PRIVATE AGRICULTURE IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USSR

Karl-Eugen Waedekin

Paper No. 10, April, 1987

Editors

Gregory Grossman
Department of Economics
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720

Vladimir G. Treml
Department of Economics
Duke University
Durham, NC 27706

Technical Editor

Nikolai Malyshev
Department of Economics
Duke University
Durham, NC 27706

93-22121
Best Available Copy
This paper was originally presented at the "Conference on Soviet Agriculture in Gorbachev's First Five-Year Plan: Opportunities Suggested by Comparative Perspective," Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., April 3-4, 1896.

A revised version of this paper will be included in a volume published under the auspices of the Kennan Institute, edited by Kenneth R. Gray.

The publication and distribution of the Berkeley-Duke Occasional Papers was made possible by the support from the National Council for Soviet and Eastern European Research.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 86-72284
PRIVATE AGRICULTURE IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USSR

K. Waedekin

Duke Univ.
Dept. of Economics
Durham, NC 27706

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the Director of Net Assessment
Rm 3A930, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Examines private agriculture in socialist countries and the implications for the USSR.

USSR Economy Private Agriculture
BERKELEY - DUKE OCCASIONAL PAPERS
ON THE SECOND ECONOMY IN THE USSR


   1. M. Alexeev, The Underground Market for Gasoline in the USSR
   2. G. Grossman, A Selected Bibliography on the Second Economy in the Soviet Union (Revised and Updated)
   3. D. Peterson, The Number and Cost of Illegal Abortions in the USSR
   4. V. Treml, Personal and Disposable Income - Urban USSR, 1979
Definitions:

1. The term "private" will be used subsequently in spite of the fact that in Communist states "personal" is the term on which officialdom insists. It is true, this sector is not fully private by Western legal and economic standards, but in its economic and social function -- as distinct from formal property -- it clearly has a more private than social character. (For more on the notion of "private" see the final section.)

2. By using the word "plot" it is understood that normally some private livestock holding goes with it.

3. "Collectivized" is the term for an agriculture where previous peasant farms have been amalgamated into large collective units. It is less comprehensive than "socialized", which comprises state and various institutional farms in addition. The differences between these categories of public farms have a bearing on the legal economic status of the plot farming of their members or workers.

Whether Soviet agriculture can expect some greater contribution from its private producers than it has hitherto received, is the question underlying the subsequent investigation. In doing so, the possibility of a fundamental change of the agrarian system of the USSR in the foreseeable future -- à la chinoise or in other ways -- will be excluded a priori.

Many people seem to assume that the private plot is more or less the same everywhere in socialized agriculture. Therefore the present paper pays special attention to its modifications, which are considerable. All member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), including Cuba and Vietnam, and China and Yugoslavia in addition, will be taken into account.

The impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology as an underlying and driving force is left out of consideration in the present paper but is not denied. Without it, there would be no socialist farms and private plots of the Communist type. Yet ideology can hardly be held responsible for the variety of forms such plot farming has taken in countries with a collectivized agriculture, or for the continuance of peasant farming in a few countries under Communist rule.

Marxist-Leninist ideology, apart from its having undergone some change, did not and does not provide specific instructions on how to organize agricultural production. All it provides in this field is a general guideline for eliminating class differences based on private property and for having the agricultural share of the economy socialized and controlled in ways similar to that of industry. The way in which this guideline is implemented depends on political decisions and feasibility under given -- national or local -- conditions.

The 1970s witnessed some slackening of the pressure on the private sector of agriculture in the countries considered; for Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Outer (People's Republic) Mongolia, this was explicitly called a change of policy. In Cuba, where collectivization of private farms has been proceeding
since 1977, policy towards private production and marketing of food became more tolerant during the early 1980s, only to be reversed radically in mid-1986. Eliminating the private sector is Castro's most recent order of the day.4 Thereby he conspicuously deviates from the other countries and reminds of North Korea, where private plots are reported to have totally disappeared.

Apart from such exceptions, the recent production trend in private plot and animal farming was similar in most of the countries with collectivized agriculture: After a decline in the first half of the past decade, its second half witnessed a moderate re-expansion, which continued into the mid-1980s. In Communist Vietnam, the share of the private sector has also increased markedly since 1975.

The evident change of policy was caused by the unsatisfactory performance of the overall food economy. A common pattern became visible, although the degree of tolerance varied, as did the methods by which the political leaders tried to encourage private food production. Yet with the one exception of China among the countries where socialization (collectivization) of agriculture has already been achieved, the wisdom of collectivization was not officially questioned: Private food production was and is considered supplementary and subordinate to socialized agriculture.

For a long time Western research interest in the role of the private sector in socialized agriculture almost exclusively was directed at the Soviet case. The private plot of the kolkhoz as it emerged from Stalin’s collectivization provided the paradigm, just as Stalinism provided that for Communist rule. Its model function began to weaken some time after the dictator’s death. The model itself and its socio-economic function also changed, adapting to the changed circumstances: The kolkhoz and the kolkhoznik’s plot of today are different from what they used to be up to the early 1950s.

Trends of Change in Subsidiary Plot Production

The main causes and aspects of change have been four:

1. On the whole, individual plot production no longer is indispensable for sheer survival of large population segments but serves to improve the diet and perhaps to make a bit of money “on the side”, when access to markets is not too difficult. However, the peculiarities and deficiencies of the overall socialized economy, and of its distribution system in particular, still make themselves felt. Although standards of living have risen, food demand, especially for the better kinds, exceeds supply. On the countryside in the USSR and Romania, the poor food retailing network goes a long way to explain the need for producing or bartering locally produced food. In those countries much public land is not used intensively, and the quantitative impact of plot farming is greater than in more densely settled countries, except for Vietnam.

2. Plots other than those of collective farmers have become more numerous, not only because of conversions of collective into state farms (in the Soviet Union) but also because of the growing numbers of subsistence and half commercial gardens outside the large public farms, due to urbanization, industrialization, changing demographic structure and new eating habits. The number of plots of collective farm members may be decreasing in the process of de-agrarization but the number of those of the non-agricultural rural population as well as those of the town and big city suburban inhabitants is increasing. As a consequence, more fruit and vegetables are produced on non-farm plots or suburban gardens while the “classical” plot
output -- milk and potatoes -- is declining its share if perhaps not its absolute volume. Among other things, this garden production is more difficult to register and record statistically, and therefore easily underestimated. Even in East Germany the suburban fruit production of the population is not negligible and systematically bought up by public procurement organizations.

