Twenty-First Century Force:
A Federal Army and a Militia

Charles E. Heller

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**Twenty-First Century Force:**

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**Abstract:**

The author contends that the United States must retain a creditable deterrent force that is relevant to both the post-cold war as well as the domestic situation. He proposes a two-component force: a Federal Army composed of the Active Component and the U.S. Army Reserve, and a second component, the Army National Guard, the historic militia. The author claims his 21st century force is cost efficient because it relies on the strengths of each current Army component and, at the same time, assumes a significant domestic support role. He recommends this force with the expectation that it will lead to a reexamination of existing paradigms and thus add to the current force structure, force mix, and roles and missions debate.
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FORCE:
A FEDERAL ARMY AND A MILITIA

Charles E. Heller

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FOREWORD

As the United States Army faces the future, there is uncertainty within its ranks as to what the years ahead hold for its role in society. There are clear signals from the American people, the Congress, and the new Administration that domestic issues have top priority. The Base Force that was held as the absolute minimum essential forces needed in facing the new global order is being replaced by Base Force 2. Base Force 3 is likely to confront us before the end of the century.

This report has one primary objective—to retain and perhaps increase the Active Army’s combat maneuver elements despite declining appropriations and end strength. The author builds a case for his alternative force structure by using the cyclical nature of the Army’s history in the 20th century and the lessons learned in OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM. His analysis leads to a new force generation model of a two, not three, component 21st century Total Force—a Federal Army and a militia (the National Guard). The Federal Army is structured to perform forward presence, contingency operations and support base missions. It relies heavily on an integration of U.S. Army Reserve units and individuals in primarily support roles with additional domestic infrastructure missions. The National Guard maintains its combat maneuver structure, but has a reinforcing and reconstitution mission thus allowing it time to conduct post-mobilization training and concentrate on its state missions in peacetime.

The author’s proposals for 21st century roles and missions may seem radical to some, but his argument is based on Army reform begun in the early years of the 20th century. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report as a contribution to the continuing force mix debate.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
SUMMARY

At the onset of the 20th century the United States took its place among the global powers. As the century draws to a close the United States has emerged as the world’s only superpower. The U.S. Army’s history throughout this ascendancy can be traced by the cyclical nature of war and peace accompanied by fluctuating periods of strength and weakness.

The genesis of possessing an Army worthy of a superpower began with Army reforms in the post Spanish-American War period. One significant aspect of these reforms was defining the traditional American reliance on citizen-soldiers. Army reformers realized the nation had never and probably would not ever desire or afford the size standing Army necessary to guarantee absolute national security. As a consequence, the reforms emphasized the building of what is now defined as the Total Army. Reserve forces would be, in peace and war, a recognized necessary component of the Army. First steps were taken to create this 20th century force with National Guard reform contained in the 1903 Dick Act. Not satisfied that the Guard’s dual loyalty and missions would ever allow it to be completely effective, the Army sought and obtained the creation of a responsive Federal Reserve in 1908. The National Defense Act of 1916 capped this reform package by declaring these two Reserve Components of the Army along with Regulars, Federal volunteers and conscripts as parts of the whole or Total Army.

Having accomplished this reform and then fielding a large force for World War I, the Army lost track of its intentions to integrate the components into a more effective land force. It also neglected its Federal Reserve forgetting why it was created in the first place. As the Army progressed thought the remainder of the 20th century several themes became apparent:
• The Army has consistently underestimated the political clout of the National Guard as exercised through two organizations, The Adjutant General Association (AGA) and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), and, as a consequence, has had difficulty in structuring a peacetime force.

• The Army has a very poor institutional memory, and while creating a more responsive Federal Reserve force in the 20th century has consistently forgotten why it did so in the first place. While at times the Reserve Officer’s Association (ROA) has lobbied as effectively as the Guard’s Associations, its membership is smaller and is reluctant to publicly challenge the Active Component leadership.

• The Army has consistently failed to understand the traditional American reluctance to maintain sufficient Regular Army forces in peacetime to meet future opponents. It also fails to remember that, throughout most of its history, it has engaged in domestic missions more often than wars.

An historical review of these themes validates the fact that the National Guard Association and the Adjutants General Association have wielded an inordinate amount of influence in Congress to assure their component’s primacy in the Defense establishment. The lobby efforts of these associations have, at times, run counter to legitimate attempts to strengthen the Total Army.

The Federal Reserve, known as the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) (today’s U.S. Army Reserve [USAR]), assumed responsibility for the Civilian Conservation Corps camps in 1934 and administered them until 1942. Yet its units and individuals remained poor stepchildren of the Regular Army. Although no ORC units were called up for World War II, thousands of its members served in Army of the United States, National Guard and Regular Army divisions.

Following World War II another military reform wave struck the Armed Forces. After the sweeping changes of the National
Security Act of 1947 an attempt was made to modernize the two Reserve Components. The Gray Report of 1948 recommended that, for a host of reasons, a reserve for national defense must not have a dual mission and should be under Federal control in peace and war. The Guard Associations made certain the recommendations were never enacted into law.

Other later attempts at reserve reform were also the target of the Guard Associations' opposition. In the 1950s, without support from the Guard Associations, reform legislation from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations brought the Federal Reserve parity with the state forces. In the 1960s Secretary of Defense McNamara had difficulties implementing his reform proposals, although he was able to restructure the reserves by placing almost all the combat forces in the Guard and the Combat Support (CS) and Service Support (CSS) in the USA.

After Vietnam and the refusal of the President to mobilize national will by calling up the reserves, the Total Force Policy was implemented by Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams. The themes mentioned earlier became more focused with the introduction of this policy in the 1970s. The first test of that policy came in 1990 with DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The Gulf War validated the fact that political will does exist to mobilize the Reserve Components. It showed that the reserve call-up affected communities across the country and mobilized popular support. The Gulf War clearly defined strengths and weaknesses of each Army component. The Active Component combat maneuver elements were able to execute wartime missions with flawless precision. Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements, most of which were in the USAR, were capable of supporting Active Army combat forces with little or no problems. However, the combat maneuver elements of the Army National Guard did not fare as well, requiring lengthy post-mobilization training and then did not deploy to the Gulf.

Conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of three areas: the historic evolution of the Army's relationship to its Reserve Components, the cyclical nature of defense appropriations and
Army strength, and the gradual evolution of the Total Force Policy from 1916 to DESERT STORM. The most important conclusion is that a restructuring of the Total Army must take place for it to meet the national security and domestic challenges in the 21st century.

From the analysis of these three areas it is apparent that the Total Army should be organized into two components, a Federal Army consisting of the Active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve, and a militia, the state Army National Guard. This structure returns the roles and mission of each component to its Constitutional authority. The two component Total Army Force Generation Model that results is structured as follows:

**FEDERAL ARMY**

Primarily Active Component
- Forward presence
- CONUS Army infrastructure
  - Research and development
  - Training base
  - Logistic support
  - Garrisons
- Contingency force
  - Early deployment capability
  - Theater and Army Corps headquarters
  - Peacekeeping capability
  - Combat arms forces
  - Minimal CS/CSS

Primarily U.S. Army Reserve
- Forward presence operations and support to combat and peacekeeping operations
- Support to CONUS Army infrastructure
  - Training base
  - Garrisons
  - Logistic support
  - Mobilization/reconstitution support base
  - Nation-wide domestic missions
- Contingency force-early to late deployment
  - Combat maneuver roundout at company and battalion level
  - CS/CSS theater build-up
CS/CSS sustainment
CS/CSS echelons, all levels division and corps
Individual augmentation, fillers, and replacements

STATE MILITIA

Army National Guard
Individual state missions assigned by governor
Reinforcement contingency force—late deployment
  Combat maneuver brigades, divisions
  Self-contained division artillery brigades
CS/CSS echelons below corps
Reconstitution (Army expansion)
  Cadre divisions

This restructured Total Army reflects the strengths of each component, the American military tradition and the reality of a peacetime force in a constrained budget environment.

The Active Component is supported in such a way as to preserve and, perhaps, increase the number of combat maneuver elements. The focus of the Active Component is on forward presence and contingency operations in addition to CONUS-based support. However, to accomplish its missions and maintain a reasonable number of combat maneuver elements, it must utilize its Federal Reserve to the fullest extent possible. The USAR, operating under the same Federal laws, regulations and standards in peace and war, will furnish support elements and individuals as part of forward presence, contingency forces and the CONUS support base.

The Federal Reserve support that is available is best illustrated with a number of examples. The Army Staff can be significantly reduced by increasing the number of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) assigned to the Pentagon. Other Major Army Command staffs may similarly be reduced by using IMAs. Training and Doctrine Command could integrate and utilize U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools’ faculties. Individual reservists could be brought on Active duty to teach throughout the Army’s education system from ROTC and Officer Basic Courses to the U.S. Army War College. USAR Training Divisions, with Active Component support, could take over the preponderance of the Individual Entry and
Advanced Individual Training mission. The Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning could be expanded and regional schools established eliminating the wasteful proliferation of state OCS programs.

Certain branches of the Army lend themselves to having most of their personnel in the USAR. Two of these are the Chaplain's Corps and The Judge Advocate General's Corps. The Medical Corps heavily depends on reserve personnel and has one of the most innovative and flexible programs when it comes to the utilization of reservists. Listed below are some other examples of the cost and manpower savings accrued to the Army by transferring support missions to the USAR:

- Area and corps support organizations to save 23 units, approximately 1,750 soldiers, and $34M.
- Echelons above division artillery to save 30 units, approximately 6,800 soldiers, and $177M.
- Echelons above division transportation assets to save 110 units, approximately 9,000 soldiers, and $234M.
- Medical evacuation organizations (air and ground) to save 22 units, approximately 1,200 soldiers, and $300M.
- Organizations to conduct initial entry training and selected military occupation specialty training to save approximately 200 soldiers, and $9M.
- Operational support airlift mission to save office (TDA) organizations, approximately 330 soldiers, and $3.8M.
- Echelons above division aviation assets, less attack units, to save 30 units, approximately 6,650 soldiers and $159M.
- Echelons above corps signal communications to save 68 units, approximately 12,000 soldiers, and $313M.
- Echelons above corps maintenance elements to save 35 units, approximately 6,600 soldiers, and $174M.
- All conventional ammunition support to save 8 units, approximately 1,100 soldiers, and $29M.

In all, when the full scope of the USAR strength is evaluated, such support mission transfers (these are only samples) from the Active Component to the U.S. Army Reserve have the potential of saving over 47,400 Active Component manning spaces and have a net worth of approximately $1.2 billion.

In the combat maneuver arena, it may be timely to consider roundout of Active divisions with USAR units. Rather than rounding out at brigade level, the Active Component might well follow the Marine Corps Federal reserve example, which, unlike the Guard, deployed company and battalion sized combat units to the Gulf.

The Federal Reserve is also important because of its individual manpower pools: the Individual Ready Reserve, the Individual Mobilization Augmentee, and the Retiree Recall programs. These pretrained manpower pools become increasingly significant as the Total Army shrinks in size.

New missions can also be assigned to the Federal Army with the USAR assuming most of them, thus ensuring that the Active Component can remain focused on forward presence and contingency operations. The new missions include youth programs and using Combat Support and Service Support to assist in rebuilding the nation's infrastructure. The USAR's new command could be responsible for FEMA. Involvement in domestic missions ultimately strengthens national security and also builds consensus among citizens for support of the military.

This new structure solves the Guard's dual mission problem. This problem has been compounded by the Guard not having the time to train for the two diverse and separate missions. Two recent cases that reveal the need to provide this breathing space to the Guard is the roundout brigades' inability to deploy and the problems that arose during the L.A. riot. These problems can be overcome by a realistic rather than political assessment of the Guard's capabilities. ARNG combat elements are mirror images of the Active Army's combat force
structure. By giving the Guard the mission of reinforcement and reconstitution (force expansion), the necessary time is created for post-mobilization training and expectations of capabilities brought to a reasonable state. Current legislation for Guard reform cannot provide its combat maneuver elements what is really needed, and that is time to train.

By easing the pressure of early deployment which was shown to be difficult during DESERT STORM DESERT/SHIELD for Guard combat maneuver forces, the Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements of the Guard can focus on state missions. Without the distraction of the national defense mission, the Guard would be better prepared to render more assistance to their communities.

This restructuring would meet the demands of such military critics as Senator John Glenn, who stated: “For years I fought for a reassessment of the Total Force policy that would provide a rational analysis of regular and reserve combat capability (emphasis in original), but I have been stymied by a Pentagon either unwilling or incapable of making an analysis.” Another critic is retired Brigadier General James P. Hartley, USAR, a former ARNG officer. His arguments echo the 1948 Gray Report, focusing on the Guard’s combat units not being able to be utilized in a majority of the state missions. There is a need for one reserve and it must be a Federal organization. State Defense Forces already active in over 30 states could be equipped and trained to handle any governor's request.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Army Chief of Staff must use the historical evidence and the lessons of DESERT SHIELD/STORM to seek a new approach to restructure the Total Army. This study recommends a restructured Army indicated in the notional configuration shown in Figure 1. While the exact number of divisions cannot be determined, the diagram is a graphic presentation of the 21st century force outlined in this report. Forward presence is primarily an Active Component mission; however, USAR overseas units can be part of that force as well as support echelons above division within the 1 month criteria. A power projection force can be available in 2-4 months. It is composed of primarily Active Component combat maneuver elements.
### The 21st Century Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forward Presence</th>
<th>Power Projection</th>
<th>Reinforcement</th>
<th>Reconstitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Month</td>
<td>2 - 4 Months</td>
<td>5 - 12 Months</td>
<td>12 - 18 Months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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#### Combat

- **XX** AR/MX
- **XX** AASLT
- **XX** ABN
- **XX** LT INF
- **XX** AR/MX

#### Contingency

- 3 Divisions
- 5 Divisions
- 7 Divisions
- 3 Divisions

#### Support Bases

- Federal Army
- Domestic Infrastructure
- Engagement
- State

#### Diagram Key

- Active Units
- Guard Units
- Army National Guard
- Army Reserve
- Air National Guard
- Air Reserve

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*Figure 1.*

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and roundout by USAR separate combat maneuver brigades, but at company and/or battalion level. The number of divisions is increased by using USAR and ARNG CS and CSS at division and echelons above division as was done in the Gulf. Spaces are also saved by the Active Component turning over some CONUS base infrastructure to the USAR. The ARNG combat maneuver elements have a reinforcement role with an acceptable 6-12 month window for post-mobilization training. Reconstitution from 12 months and beyond is an ARNG mission until Army of the United States divisions are formed from Selective Service inductees trained by the Federal Army infrastructure. Domestic engagement is the "value" added portion of the force and is a traditional role for the Federal Army in peacetime. FEMA becomes a responsibility of the Federal Army, primarily the USAR. The ties between the nation and its Army are maintained by domestic engagement without degrading combat readiness. The ARNG continues to provide state and local domestic support.

Working closely with the new administration, Congress, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin is essential for the Army. The proposals offered in this study break the paradigm and with strategic vision and leadership would help the Army meet the challenges of the 21st century.
PREFACE

This report concerns the issue of U.S. Army force mix in the post-cold war era. It examines the past and current relationships between the three Total Army components: Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The report then conceptualizes a force that will be able to meet the nation's security needs in the 21st century. With any segment of society, judgement is often colored by the bureaucracy and culture in which individuals are immersed. The Army's components and lobby organizations such as the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) or the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) represent and fight for the interest of their membership. Rational arguments sometimes make little headway under such circumstances. This report attempts an objective assessment of the issues facing the Total Army today by examining the past, then giving consideration to the nation's security needs and the implications for building a post-cold war 21st century base force.

In researching this study, several themes in the Army's journey through the 20th century became clear:

- The Army has consistently underestimated the political clout of the National Guard as exercised through two organizations, The Adjutant General Association (AGA) and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), and, as a consequence, has had difficulty in structuring a peacetime force.

- The Army has a very poor institutional memory, and while creating a more responsive Federal Reserve force in the 20th century has consistently forgotten why it did so in the first place. While at times the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) has lobbied as effectively as the Guard's Associations, its
membership is smaller and is reluctant to publicly challenge the Active Component leadership.

- The Army has consistently failed to understand the traditional American reluctance to maintain sufficient Regular Army forces in peacetime to meet future opponents. It also fails to remember that, throughout most of its history, it has engaged in domestic missions more often than wars.

The consequence of these distinct patterns which have carried over to today explain why the Army has had problems creating a responsive, combat ready Total Army in peacetime.

This study is divided into two parts. The first part, using history, follows the themes listed above. It provides an appreciation of the roots of the problem facing the Total Army today. The second part draws upon the experiences portrayed in the first and recommends a 21st century force based on the Total Force Policy, future national security needs, and the experiences of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

The force that emerges from the analysis is a two component U.S. Army that can meet the national security needs of the nation well into the uncertain and dangerous future. This restructured army will be able to accomplish its national security mission plus establish a domestic role to enhance its relevance to the American taxpayer. Lastly, but equally important, it also will fulfill the American tradition of citizen-soldier involvement in national defense.

This restructured Total Army is composed of a Federal Army, primarily the continental United States (CONUS)-based Active Component, and combat maneuver forces with U.S. Army Reserve support elements at all echelons from division to theater level, ready for early deployment. Additionally, major commands such as Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSOCOM) are integrated with Active and USAR units and individuals sharing mission responsibility. The Federal Army, with its ability to cross state boundaries, has new domestic missions such as disaster relief and military style youth programs. The ARNG combat maneuver elements have responsibility for reinforcing a
deployed Federal Army and for expansion of the Total Army beyond existing units (reconstitution). Non-combat units of the ARNG are more oriented toward state missions, but, as in DESERT SHIELD/STORM, reinforce contingency operations.
PART I

THE CONTINUITY OF CHANGE: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction.

