical information on General Ralph Edward Haines, Jr., was extracted from the West Point Register of Graduates and Former Cadets (New York: Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy, 1992), 279.

28 Department of the Army Message Number 858668, From: Chief of Staff, To: Vice Chief of Staff, 060139Z April 1968, Subject: Designation to Command Task Force, 2, File 103, RG 319, NA.

29 Ibid., 1-7. This entry is a brief synopsis of the letter of instruction issued to General Haines as he assumed command of Task Force Washington.
Missions assigned to the District of Columbia National Guard were oriented toward providing static security of certain critical installations and protecting fire-fighting forces. Installations assigned to the D.C. Guard were its own facilities, the D.C. Armory, and the maintenance and supply facilities, which included ammunition and ration storage at Camp Simms. Both of these facilities had been thought likely targets during a civil disturbance because of the weapons and ammunition stored there.


United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC), Emergency Operations Center Journals, 4-6 April 1968. Information is also found in the USCONARC After Action Report—Civil Disturbances, April 1968, copy located in the Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.

See Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, 90.
Message Number 2709, Commander-in-Chief, Strike Command (CINCSTRIKE), to Commander-in-Chief, Army Strike Command (CINCARSTRIKE), and Commander-in-Chief, Air Force Strike Command (CINCAFSTRIKE), 060230Z April 68, Subject: Garden Plot, File 103, RG 319, NA.

Message Number 55378, CG, USCONARC to CG, Third Army, 060128Z April 68, Subject: Movement of Troops, File 103, RG 319, NA.

Jean R. Moenk, "USCONARC--Participation in the Suppression of Civil Disturbances, April 1968," (Fort Monroe, Virginia: USCONARC, October 1968), 52, copy located in File, USCONARC-2, Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.


Ibid., 24.

Gilbert, Ten Blocks from the White House, 44.

Ibid.

Ibid. "Crew rest" refers to the number of hours of rest required by air crews for the safe operation of military aircraft.

Ibid., 25. All strength figures, during the troop buildup and phase down, of Task Force Washington are extracted from the Task Force Washington, After Action Report. See also Department of the Army, After Action Report, 4-17 April Civil Disturbances, 13 August 1968 and
Jean R. Moenk, "USCONARC--Participation in the Suppression of Civil Disturbances."

47 Ibid., 35.
48 Area responsibility refers to static security of fixed facilities.
49 Ibid., 32.
51 Haines relinquished command to assume duties as the acting Army Chief of Staff.
52 Dates and times of phase down and redeployment of Task Force Washington Units extracted from Task Force Washington After Action Report, 34-36.
CHAPTER IV

EVALUATING THE ARMY'S PERFORMANCE

The Army's performance in quelling the Washington, D.C. riots should be measured against the standards outlined in *Field Manual 19-15: Civil Disturbances and Disasters*; while their actions should be measured against those taken by National Guardsmen while quelling the Detroit riots in 1967. How did the Army as a total entity learn from and incorporate the lessons from the 1967 Detroit riots? How did demonstration of restraint, as evidenced by weapons discipline, reduce occurrence of death inflicted by military personnel? What was the role of doctrine and how did it affect the outcome of the April 1968 riots? Furthermore, how did Army doctrine affect civil/military relations; psychological operations; training and preparation? Finally, the chapter will provide an examination of the lessons learned from the D.C. riots and their incorporation into future civil disturbance planning and doctrine.

Statistics

The aftermath of the Washington, D.C., riots of 1968 reveals that the Army had learned numerous lessons from the 1967 Detroit riots and had incorporated them into its civil disturbance training. Chief amongst the revelations was the evidence of restraint by military
forces with regard to the death toll, control of violence, and application of deadly force—that is, of how much ammunition had been expended.

**TABLE 1**
Comparative Statistical Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>WASH, D.C.</th>
<th>BALTIMORE</th>
<th>CHICAGO</th>
<th>DETROIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire Incidents</td>
<td>(1,243)</td>
<td>(1,208)</td>
<td>(213)</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td>(7,640)</td>
<td>(5,504)</td>
<td>(3,124)</td>
<td>(7,200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Deaths</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Deaths</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoke Inhalation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Victims</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunshot by Civilian Authorities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunshot by Military Authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and Firemen Deaths</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chicago deaths not broken down by category, but no deaths were caused by military.
**Data available in dollar amounts.

Table 1 illustrates that the combined death toll of the three major riots following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in which troops were federalized was twelve less than the death toll in Detroit alone. When comparing the death toll of Washington, D.C., with that of Detroit we see a reduction in loss of life of 302 percent. This table also depicts a 47 percent improvement in the civil/military authorities' management
of violence, with injuries decreasing from 2,250 in Detroit to 1,201 in Washington, D.C. Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of federal forces in Washington, D.C., is evidenced in Table 2.

