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THE POLITICS OF TRADEOFFS AMONG
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CENTRAL ISSUES AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Western observers have long disagreed about whether internal economic pressures would restrain the Soviet impulse to amass military power and engage the United States in an open-ended arms race. For the most part, neither the proponents nor the opponents of this hypothesis have treated it with sufficient care. Proponents have frequently exaggerated the assertiveness of a populace deeply traumatized by the mass terror of the Stalin years and have often underestimated the appeal of quite modest consumer improvements for persons who lived through the acute economic hardships of that era. In addition, proponents have sometimes underrated the strength of the Soviet elite's reflexive concern about military security. Many opponents, on the other hand, have mistakenly viewed the post-Stalin system as a simple continuation of Stalinism. They have therefore failed to discern a crucial diversification of the regime's economic goals, including the development of a new commitment to the sustained growth of popular welfare. Not least important, the exponents of both viewpoints have generally overlooked possible tensions between military spending and the investments needed to maintain the USSR's long-term economic growth.

The political aspect of such budgetary tradeoffs warrants more careful analysis because it is directly
relevant to the current defense policies of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The diminishing growth of the Soviet workforce has made effective labor motivation seem more important to party leaders—and this at a time when some workers' economic expectations have already been raised by the secular increase in welfare since Stalin's death. Political calculations appear to have reinforced the economic case for further increases in consumption. Despite the infrequency of public demonstrations of consumer discontent inside the USSR, events such as the Polish crisis have prompted some leaders to ask whether higher living standards are now essential to ensure the political quiescence of a citizenry whose memories of Stalinism are gradually fading. Meanwhile the budgetary recipe of the later Brezhnev years, entailing a deceleration of investment growth to free resources for other ends, has come into disrepute among party leaders concerned about the sluggish rise of the Soviet GNP. One logical solution to the slowdown of GNP growth is a higher rate of investment. The Soviet oligarchs, however, also have weighty reasons to step up the pace of military outlays. They have long believed that military power is a central determinant of Soviet international influence, and they are deeply concerned about the acceleration of U.S. military programs since 1978. As a result, they face tradeoffs between economic investment and military spending that are becoming increasingly painful.
This report examines the scope of internal Soviet differences over the tradeoffs among consumption, investment, and military spending. It seeks to identify, to the extent possible, the leaders and the elite groups favoring divergent approaches to these tradeoffs, and it explores the changes during the 1980s in the balance of elite opinion on such budgetary issues.

More concretely, the report is intended to answer the following questions:

1. Is there persuasive evidence that the consensus over military and other budgetary priorities that prevailed during most of the 1970s has eroded or broken down? If so, how wide is the range of budgetary alternatives being debated?

2. If they exist, are differences over such priorities linked to divergent appraisals of the strategic balance between the superpowers and of trends in the balance? How large a security challenge do Soviet observers perceive in the current American military buildup?

3. How strong is the party elite's concern about the political stability and mass legitimacy of the Soviet system? Is political stability thought to require the steady growth of consumption, or are policies such as harsher labor discipline and more coercion being advocated as alternatives?

4. How much concern is there over the national-security implications of the Soviet economic slowdown? Have most
officials been willing to tolerate a further drop in growth rates, or are they alarmed by this prospect? Are any officials proposing reduced military spending and higher rates of investment as a means of ensuring the USSR's long-term military power vis-a-vis the United States?

5. What role have military officers and other categories of officials played in budgetary debates? Has the politics of leadership succession allowed military and national-security spokesmen to strengthen their claim on economic resources in the 1980s as they have in previous successions? What do trends in party-military relations show about military attitudes toward recent resource-allocation policies?

In subsequent sections, these questions will be examined through a chronological analysis of events since 1979. For the sake of clarity, however, the findings may be summarized as follows:

1. There is strong evidence of mounting disagreements within the Soviet elite over budgetary and military priorities. The disagreements have concerned the allocation of both R&D resources and other material inputs between military and nonmilitary programs. The central controversy has been whether to continue to restrain the growth of the military effort or to speed it up sharply. None of the major decisionmakers has openly contemplated reducing the effort in absolute terms.
2. The disputes over military allocations are intertwined with varying estimates of the stability of the current strategic balance between the superpowers. They are also linked to divergent appraisals of the depth of America's hostility and its willingness to initiate a war against the USSR.

3. Elite concern about the political stability and mass legitimacy of the Soviet system has risen sharply in the 1980s. While some officials apparently advocate greater coercion as a solution to this problem, the predominant attitude within the elite is that popular consumption must continue to grow, and that greater popular welfare and tighter labor discipline are complementary rather than alternative policies.

4. The Soviet leaders, particularly Andropov and now Gorbachev, have expressed deep concern about the long-term impact of the current economic slowdown on Soviet national security. In particular, they have focused attention on the need for more rapid technological innovation as a prerequisite of successful international competition. This concern has contributed to the debate over the advisability of greater current military spending versus greater spending on the industrial sectors necessary to sustain military power in the late 1990s and beyond.

5. The dominant group within the party leadership has come under heavy pressure to make drastic increases in the
military budget, but it has worked vigorously to avoid this step. The clearest source of pressure lies within the professional officer corps, and strained party-military relations have reflected the ups and downs of the budgetary struggle. Marshal Ogarkov has been the most forceful proponent of larger military budgets, but other high-level officers also appear to feel that the regime should spend more on current military programs. The object-lesson of Ogarkov's 1984 demotion is unlikely to eliminate tensions over military spending, although it has made other top officers more circumspect in arguing their case.

Since the evidence for these conclusions is sometimes arcane, a brief sketch of the themes and slogans used by the participants in the Soviet debates may help the reader follow the analysis presented below. To oversimplify somewhat, the persons who favor a major increase of military expenditures have stressed the fundamental hostility of the West toward the USSR, the rapid pace of American military programs, and the instability of the strategic balance. Arguing that military power has overriding importance as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, they have underscored the special standing of the Armed Forces and the defense industries among the numerous political and economic factors that contribute to national defense. In the same vein, they have assumed that the chief geopolitical threat from the West is military, and they have argued that the Soviet economy is capable of
matching the American economy in an all-out arms race. Dubious of the utility of diplomatic maneuvers as a means of countering American military programs, they have also warned against the danger of Soviet "passivity" and a loss of global initiative to the United States.

In contrast, the opponents of major increases in military spending have depicted Western actions in a less negative light and have argued that despite the rapid American buildup, the strategic balance is quite stable. Asserting repeatedly that the Armed Forces have "everything necessary" to meet external military threats, they have lauded Soviet diplomatic "self-control" and warned against succumbing to Western "provocations." Likewise, they have suggested that the economic component of defense capacity is as important as military forces-in-being, and they have echoed Lenin's dictum that the USSR exerts its main influence on the world revolution through its economic policies. By implying that the real purpose of the U.S. buildup is to break the Soviet economy, they have hinted that a massive counterbuildup would actually play into American hands. Last but not least, the opponents of much larger military budgets have treated domestic social tensions as a serious potential threat to the regime and have viewed increases in the standard of living as a crucial method of coping with these tensions.
II. The Eroding Consensus, 1980-1981

During the second half of the 1970s the members of the Soviet elite seemed to agree on most foreign-policy and budgetary priorities, but around 1980 this consensus began to erode. Whatever responsibility the Soviet leaders bore for provoking the more assertive Western military and political policies that began to emerge in the late 1970s, they were perplexed by those policies and unsure how to deal with them. From the Soviet standpoint, the trends in East-West relations did not fit the optimistic scenarios that had been used to justify Leonid Brezhnev's two-track approach to "detente" with the West in earlier years.

Brezhnev and his supporters had justified the introduction of that policy on several grounds. Detente would, to begin with, help regulate the arms competition with the United States and prevent the US from negating Soviet strategic gains by launching a new, technologically intensive spiral of the arms race. It would thereby ensure at least Soviet military parity with the United States, permit a slowdown in the growth of military spending, and allow the party to pay greater attention to Soviet citizens' desires for better food and consumer goods. In addition, detente would undermine the political capacity of the Western powers to sustain firm policies toward the USSR and would increase the opportunities to use Western Europe as a check on
American policy toward the Soviet bloc. Not least, detente would furnish valuable Western food and technology, thereby compensating for some of the Soviet economy's systemic weaknesses.

After 1978, however, events began to depart from this scenario. Disturbed by Soviet military trends, the United States began to increase its own military spending, and the newly negotiated SALT II agreement encountered powerful domestic American opposition. In 1979 the NATO countries, which had already committed themselves to steady increases in real military expenditures, confirmed a plan to deploy new INF missiles if the Soviets refused to dismantle their SS20s. Moreover, the United States responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with a partial grain embargo and other boycotts. Initially it appeared that the U.S. might manage to enlist other Western nations in a damaging program of economic sanctions, thereby disproving previous Soviet calculations that deepening political and economic divisions within the West would hamper NATO efforts to act in concert against Soviet interests.

Although there were no open leadership conflicts over military spending during 1980, signs of elite tensions over foreign-policy tactics and budgetary priorities suggest that the proper size of the military budget was probably under vigorous private discussion. Surveying the broad geopolitical situation, Brezhnev, who obviously had a deep personal
stake in vindicating the correctness of the detente line, counseled patience. He argued that with time the U.S. stance toward the Soviet Union would become more realistic, and that the splits within the West would help bring the U.S. back to a policy more acceptable to the Soviet Union.¹ The last decade of detente, he maintained, had brought the USSR many benefits, and one "enormous" reason for these benefits was that the party had showed "self-control" and not allowed itself to be deflected from its established foreign-policy line.²

In keeping with this picture of likely future trends, Brezhnev gave no sign of endorsing higher priority for military programs. Although he commented that American "imperialism" had become more aggressive, he claimed that the USSR was doing everything necessary for its defense and argued that Soviet defense capacity "has never before been so strong and reliable."³ Moreover, in mid-1980 the General Secretary, who even before the imposition of the American grain embargo had stated that the Central Committee was "perturbed" by disruptions in the food supply due to bad harvests, called for a "special Food Program" to compensate


². Ibid., pp. 364, 419.

for these disruptions. As he presented it, the Food Program was to become an integral part of the 11th Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) which was currently being drafted. Terming a rapid increase in consumer-goods output "a task of cardinal economic and political importance," he also suggested the creation of a long-term program for the development of the consumer industries. Brezhnev, in short, clung to the priorities he had staked out in the mid-1970s and argued that the international furor provoked by the war in Afghanistan would have no long-term impact on the USSR's strategic position.

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, one of the chief Soviet architects of the detente policy, provided an analysis of the international scene that supported Brezhnev's priorities. Gromyko granted that the Western powers were allegedly trying to block further progress in arms control by failing to ratify the SALT II agreement and breaking off other arms-control negotiations, and he emphasized that "we are far from underestimating the forces opposing us in the international arena." At the same time, he stressed that the West contained "sober-thinking state and political actors who are inclined to take into account the real state of affairs and recognize the dangerous consequences" of a stepped-up arms race. Although the arms race was accelerating, said

Gromyko, "nonetheless one must not fail to take into account the fact that existing agreements...close off some channels of the arms race, prohibit or limit particular types of weapons, and interpose definite protective barriers [zaslony], without which this race would be even more uncontrolled and expensive." "Real measures" to impose further limits on the military competition were objectively possible. "We consider baseless the assertions of those who declare that today it is generally impossible to reverse the development of events in the area of atomic weapons," said Gromyko. Perhaps significantly, he did not state that those who held this erroneous notion were Westerners. The Foreign Minister also proclaimed that the idea of military superiority was losing its meaning (although he later contradicted himself by warning that the Warsaw Pact would never permit the West to obtain such superiority.) In keeping with his emphasis on resuming arms-control negotiations, Gromyko said only that the Warsaw-Pact countries "will in the future maintain their defense capacity on the necessary level." He said nothing about stepping up the rate of Soviet military spending. Rather, he praised Soviet policy for its "self-control" in resisting the "provocations" of reactionary imperialist circles.5

About the same time, the main party theoretical journal ran an important article by Aleksandr Bovin which elaborated the case for flexible diplomacy and played down the need for a new Soviet arms buildup. Bovin hinted at disagreement over these questions by alluding to Lenin's struggle against Trotsky over whether to sign the German-dictated Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, a treaty which later generations of Soviet officials have repeatedly invoked against the domestic opponents of tactical foreign-policy concessions. Bovin emphasized that there were important political and economic differences within the West and that the more conciliatory Western groups could be influenced by Soviet foreign policy. It was, he said, essential to be flexible and avoid ultimatums, since hard-line policies merely play into the hands of aggressive elements in the West. Turning to the vexatious issue of the relationship between politics and war, Bovin argued that the West, although adventurist, would not commit suicide by initiating a nuclear conflict, and he made no reference to any Western quest for strategic superiority over the USSR and its allies. Instead he quoted a Western commentator's conclusion that the past decade of détente had worked systematically in the USSR's favor, weakening the West ideologically and undermining Western military preparedness. This implied that there was no need for measures to counter the emerging
Western military buildup, since the military balance-sheet for the detente period showed a net Soviet gain.

Bovin also cited Lenin to the effect that the USSR had achieved an equilibrium with the capitalist world, thereby obtaining not just a short breathing-space but an opportunity to concentrate on internal economic development for an extended period. When Bovin discussed ways to counter Western probes, he mentioned the "might and unity" of the socialist camp, and also the strength of the antiwar movement in the West. He said nothing explicit about Soviet military power, and nothing at all about the need to accelerate Soviet military spending. Rather, he quoted Lenin's observation that the USSR influences the world socialist revolution primarily through its economic policies—not, by implication, through military means.6

Some military figures, however, described the international situation in very different terms. Early in 1980 Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, CINC of the Navy, painted a dark picture of the world scene that may have been intended to justify greater military spending, particularly naval spending. Although his article appeared in the party's main theoretical journal, Gorshkov omitted the customary references to the policy of "peaceful coexistence" and the "Peace Program," which Brezhnev and others were touting as an

6. Kommunist, No. 10, 1980, pp. 73-75, 77-80. The article also contained some intriguing comments on the need to regulate superpower conflicts in the Third World.
effective counter to Western political and military initiatives. The naval chief also went out of his way to rebut Western critics who allegedly believed that the Soviet Union was only a continental country and therefore needed only a coastal rather than a blue-water navy. While adamantly denying the Western "myth" of Soviet naval superiority, Gorshkov eschewed the usual claim that the USSR possessed military parity with the United States. Instead he quoted President Carter as saying that U.S. naval power was sufficient for the "manifold annihilation of Russia" and that the U.S. must "pay any price that is required in order to remain the most powerful country [sic] in the world."

Avoiding the frequent Soviet assertion that detente had undermined the West's ability to "export counterrevolution" --that is, to intervene militarily in Third-World areas-- Gorshkov argued that the U.S. was returning to the role of an active world gendarme and using its navy to exert pressure on regimes it deemed objectionable. While Gorshkov did not say so, a logical conclusion from this picture was that the USSR should step up its own naval programs.

