**SOVIET ASSESSMENTS OF THE THEATER BALANCE OF FORCES: A CASE STUDY OF THE BEGINNING PERIOD OF WAR**

**AUTHOR(S)** M. Partan

**PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139

**SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
Office of the Secretary of Defense
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**ABSTRACT**
Examines Soviet assessment of the theater balance of forces.

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SOVIET ASSESSMENTS OF THE THEATER BALANCE OF FORCES: A CASE STUDY OF THE BEGINNING PERIOD OF WAR

Matthew A. Partan

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1. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the Soviet image of a future war and attempts to identify those factors which the Soviets consider important in assessing theater balances. While the Soviets may value many of the same components of military power valued in the West, we should not assume that they measure military capabilities, or weigh the relative importance of various capabilities, in the same way.

The source of data for this project is the Soviet military literature— a large body of material appearing in numerous journals and books published by the military publishing house. This literature is used to educate Soviet military officers and provide them with information about military affairs. Thus, we can learn how the Soviets want their officers to approach the problem of assessing military capabilities by studying the factors and indicators which the Soviets present in this literature. As discussed elsewhere, this linkage rests on the assumption that the factors the Soviets stress in this literature are the same as those they use when they assess their own military capabilities and try to determine how they are doing.

There are three basic approaches which can be taken to study how the Soviets assess military capabilities. The first approach involves studying Soviet military doctrine and deducing factors which should be important in Soviet assessments of military capabilities based on some understanding of this military doctrine. The second approach is an empirical one which involves studying the Soviet assessment literature to see what the data presents as identifiable factors. The third approach
is to study actual Soviet military structures and force procurements, which are presumed to be results of the Soviets' self-assessment process, and infer which military capabilities seem important to the Soviets.

This report combines the first and second approaches in an empirical-inductive approach to identify factors in Soviet assessments by studying Soviet discussions of desirable military capabilities which they derive from their own military doctrine. The beginning period of war literature, which has not been studied systematically in the West before, has been chosen for a case study because here the Soviets discuss both their image of a future war and the capabilities they feel will be valuable in preparing for that war. Thus, the value of the beginning period of war literature is that it presents a Soviet derivation of factors they consider important in assessing military capabilities taken on their military doctrine. These discussions can give us a better idea of how the Soviets view the dynamic process of going from peace to crisis to war. It is here that we find Soviet discussion of strategic-level factors to form truly strategic-level assessments. In addition, the beginning period of war discussions involve Soviet treatment of unquantifiable, subjective factors such as surprise, strategic command systems, and coalition performance.

1.1 The Purpose of the Soviet Literature

The research in this project is based on the assumption, as are other reports in this series, that the Soviet military-historical literature is used to inform and educate officers about current issues in military affairs. In the literature we have studied, the Soviets use lessons from
history to discuss the nature of a future beginning period of war and how to best prepare for that future war. Many articles explicitly state that the historical lessons "are of great interest in contemporary conditions," and discuss current military affairs using concepts presented from historical examples. It is clear that the lessons presented in this literature have relevance for current Soviet approaches, regardless of whether the Soviets base their image of future wars on lessons learned from the past, or simply illustrate their image of future wars using contrived "lessons" drawn from history. Thus, factors which the Soviets stress in this literature indicate their approach to assessing military capabilities, and these factors will be used by the Soviets when they assess how they are doing.

1.2 Methodology

To carry out this study, the first step has been to consider the beginning period of war literature as a whole in order to see how the Soviets have structured their discussions. Understanding the overall structure of the literature is important in order to establish a context within which to properly interpret the articles. The second step has been to identify strategic-level factors which are discussed in the Soviet literature and which enter into their balance assessments. The third step has been to analyze how these factors, and the issues and concerns they raise, have changed over time. Three time periods have been considered and the treatment of strategic factors has been compared between these time periods. The choice of time periods: 1) from 1959 to 1966, 2) from 1969 to 1974, and 3) from 1975 to the present, is based on
what is commonly assumed to be distinct periods of Soviet doctrinal development. The first is generally associated with the "revolution in military affairs". The third is believed to reflect a strong reemphasis on theater conventional warfare. The second period represents a transition phase.

However, as shown in TABLE 1, the temporal distribution of the Soviet materials on the beginning period of war suggests two primary periods of intense research and analysis: 1953-1957 and 1981-present. Accordingly, the discussion that follows will focus more closely on these two periods of Soviet military scholarship.

One important question addressed in this research is how the Soviets combine various factors when carrying out comprehensive theater-level balance assessments. Do the Soviets integrate different factors, taking into account mutual interactions and trade-offs, or do they simply aggregate factors, creating a rank-ordering of listed factors? While individual factors may be rather mundane and straightforward, such as the importance of transport systems or of combat readiness, it is the relative weighting and emphasis of these factors that indicates Soviet concerns and perspectives.

1.3 Sources

The beginning period of war material used in this research is drawn from a large Soviet military-technical literature which includes the vast output of Voyenizdat, the military publishing house, and a number of journals which are linked to the various armed services. The primary data source for this report is the Soviet military journal Voyennoe
istoricheskiy zhurnal (Military Historical Journal), which is an organ of the Soviet Ministry of Defense and, as such, is accessed to the Soviet officer corps. One of the journal's editors is the head of the Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History. Soviet studies of the beginning period of war have also been undertaken by high-ranking military officers at the request of the Ministry of Defense. One such prestigious study was carried out at the General Staff Academy, and parts of the resulting report appeared in Military Thought and in a subsequent book edited by Army General S. Ivanov.¹

In the preparation of this report, we have analyzed about thirty articles from the Voyenne-istoricheskiy zhurnal, as well as an additional number of books and articles from other journals, from the time period 1955 to 1985. The time distribution of the articles from the Voyenne-istoricheskiy zhurnal, shown in Table 1, indicates that all these articles fell within either the 1955-1968 or 1981-1985 time periods. The group of articles in the early 1960's were part of the wide-ranging discussions in the military literature during what the Soviets have called the revolution in military affairs. This revolution in military affairs occurred as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were incorporated into the Soviet armed forces and the Soviet view of a future war was dramatically changed. The appearance of a group of articles in the Voyenne-istoricheskiy zhurnal during the 1980's, after a dearth of such articles since 1966, is harder to explain. As part of this report we shall investigate the possible cause or significance of this renewed interest in the beginning period of war.

