RUSSIA, UKRAINE
AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

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The author examines the problems connected with the presence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and their impact on Russo-Ukrainian relations and European security. He analyzes the fears of both Russia and Ukraine, vis-à-vis each other, that have led to this situation and suggests ways out of the impasse for both states, and particularly for the United States. He examines how the present situation evolved and recommends a solution that contributes in peaceful fashion to all parties' interests.
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and may be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed to the author by calling via commercial (717) 245-4085 or DSN 242-4085.
FOREWORD

The concluding of two Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia in 1991-92 had pronounced effects on the future relationship of the Russian republic with the other ex-Soviet republics who had nuclear weapons on their soil. The most acute problem is with Ukraine, which is now reconsidering its former pledge of being a non-nuclear state. If Ukraine retains an active nuclear arsenal, it will precipitate major challenges, if not crises, in the overall European security system and the non-proliferation regime. This report analyzes the Ukrainian inclination to maintain these weapons, as well as Ukrainian and Russian positions with regard to the strategic military and political issues involved.

The author warns against the use of nuclear weapons for political bargaining and of arms control as a surrogate for confronting the hard issues in resolving the nature of the post-Soviet order. The failure of diplomacy will lead to a major security crisis involving Ukraine, Russia and the West. He also suggests an appropriate U.S. position so that another major crisis does not further poison the fragile relationships in the Commonwealth of International States and push the highly volatile Russian situation over the edge to remilitarization and a cold war against a nuclear Ukraine.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this analysis of critical developments in our rapidly changing world.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF THE AUTHOR

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SUMMARY

The character of Russo-Ukrainian relations is the fundamental test of Russia's aspirations and of the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS') international viability as a security community. Historically, the acquisition of Ukraine integrated Russia into Europe both politically and culturally. But the acquisition of that territory also confirmed and necessitated the perpetuation of an autocratic and imperial Russia under both Tsars and Soviets. Today, again, Ukraine is Russia's true window on Europe and can either separate Europe and Russia or be a medium of East-West exchange. For the moment, the security relationship between these two states is strained. Their future relationship stands at a crossroads.

U.S. and Russian efforts to use arms control to serve the respective political objectives of both states, strategic superiority, and a Russian-led military-political union in the old Soviet state have led Ukraine to follow suit and use its nuclear weapons as political bargaining chips. Fearing Russian designs upon its territory and sovereignty, the Ukraine clearly is inclined to retain its nuclear weapons as a means of conventional and strategic deterrence against Russia and to force the United States and the West to give it positive security guarantees. That posture, in turn, reinforces Russian suspicions about the Ukraine, drives a major wedge into the increasingly important non-proliferation treaty regime, and, perhaps most importantly, is a major obstacle to the stabilization of the former USSR as a viable and stable security community within Europe. This is because Russia will not adhere to the Lisbon Protocol, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and the Framework Agreement if Ukraine retains nuclear weapons. Thus a nuclear and conventional arms race between the two states will soon ensue in lieu of a settlement between them. Therefore, Ukrainian-Russian tension is a major obstacle to the overall stabilization of Eastern Europe and the CIS.
This tension, however, can be substantially mitigated by a Western and U.S. integral package of political, economic, and security guarantees to the Ukraine in return for an end to its nuclear status and peace with Russia. Such a guarantee is also a major step towards establishing a new European security order. It both hedges against further unrest in the CIS and offers Russia, which currently fears Ukrainian aspirations, true security by further integrating it into the West, since this guarantee also eases Russia's fears about the Ukraine. This combined package also moves to a new security structure in Europe that would, in time, replace NATO by an organization whose pivot is not the Soviet threat but the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and point towards realizing the ultimate objective of collective security in Europe. The guarantees to Ukraine also are powerful incentives for the continuing decommunization and demilitarization of Russian and Ukrainian politics and should be combined with continued aid to Russia, not necessarily for Yeltsin but rather for whoever will sustain true reform.

Western and U.S. guarantees to both states will enmesh them in a larger and integrating security community along with neighboring East European states and offer incentives to further that process. Guarantees have the added virtue of recognizing the legitimate interests of Russia and Ukraine and validating the benefits of a Western orientation in Russian policy. The guarantees also create a balance or equilibrium of forces between Russia and Ukraine while limiting the extent to which their rivalry can deteriorate. A combined economic, military, and political payoff to Ukraine and Russia can be the fulcrum upon which the United States can pivot past structures and systems towards a new security order across most of Eastern Europe and the CIS and contribute materially to democratic and capitalist reform in both Ukraine and Russia. A guarantee to defend either it the other attacks in return for mutual progress to denuclearization and a package of economic and political assistance can cut through many of the current problems afflicting both the CIS as a whole and these two states in particular and do for them what they cannot do for themselves.
The United States alone can take the lead to reshape the CIS security agenda in this direction. It can only be done with our allies and be a collective enterprise of all of them. Moreover, it is our responsibility and in our interest to lead. Yugoslavia has shown that Europe cannot act on its own yet. This policy continues U.S. leadership in Europe in a structure that recognizes the new realities and is based on them, combines stability with democratization, supports a process and not an unstable personalized leadership, and is cost effective. Failure to propose any answers to the CIS' basic problems can only lead to ruinous expenses later and division in Europe. Simply stated, if the United States does not rise to the challenge and shape a new security agenda, others will shape it for us, without us, or against us.
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Arms Control and the Ukrainian Threat
to Russia and the West.

