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THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT

by David L. LaSalle

Submitted to Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Professor Richard H. Shultz as partial fulfillment of requirements for Course DHP P217 and for the degree of Master of Arts.

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THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

As the 1980s approached their end and the termination of the Cold War gave a more positive meaning to global warming, the North Atlantic Alliance faced a dilemma. NATO had for forty years successfully performed the mission articulated in the 1949 Washington Treaty, that of maintaining peace and stability in the North Atlantic Area and safeguarding "the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples,...."\(^1\) With the diminution of the threat which largely defined that mission, Alliance leaders needed to respond to those calling for an end to NATO as an irrelevant (and expensive) relic of inter-bloc hostility. As the WTO vanished, many predicted that NATO would soon imitate its former rival and saw its termination as both inevitable and desirable. Those who held that position saw NATO as an old soldier who had stood guard admirably but was due for retirement and whose skills no longer met the needs of today's world.

NATO refused to accept the proposal that its role had ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain and affirmed its desire to adapt to the new geography of the European security landscape. Some may classify this will to carry on as merely an institutional self-preservation instinct but others recognized that an end to the Cold War did not imply an end to all hot ones. Fortunately and unfortunately, events in the summer of 1990 and

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the following year supported this contention and underscored the need for regional security arrangements of which NATO represented a unique model of success. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (NSC) is one of the most significant indicators of how NATO plans to refashion itself for the challenges of the future.

Published in November 1991, the NSC describes a shift in direction that reflects the new security environment but remains largely grounded in the Alliance's original principles and objectives. Crisis management and a renewed stress on political activities as the means for promoting and defending NATO interests represent the hallmarks of the new strategy.

This paper will examine in detail the relevant sections of the NSC and relate the concepts contained therein to general crisis management principles. It will also discuss how certain developments prescribed by the NSC are coming to fruition and assess NATO's relationship with other security organizations equally in evolution. A short history of selected examples of NATO's crisis management history will comprise another section. Finally, the study concludes with an evaluation of several potential problem areas for NATO as it recasts itself to better respond to the needs of its members in the crisis-fraught future.

SACEUR'S APPROACH TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT

During a July 1992 address to the NATO School Crisis Management Course, General John Shalikashvili, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), commented on the new Alliance
emphasis on crisis management as elaborated in the NSC.² He proposed a framework for considering crisis management which this paper will use in looking at how the New Strategic Concept expresses NATO's approach in this area.

SACEUR presented a three-fold conceptualization of crisis management: preemptive, proactive and reactive. Preemptive crisis management involves trying to "prevent problems from ever escalating into international crises."³ This of course would be the most desirable approach but is also the most difficult, especially in an Alliance context. Building the necessary consensus among states with varied and, at times, conflicting interests to act in concert to ward off a potentiality will be extremely difficult. The nature of crises also complicates preemptive efforts; they often erupt with little or no advance warning from an unexpected direction. An international military-political crisis is the acute manifestation of underlying conflicts of interest. As long as there are different individual or collective political units, interests will collide; predicting when and where those conflicts will develop into international crises threatening the security of NATO member countries is a daunting task.

That is not to imply that NATO planners should throw up their hands in frustration at an unfulfillable requirement. It does mandate a careful consideration of dynamic political

3. ibid, p. 2.
realities and circumspect political-military analysis. It also calls for transparency and open communication between states. Recent steps in this direction include, within NATO, the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), where former NATO and WTO adversaries meet on a regular basis to discuss security issues of mutual concern.

Proactive crisis management describes intervention in the early stages of an erupting crisis to defuse the situation and/or keep it from spreading. As General Shalikashvili put it, "(I)t makes sense to act early to extinguish a crisis as the embers of strife begin to glow, rather than call the fire-brigade once the blaze has taken hold." Here again, political agreement is the prerequisite for action. The traditionally inverse relationship of threat level to commitment to act will need modification if a proactive strategy is to be successfully implemented.

Reactive crisis management, historically the most common approach, waits until the "blaze has taken hold" and inaction on the part of the international community becomes more difficult as spillover effects pose more clearly defined risks to the interests of other than the direct contestants. The case of the former Yugoslavia falls into this category. While the images of war and suffering have affronted the values of those with access to the electronic and printed media for some time, it has only been recently that the UN has seriously considered effective, forceful intervention. The differentiation between values and interests and the nature of the responses required by threats to

4. ibid, p. 3.
each has limited world action to humanitarian and mediatory efforts. However, with hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the conflict and exacerbating the economic and social tensions already present in the receptive states, and most notably in Germany, whose central position in the European and Atlantic Communities ensures that its problems will not be ignored, pressure to intervene more directly has increased throughout Autumn 1992. The crisis has spilled over, directly affecting the financial and social interests of third parties. The threat of a military spillover implicating both NATO member states (Greece and Turkey) and others such as Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania, heightens as the situation worsens and divisions are drawn ever more starkly along ethnic and religious lines. The increased desperation of those who see themselves as the oppressed may make them more willing to resort to extreme measures designed to incite direct outside intervention, and those who perceive a kinship with the aggressed lose some of their reticence to break from the UN party line.

Reactive strategies, though, may be the least worst response when faced with a crisis, such as that in the former Yugoslavia, where the costs of intervention in blood and treasure are potentially very high and the odds of success less than overwhelming.

These three strategies for dealing with crises, as outlined by General Shalikashvili, are useful lenses through which to assess the New Strategic Concept and while searching for the
direction the Alliance ought to take in designing policies, plans and forces to meet future challenges to European security.

THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT: AN OVERVIEW

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

An understanding of the New Strategic Concept would be incomplete without some perspective. Alliance doctrine emerges from a historical dynamic and this holds true even for fairly significant changes of direction such as we see with the NSC. Thus a cursory outline of NATO's doctrinal past seems in order.5

NATO's first strategy, "The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Area," or DC 6, came close upon the heels of the 4 April 1949 Washington Treaty establishing the Alliance. Agreed upon in December 1949 by the Defence Committee and approved by the North Atlantic Council one month later, DC 5 provided an outline for the future practical application of the Washington Treaty. The document proposed to build upon the 17 March 1948 Brussels Treaty which gave birth to the Western Union (later Western European Union (WEU)) and its express purpose was to develop the necessary cooperation and defense arrangements required to counter the perceived Soviet threat to the treaty signatories. Many of those elements considered characteristic of the Alliance appeared in this document: its defensive nature, emphasis on war prevention, the

need for Alliance cohesion, and that nuclear weapons would stand as one of the pillars of NATO's defense policy. In April 1950 a medium-term defense planning supplement to DC 6 was formulated by the Military Committee and identified as MC 14.

Although updated in 1952 by MC 14/1, the next truly significant change in NATO doctrine did not come about until the December 1957 summit which saw the adoption of MC 14/2, further refining the Alliance's nuclear weapons policy. Soviet advances in nuclear and missile technology, starkly advertised by the Sputnik launch in October of that year, spurred the member countries' decision to deploy Thor and Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and to stockpile nuclear warheads in the European theater. The strategy of immediate and massive nuclear retaliation to a large-scale WTO attack was approved in conjunction with this reassessment of Soviet and WTO capabilities. The Athens Guidelines of 1962 further clarified how NATO planned to employ nuclear weapons and developed a consultative process surrounding their use.