3. Agricultural technology has been changing. Some productions are largely mechanized (grain in the first place), some products are difficult to market (e.g., milk), others do not lend themselves easily to mechanization and large-scale storing and marketing, in particular not under the inadequacies of a socialist economy (potatoes, the better vegetables, fruit), with yet others the excess demand still is great (meat). As a consequence, a "division of labor" has gained in importance. It makes the private mini-scale producers specialize on those products where manual labor and traditional selling systems still have an advantage over socialized large-scale production and marketing. The case is not one simply of the pros and cons of private vs. socialized production, but also one of small-scale vs. large-scale agriculture under conditions of an economy at large, which has been unable sufficiently to supply and efficiently to utilize the inputs for modern large-scale production and to build up an efficient storage, transport, processing and retailing system.

4. With the widening of the "Socialist Community", the diversity of nations in it with their various economic settings and historical heritages has become greater, external factors have grown stronger. This made their political leaders, though remaining staunch Communists, try to find specific remedies for their countries' problems. Among the problems those of agriculture ranged very high, if only because of the reluctance to spend hard currency on food imports. As Moscow was not able to step in and meet its allies' food requirements, its agrarian policy did not make a convincing case for emulation.

Differences among Countries

Many of the differences between countries or between republics within the Soviet Union (see Tables 1 and 3) may be traced to climate, population pressure (or non-pressure) on the land, to agricultural specialization and the development level of the economy at large. Mongolia is a special case where the "plot" consists of animal holdings only -- and of grazing rights -- and where a surplus of meat is produced for export. In Romania, the low economic level simply forced the government to tolerate a sizable private sector including a number of uncollectivized peasants in some hill and foothill areas. At the same time, Romanian private producers are under severe obligations of product deliveries or so-called contract sales to the state. The Vietnamese tried to collectivize agriculture after the Soviet model in the 1970s but finally gave up under the population pressure and food situation and accepted a form of "collective" farming with virtual mini-farm structure within a traditional communal landholding system.

The share of private plot and garden output in a given country's overall food supply depends not only on the rules imposed by the Communist Party and State but also on the differences in performance or deficiency of the socialized part of the food sector (agriculture and its forward and backward linkages), the infrastructure, the share and demographic structure of the rural population, to name only the most important determining factors.
In highly developed countries like East Germany and Czechoslovakia -- and
the Baltic Union Republics within the USSR -- the share of the rural population
is small, the work in socialized agriculture well mechanized, the land -- not
the capital -- yields are rather high and the food retail system is relatively
effective. Therefore the private sector is dispensable for large segments of
the population, although it still exerts some functions. Its shrinking was also
due to "economic and administrative measures" levelled against it at least up
to the late 1970s. Strikingly, Lithuania presents a counter-example within
the USSR, being rather well developed (though less so than Estonia) and still
having a very strong private sector. The relatively wide man/land ratio in this
Union Republic may play a role (1.3 hectares per inhabitant, as against 0.9 in
Estonia), but one hesitates to consider this an exhaustive explanation. There
was guerrilla fighting in Lithuania well into the 1950s, and one wonders whether
this has had an influence on the Soviet attitude towards her peasantry.

In these few examples as well as in other ones not put forward here, one
tends to see an interaction of the given conditions with the differences in the at-
titudes of the political leaders, the latter being influenced also by the na-
tional heritage (including the previous farm structure) and the course of recent
events. Poland and China are the outstanding examples. Hungary went through
the turmoil of the 1956 uprising and its suppression by external force and
happened to come under an indigenous leadership afterwards, which was able to
steer a course between political constraints and economic reason.

For the majority of countries under review, neither comprehensive nor fully
comparable statistics are available on the share of private plots and gardens
as well as of the remaining individual farms in total food production. A rough
assessment, however, is possible. The differences are very sizable even where
agriculture has been socialized. For the early 1980s the contribution to
overall gross agricultural output in East Germany (GDR) ranges at or slightly
above 10 percent. In Czechoslovakia it has risen again to 11-12 percent. In
Cuba it still was roughly 20 percent by 1985 (and much more if one excludes
sugar, most of which is exported), 26 percent in the Soviet Union, around or
somewhat above 30 in Hungary and Bulgaria, some 40 percent in Romania. A Soviet
source indicated -- obviously for the year 1980 -- the following percentages:
Bulgaria and USSR: 25-26 percent, Czechoslovakia and East Germany: 10-13 per-
cent, Romania: 42, Vietnam: roughly 40, Hungary: 32-33 percent. For Mongolia,
our rough estimate puts the share at one-fifth to one-quarter, whereas for
Vietnam (including the South, but excluding "family assignment" production) we
assume that more than half of that country's food is produced privately. In
the Communist countries where collectivization was reversed, Poland and
Yugoslavia have the individual peasant farms contributing 70-75 percent to total
gross agricultural production (and more on a net basis); for China it may
confidently be stated that the percentage is more than 90, although Chinese
statistics do not give breakdowns by categories of farms.

In countries where the livestock sector, social and private taken together,
accounts for distinctly more than half of total agricultural output, as is the
case in the GDR, USSR, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia, the animal production fig-
ures of private producers are indicative for the whole sector's weight in total
agricultural output because it concentrates more on animal than on crop pro-
duction. In Bulgaria and Hungary, where fruit and vegetables are important,
those shares are somewhat misleading, because the private sector concentrates
on such production, too. Except for East Germany, the contribution to animal
output tends to exceed the share of privately owned animal numbers. In the
below, the countries are ranged by order of the share of the private
sector in cattle unit numbers in 1983.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>118.6</td>
<td>112.3</td>
<td>105.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>165.4</td>
<td>165.4</td>
<td>165.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Shares of private in total livestock numbers and output (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cattle units</th>
<th>Meat</th>
<th>Milk</th>
<th>Egg (grams)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>118.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>112.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inputs of Labor, Land and Capital**

Assessing the production base of private agriculture with a view to labor, land, and capital is possible only as a rough approximation in most cases. Measuring the labor inputs on small family farms has always been a thorny problem of statistics, in particular when a sizable part of part-time farming is included. The difficulty exists even in Western countries, where private family farming is considered a legitimate or even desirable form of agricultural production. For countries where such labor is looked upon with ideological prejudice ranging from reservation to animosity, the assessment of the labor inputs is made yet more questionable by the prevailing inhibitions to publish meaningful figures. That the official statistics understate the private labor input, and may be misleading in addition, has been spelled out for the Soviet case in the leading economic monthly of that country not so long ago. 9 Polish, and to some extent Hungarian, statistics and also, up to the 1982 Republican annual, Estonian statistics are more informative on that account. On the whole, an internationally comparative picture cannot be given. As a consequence, labor productivity cannot be meaningfully assessed and compared either. Moreover, labor expended on the socialist farm but partly paid in kind or rewarded by sales of produce at favorable prices, which is used mainly for feeding privately owned livestock, may for this part also be considered a labor input in the private sector.