The need for such an inquiry had been demonstrated by recurring dissatisfaction with the reserve programs in the Congress, in the press and among the reserves themselves. The critics have charged that the regular services have failed to accept the reserve forces as essential parts of our national military structure and that, as a result, these forces have become the victims of neglect, discrimination, and conflict, producing in them a "drift toward impotence." Such criticisms require particularly urgent attention today because of the vital role assigned the reserve forces in the country's defense plans.¹

Is the above a recent statement from the Secretary of Defense? No? Then perhaps it is a response by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to questions concerning congressional opposition to reducing the strength of the Reserve Components? Wrong again. This paragraph was taken from the Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security submitted on June 30, 1948, and known as the "Gray Report" for its chairman, Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray. It is relevant as the Army today attempts to resolve what has become the inevitable struggle among the three components in a post-war environment. Unresolved issues included in the Gray Report are resurfacing today.

The U.S. Army has entered the immediate post-cold war period confronted with the overriding reality of what happens to the U.S. peacetime military establishment: significant shrinking defense appropriations and, as a consequence, a reduction in personnel, force structure, facilities, and research and development. After a century of exposure to the ebb and
flow of defense appropriations, one might expect the Army to benefit from past experience, especially when the last several Chiefs of Staff have made vigorous efforts to promote the study of military history. But the obvious disarray and disagreement among the Army’s three components are certain indications that almost all of that historical evidence is being either misinterpreted or ignored.

In response to decreasing defense budgets, Congress and the American people are looking to the Reserve Components as inexpensive alternatives to a large standing army. This has been the case throughout American history from the Revolution to today. Every major war, and even some small conflicts, that this nation has fought required reserves, and many times a mix of volunteers and draftees. The conclusion on the part of Congress and the American public, as in the past, is that citizen-soldiers will always be necessary in war. Therefore, reserves should be a major, cost effective part of any base force in peacetime. Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall aptly stated the case of the American public in August 1944:

> As with a properly organized citizen army reserve no officers or men need be maintained in the Regular Army to perform duties which can be performed effectively and in time by reserve officers and reservists, the dimensions and cost of the peace establishment, under such a system, are necessarily reduced to a determinable minimum.²

Additionally, Congressmen and their constituents want to believe that these forces will be deployable in a period of time sufficient to meet any threat. The Active Component has often fueled this belief as it did with the pre-DESERT SHIELD/STORM rhetoric, concerning the readiness of the ARNG roundout brigades.³ Overly optimistic statements concerning the readiness of citizen-soldier combat maneuver units are the rule, and not the exception. Prior to every conflict this nation has fought, Army war plans have exaggerated the response time of reserve combat units claiming it to be far shorter than is realistically possible.⁴ This optimism, however, was vindicated in part for Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) during OPERATION DESERT
SHIELD/STORM. The USAR, primarily CS and CSS structured, and ARNG units in the same categories, are not far off the mark in the expectation that they can be utilized for early deploying contingency operations.

Based on the OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM experience, there is strong evidence to validate claims that certain types of reserve units and individuals can be brought to a peacetime readiness state, requiring little or no post-mobilization training. The investment that has to be made to retain this readiness in the future is to develop a fully restructured 21st century force that depends more on reserve units and individuals prepared for peacetime missions, peacetime operational requirements, and selected contingencies. Behind this structure should be reserve reinforcing elements and cadre sufficient for expansion beyond the units available in the current force.

This report focuses on missions, force mix and the need to restructure the Army. Justifying the Base Force with a reliance on Active forces met with cynical skepticism in Congress. As an alternative, the Army now needs to focus on the most realistic roles and missions that the reserves have demonstrated they can perform; thereby providing the nation a less expensive yet capable force. The experience of DESERT SHIELD/STORM makes it clear that the missions of the reserves in the areas of CS and CSS should be expanded. Reserve units of that type should be included in a Federal Army contingency force. Combat maneuver units, specifically ARNG roundout brigades, did not fare as well in that crisis. Activated on November 30, 1990, the 48th Brigade Georgia National Guard was the only one of three brigades to be validated as combat ready by its commander and the Active Army Observer/ Controllers at the National Training Center. However, this level of readiness was not achieved until February 28, 1991, the date of the cease-fire in the Gulf. This should lead a force planner to the conclusion that ARNG combat maneuver units of brigade size or higher are best utilized in a reinforcement and reconstitution (force expansion) role.
The same conclusions were clear to military reformers at the turn of the century. To them the ARNG appeared to be an anachronism.\(^6\) The response of the Army to this situation was twofold. The first was an attempt at Guard reform by providing greater Federal control. At the same time the Army pushed for the creation of a more responsive Federal Reserve. The beginning of such a force was achieved in 1908 with the establishment of a medical Reserve called the Officer Reserve Corps. By 1916 the program was expanded into other CSS areas and a Enlisted Reserve Corps was established. After World War I the term Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) was used to refer to both the Officer Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. Its creation was an attempt to establish a responsive Federal force subject to the same experience, training, and standards of its parent organization. Unfortunately, institutional memory in the Army is short and the rationale for the Federal Reserve’s existence is frequently forgotten.

Rather than help the situation, congressional reform of the militia/ARNG has proved little more than a “band-aid” approach to establishing control over 54 often highly political state and territorial forces. As a result of its political connections and influence on congressional delegations, the National Guard continues to remain, in a number of ways, an unmanageable 18th century militia force concept. Each state and territory Adjutant General (TAG), except one (South Carolina’s TAG is elected), is a political appointee. Their role is not to command, but rather to serve as members of the governor’s staff, advising on military affairs. The TAG is then, by virtue of his position, a political entity. The conflicting dual missions of the ARNG, the independence of appointed state Adjutants General, the strong influence on state congressional delegations and the benign neglect by the Active Army of the reserves have all continued to create problems. Then, too, the ARNG’s semi-independence from Army control contradicts national security requirements of the military to successfully face the increasing complexities of modern maneuver warfare. Some critics say that faced with two diametrically opposed missions, a combat force for national security and a domestic force for local emergencies, many times the Guard does
neither very well. Two recent examples of the problem are the lack of roundout brigade participation in the Gulf War and the "errors" that plagued the California ARNG's deployment during the Los Angeles riots.\(^7\)

The problems the Active Army has had with the reserves, partly of its own making, continue to fester in peace and war, and especially now in the post-cold war era. With economic woes besetting the nation and the replacement of a global threat by small regional conflicts, the public is looking at massive defense reductions. Competition among the Army's three components for missions and funding is growing. Unfortunately, it appears the Army continues to lack a restructuring alternative acceptable to Congress in a constrained fiscal environment.

Part of this report examines the evolution in the 20th century of the Regular Army's relationship with its reserves and the latter's roles and missions. It then shows how national security, in a constrained budgetary environment, is best served with the creation of a restructured 21st Century Army consisting of two components, a Federal Army and a militia (Army National Guard). This division and the term "militia" are reflections of the Constitutional clauses relating to the two military forces. This new Federal Army would be composed of the Active Army and the USAR. The Federal Army, in addition to forward presence, will have a CONUS mission to include training and readiness of the Total Army and an immediately deployable, contingency force. The militia, or to use the modern term ARNG, would be responsible for its constitutional role of state missions and maintaining units ready to deploy as follow-on forces. It would also be responsible for reconstitution (force expansion) should the need arise. This proposal is not new nor radical, and has its origins with Secretary of War Lindley Garrison's 1914 Continental Army plan which in turn emerged from the Army General Staff's 1912 "Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States.\(^9\)"
The American Tradition.

The fear of large standing armies was part of the English heritage passed to the writers of the U.S. Constitution. Buoyed by the success of the rag-tag Continental Army in surviving as a force and, at times, achieving victory at such places as Saratoga, Cowpens, and eventually Yorktown, the Founding Fathers placed an unreasonable faith in the militia for the nation's security. Even General George Washington, a former Virginia militia officer, expressed his frustration over the performance of these citizen-soldiers after the defeat at the Battle of Long Island in 1776. Washington later modified his opinion of the militia explaining to the Continental Congress he had no complaints about rank and file, but the political appointment of officers without experience or leadership ability made training the force to Continental Army standards nearly impossible.

When the Constitution was written, the Founding Fathers gave the citizen militia a prominent role in national defense. Article I, Section 8 gave Congress the power:

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions:

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the Officers, and the authority of training the Militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

To further strengthen the militia and reinforce the notion that service was an obligation of citizenship, the second amendment stated:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

President Washington, well aware of the militia's spotty performance in war, had his Secretary of War, Henry Knox, a citizen-soldier and former Continental Army Chief of Artillery, draft plans to create a responsive Federal Reserve that could
be called to serve in place of the militia. Congress rejected the Knox proposal and instead passed, on May 2, 1792, "An Act to Provide for Calling Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of the Union, Suppress Insurrections and Repel Invasions." It limited the chief executive's authority to call out the militia, and its term of service to 3 months per year. Several days later, Congress passed "An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defense by establishing a Uniform Militia throughout the United States." This act was an attempt to standardize force structure of the various state militias to allow for a merger with the Regulars in war. The problem was that Congress, to placate the states, added to the requirement the phrase "if the same be convenient," thus allowing the individual militias to pursue their separate interests. This legislation remained in effect for 111 years.11

The 19th Century Tradition.

The 19th century is replete with examples of the failure of the militia system. However, blame must be shared equally among the Regular Army, governors, state militias, and Congress. Perhaps the most telling story of state militia unpreparedness is the Civil War. At the outbreak of the war, over 2,471,377 militiamen appeared on the rolls of northern states. The problem was that many of the rolls had not been updated since 1827. As a consequence, the units fielded by the states were composed almost entirely of volunteers. Of the 1,780 volunteer state regiments raised, only 15 were in existence prior to 1861.12

After the Civil War there appeared to be consensus in the Regular Army that, based on that conflict, the militia had a great role in national defense except to repel an attack on the shores of the United States. There were strong advocates for the use of citizen-soldiers like the politically powerful Grand Army of the Republic. Their focus, however, was on the category of soldier they were during the Civil War, Federal volunteers. The alternative to the militia suggested by a number of Regular Army officers was a similar volunteer system under Federal control, but formed prior to a conflict. Toward the latter part of the 19th century, General William T.
Sherman began to initiate reform within the Army. Sherman sent a promising officer by the name of Emory Upton abroad to study and report on the armies of other nations. Upton delivered a report when he returned and later began a manuscript, "The Military Policy of the United States," which was published in 1904 by a reform-minded Secretary of War, Elihu Root. Upton held the militia in contempt, yet was impressed with what he had seen of the Prussian Army's Federal Reserve and held a grudging respect for the Civil War's Federal volunteers. His solution to additional manpower upon mobilization was that just such a reserve should be created by Universal Military Training (UMT). However, the proposal was not acceptable for American society. Without a threat from abroad, people were content to place continued faith in the militia system.

Concern over the legality of using the militia abroad prompted the Army to assign it missions that included repelling invasions and providing officer cadres to assist the Regular Army train a force of Federal volunteers on mobilization. In 1898, just prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Iowa Representative John A.T. Hull introduced a bill expanding the Army to an authorized wartime strength of 104,000. However, he deliberately excluded the services of the militia now known as the National Guard. After the bill's defeat by Guard supporters, President William McKinley proposed alternative legislation.

This legislation defined the Army as having two components, the Regular force and volunteers. As a consequence, individuals in Guard units were required to volunteer for service during the Spanish-American War with the expectation that unit integrity would be maintained. As it turned out, the attempt to do just that could not be sustained. Up to 50 percent of the Guardsmen in the already under-strength units could not pass the Army's physical examination for induction. Problems did not stop there. The Army found that 40 percent of the Guardsmen who volunteered never drilled or fired a weapon.13

There was also the chronic problem of state Guard political appointments. Bowing to pressure from the governors it was
obvious that, as one history of the National Guard expressed it, “political considerations were evident...” in the appointment of officers. One of most blatant political moves was made by the Governor of Kansas, who refused to allow Guard members to volunteer for the war with Spain. Instead, he attempted to disband the existing formations. His purpose was to form new units, thereby increasing political leverage in the state by appointing new officers. Fortunately, Congress refused to recognize additional formations as long as the old units remained under strength.14

New Century, New Army.

The Spanish-American War highlighted problems with the Guard and the dependence of the Army on Federal volunteer units like the famous “Rough Riders” organized by former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Teddy Roosevelt. It also revealed the Regular Army’s shortcomings ranging from its administration of the chaotic mobilization and faulty logistics system to poor senior leadership and staff planning. These problems caused Congress and reformers within the Army to look for ways to bring the force into the 20th century. Fortunately for the nation McKinley appointed Elihu Root, a corporate lawyer with no military experience, as the new Secretary of War. Many positive changes came from Root’s tenure including: the concept of a Chief of Staff supported by a professional staff, the Army War College, and a modern approach to a reserve system. While Root was influenced by Emory Upton’s ideas about the militia, it was clear that he understood, as articulated in his 1899 annual report, “the regular establishment in the United States will probably never be by itself the whole machine with which any war will be fought.”15 In addition to greater support of the Guard in terms of equipment, advisors, and joint training, Root also believed more Federal control was necessary to maintain standards in its officer corps and enlisted ranks. But more than this, Root realized, as many Regulars had for years, that a modern Federal Reserve was essential to meet the requirements of the United States as it emerged as a world power in the 20th century.
The Guard and its supporters in Congress worked on “reform” legislation to insure the state forces could maintain their independence. The War Department, to placate the Guard lobby, adopted a significant portion of the newly proposed draft measure, and submitted a reform bill of its own. In one section, though, the legislation called for the creation of a national (Federal) Reserve of 100,000 men. While the bill was hotly contested in the House, Guard supporters’ opposition in the Senate forced Root to remove the offending Federal Reserve section.

The resulting legislation became known as the Dick Act of 1903 in honor of Congressman Charles Dick who was also an Ohio Guard major general. Its passage replaced the 111 year old Militia Act of 1792 and became the first significant attempt to gain Federal control over the militia. Even with the portions which insured this control, the Guard was able to secure its primacy within national defense. A section of the legislation required the President, when reinforcing the Regular Army, to call out all branches of the Guard “in advance of any volunteer force.” While the Federal control portion of the legislation was important, the latter provision tied the hands of the Regular Army. Not only could it not initially use volunteers in an emergency, but the Army also had to call up all branches of the Guard, even though the requirement might only be for infantry. Therefore, it would have to muster every state Guard unit before it could bring in volunteers as infantry. In 1908 the Act was modified, eliminating this provision and allowing the Guard to be deployed overseas.15

Still, Regular Army reformers never ceased their lobby for a Federal Reserve free of state political interference, lacking the traditional unpreparedness of the Guard, and with greater professional ability among its officer corps. Eventually, the Army was able to take the first step toward a Federal Reserve with the passage of Senate bill 1424 on April 23, 1908. This bill authorized the creation of a Medical Reserve Corps which could be activated directly by the Secretary of War. This Federal Reserve gave the Army a model that demonstrated a flexibility lacking with the Guard. The Reserve medical officers were called to active duty twice in 1913, once to allow their
Regular Army counterparts to deploy for field maneuvers, and a second time to provide medical care to Civil War veterans attending an encampment at Gettysburg. The following year, Reserve doctors were used on the faculty at the Army Medical School. The Corps grew and by 1916 outnumbered Regular Army doctors by four to one.17

Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood, who served in that capacity from 1910 to 1914, was still not satisfied with the dependence of the Army on the National Guard and often referred it as an "uncoordinated army of fifty allies" (for some reason he used the wrong number, it was 48 at the time).18 In 1912, Attorney General George W. Wickersham decided that the use of the Guard outside the United States, as outlined in the 1908 modified "second" Dick Act, was unconstitutional. This heightened Wood's desire for a Federal Reserve. Wood and other military reformers lobbied Congress vigorously for the creation of such a force. He eventually obtained a rider to the 1912 Army appropriation act for the creation of an enlisted Federal force. Men with a 7-year enlistment would serve in the Regular forces for 3 years and in the Reserve for 4 years. However, there were no incentives for the split service and there were very few enlistments for this option. The same year Wood supported the training and education by the Regular Army of a pool of Federal Reserve officers through what became known as the "Plattsburg Training Camp Movement." Of the original 159 officer candidates, all of whom paid their own way, 84 received Reserve commissions and served in World War I.19 The following year, 1914, just prior to the outbreak of war in Europe, the General Staff began revising the 1912 "Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States." A Regular officer, Captain John McAuley Palmer, who assisted in writing the original report, believed the revision would not be politically acceptable, because it asked for a large standing army of 500,000 "backed by a secondary force of a million reservists . . . . The National Guard they all but ignored, virtually relegating it to the status of a state police force."20 President Woodrow Wilson would not accept the proposals even after war broke out in Europe.
War raging in Europe led to increased American public interest in national defense. In 1916, a number of hearings were held on military preparedness. Former Secretary of War Root spoke before both the House and Senate, expressing his opinion of the state National Guards. Based on his experience, "The idea... that forty-eight different governors can be the basis for developing an efficient mobile national army is quite absurd." The Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison, also testified and presented a Continental Army plan calling for a Regular Army to meet contingency requirements and to train additional forces; a volunteer, pretrained Federal Reserve of 400,000 men (a "Continental Army") to augment the Regular contingency force; and the Guard as follow-on reinforcement. To counter this proposal, Guard advocates had as their spokesman Representative James Hay of Virginia, Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs (the predecessor of today's House Armed Services Committee). Hay's proposal was that the Guard should be strengthened to prove national defense. As Palmer's biographer remarked:

The same fierce state loyalties that brought governors and senators to support the Guard against every political threat, made it exceedingly difficult to use militia divisions as integral part of a national defense force under the Chief of Staff. While the Hay bill did propose to "federalize" the Guard far more than any previous legislation, it still left the vital power to appoint and promote officers in the hands of the several state governors, a circumstance that could scarcely fail to operate to the detriment of efficient, unified command.