**TABLE 2**

Ammunition Expenditure By Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>WASH, D.C.</th>
<th>BALTIMORE</th>
<th>CHICAGO</th>
<th>DETROIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CS Grenades</td>
<td>5,248</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>0**</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bullets)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0**</td>
<td>156,391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not available.

**See note.

Table 2 depicts unequivocally the results of months of intensified training by the Army in the wake of its fiasco in Detroit. The Army expended a total of twelve rounds of M-16 and two rounds of .45 caliber ammunition in Washington, D.C. In Detroit, federal forces expended 156,391 rounds of .50 and .60 caliber machine gun, M-1 rifle, and .45 caliber pistol ammunition. The D.C. expenditure equates to only one round fired for every 11,171 rounds fired in Detroit. This table illustrates that a total of only sixteen rounds were expended in the three cities where federal troops were employed during the post-King assassination riots in April of 1968.
The Army's response in Washington, D.C., placed greater emphasis on human life than it did on property. An 8 April 1968 article in the *Washington Post* asserted that "on balance, the first judgment has to be that they [soldiers] have served the city handsomely... Human life has been valued ahead of property." Whereas restraint was the focus of the Army and the Metropolitan Police Department, several local proprietors criticized that the lack of force by civil and military authorities was viewed as an invitation for continued looting and burning. *Washington Star* reporter Barry Kalb wrote that "many businessmen in the primary riot areas have complained that neither the city nor Federal Government provided adequate protection for private property during the height of the looting and burning." Numerous complaints surfaced from businessmen as well as Congressmen concerning what appeared to be a condoning of looting by civil and military authorities—Senator Strom Thurmond (Democrat of South Carolina), Representatives William Jennings Bryan Dorn (Democrat of South Carolina), Thomas N. Abernethy (Democrat of Mississippi), Basil L. Whitener and Roy A. Taylor, (both Democrats of North Carolina), led the attack from Capitol Hill.

**Doctrine**

Did federal troops perform their mission in accordance with the procedures outlined in *Field Manual*
Civil Disturbances and Disasters (henceforth FM 19-15)? Were the lessons learned from the disturbance in Detroit integrated into doctrine? The answers to the aforementioned questions are positive. The Army's doctrine, as outlined in FM 19-15, is very explicit on the conduct of operations, to include planning, training, operational technique, and tactics. Evidence reveals that FM 19-15 was a working document--units were basing their training and preparations on the manual--thus, units were intimately familiar with its contents and procedures when the final draft was published. Critical amongst the numerous aspects emphasized in FM 19-15 that were very evident in Washington, D.C., were restraint, discipline, and psychological factors.

According to Robin Higham, the Army underwent a metamorphosis after the Detroit riots. Higham describes the Army's "swing to sophisticated equipment and improved chemicals (mace), and then back again to the fundamental rules governing the handling of human situations. . . . Emphasis was placed on the psychological effect of providing sufficient to even overwhelming, force to cow potential trouble makers before they got out of hand."
TABLE 3

Number of Troops Deployed during Civil Disturbance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>WASH, D.C.</th>
<th>BALTIMORE</th>
<th>CHICAGO</th>
<th>DETROIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Duty</td>
<td>13,682</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>2,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>6,943</td>
<td>9,913</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,530</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,086</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,978</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,613</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 illustrates Higham's contention of the psychological effects of an overwhelming force. We see a 39 percent increase in the troop strength from the force employed on the streets of Detroit, to that which was deployed to Washington, D.C. The importance of the psychological advantage and the tactical employment of troops in civil disturbance operations was observed by D.C. resident William Cavanaugh. He recounted:

> The police came marching up 14th street to try to show force—to gain a psychological advantage, but their strategy was way off. They were all marching in a group in the same direction. One man could have wiped them all out. When the Army came in it was a different story. I wanted to get off the streets. I didn't want to deal with the Army. They sent a jeep down the street fast at first, and then three companies marching doubletime. You knew they were there. That's psychological effect!8

After studying the riots of Detroit and Newark, the Army focused on ceasing the blood-letting, thus adopting very restrictive policies on the use of life threatening...
weapons. The doctrine called for a shift in focus away from conventional Army weapons, such as machine guns and M-16 rifles, towards weapons that would minimize the loss of life, such as shotguns armed with buckshot, and tear gas grenades and canisters. Brigadier General (Retired) John Burk (the brigade commander of the National Guard forces deployed in Baltimore in April of 1968) later confirmed that absolute weapons' restraint was not only highly encouraged, but demanded. He further stated that "Detroit was a perfect example of what not to do...if you fired ammunition after the extensive training undergone (physically, tactically, and psychologically) after Detroit, you failed!" The George Washington Law Review applauded the military commanders abilities to maintain tight discipline and control over their troops. Of the military's performance in D.C. a commentary in the review stated:

The planning and preparation of the National Guard and the active military units which participated in quelling the April disturbances must be rated as near perfect. The military drew from its experiences in the riots of Detroit, Newark and elsewhere in recent years to formulate elaborate plans and provide specialized training in riot control. In addition, the military's special relation to the Nation's Capital and the previous experience of the military in working with civilian officials of the District increased the ability of military units to efficiently restore order.
The commentary also gave high marks to the Pentagon's overall response, characterizing it as extraordinarily thorough.