A worrying picture of international trends was also presented by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff. About the time Gromyko and Bovin were making the case for flexible diplo-
macy, Ogarkov addressed a meeting of the Soviet high command called to prepare for the forthcoming 26th Party Congress. Excerpts from the address indicate that Ogarkov, although he noted many Soviet geopolitical successes in recent years, did not attribute them to detente. Like Gromyko, Ogarkov remarked that the U.S. had broken off or deadlocked "a whole series" of arms control negotiations, but unlike the Foreign Minister, Ogarkov refrained from expressing any hope that a resumption of negotiations could curb the arms race. Instead he emphasized the threat posed by the West's military buildup. Led by the U.S., he said, the Western powers were striving "by any means" to undermine the growing international influence of the Soviet Union and its allies. The West was seeking "overwhelming military superiority" over the Soviet bloc. "This course, in all probability calculated for the long run, also has as its ultimate goal to change the correlation of forces in favor of imperialism."

The danger from the West, added Ogarkov, was compounded by an emerging Sino-American-Japanese military alliance reminiscent of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis of the 1930s. Ogarkov did not call for greater military spending to meet this new imperialist threat. Instead he fell in with the line adopted at the meeting and praised the party and

8. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (hereafter cited as KVS), No. 14, 1980, pp. 24-30. An editorial note indicated that this was an "abbreviated" version of Ogarkov's remarks at the meeting.
Brezhnev personally for providing "everything necessary" for the country's military needs. But in view of his later statements, it seems likely that he meant his description of the international environment as an indirect warning that Soviet military spending would have to be raised sharply. If the West was seeking not just military superiority, but "overwhelming" superiority, and if it intended to pursue this policy for an extended period, then how could the USSR avoid responding in kind? Probably Ogarkov hoped that his military forecast would affect the allocation of resources under the 11th Five-Year Plan, which was currently being formulated. The comments of other top professional officers suggest that some of them may likewise have been hinting at the need for a stepped-up military effort.

9. Ibid., p. 27.

10. Strategic Rocket Forces Chief V. Tolubko, for instance, mentioned the party's tireless attention to military needs and said the capacities of the Armed Forces had been raised to a new level. However, he avoided the standard formula that the Armed Forces have "everything necessary" and eschewed any claim that Soviet weapons were the equal of the West's (KVS, No. 22, 1980, pp. 16-17). Warsaw Pact CINC V. Kulikov praised Brezhnev's arms-control initiatives. But Kulikov also asserted that the socialist countries "cannot" rely solely on political means of competition with the West, and he remarked that in the future the socialist countries "will solve" the dual task of simultaneously struggling for disarmament and strengthening their defense capacity--thereby perhaps implying that this combination of instrumentalities had not yet been achieved. (VIZh, No. 5, 1980, pp. 24-27.) By contrast, Air Force CINC P. Kutakhov stated enthusiastically that "the technical equipping of [Soviet] aviation in full measure answers the interests of the reliable defense of the air borders and state interests of our Motherland." (KVS, No. 24, 1980, p. 24.)
The contradictions implicit in these disparate descriptions of the outside world were reflected in a few signs of renewed tension over the allocation of R&D resources between military and nonmilitary programs. During the preceding decade this issue had been intermittently debated by Soviet officials. In 1976, for instance, one military spokesman had voiced displeasure with the military's share of the national R&D effort and had attacked unnamed Soviet critics for suggesting that the current military share was hampering the development of the civilian economy. Two years later Marshal Ogarkov had observed that despite detente, the imperialist countries were expending enormous sums on improving their arsenals and creating weapons based on "new physical principles." Underscoring the need for an optimal relationship between Soviet basic and applied research, Ogarkov remarked that new means were emerging to improve the work of the laboratories of the Ministry of Defense and strengthen their ties with the Academy of Sciences and other

p. 24.)

11. For the pre-1975 background, see Bruce Parrott, Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), especially Ch. 6.

R&D establishments. Plainly he favored a closer harnessing of Academy and other institutes to military needs.13

The fluctuations in superpower relations at the end of the 1970s sharpened the latent disagreements over this issue. After the SALT II accord was signed in June 1979, some Soviet commentators began to discuss the possibility of diverting resources from military to civilian industries. Although these writers cited Western examples, they drew broad lessons that were applicable to Soviet military programs.14 The sharp downturn of Soviet-American relations after 1979 emboldened the skeptics but did not immediately defeat such proposals. In mid-1980 one military officer remarked that the persisting threat of imperialist attack meant that the regime must concern itself with strengthening the defense industries and drawing the necessary number of scientists into the tasks of military production.15 But another officer, taking a very different view, emphasized that the economy was increasingly being subordinated to the fulfillment of popular material needs and that the "social orientation [napravlennost'] of the development of science


and technology" was also being strengthened. A month later, Brezhnev told the Central Committee that defense industries should make a larger contribution to the economy, and he suggested that the Council of Ministers determine the specific defense R&D establishments that could help particular branches of civilian machine-building.

If the fencing over R & D programs was oblique, the controversy over other economic resources was more visible. In March 1980 Kommunist published an article by an economist, V. Medvedev, that reflected political differences over the distribution of resources among investment, consumption, and defense. Medvedev argued that in the past the Soviet regime had been unable to make increased popular consumption its leading goal because the economy was insufficiently developed and the requirements of promoting economic growth and bolstering defense enjoyed top priority. However, he explained, in the current stage of "developed socialism" it had become possible to orient the economy toward satisfying the workers' needs, and in the last ten years this goal had been moved to "first place." Medvedev rejected the ideas of unnamed persons who thought that the further development of heavy industry, particularly machinebuilding, and the further industrialization of agriculture were necessary before


focusing on improvements in the standard of living. Higher living standards, he maintained, were not only a desirable goal, but a necessity for motivating the workforce and attaining faster economic growth. 18

Similar themes appeared in some of the articles in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (KVS), a journal published by the Main Political Administration for the purpose of indoctrinating military personnel. One article reiterated that in an earlier stage of Soviet history consumption had to be sacrificed for investment and for the comprehensive strengthening of defense. Now, however, in the stage of mature socialism, the "main goal" of economic policy in all sectors was becoming the steady improvement of popular welfare. 19 Even more strikingly, another article in the journal claimed that higher levels of consumption contribute directly to Soviet military power. The author stated that while the needs of technological progress and "other factors" shape economic policy, the basic determinant of policy under "developed socialism" is the improvement of popular well-being. "The heightening of the living standard of the people," in turn, "is closely connected with the strengthening of the Armed Forces." Higher living standards improve public health, contribute to military power by


raising the educational qualifications of recruits, and strengthen the individual's "sense of his social responsibility for the defense of his Motherland"—in other words, his political loyalty. Consequently, concluded the writer, current economic policies would raise not only the country's economic potential but its military capacity.\(^2\)

These views, however, were quickly challenged by other military writers who favored higher priority for heavy industry and especially for current military spending. One writer, for instance, offered a different interpretation of current economic policy and its determinants. While he accepted that the USSR was now in the stage of "developed socialism," he suggested that consumption had enjoyed as high a priority in the preceding stage, which, as he defined it, included part of Stalin's reign. The author went on to underscore the importance of the preferential growth of heavy industry. Moreover, he argued that "besides internal factors of the development of our society, foreign-policy and economic [factors] also influence the economic strategy of the CPSU. In connection with this it is necessary to note the most important significance...of measures for the economic underpinning of defense." In times of war, said this writer, the comprehensive expansion of military output had become "the main expression of the economic strategy of

\(^2\) Colonel V. Kornienko in KVS, No. 2, 1980, pp. 22-26. For a similar argument, see M. Khitrenko in ibid., No. 18, 1980, pp. 10-12, 16.
the party... But also in peaceful conditions the strengthening of the Armed Forces retains strategic significance. The budgetary priorities advocated in such writings obviously contradicted those championed by Medvedev and like-minded observers.

Another commentator, Colonel S. Bartenev, staked out a middle position in the debate over nonmilitary versus military requirements. According to Lenin, said Bartenev, Soviet security depends on the strength of the state's economic, sociopolitical and spiritual foundations and on the strength of the army. The totality of these factors constitutes the military might of the state. Among the four, suggested Bartenev, the economic factor plays "a special role" in ensuring the state's military power. In contrast to the advocates of consumer needs, however, he maintained that "the party's economic policy is directed not only at internal tasks, but also at foreign-policy problems" which necessitate "a comprehensive strengthening of the country's defense capacity [oboronosposobnost']." By arguing for the "overriding growth" of "key branches" such as machinebuilding, he indicated that parts of heavy industry, and perhaps heavy industry as a whole, should develop more rapidly than consumer goods production.


Although Bartenev held no brief for consumer interests, neither was he a supporter of sharply increased current military spending. His accent on the economic component of defense was linked to his distinction between the short- and long-term requirements of military power. In view of the rapid development of military technology, he said, the connection between the economy and military affairs "is changing in many ways. The requirements presented to the national economy are fundamentally distinct from those which were presented, say, ten or even five years ago." The economy was now called upon to meet both current military requirements and the future needs of defense, and this new task represented "a definite complication." According to Bartenev, the party line required a change in the share of "progressive branches" such as machinebuilding, which in turn would create the prerequisites for sustained technological progress in the defense industry and for the introduction of new weapons systems into the Armed Forces. Bartenev appeared to be saying that strengthening the industrial base of future military power was more important than spending additional resources on current weapons systems. The logic of his analysis underscored the primacy of long-term requirements, and his dismissal of the policies of "ten years ago" seemed

23. Ibid., p. 70.
to imply that it would be a mistake to return to the rapid procurement growth of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 24

Plainly Bartenev's long-term perspective did not suit some military officials, because the guidelines for political study that were appended to his article emphasized the critical importance of short-term military expenditures. The instructions drew a clearer distinction between general industrial development and military capacity than did Bartenev. Whereas he had said that the economy plays a "special role" in ensuring the state's military might, the guidelines proclaimed that "military might is characterized above all by the level of development of the Armed Forces--their numbers, armament, organizational structure, and battle readiness." Although the guidelines acknowledged that increased Soviet economic potential could facilitate the growth of defense capacity, they also declared that there is "no direct dependence" between the two and that countries with identical economic capacities "may possess far from

24. Ibid., pp. 70-71. Further evidence corroborating this interpretation of Bartenev's views is given below. Bartenev did hedge slightly on the proper level of current military spending by citing three periods of Soviet history as examples of the correct relationship between the military and the economy: the 1930s, World War II, and the immediate postwar years. (Ibid., p. 70.) Party policy varied widely during these periods. During the war current procurement enjoyed overwhelming priority and general investment in heavy industry was cut sharply. After the war, procurement was reduced in favor of the reconstruction of heavy industry and a crash R & D program designed to yield better future weapons. In the 1930s, policy moved gradually from a broad emphasis on investment in heavy industry to concentration on weapons production.
identical military might." Turning to a discussion of "military-economic potential," the guidelines said "it is necessary to bear in mind that these or those branches and types of production enter into the composition of military-economic potential only to the degree to which they participate in the creation of military output." The moral was that increasing the state's defense capacity meant not simply building up the "progressive branches" of the economy, but increasing expenditures on supplies for the Armed Forces.

Publicly, however, advocates of restrained growth in military spending continued to hold the limelight. Shortly before the 26th Party Congress, one article in KVS picked up Brezhnev's point that a new Food Program was essential and should be incorporated into the 11th Five-Year Plan. The article went on to state that the Party "undeviatingly follows the instruction of V. I. Lenin about the unity of economic, scientific-technical, moral-political and military potentials as the basic components of the defense might of the state." The "unity" and "harmonious development" of these factors were codewords for curbing the expansion of military spending.

25. Ibid., pp. 74-75.

Shortly afterward another article stressed that Soviet defense capacity depended directly on the economy. Offering the assurance that the economy was fully meeting the Armed Forces' needs for modern weaponry, the article said pointedly that Lenin had paid "special attention to the rational utilization of resources in the interest of strengthening the country's defense. 'The cause of the defense of the Soviet Republic,'--emphasized Lenin--'insistently demands the greatest savings of effort and the most productive application of the people's labor.'" The article then quoted Defense Minister Ustinov as saying that the party was rigorously following Lenin's teaching about "the dialectical unity of economic, scientific-technical, moral-political and military potentials as the basic components of the defense might of the state."27 The relative weight of the various components of national defense was clearly a contentious issue, and Ustinov's formulation put strictly military potential on an equal footing with economic and political factors.

The attempt to restrain military outlays in behalf of other social goals, however, obviously encountered stiff private resistance. In the fall of 1980 and early 1981 the party's Main Political Administration began to strengthen its leverage over the appointment of officers and the indoctrin-  

nation of troops. The tone of this campaign indicates that it was more than the ordinary preparation for the 26th Party Congress. In September 1980 KVS ran an article which proclaimed that the party's role in military policymaking was growing for several reasons, including the increasing importance of correctly diagnosing the correlation of forces between the socialist and capitalist blocs and the increasing dependence of Soviet military might on the country's economic, scientific-technical, and moral-political potentials. In formulating military policy, said the article, the party proceeded from a careful analysis of the current international situation and of "the real possibilities of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces." The party was doing everything required to protect Soviet security and was providing the Armed Forces with everything necessary. In particular, it was ensuring close coordination of the interaction of industry and science in the interest of creating new types of weapons which would be highly effective and up-to-date, but which would consume a minimum of valuable resources. Emphasizing that weapons alone could not guarantee military power, the writer maintained that "an optimal relationship of well-prepared people and the newest technology" was necessary in order to meet defense requirements and at the same time "to fundamentally economize on human and material-technical resources, which in conditions of a possible global military confrontation with imperialism is capable of playing an
enormous role." Underscoring that military doctrines, particularly doctrines concerning the role of the economy and the moral factor in military affairs, were not "dogmas" but required creative application to concrete circumstances, the article observed that the party "demands that officer cadres not simply be military specialists but also act as conveyers of its policies in the Armed Forces..." It also included the pointed remark that the party decisively opposes "hare-brained schemes and voluntarism in military affairs." The polemical tone strongly suggests that the article was meant to reign in officers who were failing to accept party guidelines on the international situation and domestic priorities.

In the months leading up to the 26th Party Congress and the formal consideration of the "Basic Directions" for the new five-year plan, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil spelled out the foreign policy and economic implications of the Brezhnev line. Offering the assurance that the party was taking the existing imperialist threat into account, one editorial repeated Lenin's observation that "we now exert our basic


29. In addition to the question of relations with the West and military allocations, the article may have been intended to stem military dissatisfaction with the emerging crisis in Poland, although party-military tensions over this issue apparently peaked in December 1980 and January 1981. (See Richard D. Anderson, Jr., "Soviet Decisionmaking and Poland," Problems of Communism, March-April 1982.)
influence on the international revolution through our economic policy...The struggle has been shifted to this field on a worldwide scale."  

This was the same theme Bovin had sounded in connection with his plea for a focus on domestic economic tasks. A second editorial in the journal reiterated that the party and government were doing "everything necessary for the further strengthening" of Soviet defense capacity. It explained that Soviet successes in economic and social development—thus presumably including not only rapid GNP growth but rapid increases in consumption—"have enormous international significance. They strengthen the position of the world system of socialism [and] facilitate the growth of the USSR's authority in the international arena..."  

A third article cited Brezhnev to the effect that it was increasingly important for the heavy and defense industrial sectors to produce a share of consumer-goods output. The moral was that the country should not concentrate on creating more military power, but should focus on developing nonmilitary foreign-policy instruments that would raise the USSR's prestige abroad and meet the needs of domestic welfare.  