Ultimately a compromise was reached. The resulting legislation, the National Defense Act of 1916, was a milestone for the Army, and helped to lay the foundation for the creation of a modern U.S. land force. The act legally established the Army as consisting of the "Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and such other land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law." Greater Federal control of the state Guards was included in the legislation in exchange for acknowledgement of its primacy in calling up forces beyond the Regular Army. The Plattsburg Camps, now known as
Citizen Military Training Camps (CMTC), and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) were recognized as sources for commissioning men in the Federal Officer Reserve Corps. The Enlisted Reserve Corps was designated to provide combat service support and combat support specialists for the non-combat branches that existed at that time: ordnance, quartermaster, medical, engineer, and signal.

President Wilson was quick to take advantage of the provision in the Act that required, in addition to the state oath, Guardsmen to take a Federal enlistment oath. That same year the President mobilized the Guard for service on the Mexican border. Shortcomings that had nothing to do with the Regular Army's lack of support once again plagued the Guard, as they had during the Spanish-American War call-up. Units mobilized were 100,000 soldiers shy of their authorized strength. Of those who reported, in one division over 15 percent were not physically fit. Also the Guard structure was such that units were not in the branches needed and many required retraining.

Many of these deficiencies were to repeat themselves during World War I mobilization. After the President asked Congress for a declaration of war, his military advisors recommended drafting individual Guardsmen rather than calling up units. Wilson concurred with this recommendation. In the main, National Guard units were brought up to strength by volunteers and draftees. The most significant political issue that appeared during the war was the wholesale relief of Guard officers. Regulars were placed in command of Guard divisions and those divisions formed from drafted men. Only one Guard general, Brigadier General John A. Hulen, 36th Division, served in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) for the entire war. Were the Guard officers unfairly discriminated against? Probably so in some cases, but the AEF commander was as hard on Regulars as on Guard officers when it came to relief. Of the Guard enlisted men there was nothing but praise. The animosity over the numerous reliefs lingered long after the war.

The Federal Reserve was another matter. Here there was a success story. Unlike the state forces, this Reserve was ordered to active duty as an entity on June 28, 1917. Perhaps
because the officers were commissioned and trained in programs controlled by the Regular Army and had to meet Federal standards, there were fewer problems than experienced with National Guard officers. The Officer Reserve Corps grew to 89,476 members by the end of the war. The Enlisted Reserve Corps also proved its value as a Federal force. In June 1917 there were 35,000 soldiers in this Corps. By the end of the war the Army created 9 railway engineer regiments; 27 signal and 12 telegraph battalions; and 6 depot, 235 wagon, 106 auto-truck, 20 bakery and 24 pack-train companies with members of a expanded Enlisted Reserve Corps. In addition, 15,000 Reserve soldiers joined with Officer Reserve Corps medical officers in units, aid stations and hospitals throughout the Army. Thus, the Federal Reserve had a beginning as a complementary force to the Regulars providing combat support and service support to the Army’s combat maneuver units.26

Interwar Peacetime Army.

The congressional reaction to the post-war force proposed by Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March in 1919 was the first in a series of 20th century post-war political defeats inflicted on the victorious Army. Then, as today, the Army misjudged the temperament of Congress and the American people. March recommended an expansible post-war army of 500,000. Universal Military Training (UMT) graduates to create a Federal Reserve that would flesh out Regular under-strength units, and, as a force of last resort, the National Guard. The outcome was predictable. The Chief’s plan was dismissed out of hand by Congress. Instead, the Senate Military Affairs Committee turned to another Regular, one who understood the American military tradition, for an alternative.

John McAuley Palmer, then a Colonel, offered a different plan to the Congress, i.e. a small Regular Army with full units to respond immediately to an emergency, UMT, and a strong citizen force to support that deployed force. He saw the Regular Army’s first priority in peacetime as training citizen-soldiers. Congress adopted some of Palmer’s proposals and incorporated them in the National Defense Act of 1920, a
modified version of the 1916 legislation. The Regular Army was authorized a strength of 250,000 (a number not achieved until just after the outbreak of World War II). Because of the success of the Officer and Enlisted Reserve Corps, the two were merged to create a paper force structure of 27 cadre divisions, known as the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). "The Guard was restored to its primacy and given great control over its own affairs through a revitalization of the old War Department Militia Bureau. UMT as a source for manpower was dropped because, even though immediate post-war congressional support was available, the Chief of Staff was not interested in it, opting instead for a 500,000 man Regular Army.

All of the legislation and hopes for an adequate size prepared military establishment came to naught. Without an external threat, the administration of Warren G. Harding engaged in significant defense cost-cutting. By 1923 the Army’s strength dropped 131,959 officers and enlisted men (Figure 2). Funds for equipment and research and development also declined. In varying degrees, the ORC and the Guard shared budget restraints with the Regular establishment during the interwar period.

In this period NGAUS wrote and sponsored through Congress legislation to amend the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 to insure that Guard units, not individuals, would be mobilized in wartime. One of the amendments, passed on June 15, 1933, listed the components of the Army: the Regular Army, Organized Reserves and Guard, as in the basic legislation. To insure Guard units were called, it gave the War Department authority to grant them Federal recognition in peacetime and emphasized keeping units intact after entry into Federal service. Upon a national emergency, the President could call to active duty both units and individuals. The amendment also made it quite clear that “... in time of peace they [are] administered... in their states as the National Guard of the several states.”

The biographer of John McAuley Palmer stated “... Congress all but dismantled the politically impotent Organized Reserve while continuing to support the Guard, with its well-organized network of state lobbies.” While the ROA was
formed immediately after World War I by ORC officers, its most serious drawback was lack of membership. Then as today, ROA, unlike NGAUS, limited its membership to officers. After 10 years of existence, only 18,000, 20 percent of all Federal Reserve officers, were members of ROA. While ROA took credit for the progressive increase in ORC appropriations from 1925 to 1932, they merely reflected a proportional slow growth in congressional funding for the entire Army. The lack of interest in membership can be attributed to several factors. First, as with today’s USAR, most ORC officers were trained in Army programs and served on active duty with the Regular Army. They believed that there was a commonality between themselves and the Regulars. Second, the Federal status bred a hesitancy to be critical or engage in political lobbying, even in the face of benign neglect by the parent component. In many cases the Federal Reserve officers’ loyalty to the Regular Army could and still can be likened to that of Guardsmen to their respective state.
Although Guardsmen received pay and trained on a regular basis, such was not the case for the Federal Reserve. Even with the gradual increase in appropriations, an ORC member could expect to train, perhaps, every 4 or 5 years for a 2-week period while a Guard counterpart trained annually. However, when the Regular Army needed reinforcements in the interwar period, the first reserve it turned to was the ORC. In 1928, as a consequence of limited training funds and a lack of available Regular Army officers, the War Department decided to use ORC officers and units at several CMTCs. That summer the results were so favorable that the Regular Army gave the ORC responsibility for one camp in each of the nine corps areas.

Use of this responsive Reserve did not stop there. In 1933, immediately after President Franklin D. Roosevelt came to office, he announced that an Emergency Conservation Work program, later popularly known as the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), would be established. The CCC was a vehicle to provide unemployed youth, forestry workers, and veterans with jobs. On March 31, 1933 the President requested and received congressional authority to begin the program. Secretary of War George H. Dern, aware of the legislation which specifically named the War Department along with three other executive agencies responsible for the CCC, gave Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur authority to send the Army's nine Corps Area commanders a “warning order” to prepare to organize, house, feed and clothe 100,000 men. On April 5, 1933 Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 6101 and appointed Robert Fechner, a labor leader, as CCC director. After some delay caused by Fechner's lack of expertise, the War Department was asked to assume responsibility for the planning and day-to-day operations of CCC camps. The Army virtually shut down its routine operations to prepare and administer the camps. The plan for each camp included at least one ORC officer. The following year the Regular Army turned over routine operational responsibility for the 1,468 camps to the ORC. By the end of 1934, 498 Regulars and 5,853 ORC members manned the CCC camps, with Reserve officers serving as camp commanders. One of the unexpected benefits of camps commanded by citizen-soldiers was the improvement of relations between CCC members and the
camp administrative staff in those camps where Regular Army commanding officers applied military standards for a nonmilitary program.\textsuperscript{31}

Still the fact remained that most ORC members received little or no training. Inactive duty for training was not compensated as it was for the Guard and there was little or no equipment on hand. ORC divisional units were either paper units, that is they existed only in plans, or primarily in a cadre status and even these were under strength. Then, on August 27, 1940 Congress declared a national emergency. The President, on September 16, 1940, called into Federal service the Guard and the ORC. While the former initially maintained some semblance of unit integrity, the latter was used as fillers and cadre for newly formed units. Without real unit integrity only the ORC divisional numbers were utilized.

When Congress passed the first peacetime draft, the Guard feared that this Federal force would supplant it by eliminating volunteering for its units. The two Guard Associations lobbied to have a clause added to the Selective Service Act which declared the Guard as "part of the first line of defense of this nation be at all times maintained and assured."\textsuperscript{32} The Guard may have had good reason to be concerned. In 1944 the Commander, Army Ground Forces, General Lesley J. McNair, known for his Uptonian view of the Guard, wrote Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, "One of the great lessons of the present war is that the National Guard, as organized before the war, contributed nothing to national defense . . . . The structure of the National Guard was pregnant with disaster for the entire nation."\textsuperscript{33} This, of course, was not entirely correct. As poorly prepared as they might have been in 1940, it was far better to have these formations than none at all.

McNair also complained about the quality of the Guard officer corps and supported the relief of many officers. When Guard supporters took issue with the reliefs, General Marshall became angry after receiving one more letter from a senior Guard officer. In reply he said:

\begin{quote}
\ldots I do not like this. Frankly I am irritated by it. We have leaned over backward in the handling of National Guard officers, and I have
\end{quote}
laid myself open to severe criticism for delaying to the extent I have in a number of cases. At the same time we have been ruthless in the handling of regular officers who did not measure up to the required standards, and have relieved large numbers. However, there is no reaction to such action, while almost every relief or transfer of a senior National Guard officer provides a political or cabinet repercussion to distract me from vital business.\textsuperscript{34}

The National Guard was activated with 21,074 officers, but only 6,800 had ever been to an Army Service School. In contrast, by December 1941 over 80,000 Reserve officers, all trained by the Regular Army, had been called to active duty. Less than a year later this number increased to over 140,000 and ORC officers comprised 75-90 percent of the officer strength in Regular Army and Army of the United States divisions. In all fairness, no data is available in regard to the relief of any of these officers. Their service appears to have caused the Regulars few problems. If reliefs were made, perhaps for the reasons mentioned earlier, they nor any one else, including ROA, complained on their behalf. Also, unlike the continuing lobby efforts of the Guard Associations, ROA “had gone to war . . . its functions in the ‘deep freeze’ for the duration.”\textsuperscript{35}

Planning for the Post-War.

Even prior to the outbreak of World War II, Marshall had the vision to begin planning for a post-war army. His first step was to recall Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer to active duty. Palmer wrote and published a book in 1941, \textit{America in Arms}. Among other ideas, such as UMT, \textit{Palmer recommended} that a reserve could be more effective if it was organized under the Army clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 8), “To raise and support Armies . . . .”, the authority used to create the Regular Army and ORC. Palmer did acknowledge the Guard as the primary citizen-soldier force to the Regular Army, hoping that it would become a Federal Reserve. The NGAUS and the AGA ignored the former recommendation and focused on the latter.

Palmer’s position soon became known to the Guard. The joint staff committees with Guard and Regular membership
were disbanded by the Army G-1 under the Army Reorganization Act of March 1942 which required a downsized General Staff. The National Guard Bureau, as part of a separate action, was dropped from the General Staff and placed two staff layers below the Army Service Forces. "The leaders of the Guard reacted in characteristic fashion," holding meetings and consulting with their congressional delegations. Palmer was asked to attend one such meeting of the Adjutants General Association. Not fully understanding Palmer's stand on a more responsive Federal Reserve, the attendees were shocked when Palmer reiterated his position on this issue. Concern swept through the membership, believing the General was speaking for the Chief of Staff in an attempt to resurrect former Secretary of War Garrison's 1916 Continental Army plan, when nothing could have been further from the truth.

Marshall, after consulting with Palmer, ordered the creation of a post-war Planning Board with Guard representation, but none for the ORC. With Marshall's approval, Palmer resurrected the issue of UMT as a manpower source for the Reserve. "No force," Palmer believed, "raised under the militia clause could ever hope to produce a fully effective reserve for war." Senator James T. Wadsworth was interested in proposing legislation supporting this concept. While some organizations such as the American Legion approved of UMT, once again the Guard saw it as a threat to their primacy because its graduates would flow into the ORC. Although the National Guard Bureau chief, a Regular Army officer, supported Palmer's proposed UMT plan, the Adjutants General vigorously opposed the legislation. Major General Milton Reckord, Maryland's TAG, told Palmer at a conference to "go back and tell 'Senator' Wadsworth we are going to kill the bill."

Palmer was undeterred and proceeded with his post-war planning. In 1944 he drafted a statement for General Marshall that encompassed his ideas for a citizen army. Marshall accepted the document and it became War Department Circular 347. The circular called for UMT, a small standing army and a "citizen army." However, the Guard lobby made
good on its threat. Without UMT the War Department's plan for 25 ORC divisions and about 2400 “service units” were uncertain in the post-war years. At the war's end, NGAUS launched a vigorous campaign to downgrade the classification of ORC units, realizing they would be in competition for a limited pool of defense dollars in a peacetime environment.39

Post-War Army . . . Again.

The earlier than expected surrender of Japan in August 1945 brought about a precipitous demobilization of the 8 million person Army—an army whose Regular base force “consisted of less than 16,000 officers and (including ground, air, and service forces)”.40 Since the World War II armed forces were primarily a conscripted citizen force, the problem faced by the Army was one of how to release everyone who wanted to go home and yet maintain an effective combat force. The budget called for a strength of 1,070,000 which allowed for the separation of “all non-volunteer enlisted personnel by 30 June 1947.”41 (See Figure 3.) Because of the herculean efforts by the War Department the goal was met, but at the cost of combat effectiveness. As the official Army history of demobilization states, “Thus the United States Army which had been one of the world’s finest had by 30 June 1947 dwindled to a state of near-impotency.”42

Building, or perhaps rebuilding, the Army for the post-war period fell to the new Chief of Staff, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. He told Congress “that for the Army to undertake its necessary missions with a reasonable degree of safety, it must have 18 divisions equipped and trained for instant deployment.” This was his base force requirement. Six divisions were to come from the Guard and “other reservists would be needed immediately to bring the military establishment to war strength and man mobilization and training organizations.”43

Within this structure, most Guard units in the post-war period were A-1 (service support with full complement of personnel) and A-2 (combat units with full complement of personnel). The War Department designated all but a few ORC
World War II Draw Down,
31 August 1945 - 30 April 1947*

Million

*Includes Air Force

Figures 3.

units as Class C (consisting of 60 percent officer cadre). This action came to the attention of a former Guardsman who joined the ORC in the interwar period, President Harry S. Truman. Truman had his military aide send a memorandum to General Eisenhower:

It has come to the President's attention that there is some controversy largely sponsored by the National Guard Association against the creation of any A-2 Reserve units for the organized Reserve. The President directed me to advise you that he thinks these units should be created; in fact, he is of the opinion that there is no use in having a Reserve without them.

However, the War Department continued the policy that gave priority for A-2 Guard units. Specific ORC units would not be organized any higher than Class B (combat and service support units with 100 percent officer strength and a cadre of enlisted personnel). ORC combat divisions continued to be designated Class C. These units could conceivably become
Class B, and ultimately Class A, only if they reached authorized end strength. Yet, as is the case today, the Federal Reserve faced, as Brigadier General Wendell Westover, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, reported to the Deputy Chief of Staff, "deficiency of facilities, equipment, and funds . . . traceable to a large degree to the low priorities afforded the ORC and reluctance to accord it requisite support." In fact, it was not until fiscal year 1949 that funds were available to provide any meaningful training to ORC units. As a consequence, ORC recruiting lagged behind that of the Guard and readiness in general suffered.

Post-War Reform.

In another era of military reform, reminiscent of the movement at the turn of the century, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. This reform measure was based upon Marshall's post-war recommendations for unification of the Armed Forces. As a follow-on, the new Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, in November 1947, directed the formation of a "Committee on Civilian Components." The charter for this committee, chaired by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, authorized it to study and determine:

the type and character of the civilian components that should be maintained; the missions which should be prescribed for such civilian components, the optimum size, composition and organization of these components in order best to carry out such missions; the proper relation of such components to the . . . [active component] . . . and to one another; the ways in which objectives desired may be attained with the maximum of harmony, efficiency and economy; and the elimination of inequities and disparities among the several components.  