¹
2. The Beginning Period of War: Literature

This report analyzes two aspects of the Soviet literature on the beginning period of war. The first aspect of the literature is a study of the overall historical evolution of the beginning period of war and of change in the definition and meaning of the beginning period of war. One aspect is analyzed in this present chapter. The second aspect of the literature is the Soviet discussion of specific strategic factors presented as indicators of military capability. This is analyzed in Chapter 3. Time series analysis has been applied to both aspects of the Soviet literature to investigate how Soviet assessments have changed over time.

This chapter presents the overall structure of Soviet conclusions of the evolution of the beginning period of war and analyzes the specific writings on a specific issue, the definition of the beginning period of war, have changed over time.

2.1 The Structure of the Literature

Soviet articles trace the historical evolution of the beginning period of war as they discuss five major ways in which it has changed and describe three historical types of beginning periods of war. The overall structure of the literature can be summarized in matrix form, as presented in Table 2. The Soviets write that changes in the beginning
The basic framework of Soviet discussions on war has changed over time between the 1959-1962, 1971-1980, and 1980-1985 time periods. In the section the Soviet view of each historical type of beginning period of war shall be described without reference to the three time periods.

The Soviets describe the beginning period of the First World War as involving the mobilization and concentration of main forces while border forces engage in minor battles, which were of relatively minor significance. These border clashes were limited in intensity and spatial size, involving relatively small numbers of forces. The primary goal of the opponents during this period was to succeed in achieving full mobilization and deployment of their major forces, and they did not try to achieve major war aims or strategic objectives. Thus, the duration of the beginning period of war did not have a decisive impact on the further course of the war. Soviet sources state that this phase of the beginning period of war was largely devoted upon by Soviet military planners during the preparations for the Second World War.

The beginning period of the Great Patriotic War, which began with the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, had an entirely different character. In preparing for the assault on the Soviet Union, the Germans assumed that the main portion of their forces at the time of
attention or brutality of the war are dangerous. The danger of intense fighting while the war is still in progress and involved in development of new armaments, in addition to the widespread use of large numbers of new types of weapons, could have an enormous impact on the outcome of the war. Therefore, the assistant to the commander-in-chief will be extremely important in the field and the commanders.
Soviet scholars from the Brezhnev period agree that there has been an 'essential' change in the Soviet concept in the evolution of the 
beginning period of war. In addition, they agree that the results of 
beginning period of war can have a relative impact on the conduct of the 
entire war. In addition, the Soviets have consistently emphasized the 
importance of the beginning period of war on the conduct of the 
future war. The Soviets have consistently emphasized the 
importance of the beginning period of war on the conduct of the 
future war.

1. The Framework of the Beginning Period of War

While the framework of Soviet discussions about the evolution of the 
beginning period of war has changed over time, the Soviet definition of 
the beginning period of war may change. This definitional change 
was noted in the 1960s. First, the change simply a matter of 
emphasis: it does not have significance as an indication of a new Soviet 
attitude in the beginning period of war. However, if the change is
significant, what does it mean? Both those questions will be considered in this section.

Before looking at the specifics of the definitional change, it is worth pointing out that there are some indications that this change has some general significance. First, the definitional issue was at the center of a major discussion carried on in the 1960s by major military officers. Second, while the difference in definition may not be explicitly stated as a change in the date of the conclusion of the beginning period of the Great Patriotic War, from November/December to mid-July, 1941, the discussions surrounding this change dealt with some fundamental issues of how to deal with surprise attacks and contain explicit references to nuclear weapons issues. The 1960s discussions were closely tied to the doctrinal discussions concerning the resolution of military affairs, and it is reasonable to postulate that this linkage to larger issues has remained.

What has been the change in the definition of the beginning period of war? The contentious issue has been how to define when the beginning period of war ends. Over time, various definitions have been given that the beginning period of war lasts until (1) the main forces enter combat, (2) one side achieves its nearest strategic objectives, (3) the situation stabilizes, or (4) conditions change and one side is forced to change its initial war plans. Many Soviet discussions of the beginning period of war have considered the explicit definition of this period, mostly with references to the question of the beginning period of the Great Patriotic War. All the definitions state that the beginning period of war starts...
when military hostilities first occur or war is declared, which in the case of the Great Patriotic War was June 22, 1941.

The first definition, that the beginning period of war ends when the main forces enter combat, was used by the Soviets before World War II and was decisively repudiated by that war. As discussed in the previous section, the Soviets write that most theorists expected that the Second World War would start like the First World War.

During the 1959 to 1966 time period, there were numerous articles and discussions about when the beginning period of war ends. Several articles referred to conferences and meetings where this issue was discussed. During this period the second definition, that the beginning period of war ends when the nearest strategic goals are achieved or are recognized as clearly unattainable, was widely supported. In 1960, an article cited a conference where the argument was made that the end of the beginning period of war should be determined using three criteria: 1) one side achieves its initial strategic goals, 2) it may last for several months, or 3) the plans of one side are broken. Another author offered the definition that it should end when the first strategic turning point (perelom) occurs, and placed this during the beginning period of the Great Patriotic War as when the Germans were defeated at Moscow in December, 1941. The third definition, that the beginning period of war ends when fronts have stabilized, was also presented, and by this definition the conclusion of the beginning period of the Great Patriotic war also occurred at the end of November.

Thus, by both the second and third definitions, the beginning period of the Great Patriotic War ended at the end of November or the beginning
of December, 1941 when the Soviets began the Battle of Moscow. By that
time the Soviets had been able to prevent the Germans from achieving
their initial strategic objective of totally destroying the Soviet Army
and for the first time the Soviets were able to go on the strategic
offensive. In 1961 two senior officers wrote articles which summed up
the discussions and seemed to present the officially sanctioned position
to conclude the wide-ranging discussions. These authors supported the
second definition, that the beginning period of war ends when one side
achieves its initial strategic objectives. During these discussions,
the authors specifically rejected the notion that the beginning period of
war ended within four weeks of the commencement of hostilities,
considering that this was an outdated definition with no basis in
reality.

