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JOINT TRAINING - FUTURE DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:  

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Joint Training - Future Dilemmas and Solutions (U)

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Insufficient joint training has hindered past American military operations, though not outcome. With the current drawdown of forces, the inefficiencies of the past caused by insulated, non-joint training will be unacceptable in the future. Current initiatives are underway that promise to rapidly change the way our forces train to fight. Affected will be unit forces, as well as operational and theater staffs. The trend towards ever-increasing interservice interoperability raises deep fundamental questions that challenge the normal relationship between service and theater commander. Such questions include:

• Since today the service chiefs are ultimately responsible for their respective service's training, will this change in the future?
• Is joint training more of a staff issue rather than an 'operator's' dilemma?
• What technological advances will allow the military to accommodate joint training at less cost and greater efficiency?
• When does joint training start for a unit? Can it be conducted concurrently? Will the increased emphasis on joint training come at the expense of more critical unit training?

Whatever the outcome, these changes will require the American military to rethink the way its operational commands are organized, its forces are deployed and technology is incorporated.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Grenada, 1983. Operation Urgent Fury. An ad-hoc joint operation plagued by unwieldy and inefficient logistic support. Intelligence on the island and its inhabitants proves to be sketchy at best. Army helicopters are denied permission to land on Navy ships. Communication interoperability problems force some units to call long distance over commercial telephone lines back to the U.S. to call in close air support strikes.

Lebanon, 1983. Responding to anti-aircraft fire on reconnaissance units, a punitive strike is ordered on Druze anti-aircraft artillery positions. Command rigidity above the battle group level mandates an unrealistic time on target, forcing naval air units to be launched with incorrect or partial bomb loads into the morning sun on a hazy November day. Two aircraft are lost, one pilot killed.

August, 1990. Operation Desert Shield. The USS Eisenhower air wing (CVW-7) is unable to communicate with USAF AWACS or tanker assets. Connectivity between CVN-69 and JTF is stymied until an S-3B commences shuttle runs to Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia to 'hand carry' ad hoc JTF representatives and critical intelligence information.

Despite these and other horror stores, the U.S. military has been, on the whole, extremely successful in carrying our national policy in the twentieth century. This has been in no small way due to the American military system’s ability to allow considerable mass to overcome inefficiencies in its employment. The realities of the future signal the dawning of a day when the U.S. military can no longer afford to operate this way. We will be smaller.

The ramifications of this shrinking force will be profound. Greater quality will have to overcome lesser quantity. And quality will only come by thorough training that will best simulate our forces, tactics and doctrine that will be used to enforce future national security requirements. This means that U.S. military forces of tomorrow will be trained jointly. This emphasis on jointness will impact individual unit training, the service responsible for ensuring thorough readiness, as well as the theater commander to which the unit is eventually responsible to.
CHAPTER II

IMPACT ON TODAY'S COMMAND STRUCTURE - WHO'S IN CHARGE?

On 19 March, 1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that U.S. Atlantic Command 'take the role of joint force integration for CONUS based forces'. This tasking reflected a recognition that the training of U.S. military forces requires some measure of standardization. In its infant steps, joint training is starting to grow up.

Many might question the value of General Powell's initiative or its propriety. As stated in JCS Pub 2 . . . "each of the services has responsibility to organizing, training, equipping and providing forces to fulfill certain combatant functions and for administering and supporting the forces so provided (except as may be directed by the Secretary of Defense)." The Chairman's directive signals a conceptual shift by allowing a CINC responsibility for establishing joint training guidelines for the services, heretofore strictly a service role. This is a contentious issue, as it appears unlikely the service chiefs will forego their training responsibilities without considerable bureaucratic infighting.
At the time of this writing, CINCLANT has initiated an implementation working group which is currently in session to iron out functional area training requirements. The working group consists of CINCLANT subordinate commands (i.e., CINCLANTFLT, AIRLANT and AFLANT). The requirements decided on will be compiled and this list will be distributed to theater and supporting CINCs who will identify applicable joint mission essential tasks. These tasks will be gathered and commonalities identified, allowing a final generic Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) to be established for CONUS based forces. Therefore, it appears that training will be shaped more and more by the warfighting CINCs, who will focus its direction and emphasis in the future.