With regard to land used for private production, the information is somewhat better, though far from being satisfactory. First of all, the statistical categorization often does not indicate or take into account all land used privately and to that extent differs by countries. Some of such land juridically is property of communities or non-agricultural enterprises and thus not shown in the category of private land use. 10

This makes itself felt particularly...
where in the CMEA statistical annuals land used privately cannot be derived other than as a residual. The problem has recently been compounded by the fact that beginning in 1979 Soviet data in CMEA annuals -- fortunately not in the national statistics -- started to lump together in one residual category privately used land with land of inter-farm enterprises. (The earlier CMEA annuals do not seem to contain this bias.) As comparability is aimed at in CMEA statistics (see footnote 8, above), it may be inferred that the same more or less applies to the CMEA data for all the other countries considered. In the case of Bulgaria only the CMEA residual is available. For Vietnam no statistics exist on private land use, but as far as only private plots in the strict meaning of the term are concerned, the share may be assumed to amount to roughly 5 percent in the North of the country. Private land use in China covers about 90 percent of total agricultural land.

The data in CMEA statistics are for agricultural land without differentiating for arable or sown area and non-arable greeland, which makes a great difference for countries such as Mongolia, the USSR, and also Cuba. Even so, at least a rough idea of the area of land involved in private food production may be gleaned from the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>thrd. hectares</th>
<th>percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>8070 a)</td>
<td>1.5 a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>574(344) b)</td>
<td>9.2(5.5) b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>854(791) c)</td>
<td>13.0(11.9) c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2332</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td>9762</td>
<td>roughly 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia d)</td>
<td>9762</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (incl. rented non-</td>
<td>14384 e)</td>
<td>78.2 a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private land, June 1983</td>
<td></td>
<td>roughly 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1) 2.1 million hectares are deducted on the basis of the national statistical annual Vt. statist. 1985, 1985, p. 221.
2) In parentheses Plots of collective farmers only, as derived from Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1983 (IFP.
3) In parentheses Cultivated area according to Statistikal Varlek, Budapest 1985, p. 173.
4) Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik, no. 1423 (1985). It is noted in Dr. Ivan Tucarevic's, disease, for this source and information. However, the absolute as well as the percentage figures are questionable, as roughly one million hectares of agricultural land lies idle, according to a recent governmental statement by Prime Minister Branko Matic in Jutarnja Zora, no. 112, May 10/11, 1986.
5) Presumably this refers to land on private as well as on socialist farms.
7) Total agricultural land, including double-cropped fields, is underestimated in Chinese statistics.
8) The percentage is for the official total area state farm land at present most of the latter is assigned to individual holdings under the "responsibility system" for production according to the plan of the state farm.
There are practically no data available on capital inputs in the private sector; most likely, not even the statistical agencies in the various socialist countries have a picture of them which corresponds to reality. It would seem a safe assumption that such inputs are very small, and therefore could be neglected, were it not for the ongoing shift to private producers outside collective and state farms. In their intensive vegetable as well as fruit and berry farming the use of greenhouses, sprinklers, gardening machinery, etc. seems to have spread. Even so, more than a verbal caveat is not possible.

However, animals are an asset of a kind, and so Table 1 provides information at least on this part of the capital involved in private production. It remains unclear, though, how much of the animal stock and of the deriving output is to be attributed to labor, how much to money expenses (purchases of young animals, or building and repair materials for sheds, and of feed) or to payment in kind for collective or other public farm work.

The higher shares of the private sector in livestock output than in animal numbers in the USSR (see below, Table 3) as well as in most countries with collectivized agriculture point at higher animal productivity. Is it possible at all that this disadvantaged sector with poorly trained holders, old sheds, sometimes lack of running water, with limited access to concentrate feed and to high-bread stock, achieves as high as, or in some cases even a higher productivity per animal than the socialist large-scale farms, and thus makes such private production rewarding? Soviet milk yields are not really high, neither in the public, nor in the private sector; only in a few Union Republics official statistics show them to be higher in the latter than in the former, and in the agriculturally important Ukraine they were almost equal in 1983. As to meat production, it may well be that by the time of the annual livestock counts many privately raised animals are already sold internally to the public farms. If this is so, the comparative feeding efficiency of the public sector may be yet worse than the published figures reveal. That it is better in the private sector was recently stated by a Soviet author. It is true, private producers get some help from the public sector, although its importance should not be exaggerated, and in most cases it is paid for in money or labor, or connected with bound sales.

Comparative land productivity is difficult to establish because of the "division of labor" between the private and the socialized sector. The two largely specialize on different products. Potatoes, a basic food in Central Europe and the Soviet Union, are one of the few field crops which both sectors produce in large quantities. For Poland it is well known that the private peasants have higher yields of potatoes, and that the state farms are reluctant to grow them. The figures for the USSR are not quite unequivocal because other vegetables and melons are included in the statistics of land planted to potatoes. However, the area of other vegetables and melons cannot be so great as to reverse the significance of the fact that in 1983 the Soviet private sector accounted for 53 percent of the combined total area but for 60 percent of the potato output. For Lithuania, without melons, the picture is similar: 33 and 37 percent.