"Massive retaliation" quickly became the object of inter-NATO controversy and the ensuing decade saw lively debate within the Alliance about the best response to the adversary's growing military prowess, both in the conventional and nuclear arenas. The Soviets were demonstrating interest in other areas of the globe and it was thought likely that military action would be used in a limited way for limited objectives. Some questioned the wisdom of basing NATO policy primarily on a massive nuclear retaliatory strike, especially as survivability and second strike
capabilities were established. This led to sharply disparate viewpoints among NATO members and the Alliance experienced a severe internal crisis which culminated in France removing itself from the integrated military command structure in 1966. The matter was resolved in 1967 with the adoption of MC 14/3, or the "flexible response" strategy. This concept, which held that NATO must fashion its nuclear and conventional forces so as to be prepared to deter and defend against an attack anywhere along the spectrum of conflict, remained in force until the publication of the NSC in 1991. The Soviet/WTO forces which preoccupied NATO policy makers and shaped their strategic planning, began to lose some of their intimidating nature in 1989 as perestroika and glasnost began to loosen the ties that bound the Warsaw Pact together. As the reforms in Central and Eastern Europe progressed, the adversarial relationship between East and West disappeared and MC 14/3 began to increasingly resemble the right answer to the wrong question. At the London Summit of July 1990 the Alliance Heads of State declared that NATO and the WTO were no longer adversaries. This gave further impetus to an earlier Defence Planning Committee decision to conduct a review of NATO strategy, a task devolved to the Ad Hoc Group on the Review of NATO's Military Strategy (commonly referred to as the Strategy Review Group, or SRG), chaired by Michael Legge, the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Policy.

The SRG met for the first time in July 1990 with fifteen states participating; France, which did not contribute to defence planning, remained outside the review process. When early SRG
discussions made it obvious that the political element of NATO would receive heightened emphasis, the French requested to take part and did so as of February 1991. The SRG conducted a thorough reevaluation of Alliance objectives, threats to its interests and the best means of meeting those challenges. This work was consummated on 7 November 1991 when the NSC was adopted.

ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES

To guide its work, the SRG reconsidered the objectives of the Alliance as enunciated in the founding treaty. The group determined that the basic purpose of the Alliance - "to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." - remained valid, as did its defensive, collective and transatlantic nature. The reiteration of its purely defensive nature may have to be modified if NATO pursues more aggressive crisis management techniques, such as peacemaking. This issue will be considered in more detail below (see p. 51).

The SRG incorporated into the strategic concept a description of the four core security functions of the Alliance developed by the Atlantic Council and published in June 1991. These security functions indicate more clearly how NATO plans to involve itself in crisis management. The first states that the Alliance will serve as a pillar of stability, promoting

democratic institutions and the peaceful resolution of conflicts and ensuring that "no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or impose hegemony through the threat or use of force."\(^7\) Not qualifying further than "European" the possible objects of coercion would seem to indicate an expansion of NATO's self-imposed area of responsibility. As we shall see, the situation in the former Yugoslavia has provided NATO leaders with an opportunity to develop policy in this area.

The second task prescribed by the Council emphasizes the role the Alliance plays in facilitating communication between member countries on security issues. The NSC refers to Article Four of the Washington Treaty but redirects the focus away from threats to territorial and political integrity of the signatories and toward "any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security."\(^8\) This significantly broadens the scope of areas in which NATO as an institution should be prepared to act.

The third function is the traditional "deter and defend" mission which NATO has performed since its inception. Finally, the preservation of the strategic balance of power in Europe is outlined as a basic task for the Alliance. Again, no further qualification of the geographic area of concern is presented and this indicates once more NATO's new willingness to consider, or at least not dismiss a priori, "out of area" operations.

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7. NSC, paragraph 21-I. Emphasis added.
8. ibid., paragraph 21-II.
THE CHANGING THREAT

The order of presentation for the core security functions suggests an acknowledgement of the changed threat environment. It recognizes that risks to transatlantic security will take the form of localized, rather than general, confrontations and that the security of the Washington Treaty signatory states is intrinsically linked with that of their European neighbors, including former adversaries.

Paragraphs eight through fifteen of the New Strategic Concept more precisely indicate the perceived threats toward which NATO doctrine is to be henceforth directed. The NSC recognizes that NATO's raison d'être of the last forty-two years, namely the defense of Alliance members' territorial and political integrity against a massive Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) attack, no longer remains plausible. The WTO is no more and a surprise attack across the former bloc frontier has faded into the unthinkable.

The NSC does not indicate however, that NATO countries no longer are threatened. On the contrary, the menace has become "multi-faceted" and "multi-directional." The threat shifts from a deadly monolithic menace to something significantly less lethal; at risk is European stability, not national survival. The growling bear has been replaced by a diverse group of well camouflaged lesser dangers, able to damage if not destroy. They are much harder to detect beforehand and the development of specific countermeasures grows increasingly more complex and difficult.
The Alliance recognizes that the general source of threats to its security will arise from the spillover of political, economic and societal dislocation as the former command economies of Central and Eastern Europe experiment with democracy and the free market. Long suppressed trans- and sub-state aspirations, now liberated from Soviet imposed quiescence, manifest themselves in inevitably revisionist ways. Guaranteeing European security within this context requires a new interpretation of "containment," one which attempts to limit these regional tensions in intensity and geographically.

Current intentions notwithstanding, the superpower military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, of the former Soviet Union also continue to concern NATO member countries. The dissolution of the USSR greatly diminished the implicit danger of political reversal and a return to East-West confrontation, however, the spillover effect of hostility between former socialist brothers has potentially wide-ranging ramifications. The sorting out of Russia's relations with her newly sovereign neighbors, many of whose territories host large numbers of ethnic Russians, represents an especially worrisome aspect of the new European security environment.

An assessment of a potential adversary must address itself to the other's capabilities and intentions. Even though the possibility of a successful short-term or surprise attack on a NATO member country has been precluded, Russia's residual conventional military might leaves it the preeminent power in Eurasia. On the strategic nuclear level, and even assuming
implementation of the START I and II agreements, Russia continues to possess the capability to destroy the United States. The nature of the current regime controlling these weapons and its attitude towards the West have radically changed, however. Moscow's domestic political and economic problems force its attention inward - for now - and cooperation with the West is desired and actively sought out by the current Russian leadership. A return to an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy pursued through military means, especially given the absence of a crusading ideology, appears unlikely for many years.

Paragraph Twelve of the NSC outlines the attitude of NATO towards its southern flank and the Middle East. Citing the Gulf War, the importance of these regions to Alliance security is underlined and special mention is made of the disturbing proliferation of missiles capable of threatening Alliance territory as well as the spread of other weapons of mass destruction.

Another important addition to the definition of what NATO considers a threat is articulated here. Now the "global context" may elevate in Alliance threat perception developments previously considered outside its competence. Explicitly mentioned are "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage." The Gulf War clearly played a role in the shaping of this concept.

In essence, this re-evaluation of the threat environment reflects the evolution of political-military realities and sets
the stage for the Alliance's redirected emphases, to which we now turn.

FROM A MILITARY TO A POLITICAL EMPHASIS

As the direct military threat to the Alliance receded, the New Strategic Concept announced the growing prominence of NATO's political element. NATO has already played an important role in this respect, not least by coordinating the Atlantic Community's security policy throughout the Cold War period. The united front was essential to the successful development and implementation of military policies since NATO's inception. The existence of this politically stable bloc served equally as a center of gravity around which non-member Western European countries thrived and provided an historically unique model of successful international security cooperation.

With the transition away from large scale defense of Alliance territory and towards crisis management, political consultation among NATO members becomes even more important. Before the East-West thaw, planners did not expect to have much time to consult before having to react militarily, thus automaticity characterized NATO's operations plans. This was an important component to the deterrence role of NATO forces but violates crisis management principles which call for intimate political control over flexible, responsive military forces, capable of deploying, stopping, braking and accelerating as directed by the civilian leadership. Therefore, maintaining and strengthening the lines of communication between NATO members
becomes all the more crucial as responses are sought to the imperatives encountered in the current fluid European security environment.