This natural friction between the service chiefs and the CINCs over training responsibilities is attributable to the nature of attaining combat readiness, which is of course graduated, similar to building any structure. This process of development forces the military to ask basic questions about the realities shaping forces ready to perform operationally, such as when is joint training to be initiated in a unit? Can it be done concurrently with service training? What are the minimum standards of service (unit) training before being introduced to larger, more joint levels of combat training?
Before reflecting on these questions, we must first explore how global changes may affect the present command structure. The CINC's will receive the final product of the pre-deployment joint training conducted by units prior to being assigned to his theater of operations. To some, the vision of forces permanently stationed overseas is an historical aberration that may eventually disappear as world events continue to change. What may evolve is a theater system whereby all forces from the United States are instead deployed or rotated. Although normal for naval forces, this would of course be a dramatic change for ground and air forces, particularly those stationed in Europe and Korea. This would allow all theater warfighting CINC's to be shaped similarly to that of U.S. Central Command, which is essentially a staff with forces deployed to his theater, if needed, for exercise or actual operational need. The current weakness in this system is that these units are supplied in an ad hoc manner and are presently trained with limited joint foresight. It is only after forces are in theater that they begin training and interacting together. This valuable time required to mold the CINC's assets into a cohesive force has long been an exploitable American weakness.
In concept, the ideal vision of the future would require the joint training of forces (which would now be U.S. based) prior to their introduction into a theater of operations. Also, by allowing units to rotate overseas, this may allow joint force units training in CONUS to be packaged together as cadres, with land, sea and air forces familiar on an operator to operator basis.

Presently LANTCOM is being considered for restructuring which will initiate steps to establish a "U.S. COM" which could facilitate such force packaging. This new CINC will be formed by combining Air Combat Command, CINCLANTFLT, FORSCOM and MARFORLANT. While responsible for defense of the homeland, it would also be accountable for ensuring that the training initiatives and standards set up by today's CINCLANT would be carried out.

The ramifications for this 'bigger picture' change are somewhat hazy. Will the reduced requirements for infrastructure and support (fewer dependents, fewer bases, etc) offset the reduced 'corporate knowledge' gained by a garrisoned force? What of logistic requirements to ensure rotation of units to the reporting CINC? Will forward presence become secondary to surging forces out of CONUS? What is slowly becoming evident is that the driving realities of today are
ensuring that units deployed to the warfighting CINCs will be part of a tailored package, jointly trained and ready to react quickly to our national interests.
CHAPTER III

ENHANCING JOINT TRAINING

How, then does this 'macro' vision translate to the realities of today? The Navy's battle groups are important contributors to any operational commander's theater of responsibility. The preparation that the CVBG conducts prior to deployment is critical to its ability to contribute to the CINC's requirements. How then will enhanced battle group, staff and individual unit training support the warfighting CINC?

Joint Training Realities (Staff Versus Operator).

Perhaps at the crux of the joint training issue are weaknesses demonstrated in command, control, communications and intelligence. This issue is somewhat separate from problems arising between direct operational interplay. In other words the preconception is that most difficulties lie with the interface conducted between various operational commanders and their respective staffs vice soldier to sailor interaction. By emphasizing greater staff training, more 'bang for the buck' can be pursued, since that is where the majority of today's inefficiencies lie. The creations of more knowledgeable staffs
through schools, command post exercises and battle simulation will be a boon to operational connectivity and will smooth the way for more effective battlespace management. On the other hand, joint training using actual forces can be expensive and cumbersome. While there is gain, there is also tremendous cost. This cost must be outweighed by the benefits gained by testing concepts and seeing how they translate into reality. Therefore present initiatives are intended to handle these two separate, yet linked quandaries.  

Training the Battlegroup Staff.

On April first, a new training course commenced at TACTRACRULANT, Dam Neck, Virginia. This class is designed to train battle group staffs so that they will be capable of fulfilling the role of joint task force commander, if needed. Cruiser Destroyer Squadron Twelve's staff (embarked on USS Washington) are the first recipients. This training is an important building block in allowing the battlegroup commander to perform the role of JTF.