The Army also received high marks from another unlikely source--Capitol Hill. Senator Robert Byrd (Democrat of West Virginia), who criticized the Army for not making arrests, requested that federal troops remain in the District indefinitely. He stated, "if Washington is to be subjected to a summer campaign of demonstrations, as has long been planned, the presence of federal troops will be reassuring." Senator Wayne Morse (Democrat of Oregon) noted that D.C. police, fire-fighters, and federal troops were a shining example. Senate District Committee Chairman Alan Bible (Democrat of Nevada) commended city officials, and civil and military authorities for their outstanding performance during a difficult time.11

Task Force Washington also received high marks from President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secre of Defense Clark Clifford. According to the Army Times, the President stated:

During those days . . . military commanders and their superbly prepared men carried out their orders with calm professionalism . . . As the Commander in Chief I am particularly proud of the expeditious manner in which this mission was accomplished. The effectiveness of the wise and restrained use of force is attested by the fact that law and order were restored in each city without a single fatality caused by Federal and National Guard troops.12
District Fire Chief Henry Galotta paid a great compliment to the troops deployed as well, stating "before the troops arrived his men were apprehensive about going out, but with the troops here they did not mind." Task Force Washington commander, General Ralph E. Haines, later returned the compliment by saying, "we [the Army] have adopted the firemen and I believe they have adopted us."13

**Equipment**

During the nine-month period following the Detroit disturbances, both civilian and military authorities procured and developed new weapons for use in civil disturbance operations. According to *U.S. & World Report*, the Army developed a number of special weapons specifically for riot control duty. These weapons included reels of barbed steel tape which would be used as an anti-personnel obstacle; foam and foam sprayers which "could lay down a five-foot layer of foam the width of a 200-foot street"; a gas-powered paint shooting pistol which could potentially mark agitators for apprehension on sight; dart and injector weapons to fire tranquilizers; and cattle prods to control crowds.14 There is no evidence that shows employment of any of these new developments during the D.C. riots.

**Lessons Learned**

Allan R. Millett describes the paradigm of the
"Military Utilitarian" in his unpublished article, "Clio and Mars as Pards." Lessons learned in this article serve the principal purpose of identifying deficiencies, taking corrective actions, and, thus, preventing similar mistakes in future operations. The riot control operation in Washington was a tremendous success for the Army and Federal Government. The operation demonstrated that the Army—with its Task Study Group and intensified planning and training—and the Federal Government, with the Kerner Commission, could be responsive. More importantly, the authorities realized that their policies and practices required revamping.

The role of federal troops in quelling the civil unrest in Washington, D.C., in April of 1968, though highly successful, was not without errors and problems. First, amongst the problems encountered by Task Force Washington was with the staffing of its headquarters. Contingency plans called for a 150-man command and control element from the XVIII Airborne Corps located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The rapid escalation of violence on the streets of the nation's capital necessitated hasty action and thus causing the Army Chief of Staff to draw manpower from the Department of the Army Staff in the Pentagon. The failure on the part of the Army rested in the area of augmentation. The Task Force Washington Headquarters operated during the entire
operation with only one-sixth of the manpower and resources mandated by contingency plans. Whereas this austere group did a yeoman's job of command and control during its twelve days of operation, perhaps it would have been a better course of action to give the ad hoc staff interim control of Task Force Washington while the headquarters element of the XVIII Airborne Corps was deploying. Deploying the larger staff would have inevitably resulted in better command and control, better record keeping, more accurate reporting, depth in expertise, eight to twelve hour shifts for staff personnel, and, most essential, execution of the plan by its author, the staff of XVIII Airborne Corps.

The Washington, D.C., riots also revealed what was potentially a major problem area--operations outside of Washington, D.C., proper. The District of Columbia metropolitan area includes portions of two neighboring states, Virginia and Maryland. Whereas, the mayor of Washington, and the governor of Maryland had requested federal intervention, the governor of Virginia did not. Thus, federal troops and, or the President, had no legal basis or authority for entering of Virginia without the application of the legislative or executive branches of the Virginia government. The Army's After Action Report requested that the contingency plan for Washington consider provisions to cope with this possibility in any future operations.
Another problem was USCONARC's phased deployment plan called for operations in three distinct phases: preparation and deployment; employment, and redeployment. During the deployment phase "lines of authority and command relationships were not clear." The Task Force Washington After Action Report states that the problem began upon a unit's arrival at Andrews Air Force Base. "In some cases, units were attached less operational control, in other cases they were assigned but not to be employed without permission." The report further recommended clarity in the operations order as the optimal solution for delineating command, administrative support, and logistical support roles. The report also revealed a lack of standardized incident reports—by type and format.