Brezhnev's speech to the 26th Party Congress in early 1981 reflected his desire to avoid a major escalation of

arms expenditures and to concentrate resources on domestic economic needs. In his survey of the international scene, he remarked that serious difficulties had arisen in Soviet foreign relations and that the U.S. and its allies had become more aggressive. Nonetheless, he voiced the hope that policymakers in the new Reagan Administration "will ultimately succeed in looking at things more realistically."

Observing that any attempt to "win against one another in the arms race, to plan on victory in atomic war, is dangerous madness," Brezhnev warned that the arms race was generating qualitatively new types of weapons. The advent of such weapons, he said, would make mutually agreed arms limitations "exceptionally difficult, or even impossible," thereby undercutting international stability and greatly increasing the danger of war. This situation gave the task of arms control "special meaning and urgency," and this task remained at the core of Soviet policy.33

Brezhnev's reserved attitude toward new Soviet military programs was linked to his hopes for a revival of Soviet-American detente and his concern about the domestic military burden. He repeated that the USSR was not seeking

33. XXVI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1981), I, pp. 21, 40-45.
strategic military superiority. While he coupled this assurance with a warning that the USSR would not allow the U.S. to achieve superiority, he plainly meant his disavowal of the pursuit of Soviet superiority as more than propaganda for Western audiences. Brezhnev somberly began his report with references to "quite a number of difficulties, both in the economic development of the country and in the international situation," and he stated that the arms race had created "no small burden" for the USSR. When he came directly to the topic of Soviet military spending, he said only that during the last five years "the party and state have not lost from view for even one day the questions of strengthening the defense might of the state (and) its Armed Forces." He said nothing whatsoever about any need to step up the military effort. Rather, his words suggested that the military programs of the past five years were adequate to meet the international challenges of the 1980s.

Brezhnev's comments about other economic priorities reinforce this conclusion. Calling for a more flexible R & D system that excluded unproductive research laboratories, the General Secretary highlighted the lag in research and design for light industry, the food and medical industries, agricultural machinebuilding, and "several other types of machine-

34. Ibid., pp. 21, 26.

35. Ibid., p. 84.
building." He then recommended that the Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology formulate proposals for "a certain regrouping of scientific forces" that would draw on the research base of the most advanced industries, including the defense industry, to help these lagging sectors. In other words, he recommended that defense-oriented research establishments devote more effort to civilian needs, not to the faster creation of weapons.

Turning next to agriculture, Brezhnev commented that the Politburo was aware of the disruptions in the supply of food to the population. In order to overcome such disruptions, he said, it was essential to develop a special Food Program, which would include continued heavy investment in agriculture. He also called for steps to overcome the repeated shortfalls in the supply and quality of many industrial consumer goods. Noting with approval that the five-year plan called for consumer-goods production to grow faster than the output of producer goods, he stated that the manufacturers of producer goods had a large role to play in solving consumer problems, since in the future heavy industry would produce more than half of industrial consumer goods. Heavy industry, in other words, would grow slower than in the past,

36. Ibid., pp. 60, 62.

37. Ibid., pp. 63-64, 66-67.
and would simultaneously have to shoulder a large responsibility for consumer output.

Indirect evidence suggests that Brezhnev's policies met with less than full approval at the congress. First, he was distinctly apologetic about the country's foreign policy. Brezhnev told the delegates that the 1970s had shown "with all persuasiveness" that peaceful coexistence was playing an increasing role in international affairs. Remarking that life demands fruitful cooperation among "all states," he asserted that such cooperation "is not a groundless utopia. Its shoots [zachatki]--even if still modest--already exist in our day. It is necessary to see them, to prize and develop them." These defensive words suggest that Brezhnev was seeking to persuade some officials who felt that the goals of detente were indeed "utopian" and doubted that the policies of the 1970s had been as successful as he claimed.

Partly because of such doubts, Brezhnev was unable to gain the party elite's approval for a Food Program that would divert resources from heavy industry and defense. After first calling for such a program in August 1980, Brezhnev had remarked in October 1980 that the Politburo had recently decided to prepare the measure, and he had urged that it be made an organic part of the 11th Five-Year Plan. In the public campaign leading up to the congress, the Soviet media

38. Ibid., p. 43.
had reiterated that the program would be an integral part of
the Five-Year Plan. The plan guidelines approved at the
congress, however, did not include a separate Food Program,
and Brezhnev was forced to backtrack with the remark that
work on the measure "has only begun." In view of later
signs of top-level resistance, including military resistance,
to the Food Program, it is a reasonable assumption that
pressures for higher levels of military spending played a
part in preventing the approval of the Program at the
congress.

Further evidence of policy disagreements surfaced in
Brezhnev's discussion of the Politburo and its style of
work. The General Secretary noted that the Politburo faced
problems of growing complexity, and that in some cases it had
created special commissions to study events and take steps in
response to these events. He then remarked that in the

40. See, for instance, KVS, No. 4, 1981, pp. 74-75.

41. XXVI s"ezd, I, p. 63. The guidelines made only one
ambiguous reference to the concept of a Food Program and did
not spell out all the elements the Program would
contain. (Ibid., II, p. 187). In an article signed for
printing shortly after the congress, Ia. Riabov, a First
Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, stated that the Food Program "has
been included [voshla] in the eleventh plan as an organic
part." Depending on Riabov's political aims, this statement
may have been (1) an effort to force inclusion of the program
in post-congress revisions of the plan guidelines; or (2) an
effort to interpret the agricultural measures already
included in the guidelines as satisfying the requirements of
a special program; or (3) an accidental result of the
last-minute change in the public line on this issue. At the
least, the incident shows that the treatment of the Food
Program in the plan was a matter of confusion among top
planning officials. (KVS, No. 6, 1981, p. 12.)
Politburo discussions, "different opinions" had frequently been expressed, along with "numerous remarks and suggestions." Although Brezhnev offered an assurance that all Politburo decisions had been adopted "in a spirit of full unanimity," his statement was a highly uncharacteristic admission of top-level leadership differences, and he probably made it in an effort to put a good face on serious political disagreements about which some congress delegates already knew. Some of these differences may have concerned how to handle the Polish crisis. But they probably also concerned military spending, since within four months representatives of the military establishment publicly challenged Brezhnev's budgetary priorities.

42. XXVI s"ezd, I, p. 88. After a 5 December 1980 Warsaw Pact summit meeting on the Polish crisis, the Soviet Politburo resolution expressed only approval of the summit decisions, not approval "completely and in full," as is customary. Other evidence also indicates serious internal tensions over the handling of the crisis. (Anderson, "Soviet Decisionmaking and Poland," p. 31 and passim.)
III. Open Controversy, 1981-82

Although the 26th Congress had approved the "Basic Guidelines" for the new five-year plan, it had not approved a final version of the plan itself. This circumstance invited further efforts to influence the targets to be included in the final plan, which was confirmed by the Central Committee only in November 1981. In the period between the congress and the November plenum, the sparring over economic priorities intensified and finally broke into the open.

Brezhnev and his party allies made further attempts to deflect pressures for a sharp increase in military spending. Shortly after the congress, Minister of Defense Ustinov told a meeting of the Ministry's party aktiv that the government was doing "everything necessary" to strengthen the military. He underscored that "it would be at the very least naive to assume that we will permit anyone" to violate the existing military balance and establish superiority over the USSR.43 This remark was particularly noteworthy because it was addressed not to foreign audiences, but to other officials of the defense ministry, who apparently harbored fears that current policy might unwittingly do precisely that. Nonetheless, the party publications directed at the Soviet officer corps continued to claim that the Soviet military effort was

sufficient, and they began to urge greater savings in the military's operational use of resources such as fuel. For instance, *Tyl i snabzhenie*, the journal dealing with military provisioning, started a regular new column on the conservation of material resources in military units.44 Commentators also emphasized that the central task of party units in the military establishment was to ensure "the deep study and undeviating fulfillment by all military servicemen" of congress decisions and Brezhnev's pronouncements on defense.45

Shortly after the article containing this injunction was signed for printing, Marshal Ogarkov issued a hard-hitting challenge to Brezhnev's budgetary priorities in the pages of *Kommunist*. Although Ogarkov paid lip service to the desirability of relaxing international tension and curbing the arms race, he argued that the United States had taken a "still more dangerous, reactionary course" under Reagan than under Carter. In contrast to Brezhnev's expressions of hope that with time the Reagan Administration would become more moderate, Ogarkov maintained that several elements of the new administration's military-political policies had "already been revealed sufficiently clearly." The administration, he


said, was striving to wreck past agreements and current arms-control negotiations with the USSR. It was seeking military superiority and was intent on clearing the ground for an unconstrained arms race. Implicitly dissenting from Brezhnev's interpretation of the international scene, Ogarkov warned that members of the two most recent Soviet generations were inclined to underestimate the danger of war and that this mistaken view could have "serious consequences." Given the worsening world situation, he said, not only the political organs of the Armed Forces, but all party and soviet organizations had to make Soviet citizens more aware of the present military danger. This was an unusually open call by a military man for a change in the treatment of the strategic situation in domestic party propaganda.

Ogarkov's view of the international scene was linked directly to his dissent over current budgetary priorities. He noted that the question of strengthening the Armed Forces was "at the center of the attention not only of military cadres, but also of party and soviet organs." However, he avoided the stock formula that the Armed Forces' current weapons were sufficient to meet the Western threat. Instead, calling for timely alterations in the structure of the Armed Forces to reflect new means of combat, he quoted Brezhnev on

47. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
the need to adapt the forms of economic administration to changing tasks. Whether Ogarkov was hinting at the need for improved administration of the economy is uncertain. What is clear is that he was unwilling to postpone increased military expenditures on the grounds that domestic economic development had become the dominant new task facing the party, as some other commentators claimed. Immediately after his reference to new economic tasks, Ogarkov observed that military art "has no right" to lag behind military possibilities in circumstances where basic weapons systems are changing practically every ten to twelve years. In these conditions, he warned, the belated revision of views and "stagnation in the development and especially in the practical assimilation" of new means of war "are fraught with serious consequences." Ogarkov also called for measures to create adequate economic reserves for war and heighten the self-sufficiency of defense industrial enterprises in energy.

48. Ibid., pp. 85-86. Ogarkov may have been doing one or more of the following: (1) trying to buttress his call for intramilitary reorganization with quotations from Brezhnev; (2) trying to suggest that the problems of the economy were not the military's fault; (3) advocating better administration of the defense industrial sector; (4) pressing for changes in the administration of the economy as a whole. Both (1) and (2) are consistent with his other views. Interpretation (3) is consistent with his call elsewhere in the article for mobilizational plans that would ensure "improvement of the system of production ties of the enterprises putting out the basic types of weapons" (p. 89). Interpretation (4) is speculative and, in my opinion, probably incorrect.
equipment, and other supplies.\textsuperscript{49} Plainly he was demanding a large increase, not just of military R&D, but of weapons procurement and other military expenditures.

Ogarkov's views were countered in an unsigned \textit{KVS} article intended for the political education of military men. Emphasizing the "dialectical unity" of economic, scientific-technical, moral-political and military factors as the "basic constituents" of Soviet defense might, the article asserted that the heavy industrial growth rate targeted by the 11th Five-Year Plan would guarantee the improvement of defense production while lowering military production costs and avoiding "the additional involvement of human resources." It quoted Ustinov to the effect that the high level of the economy and technology permitted the USSR to create "in the shortest period" any weapons system that Soviet enemies might wager on. An example, it said, was the Soviet ability to develop the Typhoon submarine in response to the U.S. Trident program. The message seemed to be that the USSR was not in danger of being outstripped by Western weapons innovations, which it could match when necessary. By emphasizing the need for better internal administration of the Armed Forces, the article also hinted that the military

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 89.
establishment must get more defense out of the same amount of resources.50

In September 1981 an editorial in *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* provided a further rebuttal to pressures for a surge in military spending. The article praised the party's "exceptional restraint" in coping with the heightened adventurism of imperialist circles. Reiterating that economic might is the foundation not only of social progress but of the state's defense capacity, the editorial made limited concessions to Ogarkov's concern about protecting defense industries against attack, but on the whole it subsumed this concern under a broader commitment to build up various economic sectors, including agriculture and the food supply, which it said had direct significance for national defense. To an unusual degree, the editorial emphasized the economic constraints on defense spending and the need for the military establishment to do more with less. In the current "complex situation," it said, the party was posing the task of "heightening the necessary effectiveness of the defense economy." Lenin, it explained, had repeatedly underscored that the military "must be maximally powerful, mobile, but at the same time not too burdensome for the national economy." Thus he had outlined the optimal dimensions and "the limits" of the peacetime defense economy. The

editorial then called for the "qualitative solution" of the tasks of national defense with "the allocated or even fewer resources."51

Almost simultaneously, Konstantin Chernenko, Brezhnev's closest Politburo ally, spelled out the importance of welfare spending for the stability of the domestic political system. Clearly alarmed about the massive worker protests in Poland, Chernenko apparently feared that the recent jump in Soviet strikes, even though still tiny in absolute terms, might ultimately lead to a similar political upheaval in the USSR.52 Although he expressed confidence that the CPSU currently enjoyed strong ties with the masses, he remarked that "the experience of other socialist countries" demonstrated that such ties "cannot be established once and for all." The party must win the trust of the masses "again and again" by following a political course answering the basic needs of all the toilers. The people judged the party not by its "words and promises," but above all by its ability to carry out a policy that produces "tangible results." An inadequate analysis of social interests and a neglect of any


52. In 1980 there were reportedly three brief local strikes in the USSR. In 1981 the number of such strikes soared to 18. The pre-1980 high, in 1977, was 8 strikes. See Ludmilla Alexeeva and Valery Chalidze, Mass Rioting in the USSR (Silver Spring, Md.: Foundation for Soviet Studies, 1985), pp. 153-158. Despite its title, this work presents a careful analysis of eyewitness and samizdat accounts of Soviet strike activity.
class interests, Chernenko said pointedly, were "fraught with the danger of social tension, political and socioeconomic crisis." By Soviet standards this was an extraordinary statement. It came very close to saying that for political reasons the Soviet elite could not afford to neglect the material wants of the population.

In his address to the Central Committee plenum that confirmed the five-year plan, Brezhnev put a similar accent on nonmilitary needs. He asserted that the food problem, "both on the economic and on the political level, is the central problem of the whole five-year plan," and he hinted that the Food Program, when finished, should contain more resources than currently allocated to agriculture. Brezhnev also warned against reducing the volume of resources going into the development of the Soviet energy sector, including Soviet energy exports to the West. At the same time, however, he announced a cut of thirty billion rubles in the level of capital investments called for by an earlier draft of the plan. In view of the resource squeeze this created, it is not surprising that he made no mention of increasing the size of the country's military effort.

The next month a KVS editorial spelled out the implications for military spending. Emphasizing that the 26th


Congress's call for high responsibility "in full measure relates to officer cadres," the article stressed that "in the system of components of the fighting potential of the Armed Forces, the invincible moral spirit of soldiers stands on the same level as the equipping of units and ships with contemporary weaponry and battle technology." Officers bore a high responsibility for defending the country in the current complex international circumstances, said the article. It then quoted Brezhnev: "For the ensuring of the high and reliable battle preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces...we have everything necessary. Therefore the further raising of the level of battle readiness of the army and navy depends in many ways on the practical activity of military cadres, on their skill, will, energy and persistence." The message was unmistakable. Soviet officers should stop pressing for more resources and accept the responsibility for defending the country with the means currently at their disposal.