In a 1971 article in the restricted circulation journal Militar.
Thought, the fourth definition was given which stated that the beginning
period of the Great Patriotic War ended in mid-July. By this fourth
definition the beginning period of war ended when 1) the front was
temporarily stabilized, 2) the enemy rate of advance was sharply reduced,
and 3) the enemy failed to achieve its initial objective. In a footnote
to this article the author asserted that this was not a new definition
for the end of the beginning period of war, and that it was presented
"merely to confirm its correctness on the basis of additional studies."10
This is a curious note because the new definition states that the
beginning period of the Great Patriotic War ended around the middle of
July, 1941, whereas earlier definitions specifically rejected that time
frame. The new definition has been repeated in books since 1971 and ha-
been used in articles in the Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal since 1961 when major discussions of the beginning period of war reappeared in that journal for the first time since 1966.1

A modification of the new definition was discussed in 1961 by Marshal Bagramyan who wrote that the beginning period of war ends when the military leadership of both sides realize that initial plans will not be achieved and they take concrete measures to principally change their further actions.12 Bagramyan, in agreement with the fourth definition gave the middle of July as the end of the beginning period of the Great Patriotic War and rejected the idea that the end of the beginning period of war occurs as one side achieves its initial strategic objectives because, as he wrote, neither side was able to do this during the Great Patriotic War.13

* * * * *

Thus, the evidence suggests that the change in definition has some broad significance, and was not merely a matter of semantics. This immediately raises the issue of what this significance might be. To investigate the significance of this change, it is valuable to consider the tone of the discussions as well as the specific defining characteristics.

The old formulation of the beginning period of war suggested that the beginning period of war ended when the defender could effect a major turning point or even seize the strategic initiative, or else when the attacker achieved his initial objectives. The new approach is oriented towards the defender’s ability to frustrate the attacker’s initial plans.
the beginning period of war ends when the defender's forces manage to escape destruction even if the attacker retains the strategic initiative. Thus, the argument can be made that the new concept places less ambitious demands on the defender's capabilities. The defender can consider that he has successfully concluded the beginning period of war, which is when the attacker has the strongest temporary advantages over the defender, if he can force the attacker to change his plans. The defender no longer has to gain the strategic initiative in order to have concluded the beginning period of war.

While this interpretation is speculative, it may indicate that the Soviets are changing their concepts of fighting the initial battles in a war when nuclear weapons are used because it is hard to conceive of a clear initiative when the opponents are exchanging nuclear strikes. One can also hypothesize that the new definition is related to the shift in Soviet doctrine away from an all-nuclear war towards the recognition of a conventional phase. The fact that there may be a conventional beginning period of war has been recognized in one of the more recent Soviet articles on the subject. The implications of this change in definition of the beginning period of war shall be further discussed in relation to strategic factors such as the factor of surprise.
3. STRATEGIC FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN THE LITERATURE

This chapter presents analysis of major factors which appear in the Soviet literature as measures of military capability. A series of strategic factors have been identified and studied across the three time periods to measure their change over time.

One of the fundamental points the Soviets make about the beginning period of war is that the aggressor's use of surprise during this period allows him to seize the strategic initiative and gain significant temporary advantages. Soviet discussions of how to deal with adversarial use of the factor of surprise can be divided into two groups: those that advocate preparing in advance to such an extent that surprise has a less severe impact, and those that recommend developing intelligence and detection systems to provide warning time. These two methods of dealing with surprise are by no means mutually exclusive as their combined use enhances a country's ability to deal with surprise. The Soviets present these two abilities -- the extent of preparations carried out in advance, and the gain in warning time -- as important measures of how well a country can deal with the beginning period of war and the factor of surprise. In this way, when they consider how they are doing versus the West, the Soviets apparently use these criteria as guideposts for assessment. These criteria by themselves are too general to be of great value, so the next sections of this report shall analyze how the Soviets have elaborated upon them and discussed just how they can be achieved.

3.1 The Factor of Surprise
According to the literature, the beginning period of war has increased in importance because it is now possible to achieve decisive war aims during this period. This, in turn, is possible in part due to the factor of surprise. The Soviets refer to various levels of surprise ("everzagonost") with tactical, operational, and strategic surprise corresponding to the levels of military art. They also discuss different forms of surprise, with references to surprise in timing, in place of operation, and in means of operation. In addition, the Soviets have discussed different degrees of surprise, with recent use of the term "total surprise." Surprise can also involve the use of misinformation and deception to confuse the enemy as to one's real intentions and actions.

When the beginning period of war may involve a surprise attack by an aggressor using forces reached in advance, there are two ways to lessen the impact of surprise: to be constantly prepared so surprise doesn't matter, or to obtain enough warning of an impending attack to be able to bring forces to alert. Soviet discussions about these issues reveal that authors have taken a range of different positions over time. The basic differences expressed by Soviet authors revolve around their assumptions about the degree to which it is possible or desirable to prepare forces during peacetime before an attack occurs. Major aspects of these discussions have been the question of the extent to which peacetime preparations can predetermine the course of the beginning period of war, and the potential impact technology and people can have on this process.

Soviet writings on this issue have presented different positions in each of the three time periods studied. At the beginning of the 1955-
1960 time period, it was argued that it is both possible and desirable to have forces fully prepared in advance on a steady-state basis. Later in this time period, beginning in the mid-1960's, authors argued that, while it may be possible to have forces constantly ready, it is not necessary because there will be a threatening period before an attack that will provide enough warning to bring forces to full readiness. During the 1980-1985 time period, the Soviets have emphasized that a clear threatening period may not occur because nuclear weapons can be launched without warning, but that it is not desirable to keep forces on full alert on a steady-state basis because this would appear to the opponent as being on a war status and would be too provocative. Thus, over time the literature has more fully recognized both military and political problems involved in attempts to lessen the impact of surprise.

The first position, that it is both possible and desirable to pre-mobilize forces and prepare defenses in advance, was presented by a Soviet author in 1959 who argued that such preparations could enable a country to ward off an attack. This concept, that preparations carried out before a war can help prevent an attack as well as helping to ward it off, has been presented in Soviet sources at various times. The logic of this first position supports maintaining military forces on full alert and in total preparation as a steady state, even during peacetime.

The second position was presented later in the 1960's as sources indicated that there might be a threatening period before the actual launching of an attack so a country could rely on warning time to bring its forces from partial to full alert and readiness. The threatening period is defined as beginning the moment that an aggressor decides to...
attack and ending when the attack actually takes place. It was recognized that in tense situations a threatening period could arise without an actual decision to attack, and that in some cases the threatening period could end without any attack if the imminent conflict was avoided through peaceful means, such as occurred in the Cuban missile crisis. Due to the existence of a threatening period, the proper use of strategic intelligence sources could allow a country to neutralize the factor of surprise. Belief in this second position would lead the Soviets to feel that it is not necessary to maintain forces on full alert because a threatening period will allow time for a rapid alerting process, but that it is very important to possess the capability to obtain adequate warning time.