On the other hand, in regard to tactical action, troops found chemical control agents an extremely effective tool for dispersing crowds. However, soldiers discovered that the M7A3 (cannister shaped) grenade would ignite and thus start fires; whereas the M25A2 (baseball shaped) grenade was not a fire hazard. This problem was further complicated because soldiers preferred the M7A3 grenade because it held a higher concentration and higher volume of chemical agent. Troops also found CS (tear gas) crystals an effective deterrent for looters in unprotected damaged buildings.
General Haines and the leadership of Task Force Washington stressed a number of factors as a result of the Army's experience in the District of Columbia. First was the importance of prior planning, coordination, and liaison with local police, firemen, and National Guardsmen. Task Force leaders also emphasized the continued importance of establishing and enforcing a curfew, the use of helicopters for command and control, the use of buses in transporting troops. Finally, leaders stressed the significance of a positive attitude, professional appearance, and strict discipline and control of the troops on duty.

Suffice it to conclude that with the end of riot operations in Washington, D.C., the Army was able to breathe a major sigh of relief. Its monumental efforts in planning and training for active and National Guard forces and its insistence on restraint and the use of minimum force paid dividends, not only in Washington, D.C., but in Chicago and Baltimore during the same period. The lessons learned from Washington, D.C., were distributed to units throughout the Army so that others could benefit from Task Force Washington's successes and failures. The March 1968 edition of FM 19-15 was not superceded until March of 1975. A review of its table of contents reveals numerous changes. However, close scrutiny of these changes shows that they are more likely the result of post-April 1968 civil unrest. Substantial
changes in the 1972 edition of **FM 19-15** include sections on labor disorders, campus disorders, urban demonstrations, and the introduction of the riot baton as a weapon of choice during riot control operations.
Chicago, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C., data was extracted from the Department of the Army After Action Report, 4-17 April Civil Disturbances dated 13 August 1968, 12, 15-16, File 103, located in Record Group 319, National Archives (henceforth RG 319, NA). Detroit data was extracted from the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disturbances Report (henceforth Kerner Report), 60-61, and 66.

The data in Table 2 is representative of the ammunition expenditure of federalized troops—Regular Army and National Guard under federal control—only. The Illinois National Guard was conducting riot control operations for almost 48 hours before they were federalized. During this 48 hour period the Illinois National Guard expended 395 rounds of small arms ammunition and 63 tear gas grenades. Data on Illinois National Guard extracted from Jean R. Moenk, "USCONARC--Participation in the Suppression of Civil Disturbances, April 1968," (Fort Monroe, Virginia: USCONARC, October 1968), 52, copy located in File, USCONARC-2, Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.


Elsie Carper, "Byrd Wants Troops to Stay; Police-Aid Pacts Suggested," *Washington Post*, 9 April 1968, sec. A, p. 5. Perhaps these Southern conservative Congressmen. They had witnessed "business as usual" in their own states undermined by the protests of Dr. Martin Luther King and his followers.


Telephone interview, 18 May 1993, Brigadier General (Retired) John Burk with the author. General Burk served as the commander of the 3d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division Pennsylvania National Guard. He also served as
the G-3 (Operations Officer) of the 29th Infantry Division and as the assistant division commander of the 28th Infantry Division.


14 This entry is a summation of "A New Look At New Weapons to Cope With Riots," *U.S. News & World Report* 64 (January 1, 1968), 6-7.

15 Lines of authority and command relationships refers to the level of control that one command exercises over a subordinate command. Command relations consist of assigned, attached, operational control, operational command.

16 Task Force Washington, After Action Report, 4-16 April 1968, 39, File 103, RG 319, NA.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This thesis has considered six critical areas: 1) the Army and the Federal Government's actions following their subpar performance during the Detroit riots; 2) published U.S. Army doctrine on civil disturbances; 3) readiness and preparation of active and National Guard units assigned to Task Force Washington; 4) procedures and legal basis for federalizing forces; 5) public opinion towards the use of federal troops to suppress domestic disorder; and 6) an evaluation of the After Action Reports—how forces performed in comparison with stated objectives.

This thesis also has assessed the evidence and answered four essential questions. Did federal troops perform their mission in accordance with the policies outlined in Field Manual 19-15: Civil Disturbances and Disasters? Was the use of federal troops considered as a last resort by the mayor of Washington, D.C., before he asked the president for assistance? Was "Garden Plot" a contingency plan that identified specific units and command and control structures, or was it an ad hoc amalgamation that met the military's needs at the time? Finally, in what ways, if any, was the Regular Army better prepared for intervention than the National Guard?
The prevalent view of historians of the era, such as Robin Higham, Martin Blumenson, Robert Coakley, and Paul Scheips, was that the Regular Army was better suited for this unpopular mission than the National Guard, based on such factors as training, discipline, cohesion, mission orientation, and, most importantly, the fact that an integrated Regular Army was not a reflection of a segregated society. However, the Washington riots indicates that the District of Columbia's National Guard was very well trained and equally prepared for the task as the active duty forces employed in the nation's capital during the April 1968 disturbances.