As such institutional tensions increased, party controllers moved to strengthen their bureaucratic and ideological position within the military establishment. In October came the announcement of a forthcoming national conference of the secretaries of military party organizations. The last national gathering of this kind had occurred during 1973, in the wake of Brezhnev's decisive swing toward U.S.-Soviet

55. Rear Admiral V. Gulin and Captain I. Kondyrev in KVS, No. 24, 1981, pp. 20, 27. The authors gave no published source for the Brezhnev quotation.
detente, and had probably been meant to shore up his position among military officers disturbed by the implications of the SALT I agreement. The announcement indicated that the purpose of the new meeting would be to mobilize Soviet military men to fulfill the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and Brezhnev's directives on defense questions.

About the same time, a deputy head of the Main Political Administration published an article defining the role of the military party organizations in very expansive terms and complaining that "not all party organizations" had ensured the "deepened study" of the 26th Congress's defense decisions. Some military communists had shown a mediocre knowledge of theoretical questions and had approached the links of theory to practical affairs "extremely primitively." Military communists, said this MPA official, should be able to draw "practical conclusions" from the decisions of the party and the government, and also from the events occurring in the country and abroad--an open-ended reference that may have included the Polish crisis and increased domestic unrest due to food shortages. The official finished with a pointed remark that all party organizations, at the staff as well as

56. According to several retired Soviet military officers, many Soviet military men were surprised and even shocked when the agreement was signed. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "BMD and East-West Relations," in Ballistic Missile Defense, ed. Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (Washington, D.C., 1984), pbk. ed., p. 311.

the unit level, should serve as impassioned disseminators of
Marxist-Leninist ideas. Arguing along similar lines, another
commentator stated that the Communist Party had
established a precise division of labor among state organs
and did not seek to supplant them in the performance of
specific tasks. However, he said, only the party could
develop a scientifically-based general strategy for dealing
with problems. Under current circumstances the party
faced a widening range of economic, political, and "properly
military" tasks in order to make rational use of "gigantic"
resources for the sake of national security. The clear
message was that defending the USSR involved more than
expanding the Armed Forces.

Other signs of high-level tension also appeared. An
editorial in _Voennoo-istoricheskii zhurnal_, noting that
Brezhnev had recently reemphasized that Soviet defense needs
were being reliably met, went out of its way to stress that
the Defense Council had a central role in formulating
military policy. Brezhnev was head of the Council, the
editorial continued, and his political insight and ability to
work with people had allowed him to create "a wholesome,
businesslike atmosphere" in the Council and to make "a large
personal contribution to strengthening the country's defense


Discussions of the working style of the Defense Council are almost unheard-of in the Soviet media, and the comment appeared especially incongruous in the circumstances. Most likely it was meant to restore the tattered facade of elite unity in defense policymaking. Although Ogarkov may not have been a full-fledged member of the Defense Council, he probably participated in Council meetings and supervised the preparation of many of the Council's working documents. It is virtually inconceivable that the Council's proceedings could have been harmonious at a time when Ogarkov was disparaging Brezhnev's policies in public.

Despite demands that all officials close ranks behind Brezhnev and his policies, signs of disagreement multiplied. Alluding again to the recent developments in Poland, Chernenko warned that if the party became divorced from the workers and peasants it could perish. Clearly he envisioned steady increases in consumption as one essential way for the party to maintain its mass support. He acknowledged that the need to meet the imperialist military challenge required "definite means and efforts" to strengthen Soviet defense. But he also said that he attached "very large

60. VIZh, No. 12, 1981, pp. 9-10; see also KVS, No. 24, 1981, pp. 9-10.


significance" to the influential role of "realistic" Western leaders who favored continued East-West detente. Referring perhaps to the USSR as well as other states, Chernenko observed that the tense international atmosphere and the arms race were inhibiting social progress in "these or those countries." But whatever happened, he said, the Soviet Union would not emulate the imperialists by cutting its social programs. These programs, he vowed, would be fulfilled undeviatingly.63 About the same time, a liberal commentator went further, in an article that appeared to call for a shift of resources from military to civilian needs.64

Opponents, however, were unpersuaded. A prominent economist and former Gosplan official vociferously urged the priority growth of producer over consumer goods, partly on military grounds,65 while Kommunist offered some ideological support for this view. The party theoretical journal, whose editor publicly disputed the parallels between Poland and the Soviet Union,66 published an editorial containing passages that manifestly ran against the Brezhnev-Chernenko line.

63. Pravda, 7 February 1982, p. 4. Chernenko made these remarks to delegates of the French Communist Party, and his comment about the obstacles to social progress may also have been a reference to the French Socialists' crushing electoral defeat of the communists in 1981.


Motivated in part by the Polish crisis, the editorial evinced obvious concern about the deteriorating civic loyalty and ideological reliability of Soviet citizens, but it proposed a solution different from the one advocated by Chernenko.\textsuperscript{67}

The answer to the internal political problem, suggested the editorial, was to launch a heavy campaign of domestic propaganda highlighting the imperialist threat and contrasting the humanistic virtues of socialism with the defects of capitalism. Socialism's freedom from social barriers, economic crises and exploitation, it said, had been underemphasized because of the prevailing Soviet accent on popular welfare, housing and social security.\textsuperscript{68} As careful readers must have noticed, these were precisely the programs Brezhnev was trying to give higher priority.\textsuperscript{69} No doubt this dissenting theme was introduced into the party journal by the same officials who were arguing privately that there was already too much democracy in the USSR and that the proper answer to deteriorating labor discipline was a stronger

\textsuperscript{67}. Kommunist, No. 1, 1982, pp. 22-33. Significantly, the editorial was signed for printing shortly after the Polish declaration of martial law. Its strained attempts to reconcile conflicting policy prescriptions suggest that it was written by a committee.

\textsuperscript{68}. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

\textsuperscript{69}. After the editorial appeared, Brezhnev repeated that the more mature Soviet society becomes, the more attention it can and must pay to the daily requirements of workers—housing, food, services, health and education—in order to generate high popular morale and speed economic development. (Ibid., No. 5, 1982, pp. 17-18.)
hand. The editorial also hinted obliquely at criticism of the prevailing party line on international affairs. Although it emphasized that Soviet military means were adequate and that the danger of war should not be exaggerated, it also called for decisive steps to eliminate "the flight of pacifism" that occasionally appeared in "some information-propaganda materials." Earlier in the year Ogarkov had sounded a similar theme, albeit more forcefully.

Underlying the dispute over how much to spend on current military needs were different interpretations of the American strategic challenge. Early in 1982 a group of foreign-policy specialists met under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences to analyze the nature of American military-political strategy. The views expressed at this symposium were sharply contradictory. The most threatening depiction of U.S. military programs was presented by A. K. Slobodenko, a spokesman for the General Staff, who argued that the funda-

70. In ibid., No. 6, 1982, p. 41, Chernenko censured those who held this view but did not name them. See also Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 2, 1982, pp. 12-14.

71. Ogarkov had warned against the view that "any peace is good, any war is bad." (Ibid., No. 10, 1981, p. 90). The editorial did not take Ogarkov's next step, however, which was to warn directly against underestimating the danger of war in party propaganda.

72. The meeting was a session of the Foreign Policy Section of the Academy's Scientific Council on Economic, Political, and Ideological Problems of the United States of America.
mental American goal was to obtain a real first-strike nuclear capability against the USSR, as well as superiority in conventional military forces. 73 Some civilian analysts of the Academy's Institute of the USA and Canada (IUSAC) likewise implied that the Reagan Administration's programs were based on a fundamental hostility to the USSR that could be managed neither by arms control nor by manipulating West European and domestic American opposition to the programs. M. A. Mil'shtein, a retired general who had advocated U.S.-Soviet arms control in the 1970s, declared that the changes in American strategy were the product of a long-term trend in which the proponents of American military superiority had steadily gained the upper hand in the U.S. The U.S. was returning to its classical pre-Vietnam strategy, declared Mil'shtein, and there was no prospect for any achievement in arms control for the remainder of the current administration. In the same vein, G. A. Trofimenko emphasized that the Reagan Administration had set in train military programs that it would be difficult for future administrations to stop, and Iu. M. Mel'nikov added that the administration was ignoring "even the opinion of [its] allies" on questions of arms control. 74 While these IUSAC specialists said nothing about how to deal with the United

73. SShA, No. 5, 1982, pp. 126-27.
States, their views were consistent with the idea that the Soviet Union had to speed up its own military effort.

Other participants, however, took a strikingly different approach. V. V. Zhurkin, a deputy director of IUSAC, expressed the opinion that although one tendency in American policy was to strive for global and regional military superiority, another tendency was to pour money into military programs as a way of obtaining some sort of Soviet concessions. By stating that the second tendency was dominant in American policy, Zhurkin clearly suggested that the Reagan Administration was not unalterably committed to attaining military superiority, and he may have meant to imply that the U.S. buildup was part of the administration's preparations for the resumption of strategic arms talks. Moreover, Zhurkin indicated that even if superiority were the real American goal, it probably could not be achieved. The main barrier to U.S. military superiority, he said, was "the strength of [Soviet-American] military parity. When we say that the United States will seek supremacy in this or that area, we must not omit from the reckoning how much it was possible, especially in the 1970s, to strengthen the existing parity." Destroying parity, which now extended to both the quality and quantity of weapons, had become "a hopeless task." Moreover, the stability of the existing military balance was reinforced by West European and domestic American

75. Ibid., pp. 119-120.
opposition to the Reagan Administration's policies. "These factors exist in objective reality," concluded Zhurkin, "and Washington will be unable not to take account of them..." 76

Another specialist, A. A. Kokoshin, argued along similar lines. 77 The latent message of these commentators was that the strategic balance was quite stable and that the U.S. would be unable to achieve military superiority even in the absence of stepped-up Soviet military countermeasures. Zhurkin, in particular, plainly wanted to keep the party slogan about the American pursuit of superiority from being translated into massive new Soviet military programs.

The issue of the proper level of Soviet military spending was also tied up with the relative capacities of the Soviet and American economies to sustain an all-out arms race. Soviet observers who favored more military spending usually either dismissed the idea that a central aim of the American buildup was to exhaust the Soviet economy, or else they denied the feasibility of this aim. In the months before the publication of the Academy symposium, for instance, some military commentators stated that sooner or later declining Western growth curves would result in "a

76. Ibid.

77. Kokoshin argued that the Reagan Administration's military programs would undermine efforts at American reindustrialization, which was no less necessary to U.S. security than were armaments, and he suggested that an incipient bipartisan movement against Reagan's policies might soon crystallize into more active political opposition. (Ibid., pp. 120-22.)
complete halt" of Western economic expansion. Washington's expectations of undermining the socialist states' plans for economic development by forcing the arms race were "illu-
sory," claimed these writers. The socialist countries had "every possibility" to match the American buildup while maintaining their economic power. Such views implied that the USSR could increase the military share of the budget without fear of crippling itself in the economic race with the West.

Oblique evidence suggests that Marshal Ogarkov shared this perspective. In his 1982 V-E speech, Ogarkov said: "An extremely important component of the plan the imperialists have mapped out is the United States' persistent endeavor to draw the USSR, at any cost, into a new round of the arms race, which, in its opinion, the Soviet Union's economy will not be able to sustain." Although at first glance agnostic, the passage may have been meant to suggest that the idea of economic exhaustion was only an imperialist notion, and

79. General-major N. Gusev in ibid., No. 11, 1982, p. 84.
80. For Soviet disputes of this kind in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see Parrott, Politics and technology in the Soviet Union, Chs. 5-6.
therefore incorrect. This interpretation is supported by Ogarkov's later comments. In September 1983 he called for a larger Soviet military effort and said that the USSR would not "blindly imitate" the U.S. in the arms race, as the Americans appeared to expect. Instead, taking account of the level of Soviet science and technology, the USSR would follow its own path in countering the American military threat. Ogarkov seemed to be saying that even if Soviet economic exhaustion was one goal of American military policy, the USSR could expand its forces without falling into this trap.

Soviet opponents of greatly increased military spending treated the possibility of economic exhaustion far more seriously. For example, IUSAC director Arbatov concluded the Academy symposium on U.S. military strategy with the remark that the Reagan Administration, more than any of its predecessors, was counting on exhausting the socialist economies through the arms race. While Arbatov offered a pro forma assurance that such an eventuality was impossible, he singled out this economic goal as one of the nuances of American defense policy requiring special study. He thus seemed to suggest that economic depletion was indeed a real danger and that the domestic economic impact of a more rapid Soviet


military buildup should be weighed as part of the country's national-security calculus. This statement paralleled the comments of IUSAC deputy director R. G. Bogdanov. Bogdanov remarked that the U.S., although very powerful, no longer enjoyed the dominant position it had held in earlier decades. Underscoring the need for an "adequate" diagnosis of the complex international situation, Bogdanov emphasized that it was important to differentiate "authentic threats" from "aspects of bluff" in American policy and to identify American attempts to "lead the opponent onto a false path." While Bogdanov did not refer explicitly to the economic costs of an accelerated Soviet military effort, he seemed to be warning against the danger of overreacting to U.S. military programs.

This view found an echo in the statements of Defense Minister Ustinov. During 1982 Ustinov began to describe American intentions more darkly and declared that the USSR would match any increase in Western military power, but he avoided calling for a major increase in the military effort. Instead he commented that the struggle for detente required "enormous restraint and firmness." Socialism, he said, exerts its major influence on world development "through its successes in the economic area." The "decisive front" in the East-West competition lay "precisely in the sphere of the

83. SSHA, No. 6, 1982, p. 127.
84. Ibid., p. 119.
economy.85 Ustinov maintained that the party was ensuring an adequate rate of weapons innovation and doing everything necessary for the country's defense.86 In striking contrast to Ogarkov's views, he remarked that it was impossible to re-equip all branches of the Armed Forces simultaneously and that the capabilities of older generations of weapons still in service should not be underestimated.87 Ustinov also called the food supply the central problem of the current quinquennium and promised that the Food Program, which Brezhnev was still struggling to push through, would be included in the 11th Five-Year Plan.88 Although he decried the growing aggressiveness of the West, he added that the forces of international reaction possessed not only "powerful contemporary means of attack" but also "enormous economic, scientific-technological and military potentials" that demanded a realistic and balanced Soviet policy.89 His words suggested a reluctance to pit the Soviet and Warsaw Pact economies against the West in an all-out arms race.