Finally, in the 1980's, Soviet sources have presented a third position. They indicate that it is not possible to have all measures taken in advance, or to complete them during a threatening period, because 1) now there may be an attack without any threatening period, and 2) total preparation of forces can appear to the enemy as being a move to a war footing and this may provoke a war. This recent Soviet position concerning the alert status of the armed forces clearly recognizes the problems and implications of various strategic postures. Correspondingly, other Soviet sources have argued that today no aggressor can avoid suffering an inevitable retaliatory blow after attacking the opponent because the defender's forces are either survivable or can be launched under attack. It is unclear how these views affect Soviet thinking on theater warfare, and further investigation is necessary.

In any case the Soviets recognize that it is not politically possible
to have all forces on high alert and that, at least in the case of intercontinental war, a clear threatening period may not occur before an attack. This has served to sharpen Soviet interest in the study of the beginning period of war.

In the context of the above the Soviets have discussed various preparatory actions, and have divided these preparations into two categories: preliminary preparations and direct preparations.19 Preliminary preparations, which include a wide range of economic, political, and military measures, can be begun long before a war, whereas direct preparations are begun during a threatening period closer to the possible beginning of a war.

3.2 Preliminary Preparations for the Beginning Period of War

The Soviets place particular emphasis on a series of preliminary military preparations including:

- premobilization and strategic deployment
- the development of the economic base
- the development of military science

Many of these measures are considered part of strategic deployment (strategicheskoye razvertyvaniye) which is closely interconnected with aspects of mobilization and preparation.20 It is the capability to carry out these measures, and the degree to which a country has carried them out, which the Soviets evaluate when they carry out their balance assessments. We have not yet gathered sufficient data concerning these factors to be able to present a clear analysis of how Soviet treatment has changed over time, so the findings in this section must be considered
tentative.

The Soviet literature emphasizes that premobilization should be carried out to such an extent that one can begin initial operations immediately at the outset of a war. As one author wrote in 1981, before the beginning of a war it is necessary to have forces and means in a readiness condition such that they are able to ward off a surprise attack without requiring additional completion of mass mobilization. In addition, earlier sources indicate the importance of preparing engineering defenses in the likely theaters of military action and point to problems in the Great Patriotic War with Soviet forces which were placed directly along the borders without the support of fortified defenses.

Soviet discussions of the ability to hide premobilization measures indicate that they consider this an important factor in determining a country's military capabilities. This consideration is applicable to the Soviets' own military capabilities even though they don't explicitly discuss actions they may take to hide their own premobilization. Soviet sources indicate that it is very difficult to hide premobilization measures, as reconnaissance capabilities have greatly improved since the Second World War. Nevertheless, the Soviets describe several ways that premobilization can be carried out in secret and stress the historical importance of this secrecy.

First, the Soviets write that measures should be carried out gradually over a long period of time so they are easier to hide. Sources from the 1953-1966 time period seem most interested in hiding preparations, whereas later sources write more often that additional measures will be
needed. A 1960 article observed that mobilization before the First World War was openly carried out as quickly as possible, whereas before the Second World War it was done in secret over a long period.\textsuperscript{24} Soviet articles in 1959 and 1966 presented percentages and a chart to emphasize that the tendency in the 1930's was to begin strategic deployment measures earlier in the prewar period.\textsuperscript{25}

Additional sources, including one from 1984, observe that pre-mobilization can be carried out in stages so that it is harder to detect. A 1963 article emphasized that, while rapid and successful strikes require massing of forces, these large force formations cannot be hidden so surprise should be achieved through inconspicuous measures, and not by rapidly creating strike forces.\textsuperscript{26} Citing German actions, the 1964 article noted that a first stage involves the gradual mobilization of forces over a long period of time, and a second stage involves the formation of large groups of forces, which cannot be hidden so it is done at the last moment before a war.\textsuperscript{27}

A second way to hide preparations is to use disinformation instead of, or along with, masking preparations. Sources from both the 1959-1966 and 1980-1985 time periods write that this includes both the use of increased diplomatic action and intensive negotiations to deceive the enemy, and carrying out military preparations under the pretext of conducting military exercises, standard maneuvers, force replenishment, or strengthening defenses.\textsuperscript{28} A 1961 source cited the German use of a prelude of "local wars" to prepare its economy and forces for the attack on the Soviet Union, and added that modern local wars must be carefully studied because they too may lead to a new world war.\textsuperscript{29} Soviet sources

\textsuperscript{21}
cite the German use of diplomatic, press, and state organs in a massive
disinformation campaign to create the impression that they were actually
preparing for an attack on England, not the Soviet Union. They also
mention the World War II practice of world leaders who took well-
published vacations to add to the pretext that their countries were not
preparing for war.

The second preliminary preparation, which the Soviets have cited ---
in all time periods, involves economic measures introduced to strengthen
the defense capability of the Soviet state. These include the common
measures to improve the material-technical base of the economy,
especially the heavy and military industries, and emphasis is placed on
historical efforts to become economically independent. Especially:
ares such as the production of synthetic rubber and special metals. The
Soviets also present the development of better railroad and road
transport systems as being particularly important, and even suggested
that the Soviet Union did not adequately do this before the Great
Patriotic War. In this process of economic preparation the Soviets
attach great importance to having a central coordinating and planning
organization to direct preparations.

The third preliminary preparation discussed by the Soviets involves
the development of military science. As mentioned above, it is the task
of military science to analyze the likely nature and characteristics of
military operations in a future war, such as predicting the overall
nature of the beginning period of war. During the 1989-1994 time period,
Soviet sources focused on problems encountered in World War II, citing
the huge number of directives which were issued in the beginning period
of the Great Patriotic War on how to conduct military operations; because many prewar military principles were found to be incorrect. In reference to the Great Patriotic War, Soviet authors remind readers that it is necessary to have clear plans to ward off an attack as well as having plans to carry out an attack. Before the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet military had primarily focused on the conduct of the offensive and was not prepared for the long period of strategic defensive operations which they were forced to carry out.