The report, Reserve Forces for National Security, was issued on June 30, 1948, and has relevance for the Army today. It was a significant attempt at restructuring the post-war Army with expanded roles and missions for the "civilian components." Much of the report's conclusions and recommendations echoed earlier reform attempts, including those of John McAuley Palmer. The first and most significant recommendation brought forward by the Committee stated, "National Security Requires That All Services Each Have One
Federal Reserve Force." As is today's USAR, this Reserve would be organized under the Army clause of the Constitution. Concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG) (an Air National Guard came into existence after 1947), the report stated “The Committee is convinced that the same forces can no longer be expected to perform both local and national functions and that a modern Federal striking force cannot be prepared adequately under State control.” The committee realized how politically sensitive this concept was and made a lengthy attempt to soften the blow by acknowledging the contributions of the National Guard. It also attempted to deflect any attempts by the Guard to compromise by allowing, as it had in the past, greater Federal control of it as an “M-day force.”

The report then listed the inherent problems of a dual mission force. The way the ARNG was organized did “not follow sound organizational principles . . . For this reason it becomes a victim of faulty administrative practices.” The Army leadership must go through the National Guard Bureau. If one Guard wishes to train in another state both governors must agree. Guard “equipment and facilities cannot easily be shared to train reserves.” The organization of the Guard by state “does not repose authority where basic responsibility rests.” Under the Constitution responsibility for national security and the Army rests with the Federal government, not the states. The Regular Army has no “positive means of control over the 51 (54 today) State and Territorial National Guards. They have negative control only.” The Regular Army is at a disadvantage when dealing with the Guard for “it cannot break a stalemate except by concession” because “they (the Regular Army) are supplicants to the states for the use of federal funds appropriated by the same authority from which they derive their primary responsibility.”

The Gray Report went on to elaborate on a litany of problems and potential problems in depending on dual mission, dual command and dual reporting systems. It said, although the authority varies from state to state, that “A governor can, in effect, abolish or seriously disorganize the National Guard by a number of executive acts.” For example, “. . . he can cancel the commissions of the officers of the Guard,
without explanation or trial... withdraw state-owned armories and use them for other purposes... abrogate the existence of National Guard units by order or decree." The report explained "... the only means available to the Federal Government to correct unsatisfactory conditions is to deprive the unit or individual of Federal support... [which] results in the cure being worse than the disease."

The report also highlighted ARNG mobilization, which it claimed was "complicated and cumbersome in transition from state to federal status in emergency." All in all, the condition that exists "violates the principle of simplicity and denies the military establishment the flexibility required in modern war."

As for Guard leadership the report said:

the high civilian commander must take his chance on retaining his command for combat. He will without doubt be at some handicap because of the complexities of modern warfare, but his personal feelings must be subordinated to the decision of those responsible for the lives under him and for the success of the operation.

The Gray Report acknowledged that "the emphasis to date in organization, training, and equipment as between the reserve components has been on the National Guard." Further, the report pointed out that "the Regular Army needs some service (CSS) units from the ORC in order to operate efficiently on M (mobilization)-day. The service support of the National Guard and some combat support must all come from the ORC before the Guard can be deployed." The problems cited for the ORC included the difficulty of training officers in "composite groups," a lack of inactive duty pay, a lack of armories, a shortage of instructors and limited funding.

NGAUS was quick to respond. As a history of the Guard noted, "defenders of the Guard exploded" and the Association ran an editorial in The National Guardsman, "The Battle Is On!" The editors claimed that the Gray Committee deliberately set out to discredit the Guard. The argument advanced by the Association against becoming a Federal force in peacetime was unfair since it compared the ARNG's superior readiness and Manning levels to the ORC, ignoring the fact that it not only received the lion's share of the funding, but that, unlike the
Guard, ORC members, by law, could not receive pay for inactive duty. The editors then attacked the integrity of the Regular officer corps whose sole objective they claimed was to destroy the Guard and that "Innuendos and falsehoods emanating from the Pentagon must stop." Committee member Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain tried to point out that there was no ulterior motive behind the report, and that the recommendations were based on facts. Historian John K. Mahon says this logic was ignored and "the Guard leaders hurried with the matter to their ultimate protector, the Congress of the United States." There, Mahon states "it was good politics to stress the power of the states." The editors of The National Guardsman made full use of the state rights issue and declared, "So long as the Federal Constitution remains the Supreme Law of the Land the states are sovereign." The Gray Report’s recommendation concerning the National Guard coming under total Federal control in peacetime was rejected by Congress.

The Gray Report also recommended UMT. While there were a variety of opponents to UMT, including the Guard Associations, its passage was doomed by the Soviet Union’s aggression in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade. Occurring the same year as the report, these events marked the onset of the cold war. This new era of heightening tensions was used as part of the argument to defeat the legislation. In 1948, it appeared to be far better to have fewer fully trained Selective Service inductees than a very large pool of partially trained civilians generated by UMT.

However, some reform in this post-war period did take place. Two months prior to the Gray Report’s release, the new Department of Defense, with ROA lobbying efforts, supported legislation that became law on March 25, 1948, authorizing the ORC be paid for training in an inactive duty status. In this area parity was achieved between the two Reserve Components. Truman became impatient at the Army’s inability to build an effective reserve structure. As a consequence he issued to the military Secretaries an executive order calling on them to "proceed without delay, utilizing every practicable resource of the regular components of the armed forces, to organize all
reserve component units, and to train such additional individuals . . . as may be required for the national security . . .

The order moved Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall to ask the Committee on Civilian Components, chaired by former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, for suggestions on improving reserve readiness. The result was a report that recommended an ORC end strength of 579,300 against an ARNG total of 682,000. At the time both figures were unrealistically high. At the outbreak of the Korean War, the ORC total strength was at 508,617, but only 186,541 were in a paid drill position. The ARNG, on the other hand, had a total strength of 310,322, all in a paid status. For comparison purposes the Regular Army numbered 591,000 against an authorized end strength of 940,000.

Korea . . . Another Peacetime Failure.

How wars are fought is determined by what military forces do or fail to do in peace time. The Army leadership, having abandoned Marshall’s proposed reforms and failing to obtain the Gray Report reforms, did not grasp the essence of the force mix problem. As a consequence, little was done to restructure the Army for the next war. The lack of early warning in 1950 made mobilization plans a fiction. When the Korean War broke out, reserve units and individuals were activated in a “creeping,” wartime partial mobilization. Again, as in World War II, individuals of the ORC were first called to active duty. Unassigned lieutenants and captains, 7,862 to be exact, reported. By the end of the war there were 404 units of the ORC and a total of 240,500 of its members on active duty. In 1950 four ARNG divisions with supporting units were initially called to active duty. In 1951 two more were mobilized. The confusion and the unpreparedness of both Reserve Components prompted wartime planning for a post-war army.

During the war another attempt to provide a combat ready reserve was presented in the Congress. Acknowledging the flexibility of the Federal Reserve, the Truman administration sought through the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 to
enhance ORC readiness. The act consolidated a number of statutes pertaining to the Reserve and renamed the ORC while merging its two components, the Officer Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. The Federal Reserve was now the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). Apparently ROA did not have to lobby very hard in support of the legislation for its history says "the only real action in 1952 was to raise the dues." 5

However, any suggestion of increased support for the Federal Reserve once again brought opposition from NGAUS. Brigadier General E. A. Evans, Executive Director of the ROA, was taken aback by the Guard’s reaction to legislation that improved the USAR and yet did not detract from the position of the other citizen-soldier component. Evans suggested that perhaps the Guard leadership saw too clearly the strengths of a Federal Reserve and feared it might replace the 18th century militia concept. A Marine Reserve general officer put it this way, "I had never realized that the main purpose of the federal government . . . was for the maintenance of the National Guard, and today was the first time I learned that the army was only an auxiliary of the National Guard." However, politics prevailed and NGAUS provided to Congress its own 97 amendments to the final reserve legislation. 56

The Cold War and the Reserve Components.

Mobilization for the Korean War was the beginning of a massive build-up to prepare the Army to fight a major war with the Soviet Union on the plains of Central Europe. Even during the war itself, most national security advisors and the President were convinced that the main Communist threat was toward Western Europe. The cold war build-up accompanied by distractions, periodic declines, and brief flare ups lasted for three decades.

Beginning with the 1952 legislation there were obvious signs the Army leadership realized, as its predecessors had at the turn of the century and after World War II, the need for a strong Federal Reserve. In his January 1955 message to Congress, President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented a "National Reserve Plan." As with the 1952 Reserve Act, this
proposed legislation provided nothing the National Guard thought would enhance its position and, although asked by the administration to help, NGAUS refused to back the bill. The legislation was merely an effort by the Executive branch and the Congress to bring the ORC to the same level of support as the state Guards. The administration was intent on obtaining congressional approval and lobbied heavily for its passage. With the assistance of the ROA, especially National President Strom Thurman, the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 was passed. As a study of reserve legislation explained, “The National Guard Association was out flanked by the Reserve Officers Association . . . the NGA was most effective in a negative way by preventing features unwanted by the militia from being enacted into law.” After the 1955 Act’s passage, Eisenhower “put the National Guard on notice,” making it clear that he was not pleased with the lack of support the administration received. He had “serious doubts” that the ARNG would be able to obtain the end strength it desired nor did he believe it could reach “the necessary standards of military proficiency and readiness” needed for modern warfare.57

Lingering doubts remained in the years that followed concerning the viability of the Reserve Components. During President John F. Kennedy’s administration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara became increasingly concerned about the lengthy post-mobilization period required for ARNG combat divisions prior to deployment during the Korean War. His focus on this issue was sharpened by observations made during the 1961 Berlin call-up. The Secretary believed the Army needed both a more dependable strategic reserve and other reserve units available for early deployment in contingency operations. He also thought that both the ARNG and the USAR were over strength in combat divisions and, in 1963, successfully reduced the number of units.

The following year, McNamara announced plans to consolidate the reserves eliminating more USAR units and merging the balance with the ARNG. The NGAUS and senior Guard officers supported the legislation. However, the majority of Congress and the ROA did not. Part of the negative reaction from the legislators was a result of the Secretary’s perceived
arrogance during testimony. Also, McNamara never consulted with Congress, nor had he, as in previous reserve initiatives, informed the two lobby groups, the POA and NGAUS.

However, McNamara was undeterred and continued to order the deactivation of USAR units. Several members of Congress introduced a bill that placed a floor on USAR paid drill strength at 260,000. The growing gap between the administration and Congress created uncertainty about the future of the USAR and, as a consequence, recruiting and readiness suffered. Finally, McNamara abandoned his merger plans and accepted the congressional guidelines. As an alternative, the Secretary decided to change the structure of the Reserve Components, placing most reinforcing Combat Support and Combat Service Support in the USAR and maintaining the ARNG with reinforcing combat units. The NGAUS acquiesced to the initial reductions because it believed there was an understanding with the Active Army senior leadership that all USAR combat units would be transferred to the ARNG, thus saving most of the Guard combat divisions. However, Congress intervened and stopped the transfer of all USAR combat units. NGAUS president, Major General James Cantwell, believed the Pentagon influenced the decision. This was probably true since the Army senior leadership "handed back to the Reserve much more than Congress had mandated." Someone on the Army staff apparently awakened to the fact that a Federal Reserve was inherently responsive and less political than the state National Guards.

The reductions and reconfiguration of the two Reserve Components were made inevitable since President Lyndon B. Johnson decided not to mobilize them for Vietnam and to rely instead on increasing Selective Service inductions and ROTC quotas. In 1968 following the TET offensive, the administration gave approval for a selective mobilization. Still, the decision not to mobilize early and then later call up insignificant numbers insured the demoralization of the Reserve Components.
Enter the Total Force Policy.

For the first time in modern U.S. military history a major war, Vietnam, was fought without resorting to a call-up of reservists. Instead, the nation relied on Selective Service. To heal domestic wounds, one of President Richard M. Nixon’s campaign promises was the halting of Selective Service inductions. In 1973, the draft ended and the transition to an all-volunteer force began. The Army leadership initially opposed this change and had not adequately prepared the force for what was to come. The changes created significant manpower problems that ranged from deteriorating race relations to housing female soldiers to accepting lower mental category recruits for all three Army components.

There were other problems. The cost of an all-volunteer force placed an additional strain on a shrinking defense budget. Over the years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Soviets began a massive arms buildup. Now the Army refocused on the Soviet threat to Europe, and initiated long overdue equipment modernization programs. The erosion of combat power in the post-Vietnam period was significant. Nixon’s Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird searched for ways to rebuild the Army and while doing so came up with the concept that became known as the Total Force Policy.

However, the man who followed Laird as Secretary of Defense, James A. Schlesinger, and his Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams, were responsible for its introduction as a policy based upon creating a perceived minimum essential force to meet national security needs. The introduction of the Total Force Policy brought the Army back full circle to the National Defense Act of 1916 and its unfulfilled promise of a one army concept. Once again the Reserve Components, as they were in planning and executing the two world wars and Korea, were to become an integral part of the Army. Again, the same bottom line appeared in 1972 and in 1992 as in 1916. Peacetime preparations for modern war by maintaining a large Regular Army are too costly and the nation must rely on less expensive citizen-soldiers.
General Abrams also had the solution to halt the downward spiral in the number of Active Component combat divisions. This force reduction was driven by a lack of support in Congress for ground forces and the increasing personnel costs associated with an all-volunteer force. Despite the expense, General Abrams believed national security required 16 Active and 8 reserve divisions, and he arrived at this conclusion "without supporting staff work or outside assistance." Thus, the driving force behind the introduction of the Total Force Policy was perceived national security needs. To accomplish this goal, which was the beginning of the Army's renaissance following Vietnam, Abrams had to turn to the reserves.59

Abrams now had at hand a way to prevent the Army from being committed to a limited war that might have only momentary public support. He believed that the same linkage Marshall sought between citizens and their Army was even more essential after the Vietnam experience. Abrams commented to General John Vessey on numerous occasions "They're not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves."60

Initial Total Force Policy documents indicate that the ARNG and USAR units would "be the initial and primary source of personnel to augment the active forces—particularly the early deploying forces—in a military emergency."61 Consequently, billions of dollars appropriated by Congress began to flow into the reserves. However, there was a continual inequity in the percentages of appropriations allocated to each component. To illustrate the point, one need only look at the data for a typical appropriations year, Fiscal Year 1990, the last year of the cold war. The percentages have remained fairly constant up to today. The Total Army structure in Figure 4 shows that 44 percent of the total CSS assets are in the USAR and 26 percent of the CS units, shown in Figure 5, reside in the Federal Reserve. The combat structure in Figure 6 indicates that 92 percent of these units are equally divided between the ARNG and the Active Component, while 8 percent reside with the USAR. When the Ready Reserve is included in manning the Total Army, the USAR has a preponderance of personnel over the ARNG as illustrated in Figure 7. However, the "Funding
Profile of the Total Army" shows in Figure 8 an inverse of percentages, with the USAR receiving less than half the appropriations allocated to the ARNG, 4.5 percent as opposed to 9.8 percent. This is not a unique fiscal year in the history of the Total Force Policy. It repeats the history of the three component Army and validates the ARNG's state lobby power in Congress and the neglect of the Active Component toward its Federal Reserve. In all fairness to those concerned, it is a lot easier to justify tanks than mobile bakeries or laundries, but the facts are clear: the Federal Reserve has remained under-funded throughout history, including the Total Force Policy era up to DESERT SHIELD/STORM.62

DEsert SHIELD/STORM.

The political decision by President Johnson not to mobilize the Reserve Components for Vietnam was used as part of the argument against the Total Force Policy. If the will did not exist to call-up the reserves for that war, would the chief executive exercise the authority given him under 10 U.S. Code Section 673b which authorizes the president to mobilize up to 200,000 Selected Reservists for 90 days, with a 90 day extension possible?

In August 1990, when President George Bush ordered the deployment of U.S. ground forces to Saudi Arabia, this question hung in the air. Creighton Abrams, however, had his wish fulfilled. On August 23, 1990, the Secretary of the Army was authorized to order to active duty no more than 25,000 CS and CSS Selected Reservists. From then on a creeping mobilization occurred. A November 14, 1990 authorization raised the Army ceiling to 80,000. The Department of Defense FY 1991 Authorization Act passed on November 5 gave the President approval to call to active duty reserve combat units for 180 days with a 180 extension if necessary. As a consequence, under congressional pressure, the ARNG roundout brigades and battalions were mobilized later that month. On December 1t, 1990, the ceiling was raised to 115,000. Finally, using the authority under Section 673 of Title 10 on January 19, 1991, the maximum number of Army reservists that could be called was raised to 220,000. Since
Total Army Structure

Combat Service Support

- Medical
- Finance
- Supply & Service
- Quartermaster
- Transportation
- Ammunition
- Judge Advocate
- Adjutant General
- Petroleum/Water
- Railroad
- Maintenance

Active Army 42%
Army Reserve 26%
Army National Guard 26%

Data as of 30 September 1990
Source: OCAR, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991

Figure 4.

Total Army Structure

Combat Support

- Signal
- Chemical
- Military Police
- Civil Affairs
- Engineer
- Aviation
- Military Intelligence
- Psychological Ops

Active Army 42%
Army Reserve 26%
Army National Guard 32%

Data as of 30 September 1990
Source: OCAR, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991

Figure 5.
Total Army Structure

Combat

- Infantry
- Armor
- Artillery
- Air Defense
- Special Forces
- Engineer (CBT)
- Aviation (CBT)

Active Army 46%
Army Reserve 8%
Army National Guard 46%

Data as of 30 September 1990
Source: OCAR, Army Reserve Special Report 1991

Figure 6.