85. D. F. Ustinov, Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunista (Moscow, 1982), pp. 23, 30. (Signed for printing on 15 February 1982).
86. Ibid., pp. 53, 58-59.
87. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
88. Ibid., p. 30.
89. Ibid., pp. 50-51; KVS, No. 11, 1982, p. 9.
The debate on this issue spilled over into the editorial pages of Kommunist. An editorial on the social consequences of the "scientific-technological revolution" pointed out somberly that the USSR was "only in the first period" of this revolution and that "a great, great deal" remained to be done to raise Soviet industry to advanced technical levels. At the same time, the editorial pictured the West as a formidable technological adversary. The editorial castigated "some Marxist researchers" who had proposed that capitalism was incompatible with the scientific-technological revolution and would necessarily be undermined by it. In actuality, said the editorial, capitalism had centuries of experience in applying diverse policy measures for the "solution or softening" of its internal crises. Notwithstanding its growing fixation on creating new weapons of mass destruction, capitalism was striving for the comprehensive advancement of science and technology, and the scientific-technological revolution was accelerating capitalism's development. Such facts were "important not only in a theoretical but in a practical respect," since they affected the Soviet choice of a strategy in the struggle against imperialism. Viewed in this light, competition with the West required close atten-


91. Ibid., pp. 13, 20.
tion to the USSR's economic development as well as to its military power.

The conviction that a massive increase in military expenditures should be avoided was backed by the national conference of military party secretaries. The final resolution of the conference dwelt on the increasing aggressiveness of imperialism but refrained from calling for a large increase in the Soviet military effort. Instead it stated that the armed forces "now possess everything necessary for an instant rebuff of any aggressor."92 The addition of the word "now" in the resolution seemed intended to show that this was not simply a ritual affirmation of Soviet strength for propaganda purposes, but a statement about real Soviet military capacities at the present time. Whether most members of the professional officer corps accepted this judgment was a different matter, however. At the meeting Ustinov's lavish attempts to establish Brezhnev's military credentials appeared to be designed to justify Brezhnev's authority in the eyes of military men skeptical of current policies.93


93. In his speech, which was published only in part, Ustinov paid homage to Brezhnev and hailed his "truly titanic work in strengthening the economic and defense might of our Motherland..." (*KVS*, No. 11, 1982, p. 7. See also Ustinov, *Sluzhim Rodine*, pp. 36-38.)
Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that budgetary priorities were heatedly debated in the spring and summer of 1982. The first installment of the Academy symposium on American strategy appeared in April, at a time when the party leaders must have been pondering what negotiating position to adopt when the long-delayed START talks finally got under way. In mid-May Brezhnev proposed a U.S.-Soviet freeze on the deployment of strategic weapons,94 and the national conference of party secretaries convened to endorse his position on military spending. Brezhnev also continued to press his critics to accept the Food Program, which was publicly unveiled at the end of May. Almost simultaneously, the second installment of the Academy symposium appeared, and Kommunist published a lengthy editorial intended to rebut internal criticism of the Brezhnev line toward the West.95

One striking feature of the editorial was the defensive tone of its claims that current Soviet policy was based on an "unerring" evaluation of the international correlation of forces. Praising Lenin's 1922 decision to present a detailed program for international disarmament and economic ties with the West, Kommunist lauded Soviet policy for

94. More precisely, Brezhnev proposed that once strategic arms limitation talks resumed, there should be a freeze on the deployment of new weapons and a maximum reduction in the rate of weapons modernization. (Kommunist, No. 8, 1982, pp. 7-9.)

95. Ibid., pp. 10-20, signed to press on 19 May 1982.
showing "endurance" and resistance to Western "provocations."
While the editorial called recent Western acts a threat to
peace, it asserted that there were "real possibilities" to
foil the threat by political means and claimed that moderate
groups alarmed about the international situation were
gaining influence in the West. It also made the quite
unorthodox comment that given the current correlation of
forces, peaceful coexistence required a relaxation of
international tensions. This comment, probably a concession
to Soviet critics, implied that more confrontational policies
might be necessary to preserve "peaceful coexistence" in
different military and political circumstances.96

More concretely, the editorial reaffirmed Brezhnev's
commitment to avoid an "uncontrolled arms race." A
favorable American response to Soviet INF reductions and to
Brezhnev's recent offer to negotiate a quantitative freeze on
strategic arsenals would give "all sides" an "extremely
useful" interval for mature reflection and decisions while
preserving rough parity. While the editorial noted that the
U.S. arms buildup faced large domestic obstacles, it treated
American hopes of exhausting the Soviet economy as a serious
matter. As for Soviet arms expenditures, the editorial
stated that the USSR was taking "necessary measures" to
counter the Western threat but added that the Armed Forces

96. Ibid., pp. 18-20.
already possessed "everything necessary" for the timely repulse of any aggression. It closed with the pointed remark that although the struggle for peace was bound to encounter significant difficulties, "only declared enemies of the principles of peaceful coexistence...are incapable of seeing...the process of [these principles'] gradual materialization in the practice of international life."97 The editorial's failure to identify these enemies as foreigners strongly suggests that some of them belonged to Soviet ruling circles.

One focus of internal criticism was Brezhnev's attempts to push through the Food Program, which was finally announced near the end of the month. In the weeks preceding the announcement, articles appeared which clearly implied that too large a share of capital investment was being channeled into programs such as agriculture and energy, and that the share of such investments would have to be cut back.98 However, at the Central Committee plenum where he unveiled the draft Program, Brezhnev signalled that he wanted even higher investments in agriculture than the draft called for, and he provided only a tepid assurance that the country's defenses would be safeguarded through future military efforts. Instead, in a novel departure, he explicitly

97. Ibid., pp. 13, 16, 18, 20.

discussed the Food Program as an important national security measure needed to accumulate necessary Soviet food and fodder reserves and protect the country from "any sorts of contingencies" such as the recent American grain embargo. Brezhnev also made a suggestive comment about the efforts of unidentified "enemies of socialism" to ignore or minimize the recent achievements of Soviet agriculture.99

Even after Brezhnev unveiled the Food Program, Politburo members expressed divergent attitudes toward it. Some, such as Chernenko, Kunaev, and Shcherbitskii, gave it a glowing endorsement.100 But others, such as Moscow party leader V. V. Grishin and Council of Ministers Chairman Tikhonov, were distinctly unenthusiastic. Grishin's first comment after the plenum was lukewarm.101 His second comment three days later was more favorable, but the paraphrase of the speech attributed to him had obviously been doctored to produce this result.102 Within two weeks Grishin hastened to pledge his


102. The most striking thing about the paraphrase is that it reads like a splice of Grishin's speech with Brezhnev's address to the May plenum. After the introductory passage it is written as if Brezhnev is speaking ("Considering these factors, said L. I. Brezhnev," "as L. I. Brezhnev said," and so forth). It is these paragraphs which echo the May plenum's instruction that the Food Program should be the basis of future economic plans and Brezhnev's
public loyalty to the Food Program, and his Moscow City party committee held an unusual conference at which shortcomings in explaining the Program and Brezhnev's "peace policy" were criticized.103 But it is hard to believe that such defects in party propaganda could have occurred without Grishin's active or tacit approval, and behind-the-scene resistance to the Food Program continued. In July a Kommunist editorial recalled Brezhnev's injunction to "improve" the targets of the Program and urged the Council of Ministers and Gosplan to speed up the transfer of resources into agriculture. Unfortunately, said the editorial, "a large number of unsolved problems" in the work of the planning organs were inhibiting basic economic changes like those outlined in the Food Program, and the work of the planning bodies must be upgraded.104 In all likelihood, the economic planners were taking their cues from Politburo opponents of the Program, and the attacks on bad planning were aimed partly at these Politburo critics.

In the face of such top-level differences, members of the officer corps questioned the wisdom of stepped-up spending on agriculture. One hint of military resistance comment that the Program's target should be regarded as minimums to be exceeded. (Moskovskaia pravda, 2 June 1982, pp. 1-2.)


appeared in an article published in Krasnaia zvezda shortly before the announcement of the Food Program. The article, which attempted to refute the critics of the Food Program "who have already appeared in the West"—that is, even before the publication of the Food Program—seemed aimed at skeptics within the Soviet military establishment. Additional evidence of resistance from Soviet officers surfaced in the wake of the May plenum. Immediately after the plenum, the party aktiv of the General Staff, augmented by many of the country's top officers, met to discuss the recent national conference of military party secretaries and ways to improve party work within the General Staff. In his address

105. N. Karasev in Krasnaia zvezda, 7 May 1982, p. 2. At the time this article appeared, some Western observers interpreted it as a direct expression of military opposition to the Food Program. The basis of this interpretation was the article's favorable comparison of the Soviet food situation with the widespread hunger alleged to exist in the West. (See Radio Liberty Research Bulletin). However, the article also discussed the need to improve the welfare and diet of the Soviet population, mentioned the Food Program explicitly, and defended it against "Western" critics. One Soviet criticism that coincided fairly closely with the views rebutted in the article was that Soviet agriculture should be improved through decentralization rather than through the infusion of additional material resources. An exceptionally forceful expression of this view appeared in Pravda on the same day that Krasnaia zvezda printed the Karasev article. (V. Trapeznikov in Pravda, 7 May 1982, pp. 2-3). On balance, the article seemed intended to counter domestic opponents of the Food Program, and its appearance in the military press implies that the Program's defenders believed that some of the opponents were in the armed services.

106. Apart from Ustinov, three first deputy ministers of defense (Ogarkov, Kulikov, and Sokolov) and five deputy ministers (Tolubko, Koldunov, Kurkotkin, Altunin, and Shkadov) took part. First deputy chiefs of the MPA and the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department were
to the meeting, Ustinov discussed the future of Soviet weapons development, but he also told the gathering that military communists must actively explain Brezhnev's plenary report and the Food Program and "ensure the latter's implementation in the Armed Forces." According to the press account, the meeting was told that the party work in the General Staff "must meet most fully the demands of the 26th Party Congress." Reportedly the other speeches at the meeting (none of them by the top officers who attended) "wholly and fully" approved the party's new agricultural commitments. Nonetheless, a month later Ustinov found it necessary to repeat publicly that "military leaders...must not stand apart from that large and responsible work to which...the Food Program orients the Soviet people...It is necessary to inculcate in military persons a genuinely careful, economical, thrifty attitude toward everything our country gives the Armed Forces." Plainly some officers remained unenthusiastic about heavy spending on agriculture. Less than two weeks later Ustinov also went out of his way to assure unnamed "Soviet persons" that Brezhnev's recent unilateral pledge against the first use of nuclear weapons would not encourage Western aggressiveness or threaten Soviet

also present. (Krasnaia zvezda, 29 May 1982, p. 1).

107. Ibid.

security. The USSR, said Ustinov, was soberly evaluating Western military strategy and capabilities. There can be little doubt that a substantial number of officers were critics of both the Food Program and Soviet arms-control policy.

These signs of conflict over policy were accompanied by bureaucratic friction. At the end of May General-colonel V. Goncharov, First Deputy Chief of the Main Cadres Administration of the Ministry of Defense, issued a call for tighter screening and control of military officers. The Armed Forces had all the technology they needed, he remarked, but without well-trained cadres completely loyal to the party, it would be difficult to achieve military success no matter how good the technology. The main thing, said Goncharov in an unusual choice of words, was "to strengthen individual work with subordinate officers, generals, and admirals." Regular attestation of cadres could serve as a "powerful stimulus" to officers to fulfill their party and service obligations, and it was necessary to arrange matters so that officers understood that attestation was not a formality but a procedure "determining for years" the position in which an individual would serve.

Even more revealing was Goncharov's discussion of the qualities desirable in officers. Lenin and Brezhnev, he

110. VIZh, No. 6, 1982, pp. 4-5, 9.
said, had underscored the need to promote real organizers, people who could establish friendly working relations among a large number of people, and who could do so without "turmoil and noise." "Only" such people should be promoted.111 Usually the responsibilities of an officer or general increased with his rank, said Goncharov. But occasionally there were cases in which an immature officer began to consider himself "infallible" and had to be corrected. Sometimes it was necessary to consider removing "those leaders" who, despite their love of work, their discipline and sense of responsibility, depended too little on party and Komsomol organizations and could not create a sense of solidarity within their military units. Improved leadership style, said the cadres chief, was closely connected with strengthened supervision of the fulfillment of party directives, and above all fulfillment of the orders of the Minister of Defense and the head of the Main Political Administration.112 As a rule, public threats to remove Soviet officers are connected with charges of venality or incompetence. In this instance, however, the writer was acknowledging that highly professional officers might have to be removed because of their imperious style and unwillingness to cooperate with party units.

111. Ibid., p. 9. Emphasis in the original.
112. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
Such threats did not deter Brezhnev's military critics, who continued to suggest that military considerations should play a larger role in peacetime economic decisions. In June an important article appeared on "The Role of Military Strategy in Preparing the Country for War." Citing Ogarkov's 1979 article on "strategy" in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, the author remarked that practical activity for the peacetime preparation of the country for war was one of the most important elements of military strategy. However, despite the constant expansion of the role of strategy in readying the whole country for military conflict, this role had been obscured by the use of the formula that strategy participates "in the preparation of war." Even the articles on military strategy in all three editions of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia had limited the role of military strategy solely to the preparation of the Armed Forces for war, said this military author. But military art was developing continuously, and the quantity and complexity of strategic tasks were steadily increasing. The article contained sharp contradictions which suggest it may have been the object of a political struggle, particularly over the definition of the proper role of the General Staff in

114. Ibid. p. 47.
national-security planning.\textsuperscript{115} But on balance it conveyed
the impression that the prevailing civilian conception of
strategy should be redefined to give military needs greater
weight and perhaps to give the military establishment
increased institutional representation in economic
planning.\textsuperscript{116}

Subtle signs of disagreement also surfaced in some
collections on the military balance. An article intended for
military seminars on the theme of military preparedness
contained an assurance that the material base of the Armed
Forces was developing in full correspondence with the
interests of reliable defense. However, it then added that
the NATO powers were putting increasing emphasis on the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} The contradictions occurred in the discussion of
past theories and cases of military strategy. On the one
hand, the article quoted M. Frunze to the effect that
preparations for war extend far beyond the powers of the
military establishment and that peacetime preparations for a
rapid, smooth transition to war are an "insistent, burning
and urgent task." On the other hand, the article quoted
B. M. Shaposhnikov's comment that the government rather than
the General Staff bears responsibility for the preparation
and conduct of war. The General Staff should make sugges-
tions about such preparations but should not "dictate"
them, because overloading the economy would risk military
defeat. (Ibid., pp. 52-53.)

\item \textsuperscript{116} The article noted that Germany had prepared inade-
quately for World War I but had prepared much more thoroughly
for World War II. Before World War II in Germany it was
recognized that deficiencies in military-economic prepara-
tions were due to the lack of a special organ to direct the
process. The question of creating such an organ was raised,
said the author, and ultimately a military-economic council
was created for this purpose under the military high command.
(Ibid., pp. 47-49, 51-52.)
\end{itemize}
qualitative arms competition, making it "very important" to follow Western developments and keep Soviet weaponry on an advanced level. The Armed Forces, said the article, "must now be prepared for the conduct of war and the destruction of any aggressor. In this connection it is insufficient to ensure only the defense of our country and the countries of the socialist commonwealth; the full destruction of the aggressor is necessary." The article then quoted Ogarkov's comment that it was necessary "to know not simply how to defend oneself, opposing the aggressor with the corresponding passive means and methods of defense, but also to deliver against him retaliatory blows and destroy the enemy in any conditions..." These words seemed to hint that although the Armed Forces "must" be prepared to destroy any aggressor, they were not presently in a condition to do so. The article also noted that military readiness hinges on well-organized preparations for the timely mobilization of armies from a peace- to a wartime footing.