In the 1980s, the Soviets have focused on the need to fully articulate alternative war plans. As a 1981 source wrote that planners should work out several variations of the new operations they intend to use before a war starts and take into account the enemy's plans and possible actions. Thus, it is very important to know the enemy's military strategies and methods as well as to have your own defense military theory which has studied how to make use of all new types of weapons. In 1985, Gareev (then Chief of the the Military Science Directorate of the General Staff) wrote that superiority in military art is one way to increase combat capability without needing any additional material expenditures.

Thus, the Soviets assess a country's capability to carry out preliminary preparations largely in terms of how well that country can conceal those preparations. Measuring the ability to keep preliminary preparations secret was emphasized much more than any other aspect of these preparations. Over time the Soviets seem to have recognized the increasing difficulty of hiding preparations, but have always discussed the benefits of disinformation if hiding preparations is not possible.
3.3 Direct Preparations for the Beginning Period of War

Whereas the literature suggests that preliminary preparations should be conducted on a steady basis under contemporary conditions, direct preparations are those taken during periods of increased threat of war or during a threatening period, if a threatening period occurs. As mentioned above, the Soviets write that a threatening period can begin by chance during a time of high tensions or it can begin with one country's conscious decision to start a war. The threatening period ends when a crisis is resolved through peaceful means or when an attack is launched.

Soviet sources since the late 1950's have discussed the possibility of a threatening period but over time they have become increasingly doubtful that an obvious threatening period will occur. Nevertheless, despite the unresolved issues of whether a threatening period will occur and what form it will take if it does occur, it is clear that the Soviets have considered it important both to be able to detect an opponent's direct preparations and to be ready to carry out one's own direct preparations.

Until the 1970's, Soviet sources indicated that there would be some concrete identifiable signs of enemy preparations which, if detected and acted upon, would allow the placing of forces on full alert. A 1959 source described modern forces, such as rocket, air, naval, and mobile ground forces which are ready for action in quantities sufficient for achieving strategic goals in the beginning period of war, as beginning military action with surprise attacks launched from their basing regions. This source, citing foreign authors, wrote that the strategic deployment of these forces "basically comes down to their most rational permanent
deployment [basing] in all intended theaters of military action and to secretly shifting, to a limited degree, only parts of these forces during a threatening period (which, besides, may not even occur)."

During the 1959 to 1966 period, many Soviet articles recounted various direct military preparations carried out in World War II, but a remarkable passage in a 1963 article by Col. Lipitskii explicitly described contemporary preparations:

Many ... signs of the threatening period no longer arise. However, some signs remain. For example, placing the highest command organs on a war footing; turning on new communications networks; bringing troops to full combat readiness; dispersal and masking of bases and aviation weapons.

Along with these familiar signs, new and extremely important signs will inevitably appear.

It is obvious that no country today will risk starting a rocket-nuclear war without taking serious preliminary measures in the areas of anti-air and anti-nuclear defense. Besides this, it is impossible to use contemporary aviation, operational, and strategic missiles without starting up complex servomechanisms and guidance systems. In order to use nuclear warheads (yadernye boyevoe napryazhenii), one has to assemble (sobrat') them and deliver them to airfields and missile launch sites. Therefore, defining the threatening period as the interval of time used for direct preparations for the first operations of a war, retains its meaning even in contemporary conditions. But such a conclusion by itself does not teach very much. Moreover, it would be an unforgivable mistake to count on the presence of a clear threatening period in future wars. The entire experience of imperialist wars leads us to a different conclusion.

Lipitskii's reference to the need to assemble nuclear warheads and bring them to launch sites appears to apply to Soviet weapons because at that time the KGB appears to have had physical control over nuclear warheads which, in time of crisis, would have been transported to missile sites for emplacement on the missiles. Lipitskii indicated that, while some signs of a threatening period will probably still be detectable, the traditional "clear" threatening period may no longer occur. Nevertheless, the Soviets, according to Lipitskii, expected that there
would be some warning before a U.S. attack because gyroscopes and
guidance systems had to be started up. Later in the article, Lipitskiy
repeated that there may not be a clear threatening period, and added that
it is not impossible for an aggressor "to some degree" to hide direct
preparations for a first strike, so the bottom line is that ability to
detect preparations and constant combat readiness of the troops have
decisive significance.

Other sources from this period describe additional important direct
preparations which could be made during a threatening period. These
include carrying out reconnaissance of the entire front in order to
determine the plans and deployments of the enemy, placing command organs
on a war footing, concentrating forces, and organizing operational
security and command. Lipitskiy mentioned a range of military measures
such as giving troops full ammunition supplies and increasing stocks of
fuel or other supplies. A range of military-economic actions are to be
expected, such as changing railroad schedules, increasing military
transportation, and having ships return to ports or bases. In addition,
the economy can be secretly shifted to a war footing far in advance of a
war, using "local wars to cover this action.

Various articles also described the less explicit indications of a
threatening period as including great diplomatic activity, domestic
militarism and censorship, military negotiations with allies, and general
increases in tension in international affairs. Lipitskiy goes so far as
to cite a French theorist to the effect that, in order to catch the
defender unawares, the aggressor should strive to ease tensions and
conduct successful negotiations. 

26
In contrast to articles in the 1960's which discussed explicit signs of a threatening period, a series of sources written in the 1980's by prominent military officers suggest that there may not be a "clear" threatening period. While these articles do not discuss concrete signs of direct military preparations, they do continue to indicate, in part based on World War II experiences, that there will be a period of increased tensions during which a country can raise the combat readiness of the armed forces. For example, in 1985 Yevseyev noted that "it is necessary to take the basic preparatory measures to foil an attack at a real threat of attack arises." He went on to add that the combat readiness of the armed forces and the firmness of the leadership of the country and armed forces must be increased as the threat of surprise attack becomes more serious. At the same time, Kir'yan noted that the massive use of electronic and technical means of intelligence gathering allows one to detect the massed launch of missiles and perhaps to detect enemy preparations for a first strike. In contrast, in a book also published in 1985, Gareyev emphasized that an attack could take place without any preparations, and that you can no longer rely on being able to finish preparation measures during a threatening period. Gareyev also noted that it is not politically plausible to have total preparations made in advance of a war because such a level of preparation and mobilization would appear to the enemy like being on a war footing and, as he implicitly indicates, this could provoke a war.

While these discussions present a range of positions, they do indicate that the Soviets still believe that there will be a period of increased tensions, if not explicit signs of a threatening period, during which
they will be able to increase the readiness of their armed forces. An important area for further research concerns the issue of how or when the Soviets may decide to initiate their direct preparations, and how they expect these preparations may affect an evolving situation.