Total Army Personnel
By Percent - Including Ready Reserve

- Army Reserve 32%
- Army National Guard 26%
- Active Army 42%

Data as of 30 September 1990
Source: OCAR, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991

Figure 7.
the President had declared a national emergency in August to freeze Iraqi assets in the United States, this section of the code allowed an involuntary call-up of USAR Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers.

As in the past, the most under-funded of the Reserve Components was successful when mobilized. The USAR deployed 94 percent of the Civil Affairs units, 89 percent of prisoner of war military police elements, 69 percent of the postal support units, 65 percent of petroleum elements, 63 percent of the psychological operation elements, and 59 percent of the water handing assets to the Persian Gulf. Other units representing significant support areas included chemical decontamination, transportation, military police, maintenance and engineer assets. Additionally, the USAR provided all the filler requirements from the IRR. Numerous USAR Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) and retirees also served. Stateside, more than 50 USAR units and cells from other units...
were activated to support mobilization of all three components including assets unique to the federal Reserve to include replacement battalions, U.S. Army Reserve Garrisons, training groups, a U.S. Army Reserve Forces School and a reception station. Over 25 percent of the vast USAR medical assets were also mobilized for duty both in the United States and Southwest Asia.63

ARMG CS and CSS units were also mobilized and deployed in the United States, Europe and Southwest Asia. The list includes, but is not limited to, the following type and number of battalions: field artillery (6), military police (5), maintenance (4), medical (4), quartermaster (1), and engineer (2).64 These assets, plus the other units in the CS and CSS category in the USAR were the success story in the Gulf War. However, the combat maneuver elements, the most touted feature of the ARNG's contribution to the Total Force Policy and one of the most expensive (about $100 billion dollars went to the ARNG, most of it to combat units, over the a 10-year period preceding the Gulf War) for the American taxpayer, emerged as a questionable asset.65 The ARNG provides in war 44 percent of the Total Army's combat assets, an amount equal to the Active Component. However, no combat maneuver units of the ARNG deployed to the Gulf.

In late November 1990, three roundout brigades and three battalions from the ARNG were Federalized. This amounted to 15,000 soldiers, one fourth of all those Guardsman mobilized. All required significant post-mobilization training and only one, the 48th Brigade, Georgia National Guard, was certified as deployable at the end of February when the Gulf War was over. The Army's Inspector General and the General Accounting Office were critical of the brigades. The latter agency noted in its February 1991 study that the faults they had noted in three previous studies had yet to be corrected. Criticism echoed Army complaints that the 48th Brigade "suffered from deficient leadership and training, poorly maintained equipment and key personnel sidelined with medical conditions." The author of this study visited the National Training Center in the Mojave desert and interviewed a number of observer/controllers who were present during the 48th Brigade's training. From sergeant to
captain, all were unanimous in their praise of the enlisted soldiers' enthusiasm and willingness to learn in a relatively short time. However, criticism was leveled at ARNG company grade officers and senior NCOs. The most common complaint was that the officers "would not take care of their men" and were unwilling to pitch in and "get dirty" when conducting training such as breaching anti-armor barricades. This came as a surprise to the author, since most of the previous criticism in official reports and the media was leveled at senior ARNG officers at battalion and brigade level. As in earlier post-war controversies between the ARNG and the Active Component, there were charges and countercharges. The ARNG's After Action Report on the Gulf War states: "There is a perception on the part of many in the Defense community and within the media that the three Roundout Brigades were incapable of deploying. The facts are that they met the Army's deployability criteria, but were never given the mission to deploy . . . ." Further:

All of the Roundout Brigades and Battalions met the readiness deployability criteria established by the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) on the first day of federalization. The deployment readiness requirements were significantly increased for the Roundout units after they were federalized. The other two ARNG combat brigades and the nine groups were not required to achieve the higher readiness levels before they were deployed. A significant number of active units did not meet AMOPS criteria before they deployed but their readiness ratings were subjectively upgraded to meet deployment requirements.

However, the issue is cloudy. A Congressional Research Service Report For Congress, says, "The problem of readiness evaluation and reporting actually appears to be much more complicated than charges of 'double standards' may indicate."

It is probably correct, but, as in the past, the National Guard reacted to criticism of its performance in emotionally charged rebuttals. The FY 1990 Reserve Forces Policy Board Report, an organization whose membership includes Guard representatives, points out, AMOPS is only one tool a commander uses to determine whether or not a unit is combat ready. The Report specifically states "Intangible factors, such
as leadership, morale, cohesiveness, skill retention as well as physical fitness, strength, and stamina of the individual members also affect combat readiness of a unit. . . . Measuring the readiness of a reserve component unit or an active component unit remains a complex issue." This controversy has echoed in the aftermath of the war and has impacted on planning for the post-cold war Total Army.

The Aftermath of the Gulf War and the Post-Cold War Base Force.

The Army's posture statement for FY 1993 Strategic Force Strategic Vision For the 1990s and Beyond, declares "America's Army: Not A Smaller Cold War Army." Yet the Base Force outlined in the posture statement as shown in Figure 9, does not appear to be anything more than a scaled down version of the cold war Army. The most controversial issue to emerge from the Base Force announced by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney is congressional resistance to reserve force reductions. With certainty of action that all but the Department of Defense and the Army saw coming, the Congress stopped impending large cuts in the reserves. What Secretary Cheney and General Colin Powell offered was an across-the-board cut of Active and reserve forces to maintain the same ratio. The rationale was that many reserve units were either required for a massive buildup for a war in Europe or supported Active units scheduled to deactivate and were no longer needed. This argument makes sense only if you intend to reduce the force creating a smaller cold war army, without restructuring as called for by President Bush in his August 1990 speech in Aspen, Colorado.

Regardless, the Army's insistence on treating each component as a separate army without regard to a full integration of the three separate entities as the final stage of the Total Force Policy has inevitably led to infighting rather than presenting a united front to protect a restructured force. As in the past, one of the most effective lobbies in Washington is NGAUS. Staff members of the House Armed Services Committee reported that they are "inundated" with letters and calls from NGAUS and AGA members. Perhaps, the best
example of the independent behavior of NGAUS and AGA was their joint paper, "An Alternative Force Structure Proposal," delivered to Congress in February 1992. The Army Chief of Staff appears to have had no advance notice and received a copy at the same time the proposal became public. It recommended a counter to the Base Force of 10 Active, 10 Guard and 0 cadre divisions, proposing a National Guard force structure allowance of 420,000 and, by inference, reducing the two Federal components' strength. It uses the Guard's role in the Gulf War as a rationale for increasing its combat divisions. Unfortunately, the proposal ignores the Guard's combat maneuver units' failure to deploy by concentrating on the successes its CS and CSS units shared with the USAR.70

Probably the most important ear the National Guard lobby obtained was former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin. After several excellent papers using the Gulf War as a defining event establishing future forces, Aspin,
in seeking an alternative to the Base Force, proposed legislation that enhances the combat capability of the ARNG, whose combat units were not used in the Gulf War and decrements the component whose CS and CSS units were, the USAR. A professor of Political Science at Washington University who specializes in National Security issues, after reading the text of a speech Aspin delivered to the West Point Society of the District of Columbia, noted that it "focused entirely on the National Guard (and was totally silent on the Reserves)." Surprised at the lack of balance he fired off a note to Aspin. He wrote that the ideas for improving readiness in the Guard were on the whole sensible (though not easy). . . . [yet] it would make sense for more combat power to be shifted to the Reserves [USAR] (away from the Guard) arguing that because of dual loyalty integrating the Guard into a real Total Force would be even harder than smoothing relations with the Army Reserve. Since Aspin emphasized the importance of the Guard's civil order functions, . . . this called for MPs and medics, but surely not armor and heavy infantry.

While the Department of Defense and the Army have argued for an Active strength that some senior officers and their staffs know will be increasingly under attack and may eventually be cut, Congress, as it has done in the past, will do the restructuring. The problem today is that rapid deployment contingency forces will be required in the post-cold war era. Old fashioned political lobbying of the Guard may well place national defense in peril. The combat elements of the post-cold war contingency force must be at an op tempo (operations tempo) that no reserve roundout brigade or division could ever hope to obtain. However, Aspin wrote legislation for improvements to the ARNG, such as establishing a minimum percentage of prior active duty personnel in the Guard and a review of some Guard officer promotions by the commander of the responsible Active Component unit. Few of the requirements have received strong support from the National Guard Bureau or NGAUS. If the historical record is any indicator, attempts at reforming this politicized force will be difficult. Some members of the House Armed Services Committee disagreed with Aspin. Congressman G.V. Sonny
Montgomery told the Chairman "at least three times" that using the USAR as a bill payer for ARNG combat strength will "wreck" the Federal Reserve. What Aspin will do as Secretary of Defense remains to be seen. The fact remains that most of the suggested "reforms" of the ARNG are not necessary for the USAR since it is organized under the Army clause of the Constitution. Further, the majority of USAR members have served on active duty. Most importantly, USAR CS and CSS units, like the ARNG's CS and CSS elements, but unlike the ARNG combat units, were successful in DESERT SHIELD/STORM. It appears that, as this century ends after a limited war, the shades of another turn of the century period cast a knowing glance over the current struggle for a modern Army to enter the new era. The post-Spanish American War reforms, beginning in 1903, initiated the three themes this study identifies that continued through the turbulent 20th century. Now the Army stands on the threshold of the 21st century. Will it learn from those themes to build a modern force, or ignore history and allow the paradigm of unpreparedness doom the U.S. Army to suffer yet another costly first battle?

Conclusions.

As the preface to this study indicated, there appear to be three constant themes throughout the 20th century that manifest themselves in preparation for war and during peacetime. The first is the political influence of the National Guard. The Gray Report was accurate in stating that it is very difficult for the Federal Army to obtain the control necessary over state forces to enhance combat readiness when it must appeal to legislators from those very states for appropriations. Although the Guard has traded some of its authority to obtain increased Federal funding and recognition of its primacy, one can see from the "reforms" enacted by Congress that there is still a long way to go.

Modern war places great demands on combat maneuver forces.

Second, the need for a Federal Reserve has been obvious to Army reformers since the dawn of a modern professional Army in 1903. That Reserve was created in 1908 and has continued to be a responsive and flexible force in peace and
war. However, as the historical record reveals, it continues to be neglected by the Active Component. It should be a source of amazement that it has been so successful since it has consistently faced a second class funding status. The Guard lobby insured that under Secretary of Defense McNamara's reorganization, the Federal Reserve would be structured to provide less glamorous support units. As it turns out, based on the success of reserve support units in the Gulf War, the CS and CSS missions are exactly what is needed to compliment the Active Component combat maneuver units. It now appears more obvious than ever that the Federal Reserve is in fact now structured to compliment an Active Component combat arms contingency force.

Third, the American public has always turned inward after a conflict. As a consequence national defense is not considered a top priority. Military appropriations are usually the first to be affected by the change. The American public has appreciated the nation's military immediately after the successful conclusion of a war, but it has only grudgingly supported the peacetime Army which follows.

It may be true as the Department of Defense and the Army have, in the past, insisted that the National Military Strategy requires an Active base force strength of 535,000. However, the American public, through the Congress, is not willing to accept the burden because it is more interested in domestic issues such as the economy, as the 1992 election proved. As the reader has seen, there has never been a peacetime or even prewar period when the Army strength is sufficient to fight the next war. No argument other than an immediate and direct threat to national security interests will convince this country's citizens that it needs a large standing army. As Aspin stated, reserves are indeed less expensive. As for readiness, the Gulf War proved that CS and CSS reserve forces can be deployed in support of Active units. The war also cast a doubt that even more money and more attempts at reform can ever make reserve brigade size combat units deployable in a short notice contingency. They are, however, a less expensive insurance policy than additional Active combat units and are absolutely
necessary to fight a global war (however remote) or a situation where the nation is faced with multiple contingency conflicts.

As noted earlier, it is not necessarily the fact that standards were rigidly enforced for the Guard combat maneuver units that causes Active Component senior officers to hesitate sending reserve combat units directly into battle. Instead, the decision may rest on two closely related issues. The first is the acknowledged limited time available to reserve combat units to train in occupational specialties for which there are no civilian equivalents. The second is the concern that all commanders share, the responsibility for ordering unprepared troops into battle and the resulting high casualties. Sending Active Army soldiers to fight and die is one thing and the American public understands that consequence. Sending unprepared citizen-soldiers into combat without having done everything possible for their readiness and not having committed every reasonably available Active duty soldier to battle is another matter and the American public will not accept the consequences.

Perhaps modern maneuver warfare is too complex and too deadly for large reserve units given their limited time to train. Yet the ARNG lobby continues to push for a contingency role for its roundout brigades and disputes Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan's testimony before Congress that their combat brigades require a minimum of 90 days and divisions 360 days of post-mobilization training. Many in Congress and even some Army senior leaders and their staffs know that there is an historic inevitability to the Active Army continuing to be reduced in size. It is absolutely necessary for the Active Component to maintain as much combat maneuver end strength as possible. It is also absolutely necessary to maintain some combat maneuver units in the ARNG for reinforcement and reconstitution (force expansion) without detracting from state missions. To some observers it appears that the Guard, by trying to meet the requirements of its dual missions, is doing neither well. The National Guard leadership proclaims the ARNG “as a strategic force” that has “demonstrated its ability to alert, federalize, and rapidly deploy units. . . .” The fact is that it does not and cannot under law do these things itself. The
Total Army is the nation’s strategic force and the ARNG is a part of that force. It is the Army, having received authority from the President, and at times Congressional approval, that alerts the Guard, federalizes it and orders its deployment. The Guard’s inaccurate interpretation of its role and apparent “go it alone” attitude has, and continues to cause problems within the Total Army.

One of the most efficient ways to solve the problems indicated earlier is for the Active Component to integrate its Federal Reserve into a Federal Army allowing primarily the USAR to take over contingency missions for CS and CSS units and for its individual manpower pools. It would also be advisable to use the Federal Reserve assets to fill positions in the TDA (Table of Distribution and Allowances) Army from school house to training area to storage depot. The Army should also face the reality of accepting domestic peacetime missions as it did in the 1930s with the CCC. All of this means that the Active Component may be the bill payer for both the USAR and the ARNG. The ARNG cannot in the training time available be all things to all people. Increased emphasis on national security missions can only detract from state missions. Accepting the fact that significant post-mobilization training must occur prior to deployment allows the state Adjutants General to make better use of current training time for both missions.

As drastic as these restructuring proposals appear, there is an historic inevitability for declining defense budgets. It would be far better for the Army this time around to promote a fully integrated Army so that it can be better prepared for the next war. The restructuring is the fulfillment of the Total Force policy and should break the cycle of peacetime unpreparedness. Only if a radically restructured 21st century force of a Federal Army and a modern militia is created will this nation be able to meet its national security needs and domestic rebuilding agenda. The nation cannot and will not do both and the loser has always been national security—this is the American tradition. Now is the time to act.
PART II

A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FORCE

Introduction.

Having examined the U.S. Army’s experiences in the 20th century, one can see that difficulties now facing the post-cold war Army are not new nor do they have simple solutions. With a world that is a more unstable and dangerous place than in the bipolar cold war era, the need to make the right decisions on national defense is even greater. There continues to be the need for a strong military to protect U.S. interests and allies abroad. There is also the remote possibility of a major confrontation leading to global war. Who, in 1919, surveying that era’s new global order, could imagine the United States, the only nation to come out of World War I relatively unscathed with its vast resources intact, would be locked in mortal combat with Germany a little over 20 years later? Germany was a defeated nation drained of resources, both human and material, and torn by civil war. History then can provide an ability to add depth to perceptions as to what the future holds.

What then of future war? In a recent study, A World 2010: A New Order of Nations, futurist Charles W. Taylor observed:

“Chances are good that by 2010 many nations of the new world order will be achieving an economic growth unprecedented in their histories, while at the same time possessing a capability by which they could destroy their economic competitors by military rather than by peaceful economic strategies.”

There are those who would argue that the devastation wrought by past wars would dissuade any nation from seeking to go to war for whatever reason. However, World War I and other wars were conflicts where rational arguments such as this did not prevail. Who among the Western allies could
understand Saddam Hussein’s “irrational” behavior when confronting the vast, powerful coalition arrayed against him? The United States, in this uncertain future, needs not only a strong economic base, but also a strong military. To achieve both requires that existing paradigms be broken.

After the startling changes within and outside the Soviet Union heralding the end of the cold war, then President George Bush, in an address at the Aspen Institute in Colorado, spoke of shaping “our defense capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances.” The President went on to explain that what really matters is “how we reshape the forces that remain.” He elaborated on this point with an insightful warning that, if listened to, would allow the Army to break from past mistakes and, in turn, give new life to the Total Force Policy:

The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions—cut equally across the board—we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely—and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions—but restructuring.79

Strength of a Post-Cold War Army.