These tensions came to a head in late October, when Brezhnev and other Politburo members met with a large contingent of the Soviet high command. Probably the


118. Ibid., p. 8.

119. The other Politburo members in attendance were Andropov, Gromyko, Tikhonov, Ustinov and Chernenko. (Pravda, 28 October 1981, p. 1.) About a week earlier, a large conference of military political workers had met to discuss
meeting was precipitated by the worsening Soviet relations with the United States and by the need to finalize the annual economic plan for 1983. Brezhnev's speech to the gathering was defensive but not acquiescent. He remarked that life had confirmed the correctness of the 26th Party Congress's decisions and that the policy of detente was allowing the USSR "to keep the initiative in international affairs," but he conceded that because of the troubled international situation "naturally new questions also appear which must be decided without delay." Underscoring his long familiarity with military issues, Brezhnev asserted that "we are equipping the Armed Forces with the most advanced weapons" and that the party was taking steps "in order that you need nothing [more]." His comment that "the Armed Forces should always be worthy of this concern" carried a hint that the military had not always used these resources wisely, and his references to bottlenecks in the fuel and energy sectors were probably meant to signal that there were serious limits on the number of new weapons systems that could actually be deployed. Brezhnev also emphasized the security benefits of

the 26th Congress's guidelines on ideological work in the Armed Forces. The meeting was attended by the head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department and the First Deputy Head of the Administrative Organs Department. (Krasnaia zvezda, 21 October 1982, p. 1.)

his agricultural policies and the "exceptional importance" of the Food Program.

At the same time, however, Brezhnev acknowledged that the international technological competition in armaments had "sharply intensified" and was in many cases assuming a "fundamentally new character." A lag in this competition was impermissible, he said, and Soviet researchers and engineers would do everything necessary to see that this task was successfully solved. Whereas in earlier years Brezhnev had called on military industrialists to do more for civilian production, he was now calling on all specialists to do more for military programs. He seemed reluctant to speed up the production and deployment of new weapons. But he was plainly promising to accelerate the process of weapons development.121

The responses of other top Politburo members to Brezhnev's speech showed significant variations. Although none of the leaders was prepared to give the military lobby everything it wanted, some were more favorably disposed toward it than others. Scanty evidence suggests that Grishin may have been marginally more sympathetic to military demands than were other middle-of-the-road Politburo members. Although Grishin said after Brezhnev's speech that the party "is undertaking everything necessary" for defense, he also remarked that world socialism influences the course of

history "not only through its foreign policy" but also through the solution of its economic and social tasks.¹²² This subtle departure from Brezhnev's standard slogan may have been intended to upgrade the importance of foreign policy instruments such as military power and to downgrade the significance of domestic economic programs. Grishin observed that Brezhnev's "clear, substantial" speech had been perceived by the populace and the military establishment as "a program for further heightening the level of battle preparedness of the army and navy," and he showed no visible apprehension about the economic burden of the arms race for the USSR. Instead, implying perhaps that the burden was more painful for the West, he claimed that the arms competition was producing many economic manifestations of a capitalist crisis unprecedented in the postwar period.¹²³

Ustinov's response to Brezhnev's speech was slightly more cautious. The speech, he said, constituted a new manifestation of the party's concern about defense, and it defined precisely the critical links in the activity of the Armed Forces and the defense industries to strengthen defense capacity.¹²⁴ Coupled with Ustinov's reiteration that the Armed Forces had "everything necessary" to repulse aggres-

¹²³. Ibid.
sion, this comment may have been intended to focus the impact of the speech on military R&D, rather than allowing it to be generalized to defense production as a whole.125 This interpretation is consistent with Ustinov's comments about the economic burden of the arms race. Ustinov remarked that the United States was attempting to drag the USSR into expanding its weapons stock and into fighting local wars, in order to exhaust the Soviet economy and retard domestic social progress.126 These words implied that the American goal was a serious one and that the USSR should strive to avoid such a trap.

By far the most striking treatment of Brezhnev's speech came from Chernenko. A few days after the speech, Chernenko commented that although the Reagan Administration had spent two years flexing its muscles and accumulating more nuclear weapons, such policies had weakened America's international position by creating tensions with U.S. allies. The USSR, said Chernenko, wanted better relations with the United States. "But if Washington...continues a policy of threat and diktat, okay, we are strong enough and we can wait. Neither sanctions nor warlike poses frighten us. We believe in reason. And we believe that sooner or later—and the sooner the better—reason will prevail and the danger of war

126. Ibid., p. 25.
will be averted." Chernenko completely omitted any reference to Brezhnev's speech or to the need to strengthen Soviet defenses. Given his decision to discuss relations with the U.S., this was a glaring omission that strongly implied disapproval of stepping up military programs of any kind.

127. By contrast, Brezhnev's speech was mentioned by another speaker at the gathering where Chernenko spoke. (Pravda, 30 October 1982, p. 2, as translated in FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 3 November 1982, pp. R15-R17.)
After Brezhnev died in early November, the military lobby probably anticipated that its claims on the budget would receive a more sympathetic hearing. The history of past changes of top leadership indicates that the defense lobby has usually enjoyed heightened influence in the first phase of the succession process, as Politburo competitors strive to enlist influential bureaucratic constituencies against their rivals. In the months after Brezhnev's death, military spokesmen did indeed press for higher military spending, and some party leaders attempted to present themselves as dedicated champions of Soviet military security. In the case of Andropov, however, these attempts were primarily gestures intended to undermine political rivals such as Chernenko, rather than real offers to step up the growth of military outlays. Although sparse, the evidence suggests that another leader, Grigorii Romanov, may have offered genuine support for higher military spending. But on balance, the strenuous efforts of Ogarkov and others to win firm party backing for a rapid spending increase met with political resistance and measures to strengthen party control of the military establishment. When Chernenko succeeded Andropov, this pattern was repeated, resulting in Ogarkov's demotion.
While jockeying for Brezhnev's mantle, Chernenko continued to play down the idea of increased defense spending. In speeches during November 1982, he tried harder than any other contender to depict himself as a faithful exponent of Brezhnev's political legacy. Yet, significantly, he again passed up the opportunity to mention or endorse Brezhnev's October concessions to the military high command. Instead, he discussed national economic goals in a way which implied that general economic growth and improved popular welfare were prerequisites for the expansion of Soviet defense capacity, and he made no explicit mention of strengthening the Armed Forces per se.128

Although Andropov's statements did not offer an iron-clad commitment to build up the military establishment, they must have sounded more reassuring to conservative party and military figures than did Chernenko's words. "We well know," said Andropov, "that you can't get peace from the imperialists by asking for it. It can be defended only by leaning on the indestructible might of the Soviet Armed Forces." Brezhnev, Andropov said, had constantly paid attention to the need to keep the country's defense capacity "on the level of contemporary requirements."129 Implied allusions to Brezhnev's October speech were thus turned

against Chernenko, Brezhnev's closest disciple. A few months later, Andropov promised that the USSR would increase the fighting capacity of the Armed Forces and "do everything necessary" to protect Soviet security.130

At the same time, however, Andropov signalled that he was reluctant to support a drastic increase in military spending. In an address to the Central Committee, he remarked that the party was following Lenin's "farsighted" instruction that "we exercise our main influence on the world revolutionary process through our economic policy."131 The new General Secretary, who repeatedly voiced deep concern about the economy's poor performance, remarked that the USSR would welcome a mutual reduction of weapons and military expenditures, which would be "a great benefit for all countries."132 Taking note of the imbalances in Soviet economic plans and the shortage of consumer goods, he called the elimination of such imbalances "both an economic and a political task." Finally, he offered an assurance that the regime did not intend to attain greater economic output at the expense of the workers' interests, and he warned that insufficient attention to the contradictions within Soviet


society could lead to "serious collisions." Although Andropov plainly meant to enforce strict labor discipline and speed up the pace of economic reform, he showed no sign that he intended to alter the trend in military outlays established under Brezhnev.

In the meantime a much harder-line position, possibly associated with Grigorii Romanov, appeared in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal. The subject of the article was the attitude of an early Soviet leader, Sergei Kirov, toward the political problems of war and the army. Kirov's views, said the writer, had large significance for contemporary military cadres. Kirov had deeply understood the historical inevitability of armed conflict between the proletariat and the forces of reaction after the founding of a workers' state. He had noted that the USSR favored a peace-loving policy, "but we will do everything necessary to multiply, improve and strengthen our Armed Forces," because "imperialist encirclement" required it. Such measures were necessary to protect the Soviet state from being annihilated while "continuing peaceful construction." The writer's skeptical enclosure of this phrase in quotation marks was significant. As party chief of Leningrad, he explained, Kirov had harshly reproached those who failed to fulfill military production orders on time, because this involved "a direct underesti-

mation of international tension." Moreover, Kirov had stressed that anyone who wanted to end the phenomenon of imperialist war would have to "tear up the very roots of imperialism." 134

The precise connection between this article and leadership politics is uncertain. The author may have meant to imply an analogy between Kirov and Romanov, who had a background in the defense industry and was currently chief of the party committee of Leningrad oblast. 135 But whether or not the author wrote with this intention and with Romanov's approval, the article was manifestly a call for the more rapid expansion of military production. Its formulas came very close to reviving the Stalinist doctrines of the "inevitability of war" and "capitalist encirclement," both repudiated by Khrushchev in the 1950s as part of an effort to curb Soviet military spending. 136 Moreover, the author's dismissive treatment of the idea of "continuing peaceful construction" was obviously meant to warn against a dangerous preoccupation with domestic economic development at the expense of Soviet military security.

A similar note of dissent appeared about the same time

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135. Romanov remained in this post until June 1983, when he moved to Moscow as the national party secretary in charge of overseeing the defense industries.

136. For details, see Parrott, Politics and Technology, Ch. 4.
in an analysis of the sources of Soviet defense capacity. "In characterizing the military might of the USSR," said the author, "usually they emphasize [obychno vydeliaiut] economic, social, spiritual... [and] scientific potentials, and also the 'properly military' potential." However, said this writer, the direct components of military potential include "not all economic potential," but only "that part of the economy which immediately supplies the defense requirements of the state." Defensive might also hinges on "the level of development of military-scientific potential--the achievements of the natural, technical, social, and logical-mathematical sciences in their military aspect." These economic and scientific factors were among "the immediate sources for the formation and development of 'properly military' potential, which basically is embodied in the battle potential of the Armed Forces." The battle potential of the military services, said the writer bluntly, "occupies a special place among the components of defensive might" and "must not be regarded as 'one of' the potentials on the same level with the remaining ones. It is necessary to underscore that the battle potential of the army and navy constitutes the core of the country's defense potential and most directly and effectively expresses its essence."137 In criticizing the equation of the "properly military" factor with other components of defense capacity, this writer was rejecting a

formula used by advocates of curbs on the growth of military spending. He manifestly favored heavier spending on the military establishment.

This viewpoint was soon rebutted in an article intended for military seminars on the subject of the party's concern about equipping the Armed Forces. Far from complacent, the writer emphasized the rapidity of changes in Western military technology and contended that all the fruits of Soviet scientific research must be used to improve Soviet weaponry. In particular, he highlighted the increasing importance of electronics and rocket weapons, and he mentioned a rate of growth for machinebuilding far above the target in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. But the writer's emphasis was on strengthening the general industrial base needed for military power, rather than on the immediate expansion of weapons production. He balanced his reference to the increasing importance of rockets with a reference to "a relative reduction of expenditures on several types of conventional


139. Colonel S. Bartenev in KVS, No. 5, 1983, pp. 17, 21. Bartenev stated that the output of machinebuilding "practically doubles every seven or eight years." For output to double every eight years, it would have to grow at nine percent per year. A 1984 CIA analysis estimated the FYP target for the machinebuilding and metalworking sectors to be 3.4 percent per year, and the actual growth rate in 1981-83 to be 3.8 percent. (The Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1984, Statement by Robert Gates, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 21 November 1984, p. 18.)
weapons." Citing armaments chief V. M. Shabanov on the need to ensure a strong defense in both the present and the future, he remarked that the party's demands for the economical use of resources were directly relevant to the Armed Forces, since military preparedness depended not only on the amount of resources allocated, but on their rational use. In addition, his allusion to the imperialists' "crafty methods" of undermining the socialist economies may have been an oblique reference to the economic burden of the arms race.140 On balance, he seemed to advocate accelerated military R&D together with careful control of other current expenditures in order to match the West in the long-term military competition.

The disagreements about military spending were linked to disagreements about party indoctrination and control of the military establishment. In KVS the deputy director of the MPA observed that some political workers in the military were "living in a past day" and failing to interpret the Central Committee's ideological demands correctly.141 Another article in the same issue stated that the party's role "in deciding fundamental military-theoretical problems—in particular, research on the possibility of preventing war and maintaining the military balance—is growing." The Central Committee, continued the article, "orients military cadres

140. Ibid., pp. 15, 22.
toward a deep mastery of the military art and an effective application of battle technology and weaponry."142 The obvious message was that the party reserved the right to assess the danger of war and to determine whether the strategic balance was moving against the USSR. The duty of military men was to concentrate on mastering and applying the resources they were given.

Some military officials, however, were apparently unwilling to accept this division of labor, and their resistance provoked unusually polemical explications of the party's prerogatives in the military realm. The party, stated one such article, "develops the basic tenets" in the area of military science and doctrine, "coordinates the activity of all the state organs" charged with protecting national security, and "helps Soviet persons to draw the correct conclusions from the international situation." The article, which approvingly listed "properly military" potential as one of several components of national defense, contained a lengthy analysis of the Leninist attitude toward distortions in party-military relations. Lenin and the party, it said, had given "a decisive rebuff to those who expressed doubts concerning the party's leadership of the military department." A 1918 Central Committee decree had condemned "the efforts of particular persons and press organs to depict the policy of the military department as the

142. Colonel V. Zotov in ibid., p. 51.
incidental actions of these or those personalities and
groups." Lenin had vigorously opposed "partisan conflict"
(partizanshchina) within the army, and the Central Committee
had declared that the military department, like all other
components of the state apparatus, acts on the precise basis
of party directives and under party supervision.\textsuperscript{143} This
pointed historical excursus strongly implied that some
contemporary "persons and press organs" were not following
the party's lead on military policy.