Renewed focus on the political aspects of NATO activities also has great significance for relations with non-Alliance states. Especially when viewed through a preemptive crisis management lens, developing political contacts with former adversaries and non-aligned countries should become high on the priority list. And in fact, NATO has been responsive to this requirement. The above mentioned NACC represents perhaps the most outstanding example of the inclusion, albeit partial, of non-NATO states in NATO security deliberations. The NACC, while criticized by some Central and Eastern European members as an inadequate response to their security needs, does provide a forum for exchanges on defense issues of common concern and for attempts at resolving conflicts in their germinal stages.9

Questions surrounding the long-term viability of NACC notwithstanding, it provides an important service today and its efficacy in resolving international defense disputes was evidenced during the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty ratification process. NACC successfully managed the disruptive effects of the Soviet Union's break-up and pushed forward the

9. For a brief but useful discussion of views on NACC from Western and Eastern perspectives, see: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, ed., A Conference Report. Preventing Instability in Post-Cold War Europe: The Institutional Responses of NATO, the WEU, the EC, the CSCE, and the UN. (Cambridge, MA, IFPA, 1992.)
ratification process so that CFE Treaty implementation began in July 1992, only days behind schedule.\(^{10}\)

In addition to NACC, regular contacts with former adversaries have been established through various fora such as: Military Committee in Co-operation Sessions, Group on Defence Matters meetings and attendance at the NATO school by former WTO countries' military members.\(^{11}\) The institutional and personal relationships developed through these activities will help to shed the years of suspicion and distrust built up during the Cold War and provide a valuable source of information and counsel to NATO's new partners attempting to construct defense establishments more harmonious with democratic societies. Achieving these goals will promote successful low-level resolution of the inevitable conflicts of interest embedded in the European security landscape.

**NATO'S RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE UN, CSCE, EC AND WEU**

Not least in the concerns about NATO's future role are questions relating to where the Alliance fits in the array of institutions which, centrally or indirectly, concern themselves with the defense of Europe. The United Nations and its Charter have always figured in NATO considerations; the Charter's

\(^{10}\) The CFE Treaty entered into force provisionally on 17 July 1992, eight days after the original target date. The entry into force was provisional because domestic political reasons had kept two of the twenty-nine parties, Belarus and Armenia, from formally ratifying. They have since done so.

\(^{11}\) For more on proposed co-operation activities see: "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10 March 1992" (pp. 34-35), and "Statement Issued at the Meeting of Defence Ministers at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 1st April, 1992" (pp. 31-33), NATO Review, April 1992.
principles are recognized as the common goal and standard of Alliance behavior in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty. Although during the Cold War the UN was often dismissed as moribund and ineffective, the institution has enjoyed a resurgence of relevance. Released from its Cold War shackles through the cessation of superpower animosity, it has been extremely active in crisis management during the last two and one-half years. Its intervention efforts have expanded dramatically: the number of operations undertaken since the Gulf War equal those in the years prior to 1990 and will soon surpass them.

NATO has continuously reiterated its respect for the UN as a sanctioning body. The Washington Treaty bases the right of collective self-defense on the principles enunciated in the UN Charter and the NSC reaffirms that commitment. Discussions of NATO involvement in the Balkans crisis assume appropriate United Nations resolutions and requests for assistance and intervention. Operating under UN auspices will be especially important as further non-traditional missions are considered. In order to obtain the necessary consensus within member states' domestic public and political opinions and on the North Atlantic Council, prior approval by the UN Security Council will very likely prove a prerequisite.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also figures in deliberations about how to best manage European stability. The inclusionary nature of the CSCE is cited by those who favor using it as a forum for dealing with regional
controversies in a comprehensive manner. Achievements include the various Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) adopted by the CSCE, starting with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Although most CSBMs would fall under the preemptive crisis management rubric, in November 1990 a measure establishing a consultative process in the event of unusual military activities was instituted. This proactive activity would take place largely through the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) foreseen at the same Paris CSCE summit and subsequently put into operation in Vienna. This mechanism was implemented in late June 1991 when hostilities broke out between Slovenian forces and the Yugoslavian Federal Army. The process worked well up to the point of agreement for a cease-fire but the CSCE lack of enforcement capability was brought into the spotlight and parallel efforts by the European Community overcame the CPC's work.12

This example illustrates one of the criticisms leveled at the CSCE, namely, that it is a toothless tiger. As Dr. Peter Schmidt has written: "On the negative side, the limitations begin with the very concept of cooperative security, which simply prevents sanctions from being applied. That is because the process depends on the willingness of all participants, including the parties in conflict, to agree upon a solution."13 Thus, although the consultative process can be initiated by individual members, (in the case just mentioned, Austria and Italy) no

13. ibid, p. 20.
implementation of decisions, if obtained, can be enforced by the CSCE.

Those who question the CSCE's potential as an effective agent of stability in Europe also make the observation that merely arriving at consensus on what should be done, when each of fifty-three disparate state actors possesses a veto option, is an unlikely proposition, especially when some of those countries are themselves embroiled in conflict. In order for the CSCE to become an effective decision-maker, streamlined mechanisms must be created. Towards this end certain ideas have been proffered, such as a rotating executive council or the exclusion from deliberations of those states forming the subject matter of crisis discussions. An improved deliberative process, however will not solve the problem of institutional impotence.

Another option would be to turn the CSCE into a regional sanctioning organization, a sort of European UN. Or perhaps even something less formal, merely a regional non-governmental forum for exchanging ideas and information or applying collective political and diplomatic pressure. The flexibility possible in this type of arrangement could be useful if the CSCE were willing to accept such a loosely defined, but intentionally restricted role.

NATO has worked well with the CSCE in the past, notably during the CFE negotiations, conducted under CSCE auspices. The end of the Cold War has, of course, lessened the CSCE's importance as a device for bringing the superpowers together in a regional context and the creation of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council has in some ways supplanted the CSCE in this regard.

It may be that the very lack of any indigenous implementative capacity makes the CSCE attractive to the Alliance as a communicative tool. Indeed, the wording of the New Strategic Concept suggests just this: "The potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help defuse crises and to prevent conflicts....To this end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions." 14

It is difficult to predict what future function the CSCE will perform in the promotion of European stability and crisis management. It does seem safe to say that the institutions currently able to act, primarily NATO but also the Western European Union and, in the economic sphere, the European Community, must be willing to invest in the decision making machinery of the CSCE and make available their capabilities to implementing resolutions under CSCE authority. The precedent provided in the Balkans crisis does not give cause for optimism.

The final two organizations which have a bearing on crisis management in Europe are the EC and the WEU. The importance of the EC as a source of trade and financial aid for many parts of the world has given it significant leverage in influencing the policy of those with whom it deals. One lesson that Iraq and Yugoslavia have taught the international community, however, is that a country's leadership may be very willing to risk its

14. NSC, paragraph 34. Emphasis added.
national economy in the fixed pursuit of political goals. Economic leverage is an essential element of pressure but is at best a medium-term solution and in a fast-moving crisis has limited utility. The EC has been attempting to remedy this anemic ability to influence political-military events by developing, through revitalization and expansion of the WEU, a military complement to its financial clout.

Before discussing the WEU in greater detail and observing how it relates to NATO in the European security environment, a word is necessary about other factors affecting the EC's heretofore relative inability to respond effectively during crises. One reason lies in the lack of internal political cohesiveness. Despite the Maastricht Treaty's call for tighter political union and the development of a common security policy for the Twelve, persistent basic problems in the economic and political arenas raise important questions about the odds of accomplishing this goal in the short to mid-term. The "widening or deepening" question remains open and the move towards democratizing reform in the EC bureaucratic structure may enhance representation but is unlikely to improve the ability of the EC to act decisively and in a timely manner on urgent security matters. These internal political factors prohibit the community from matching NATO's proven capacity for decision and action.

Developing a uniquely European defense identity with the WEU, whose full membership expanded to ten in November 1992 with
the addition of Greece, remains a priority for the EC. A closer coupling of the two institutions, or an absorption of the WEU by the EC, has made reinforcement and enhancement of the WEU a response to political pressures rather than a strategy for countering the risks to European security. With eventual full Political Union in mind, European leadership desires direct access to the same type of military instrument available to most national governments to enforce its eventual defense policy. A problem arises, however, due to differing requirements for membership in the two institutions. The WEU demands adherence to policies such as nuclear deterrence, a posture historically anathema to certain prospective EC members such as Switzerland and Sweden.