The evidence also revealed that twenty-six percent of the D.C. National Guard were Negroes. Race was a considered as a major contributing factor by Martin Blumenson in his assessment of the Detroit riots in 1967. He argued that the 98.7 percent Caucasian Michigan National Guard was perceived as being representative of the segregated majority and thus fostered the same prejudices as the larger society. Blumenson, Adam Yarmolinsky, and Roger Beaumont are in concert on the issue of race and the potential positive impact that an integrated Michigan National Guard could have made. Whereas it is difficult to assess the impact that the integrated D.C. National Guard may have had on the
revolting citizens, Star reporter Thomas Oliver noted that the presence of Negro soldiers was reassuring to him personally.²

Perhaps the greatest revelation from the D.C. riots lies within an examination of the question: Why were federal forces successful in Washington, D.C.? Success in part can be directly attributed to the "Five P Principle"—prior planning prevents poor performance. The riot control components of the Army (active and National Guard) as a result of a poor showing in Detroit, and the subsequent recommendations of the Army Task Group and the Kerner Commission, had conducted significant and focused training, implemented refined procedures, and developed plans that affixed responsibilities to designated units for riot control operations in specified cities.

In February of 1968 the Army initiated, by the direction of the Army Chief of Staff, the "Senior Officers Civil Disturbance Orientation Course" (SEADOC).³ During the period of February 1968 to April 1969 the Army trained over 2,000 active and reserve commissioned officers (lieutenant colonel and above), 982 National Guard personnel and 1,200 civil law enforcement officers. Additionally, the Regular Army took the lead in training the reserves, National Guard, and civilian law enforcement agencies in civil disturbance operations. A
February 1968 account in the *Washington Daily News* captured the extensive training undertaken by the District of Columbia National Guard and the Metropolitan Police Department to prepare for any eventuality in the spring or summer of 1968:

Squads of policemen received extensive training in marksmanship, procedures for dealing with snipers without indiscriminate firepower—as done in Newark and Detroit in 1967—and training in crowd control, alert procedures, and establishment of a communications center. Key members of the District of Columbia National Guard were attending anti-riot training at the Military Police School located at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

District Guardsmen had additionally undergone extensive unit training since the summer of 1967. They had conducted twelve hours of riot control training prior to annual field training 1967 and another seventy-two hours during annual training 1967, which included a twenty-four hour field training exercise for each unit in a realistic riot environment, twenty hours of staff training, and another twenty-eight hours of training during the period October to April. The Guard also performed eight hours of actual riot duty during the 21–22 October 1967 Vietnam demonstrations at the Pentagon. The entire D.C. National Guard had undergone a 32 hour riot control refresher course only a month before King's assassination. The District Guardsmen additionally, made detailed reconnaissance and
coordination for all security missions assigned in contingency plans which included utilities, bridges, the National Guard Armory, Camp Sims, and the police headquarters.\(^5\)

Another aspect of planning and preparation that contributed to the success of federal troops was their familiarity with the riot area. The operations plan for Washington, D.C., (OPLAN Cabin Guard), assigned specific units to specific police precincts. In February and March of 1968 officers of each of these units toured their assigned precincts with Washington police officials.\(^6\) An account in the *Washington Daily News* further elaborates on the fact that federal forces were no strangers in the District for riot duty: "some troops knew the names and faces of the policemen they'd be working with, and the neighborhoods where they'd be stationed."\(^7\)

The violence and lack of restraint of the Guardsmen that prevailed in Detroit and Newark during the summer of 1967 was almost nonexistent in the professional soldiers that guarded the streets of Washington, D.C. The Army's training after Detroit provided cities with well-prepared, excellent military units, with strong professional-soldier traditions, units trained in the latest riot-control techniques, which emphasized restraint in the use of physical force. The soldiers'
restraint was reciprocated by the populace. According to a *Washington Evening Star* reporter who was also a soldier in the District of Columbia National Guard, "I was struck by something no one had suggested was possible during all of our civil disturbance training—the friendly attitude of people living under what almost amounted to military occupation. People gave us coffee and food, greeted us on the streets with a 'how're you doing?' Kids, hundreds of kids, pointed to us and waved, and we waved back."  

The troops of the 82d Airborne Division received a little rest and relaxation as they were entertained by youths from Richmond, Virginia. U.S. Senator Wayne Morse (Democrat of Oregon), praised the police department and federal troops for "keeping violence in check and the death toll down by treating human beings with restraint... he concluded the police, fire department, and federal troops were a shining example."  