An analogous comparison for vegetables other than potatoes would not make sense, even if the relevant data were available, because the two sectors tend to produce different kinds of them. The bulkier ones, such as cabbage, predominate in the social sector, herbs and onions on the private plots. Figures for fruit and wine are more amenable to comparison, though not quite free from possible similar distortions. At any rate, the picture emerging from Soviet data speaks unequivocally for high productivity of the private land under fruit, berries, and wine.
Diversity also within the Soviet Union

Because of the country's role as the initial model, of its size and its deriving importance for the world food markets, Soviet data deserve special interest. The kolkhoz Model Charter of 1969 permits plots of up to 0.5 hectares, and of 0.2 hectares on irrigated land. The actual all-Union average, however, is 0.3 hectares and thus equals the legal norm for non-kolkhoz agricultural workers. For certain other categories of rural inhabitants it is 0.25 and for the rest of the rural population 0.15 hectares per household or person. The legal sizes vary by Union Republics and regions. Kolkhoz plot sizes may even exceed 0.5 hectares where legally existing before 1969. Kinds and sizes of permitted private animal holdings may also vary regionally. In addition, the decrees of January 1981 emphasized what in actual practice had existed before in some places, namely that plots and holdings may exceed those norms if the owners partially produce for a kolkhoz or sovkhoz on a contractual basis.

Such differences within the USSR are largely the result of the country's great variety in climate, soils and also socio-economic traditions of land use and animal husbandry. Abstracting from the Communist countries with noncollectivized agriculture, one finds those differences not much smaller than between the other countries of the "Socialist Community". (The implications of this diversity for a hypothetical Soviet adoption of those countries' policies towards the private sector will be discussed below.)

Already under Stalin, the plot of the Central Russian kolkhoznik differed in a number of ways from that of the Ukrainian and still more from that in the kolkhozes of Transcaucasia and from those in the dry-steppe kolkhozes of halfnomads (transhumance) or in the oases of Soviet Central Asia. Together with ethnic factors and local national traditions, the great differences in natural and socio-economic environment between the various parts of the country exerted their influence even under the centralistic Iron regime of that time. And also within one and the same nationality such as the Great Russians, life in a far outlying hamlet of North Central Russia required a plot very different from that in a metropolitan suburban area with easy market access or in one of those relatively affluent huge towns in the Krasnodar black earth region.

Relevant statistics are available for most Union Republics, but not for administrative units within them.
Table 3: Shares of the private sectors in the USSR and most of its Union Republics (1983 and some preceding years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share in Soviet</th>
<th>USSR and</th>
<th>Belorussia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Moldavia</th>
<th>Kazakhs'</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Kirghizia</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>share of land</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share of capital</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share of output of goods</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share of output of services</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share of output of construction</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share of output of other</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The various Union Republics are, of course, not fully comparable on the basis of the figures of Table 3. A few examples may serve to illustrate additional differences. Thus, of total grain in Georgia, 24 percent (presumably corn for the most part) was produced on private plots in 1979, while in other Union Republics the percentage of grain grown on plots was negligible. In Belorussia not only half of the potatoes and vegetables but also 90 percent of all fruit and berries were grown on private plots in 1981, and their yield per hectare was 5 tons as against 11 tons on socialist farms. If for Tajikistan one deducts the value of cotton production one finds that the private sector supplied roughly half of all food produced in that Republic; on the other hand, sizable quantities of grain have to be imported from other Union Republics.

Implications for the USSR

Hungary, East Germany, and China are the three countries with relatively productive agricultural sectors, and Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria do not lag far behind. In order to simplify the argument, the systems of only the first three will be considered with a view to a possible adoption by the USSR for increasing the latter's lower land and animal productivity with the help of the private sector. (The question of cost of production shall not be discussed here.)

Obviously, a Soviet adoption of the Chinese way in the foreseeable future is not to be expected. Apart from political reasons, it does not seem advisable because of fundamental differences in the socio-economic environment of the two countries.

Looking at the East German experience one doubts whether it is viable for the USSR at the present stage of Soviet economic development. The USSR lacks not only a similar degree of industrial, infrastructural, and administrative development but also is not so small and homogeneous a country as the GDR.
to speak of the special advantages of intra-German East-West trade. The private sector of agriculture -- and even the whole of agriculture -- is of less importance for the GDR than for the Soviet Union. However, one could think of something reminding the East German experience in a small and highly developed Union Republic like Estonia. As in the GDR, the Estonian private producers put emphasis on fruit and vegetable growing (less on potatoes) and in 1983 accounted for 31 percent of the vegetables (see Table 3) and 87 percent of the fruit and berry output. 21 Despite parallels one would still have to wait for Moscow under the new leadership in actual fact to grant some degree of genuine autonomy to an individual Union Republic and nationality, which would be an indispensable prerequisite for Estonia to develop her agriculture along East German lines. Still, Estonian agriculture seems to enjoy some special status; recently it was reported that her public farms not only on principle but in actual fact plan on their own "the sowing structure, the livestock inventories and other, intermediate indices". 22 But then, this concerns the public farms, while the private sector in Estonia is of comparatively little, although not of so minor importance as in the GDR (see Tables 1 and 3, above).

Reminiscent of the Hungarian case, which recently again -- after a time of silence -- was favorably mentioned by as high-ranking a person as the president of the new Gosagroprom, V. S. Murakhvitski. 23 It need not be explained here in detail that the success of Hungarian agriculture is not merely due to the leeway granted to private food production. Of no less importance is the freedom of economic decision-making for the managers of collective farms, less so of state farms. In addition, Hungary enjoys a relatively liberal atmosphere not only in economics but also in domestic politics, and is exposing its agriculture to the world market more than most Communist countries use to do. Finally, like the GDR it is a small, homogeneous country, and its infrastructure, if not quite as developed as the German counterpart, is much better than that of large parts of the Soviet Union. For such reasons, the present writer argued elsewhere 24 that a wholesale Soviet adoption of the Hungarian system of agriculture is unlikely, and that the adoption of parts of it would effect a part success at best.

However, we are concerned here with the private sector, which in itself is only a part of the system of socialized agriculture. Below, it will be argued that not restrictions as such are detrimental to a private sector within a socialized economy but the degree and kind of restrictions. Their lifting or slackening in Hungary is mainly of three kinds:

1. Exchanges of goods and services within the public farms between their members and the farm management. They are based on division of labor between large-scale and small-scale production at a given level of technology (and changing together with that level), and moreover on the free will of both sides under only latent control by State or Party organs.

2. Access of private producers to free markets, or relations with public enterprises under truly negotiated conditions which remind of free markets.

3. Acceptance of the role of the small, family, kinship or friendship group within the large farm, which sometimes makes it hard to define whether there is a small group of wage-earners working for the large public farm, or one of private workers producing on behalf of the former.