3.4 Intelligence Systems

A series of Soviet sources state that it is important to begin with preliminary and direct preparations under cover in order to surprise the opponent. On the other hand, the Soviets seek to plan to make a series of direct military preparations which depend on the ability to obtain indications that an enemy is preparing to go to war. This points to the Soviet belief that it is necessary to have a good intelligence gathering capability, and that the possession of such a capability is an important factor in assessing one's overall military power.

During the 1959-1966 time period, many Soviet sources were concerned with the need to have rapid transfer of intelligence data to the highest command levels. For example, one author in 1959 wrote that well-organized intelligence could exclude the possibility of a surprise strike, and expressed the need to have constant daily checking of the status of the enemy and its troops in all theaters of military action.47 Several sources have gone on to mention the need for the High Command to have intelligence channels independent of lower commands, in part due to the delays which multi-tiered structures can create.48 Finally, many sources have written that it is necessary for the strategic leadership to rapidly process the intelligence information and take the necessary actions, often referring to Stalin's failure to do this in
response to warning of the German preparations. Thus, in their 1954-1966 assessments of intelligence capabilities, the Soviets stressed the need to rapidly obtain information and transfer it to the highest levels.

Soviet writings from the 1980-1985 period have been more concerned with the capability to fully monitor all enemy plans. These sources indicate that an intelligence system optimally should be able to gain information about enemy war plans, strategies, development of new weapons or methods, and to warn of enemy intentions. This has often simply been mentioned as the need to be able to unmask the schemes of the aggressor.

Over time, the Soviet concerns about intelligence systems appear to have changed as these systems have changed. Thus, in the early period when direct intelligence links were stressed as the concern was to reduce the processing time for intelligence data as it moved from the lower to the higher command levels. In the 1980's this concern has been muted as the focus has shifted to the need for more fully capable intelligence-gathering systems.

3.5 Strategic Command and Communications Systems

The Soviets have considered the proper design of a strategic command system as an increasingly important factor in assessing the military capability of a country and its armed forces. Soviet articles from all time periods make widespread reference to the Soviet problems at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War when they had to establish new strategic command organizations because the leadership had not correctly anticipated the nature or requirements of a future war. The prewar strategic command system was set up so that the High Command directly
commanded the Fronts and Fleets, but the experiences of the first days of combat showed the necessity of intermediate command organs to bring strategic leadership closer to the troops. While articles from all three time periods make this general point, they discuss the more specific strategic factors in different ways.

Articles in the Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal from the 1959 to 1966 period discuss the decentralization of strategic command but do not focus on the specific institution of commands of strategic directions. As Rukhle wrote in 1959, the High Command could not operationally lead operational-strategic actions of interacting groupings of combined-arms forces, especially in the rapidly changing conditions of the beginning period of war. This required a certain decentralization of strategic leadership, which took the form of the creation of commands of strategic directions, in order to coordinate the actions of groups of Fronts. So Soviet sources from the post-1980 period focus much more on the institution of commands of strategic directions. While these commands of strategic directions are credited with a certain amount of positive influence on war actions, they apparently had problems because they did not have adequate forces at their command to act independently, so they often had to appeal to the High Command for support. In addition, the directional command was often simply a transformed Front command without independent apparatus, but experience showed that the successful conduct of a large offensive operations required the support of an independent command apparatus. Finally, the High Command began to issue orders directly to the Fronts, bypassing the directional commands. This had negative effects because time and clarity were lost while the Fronts
double-checked different sets of orders with both the directional and High Commands. These problems led to the gradual dismantling of the directional commands. Soviet sources conclude that the intermediate command links can have positive effects under certain conditions, and point to the Far East Command which was positively regarded and has recently been reestablished.54

In addition, Soviet sources from the 1980's make a series of points about evaluating the proper design and use of strategic command systems. First, it should be expected that command and control organs will be some of the first targets to be attacked.55 Thus, as also mentioned in 1961, the command system must be ready to operate under conditions when the enemy has the strategic initiative and when the system itself is under attack.56 Second, because of the possibility of sudden attacks, strategic command systems should be prepared so that they do not have to be improvised or reorganized in the beginning period of war.57 Third, the staffs of military districts will be transformed into parts of Fronts and Armies, and this process must be thoroughly prepared in advance so as to occur with a minimum of time and confusion. Fourth, as discussed above, commands should be decentralized to the extent necessary to be able to operate in rapidly changing conditions and handle highly maneuverable forces. Finally, it is stressed that each level of strategic command must have control over adequate amounts of the strategic reserve forces so they can control the course of combat during the beginning period of war (see discussion below). Strategic commands must have the proper structure and principles of operation worked out before a war to correspond to character of military action in that war.
and be able to control and rapidly maneuver effective amounts of strategic reserve forces. 58

Soviet sources also place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of being able to maintain communications in the beginning period of war. Articles from different time periods express the expectation that communications assets will be high-priority targets which must have high technical readiness, and cite the major efforts made in the Great Patriotic War to retain constant contact with units despite the destruction of many communications assets. 59 Articles from the 1980-1986 time period appear to stress the need for reliable communications more than do articles from the early period. For example, an 1984 article recalled how initial German attacks on radio stations and on both military and governmental communications systems placed the Front and Army commands out of contact with the High Command and the General Staff, so many commands were not fully informed about the conditions and progress of the war. 60 Another article from 1984 said that the protection of frontal communications is one of the PVO’s most important roles during the beginning period of war. 61 They consider the possession of a robust communications system an important factor in evaluating the military effectiveness of a country.

Thus, Soviet consideration of strategic command systems has focussed on their ability to rapidly move from peacetime to wartime status as a war begins, and to adjust to new requirements during the course of a war. Reaction time is presented as a major indicator of this capability. In addition, the Soviets have paid increasing attention to the institution of commands of strategic directions, suggesting that these intermediate
command links can be very valuable under certain conditions. Soviet discussions of communications systems have also placed increasing stress on the need for such systems to be survivable and decentralized to the extent needed for optimal operation in an environment of rapid and dynamic combat. Thus, there appears to be a growing recognition that limited decentralization of command and communications may be appropriate under some contemporary conditions.