The Army's success in Washington, D.C., was the direct result of preparation and training—not for a riot—for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference Poor Peoples Campaign scheduled for 22 April 1968 in Washington, D.C. Thus, the units assigned to Task Force Inside, which were all units stationed within the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, had undergone a series of field training exercises and command post exercises in preparation for crowd control during the
Poor People's Campaign. This preparation and Task Force Inside's resultant high level of preparedness caused the violence in Washington to be quelled after three days.

George C. Marshall's words, "We cannot train without planning and we cannot teach without preparation," epitomize the Army's post-Detroit civil disturbance efforts. The Army and National Guard had redeemed themselves and had contributed significantly to civilian law enforcement agencies increased readiness. Perhaps the role of federal troops in quelling the Washington, D.C., riots of 1968 is best described in a 17 April 1968 memorandum from the under-secretary of the Army to the Army's Chief of Staff: Under Secretary David McGiffert wrote:

With the withdrawal of troops yesterday from Washington and defederalization at midnight of the D.C. National Guard, the direct participation of Federal military forces in controlling the recent civil disorders has ended. I want to take this occasion to express my appreciation and congratulations to you and to all the personnel of the active Army and of the National Guard who played a part in this effort. The task was a difficult one; the response was magnificent. The extensive work which had been done in the six months previous to these disorders to improve training and to perfect planning paid tremendous dividends. Even more important, the disciplined and restrained approach adopted by the military forces contributed very significantly to bringing the disorders rapidly under control without substantial loss of life and without creating a legacy of bitterness which could only serve to stimulate further unrest. The citizens of our country can be rightly proud of this achievement.
Reflections

A close examination of the two and one half days of chaos and twelve days of military occupation of the nation's capital in April of 1968 raises several questions. Such as: Was the assassination of Martin Luther King the cause or the catalyst of the D.C. riots? Were the D.C. riots racially or socially motivated? And finally, does the Federal Government need to rethink the Posse Comitatus Act?

Was the assassination of Martin Luther King the cause or the catalyst of the D.C. riots? Obviously, there is not a simple yes or no answer to this question. However, there is considerable evidence on both sides of the debate. Marion Barry, Washington, D.C., resident and Negro leader, emphatically stated that "King's death didn't really cause this stuff. The riots were without any stated purpose or goal. No demands were made."

Barry further stated, "oh, probably some understood who King was and what was going on, but a lot of guys out there in the street didn't." Mary McGrory likewise concluded that the D.C. riots had nothing to do with King's death. She asserted, "even the most ivory-skulled racist knows that what happened here [Washington, D.C.] had nothing to do with Martin Luther King." Perhaps the best advocate of the King-as-a-catalyst school is Washington Evening Star staff writer Michael Adams.
Adams contended that the sentiment for riot had been festering for a while. He stated that "this has been building up for a long time . . . there is this deep seated resentment . . . the looting and burning didn't come as much of a surprise. The whole thing goes back to the resentment . . . the pent up emotion." 14

On the other side of this issue is Richard Sanger, a leading analyst on uprisings in America and abroad, who stated during an interview with U.S. News & World Report unequivocally that the April 1968 riots were the direct result of King's assassination. He asserted that "the violence began out of the spontaneous anger of Negro people to Dr. King's death--the loss of a soul brother. Then it continued, partly as a looting spree and partly because it was fanned by extremists." 15 The marginal caption of a contemporary article in U.S. News & World Report captured the essence of many of the subscribers to the King-assassination-as-cause school. The caption reads: "A single shot by an assassin sent a shock wave across the nation. Overnight, the race issue took on a new dimension. Fearsome events tumbled over each other in the wake of the death of Martin Luther King, preacher of nonviolence." 16 Daniel Williamson, a Caucasian high school student who was actually in the riot corridor, contended that the riots would not have occurred if had King not been assassinated. He recalled walking back to
his hotel from the Smithsonian during the late evening of initial violence. However, he did not feel that his personal safety was in danger as he walked down 14th Street, thus race was not the issue. Williamson felt that the violence was the direct result of King's assassination.17

So, what is the truth? Were the D.C. riots the direct of King's assassination, or was his murder the catalyst for the unrest? The answer rests, in biographer Leon Edel's words, in the evidence in the reverse of the tapestry—in an examination of factors behind the scenes.