The June 1992 Petersberg Declaration expanded WEU competence to allow involvement in out-of-area operations, missions not necessarily sanctioned by the UN (or the CSCE if it becomes a regional security organization) and use of WEU forces in all forms of military operations, rather than merely "blue helmet" missions. Thus, on a declaratory level, it rivals and even surpasses NATO's ability to act. On a practical level, of course, the absence of infrastructure, trained forces in sufficient numbers and the support elements necessary to sustain operations, relegates the WEU to a status of dependency on NATO.

15. For an excellent brief discussion of the WEU within the developing European security context, see Peter Schmidt, "The Western European Union (WEU) in the 1990s - Searching for a Role Between the Atlantic Alliance and European Union", Ebenhausen, Germany, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 1992 (mimeographed). Much of the information in this section on the WEU is drawn from Dr. Schmidt's paper.
Operations have been carried out under the WEU flag, notably maritime minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf and embargo monitoring/enforcement activities in the Adriatic Sea off the coast of the former Yugoslavia. This last example demonstrates as well the possibilities and problems inherent in having NATO and WEU forces performing identical missions in the same theater.

After reviewing these other entities vying for a place in the European defense architecture, it seems clear that NATO remains the only institution currently possessing the capacity for effective military action, especially in a crisis situation requiring a responsive policy tool. The New Strategic Concept posits, however, that security implies more than just military aspects and that the diplomatic and economic resources represented by the CSCE and the EC are essential to promoting stability and protecting the national interests of the Allies. Preemptive crisis management, which by definition emphasizes non-military instruments of influence, is especially addressed through these organizations.

A BROAD APPROACH TO SECURITY

One of the factors contributing to the rise in estimation given to these above mentioned institutions, is that the NSC recognizes that with the diminution of the direct military threat, more effort must be focused on the other, non-military areas of security. "It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well
as the indispensable defence dimension." The implications for crisis management are obvious: international political-military crises have their origins in other aspects of society: perceived economic inequity, competition for limited natural resources, ethnic and religious conflict, etc. Attempting to resolve those potential sources of strife at a sub-crisis level falls within the realm of preemptive crisis management. However, a holistic strategy to promote European peace and stability exceeds the competence of NATO alone. Thus the NSC insists on the complementarity of the existing institutions and expresses the desire for an inclusionary approach, allowing each organization to contribute according to its fortes. Cooperation and coordination will be mandatory if this multi-actor approach is to be effective. An uncharacteristic display of realistic self-evaluation and political humility must accompany the development of the various security organizations. The fluidity of the European political scene seems to argue that solutions will be short-term at best, and adaptability should be a prominent characteristic.

How then, does the NSC describe NATO's broad approach to security. It is founded on three pillars: dialogue, cooperation and collective defense. The elements of dialogue and cooperation have been discussed somewhat above. The strategy calls for increased diplomatic and military contacts between the Alliance and former WTO states. This is hoped to "encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, to increase

17. NSC, paragraph 25.
transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The Alliance's pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater co-operation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means."  

Increased understanding, it is thought, will lead to increased cooperation in those areas affecting security. At the least, some of the ambiguity regarding intentions and capabilities, so prevalent in an era of animosity and secrecy such as Europe experienced from 1945-1989, should be reduced. More effective detection of the sources of crisis will be possible as well. Although it may be that the issue under contention escapes resolution, a more precisely tailored response to the threats posed by a crisis and appropriate measures to ensure it remains localized could be prepared in a preemptive or proactive manner rather than after the "blaze has taken hold."

This leads to the third element of this broad approach: collective defense. Understood is that the danger of crisis prevention failure is realistic and the Alliance must be prepared to implement military measures in the case of aggression against any member. Maintaining an effective common defense will provide a credible deterrent that at a minimum should keep the territorial and political integrity of the member countries intact. It is difficult to imagine in the foreseeable future a power arising that would be able to counter the Alliance's assembled capabilities. The powerful political and military signal sent by a united NATO was heard and heeded over the last

18. NSC, paragraph 29.
forty years. Its efficacy proven, NATO collective defense would seem the best guarantor that external crises do not escalate into military threats to the Alliance members themselves. The nature of that defense has changed, however, and the NSC outlines how NATO plans to organize its forces to meet the challenges of the future.

A RESTRUCTURED FORCE

The strategic outline of the restructured Alliance forces, contained in paragraphs forty through fifty-seven of the NSC, underscores the new preoccupation with crisis management. The missions of the military forces are differentiated according to the context: peace, crisis or war. The wartime mission, defense and restoration of Allied political and territorial integrity, falls largely outside the scope of this study. The other missions do fall within the three types of crisis management we are using to examine the NSC.

During peacetime, the Alliance forces will perform a deterrent function and fulfill the dialogue and cooperation requirements described above. Important aspects of the latter include Arms Control Treaty verification activities and participation in the CSBM regime established under the auspices of the CSCE. The contribution of NATO member nation forces to "blue helmet" operations will also make up a portion of the peacetime role. This commitment was increased at the June 1992 North Atlantic Council Foreign Ministers Meeting in Oslo, Norway. The Ministers declared NATO's readiness to consider on a case-by-
case basis support to peacekeeping missions under the responsibility of the CSCE, in addition to the traditional contribution of member-country troops to operations under UN auspices.19

In a crisis atmosphere which is perceived to hold threats to Alliance interests, NATO forces will be called upon to provide the "muscle" behind the political reaction determined by Alliance leadership. NATO forces employed in a crisis situation must be configured and prepared to perform all four basic functions of military power: deterrence, defense, compellence and demonstration. Forces involved in crisis management will have to operate in situations somewhere along the spectrum between peace and war, with all the ambiguity and operational difficulties that entails, but also must be prepared to enter either extreme on short notice.

Given these requirements, how does NATO, as expressed in the NSC, plan to refashion its military arm so as to accomplish the varied missions with which it may be tasked? One of the first significant changes involves the general size and level of readiness of Alliance forces: both will be reduced. This reflects the removal of the massive WTO threat and is consistent with the risks to security outlined above. This also reflects the economic realities facing the member states which mandate reductions in defense budgets. The US Government, having already begun implementation of a plan to more than halve its European-

based troop strength to 150,000 by 1995, is considering further
drawdowns, perhaps reducing the 1995 personnel figure by half
again. In December 1992, continued revision of NATO force size
was reinforced in light of announced drastic cuts in the defense
budgets, and thus military forces, of Belgium and the
Netherlands.20

Despite the overall reduction in readiness, NATO forces' ability to perform their crisis management missions will be ensured by the creation of immediate and rapid reaction units, supplemented by main defense and augmentation forces. The reaction forces will be described in more detail below. The main defense forces (MDF) "...will provide the bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their lines of communication;..."21 The Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Vigleik Eide, describes the MDF as the "backbone" of the Alliance. According to Air Force Magazine, the MDF will comprise sixty-five percent of Alliance forces and be organized into seven corps plus their air support. Six of these are to be multinational and located in the territory of the former West Germany. The seventh will be based on the territory of the former GDR and contain only German personnel in accordance with the 1990 Two-plus-Four agreement on German reunification.

The Augmentation Forces, as the name suggests, are to reinforce units already deployed. They will represent

21. NSC, paragraph 48.
approximately twenty-eight percent of the total NATO manpower numbers and be filled mainly by units based in North America, although some European Allies will contribute as well. Both the Augmentation Forces and the MDF will be comprised of active duty and reserve units.  