Despite such veiled threats, some officers continued to
express doubts about the party's diagnosis of the interna-
tional scene. In the spring of 1983, immediately after the
failure of Soviet efforts to sidetrack NATO's INF plans by
manipulating the West German parliamentary elections, a
military analyst published an article stressing the
short-term danger of war. The writer acknowledged that the
tactic of dividing the West had influenced some of the
smaller West European countries, but he emphasized that the
major West European states were actively supporting American
military plans, including the forthcoming INF deployments.
Arguing that the postwar international situation had now
passed into a new phase of superpower confrontation, he
quoted the conclusion of the 1980 Republican platform that
detente "is dead," and he underscored the centrality of the

\textsuperscript{143.} N. Pankratov and Colonel V. Semin in VIZh, No. 1,
1983, pp. 11-12. See also ibid., No. 5, 1983, pp. 4, 10.
Soviet Armed Forces in preventing the outbreak of a new imperialist war.144

Marshal Ogarkov struck a similar note by drawing a close parallel between the current period and the 1930s and noting that diplomatic efforts to stop Hitler had failed. Ogarkov, sobered perhaps by the demands of party controllers and steps to counter his influence within the military establishment,145 stated that the Armed Forces had "everything necessary for the qualitative fulfillment" of their tasks.146 But his unusual choice of words raised an implicit question about whether the military establishment had enough weapons to fulfill its mission "quantitatively." Previously Ogarkov had drawn a sharp distinction between creating new weapons and deploying them in adequate numbers. His wording seemed especially suggestive because in October Brezhnev had promised to accelerate military R&D, not weapons procurement, and because after Brezhnev's death Ustinov had sought to


145. In late March four generals were promoted to the rank of marshal. One of them was S. F. Akhromeev, the deputy chief of the General Staff. This was the first time since the creation of the General Staff in 1935 that a deputy chief had held this rank. The promotion prompted speculation that Akhromeev was being groomed to succeed Ogarkov, as in fact ultimately occurred. (See Peter Kruzhin, "The New Marshals--A Sign of Change in the Soviet Ministry of Defense?" Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, No. 148, 11 April 1983.)

underscore the quantitative adequacy of Soviet forces.\textsuperscript{147}

During this period Ogarkov's military sympathizers repeated his earlier warnings about the "serious consequences" of "stagnation" in the rapid renewal of "basic systems of armament."\textsuperscript{148}

The dissenting views of the military lobby provoked a vigorous reposte from Gromyko immediately after the West German elections. Staunchly defending established Soviet policy, the Foreign Minister reiterated that "the future belongs to detente" and recited a long list of East-West agreements reached during the 1970s. Without making any reference to the recent worsening of East-West relations, he claimed that Lenin's policy of negotiating with the imperialists and playing on differences within the West had repeatedly produced positive results. In particular, it had been indispensable to the creation of the Allied coalition against the Nazis--a coalition that, despite its internal frictions, offered an example of cooperation between states from different social systems. Whereas Ogarkov had emphasized the inability of Soviet diplomacy to prevent Hitler's rise, Gromyko contended that flexible diplomacy had been

\textsuperscript{147} Emphasizing that the military possessed "everything necessary" to repel aggression, Ustinov had claimed that the achievements of Soviet science and technology "permit us to have --and in the necessary quantity--any weapon which a potential enemy possesses or wants to possess." (\textit{Kommunist}, No. 16, 1982, p. 28.)

\textsuperscript{148} Colonel P. Skorodenko in \textit{VIZh}, No. 5, 1983, p. 52.
essential for Hitler's final defeat. Lenin, noted Gromyko pointedly, had criticized radical comrades who wanted to adopt a confrontational attitude that risked the security of the Soviet Union. Such a policy, said the Foreign Minister, actually verged on passivity toward imperialism because it ignored the diverse tools at the disposal of the socialist state. The Soviet Union was keeping the initiative in questions of disarmament, and in the past it had achieved real success in restraining the arms race. Strikingly, Gromyko said nothing about the role of military power in preserving Soviet security or shaping East-West relations. Instead, he quoted Andropov on the importance of economic growth for Soviet security and argued that the USSR exercises its main influence on the world revolutionary process through its economic policy. Rather than mention the Soviet Armed Forces, Gromyko lavishly praised the diplomatic corps for following Lenin's precepts and knowing how to maneuver adroitly as political circumstances required.\textsuperscript{149} The article was manifestly a rebuttal of hard-line critics who thought the time had come to change the mix between diplomacy and military force in Soviet foreign policy.

Top Soviet officers were not all of one mind about the current needs of the military versus the needs of the economy. For example, V. M. Shabanov, the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments, remarked that the military importance

of economic growth "is increasing many times." Without economic growth and the ability to supply military requirements in short order, it would be "practically impossible to maintain the battle effectiveness of the Armed Forces on the necessary level." Although somewhat hazy, this statement was more consistent with prevailing party priorities than were the comments of Ogarkov. Deputy Minister Tolubko, CINC of the Strategic Rocket Forces, likewise noted that the successes of industry and agriculture would strengthen Soviet defense capacity, and he stated that the task of the more economical utilization of resources was relevant to the military establishment "in the most immediate fashion."

Despite such public endorsements, however, party controllers were having trouble keeping many members of the officer corps in line. In mid-1983 a deputy head of the MPA lamented that there were cases in which military propagandists chose their facts incorrectly in an attempt to provide as much information as possible to their military audiences. "Selectivity" in explaining state activities and Soviet military policy, he continued, "does not at all contradict truthfulness and objectivity." Rather it was one of the most important foundations of genuinely scientific propaganda. The official went on to say that military R&D must be speeded up


but that the military must also expend resources more economically. The party, he emphasized, desired military men who combined party loyalty with competence and who were able to put the interests of the state first. Every officer, "whatever post is entrusted to him, must be able correctly to evaluate various phenomena of political and social life..."\textsuperscript{152} This defense of "selectivity" in explaining Soviet military policy was extremely unusual, and it suggests that officers of the Ogarkov school, who stressed the need for "objective analysis" of a more pessimistic variety, were accusing MPA officials of understating the Western military threat.

Many military men were uneasy with existing policy. Tolubko, despite his earlier comments about the importance of economic growth, emphasized that the SRF's first duty was military and tried to reduce the number of SRF personnel working in auxiliary agricultural units.\textsuperscript{153} Ogarkov was much more forceful. Although "only suicides" could gamble on a nuclear first strike, he said, the United States was spending enormous sums "precisely for the purpose of achieving the possibility of inflicting a 'disarming' strike on the USSR."

Meanwhile the U.S. was also making intensive efforts to

\textsuperscript{152} General-lieutenant B. Utkin in VIZh, No. 8, 1983, pp. 7-8.

create qualitatively new conventional weapons. These circumstances, said Ogarkov, called for "bold experiments and solutions." That was why the party had told the people not to be complacent, and why a recent Central Committee plenum had been "quite justified in setting the task of doing everything necessary to safeguard the country's security." Careful readers must have noted that Ogarkov had transformed the phrase "everything necessary" from a description of current Soviet military means into a goal yet to be achieved.

Three months later Andropov assured the December 1983 Central Committee plenum that the 1984 economic plan provided everything needed for Soviet defense, and MPA chief Epishev repeated this assurance. Nevertheless, a new note of alarm appeared in many military comments. One hard-line advocate of greater military spending reproached "some marxist authors" for underestimating the possibility of a Western nuclear attack and emphasized the "severe requirements" that the Soviet no-first-use pledge created for the equipping of the Armed Forces. Other writers, emphasizing the need to improve conventional as well as nuclear weaponry, stressed the special contemporary relevance of Lenin's


156. Colonel A. Dmitriev in KVS, No. 5, 1984, p. 36. Dmitriev's criticism of giving equal weight to economic and "properly military" potentials was discussed above.
observation that it would be "foolish or even criminal" for an army not to prepare to master all the weapons its enemy has or might obtain.\textsuperscript{157} In a more measured fashion Marshal V. Petrov, CINC of the Ground Forces, likewise disputed Ustinov's assurance that the current period was substantially different from the 1930s and should not be overdramatized.\textsuperscript{158} The situation should not be overdramatized, said Petrov, but it must be stressed that strategic parity and Soviet security could be maintained "not at all automatically." To do so would require significant efforts both from Soviet military men and from Soviet science and industry.\textsuperscript{159}

After Chernenko succeeded Andropov in February 1984, public counterarguments against such views became more common. Chernenko, while promising to strengthen Soviet defenses, set the tone by claiming that the party was doing "everything necessary" for Soviet security and by rejecting suggestions for a special public austerity campaign to

\textsuperscript{157} Colonel G. Lukava, in ibid., No. 2, 1984, pp. 27-29; Colonel V. Login in ibid., No. 8, 1984. Echoes of this theme even appeared in a KVS editorial. However, Lenin's reference to possible "criminal" errors on this account was omitted. (Ibid., No. 3, 1984, p. 7).

\textsuperscript{158} Ustinov made this argument in KVS, No. 1, 1984, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{159} Kommunist, No. 3, 1984, pp. 84-85.
strengthen Soviet military power. Following this lead, a KVS editorial stated that Soviet weapons were being continually improved to take account of weapons-innovations in the West. Another editorial, harking back to the 26th Party Congress, remarked that military men had to fulfill their duties in the circumstances of a developed socialist society and should understand "the peculiarities of this historical stage." "Officers and generals" should be encouraged to undertake "a deep study of theory," it said. A third article gave more explicit pointers. National defense, it explained, encompasses not only military measures but "also questions of the economy, ideology [and] diplomacy..." Lenin had emphasized that defense begins with the expansion of the economy, including both "the comprehensive development of heavy industry" and "a fundamental transformation of agricultural production." At present the party was firmly following Lenin's dictum that economic, social,

160. Chernenko remarked that the Central Committee had received "many letters" suggesting a longer work-week and the creation of a "fund for the defense of the country." The authors of the letters, he said, included military veterans, communists, and young workers and peasants. (During World War II a Fund for Defense and a Fund for the Soviet Army had been set up to channel monetary and material contributions from the populace into defense production.) In the speech that rejected such suggestions, Chernenko called for added measures to expand public housing. (Ibid., No. 3, 1984, p. 12 and No. 7, 1984, pp. 7, 15.)

161. KVS, No. 6, 1984, p. 6.

162. Ibid., No. 7, 1984, p. 5.
scientific-technical, moral-political and military factors together constituted "the basic components of the defense might of our state." The realization of the party's economic and social programs, concluded the article, would also ensure a stronger national defense.\textsuperscript{163}

This view accorded with Chernenko's belief that Soviet national security was critically dependent on domestic as well as international factors. Chernenko had already voiced apprehension about the fragility of the domestic political order, and during 1984 like-minded observers intimated that rising popular discontent and misguided party policies could precipitate an internal crisis. One extraordinary article analyzed a series of "sociopolitical crises in the process of the development of socialist countries." In this category it placed Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980.\textsuperscript{164} Taking Lenin's 1921 introduction of the New Economic Policy as a model of how to handle situations of this kind, the article argued that although counterrevolutionary elements might try to exploit them, such crises were caused principally by incorrect party policies which opened a gap between the regime and its social supporters. In 1921,

\textsuperscript{163} Colonel V. Bokarev in ibid., No. 9, 1984, pp. 79, 82. This article was intended for political study groups within the military.

\textsuperscript{164} E. A. Ambartsumov in Voprosy istorii, No. 4, 1984, p. 16. Ambartsumov is chief of the sector on political problems at the Academy's Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System.
for instance, the crisis had been fueled by rising worker expectations and disruptions in the supply of food and other necessities.\textsuperscript{165} Moreover, Lenin had pointed out that the strikes and peasant rebellions of 1921 were "undoubtedly more dangerous" than the White armies the Bolsheviks had defeated in the Civil War. Some party members had wanted to respond with heightened coercion and centralization, but Lenin had condemned this "tactical" view as a recipe for "suicide" by the party. Instead he had initiated a major economic decentralization and "urgent" welfare measures that had quickly doubled workers' real wages.\textsuperscript{166} There can be no doubt that the writer regarded his article not just as a prescription for Poland but as a warning about Soviet conditions. Emphasizing that the lessons of 1921 remained relevant in the present day, he linked his discussion to the 26th Party Congress's call for more objective analyses of Soviet society and to a scholarly debate over internal socialist "contradictions" that plainly referred to the USSR as well as other bloc countries.\textsuperscript{167}

Although such views were sharply disputed by the editor

\textsuperscript{165}. Ibid., p. 20.

\textsuperscript{166}. Ibid., pp. 23, 25, 28-9.

of Kommunist and other commentators, they were backed by some actions of the party Secretariat. During the summer, for example, Central Committee Secretary I. Kapitonov published an exceptionally forceful article that advocated raising consumer welfare "to a qualitatively new level" and indicted numerous party and state organizations for neglecting consumer needs. Kapitonov demanded that several heavy industrial ministries increase their output of consumer goods. He also called for Gosplan to allocate more resources to the consumer sector and for R&D institutes to do more to upgrade consumer production. Apart from strengthening work incentives, he argued, faster increases in living standards would highlight the advantages of the Soviet system and raise its prestige in the world arena. Kapitonov was clearly offering a foreign-policy rationale for allocating a larger share of budgetary resources to the consumer.

Chernenko's broad definition of Soviet security and his skeptical attitude toward larger military budgets apparently disturbed many professional officers. Chernenko's selection as General Secretary had been treated with marked coolness by

168. Kux, "Contradictions," p. 23; R. Kosolapov in Pravda, 29 July 1984; and E. Bugaev in Kommunist, No. 14, 1984, pp. 119-126. Bugaev charged that Ambartsumov had incorrectly generalized from the 1920s to contemporary socialist experience, underestimated the significance of external imperialist opposition, exaggerated the Bolsheviks' mistakes, and falsely attributed his own views to Lenin. (I am indebted to Marc Zlotnik for referring me to these sources.)

the military press,\textsuperscript{170} and in May Ogarkov issued a clarion call for greater attention to military needs. Warning that American imperialism was becoming far more aggressive, Ogarkov also drew a parallel between alleged neofascist trends in Western Europe and developments in Germany on the eve of World War II. Although at one point he said that "everything necessary" was being done to put Soviet military power on the necessary level, this was simply a pro forma statement. Citing Chernenko's promise the previous month to strengthen Soviet defenses, Ogarkov remarked that "this demand must be fulfilled undeviatingly." The wording implied that the promise was not presently being fulfilled. Ogarkov went on to warn that the extremely rapid pace of weapons innovation had created the possibility of the imminent appearance of radical new weapons. The emergence of such weapons in countries such as the United States was "a reality of the immediate future," he said pointedly, and "not to take account of this now would be a serious error." Failure to respond promptly to these trends, he added darkly, could not fail to alter existing conceptions of "the military might of the state."\textsuperscript{171} Ogarkov focused especially on changes in conventional military technology, but he was plainly concerned about the superpower military balance as a whole. In


\textsuperscript{171}. \textit{Krasnaia zvezda}, 9 May 1984, pp. 2-3.
a scarcely veiled way, he was warning that current Soviet policy was endangering the country's military security.

Within two months party overseers moved to tighten political discipline within the military establishment. The first deputy head of the MPA dwelt on the role of "generals and admirals" and other officers in fostering discipline among their subordinates. Urging that the party organizations of military staffs play a more vigorous role in preventing irresponsible behavior by staff officers, he noted that some military men wrongly tried to concentrate exclusively on weaponry and purely specialized questions. As Chernenko had pointed out, he said, a leader was always on view, and the higher the leader's post, the more people looked to him as an example of someone who took an "active political position" and put the interests of the party above all else. But subordinates also noticed the "arrogance" and "tactlessness" of a leader, said the MPA official. Although rare, such cases signified that the political and party organizations in the military had failed to discern when the person had crossed the line separating the permissible from the impermissible. These organs must strictly apply the Central Committee's firm line against those who rejected criticism; there could be no indulgences for persons who forgot their duties as communists. The writer concluded that "conceit" and "excessive ambitions" should be quickly blocked in order to ensure that every military leader adopted a
leadership style.\textsuperscript{172} It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the article was written with Ogarkov and his military supporters in mind.