What about the race issue? Was the violence in Washington racially or socially motivated? Could racial and social factors in the District of Columbia be considered synonymous? An examination of the post-riot figures would incline one to believe that racial and social hostilities were both factors in Washington. A review of the riot fatalities reveals that only two of the thirteen victims were Caucasians, one of which may not have been riot-related.18 A review of the bail bondsmen's records, which recorded factors such as race, income, education, employment status, occupation, and sex illustrates that the violence, looting, and destruction was not, as Richard Sanger alluded, confined to only black residents.19
Much of the criticism of federal troops and police employed in Washington, centered around arresting looters and too much restraint from using force. Much of this criticism evolved from U.S. Senators and members of Congress. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 precludes federal military forces from enforcing laws and arresting civilians. Perhaps it is time to revise the provisions of Posse Comitatus? Truly the events transpiring in the 1860's and 1870's—the claim of interference in elections, the complaints over imposing loyalty oaths on the citizenry, and the apparent personal use of military forces by local, state, and national politicians and business leaders—are not in existence today. Military forces under federal control are severely limited in what they can and cannot do. The soldier employed under federal control, as stated by Lewis Zickel, "is there merely to restore order, just that and no more. He is not there to overwhelm, to crush or to teach a lesson to the rioter." Zickel concludes: "It is not the soldier's job to judge the justice or injustice of the situation."20

On the other hand, the National Guard, which is a state controlled organization, is not bound by the provisions of Posse Comitatus as long as it is under state control. Under the provisions of Section 4-133 of the D.C. Code, the District of Columbia National
Guardsmen have "all the powers, responsibilities, and duties of privates of the Metropolitan Police Department" when sworn in a special police in suburban jurisdictions.21

Suffice it to conclude that compromise may be in order to reach a medium where the application of force is neither encouraged or condoned by the President, the Congress, or the military. After the fiasco in Detroit the entire Army--Regular and National Guard--was very gun shy. Even in Chicago, where the mayor instructed police to shoot arsonists and looters on sight, federal troops did not fire a shot. The apparent post-Detroit consensus, that violence by the military must be kept to an absolute minimum, proved not so apparent after all. Several politicians and businessmen criticized the military for their over-emphasis on restraint against looters and arsonists.

The Army Chief of Staff's selection of General Ralph E. Haines as the Task Force Washington commander proved to be a very prudent choice. Haines worked closely with civil authorities. He proved equally adept at handling the inquiries of senators and congressmen and fostering a close working relationship with District city officials, while staying abreast of the military situation. Following his assignment in Washington, Haines was selected as the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army
Pacific Command. He served his final tour of duty as the Commanding General of the United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC)--the command responsible for civil disturbance operations and planning.  

The Army's performance in quelling the civil unrest that shook the very foundation of Washington, D.C., though not flawless, was a monumental success. Not only did the Army quickly restore order to the city, but it also served as a calming presence for both protagonist and antagonist. The Army's performance also reconfirmed its reliability in a role performed with scattered success since the 1790's. April of 1968 found the military fully capable of accomplishing its oath to support and defend the Constitution against the foreign and domestic enemy. Once again, the Army had proven itself to be, as Samuel Huntington noted, "the country's general servant, well-disciplined, obedient, performing civil functions."
2 Ibid.
3 SEADOC, the Senior Officer Civil Defense Orientation Course was taught at the Army's Military Police School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. SEADOC provides a medium for review of broad civil disturbance policies and procedures, problems and resources by civil officials from priority metropolitan areas and military officials involved in civil disturbance planning and operations. It prepares civil disturbance mission unit personnel for command, supervision, and planning duties in connection with commitment of civil police, Army National Guard and Regular Army to civil disturbance operations.
5 District of Columbia, National Guard, Task Force Goblet Glass, After Report 5-16 April 68, 14 May 1968, located in File 103, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
8 Thomas, "Guard Found Duty Rough, sec. B, p. 43.
10 David E. McGiffert, Department of the Army, Office of the Under Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, dated 17 April 1968, located in File 103, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
12 Clopton and Sims, "D.C. Turns to Mammoth Relief," p. 11.


17 Personal interview with Lieutenant Colonel Daniel C. Williamson on 12 February 1993. He was visiting Washington with the junior class of A. L. Brown High School from Kannapolis, North Carolina.


21 Memorandum entitled "Using D.C. National Guardsmen as Special Police In Surrounding Suburban Areas," not dated, in File 103, RG 319, NA.

22 Biographical information on General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., was extracted from the *West Point Register of Graduates and Former Cadets* (New York: Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy, 1992), 279.
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APPENDIX A

SPECIAL ORDERS GIVEN TO SOLDIERS ENGAGED IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS\(^1\)
1. Carry out your assigned duties in a military manner and present a neat military appearance at all times. Be sure that everything you do reflects credit upon your country, the military service, your unit, and yourself.

2. Have regard for the human rights of all persons. Be as courteous toward civilians as possible under the circumstances. Do not mistreat anyone or withhold medical attention from anyone needing it. Do not damage property unnecessarily.

3. Use only the minimum amount of force required to accomplish your mission and, if necessary, to defend yourself. When under the control of an officer, you will load or fire your weapon only on his orders. When not under the control of an officer, you will load or fire your weapon only when required to protect your own life or the lives of others, to protect specified property designated as vital to public health or safety, or to prevent the escape of persons endangering life or vital facilities; you are not authorized to use firearms to prevent offenses which are not likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, nor endanger public health or safety.