To meet future security needs the Army uses a process called Total Army Analysis (TAA). This analysis forms the basis for determining what forces are required to accomplish the Army’s missions. The FY 93 Posture statement does not give a coherent rationale for the Army’s projected strength. It declares that:

*We are a capabilities-based Army, not a threat-based Army* (emphasis in original). In the Cold War a specific, identifiable threat drove our force design, force structure, doctrine and training. Now our focus is to maintain a flexible, lethal, expandable set of combined arms capabilities ready to deliver decisive victory across the entire continuum of military operations to counter any threat to U.S. interests. These capabilities are the minimum essential we feel
necessary to meet the threat of a changing and unpredictable world.80

Obviously, TAA takes into consideration specific potential threats. The National Military Strategy of the United States says, "We can still point to a North Korea, a weakened Iraq, and perhaps even a hostile Iran as specific threats for which we must maintain forces. There may be one or two other others that might be added to such a list without straining credulity."81 In the TAA process some of these potential threats are used in one or several contingencies that may break out. It is, however, difficult for Americans to conceptualize for "... the real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown."62 The Army appears not to have made a good case for the Base Force. Others have offered different ways to arrive at a future force. Retired General Maxwell Thurman, as a member of the Active/Reserve Component Commission overseeing the congressionally mandated RAND Corporation study on future force mix, spoke to the executive council of NGAUS. He criticized the Base Force because he believes it is still solely a threat-based force. His question to the council was: What if every threat we could possibly conceive went away? What would be used then for justifying the Army? He stated that nations require armies, but, in this case, with no threat, the size of the Total Army is what Congress is willing to fund. His recommendation was that beyond this force, any additional ARNG and USAR strength should be based on a percentage of the total population. The resulting manpower pool then could be structured into inexpensive light infantry forces (an idea proposed by other defense analysts). Once this is established, the defense establishment can argue with Congress as to the percentage figure.83 Thurman, then, has come full circle, and is touting a program similar to the one Washington's Secretary of War Knox recommended to Congress in 1786. Congress rejected the proposal and offered another plan as it has done recently.84

Aspin, as Chairman, House Armed Service Committee, offered a proposal for determining Total Army strength. He called it "The New Security: A Bottom-Up Approach to the Post-Cold War Era." Using Congressional Budget Office data
he gave pre-war Iraq military forces a unit of “1.” All other current and near future threats are given numerical equivalents of their forces compared to Iraq. Next the proposal indicates what the United States requires for a “Defense Foundation.” This foundation includes research and development, strategic nuclear forces, forces for overseas presence, U.S. territory defense forces and Special Operations forces. The proposal cited “demonstrated military capabilities” in the most current commitment of forces in DESERT STORM, JUST CAUSE, PROVIDE COMFORT and the maintenance of an air component only for Korea. Aspin assigned the costs and then presented combinations of the above beyond the defense foundation, (support base) and asked, “What do you, the American tax payer want to pay?” Aspin’s most favored option is “C” which proposes nine Active, five Guard and two cadre divisions.85

The congressionally-mandated RAND study, Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense also examined Army alternative forces. In the analysis the following alternatives were matched against two contingencies. The first would absorb all immediately deployable units and the second would necessitate an expansion of that force. The RAND study presented these alternatives, none of which fully covered the requirements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPOSED FORCE OPTIONS</th>
<th>DIVISIONS (AC/RC/Cadre)</th>
<th>STRENGTH (AC/RC)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Force</td>
<td>12/6/2</td>
<td>550/542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGUS/AGA</td>
<td>11/10/05</td>
<td>12/542</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aspin “Option C”</td>
<td>9/5/2</td>
<td>483/570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAND “I”</td>
<td>12/6/0</td>
<td>525/669</td>
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<td>RAND “J”</td>
<td>12/7/0</td>
<td>504/732</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAND “K”</td>
<td>10/6/0</td>
<td>465/635</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhanced Active</td>
<td>12/4/0</td>
<td>575/462</td>
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<td>Army Force (RAND)86</td>
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The last option matched against the requirements still revealed shortfalls in the forces required. The numbers of
Active Component combat arms soldiers necessary to close this gap can be made available with the restructuring suggested in this study to create a two component Army.

The fact is that the Base Force will not survive as it is currently configured. Certainly congressional action to slow reserve troop reductions in the FY 92 and FY 93 Appropriations Acts is a good indicator of its demise. Active Component strength will continue to decline and so will the reserve, although not to as great a degree as programmed for the Base Force. Given a continued relatively tranquil world, where few U.S. national security interests are at stake, it would be realistic to visualize Active Component strength to reach perhaps 380,000 to 400,000 by 2000. The actual number is not at issue; given the evidence, it will be smaller than today’s forces.

There is a different mood than in past post-war eras in the Congress and among the American public regarding the military establishment. At least for the present, there is general agreement that the world is still a dangerous place, full of conflict and hostile intentions. As citizens of the only “superpower,” Americans want a strong military. Still, with pressing domestic problems, the public wants a less expensive defense establishment. What is missing from the proposals to replace the Base Force with a restructured Army rather than a smaller cold war Army is the detail describing the force mix within the force structure. In many ways this has always been a subjective and sometime political call. Now, with the experience of OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, decisions regarding Total Army force mix should be less subjective or political and based more on experience.

A New Force Generation Model.

By using OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, a force generation model will emerge based on the strengths and weaknesses exhibited by the Army’s three components, exactly what Aspin suggested as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. The model presents a two component force structured as follows:
FEDERAL ARMY

Primarily Active Component
Forward presence
CONUS Army infrastructure
Research and development
Training base
Logistic support
Garrisons
Contingency force
Early deployment capability
Theater and Army Corps headquarters
Peacekeeping capability
Combat arms forces
Minimal CS/CSS

Primarily U.S. Army Reserve
Forward presence operations and support
to combat and peacekeeping operations
Support to CONUS Army infrastructure
Training base
Garrisons
Logistic support
Mobilization/reconstitution support base
Nation-wide domestic missions
Contingency force—early to late deployment
Combat maneuver unit roundout at company
and battalion level
CS/CSS theater buildup
CS/CSS sustainment
CS/CSS echelons, all levels division and corps
Individual augmentation, fillers, and replacements

STATE MILITIA

Army National Guard
Individual state missions assigned by governor
Reinforcement Contingency force—late
deployment
Combat brigades, divisions
Self-contained division artillery brigades
CS/CSS echelons below corps
Reconstitution (Army Expansion)
Cadre divisions

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The Federal Army.

In the Federal Army, the Active Component is restructured to integrate the Federal Reserve, the USAR. In this integration the strengths of the two former Total Army components are balanced to take the optimum advantage of one another. All of the restructuring has one overriding objective, to preserve as much Active Component combat arms structure as possible as defense appropriations continue to slide. This is a priority for several reasons. The Gulf War showed that modern maneuver warfare is extremely complex. Its application requires extensive, continuous, and lengthy education and training, especially for officers, both in the classroom and in the field. In DESERT STORM, it was obvious that the Active Component was master of modern maneuver warfare. This stature was reached because only it had the capability in resources and time to maintain the highest state of readiness possible to allow for immediate deployment into combat. Additionally, its very justification as an all volunteer professional force required it, rather than combat arms citizen-soldiers, to bear the brunt of an aggressor’s attacks. No administration would be able to survive the outrage of the nation if a partially trained citizen-soldier combat force was placed in harms way and suffered casualties without all possible Active Component forces first being deployed.

The way to obtain the necessary combat arms spaces in the Active Component is to turn over to the USAR those missions for which it is qualified and has shown itself capable of accepting as it did in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The USAR is an obvious and natural adjunct to the Active Component since the legal authority for both is the Army clause of the Constitution. The vast majority of USAR officers have served on active duty with the Active Component. The standards are the same and performance to standard can be more closely monitored, and the accessibility to units and individuals in war and in peace is unencumbered and direct. Also the current structure of the USAR is complementary to the Active Army’s structure.
As the Army becomes smaller so, too, will the Army Staff. However, it can be made even smaller, yet have an expansion capability for routine workloads and peacetime contingencies, as well as during mobilization and war. It might even be possible to significantly reduce the Pentagon staff yet have the flexibility to enlarge it during a crisis. This can be accomplished by the expansion of the USAR Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program. Currently, both Department of Defense and Department of the Army activities have indicated requirements for approximately 20,000 IMAs (the FY92 authorization is 11,800). IMAs are pre-trained soldiers who are pre-identified to augment units and agencies upon mobilization. They are members of the Select Reserve and perform a minimum of 12 days of Annual Training (AT). To further enhance the mobilization readiness of a reduced manning Army Staff there is also the Drilling IMA (DIMA) program. Not only do soldiers in this program perform their 12 days' AT, but also 24-48 Inactive Duty for Training (IDT) periods during each FY. During IDT and AT periods, these Reservists “train” by perfecting the skills they require to augment the activity to which they are pre-assigned. Currently, additional funding from the agency or command for a Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) or Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) can bring the IMA on active duty to assist the activity beyond the training periods described above. However, these two narrowly defined categories for using reservists in an active duty status can be expanded by Congress so that a smaller Active Component may have full access to this manpower pool to accomplish temporary duties that would be necessary for the effective operation of the Total Army. Using the Army Staff as an example, the possibilities for reducing other Major Army Commands by expanding the use of IMAs is readily apparent.

In this same vein, it is apparent that a smaller army needs to shift from maintaining CONUSA headquarters to a regional corps headquarters configuration as existed in the 1930s. Congress mandated the establishment of an independent USAR command similar to the U.S. Air Force Reserve Command. This was an attempt to reduce the number of reporting chains, allow the USAR to have greater budgetary
control, and eliminate duplicate functions in each CONUSA. The elimination of the CONUSA headquarters was to occur as the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) came on line. One, 4th Army, was deactivated and the process halted. Again, the Active Component would provide the commanders, and the staffs would be integrated with reserve personnel, either IMA's or members of Selected Reserve units on detached duty assignment with the corps headquarters. This would also save Active Component spaces.

While the Active Army has primary responsibility for educating and training the Total Force, the USAR is also a school house and augments the training base. There are 90 U.S. Army Reserve Forces (USARF) Schools training soldiers from all three Army components in over 1,100 locations in CONUS and overseas. These schools cover a variety of subjects from military occupation specialty training for soldiers to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff (USCGSC) and the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS) courses. These schools have a mission to "fall in" on a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) school upon mobilization. Recently, a peacetime Affiliation Program for the USARF schools was initiated with Army service schools. In peacetime they conduct training at their own site or on an Active or reserve installation or, in the case of the active duty phase of USCGSC, at a contracted college or university. With a little extra planning effort, all Army courses of instruction could be constructed in 2-week increments. This would assist the Army in training reservists and also allow for individuals and schools to perform their AT educating Active and Reserve students. In a downsized Army of the 21st century, the reduced flow of students and trainees at most schools (currently the one exception is the U.S. Army War College where plans are being made to increase the number of students) does not require as large a number of instructors and faculty. Permanent instructors and faculty could be augmented by the USARF schools with significant savings accrued. TRADOC schools could then have an Active Component cadre for administration, upkeep, and teaching of lengthy courses or those such as at CGSC which require specific Active Component expertise and experience. Individual USAR soldiers from the IRR, many with
advanced degrees, could be given a Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) to teach specific blocks of instruction at such institutions as the U.S. Army War College or CGSC. After all, the Army has been doing this since 1913. Why not expand the concept? Also by making greater use of the USARF schools, the Army would be insuring an expansion capability for mobilization, both for the price of one.

There have been 12 USAR Training Divisions, 3 separate training brigades and 2 separate training battalions which also expand the training base on mobilization. Their mission is to conduct Individual Entry Training (IET) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT). To train for their mobilization responsibilities, the divisions or rather components of the divisions, brigades, and battalions conduct what is called “vertical” training during their AT. By way of contrast, the entire training period for IET or AIT is “horizontal” training. With the use of 2-week increments and some innovative scheduling, the USAR Training Divisions and separate units, with some Active Component cadre, could take over a downsized Army’s training load, conducting “horizontal” training. This, as with the USARF schools, would be a less expensive method of training the Army while at the same time training the expansion base for mobilization. Other missions for these divisions range from ROTC Summer Camp support to Army-wide operational management for the Army Physical Fitness Training Program and special regional training programs for IRR soldiers.88

In a smaller Army there will be even less justification for the multiplicity of individual state ARNG-run Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). If there were absolutely no Federal funds used for such programs and they met Total Army standards, there would be no problem. However, with shrinking Army appropriations, the dollars could be better spent elsewhere. The Active Component needs to expand the Total Army’s OCS program at Fort Benning. It could also open regional (Corps Area) OCS academies. All state OCS programs should be closed. Not only would this save scarce dollars, but it would contribute to reinforcing a Total Army culture and give absolute certainty to the maintenance of officer commissioning standards Army-wide.
The other officer producing program, ROTC, may also be restructured to save dollars and Active Component spaces. Now that Congress has reversed itself and lifted the ban on Active Guard/Reserve officers serving as Assistant Professors of Military Science, the possibility exists for the USAR to increase its staffing of ROTC. There are several ways to further reduce Active Army manning and one is to establish relationships between ROTC detachments and USAR units, especially USARF Schools. The support to the detachments by USAR units can eliminate the need for most of the current administrative staff of NCOs thus saving additional Active Component spaces. Also, the talent available within the IRR and IMA program, officers and NCOs, residing within commuting distance, can be drawn upon with coordination with ARPERCEN, and retirement points awarded for participation in the classroom or in field training (reservists require 50 points acquired by a variety of methods which include ADT, AT or IDT for a "good" retirement year).

Active Component garrisons around the nation can be augmented by USAR Garrison units, by USAR CS and CSS units and by individuals from the individual pre-trained manpower pools in the USAR: IRR, IMA, and Retiree. While there would continue to be the need for Active Component support and Department of the Army civilian staffing on installations, part of the reduced strength permanent party contingent could be used to schedule appropriate support from USAR units and individuals. Since many USAR soldiers have civilian skills which match their military specialties, it would be beneficial to use such individuals to assist in support, i.e., engineer, maintenance, military police, and medical.

Several current branches of the Army, with the exception of some members exercising overall administrative control and support of contingency forces, can have their mission turned over almost completely to the USAR. One is the Chaplain's Corps. Originally established during the American Revolution to support the Continental Army in the field, it has expanded its functions to support religious denominations in peacetime garrisons across the nation and overseas. Today it has moved into the area of "counseling." Chaplains in wartime, regardless
of denomination, are "Army" chaplains. However, in a
peacetime environment there is an increasing tendency for
chaplains to focus on their own and like denominations. The
growing number of minority groups are, at some installations,
not supported with the same vigor as majority groups and this
is understandable, but it continues to raise Constitutional
issues. While there is a need for chaplains in units that deploy
to the field for training or in contingency forces or forward
presence units or remote installations, no more than one
chaplain should reside at any given CONUS installation as a
cadre/coordinator. The service member and his or her family
may be better served by joining a local congregation. A side
benefit would accrue to the Army with the stronger ties
established in peacetime with the civilian community. The bulk
of the chaplains would serve after commissioning and Officer
Basic Course training in the USAR, either in the IRR or as IMAs
to augment the Army community.

The Judge Advocate General's Corps is another branch for
which an Active Component cadre with substantial use of
USAR Judge Advocates could administer to the needs of a
smaller peacetime Army. One argument for the transfer of this
function to the Reserve is that "the prohibition against
command influence has severely limited the use of
court-martial as an instrument of military discipline," which has
commanders today using administrative and nonjudicial
punishment to maintain discipline. This change offers the
opportunity to allow USAR judges and lawyers to staff the
Army's military justice system. Beyond cost saving benefits,
using Reserve assets would "... minimize the potential for
command influence, and increase public confidence in military
justice." The Active Component Judge Advocates would then
be freed to provide greater support to their commands by
focusing on "legal issues that are critical to mission success."
In OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Reserve lawyers
were deployed to provide enhanced military justice capability
while Active Component lawyers provided advice on
"operational law issues."90 Of course lawyers would continue
to serve in Civil Affairs units, the majority of which are in the
reserves. These units have wartime missions to establish
governments in occupied territories. However, in peacetime
they could function to support installations augmenting USAR Garrison units similarly employed. Installations throughout CONUS would have only minimal Active Component cadre that would oversee the day-to-day operations.

This leads to the possibilities for USAR integration of Army-wide logistic support. By centralized, coordinated scheduling, USAR CSS units could provide support during AT and drill periods at Area Maintenance Support Activities in existence today and expand the program to Active Component installations. USAR units could augment supply depots and also provide depot maintenance for Active and reserve equipment as an AT mission. Not only does this reduce Active Component spaces, but also costs, since AT and real time support are one in the same.

The USAR medical support to the peacetime Army in clinics and hospitals has increased dramatically over the past few years and expansion should continue. Not only are units being used during drill periods to man Army clinics and hospitals, but individuals as well, especially specialists such as physical therapists or allergists, who devote several days a month in a paid (usually TTAD) or non-paid, retirement points only, status. The medical program is one of the most innovative and flexible in the Army system. Because of their civilian schedules some Reserve medical specialists cannot "drill" with their unit. These individuals are integrated into the schedule of an Army clinic or hospital or a medical facility of another service. These alternate sites could also serve, with coordination with civilian authorities, as Regional Training Sites for medical personnel (RTS-MED).

Recruiting for the Total Army is another likely mission for the USAR in conjunction with an Active Component cadre. The USAR has units in over 1,600 communities around the United States, almost all within commuting distance of one or more major population centers. The USAR Retiree Recall program could be used to supplement the recruiting program at no cost to the Army and the same is true for USAR soldiers assisting in recruiting efforts on a retirements point only basis. A Recruiting Command could be established under the USARC with a Total Army mission.
Given the current domestic situation, it is becoming increasingly clear to members of Congress, Senator Sam Nunn for example, that there is a significant role for the military to play in accepting peacetime missions which can lead to strengthening America. There is a strong institutional bias within the Army against involvement in such missions. Any detraction from the Army's primary mission to fight and win wars should evoke that response from the leadership. However, any survey of the Army's history over the past 218 years will show that it has spent more time at peacetime missions than fighting the nation's wars. The Federal Army has: explored and mapped the continent, pioneered medical science, forecast the weather, delivered the mail, quelled civil disturbances, provided disaster relief, run youth programs, engaged in public works projects, and a host of other non-military missions. A smaller Active Component in the 21st century, however, will have a difficult time attempting to accomplish both its primary national defense mission and a domestic peacetime mission.