Ogarkov's demotion two months later signified an important if uncertain victory for restraints on military spending. Just before the demotion was announced, a \textit{Pravda} editorial declared that although the needs of defense were absorbing "not a few" resources, "no thought" was being given to dismantling the broad social program outlined by the 26th Party Congress. As Chernenko had said, "nothing" could shake the party's commitment to the progressive improvement of the toilers' welfare.\textsuperscript{173} In keeping with this line, Ogarkov was compelled to do an about-face. Within a few weeks he published an article affirming that war was not inevitable and that the forces of the socialist camp were currently strong enough to "neutralize" the remaining threat of military conflict. Focusing almost entirely on the political obstacles to war, the article eschewed parallels between the 1930s and the 1980s. Although it noted that the contemporary West European peace movement could not "fully solve" the problem of war and peace, it asserted that the Reagan Administration had been unable to undermine the movement and that the movement would continue to grow. The article said

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\textsuperscript{172} Admiral A. Sorokin in \textit{KVS}, No. 14, 1984, pp. 9, 11.
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almost nothing about military deterrence of a new imperialist war, and nothing whatever about American weapons innovations or the danger of being outstripped in military power. Instead it remarked that nuclear weapons had changed the relationship between the categories of "war" and "policy." It then quoted Chernenko's remark that "it is criminal to regard thermonuclear war as a rational and nearly 'lawful' [законное] continuation of policy." Coupled with Ogarkov's silence about any conventional military danger from the West, this quotation amounted to a forced endorsement of Chernenko's more sanguine view of the strategic situation.

Although Ogarkov's demotion was a setback for the internal critics of the two-track detente policy, they continued to push their views. An important article in Kommunist went out of its way to rebut "well-intentioned skeptics" who believed that the detente era was over and that the future would entail "an endless arms race" and intensifying East-West competition. The description of these skeptics as well-intentioned and the failure to give their nationality strongly suggest that some of them were Soviet. Not long afterward, a military observer advocated priorities that the skeptics must have shared. Revealing that 145 research institutes had recently been closed, apparently as part of the review of the national R&D network.

initiated by Brezhnev in 1980-1981, the writer argued that
more attention should be given to military R&D. He
emphasized that the relationship between general technolo-
gical capacities and those which contribute to military power
"is not stable." Rather, depending on international circum-
stances, the accent could be put on either economic or
defense tasks. The adoption of measures to change such
priorities, said the writer, "is far from simple, but
events in the world arena make it necessary." Obviously
he believed that a still larger share of the national R&D
effort must be channelled into military programs.

176. Colonel V. Bondarenko in KVS, No. 19, 1984,
p. 14. Bondarenko stated that these institutes had been
closed by the State Committee for Science and Technology
(SCST). For an earlier discussion of the review by the SCST
chairman, see G. Marchuk in Kommunist, No. 4, 1983, p. 68.

177. KVS, No. 19, 1984, p. 15.
V. Gorbachev and the Future of the Allocations Debate

Although it is still too early to determine which military policies Mikhail Gorbachev will pursue as party General Secretary, the record of previous years sheds some light on his policy preferences. Because these preferences do not include a rapid increase in military expenditure, they are likely to disappoint the influential members of the military establishment who favor such a course. Gorbachev's priorities, however, do entail a greater concentration of resources on economic sectors having long-term military importance. Compared with Chernenko, he is likely to appeal to officers and party figures who believe that the strategic competition with the West is primarily a long-range rather than a short-range problem.

Before becoming party leader, Gorbachev took a reserved attitude toward the need for a sharp increase in military spending. During the spring of 1983, when the Soviet debate over the "death of detente" was particularly intense, he defended the feasibility of the two-track detente policy. While he depicted American global plans quite negatively, he maintained that "intensifying contradictions" among the Western powers and the presence of "realistic" Western political groups provided "a good basis" for expanding peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world.  

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Expressing confidence that Soviet defenses were already being adequately strengthened, Gorbachev did not subscribe to the view that impending changes in the strategic balance required a jump in military outlays.\textsuperscript{179} He told a Canadian audience that the USSR "will do everything necessary" to maintain the balance, but he also said that nothing in the military situation had changed since the USSR attained the position of strategic parity embodied in the SALT II agreement. This comment was evidently more than propaganda for Canadian ears, since he added broadly that "in general, strategic parity cannot be changed substantially in a few years. Such is the objective situation." Mentioning the "fabulous resources" being consumed in the arms race, he disavowed the view that the accumulation of arms was equivalent to increased security.\textsuperscript{180}

If this part of Gorbachev's stance was disappointing to members of the defense lobby, other parts of his outlook were probably more encouraging. Although he underscored the need to improve the food supply, he expressed the opinion that poor agricultural performance was a drag on the whole economy and that agriculture's main problem was not a shortage of

\textsuperscript{179} The defense forces of the Warsaw Pact, said Gorbachev, were guarding peace and socialism. "And as soon as [kol' skoro] the situation requires, the people of the socialist commonwealth do and will do everything to make their defense stronger and more effective." (Ibid.)

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 19 May 1983, p. 4.
resources, but inefficient organization. Gorbachev's initial response to the May 1982 announcement of the Food Program was lukewarm.\textsuperscript{181} Perhaps under pressure, he later endorsed Brezhnev's high goals for agricultural investment, but he soon backtracked from this position.\textsuperscript{182} The most important thing, he said in 1983, was that agricultural workers should make better use of current possibilities. Although the level of material inputs affected the size of harvests, "close analysis shows that decisive significance belongs to how rationally the land is used as the basic means of production." When this rule was not followed, large applications of equipment and fertilizer could not produce good results.\textsuperscript{183} In place of this approach Gorbachev, who had previously advocated "radical measures" to solve the problems of agriculture, called for a decentralization that would make the normless brigade and the normless link the basic units of farm organization.\textsuperscript{184}

Gorbachev coupled his accent on restraining the growth of agricultural spending with a call for greater spending on machinebuilding. Noting the importance of heavy industry, he stated that the country's inability to introduce many

\textsuperscript{181. Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, No. 268/82 (2 July 1982).}

\textsuperscript{182. For the endorsement, see Kommunist, No. 10, 1982, p. 11.}

\textsuperscript{183. Pravda, 10 February 1982, pp. 2-3.}

\textsuperscript{184. Pravda, 29 March 1982, p. 4, and 23 April 1983, p. 2.}
effective kinds of new technology was caused by the "lag of individual parts" of the machinebuilding sector.\textsuperscript{185} It was necessary, he said, "to give a priority character to the development of machinebuilding."\textsuperscript{186} This theme had been sounded by many military commentators, both those who favored a surge in military spending and those who favored focusing on long-term military needs.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev had few personal links to the military,\textsuperscript{187} and his selection as Chernenko's successor may have caused some concern within the national-security establishment. At the Central Committee meeting that elected Gorbachev, Gromyko gave a nomination speech marked by unusual personal warmth and a clear effort to accent Gorbachev's foreign-policy skills. Gromyko commended Gorbachev's ability to comprehend international developments—an ability he suggested might be clearer to him as Foreign Minister than to "some other comrades"—and Gorbachev's aptitude for avoiding "black and white" solutions to problems. Highlighting the Western desire to find divisions within the Soviet political elite, Gromyko emphasized that the party leadership would not satisfy this hope. Immediately afterward he observed that Gorbachev had often spoken in the Politburo of the need to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 23 April 1983, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Krasnaia zvezda, 1 March 1984, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Archie Brown, "Gorbachev," Problems of Communism, May-June 1985, pp. 15-16.
\end{itemize}
"keep our powder dry" and had insisted on the struggle for peace and the maintenance of defense on the necessary level. Coming from Gromyko, who had long favored the pursuit of East-West agreements and resisted an open-ended arms race, these words sounded faintly like an attempt to reassure the Soviet advocates of harder foreign and military policies.\textsuperscript{188}

At any rate, Gorbachev has articulated his priorities more sharply since becoming General Secretary. Emphasizing that East-West parity is an "exceptionally important" achievement, he has vowed that the USSR will spare no effort to maintain the military equilibrium in the future, but he has subtly implied that this will merely be an extension of current policy. While issuing a veiled threat to break off the new Soviet-American arms talks if the U.S. refuses to compromise, he has also claimed that the Western antiwar movement is raising increasing resistance to American military policies and that there is "an enormous potential" for peace.\textsuperscript{189} On balance, he appears to be trying to avoid a sharp rise in military spending by deflecting U.S. military programs through political means.

Gorbachev has showed greater concern about the economic threat to Soviet national security. It is necessary, he has said, to draw "the most serious conclusions" from the

\textsuperscript{188} Kommunist, No. 5, 1985, pp. 6-7. It is worth noting that during 1984 Chernenko also remarked the need to "keep our powder dry."

\textsuperscript{189} Pravda, 24 april 1985, p. 2.
slowdown of the economy, because "the historical fate of the country [and] the position of socialism in the contemporary world" depend on accelerated economic development. Toward this end he has called for changes in the economy's sectoral structure. During the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, he has declared, machinebuilding should grow 1.5 to 2 times faster, in order to accelerate the technological modernization of the whole economy. Particular attention should be paid to the development of the machine-tool, electronics, computer, and instrumentbuilding industries. Agriculture, on the other hand, seems slated to receive a smaller share of resources. Stressing that resources should be concentrated in the most productive sectors, Gorbachev has observed that investments in the agroindustrial sector have reached "optimal dimensions" but are yielding inadequate returns—a clear hint that they may not grow in the future. However, he has not written off consumer interests. He has underscored the need for better food and asserted that the party cannot dismantle its social programs. Rather, he has said, Soviet consumers must perceive an improvement of their situation in the immediate future, and a Complex Program for the improvement of consumer goods and services must soon be approved.

190. Ibid., p. 1.
193. Ibid., and ibid., 24 April 1985, p. 2.
Plainly the desire to achieve all these goals simultaneously underlies Gorbachev's determination to push through a major decentralization of the economic system.

Such policies may assuage some of the military's anxieties, but not all of them. In the wake of Ogarkov's demotion, leading professional soldiers have adhered more closely to the party's doctrinal formulations on the international political and military situations. For example, Marshal Sokolov, who became Minister of Defense after Ustinov's death in December 1984, has expressed the belief that diplomacy can have a favorable effect on the strategic situation, and Marshal Akhromeev, Ogarkov's successor as Chief of the General Staff, has drawn an explicit contrast between the political disarray that permitted the rise of Hitler in the 1930s and the strength of the progressive forces that today oppose American military plans. At the same time, however, Sokolov has said that the growing NATO threat "requires the strengthening of...the Soviet Armed Forces." The party, in his words, "is working out and realizing" a military policy that includes measures to equip the army with "everything necessary." The remark that such a policy is still being "worked out" implies that present policy does not fully meet the material needs of the mil-

Meanwhile Akhromeev has reiterated that military science has a role in preparing the entire country for war, although he has added the apparently cosmetic concession that in this respect its role concerns "only the military side" of such preparation.\textsuperscript{196}

The most suggestive evidence of continuing controversy over military spending comes from signs that Marshal Ogarkov's influence is again increasing. Western news accounts indicate that Ogarkov has been reappointed a First Deputy Minister of Defense, although other sources call this report into question.\textsuperscript{197} At any rate, Ogarkov recently published a new book that represents an uneasy amalgam of the geostrategic views he expressed before and immediately after his September 1984 demotion.\textsuperscript{198} Although at points the work suggests that there have been deep changes in the international political situation since World War II, it also

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., No. 5, 1985, pp. 67, 69.

\textsuperscript{196} In the same discussion, Akhromeev also remarked that military science deals with "the military economy" and "the rear" of the Armed Forces. These elastic definitions could easily provide a basis for asserting the military's interests in decisions on economic policy. (Ibid., No. 3, 1985, p. 50.)

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Washington Post}, 18 July 1985, p. A1. Government analysts have since stated that Marshal Kulikov, whom Ogarkov was reported to have replaced, is still First Deputy Minister in charge of the Warsaw Pact forces.

\textsuperscript{198} N. Ogarkov, \textit{Istoriiia uchit' blitelnosti} (Moscow, 1985). The book was sent to the compisitor about two weeks before Chernenko died, and signed for printing a month after Gorbachev became General Secretary. The timing may help explain its internal inconsistencies.
\end{footnotesize}
highlights the similarity between the current situation and the 1930s. Ogarkov dutifully itemizes the East-West agreements signed during the 1970s, but he also recites a long list of historical cases in which the West allegedly rebuffed Soviet efforts to regulate the arms race, including a Soviet attempt in 1958 to prevent the militarization of space. Although the book gives the appearance of conceding that nuclear war cannot be regarded as a continuation of policy, it asserts that American ruling circles harbor the hope of winning a nuclear war, and it states that in a new world war the USSR will attain "full victory" over the enemy. On balance, the alarmist themes of Ogarkov's earlier pronouncements on the geostrategic situation have been slightly muted in deference to political demands but remain just below the surface.

This conclusion is reinforced by Ogarkov's treatment of specifically military questions. The book says that the Armed Forces have "everything necessary" to repel aggression but adds that a further strengthening of defense is "an objectively vital necessity." Moreover, Ogarkov strongly

199. Ibid., pp. 20, 24, 82-84, 93-94.
201. Ibid., pp. 38, 69, 77, 88-89. In keeping with Ogarkov's new attention to conventional warfare, the passage concerning "victory" does not say that a world war will necessarily be fought with nuclear weapons, but neither does it exclude this possibility.
202. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
emphasizes the "major errors" and "extremely weighty consequences" that can result from misunderstanding military-technological trends and preparing for past rather than future wars.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 43-44, 47.} Warning that the intensive development of new American weapons represents a "special threat," he underlines the rapid changes in nuclear weapons, military electronics, and conventional armaments. More concretely, he singles out the "intensified" re-equipment of U.S. and NATO units and brands the neglect of new means of air warfare against tanks and naval forces "dangerous."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 35, 40-41, 54, 69.} Presumably the need to accelerate Soviet weapons programs underlies his view of the links between military and economic policy. Although at one point he writes that the role of military strategy is to prepare the Armed Forces for war, at another point he asserts that strategy prepares the military forces, the country, and the population (sic) for war.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 58, 79.} In view of Ogarkov's past statements and the tone of his remarks on military trends, it is fair to assume that he continues to hold an expansive view of the scope and needs of military strategy. It is probably no coincidence that the book appeared at a time when the party leadership was struggling
to hammer out the targets for the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. More study is required before we can be certain about the relationship between Ogarkov's renewed prominence and the consolidation of Gorbachev's political power. It is at least conceivable that Ogarkov's latest book was meant as a critique of Chernenko's military policies and that Gorbachev sympathizes with Ogarkov's desire to accelerate technological progress in the military realm. If only general orientations were at issue and no short-term decisions on resource allocations were required, there might be considerable room for political cooperation between the two men. But Gorbachev faces pressing economic demands that he himself has helped to pose, and barring an extraordinary improvement in superpower relations, Ogarkov and others are likely to continue to press for an immediate surge in the Soviet military effort. During the next year, the Soviet leadership will confront many painful choices about the economic and military targets to be incorporated into the new five-year plan, and the signs thus far suggest that these choices will be attended by vigorous bureaucratic infighting and serious disagreements over the scale of the Soviet military effort.

206 Gorbachev's June address to a large party gathering on technological progress marked a new stage in this process. At the meeting, he made a strong effort to impose his own priorities and noted that the Politburo had made "serious remarks" that required "further development" of the plan guidelines. (Pravda, 12 June 1985, p. 1.) Ogarkov's book was published in mid-June (New York Times, 16 June 1985, p. E 7.)