4. When firing is necessary, shoot to wound, not to kill.

5. When possible, let civilian police arrest lawbreakers. But when assistance is necessary or in the absence of the civil police, you have the duty and the authority to take lawbreakers into custody. Take such persons to the police or designated military authorities as soon as possible. Cooperate fully with the police by safeguarding evidence and completing records as instructed.

6. Allow properly identified news reporters freedom of movement, so long as they do not interfere with the mission of your unit.
7. Do not talk about this operation or pass on information or rumors about it to unauthorized person; refer all civilians who ask for information about what you are doing to your commanding officer.

8. Become familiar with these special orders, and carry this card on your person at all times when engaged in civil disturbance operations.
APPENDIX B

TASK ORGANIZATION TASK FORCE WASHINGTON$^2$
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Home Station</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Headquarters</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>GEN Haines</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force 82</td>
<td>(4,901)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force Headquarters</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>MG Seitz</td>
<td>Ft. Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde, 82d Abn Div</td>
<td>1,945</td>
<td>COL Roop</td>
<td>Ft. Bragg, NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde, 82d Abn Div</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>COL Carley</td>
<td>Ft. Bragg, NC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Student Battalion</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>LTC Mooney</td>
<td>Quantico, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Inside</td>
<td>(6,689)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Headquarters</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>MG O'Malley</td>
<td>Ft. McNair, VA</td>
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<td>1st Battalion, 3d Infantry</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>COL Conmy</td>
<td>Ft. Myer, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Armored Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>COL Gompf</td>
<td>Ft. Meade, MD</td>
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<tr>
<td>91st Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>LTC Smith</td>
<td>Ft. Belvoir, VA</td>
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<tr>
<td>716th Transportation Group</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>LTC Conroy</td>
<td>Ft. Eustis, VA</td>
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<td>503d Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>LTC Adair</td>
<td>Ft. Bragg, NC</td>
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<td>544th Supply &amp; Services Battalion</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>LTC Cronin</td>
<td>Ft. Lee, VA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force Reserve</td>
<td>(2,064)</td>
<td>COL Duncan</td>
<td>Ft. Carson, CO</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bde, 5th Infantry Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>D.C. National Guard</td>
<td>(1,848)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>MG Southward</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>COL Conlyn</td>
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<td>171st Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>LTC Miller</td>
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<td>163d Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>LTC Cook</td>
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<td>140th Engineer Detachment</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>LT Thomas</td>
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<td>104th Light Maintenance Company</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>LT Pearson</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>115th Evacuation Hospital</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>COL Chapman</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>257th Army Band</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>CWO Berger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>BG McCall</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force Totals</td>
<td>(15,530)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Regular Army</td>
<td>13,682</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>D.C. National Guard</td>
<td>1,848</td>
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<td></td>
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APPENDIX C

TROOP BUILDUP AND PHASE DOWN OF TASK FORCE

WASHINGTON IN WASHINGTON, D.C.\textsuperscript{3}
APPENDIX D

GLOSSARY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Formal Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.A.R.</td>
<td>After Action Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.O.C.</td>
<td>Army Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Civil Disturbance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCC</td>
<td>Civil Disturbance Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGUSCONARC</td>
<td>Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSTRIKE</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strike Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONARC</td>
<td>Continental Army Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Riot Control Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Chief of Staff Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDPO</td>
<td>Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMPD</td>
<td>District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCNG</td>
<td>District of Columbia National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSLOG</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSOPS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual or Frequency Modulating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFR</td>
<td>Memorandum for Record</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Message</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACCD</td>
<td>National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCSA</td>
<td>Office, Chief of Staff Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSA</td>
<td>Office, Secretary of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUSA</td>
<td>Office, Under Secretary of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEADOC</td>
<td>Senior Officer Civil Disturbance Orientation Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USAF
US of A

U.S. Air Force
Under Secretary of the Army
APPENDIX E

MAP OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
APPENDIX F

NOTES

2. Department of the Army After Action Report, 4-17 April Civil Disturbance, dated 13 August 1968, Appendix 1 of Annex E, File 103, RG 319 NA.

3. Ibid., E-1-3.

VITA

Barrye La Troye Price was born on 30 May 1962 in Gary, Indiana. He was a May 1985 Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of Houston's College of Business Administration. He entered the U.S. Army as a Second Lieutenant in May of 1985. He has served as an Executive Officer of the 5th Personnel Services Company, Commander of the 5th A.G. Replacement Company, Chief of G1/AG Plans and Operations for the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and as the Regimental Adjutant for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment both in Kuwait and Fulda, Germany. His military schooling includes the Adjutant General Corps Basic and Advance courses, the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense course, the Military Personnel Officer's course, the Force Integration course, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, the Command and General Staff College, and the Airborne and Air Assault courses. He is a contributing author in the unpublished book Blackhorse: The History of the 11th U.S. Cavalry 1901-1991. Captain Price is a member of the Society of Military History and the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Barrye Price can be reached by writing to: 3715 Florinda, Houston, Texas 77021.