3.6 Strategic Reserves

The Soviets consider that changes in the nature and importance of the beginning period of war have increased the importance of the proper organization and use of strategic reserve forces. Soviet evaluations of strategic reserves focus on two criteria: that strategic reserves be configured so they can be rapidly maneuvered and brought into action, and that the strategic leadership have direct control over a sufficient quantity of strategic reserves to be able to impact the flow of the war.

Articles in the Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal from both the early and late time periods discuss the need for organizing the structure of the strategic reserve forces so that they can respond to the rapidly-developing action which will occur during the beginning period of war.\footnote{62} One article from 1966 mentioned that the Allied command of France and Britain suffered both from a lack of adequate reserves and from the lack of close coordination which would enable the reserves to be rapidly shifted to where most needed.\footnote{63}

A series of Soviet articles have also stated that the strategic leadership organs must have direct control over strategic reserves in
order to be able to affect the course of combat action during the
beginning period of war. Several articles from the 1959-1966 period
state that the Germans held only about 12 percent of their forces in the
General Staff reserve when they attacked the Soviet Union, and that this
contributed to the wasting away of German offensive potential which
finally ran out at the battle of Moscow. Another article from this
early period suggested that the lack of reserves under a strong unified
leadership contributed to the French and British losses despite the
slight numerical superiority of the combined French and British force.
In the period after 1980, articles on the value of commands of strategic
directions note that the lack of control over an adequate force of
strategic reserve forces was one of the major reasons why the directional
commands were of limited effectiveness.

Thus, the Soviets consider the possession of strategic reserves in
adequate strength and under close command by the strategic leadership to
be an important component of military capability. Whereas early articles
focused on the need for adequate quantities of reserves, later articles
were oriented towards the importance of command structures in the use and
shifting of reserves.

3.7 Additional Strategic Factors

In addition to the above-mentioned capabilities and preparations which
the Soviets feel are important in assessing a country's defense
capability, the beginning period of war literature raises a series of
other factors which are considered in balance assessments.

A first factor is the design of logistics and supply systems. The
Soviets use the experience of the beginning period of the Great Patriotic War to draw lessons concerning the best way to organize logistics and supply systems for the future. Once again the Soviets emphasize that an incorrect pre-war image of the beginning period of war led them to design their logistics system based on the assumption that there would be time to mobilize. As a result, the supply system consisted of large stationary depots from which, it was assumed, supplies would be moved to smaller local supply centers. Command of the supply system was divided between General Staff and NKVD directorates as well as being coordinated by Front commands. Due to the suddenness of the German attack and the rapid mobility of many forces, the supply system was totally inadequate. Many supplies were captured at the stationary central depots while lower-level supply centers ran out of material. Fronts and Armies had to go directly to the NKVD for supplies, creating a chaotic command structure. All requests for supplies were uncoordinated.

Thus, the Soviets conclude, a supply system must have centralized command of all rear supplies, there must be independent operational-level rear commands, and supply units and distribution centers must be mobile and dispersed. The system should also be prepared for providing supply under conditions of massive evacuations. Due to the anticipated nature of the beginning period of war, a supply system must not assume that it will have time to move supplies from central to local depots.

Another factor the Soviets discuss is the effect of coalitions on military balances and on the conduct of warfare. The degree of integration in economic, planning, and military respects is very important according to Soviet sources, as is the problem of organizing...
reliable command of coalition armed forces. In the case of India, where in 1965 that the lack of integrated or unified command between the French and British forces in World War II negated their numerical superiority.7 The Soviets write that allies should unite their economic and military resources and develop shared doctrines and strategic plans. The effectiveness of an alliance, according to the Soviets, is measured by much more than simple military means and cooperation, as the objective is as total a degree of integration as possible.

The Soviets also discuss sources of uncertainty in assessing military capabilities. First, they write that in today’s conditions of rapid technological change, decisions often must be made without sufficient experience. For example, it is impossible to replicate situations such as the enemy use of weapons of mass destruction. In combat, military operations is limited.7 In addition, they mention that it is difficult to test fully the capabilities of new weapons without wartime restrictions, so one may encounter unexpected weapons effects, lethality, and vulnerabilities. Second, a 1960 source wrote that military forces will have habits based on previous wars and these may be very difficult to change.72 Third, the country as a whole may respond unpredictably to massive surprise attacks. In this respect, sources in the 1960’s argue that it is important to prepare for the psychological reorientation of the people and the armed forces so they can deal with these incidents.7 Finally, morale is a factor, as the French and British suffered from low morale as a result of the "phony war" and the passive strategies of their countries.

A final capability which has been discussed in Soviet sources is the
need for defenses prepared in advance of a war. One source in 1963 wrote that anti-air and anti-nuclear defenses would be prepared before any country would risk beginning a nuclear war. Other authors in the 1980's have written that in a war which may be of long duration it is very important to have air defense of industrial centers as well as airfields, troops, and command organs.
4. CONCLUSIONS

This study has shown that the the beginning period of war literature can provide information about a wide range of issues and factors which the Soviets consider important in assessing military capabilities. Analysis of Soviet treatment of strategic factors has shown that Soviet assessments have changed their focus over time from the 1960-1965 period to the 1980-1985 period:

1) Discussions of the factor of surprise have shown increasing Soviet recognition of both political and military constraints on measures to reduce the impact of surprise.

2) Discussions of preliminary preparations show that the Soviets expect that these measures will commence very early, and over time they have recognized that the importance of disinformation has increased because improved reconnaissance abilities make it difficult to totally hide preparations.

3) Discussions of direct preparations for war have, since the early 1960's, stressed the importance of these measures even though over time the Soviets have increasingly realized that there may not be a "clear" threatening period.

4) Discussions of intelligence systems have shifted from a focus on the importance of achieving rapid rates of data flow to the high command to a focus on the need to acquire full data on enemy plans and intentions.

5) Discussions of strategic command and communications systems over time have focused more on the need for intermediate and partially decentralized systems.

6) Discussions of strategic reserves have moved over time from using quantitative measures of reserve capabilities to using measures related to the quality of command and utilization procedures.

This analysis has shown that the Soviets feel that the level of preparation of the armed forces should be raised in accordance with a possible increasing level of threat of war. As tensions grow, and
especially if a threatening period is judged to have begun, the required level of military readiness increases dramatically. The Soviets seem to believe that, although there may be no "clear" threatening period, they still will be able to detect increasing levels of threat of war and raise their preparatory and readiness levels accordingly. This is a further indication that the Soviets directly link their desired levels of military capability to the level of threat of war. As stated above, this implies that Soviet assessments of military balances can change dramatically depending on their perception of the level of threat of war. Thus, balance assessments in peacetime conditions may use different criteria than balance assessments in threatening periods.