Another application of the NSC's call for a streamlined force can be seen in the reorganized NATO command structure. The number of major commands has been reduced from three to two; Allied Command Channel has been abolished and responsibility for that area has devolved to Allied Forces Northwest, now one of Allied Command Europe's three subordinate commands, along with Allied Forces Central Europe and Allied Forces Southern Europe. The organization of these subordinate commands has also been rationalized consistent with the leaner force and changed defense posture.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT ASPECTS

CRISIS PREVENTION

As General Shalikashvili stated in his lecture to the NATO Crisis Management School, the best and most cost-effective method of crisis management is to avoid crises altogether. This involves identifying areas of possible contention and building structures to manage the disagreements at a pre-crisis level. It also requires efforts aimed at increasing transparency, thus reducing the tendency towards unilateral security measures. As already discussed in some detail above, NATO's determination to

reinforce the political activities of the Alliance, to include military exchange and liaison programs, demonstrates its commitment to preventing crises between the Allies and their former adversaries. The CSCE mandated Confidence and Security-Building Measures also aim to reduce tensions at low levels. Arms control efforts, and especially the various inspection regimes agreed to in the verification clauses of treaties such as CFE will be important in this regard. The CFE Treaty also mandates annual information exchange procedures requiring signatories to furnish detailed information, including the location and quantities of treaty-limited offensive conventional weapons as well as organizational data on the units possessing those weapons.23

Adequate intelligence represents another essential element to any crisis prevention strategy. The task in the former WTO countries has been eased somewhat due to the opening of their societies. Officials and citizens of NATO's neighbors to the East are much more accessible and a flourishing press gives Westerners greater opportunity to observe developments in those countries on a close and continued basis. This enhanced ability to follow social, political and military trends is offset, however, by the increased complexity of the task. The advantage of facing a monolithic bloc as an adversary lay in the ability to focus on a relatively narrow range of intelligence targets. Although perhaps other methods would have been preferred, during

the Cold War era NATO could at least rely on Moscow to resolve any internal Warsaw Pact crises. The Alliance's current dilemma arises from an ambiguous security situation created after the withdrawal of Soviet power. Crises on the eastern periphery of NATO could now erupt from many different sources, rather than the old familiar one. At issue is no longer the prevention of one identified potential crisis but the discovery and analysis of multiple implicit conflict frontiers arrayed throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

The acquisition of technologically advanced weaponry, especially nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, by states situated to the south of NATO territory, whether in Southwest Asia or North Africa, increases the importance of preventive measures towards these regions. This remains especially true in the oil-rich areas of the Middle East, where the possibility of lost access to crucial natural resources demands that Alliance members actively promote regional stability. Positive dialogue and cooperative arrangements would certainly help monitor the pulse of the region. Intelligence assets should be directed to monitor the flow of arms and technologies with military applications and maintain vigilance over internal political and social trends with destabilizing potential.

Despite best intentions, not all crises will be avoided. Discerning where and around which issues conflicts will arise does not imply that a solution acceptable to all parties will be found and implemented before recourse to military action is taken. And it may be that the respective values and interests
are so contradictory that no solution short of force will be possible. It must also be recognized that a certain level of military confrontation could be precisely the development desired by a party, in which case efforts at prevention are exercises in futility. Recognizing the need to prepare for this eventuality, NATO leaders, through the NSC, decided to create Reaction Forces capable of fulfilling the crisis management role.

CRISIS RESPONSE FORCES

The centerpiece of the new military elements of crisis management are the immediate and rapid reaction forces called for in the NSC. These have been organized into the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), directly subordinate to SACEUR and the successor to the ACE Mobile Force, which was more a demonstration of Alliance solidarity and interest than a potent fighting organization. The ARRC was activated on 2 October 1992 at Bielefeld, Germany, under the command of a British general and is projected to become fully operational in April 1995.24 Reports of the precise number of divisions dedicated to the ARRC vary from eight to ten.25

One innovation involves the creation of two thoroughly multinational divisions (MND), one air mobile, the other infantry. Only the headquarters of these two will be under operational control of the corps commander in peacetime. The MND

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brigades and the other primarily national divisions of the ARRC will remain under national command until "chopped." 26

Still unclear is which units will be considered "immediate" versus "rapid" reaction forces (IRF or RRF). It has been suggested that the IRF will maintain a level of readiness that will permit it to deploy within seventy-two hours. The RRF will require seven to fourteen days to arrive on the scene of a crisis. 27 NATO planners will also assign ARRC units a second role as part of the main defense forces. This may explain why descriptions of these units indicate that they are still fairly "heavy". How the ARRC will rationalize the different equipment and organizational requirements of these two types of missions remains to be seen.

In addition to the ground component, the Alliance will create a Reaction Force Air. As of June 1992, plans called for a German general to direct a "Reaction Force Air Staff" which would manage a pool of aircraft, surface-to-air missile units, and a command and control element designated for the force and to be made available to any NATO air commander requiring them in a crisis situation. 28 The inherent flexibility of air power will be exploited when deploying the Reaction Force Air. According to General Robert Oaks, Allied Air Forces Central Europe Commander, "You would probably start out sending AWACS, and then you would send some protection for AWACS, so you'd send some F-15s, and

26. ibid., p. 31.
then as Army got in there...you would send some close air support aircraft. [Then] offensive counterair, interdiction forces, F-16s. You would mold the force to meet the need." 29

To support this approach to employing airpower, a revamped logistics system is under development. Prompted by the difficulties encountered when USAFE assets were deployed to the Persian Gulf in conjunction with Operation DESERT STORM/SHELIF, planners have elaborated a blueprint for regional logistics centers dispersed geographically throughout Alliance territory. These will facilitate timely deployment of appropriate aircraft to areas of tension through "centralized management of the command's vast, widespread stocks of war reserves and prepositioned equipment for reinforcing units." 30

Maritime assets have already and will continue to play an important role in NATO's efforts at crisis management. The unique capabilities and operating environment of naval ships is acknowledged in the NSC; their ability to unobtrusively position significant military force close to an area of concern makes them uniquely suited to crisis response missions. These "show-the-flag" missions are a valuable tool for demonstrating interest in an unstable region and also provide the Alliance with important military options if diplomatic efforts fail to resolve a crisis. In keeping with this the Alliance created in April 1991 the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) to provide a permanent NATO naval presence on the volatile southern flank.

29. Quoted in ibid.
30. Ibid.
The force structure modifications NATO has made in the last two years demonstrates its commitment to adapt to the new security environment. Fiscal realities and the absence of major, immediate threats made logical the transition to a smaller force, reorganized "with an enhanced capability for flexible deployment."

The clearest evidence of this development is present in the ground component of NATO forces with the creation of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps.

MULTINATIONAL UNITS

Another of the changes opted for in NSC has been the decision to incorporate more multinational units into the force structure. Plans for the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps embody this idea. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Britain has two divisions assigned to the ARRC, while Italy, Germany, Turkey and the United States will contribute one each. Two other divisions will be thoroughly multinational: MND Central will field brigades from the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. An Italian mountain brigade, a Greek mechanized infantry brigade and a Turkish commando brigade will comprise MND South. The various corps support units also reflect the national diversity of the Alliance.

The concept of multinational units certainly poses many problems. The difficulties encountered because of differing procedural approaches and military-cultural traditions, not to
mention basic communication problems, are formidable. The extra-NATO Franco-German Brigade, one of the most ambitious attempts to date at building a truly multinational unit in Europe, has been criticized by some as merely an elaborate language school. That does not bode well for operational effectiveness, especially in a combat situation. Training together often and in as-realistic-as-possible circumstances will be one step towards mitigating the inefficiencies inherent in integrated units.

From a crisis management perspective, an obvious advantage of combining nationalities lies in the signal of political solidarity sent to potential adversaries. A multinational force represents a condensed version of the Alliance and is a potent symbol of its commitment to defend common interests.

There exist, of course, drawbacks to such an approach. One is that the decision to use the collective tool will be more difficult to reach in situations not significantly affecting the security of all members, especially the most significant contributors. Precisely because the troops assigned to the ARRC represent the varied contributory states, lamentable delays in implementation may occur, or in a worst-case scenario, some members may refuse to participate. In this sense, each crisis will provoke a re-evaluation of how the Alliance responds to the perceived short- and long-term security interests of its members. Debate over this issue will probably grow more acute as the memory of the WTO threat fades and as the Council deliberates the use of NATO multinational units to deal with crises on the periphery, or perhaps even out-of-area. The internal challenge
this poses to NATO will necessitate far-thinking national political leadership in the years ahead if Alliance cohesion is to be maintained.

MOBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY

Two important requirements for crisis response forces involve the capacity to reach a crisis area quickly and the ability to responsively apply various military capabilities to an unclear and developing situation. The unanticipated nature of many crises makes prepositioning of troops and equipment unlikely. The NSC takes this into consideration with its call for immediate and rapid reaction elements composed of sea, air and ground units at a high state of readiness and in sufficient numbers to "deter a limited attack, and, if required, to defend the territory of the Allies against attacks, . . . ."33

To support these numerically limited reaction forces, the NSC mandates the development of a rapid and responsive reinforcement capability. Work on this aspect of the new strategy actually began in December 1989 when the Reinforcement, Policy, Planning and Coordination Cell of the International Staff was created.34 Their work led to the adoption of a new NATO Reinforcement Concept shortly after the publication of the NSC. The previous concept, the Rapid Reinforcement Plan, was designed to offset the negative disparity in conventional military forces between NATO and the WTO and detailed plans were developed so

33. NSC, paragraph 47-a.
that decision making after the initial agreement to initiate the plan would be minimized. The Rapid Reinforcement Plan was characterized by a rigidity that threatened to provoke the adversary as much as demonstrate Alliance commitment to collective defense.

Gordon Ferguson, who headed the cell which developed the new concept, defines reinforcement as the "process of relocating forces to any area at risk within the Alliance in order to strengthen military capabilities as a means of conflict prevention, crisis management or defence."\(^{35}\) NATO plans to do this in such a way as to demonstrate Alliance political cohesiveness and resolve in the face of threats to any member.

The new Reinforcement Concept does not elaborate detailed plans for the numerous plausible contingencies which could confront NATO. Rather, it develops reinforcement strategies based around capabilities required for certain types of missions. It is hoped that this "capability/capacity planning system" will allow NATO the flexibility to effectively counter the multi-faceted and multi-directional threats considered most likely to arise in the future.

Perhaps unavoidably, Mr. Ferguson's article on the new Reinforcement Concept focuses on the build-up of forces. Just as important is the practiced ability to slow, stop and reverse the process, to "draw down forces quickly and discriminately," as the NSC puts it.\(^{36}\) This is all the more crucial if one hopes to

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35. ibid., p. 33.
36. NSC, paragraph 47-c.
resolve crises without recourse to war. NATO should remember this as it develops crisis management exercises.

IMPLIED MISSIONS

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, another non-NATO effort using NATO resources, provided many useful lessons about the use of the military for non-traditional missions, including that they must be ready to shift emphases as required in a fluid operational environment. General John Galvin’s commentary on the lessons learned during PROVIDE COMFORT illustrates this point:

My mission, which I passed on to John Shalikashvili, was to get food to the Kurds as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours he had the first aircraft going in dropping food to the Kurds in the mountains. But we soon realised (sic) that this was not going to be very efficient because we did not know where the Kurds were exactly and what to drop in and so forth. So although Clausewitz insisted that one should always keep to the objective and not let it change, we had to change the objective three or four times.

First, I had to go back and point out that I could not get food in to the Kurds unless I could get somebody in there so that I knew where the Kurds were and what they needed. So, we put in some Special Forces - including some British - very early on. When they got onto the ground, they radioed back and told us that a shortage of food was not the biggest problem: the main problems were a lack of sanitation, water and shelter and that the Kurds needed to be evacuated as soon as possible. So, I went back again and requested another change of objective to get the Kurds out of the mountains, which we achieved by putting them into some camps on the flat land where we could provide improved medical care, sanitation and food. But as the Kurds came out of the mountains, it became evident that they might possibly be returned to their original homes; in fact, some had already begun easing through the Iraqi lines. So, once again, I had to ask for a change of the objective to use the camps as way-stations, letting the Kurds pass on through them, and this is what we did.

Now while all this was happening a security zone was also created to protect the refugees. Not only was a peacekeeping effort going on at the same time as there was peacemaking, but there was also some low-intensity conflict because the Kurdish PKK were attacking the Iraqis and the Iraqis were fighting back. So a mix of missions was being
conducted concurrently: there was deterrence, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and conflict.\textsuperscript{37}

This account demonstrates the flexibility which will be required of forces operating in the gray area between peace and war, and which will probably be most characteristic of crisis situations. To operate successfully in such an environment, NATO forces cannot resemble the heavy armored units designed to repel an invasion by similar heavy forces. Speed, flexibility, adaptability, a capacity to rapidly augment and reduce troop strength and sustainability will be more pertinent to a force focusing on crisis management.

General Galvin's description also has implications for how one develops rules-of-engagement (ROE). A dilemma is produced when the need for strict political control is juxtaposed with ill-defined military operational environments demanding latitude and adaptability. If ROEs are defined too narrowly, on-scene commanders may find themselves restricted from reacting to protect their troops and fulfill their missions in evolving, dangerous situations. If defined too loosely, political leaders may find that escalation dominance escapes them through the unfortunate acts of subordinates far down the chain-of-command.

NATO'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT HISTORY

The track record of NATO proper as a crisis manager is fairly modest. This is not to say that the Alliance has not faced crises; indeed some would call the Cold War a forty-year crisis of unsurpassed magnitude. It does indicate, however that

as an institution the Alliance has avoided direct action up until very recently. One reason for this, at least during the years of animosity with the WTO, is understandable: all political-military events were seen through a bipolar lens and the danger of provocation often outweighed the promotion of non-vital Alliance values. The relative ignorance of crisis management techniques and procedures also played a role. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, NATO Military Committee Chairman from 1974-1977, expressed these thoughts in the following terms:

The fact that crises involving alert measures have not happened, or have been avoided, could be taken as a tribute to the success of the Alliance, but it could also, and less attractively, be attributed to a collective reluctance to take unpalatable decisions or to the absence of the machinery so necessary for rapid political consultation in fast-moving situations such as the Hungarian rising of 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.\(^{38}\)

For Admiral Hill-Norton, who penned these words in 1978, the test of involvement was the implementation of the alert system, the process of upgrading NATO readiness and implementing procedures in preparation for hostilities with the Warsaw Pact. NATO doctrine and strategy was such that alert status upgrades comprised the only active military measures available to Alliance leaders. The creation of the ACE Mobile Force in 1960 added a further, lower-level option that represented more a political gesture of unity than an effective military tool.

The following sections will provide a summary of three crises in which NATO was involved. The first is one of the few during the 1948-1949 period and concerns the Greek-Turkish feud

over Cyprus. The second deals with NATO's actions during the Persian Gulf War and finally, in the realm of current events, the Alliance's growing part in trying to find a resolution to the violence in the former Yugoslavia. NATO members have participated in many other crisis operations, however, this paper will only consider this trio, which demonstrate the direct involvement of the Alliance as an institution.

CYPRUS "CHRISTMAS CRISIS" 1963

When the long-standing dispute over Cyprus threatened to draw Greece and Turkey towards military confrontation in December 1963, Alliance leaders were forced to take action. NATO was unavoidably implicated because the issue involved two NATO member countries and the prospect of a war between them was unacceptable. In January 1964 as the situation continued to deteriorate, SACEUR General Lyman Lemnitzer, acting as the personal envoy of President Johnson, traveled to the Greek and Turkish capitals to emphasize the deleterious effects an escalation of the crisis would have on the Alliance. In an attempt to internationalize and upgrade the deterrent force of British troops monitoring the cease-fire, Britain hosted a conference in London and proposed establishing on the island a peacekeeping force consisting of NATO member-country military personnel. The Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios III, rejected the plan. Fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces continued and in June 1964 the Turkish government threatened to invade the island. Further pressure was applied by President
Johnson in the form of a warning to Ankara that an invasion could prohibit implementation of the Washington Treaty's collective defense clause in the event of a Soviet attack on Turkey. Turkey did not invade, restricting its intervention to air attacks, and the crisis eventually reached an acceptable level of tension.