For the past two years on the West Coast, CINCPAC has developed and initiated a two tiered training Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) staff concept for battlegroup staffs that are likely to become a CJTF. The battlegroup staff is involved in
three exercises. The first, Tempus Express is an initial familiarization of the JTF functions. The second, Tempo Brave, is a command post exercise involving a communications drill using actual force staffs. The third, Tandum Thrust, is an actual joint exercise.⁹

Coupled with this dual-coast battlegroup staff training, is the greater emphasis being placed on simulation, field exercises and computerized command exercises simulating joint battle problems. What previously had been a Navy only staff, tactical training groups in Norfolk and San Diego now have been remanned with Army and Air Force personnel to more realistically advise the battle group commander.¹⁰

These initiatives serve to greatly improve the battle group commander and his staffs ability to function in the joint arena. What then of the operations that serve the battle group? How is the carrier air wing affected?

**Unit Training During the Turnaround Cycle.**

Traditionally a carrier air wing prepares for deployment by conducting a 'turnaround cycle'. After deployment, a squadron is normally 'stood down' for approximately one month. Following stand-down is a period of squadron operations which emphasizes aircrew proficiency on a unit level. The squadron
then progresses towards Airwing level training either embarked or ashore. Carrier shakedown/qualification/refresher training may or may not have preceded a two week NAS Fallon, Nevada deployment, which occurs approximately four to six months prior to overseas deployment. Following the airwing workup at Fallon, the transition to battlegroup training commences, finally culminating in a large scale fleet exercise (FLEETEX) one month prior to overall battle group deployment.

Clearly the historical building block approach that must be conducted for the CVW and the squadrons that it is comprised of will not change to any great extent, particularly in the early stages of an airwing’s turnaround training. However, several initiatives towards emphasizing joint training concurrently with unit training are underway.

Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT) now coordinates ‘joint training opportunities’. Staff officers identify units capable of conducting joint operations based on availability of CINCLANT units (AFLANT, AIRLANT, SURFLANT, MARLANT, etc). Units available are then notified via chain of command of the possibility of conducting a joint exercise. Since these joint availabilities are offered during a unit’s individual training the unit is free to decline the offer. However, this is seen as a way to afford opportunities to units
who might have to otherwise wait for large scale joint exercises. Additionally (and perhaps more importantly), the coordinating command will be required to gather lessons learned from the exercises which will be compiled by COMNAVAIRLANT. These lessons learned will be used to identify weaknesses in joint training, which will be granted greater emphasis during later, larger scale fleet exercises. This initiative will allow compilation, identification, and attempted resolution of joint problem areas.12

Carrier Air Wing Training At Fallon, Nevada.

The carrier airwing deployment to NAS Fallon, NV, is traditionally where its squadrons mold themselves into a cohesive striking force. Accustomed to being on the cutting edge of strike training, NAS Fallon and its resident command, Naval Strike Warfare Center, (AKA "Strike U"), has evolved steadily since its inception in 1984. Current training consists of an Integrated Training Phase (ITP) and Advanced Training Phase (ATP). ITP consists of one time integrated airwing strikes similar to contingency operations such as "El Dorado Canyon". ATP is more comparable to Operation Desert Storm, a sustained campaign.13 A Strike Leader Advanced Training Syllabus (SLATS) offers theater specific briefings
covering the threats to be faced on the airwing's upcoming deployment.\textsuperscript{14}

As advanced as this training is, NAS Fallon (among others) is the subject of a large-scale study being undertaken to explore advanced distributed simulation (ADS), a new technology that is envisioned to greatly enhance present military training. ADS will utilize a technology base common to all services, allowing users to share a battlefield via networking, using a mix and match of live, constructive (such as wargames and models) and virtual simulation methods.\textsuperscript{15} On 21 May 1992 a demonstration was conducted for the Senate Armed Service Committee in Washington, DC. A set of simulators were set up in Dirksen Senate Office Building, and a real time linkup was conducted between an F-16 simulator, an AH-64 attack helicopter simulator, an OH58D simulator (flown from FT Rucker, Alabama) and a platoon of M-1 tank simulators operated from Fort Knox, Kentucky. Other vehicles, including ships were linked.\textsuperscript{16}