Yet, in the past, Congress and the chief executive have directed the Army to take on peacetime missions. Senator Nunn and others apparently see the need to do so again. However, in the future, it is the USAR portion of the Federal Army that is structured and deployed to take on the domestic nation assistance directed by Congress and the President. President Roosevelt's "New Deal" gives ample evidence of the ability of the USAR to step in to allow the Active Component to concentrate on its primary mission. In 1933, Reserve officers of the ORC augmented the Regular Army in the operation of Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps. By February 1934 there were only 537 Regular officers overseeing the program and over 5,000 Federal Reserve officers were ordered to active duty to administer the camps.92

What then can today's Federal Reserve, the USAR, more readily accomplish than the Active Component and the combat arms oriented ARNG? The USAR is uniquely structured to engage in domestic peacetime missions. The vast majority of its units are CS and CSS, the type which are best suited for domestic missions. During the recent Los Angeles riots, for
example, USAR Military Police units probably would have been more suited for riot control than the California National Guard’s 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized) which was Federalized. Natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, and forest fires require the type units common to the USAR. These units are engineers, military police, signal, transportation, supply and service, and medical. While the ARNG has these type units, they are not centrally controlled and are used within individual states. All of the USAR units operate independently which makes them versatile for being a part of a national tailored force for specific operations in peace and war.

This versatility when natural or manmade disasters strike extends beyond the utilitarian value placed on USAR units’ civilian equivalent skills. Their versatility lodges in the fact that they are Federal and can transcend state boundaries. If one looks at the ARNG’s structure it is heavy with combat arms. While these forces have their own support base of CS and CSS units, no state can always have the type unit and a sufficient number of those required in an emergency. Also, during an extremely severe emergency, Guard personnel may be victims themselves and their equipment rendered inoperative. Then too, since Guard units have sometimes been Federalized, as in the Los Angeles riots, would it not make practical sense, with the same type of legislative changes that slowly made the National Guard a deployable force for national security, to create the means for the Federal Government to call up the exact type and numbers of USAR units from locations unscathed by natural or manmade disasters? This tailored force could then be sent to the state or states that require assistance.

Also in the area of disaster assistance is a Federal civilian agency, FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). Few people realize that FEMA depends on USAR individuals in an IMA status, that is, with preassigned positions in this civilian agency. The use of USAR assets is to enhance the capabilities of local, state and Federal governments during crisis. There are approximately 300 FEMA IMA positions. These range in rank from Sergeant First Class to Sergeant
Major in the NCO ranks and Major to Colonel at the officer level. After Hurricane Andrew struck Florida, there was significant criticism of the FEMA civilian leadership, in stark contrast to the efficiency of the military. Some members of Congress and others suggested that the Department of Defense assume responsibility for this function. Senator Bob Graham suggested FEMA was not up to the task and disaster relief work should be “an ongoing significant part of the military task.” Congressman Dante Fascell declared that when a disaster strikes what is required is “...a highly visible disaster czar with a definite command structure to deal with it early on, and obviously that’s the military.” (It is uncertain whether or not these individuals were aware of the 300 USAR soldiers in the FEMA IMA program.) There is no reason not to pursue this idea. The USARC in Atlanta could be an alternative to replace the current civilian bureaucracy. The American public will be better served by such a move. The taxpayers would certainly be pleased that not only could the Federal Government be reduced by one bureaucracy, but also happy that defense dollars spent on the USAR would have double value by providing them with the support needed in times of national domestic emergencies. The USARC can exercise command and control all USAR units in CONUS through Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM). General Officer Commands (GOCOM), major troop commands and training divisions. Its staff could be expanded to include a “Deputy Chief of Staff for Emergency Management.” This staff function could work directly with state agencies, local communities, ARCOMs, GOCOMs, and ARPERCEN to coordinate relief work. Drilling IMAs would be area and regional coordinators who would work with the USARC and be prepared to mobilize and coordinate incoming support should the need arise.

Today, there is a daily need in cities and towns across the nation for the type support available from USAR and ARNG CS and CSS units. A former Commerce Secretary Peter G. Peterson, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, believes that domestic infrastructure problems are a threat to “America’s long-term national security more than the traditional preoccupations of security and foreign policy ...” His comments are echoed by others such as former Transportation
Secretary Samuel Skinner and economist David A. Ashauer. The nation's needs range from medical support to rebuilding the crumbling roads and bridges to rehabilitating blighted urban areas to job training and youth programs.

What are the infrastructure problems specifically? Here are several examples. A Federal Highway Administration report stated approximately 23 percent of the nation's 575,000 plus bridges had structural damage. Department of Transportation reported last year that about 40 percent of the nation's road network were in fair to poor condition.

Then there is the state of tomorrow's work force that will affect national well being. A study funded by the Department of Labor, Workforce 2000, says that the workers of the next century will come increasingly from the ranks of the disadvantaged and the new jobs they will be seeking "will demand much higher skill levels than the jobs of today." That workforce is the youth of today. A former governor speaking at the U.S. Army War College noted that an American MBA candidate on the average knew less math than a Japanese 8th grader. He continued that the United States has the largest number of functional illiterates of any industrialized nation. Disadvantaged youth who try to learn in under-funded schools also face increasing violent crime and drugs. These children are also victims of inadequate health care. Diseases this nation had virtually eliminated are surging back. In 1982 there were 1700 cases of measles reported in the United States and in 1990 over 27,000. Other, more deadly diseases such as tuberculosis are also on the rise.

There should be a sense of immediacy to these problems. Every day that passes means more of our future work force and more of our national treasure are lost. While the ARNG can assist with their CS and CSS units in local communities, the preponderance of the type units needed are in the USAR. Also, with a Federal program managed by USARC, units and individuals can be concentrated to meet local needs with relative administrative ease. Each mission can be responded to with a uniquely tailored Federal force. USAR Engineer units across the nation can work on local projects on a rotational basis without the legal restrictions regarding crossing state borders.
lines, as they do in Central America. Units on the west coast can take over from midwest units in repairing bridges and roads on the east coast and so on. Criteria for use of Army assets would be to accept construction projects for which there are insufficient Federal or state funds available to complete through private contractors or local government agencies and which pose an immediate safety hazard. The same is true for other CS and CSS missions. Since the outbreak of measles is concentrated in urban areas, enough USAR medical units to cover an entire city could perform AT in disadvantaged neighborhoods, not only providing inoculations, but preventative health care. If the Army can do it for Kurds in Iraq, it can do the same here at home.

There are domestic missions for USAR Training Divisions that can focus on youth at risk. Military style “boot” camps for youthful offenders are springing up nation-wide. However, the corrections officers lack the expertise that is necessary to establish and conduct meaningful instruction to the inmates. As an example of what can be done is the work of the 91st Training Division, Sausalito, California, with the Santa Clara Woman’s Correctional Facility. Members of the division “trained” the corrections officers in drill instructor techniques. These officers were then able to implement a voluntary 10-week boot camp program, Project PRIDE (Practical Regimented rehabilitation for Inmates Determined to Excel). In this case, the offenders were young adult females, convicted primarily of drug or drug-related crimes. From personal observation and interviews with inmates and corrections officers, the results were remarkably successful. People on the lowest rungs of society can be salvaged by using military techniques and training to build self-respect, confidence and structure into their lives.109

In another program, run by the Los Angeles Probation Department, young male drug offenders are selected by the judge after sentencing to enter one of two boot camps instead of the 16 other youth work camps. Although the staff has had little or no experience and little assistance from the military, except for several visits from Marine Corps personnel stationed at Camp Pendleton, their success rate is significant. In the
other 16 county correction camps for juvenile offenders, the repeat offender rate is 67 percent; at the boot camps the rate is 12 percent.\textsuperscript{101} The USAR Training Divisions, with a small Active Guard/Reserve full-time cadre, could help assist in similar camps throughout the nation.

The CCC, was after all a Federal program and eventually the day-to-day camp operation mission fell to the ORC. Today there is a desperate need for a Federal youth program. The idea has proliferated across the country from the California Conservation Corps to the Pennsylvania Conservation Corps. In fact, there are so many of these state and local youth programs, an association has sprung up, a certain sign of bureaucratic layering. The growth of these programs is a strong indication of their effectiveness. However, the trend toward decentralization is expensive. The House Armed Services Committee included in the 1993 Appropriation Bill funds for the National Guard to establish several youth camps. Instead of using the assets at hand, the Guard response was that they needed to contract counselors and psychologists. The USAR has these assets, not only in units but in its individuals' accounts, IRR, IMA and Retiree Recall.\textsuperscript{102} In a recent study a statement is made that appears to indicate the Guard may be overly concerned about establishing exclusive and proprietary rights to the program. The study says:

\begin{quote}
Congress, by dedicating funds to the Guard specifically for this program, has stipulated that the military-sponsored youth service corps will be a Guard initiative. All final decisions and ultimate control rest with the National Guard.\textsuperscript{103}
\end{quote}

This should be a Federal program and a nation-wide effort directed toward improving the lives and futures of American youth while rebuilding the nation's infrastructure and assisting fellow citizens in need. Its other purpose is to create a bond of understanding between people from diverse backgrounds and locations all working for the common good. It can also be a vehicle to teach national social and civic responsibility, thus creating a greater societal cohesiveness. Thus, it should be administered as a national program and not fragmented state-by-state. As with the early CCC, it also must be a cost effective program with limited funding directed toward support
of the participants and not another swollen bureaucracy with duplication of infrastructure.

An executive agency such as Labor, Interior, Education, or Health and Human Services might be best to provide oversight for the program. The reception, induction and preliminary training would be the responsibility of the Army as should be the operational aspects within the camps. As the CCC was organized, so too should the Army within each CONUSA provide administrative support perhaps through the USARC using USAR assets, especially Training Divisions. While the program would be non-military in general, as the CCC, it would have a voluntary military option. After completing the civilian training and civic work program, members could volunteer for exclusive military training. Only those who met established military standards would be allowed to continue. These “recruits” would then flow into the Active Army, Reserve Components’ units or into the IRR.

All domestic peacetime missions have the same goals. They strengthen national security by rebuilding and repairing the infrastructure, both human and material. There are a number of Army public relations objectives as well. The Army maintains a high positive profile among citizens of the nation, it justifies, to some extent, end strength and modern support equipment purchases and it provides peacetime training for many CS and almost all CSS units. By using the USAR, already structured and located to perform these missions, it allows the other part of the Federal Army, the Active Component, to concentrate on its contingency and forward presence missions while gaining the public’s support.

Forward presence continues to be an important mission for the Active Component. These forces continue to be composed primarily of early deploying units. With shrinking appropriations driven by increasing domestic demands and the traditional cry of Congress and the American public to “bring the boys home,” these units need to be combat arms in a high state of readiness with advanced technology modern weapons. CS and CSS organic to the units forward deployed as well as much of the support base are manned by Active Component soldiers. Those units which are based beyond the shores of the United
States have a peacetime mission to show this nation's commitment to a region, but also to provide support for indigenous USAR units, where they exist, e.g. Germany, and for the coordination of CONUS-based USAR and ARNG unit training deployment.

However, the USAR's Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) program could provide the Active forward deployed forces with CS and CSS support rather than allowing American dollars to flow into the local economy for contracted services. At the urging of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the Army developed a program to test this concept. Currently, Reserve Heavy Equipment Maintenance Companies (HEMCOs) and Light Equipment Maintenance Companies (LEMCOs) provide such support in the area of depot maintenance to reduce backlogs.104 This support concept is also being tested at Camp Dodge, Iowa. With a reduced forward presence in Europe, the planned rotation of Reserve maintenance units could well provide the necessary General Maintenance Support for U.S. Army Europe while obtaining deployment and mobilization training. Expansion of the program for the Reserve to assume all maintenance functions in support of combat units exercising forward presence could not only save defense dollars, but also Active Component combat arms strength for the early deploying contingency force.

In essence, forward presence must continue to be the Active Component's primary responsibility. Still the numbers of combat units could be increased and expenditures to maintain that presence reduced if Reserve CS and CSS units could be integrated in providing the necessary support.

While forward presence forces provide an important part of deterrence, it is unlikely that Congress and the American public will support the size forces necessary for that strategic deterrence. As a consequence, the importance of crisis response for deterrence will rest in the power projection capability of contingency forces. The question, then, is how to build a proper mix within the budgetary constraints imposed by current and future congressional appropriations. The arguments put forth by the Chief of Staff cannot be overlooked:
The National Military Strategy, with its focus on response to regional crisis, requires fully trained, highly ready, and rapidly deliverable forces. A basic consideration is the required availability for deployment, which drives required unit readiness, and is largely dependent on warning and response time.105

However, the number of Active Component divisions required in the initial contingency force, "five fully structured divisions" and "three reinforcing divisions," may well be next to impossible in the next century without restructuring taking place. Unless there is a radical change in the way a peacetime army is built, given domestic political demands and the American tradition of reducing its standing forces in peacetime, there will be fewer Active divisions than planned. As indicated on a number of occasions, one of the most cost effective methods to retain sufficient combat end strength in the Active Component is to turn over CS and CSS missions to the Federal Reserve, the USAR. If USAR and ARNG CS and CSS unit members practicing their civilian skills in uniform can be mobilized early, with little or no post-mobilization training as many were in the Gulf War, then they should not only support the movement of Active Component units overseas, but should join deployed combat elements, even as part of the combat division's organic support element. This would be a new Active Component divisional roundout concept using USAR CS and CSS units.

The Gulf War experience clearly shows that the most significant contribution that the reserves can provide is in CS and CSS units for all echelons. As Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney remarked of reservists in these areas, "we could not have done the operation" without them.106 What is needed is a commitment to the training and education of major Reserve commands, such as the 377th Theater Army Area Command, so that they are mobilized to perform their wartime mission rather than being left behind while the Active Component creates a duplicate provisional headquarters.

In DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM many USAR units had to be activated in advance of the deployment of Active, USAR, and ARNG units. For example, the 1185th Transportation Terminal Company was activated with two days'
notice while preparing for AT and diverted to Savannah to load the 24th Infantry Division. It had its AT extended at Savannah and then, when mobilized as part of the call-up, redeployed to Wilmington, North Carolina. USAR Training Division elements were also activated to assist in post-mobilization training and medical units were utilized as part of the USAR's 19 percent of the mobilization/CONUS-based and training base support. The USAR units available for deployment in the CS area are 27 percent and in CSS about 56 percent. Six hundred forty-seven USAR units deployed to Southwest Asia. All totaled, some 84,000 USAR soldiers were mobilized in units and as IMAs, IRRs, and retirees. Unit response from alert to activation was as little as two days and the average time of all units 11.7 days. In the Gulf War, as stated earlier, the USAR provide 94 percent of Civil Affairs, 89 percent of Military Police (prisoner of war handling), 69 percent of the Adjutant General postal units, 65 percent of the petroleum handling, 63 percent of the psychological operations, and 59 percent of the water capabilities. In other areas such as medical, transportation, signal, engineer, and quartermaster, the USAR also contributed significant numbers of units.107

The ARNG, after Federalization, deployed 60 CS and CSS groups, brigades and battalions to South-West Asia. Twenty-eight percent of those units deployed within 20 days after Federalization. Their success was, as with the USAR units, a contributing factor to the outcome of the operation. As the commander of the British 4th Armored Brigade remarked, "...we got the National Guard 142nd Artillery Brigade with two batteries each of MLRS and M110. By golly, they were good."108

These statistics and the performance of reserve units and individuals, primarily in the CS and CSS arenas, are convincing evidence that participation in future contingency operations is a viable alternative for the USAR as a predominately CS and CSS force in a Federal Army. Unlike recently legislated ARNG reforms, no such costly initiatives were necessary for the USAR support forces or, for that matter, like ARNG units. Basic survival skills, most of which have high retention rates and can be relearned in a short time with limited facilities, are what the
soldiers require. USAR officers can attend exercises and simulations to provide them with the knowledge to synchronize their support functions with the Active Component maneuver elements in a theater of operations. What this means is that USAR follow-on forces in the CS and CSS areas will be ready to enter the flow at the appropriate time in deployment schedules. If this support is pushed to its fullest potential, substantial savings accrue to the Active Component in manning spaces and dollars. Listed below are some examples of such a “peace dividend” accomplished by transferring support missions to the predominately CS and CSS USAR:

- Area and corps support organizations to save 23 units, approximately 1,750 soldiers, and $34M.
- Echelons above division artillery to save 30 units, approximately 6,800 soldiers, and $177M.
- Echelons above division transportation assets to save 110 units, approximately 9,000 soldiers, and $234M.
- Medical evacuation organizations (air and ground) to save 22 units, approximately 1,200 soldiers, and $300M.
- Organizations to conduct initial entry and selected military occupation specialty training to save approximately 200 soldiers, and $9M.
- Operational support airlift mission to save office [TDA] organizations, approximately 330 soldiers, and $3.8M.
- Echelons above division aviation assets, less attack units, to save 30 units, approximately 6,650 soldiers and $159M.
- Echelons above corps signal communications to save 68 units, approximately 12,000 soldiers, and $313M.
- Echelons above corps maintenance elements to save 35 units, approximately 6,600 soldiers, and $174M.
- All conventional ammunition support to save 8 units, approximately 1,100 soldiers, and $29M.
In all, when the full scope of the USAR strength is evaluated, such support mission transfers (these are only a sample) from the Active component to the U.S. Army Reserve have the potential of saving over 47,400 Active component manning spaces and have a net worth of approximately $1.2 billion.109

In the combat arena, it may be timely to consider roundout of the follow-on Active divisions with USAR combat elements. Rather than rounding out at brigade level, the Active Component might well follow the Marine Corps Federal Reserve example which, unlike the ARNG, deployed combat units to the Gulf. The Marine Reserve success story appears to have been due to several factors. The first was that the reservists, many of whom had served on active duty (the same is true for the USAR) were required to attend all of their training courses with the Regulars and one common standard was maintained. Second, roundout was at a battalion and company level. Third, there is an easy acceptance of Reserve elements led by Active officers. One Marine Active battalion commander remarked, “I really didn’t sense much of a difference at the small unit level in levels of confidence and competence between the reserves and my active units. It was clear to me that at least at the company level, they were proficient and knew their business.”110

There are obvious conclusions that can be drawn from the Marine experience. Reservists should, for the most part, have active duty experience. All officer candidates should be products of one school system. Both Active and reserve officers should share a common culture. Roundout works best at company and perhaps battalion level. It is easier to manage a relatively small number of reservists in combat specialties than large formations. All of these conclusions could apply to the combat elements of the USAR except for the battalion and company size units. However, as with the Marine Reserve, these units are Federal and immediately responsive to Active requirements. The current separate brigades and battalions could readily become peacetime caretaker formations, and their component companies and battalions used as roundout to Active divisions upon mobilization.
Lastly, individual augmentation, fillers and replacements, should be addressed as an important Federal Army responsibility. Earlier the use of IMAs was outlined. Because of the need to provide these pretrained officers and NCOs to expand the Active Component, it is essential that this remain a Federal Reserve responsibility. Given the current dispersed, state-by-state, Guard personnel system (Guard Personnel Center or GUARDPERCEN only manages Title 10, i.e. Active Guard/Reserve personnel), it would be difficult for the state-aligned ARNG to recruit, train and manage similar programs as has been suggested by the House Armed Services Committee.