It is important to remember that NATO's involvement in this crisis was limited to diplomatic efforts, and that the drama on Cyprus was significant because of the potential ramifications for Alliance cohesion and its ability to defend against the principal danger, the Soviet Union. The most forceful proposition was a threat to remove the defense umbrella from Turkey, to exclude rather than intervene. In this instance NATO took measures to protect its primary collective interests, subordinating the national and territorial integrity of particular members to the higher cause. This threat prioritization was mandatory during the Cold War if the Alliance was to successfully respond to the potentially mortal defense challenge represented by the WTO.

DESERT SHIELD/STORM

While many of the assets used in the Gulf War by North American and European coalition members were drawn from resources based in NATO territory and the infrastructure and procedures developed by the Alliance were essential to the deployment of European-based materiel,\(^{39}\) NATO's direct military role was

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Active military measures were comprised of the deployment of aircraft and air-defense elements of the ACE Mobile Force (AMF) to Turkey and the positioning of NATO sea and air forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On 7 January 1991, in response to requests from the Turkish government, the Defence Planning Committee decided to send forty-two German, Italian and Belgian aircraft, accompanied by several surface-to-air missile batteries, to Turkey. According to the U.S. State Department, this deployment, the first ever for the ACE Mobile Force in a crisis situation, was intended to demonstrate solidarity with the Turks and to emphasize Alliance intent to fulfill its Article Five obligations to member countries. The move sparked heated debate in Germany among the public and in the government over the possibility that German pilots could be involved in retaliatory operations inside Iraq, activity considered by some to violate the Federal Republic's Basic Law. Although Germany could be viewed as a special case, this example provided a foretaste of the controversial nature of out-of-area operations when Alliance commitments conflict with national political factors. Fortunately, Iraq did not attack Turkish territory, and the AMF was not involved in any fighting. The units returned home Turkey in March 1991 after the ceasefire.

Further military precautions taken by the Alliance involved the deployment of ships and maritime patrol aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean. Concerned with the threat of mining or terrorist attacks on shipping in the area, NATO leaders decided on 16 January 1991 to order minesweepers normally operating in the English Channel to the Mediterranean. These joined an eight-ship multinational flotilla already on station and contributed to the replacement of naval capabilities lost when the United States transferred its 6th Fleet to the Persian Gulf.42

In late January 1991 eight European members of NATO (Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey) sent approximately thirty maritime patrol aircraft to support the above naval effort. Although the planes remained under national control, their activities were intended to complement those of the Alliance naval forces and were coordinated with them.43

Clearly, as stated in the document itself, the experience of the Gulf War affected the development of Alliance thinking about its future and the expression of these thoughts in the NSC. During this first major post-Cold War crisis, several aspects of the new order manifested themselves. A non-threatening, cooperative Soviet Union gave the Allies greater latitude to remove forces from Europe and deploy them to the Gulf. The

growing importance of out-of-area issues for European security was emphasized, as was the danger arising from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and other types of advanced weapons. Concern over the lack of export controls (or the enforcement of existing restrictions) on militarily related technologies underlined the inseparability of economics and national security. Turkey's request for aid and the decision to deploy the ACE Mobile Force generated debate over how the Allies should respond when an aggression against NATO territory, and thus the activation of the Article Five mechanism, could result from the extra-Alliance actions of individual members. These and other issues made very practical the deliberations of the SRG as it developed the new strategy, whose concepts are being put to the test and refined in the current crisis with which NATO is confronted.

THE BALKANS 1992

The violent breakup of the former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has forced NATO to consider a terrible and seemingly insoluble catastrophe right on its doorstep. In addition to the assault on international human rights standards, several aspects of this crisis present potential threats to Alliance members, not least the question of the overall geopolitical balance in the Balkans. The risk of the conflict expanding to neighboring states, many of which are struggling through an era of tense post-1989 political and social restructuring, has prompted comparisons with the volatile situation prior to the first World
War. As mentioned above, the burgeoning refugee problem has impacted more distant neighbors, notably Germany.

The majority of the international attempts at managing the crisis have been sponsored by the UN and, as usual, NATO member countries have contributed diplomatic and military assets to these efforts. The Alliance has increasingly taken a more active stance on direct participation, however. The willingness to act in solidarity as an institution was delivered through statements such as the communiqué issued after the Oslo ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 1992. The Alliance declared itself ready to "support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise."44 The precipitant behind this decision was the Balkans crisis and shortly afterward, on 15 July, General Shalikashvili ordered the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea to aid in monitoring the UN embargo against the FRY. In conjunction with the maritime operation, five AWACS platforms, based in Italy and Greece and flying only in NATO and international airspace, were to provide aerial surveillance support.45

This observer role expanded in late September when NATO AWACS began flying in Hungarian airspace to monitor the UN-imposed military no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was an

extremely significant step for several reasons. First, at no other time in Alliance history had an out-of-area military operation been officially acknowledged. The plunge had been taken, although the chances of military confrontation were minimal. Second, this type of cooperation with a former WTO country was unprecedented. Not only did the aircraft have permission to use Hungarian airspace, but a NATO officer sat in a Budapest air traffic control center to coordinate the ingress and egress of the NATO planes to their surveillance station. Even more astounding, Hungarian Air Force MiG-21 fighters were placed on alert to protect the AWACS in case of aggressive action by Serbian aircraft.46

On 22 November NATO stepped further away from its traditional role, when, in conjunction with the WEU, the Alliance agreed to escalate from monitoring to enforcement of the UN resolutions establishing the embargo of Serbia and Montenegro. It is unclear whether the rules of engagement for the fleet allow only warning shots, as indicated by German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe, or more lethal coercive measures.47 In either case, NATO personnel and equipment are conducting a non-defensive mission. The fact that Germany continues to restrict its vessel assigned to STANAVFORMED to monitoring activities suggests that the Alliance recognizes its unorthodox position.

Growing frustration with the situation in the FRY has led the Allies to develop contingency plans and also to seriously consider UN-inspired operations such as the deployment of troops in Macedonia and Kosovo to deter an expansion of the conflict to those regions.\footnote{Growing frustration with the situation in the FRY has led the Allies to develop contingency plans and also to seriously consider UN-inspired operations such as the deployment of troops in Macedonia and Kosovo to deter an expansion of the conflict to those regions.} Indicative of the changing attitude towards more active involvement in the FRY was NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner's comment that "we must intervene with limited military means if we want to get on top of the situation."\footnote{Quoted in ibid.} Although the "we" referred to the international community in general, Wörner's position makes his statement important as an indicator of the Allies' evolving attitude toward its future role in managing and resolving crises which affect European security.

POSSIBLE PROBLEM AREAS

Following is a short discussion of certain questions which must be addressed by the Alliance as it contemplates a more active crisis management role. There are certainly other areas requiring further study, and the number of those will increase as NATO grapples with the political and practical issues associated with such a transition. The following provide adequate subject for meditation in themselves and how they are resolved will greatly affect the future of the Alliance.

\footnote{Growing frustration with the situation in the FRY has led the Allies to develop contingency plans and also to seriously consider UN-inspired operations such as the deployment of troops in Macedonia and Kosovo to deter an expansion of the conflict to those regions.} \footnote{Quoted in ibid.}
THE INTELLIGENCE GAP

If NATO is to upgrade its ability to predict and monitor crisis situations, improvements in its ability to collect, receive, analyze and disseminate intelligence will need to be made. Currently, the Alliance is dependant upon the voluntary contributions of member states' national intelligence systems for most of its information. The United States is by far the most important component in that flow. Having an American SACEUR provides obvious advantages in this respect but the willingness of member nations to provide the most sensitive information continues to be questioned. Paul Stares, in his recent study on NATO command and control issues, recognizes this problem and suggests several possible solutions. He asserts that the Alliance ought to expand its indigenous collection assets, to include satellites. He also advocates an increase in the number of secure communications systems within the Alliance and the establishment of direct links to national intelligence centers. An adequate number of well-trained, exercised intelligence staff personnel round out Stares' recommendations in this regard.