Which of these elements are applicable?

1) The intra-farm exchanges between between the private and the social sector already take place in the Soviet Union without being recorded in the
official statistics (the recent annuals for Lithuania and Latvia are an exception, see footnote d of Table 3, above). Most likely, their volume also exceeds what is revealed in the writings of a few competent Soviet writers. Yet such exchanges are not wholly of the free will of private producers and public farm managers. Both sides are under the pressure of ambitious plans from above. State and Party have permitted such exchanges and even encouraged them in recent years but are eager to control their forms and prices. The consequence was widespread resort to circumventions and infringements upon the law and unsatisfactory economic results.26 By a decree published in the Soviet press on March 29, 1986, purchases from the private sector and resales to the state, as well as other purchases from private producers on the territory of a given kolkhoz or sovkhoz by an entitled public organization, have been made an explicit part of the sales plans and achievement indicators of the public farms. This "territorial principle" might induce farm managers and local administrators to put counterproductive pressure on farm members/workers to deliver private produce to the public farms. Such pressure would represent a significant distinction from Hungarian procedures.

There are other, so far not very numerous, attempts in the USSR at integrating small-scale private into large-scale socialized farm production and procurement, which may turn out detrimental to private plot farming of the older kind. Thus, a kolkhoz in Western Ukraine concluded "contracts" with families for growing potatoes on behalf of the kolkhoz on their private plots.28 A renowned kolkhoz in Moscow province induced its members to throw their private plots and animal holdings together and form a new cooperate of 450 members, named "Iskra", alongside with the existing kolkhoz; others in the province are said to proceed in similar ways.29 On grounds of economic theory, this may make sense, yet only if it is really done in a voluntary way. Genuine voluntariness would imply, among other things, the possibility for the members to leave that cooperative again, if they find that it works more to the advantage of the state and the kolkhoz than to their individual own. Exactly that remains to be seen. It was already Khrushchev, after all, who put forward such an idea -- and failed. Kolkhoz members will hardly have forgotten that precedent and might not all agree with what one of them is reported to have said: "Iskra' is the future of the personal subsidiary economy."

2) The access to markets seems to be the most touchy point in a Soviet environment. The Hungarians let the free markets expand and at the same time improved and liberalized the public marketing outlets. In contrast, the Soviet leaders want the private production to grow but not to make the free markets expand. Private produce should be channelled mainly to the state through the public farms or into the processing and retailing network of the consumer cooperatives. The latter, however, have not proven up to the task, neither in material resources (transport, storage, processing plants) nor in organization and personnel. The recent decree on expanding and improving their activities is not the first and probably not the last of its kind. Where and as long as the state or cooperative outlets are not able in an attractive and flexible way to market the supplies potentially offered by private producers, those will either go to the free markets or, if access to those is difficult, or prevented, or too costly, will not expand their activities beyond a certain limit. They will then be more likely to improve their own consumption or to resort to intra-village or urban neighborhood barter transactions.

3) Until very recently the small or even family team has been rather the exception among the much propagated Soviet "podriad" (assignment) work units, although it existed under special circumstances and in some regions. More recently, Mirakhovskii, in his interview quoted above, defended it and -- more
Interestingly -- did so in words which establish a connection with private work for the public farm: "Even if it is an individual person who wants to set about growing so and so much vegetables, or feedroot, or something else for the kolkhoz -- one should not prevent him, let him work." Murakhovskyi in his defense of the small unit referred to "concrete conditions and specifics of one or the other locality". It remains to be seen whether it will result in successes similar to those it has had in Hungary.

The present Soviet leadership seems determined to make it a success. A Central Committee decree in December 1986 "On urgent measures for raising the productivity of labor in agriculture ..." strongly advocated smaller sizes of brigades and links, in particular the "family form of contract" (podriada), in the labor-intensive kinds of production, who are to be assigned land and technical inputs "for a prolonged term". It castigated "formalism and irresponsibility" in the introduction of this form, the inadequacy of input supplies for them, infringements on the "democratic principles" and on the "rights of the labor collectives". The decree not only emphasized the points made by Murakhovskyi, but also recommended to "comprehensively develop" the "thorough-going (or complete - skvoznyi in Russian) and family podriada". During the Central Committee Plenum of January 1987 numerous examples of family link organization were quoted, but also managers' reticence against it was castigated. At the same time and afterwards, the agricultural daily of the Central Committee and its new weekly supplement described and applauded a great variety of cases of family links in kolkhozes as well as state farms. They refer mainly to production branches with a low degree of mechanization such as vegetables, tobacco, grapes, sugar beet, feedroots, milk and calf and piglet rearing. G. I. Shmelev mentioned silkworm production and the fact that by now -- and probably also earlier -- most of the mountain sheep herding in the Caucasus area and Central Asia is done "on the basis of families". On the other hand; small but larger-than-family units in cotton ("hundreds" of them in the Khashka-darja province of Uzbekistan) and grain growing as well as "rigid control by brigade heads and agronomists" over family links in vegetable fields have also been mentioned approvingly.

Depending on the contents and the juridical form of such contracts, a considerable element of private interest can be involved. Then families or even individuals, although acting on behalf of a large, socialized farm, might be considered semi-private production units, not groups of hired workers, provided that:

a) they enter such a relationship fully on their own will and can accept or refuse the contract offered by the large farm,  
b) the duration of the contract is for one full production cycle of the given product at the very least,  
c) can dispose of a stipulated share of the produce fully at their own discretion,  
d) organize their work within the contracted production task as they themselves see fit without interference by the farm management, except for stipulations laid down in the contract.

To make such an arrangement economically viable, one more condition has to be met, namely that:

e) the contract is really binding both sides, which implies that economically significant sanctions against its violation can be applied also towards the stronger partner, the management of the socialized farm. Such violations
are frequently criticized in Soviet press reports and may consist in retroactive reduction of "excessive" payment, non-supply of contracted inputs, orders to do work in other farm sections, etc.