"The power of the technique here is obvious. The different combatants were brought together on a common battlefield using virtual simulators, virtual prototypes and a network of communications adapted for these purposes using commercially available components and services".\textsuperscript{17}
ADS is proposed as an adjunct to normal operational training. It is not intended as a replacement for live training or testing. It is recognized that it has certain weaknesses (the training of large, joint forces on short notice is not a strong suit). However, it is seen as a blueprint towards achieving major cost savings, avoiding the ad hoc ways of interoperating among services so prevalent in the past, and allowing the opportunity for forces of some size to train together on a planned basis.18

One of the major examples of ADS' worth can be drawn by contrasting the 1988 and 1992 Reforger exercises. In 1988, two corps were employed in this NATO exercise (17,000 alone from the U.S.) in what essentially was the use of huge numbers of men and equipment for a command staff battle problem. Total cost 53.9 million dollars. In contrast, Reforger 1992 was characterized by a large amount of combined simulation, supplanting the need for 80% of the troops and over 90% of the equipment required in 1988. Reforger 1992's total cost was 19.5 million dollars. Not only was the cost savings significant, the actual training derived was judged to be far superior as well.19

It is envisioned that ADS methods will allow NAS Fallon to become part of a joint complex of ranges in the southwestern
United States. Current initiatives plan to link the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, Nellis Air Force Base, China Lake Weapons Testing Center and Twenty-Nine Palms Marine Corps Station together (See Figure 1). This would allow greater out of area training opportunities for carrier and air wings and allow operator to operator interface between the ground and air. An additional linked complex of ranges in the southeastern United States has been proposed by Commander, Naval Forces Atlantic Fleet to address "Brown Water" scenarios as envisioned in the "From the Sea" whitepaper. ²⁰

This expansion and integration of training ranges is not indicative of the embracing of jointness by the respective range commands. As has been noted, services retain the responsibility for their respective unit training. Surrendering a service's training space and time is deemed (and rightfully so) endangering their respective core training. Therefore, any true 'joint' training between these ranges will (at least in the immediate future) be training 'targets of opportunity'. For instance if an air wing work up is coincidental with an Army unit's rotation to the National Training Center, Close Air Support Training may be arranged by mutually agreeing commands.
FIGURE 1

SOUTHWEST UNITED STATES TEST AND TRAINING RANGE COMPLEX
Likewise, it is envisioned that opportunities will arise for the joint combination of Red Flag exercises in Nellis with carrier air wing work ups in Fallon to afford JTF exercises and flex C4I interoperability. ADS will allow concurrent staff and operator training without interfering in the individual services's need to train its respective units. Eventually, however, it may be possible to 'marry up' Air Force, Navy and Army units and conduct training together for those units that will deploy and fight together overseas. ADS, therefore, may enable the adaptive training process to become reality by facilitating this interaction. The high cost incurred by physically having to have forces massed together, as in the past, is no longer a necessity. Yet, they can train "together" just the same, and they will be used to fight together.

From Fallon To Deployment.

Predictable joint training opportunities such as battlegroup Fleetex operations or Reforger afford the premier means to provide the scenarios that deployed forces will most likely encounter in their expected theater. This is where the training initiatives already discussed will culminate in further refining of the units joint warfighting capabilities. Using the structure of the JMETL as a guide, the unit will be
tested and evaluated. Depending on the interplay, the battle
group staff (now trained to handle joint task force functions)
will be able to be the enabling force or assist the JTF
commander, if ashore. Weaknesses in joint proficiency, derived
via lessons learned from unit level joint interplay, will be
emphasized so as to iron out hard point problems such as
hardware, doctrine or command and control difficulties.\textsuperscript{22}
Linked simulation and virtual reality will be utilized when
necessary to supplement actual live fire and operator to
operator interplay. The overriding vision is that future
supplied forces will be trained to warfighting CINC
specifications (derived from JMETL), tailored to the CINC's
force requirements, ready to fight in the theater arena, using
the strengths and capabilities of all service forces.\textsuperscript{23}
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY

This paper has attempted to examine the interplay between the services and warfighting CINCs, the necessity for our service units to become more jointly trained and some initiatives being undertaken to transform this vision into reality. There are certain considerations to be pondered for the future, however:

1. **Simulation is No Panacea.** States Major General John C. Faith, "Operations and maintenance funds, which pay for unit training and joint exercises, have no constituency in Congress. They look soft at budget cutting time. Their preservation at appropriate levels must be an integral part of any decision (affecting joint training)." The development of Advanced Distributed Simulation is not proposed to replace live, large scale, operator to operator exercises that have so ably served our forces to this date. The danger lies in the affect that a shrinking budget will have on presuming simulation vice live interplay is sufficient when in actuality its woefully inappropriate. There is no replacement for flight time, time in the field, or time underway.
2. **Training Jointly Does Not Mean Sacrificing Unit Training.** The joint mission essential tasking list will allow concurrent joint training that should dovetail nicely with traditional fundamental service training. It will be imperative that the services retain this responsibility, for in so failing, individual units may be figuratively forced to run before they might walk. Thus, time spent in joint training may be time stolen from unit training. It may be necessary to lengthen a training cycle to accommodate joint training requirements.

3. **Joint Training Must Reflect Real World Needs.** While in the past, our Cold War doctrine mandated that forces train towards large scale (if not global) conflicts, the present and future world requires forces trained to respond to regional conflicts that entail peacetime engagement. Terms such as peacemaking and peace enforcement are routinely bantered about, yet our forces thrown into such situations have little, if any, applicable training. Soldiers, such as those deployed to Somalia, must rely on personal initiative and ingenuity, which may be tragically insufficient. This can eventually result in unnecessary and unfortunate loss of life and public support. The initiatives currently underway need to account for the ever
expanding demands put on theater commanders training our forces for a myriad of community roles including nation building and anti-drug operations.

A dilemma can therefore arise between training for these new missions and maintaining readiness for war fighting. What are the trade-offs? As long as there are sufficient forces, the American military may be able to accommodate a 'grab-bag' approach, having some forces more concentrated in peacemaking operations (such as special forces). However, as forces shrink, training will need to be passed on to more conventional units. The reality is that yes, war fighting capability may suffer if time and money are shorted as requirements expand.

4. **Joint Training May Not Be The End Game.** Some operational commanders will require combined as well as interagency interplay. The bottom line is that there is a need for continuous education. In some theaters, the demands on our forces will be strictly military, in others the demands will be a mix of civilian, military, foreign and domestic.

5. **Let's Not Be Trendy.** Training allows units to make mistakes so that they will hopefully not occur in battle. However, the rush to do things jointly for jointness sake
should be recognized for the impulsive error that it is. We must be careful to preserve the strengths of our individual services and the depth of options this strength affords. The hotly debated USS Roosevelt MAGTF is such an example. Tailoring forces must be done with the intent of supplying the warfighting CINC the most capable and efficient force possible. Improved joint training will ensure an adequate force is capable. The wrong mix or inadequate forces (making them joint for jointness sake) will not make them efficient, and may indeed be dangerous to national security.

In summation, joint training is a concept old in evolution but young in implementation.

The realities of the future dictate that we take the opportunity of the present and allow our military force to be sensibly down-sized with minimal affect on its quality. Joint training should not lead to homogenization, but should instead strengthen our ability to react with tailored military force when tasked. Its future indeed looks promising.
NOTES

1. Message, USCINCLANT DTG 252215Z MAR 93.


3. Message, USCINCLANT DTG 252215Z MAR 93.


5. Phone Conversation with Commander Dana Griffin, CINCLANTFLT N-7X, Norfolk, VA, 26 March 1993.

6. Phone Conversation with Captain Fields Richardson, Commanding Officer, Naval Strike Warfare Center, Fallon, NV, 31 March 1993.

7. Phone Conversation with Mr. Eric Shaeffer, CINCLANTFLT, Norfolk, VA N33D, 26 March 1993.

8. Ibid.


12. Phone Conversation with Commander Dana Griffin, CINCLANTFLT N-7X, Norfolk, VA, 26 March 1993.


14. Ibid.
NOTES (CONT'D)


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


22. Phone Conversation with Commander Joseph Comacho COMNAVAIRLANT, Norfolk, VA, 26 March 1993.

23. Phone Conversation with Commander Dana Griffith CINCLANTFLT N-7X, Norfolk, VA, 26 March 1993.

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