Unfortunately, these calls for more stuff, more staff, more training and more practice are unlikely to all receive positive responses in an era of shrinking financial resources. It is likewise difficult to imagine national governments sanctioning a policy which would give NATO direct access to their intelligence agencies. However, if NATO is to develop an effective crisis

management capability, this issue must be addressed and an
acceptable solution found.

A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE?

As indicated above, the NSC affirms NATO's defensive
nature: "The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of
its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence."\textsuperscript{51} This
declaration will need to be reinterpreted or modified as NATO
considers a more active crisis management policy, especially if
involvement in peacemaking operations becomes accepted policy.
"Peacemaking" infers that an intervening military force would
impose itself in a combat situation without invitation by all
parties to the conflict. To impose peace will require, in all
probability, the use of military measures to compel the cessation
of military operations. This implies a willingness to use NATO
weapons against a force or forces targeting third parties.
Clearly, that exceeds the boundaries of the concept of self-
defense. The most stark example involves the embargo enforcement
activities of STANAVFORMED in the Adriatic. NATO has agreed to
fire its weapons to coerce ships that do not heed requests for
boarding and inspection of their cargo.

It may well be that the mere deployment of forces and
threat to use military power would suffice to impose and enforce
a cease fire or compliance with UN resolutions. Current history
seems to suggest, however, that the international community has a
credibility problem and a demonstration of commitment and

\textsuperscript{51} NSC, paragraph 36.
capability will probably be required to establish active respect for UN intervention forces. UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali's embarrassing visit to Sarajevo on 31 December 1992 indicates the bitterness and loss of prestige which can befall an international organization whose words are not buttressed by effective action.52

THE OUT OF AREA QUESTION

Another problematic question facing the Alliance concerns its policy toward crises that lie outside its area of responsibility, as defined in the Washington Treaty and amendments. As discussed above, the NSC, in its assessment of the potential threats to NATO security, raises the possibility that threatening out-of-area situations may require a response involving NATO troops operating beyond the traditional area of responsibility. With the monitoring of the no-fly zone over Bosnia this has become reality, although this precedent has not yet been promulgated as a general operating procedure; indeed, NATO officials hoped to keep secret the AWACS operations in Hungary.53 There are many risks inherent in such a policy, not least the threats to Alliance cohesion arising from the political sensitivities of some NATO members. The strident debate within Germany over the out-of-area question, both during and after the Gulf War when German units were deployed to Turkey, demonstrated that national consensus on this issue may be as difficult to

reach as international agreement. The inevitable delays involved in reaching unanimous agreement, the confusing signals likely to be transmitted through inter-Ally debate, and the threat of peripheral-issue based fractures within the Alliance are some of the negative repercussions likely to accompany the embrace of out-of-area missions. Even if coalitions-of-the-willing become the rule for non-Article Five operations, a goodly amount of tension remains likely. This may be an acceptable risk if NATO views such an option as the prerequisite for continued relevance.

**NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR FORMER ADVERSARIES?**

A continuing dilemma for NATO will be how to incorporate the former WTO countries into an acceptable European security architecture. It is in the interest of the Allies to reduce the possibility of any large scale military hostilities among their eastern neighbors. The NACC represents a partial response, however, dialogue and cooperation do not replace an adequate defensive capability. The Central and Eastern European nations understand their vulnerability and see NATO membership as the most desired solution, however, many reasons argue against that as an immediate option. Few if any of those countries have attained the level of political or economic stability necessary to be full Alliance partners. The latent risk of violent realignments in societal and interstate power relationships inspires an understandable reticence on the part of NATO leaders to extend security commitments to the region. Also lacking is the requisite infrastructure developed in Western Europe over
forty years and at great cost. Equipment incompatibility and the price of conversion also present significant barriers to effective military integration. Most observers would agree that already insufficient resources should focus on the difficult and horrendously expensive transition of the civilian sectors of the former command economies to free market models.

What then are NATO's options? A continuation of the NACC policy of dialogue and cooperation is possible. The eastern partners will not be satisfied with this but an honest discussion of the political realities should make such a position understandable. The prospect of eventual membership sometime in the future may also spur non-member states to push hard for reform. The greatest risk to this approach is that violence may erupt in the region, engendering calls for immediate assistance. That would precipitate a high-stakes crisis for the Alliance and force an extremely difficult and potentially divisive decision on intervention.

Another scheme might involve highly-caveated security guarantees that would allow NATO much more latitude than a collective defense structure such as exists within the Alliance. The imposition of conditions such as systematic foreign policy coordination with NATO before implementation in areas bearing on security could also form part of such an arrangement. These attendant limitations on sovereignty, if handled discreetly and with sensitivity, might be acceptable to those countries desiring NATO support. This could assuage somewhat the security concerns
of the cooperation partners without locking the Alliance into risky commitments not in its interest.

The greatest requirement for any policy addressing this issue is adaptability. The Europe needing this security architecture is experiencing great and rapid change. It must be hoped that what is built today will not be needed tomorrow, at least not in the same degree nor form. Not only would such a development be desirable, as the end of the Soviet threat was desirable in 1949, but some form of evolution is inevitable. The task is to guide that change as much as possible in the direction of a stable, just and lasting peace.

CONCLUSION

NATO is confronting difficult but urgent decisions regarding the nature of the Alliance, at least as regards policy towards the requirements for the use of military force. There appear to exist two basic directions, with nuanced positions on each side: NATO can either renounce its intention to intervene militarily to control crises and thereby maintain its standing as an organization dedicated solely to collective defense, or commit itself to becoming a regional security enforcement institution and evolve into a more active policy instrument. It does not appear that doing both is possible. The former option presents certain advantages: the member countries are comfortable and practiced in this role, there is likely to be less controversy over the mission of an international institution which is defensive in character and reticence to support it with
reasonable amounts of national resources should be limited. There are drawbacks, however. If the threats to political and territorial integrity continue to diminish in magnitude and immediacy, it will be difficult to forestall the Alliance's migration towards the fringes of relevance. NATO's military forces could come to be seen only as catastrophic insurance; the lower the odds of suffering a catastrophe, the less one thinks about it or is willing to pay for it. The effect of such marginalization on troops serving in NATO commands would certainly not increase unit quality.

The latter, more activist option solves the relevance question and seems to most closely resemble the track NATO member country governments have chosen to pursue, albeit somewhat tentatively. By embracing non-traditional missions, NATO will allow itself to be useful in a dynamic international security environment. This would allow the operational strengths of the Alliance, unparalleled by any rival international organization, to make it the instrument of choice for UN, regional and national leaders.

The New Strategic Concept provides a blueprint for NATO to build upon which is generally suited to this second option. The revisions in force structure and operational doctrines are improving the practical capabilities of the Alliance to impose itself effectively in crisis situations. The changes outlined in the NSC and which are now beginning to come to fruition conform generally with General Shalikashvili's thoughts on how to approach crisis management as an Alliance. A renewed focus is a
necessary first condition and points NATO in the right direction. The destination is still over the horizon, however and the path is not marked. Also unclear is whether NATO leaders are prepared to make the political decision to sacrifice the Alliance's defensive nature on the crisis intervention altar. Recent statements and the actions taken in response to events in the former Yugoslavia point towards a willingness to do so.

In June 1992, Daniel Plesch and David Shorr, Director and Vice-Director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), opined that "(t)he organization with the least to contribute to the new political order is NATO, and its recent behavior has only weakened its case for a major role." In a world where recourse to violence as a means of attaining political goals has experienced a resurgence, it is difficult to concur with the first half of their statement. Whether NATO can or should remain the preeminent European security institution is an open question. To this point no acceptable replacement has been found and in that void NATO appears best placed to effectively promote stability and cooperation in Europe and deal with the inevitable crises to come. The duration of its central position has yet to be determined.

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