It emerges from the sources quoted above that the forms prevailing in actual Soviet "contract" (podriad) practice meet some but not all these conditions, especially so, if larger than family or kinship work units (brigade or zveno) are concerned; in fact, the term "assignment" (zasada) is sometimes also used. However, the recent reports and authoritative public statements, in particular the decree of December 1966 (see above), made it clear that the present leaders want the reality of the family "podriad" to correspond more closely to the conditions enumerated above. In other words, they favor a strong element of private interest for the sake of greater effort and care in the execution of contracts, and thereby in more efficient utilization of the land and the capital involved. The "voluntariness" of contract also is emphasized frequently, yet the possibility to refuse a contract offered by the socialized farms seems never to be mentioned explicitly. On the whole, things are very much in flux, and not everything points at truly autonomous family links. The fact, however, that there is a variety of forms and no rigid guideline as yet, bears promise of a flexibility which previously has not been typical for Soviet attempts at reform.

On the three points -- intra-farm exchanges, access to market, and family links (or comparable small units within large-scale socialist farms) -- developments of private activities within socialist agriculture emerge, but also limits to a Soviet adoption of the Hungarian methods of making the private sector contribute to the national food economy (and even to exports). They also show where improvement seems possible without upsetting the Soviet system too much. More autonomous decision-making by the family and other small teams and strictly voluntary commodity exchanges within the farm will have to accompany the application. However, to make such mechanisms work successfully has taken a number of years in Hungary and may take yet longer in the Soviet Union.

Imaginable Improvements Through "Private" Initiative

If such a road would be taken, what could be its effects in the mid, though not in the short run? In crop production the division of labor could deepen and, in combination with better marketing possibilities, increase and improve the supplies of vegetable, fruit and some technical crops. Although being important problems, those, however, are not the most burning ones of the Soviet food economy. Paramount today is the meat and grain deficit. If it is correct that the small-scale private production of meat and milk still is more efficient on many Soviet farms, then an obvious solution would be to transfer a greater part of the animal production to the private producers. That is what the Hungarians have done to some degree and what Moscow recently has attempted to do at least in part. But in the Soviet version there are strings put to it: Only if a delivery contract at fixed prices is concluded with the public farm or cooperative, the individual or family is entitled, quite generally since 1981, to keep animals beyond the old upper limits. The early 1980s have shown that that did not sufficiently work as an incentive, in part because the public partner failed to supply the promised feed. This failure might be improved upon.

Two serious impediments are left at any rate. One is shortage of labor, which prevails in the traditional livestock rearing regions of European Russia North of the black earth zone. It is the South where labor for tending livestock still is in more ample supply but where at the same time the good land is taken
by grains or intensive crops like cotton, fruit, etc., and few meadow and good grazing land is available.

The second factor is one whose impact cannot be gauged with certainty: is the feed conversion ratio as bad indeed as Soviet statistics and publications tell us? How much of the feed accounted towards the consumption by socialized livestock actually rots in bad storage or is eaten by rodents and vermin, is illegally given or sold to private producers, or diverted in other ways? Is it true what the Lithuanian and Ukrainian statistics tell us indirectly, that privately-owned livestock gets slightly more feed units per cattle unit than the publicly-owned?40 Be that as it may: if on the private plots less feed is consumed per unit of output, instead of per cattle unit, then a saving of feed would still result from transferring a larger part of animal production to them. And on the whole the disparity of animal productivity (see p. 13/14, above) seems great enough to offset some correction of the statistical conversion ratio. Moreover, increased private interest in animal production very likely would lead to additional feed availability through better utilization of non-grain feed such as hay, grazing, kitchen garbage, etc. The quantitative importance of such improvement may be sizable and have an impact on Soviet feed grain imports.

All this would not represent the adoption of some other socialist country's ways of dealing with the problem of the private sector within an otherwise socialized agriculture. Moreover, the solution of this problem is not possible without implications for the overall agrarian system. Individual steps and measures might be taken in imitation of what has proven successful elsewhere but they will hardly be applicable uniformly for the whole of the Soviet Union. Other than its partners, the USSR is too vast and too manifold a country, and what may be suitable for one of its parts will hardly be so for all of them.

Thus, a number of "Hungarian" specifics might prove applicable in the Baltic republics or Georgia, and in fact seem to have been applied there, but will not fit the gigantic grain farms of Kazakhstan or the cotton and fruit producers of Central Asia. East German forms of non-private integration might prove workable under the conditions of a relatively developed infrastructure around big urban agglomerations in European Russia, yet are unlikely to succeed in some sparsely settled parts of Siberia.

Great differences of historical and ethnic traditions are an additional element which does not exist to the same degree within each of the East European countries. Yugoslavia is the one country where the degree of diversity comes close to that prevailing in the Soviet Union. Quite apart from that country's less than convincing recent agricultural record, it is exactly the Yugoslav model which is the least likely to be adopted by Moscow. This is so not only for general political and ideological reasons but also because the system of that country cannot be separated from the autonomy of its constituent republics. The well-known economic and other problems created by this autonomy could only be enhanced on the much greater territory of the Soviet Union.

The regional disparities of Soviet living standards and deriving unwanted migratory processes are not in the last place linked with the role of the private sector. What would happen if "Hungarian" ways adopted in, say, Lithuania created a growing comparative affluence in that Union Republic? What would that do to the regional flow of goods and to central planning? The private sector is, of course, only one, and not the most important aspect of such problems, and all this is not to say that they are impossible to solve. It does say, however, that not one model can be adopted from elsewhere, that Soviet agriculture will have to find its own ways and that the process of finding and implementing them has no shortcuts of borrowing.
Some Final Remarks on the Notion of "Private" in a Socialist System

Land was nationalized only in the Soviet Union, Mongolia, China (People's Republic) and -- apparently without formal legislative action -- Albania, whereas in the other countries under Marxist-Leninist regimes it has remained private at least to some extent. Thus, formal individual property of land is an important but not the only and indispensable criterion of private production in those countries. It would clearly make few sense to say that the remaining legal property title of land makes, say, Czechoslovak or Bulgarian private plots basically different from their Soviet counterparts, or that it makes peasant farming in Yugoslavia very dissimilar from that in present-day China; or not to call private the production of the Polish peasant, when and where he farms land rented from the State Land Fund or from state farms. One also finds that Polish peasant farming during the late 1970s was not as "private" as some may think, which explains the otherwise paradoxical demand for a "trade union" of private peasants (the "Rural Solidarity") in that country in 1980-81. In Romania, the remaining individual peasants are so strictly subjected to the state procurement system that one hesitates to call their production "private", and this applies to the private plot producers as well. By a similar token, the Romanian version of family and kinship teams on collective farms, favored there as early as the 1960s, did not prove a success under that country's overall socio-economic and political conditions.