This analysis has also investigated whether the Soviets aggregate or integrate the many factors which enter into composite assessments of military balances. While there have not been any explicit examples of the Soviets integrating factors with clear interactions or trade-offs, there have been several cases of implicit trade-offs. For example, the Soviets recognize the negative interaction between carrying out preparations for war and achieving surprise in that war. Their response to this seems to be that this trade-off can be managed through carefully planned preparations and concealment measures including the use of disinformation and maskirovka. In one case there was an implicit statement of a trade-off between coalition unity and numerical superiority where the lack of unity and cohesion in military alliance planning, accompanied by morale problems, negated a slight numerical superiority in forces. Apart from these examples, we have yet to uncover further evidence of how the Soviets integrate the factors in their...
assessments. They do consider factors which are related to one another, such as strategic command and the need to have adequate levels of strategic reserves at each level of command, but most factors are aggregated in the literature.

Another issue addressed in this report has been the relative importance of qualitative and quantitative measures of armed forces. When articles have presented numerical data they have given both kinds of quantitative measures, such as the percentage of overall forces which were involved in the beginning period of war or ratios of numbers of divisions, and somewhat qualitative measures, such as the ratios of qualitatively new types of weapons. Over time between 1959-1966 and 1980-1985, discussions of preliminary preparations and strategic reserves have shown decreased use of quantitative measures relative to qualitative ones. In general, many articles have also emphasized the growing importance of qualitative advances in weapons and technology. Thus, in balance it appears that the Soviets have increasingly been using qualitative measures over quantitative ones in their assessments.

One overall factor which is prevalent in many Soviet assessments of military capabilities is that of time. Whereas Western analysts may use quality of performance as the dominant criteria for evaluating military forces and means, the Soviets use a criteria of how long it takes to perform a given mission. For example, they measure the effectiveness of intelligence systems in terms of how long it takes information to reach the top, the effectiveness of command systems by how long it would take to reconfigure them to a wartime status, and the effectiveness of supply systems by how little time they require for full operation. Even in
discussing strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets express the need for higher alert levels and the need to detect enemy actions as soon as possible.

This raises the issue of how the Soviets assess crises. They express the need to carry out preparative measures as soon as a threatening situation arises, and the set of criteria they use to assess the military balance during such a period may generate very different conclusions than the set of criteria used during peacetime. The time factor may assume great significance for the military as they may not be able to account the time they feel is necessary for warning and preparations. The Soviets have recently addressed the issue that being fully prepared for war, while this may be militarily possible, is not politically plausible because such a level of military preparedness is not clearly distinguishable from a war footing and thus is provocative. It is these issues, of how Soviet assessments may shift during the process of moving from peace to beginning period of war and of what actions the Soviets may take based on these assessments, which we have begun to address. Nevertheless, this subject remains an area for further research involving a wider range of Soviet sources.

The beginning period of war literature has provided a direct view of strategic factors which shape the framework for Soviet theater-level military assessments. Over time we have seen how the basic assumptions which lie behind the assessments have changed as the expected nature of the threatening period has been reevaluated. In order to further probe the details of the Soviet balance assessment process, it is necessary to expand our analysis of the beginning period of war literature to more
firmly establish possible changes over time in the Soviet treatment of
the major factors we have identified so far.
TABLE 1: Temporal Distribution of Source Materials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>VIZn Articles</th>
<th>Other Sources</th>
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**TABLE 2: Three Soviet Images of Historical Types of Beginning Periods of War**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>World War I</th>
<th>World War II</th>
<th>Contemporary</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Beginning Period of War</td>
<td>Relatively small units of border forces</td>
<td>Major groups of forces deployed in peacetime</td>
<td>Nuclear reactor or conventional forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Combat</td>
<td>Limited border clashes of relatively low intensity</td>
<td>Dynamic all-arms combat</td>
<td>Massed nuclear or conventional strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Combat</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals of Military Action</td>
<td>Carry out covering battles while major forces mobilize and deploy</td>
<td>Achieve nearest strategic goals while major forces mobilize and deploy</td>
<td>Achieve major war objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of results</td>
<td>Relatively minor</td>
<td>Result can affect course of war, and perhaps outcome of the war</td>
<td>Result can directly determine the outcome of the entire war and place the country in extreme circumstances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES

1. Ivanov (1971a; 42), Ivanov (1974), most of the Ivanov (1971a article appears later as the introduction to his 1974 book.

2. Rukhle (1959; 3-18), Kolgushkin & Bersnadskiy (1960; 50-51).

3. see, for example, Viktorov (1960).


5. Viktorov (1960; 122-123).


7. Mernov (1960; 40).


15. see Rukhle (1959; 8-9).


17. Lipitskiy (1963; 11).

18. see Gareyev (1985a; 241-243).

19. see, for example, Lipitskiy (1963; I2-13, 19-20), Zapovozhenenko & Galitskiy (1984; 39-40).

20. see Kozlov (1959; especially pp. 3).


22. Kolchigan (1961),
23. see Partan (1986).
24. Mernov (1960;34).
27. Zaporozhchenko & Galitskiy (1984;39-40), others
28. see Rukhle (1959;5-9), Kozlov (1952), Lipitskiy (1963;12-13,16,24),
30. see, for example, Matsulenko (1984;30-33).
31. Karryuknov (1964;5-6).
32. see Mernov (1960;33), Kurkotin (1984).
33. see, for example, Baskakov (1966;32-33).
34. Alferov (1991;33).
37. this will be discussed in more detail below, and see Lipitskiy (1963), Proektor (1966;38), Ivanov (1971).
38. Kozlov (1959;17).
42. Lipitskiy (1963;24).
47. Rukhle (1959;16).
48. Rukhle (1959;16), Korkodinov (1965;30), others


52. Rukhle (1959;17).


54. see, for example, Mayorov (1985), Gurkin (1984;19).


56. Zakharov (1961;8).

57. see, for example Mayorov (1985;33).

58. see Mayorov (1985).


60. Matsulenko (1984;43).


63. Proektor (1966;34).


65. see Rukhle (1959;17), Zakharov (1961;6).


70. Proektor (1966;34-35).
74. Lipitskiy (1963:34).