Again, using the DESERT STORM experience, another USAR program today looms in importance and will be even more significant as the Active Army becomes smaller. This is the IRR program. Without conscription being instituted prior to the onset of a conflict, the IRR remains the primary individual pre-trained manpower pool for fillers and casualties. In the 20th century there has never been a mobilization, even with over a year to prepare as in World War II, where there have been adequate numbers of service volunteers. Since global crises now occur more rapidly than ever before, the IRR as a filler and casualty replacement pool becomes the only alternative short of breaking up units as the Army has done in past wars.

To avoid this inefficient past practice, the U.S. Army Personnel Command and ARPERCEN must maintain an integrated data base. The transfer of personnel between the two Federal components must be unimpeded in peace and war. The commands should remain separate and distinct. However, both should report directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER), or some other umbrella staff element of Army headquarters. Such an arrangement will allow the Federal Army to identify and share its collective assets from Active soldiers to Troop Program Unit members and those individuals in the IRR, IMA, and Retiree Recall program.

This is the Federal Army component of the Total Army. It is an integration of two former separate components of the Total Army that plays on the core competencies of both to provide to the nation a strong deterrent force. However, to enhance
that deterrence, one should also look to the militia or ARNG and the capabilities it offers to a restructured 21st century force.

State Militia.

One must remember that the roles and missions of the National Guard have changed far beyond what the Founding Fathers stipulated in the Constitution. The document states in Article I, Section 8 that Congress has the power “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrection and repel Invasions.” The use of the militia beyond the shores of the United States was never intended and caused considerable concern in the Spanish-American War and World War I. This was so much of a Constitutional issue that in the former the Guardsmen had to volunteer, and in latter they were drafted. Fortunately for national defense, a number of legislative acts were passed allowing the Guard to be deployed overseas, and they have been since World War II.

There are still some questions as to the readiness of ARNG combat units and the relationship of those units to the second mission of the Guard within the boundaries of the various states. To many observers, the dual missions of the Guard seem diametrically opposed. Yet there appears to be no movement by the Guard, the state governors, Congress or the Active Component to bring the missions into closer alignment with reality. Given the current situation, the National Guard as presently configured can be easily integrated into a restructured two component Total Army.

Two recent events have heightened awareness of the Guard’s state missions: the 1992 Los Angeles, California riots and Florida’s bout with Hurricane Andrew. In both incidents, the Guard responded to the respective governor’s call, maintaining order and meeting the citizen’s immediate needs. In the aftermath of the riot, until Federalized, which saved state funds, the Guard’s “police” authority allowed them full latitude to assist local law enforcement authorities.¹¹¹

In the Florida case, the mission was not only to prevent looting, but to assist in the relief work for victims, clean up, and
rebuilding. It was clear that beyond the politics and the slowness of FEMA to act, the disaster was of such magnitude that the Florida Guard needed augmentation. As a consequence, Active Component units were ordered to the scene and, shortly thereafter, the U.S. Army Reserve Command in Atlanta coordinated the organization of volunteers from USAR Engineer and Civil Affairs units stationed in the state for active duty to provide additional assistance.

The use of the Guard in these two examples provides enough information to analyze its specific state missions. First and foremost it is not, as a senior National Guard Bureau officer has claimed recently, a Federal component. If this were the case, then the Guard's state mission to back up local law enforcement officers could not exist because of the restrictions placed on the Federal Army by posse comitatus. Although Title 10 U.S. Code, sections 3077-3079 authorizes Federal recognition of Guard units, there is still a legal difference between them and Federal units. If there were no difference legally or in Army Regulations, there would be no state forces today. The importance of the Guard to governors is that it can be used in a law enforcement capacity. It is also clear that for major rioting and natural disasters, no single, or even combination of several state Guards will ever have the exact type and quantity of units needed for every specific incident. The alternatives appear to some self-evident, yet may be unacceptable for those in the National Guard Bureau and NGAUS who see the Guard's mission as primarily national security, with combat maneuver units in overseas deployment scenarios. To adequately perform state missions requiring units most suited to riot control and natural disaster relief, the Guards of many smaller states, like Wisconsin, may have to become almost exclusively CS and CSS. This argument has been presented by a number of national security analysts, and is best illustrated by Colonel Philip Brehm, ARNG, in two recent studies, Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total Force, and, with Major Wilbur E. Gray, ARNG, Alternative Missions for the Army. The argument is that combat maneuver elements of the ARNG, specifically roundout brigades and divisions, do not have the time to train to meet the needs of complex modern
maneuver warfare. Therefore, there is little likelihood of them being used in such a contingency. As a consequence, the Guard should be restructured to provide additional CS and CSS support beyond that currently available in the USAR.

General Sullivan told Congress that it will take at least 90 days to ready an ARNG combat brigade for a contingency, and one year for a division. Does this mean that Brehm and Gray are right? Yes and no may be the best answer possible. The state missions are extremely important and must be continued within the Guard's current structure. A recent Department of Defense directive states that "Army and Air Guard forces, acting under State orders (i.e. not in Federal Service), have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to State and local government agencies in civil emergencies." However, if FEMA's mission is transferred to the USAR in the new two component Total Army with its already in-place CS and CSS units in communities across the United States and legislative changes enacted, this would help augment individual states' Guard units for domestic missions. This would make unnecessary a radical reorganization that neither the Guard nor the USAR would support. To do otherwise would degrade the Guard's second mission, that of national defense.

As the Constitution states, the Guard is a domestic force, "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel invasions." However, this role has been enlarged with a plethora of legislative changes expanding the Guard's national defense roles. Thus, as the nation enters the 21st century the ARNG appears as almost a mirror of Active Component combat force structure. The world, within the "new global order," has not become more stable than its previous bipolar order. As a consequence, the combat mission of the Guard beyond the shores of the United States continues to be significant as a deterrent. Nations equate numbers of divisions with military strength, as U.S. intelligence did with Iraq prior to the Gulf War. How then can this need be reconciled with the historical record, especially with the unfortunate experience of the roundout brigades? The answer is simple and does not rest with the House Armed Services Committee legislated ARNG reforms. Nothing legislators can do will provide the ARNG
combat manuever units the ingredient they need to be part of an early deploying contingency force. That ingredient is training time. Study after study on combat readiness lists this fact as the key difference between Active and reserve forces. Certainly, prior active duty experience will help, but mastering the complex nature of modern, high technology warfare requires constant training.

ARNG combat units of brigade and division size require at least the time General Sullivan says they need, and probably more if you consider that the tremendous support available during the Gulf War will not be available from a much smaller Active Component during future mobilizations. Therefore, ARNG combat units of infantry and armor will probably always be the forces of last resort and deploy later as reinforcing elements. As with all units, the commander, in the final analysis, should be the individual whose judgement should carry the most weight. Grooming the type of leadership which can be trusted with such a responsibility will be helped by the reforms legislated by Congress in the Department of Defense Authorization Act FY 1993. In the future two component Army, all brigades currently roundout to Active divisions will be eliminated. All ARNG combat manuever units’ deployment would be after an extended period of post-mobilization, after elements of the Federal Army have established themselves in the theater of operations.

Self-contained ARNG artillery brigades, as indicated earlier, performed well in the theater of operations in the Gulf. As a consequence these CS units (as distinct from combat maneuver elements, FM-100-1-5) can be expected to enter the reinforcing flow earlier than combat maneuver units. The same is true for other CS and CSS units which are echelons below corps. Their deployment might well be on the same schedule as similar ARNG units in the Gulf War of which 67 percent deployed within 45 days, 41 percent within 30 days and 28 percent after 20 days of Federalization.114

Though the Federal Army expanded training base would be responsible for providing individual post-mobilization training to the IRR and, if the conflict was prolonged, Selective Service inductees, reconstitution of immediately required
combat units would be the responsibility of the Guard. These units would be cadred in peacetime by the full and part-time ARNG soldiers. In the event the Active Army is brought down even further, the excess combat equipment would be available and the cadre divisions could be heavy. Using the World War II division 12 percent cadre as a model, and adding an additional 4-6 percent to adjust for the technological revolution in systems and the complexity of modern operations, would be a reasonable size cadre of 16-18 percent. Such units' organic support could be Federal USAR CS and CSS or ARNG units. With this configuration, bringing them to deployment criteria would be faster than reconstituting units from scratch, and would fill the void until new units could come on line. They, like the separate brigades and divisions from the ARNG, form a significant deterrent insurance policy the nation will need as it enters the 21st century.

Conclusions.

Senator John Glenn responded to an Army Times editorial, "Cut the reserves," explaining that Congress has struggled with this issue. He stated that, "For years I fought for a reassessment of the Total Force policy that would provide a rational analysis of regular and reserve combat capability; (emphasis in original), but I have been stymied by a Pentagon either unwilling or incapable of making an analysis." When Congress mandated such an analysis in the 1990 Defense Authorization Act, the Defense Department assured Congress it would "justify the rationale for the active-reserve force mix." However, "it failed to do so." At a hearing, the Senate Armed Services Committee learned that the report "which initially advocated greater reliance on the reserves, was reversed 180 degrees." This attitude by the Defense establishment is part of the Army's historical record of the past 218 years. There are other voices adding fuel to the debate as well.¹¹⁵

Another point of view is offered by retired Brigadier General James P. Hartley, who served in the ARNG as an enlisted soldier beginning in 1943 and then as an officer from 1951 to 1956. He transferred to the USAR in 1956 and remained in that component until 1988. The question he poses is why have two
reserve components? His arguments echo much of the 1948 Gray report, and they are worth repeating. The Guard of today is a far cry from frontier days. Guard members take an oath to the state and then to the nation. Units in peacetime are under the governor's control. Although "preserving law and order" can justify infantry units, training and use of the Guard for that requirement is only a small fraction of its mission. He says, of the 500 call-ups of the Guard between 1987 and 1989, "fewer than 10 involved riots." Most were of the community assistance nature. In the war on drugs, most of the Guard's involvement was using the state air assets. He believes the force "is not trained, equipped, organized or located to meet the foreseeable contingencies of the states"; rather, "it is oriented to being an 'essential' part of defense and it is for that purpose it is trained and armed."

Going further, he highlights the same problems identified in the Gray Report, the difficult coordinating with over 50 governors (territories included), the "arms length" relationship between the two Reserve Components that results in a lack of integrated training, cross utilization of training sites, and equipment exchange.

General Hartley believes there needs to be one reserve for national defense, and it ought to be a Federal Reserve. The Guard he says, should be incorporated into the USAR. As for state missions, there are 30 states with State Defense Forces. These units and units created in the other states should be equipped and trained to meet the needs of the governors. This move, he believes, will create "a more effective and efficient Total Force of active and reserve units...."\(^{116}\)

The reader, now familiar with the historical precedence, will appreciate why this suggestion will not come to pass. However, there is a solution that will bring about two components as well. This is a two component 21st century Total Army of a Federal Army and a militia. The 21st century force is constitutionally sound, in keeping with American tradition, involves citizen-soldiers early in a conflict, enhances the strengths and diminishes the weaknesses of each component as revealed in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, is cost effective,
promotes efficiency, and will ultimately save the lives of young Americans when they face the next war's first battle.

Recommendations.

With a new administration comes the possibility of the opening of a window of opportunity closed since Congress opted not to reduce Reserve Component end strength to the extent previously recommended. The Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must face the historical evidence and seek a new approach to restructuring the Total Army. Marshall's use of John McAuley Palmer to work with Congress to design a peacetime force is an example to emulate.

The missions indicated earlier in this study form the basis for a restructured 21st century force. That force might take on the notional structure shown in Figure 10. While the exact number of divisions and other units cannot be determined, the diagram is a graphic representation of the 21st century force presented in this report. Forward presence is primarily an Active Component mission; however, USAR overseas units can be part of that force as well as support echelons above division within the 1 month criteria. Active Component combat maneuver elements comprise the bulk of the power projection force available within 2-4 months. USAR separate combat brigades roundout the divisions, but at company and/or battalion level. The number of divisions is increased by a new roundout using USAR and ARNG CS and CSS at division and echelons above division as was done in the Gulf. Spaces are also saved by the Active Component turning over some CONUS base infrastructure to the USAR. The ARNG has a reinforcement role with an acceptable 6-12 month window for post-mobilization training. Reconstitution from 12 months and beyond is an ARNG mission until Army of the United States divisions are formed from Selective Service inductees trained by the Federal Army infrastructure. Domestic engagement is the "value added" portion of the force and is a traditional role for the Federal Army in peacetime. FEMA becomes a responsibility of the Federal Army, primarily the USAR. The ties between the nation and its Army are maintained by
THE 21st CENTURY FORCE

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**COMBAT**

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**SUPPORT ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION**

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**BASES**

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**Figure 10.**

84
domestic engagement without degrading combat readiness. The ARNG continues to provide state and local domestic support.

Once the options and structure are agreed upon, Secretary of Defense Aspin is ideally equipped to work with Congress. The Secretary should keep in mind his use of OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM as the basis for restructuring, including force mix. The two component Army recommended in this study breaks the present paradigm. The Army Staff with the ARNG and USAR must begin planning for a phased implementation of a two component Army. A realistic target date for reaching a steady personnel strength should be by the year 2000. Politics and self-interest must be set aside and there is no one better prepared to promote this reform than Secretary Aspin. Each day lost means the increased likelihood of repeating our nation’s past unpreparedness when entering a major war. The consequence is the needless loss of lives.

Is this possible? For the sake of the nation, one can only hope that strategic vision and dynamic leadership can mold the future rather than become its victim.
ENDNOTES


2. War Department, Military Establishment, WD Circular 347, August 25, 1944.


11. Mahon, p. 52.

12. Ibid., pp. 97-100.

13. Ibid., pp. 126-128.

14. Ibid., p. 133


18. Mahon, p. 142. General Wood was incorrect in his count of state Adjutants General. Perhaps his use of the number fifty was a visionary flash.


25. Mahon, p. 163.


32. Mahon, p. 18.


34. George C. Marshall to Roy D. Keehn, June 11, 1942, quoted in Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens, *The Papers of George C.*


37. Ibid., p. 626.
38. Ibid., p. 628.

41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 283.
44. Crossland and Currie, pp. 86-87.
45. Ibid., pp. 87-88
47. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., pp. 33, 109-110.
54. Executive Order No. 10007, October 15, 1948, quoted in Crossland and Currie, p. 95.

55. Carlton and Slinkman, p. 297.


58. Mahon, pp. 235 and 236.


73. Les Aspin to Members, Committee on Armed Services, Memorandum: Combat Power from the Reserve Component, May 7, 1992, p. 5-10.


82. Ibid.


84. Palmer, pp. 32-34.


96. Ibid.


100. Interviews by author conducted with Santa Clara County corrections officers: Lieutenant Fine, Captain Davis, Sergeant Knight, Officer Grace, at Women's Correctional Facility, Milpitas, CA, September 6, 1991.

101. Based on personal inspection by author of Los Angeles County Probation Department's Camp Munz and Mindenhall, Lake Hughes, CA, and an interview with the camp director Mr. Edward Anhalt, September 7, 1991.


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

COLONEL CHARLES E. HELLER is the U.S. Army Reserve Adviser to the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. A graduate of both the U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, he also holds a B.A. in history from Hofstra University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in U.S. history from the University of Massachusetts: Amherst. An Army Reserve Ordnance officer in the Active Guard Reserve Program, his last assignment was as Chief, Mobilization Training Division, U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center. He has served on active duty with the 8th Infantry Division in Germany. He is the author of a number of articles on national security issues and military history including a Leavenworth Paper on chemical warfare in World War I. He is also the coeditor of America’s First Battles, published by the University Press of Kansas.