The essence of private farming is the individual's or individual family's usufruct right on land and their right to decide on the kind and degree of their personal labor inputs, enabling them to decide on whether they will produce food or other saleable farm output, and if so, what kind and in which mix, and how to dispose of the output. It does not exclude the existence of parameters set by the state or some social organization, such as certain conditions or limits to the land use, upper limits to private ownership of livestock, mandatory deliveries of part of the output, or production on behalf of social enterprises combined with the right freely to dispose of the output produced beyond the contracted quantities. Such parameters do not necessarily act as an inhibition of private initiative. Just as regulations of land use, taxes, etc. do not in a non-socialist society.

The crucial issue is the degree to which restrictions are imposed. If they leave enough scope for individual activity and the disposal of the resulting output, such production may be called private or semi-private. It is the duration and firmness of the usufruct right, the size of the share compulsorily delivered to state or social organizations in kind or at fixed non-market prices, the limitations on the kind of permitted production, etc. which may or may not put severe restrictions on individual economic decisions that public control over production and disposal is near to complete. If there are restrictions of such a degree, one may no longer speak of a private sector, although land may still be owned privately in a formal meaning of the word.

The role of the family as a basic production and labor unit as it has recently emerged in Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese socialized agriculture under the pressure of food demand since the late 1970s, is a significant case in point. It has common as well as differing traits. (Collectivized agriculture in Vietnam will be used for comparison because it occupies an intermediate position in this regard.)

In present-day China, the restrictions on private farming have been reduced to a degree that makes some observers consider her agriculture "privatized" in spite of the remaining social property of the land. Most Chinese peasants now have permanent usufruct rights on small plots (comparable to the previous household plots) and mid- to long-term leasehold of the other land they till.
They decide individually on what to produce, and in which way; they even may sub-lease the land, at least in practice. Having complied with their tax and sales obligations towards the state and local community, they may dispose of their produce for their own consumption and/or on the free market, or in any other way. A major exception are the former workers on many state farms, who now may also produce on a household basis, yet for the most part according to a production plan issued by the state farm management.

Within Vietnamese collective farms the family household as a basic production unit also plays a central role. In view of the general low degree of mechanization and the abundance of labor in Vietnamese agriculture, the productive performance depends almost exclusively on the manual workers' interest and deriving effort and care. The incentive of direct — "private" -- interest of the individual or of the small, socially coherent group remains a most effective element of production. It is this unit which is assigned the bulk of the production tasks by the collective farm management on behalf of the state since 1979, when the strictly Soviet-type collective farming had failed in Vietnam. In this function and for some specialized production, however, the collective farms continue to exist, and that is where the role of the peasant household in Vietnam differs from that in China.

The competent Soviet author G. I. Shmelev in a recent report on Vietnamese agriculture outlined the purposeful intertwining of collective and individual elements in crop (for the most part, rice) production. Roughly 70 percent of total work inputs in growing, harvesting and delivering of rice is supplied by the families or groups of families (very likely traditional kinship or hamlet groups). They are assigned plots of paddy land for a period of up to five years and a "plan task" of production and delivery. Most of the above-plan output is said to remain with them for own consumption or for selling either on the market or, at higher than planned procurement prices, to the state. At the time of the reporting (1985), this "family assignment" principle was being applied on almost all collective farms in Vietnam, except for a sizable minority in the mountainous areas.

Such a system is adapted to a socialized agriculture with abundant manual labor at low cost, or a low man/land ratio. However, the overall political system in Vietnam leads one to assume that the state rigidly ensures its interests, not in the last place by setting the price for planned deliveries; moreover, Shmelev explicitly states that in cases of nonfulfillment of the delivery plans, the families "compensate for losses conditioned by subjective causes". On the other hand, private interest has to be safeguarded at least to a certain degree, if the system is to serve as a work incentive, as it obviously is devised for. Traditional local socio-economic entities seem to play a certain role in it, which the state is not capable, and perhaps not determined, to control entirely.

Strikingly, Shmelev's report contains the Soviet term "plot at the house" (priluzedemy ulistovki) only once, without paying any attention to this kind of private farming, which is equally conditioned upon the availability of great resources of labor. Livestock production, whether collective or not, is not dealt with either by Shmelev, while the GMEA statistics on it (see above, Table 1) make it clear, that only one-fourth of the livestock totals -- for the North alone, the "guessimate" would be roughly one-half -- and of their output is in the state or collective sector. This "private" (*personal", in Soviet parlance) production, typical for all Soviet-type collectivized agriculture, obviously continues to exist in Vietnam along with the "family assignment" production and, similar to its Soviet counterpart, not for producing the basic grain but other food and, above all, for holding livestock.
Apart from the plot, the Soviet (and similarly, the Bulgarian) family link in outward form seems an analogue to its Vietnamese counterpart, yet is different in its economic and social content. The Soviet public farm and in it the small and family unit dispenses of more off-farm inputs and less workers per acre, therefore its productive performance depends only in part on the manual workers' effort. The individual ("private") economic success is conditioned not on the labor input alone, the contracted supply of capital inputs and their efficient use is more important than in Vietnam or China. Thereby the productive success is more closely connected with the socialized sector of agriculture and the economy at large. This fact does not remove the importance of individual interest but puts it into a different context. Accordingly, the family link is only one among other recommended sub-units of the Soviet large-scale farm, geared mainly at certain productions and regions.

The appeal to individual interest and effort in agricultural production under Communist regimes has acquired so many aspects and forms that the term "private" appears too narrow and straightforward to be applied to all of them. Some still are outright private, others of a semi-private character have emerged, and still others may rather be called non-official production governed by individual or small group interest within a socialist setting. In sum, the "privateness" of agricultural production in basically socialist systems depends not merely on private versus socialist principles as such, but no less on the ways of their implementation in practice.

FOOTNOTES

2) The theoretical-ideological aspects have thoroughly been explored by Christian Krebs, Die wissenschauffichen und wirtschaftstheoretischen Grundlagen der Agrartheorie im Marxismus-Leninismus, Berlin (West) 1983.
3) G. Shmelev in Agrarnoe otnosheniia v stranakh sotsializma, otvetstvennyi redaktor T. Bogomolov, Moscow 1984, p. 76.
4) Most of the available information on the private agricultural sector in Cuba is contained in an article by Vtctor Figueroa Arbelo and Luis A. Garcia De La Torre "Aportes sobre la comercializacion agricola no estatal", Ecologia y Desarrollo, no. 83, 1984, pp. 34-51. It is analyzed, together with other sources, by Peter Gay, "Agrarpolitik zwischen sowjetmodell und Castro Utopie", Europa, no. 1, 1987, pp. 42-56.
5) Agrarnoe otnosheniia ..., op. cit., p. 74, footnote 3.
6) Zdenek Lukas, Der Privatsektor in der Tschechoslowakischen Landwirtschaft seit 1970 (WIIW Forschungsberichte, Nr. 121), Sept. 1986, p. 54 (Tab. 2).
7) Agrarnoe otnosheniia ..., op. cit., p. 74.
8) Table 1 is mainly calculated from residuals on the basis of the CHEA statistical annual, which presents data based on a uniform methodology and unified indices as approved by the Standing CHEA Commission for cooperation in the field of statistics, see Novye knigi, Moscow, no. 17, 1986, pp. 73. However, some of these residuals seem to comprise also items referring to other than private producers, and therefore were compared with, or complemented by the national statistics where possible; when minimal, such discrepancies are neglected.
10) For the Soviet case, such intricacies have been dealt with in detail by the present author in his Privatproduzenten in der sowjetischen Landwirtschaft, Köln 1967, appendices A and B, and in various subsequent publications.
11) According to collective farm statutes, it is to be five per cent. I am indebted to Dr. Adam Forde, London, for this information.
16) This was recently confirmed by the juridical department of
the all-Union Gosagroprom, "Sel'skaja zhizn', January 13, 1987, p. 4, where the rural non-kolkhoz population categories entitled to 0.25 hectares also were enumerated as far as the Russian SFSR is concerned.

20) These differences have been dealt with by the present writer in his forthcoming "Agrarian Structures and Policies in the USSR, China and Hungary", Socialist Realism: A Challenge, J. C. Bradt, K.-E. Wadekin, eds., Boulder, CO. 1987.

22) A. H. E. N., Literaturnaja gazeta, no. 43, October 23, 1985, p. 11.
24) "Agrarian Structures..", op. cit.
26) For an example which was explicitly said not to be exceptional, see Igor' Gamal'gov, "Opavshie tabloki", Literaturnaja gazeta, no. 41, October 9, 1985, p. 11.
30) Sel' skaja zhizn', February 1, 1986.
31) The mostly used translation term "contract" is misleading in most cases, as it implies an agreement between partner of more or less equal rights, though not necessarily of economic weight. Frequently, the "podriad" simply assigns production tasks instead of work norms.
32) As explicitly stated for Krasnodar province in Vestnik Agrorgrom, no. 2, 1987, p. 3, and more generally by some respondents in interviews held by the present writer among recent emigres from rural areas of the USSR, cf. Shmelev, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii..., op. cit., p. 14.
34) Ekonomicheskaja gazeta, no. 52, 1986, p. 3.
37) Shmelev, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii..., op. cit., p. 18.
38) Sel'skaja zhizn', January 4, 7 and 9, 1987, each on p. 2.
41) See the forthcoming article by Sam Bock in Osauropia, 1987.
42) The following refers mainly to the Northern part of the country. Mass collectivization in the South started only recently and "is developing successfully, yet the Party continues looking for ways of its further improvement" (which implies a search for new ways of implementation); the formation of big "state corporations" for the production of technical and export crops has so far received priority. (V. Pritula, "vostochnennyi bri", Sel'skaja zhizn', April 29, 1986, p. 3.
44) For most of the information on Vietnam beyond the quoted Soviet reports, I am indebted to Mr. Adam Fforde, London, who is writing a paper on the subject.
APPENDIX

A Note on Intra-Farm Sales of Milk and Meat by Private Plot Holders in the USSR

Soviet statistics do not reveal openly how much meat and milk produced by private animal owners is indirectly, via intra-kolkhoz or intra-sovkhoz sales, channelled into the state procurement system. Since the decree of January 8, 1981, the kolkhoz or sovkhoz is entitled, even encouraged, to include such private output in its production and procurements accounts, and is being credited for it statistically. In Table 3, footnote d., of the above article it was already pointed out that the quantities involved must be considerable; in fact, the Soviet official V. Bidorenko mentioned 1 million tons of meat and 4 million tons of milk for the year 1983 (Izvestia, January 4, 1986). Other all-Union figures were not published to the present writer’s knowledge. However, they may be derived by comparing the data in the 1983 Narodnoe khoziaistvo volume for private milk output in million tons with its percentage in the total Soviet milk output. Up to and including 1980, both sets of data yielded essentially the same results, but beginning in 1981 these have deviated from each other increasingly, as shown below.

Private output in absolute quantities and as derived from percentage of the Soviet totals (million tons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Milk absolute</th>
<th>from % of total</th>
<th>Meat absolute</th>
<th>from % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two questions arise: 1) Might not the difference be caused by output of other non-kolkhoz and non-sovkhoz institutions, e.g. the consumer cooperative? A recent table in Kommunist (no. 7, 1987, p. 124) shows, unlike the Nar. khoz., volumes hitherto, milk produced by kolkhozes and sovkhozes, excluding those other institutions, at 74.5 million tons in 1985, whereas Nar. khoz., including them, shows 75.9 million tons. That leaves for those other institutions only 1.4 million tons (very roughly, because of rounding of the underlying data) and about 22.1 million tons for private animal owners. Thus, the milk quantities sold by the latter, internally to kolkhozes and sovkhozes must have been of the order of 6 million tons or more in 1985.

2) Why do the data for meat not deviate in a manner similar to those for milk (see the table), though it is known that considerable quantities of meat, too, go through intra-farm sales (see above, for 1983)? Meat sales, however, differ in economic content and legal form from those of milk, which by its nature has to be collected daily over a longer time. Milk sales are apparently based on annual (or otherwise not one-time) contracts (dovzory of procurement), whereas for meat the form of the one-time deal (kuplia-prodazha) seems to be used in most cases, even if it is based on a contract concluded at some earlier time of the year. Apparently, quantities of kuplia-prodazha are not shown in the published statistics as kolkhoz or sovkhoz output. Why this is so, must remain open at the present stage. The whole phenomenon of intra-farm flows of private-to-public production needs further investigation, which the author intends to undertake in the near future.