In 1992, just before becoming Deputy Defense Minister of Russia, Andrei Kokoshin observed,

Nuclear weapons are becoming primarily an element of political bargaining, no longer between adversaries, but actually in relations between friends and allies. We see this not only in the CIS but also in the West.¹

He accurately summed up the state of strategic issues in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The two Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaties between Russia and the United States have become conscious tools of both states’ respective political objectives; a Russian-led restored military-political union in the former USSR and U.S. strategic superiority. Russian analysts like Aleksei Arbatov expressed this ambition when he stated that arms control should be "one of the most effective levers" to maintain some form of union. The START treaties to date have signified that this political use of arms control for those objectives is exactly Moscow’s and Washington’s goal.²

Because both states have substituted arms control talks for politics they have made those talks bear the burden of overall security policy. Moreover, by so using arms control they encouraged other nuclear post-Soviet states like Ukraine and Kazakhstan to follow their example. Ukraine, in particular, is overtly using its nuclear weapons to demand political guarantees from Russia, the West, and the United States; it is threatening to retain its nuclear weapons unless it receives the guarantees discussed below. Thus the fate of the START treaties now rests in Kiev. Should Ukraine retain its 1,656 land- and air-based missiles, Russia will likely reject the treaties. Because of the threat those missiles would then represent to
Russia, that decision could likely start a new European cold war based on both sides' strategic weapons. That decision would also effectively end the Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) regime set up in 1968 and encourage other would-be nuclear or "threatened" states to proceed and block the treaty's renewal in 1995.

Thus we now face a potential new cold war in Europe because arms control cannot resolve the fundamental issues between Russia and Ukraine; instead it exacerbates them. It is now also clear that the U.S. policy to bypass the republics, deal only with Russia, and focus on nuclear disarmament by removing republican nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantlement misreads the need for a broad policy to address Ukraine's and other republics' resistance to efforts to use arms control to restore a military-political union.3

Officially Ukraine intends to dismantle the strategic systems under its control and transfer them to Russia under the Lisbon Protocol to START I. However, influential forces want Kiev to keep those forces and have led it to demand "compensations" for removing them. Ukraine is clearly using nuclear weapons, not just for deterrence, but also for political demands upon the United States, Russia, and NATO. But it is only following what the United States and Russia have long since acknowledged in deed and what Kokoshin and Arbatov understood. Whether Ukraine is justified or not, arguably failure to live up to the Lisbon Protocol and dismantle those systems would provoke the very Russo-Ukrainian tensions that both sides profess to shun.

That outcome would certainly reinforce nationalist pressures in both states by validating the charge that the other side is "out to get them." The net result would be increased military and political antagonism where the NPT is broken, and a reversal of the trend to denuclearize European security. A Ukraine, having (at least on paper) the third largest army in Europe, and nuclear missiles targeted at every NATO state, forces NATO to reciprocate by targeting Ukraine, and, could also promote political opportunities for Russo-Western rapprochement at Kiev's expense. It would also decidedly unsettle every state in Eastern Europe with this dangerous
"umbrella." Since U.S. intelligence agencies have proclaimed that they believe Ukraine is moving to positive, operational control over those systems, action to prevent that decision becomes urgently necessary. Poland has already decried Ukraine’s nuclearization, fearing further militarization of regional tension.

To see the political uses of Ukraine’s nuclear systems we must ask why Ukraine holds back on denuclearization, what conditions it demands, and to what extent, if any, are its concerns justified? Clearly Ukraine’s main fears about security lie in its continuing differences with Moscow over the CIS, its future, and Ukraine’s role within it. Moscow tends to view the CIS as the basis for a future restored military-political union of the former Soviet republics. Since 1991 it has clashed often with Ukraine on economic, territorial, and military issues within the CIS which the Ukraine refuses to see as more than an instrument for a civilized divorce. While Ukrainian elites acknowledge that the Yeltsin government, however inconsistent its policies, will not attack, they fear the future policies of a volatile and unsettled Russia. They also fear efforts by Russia to tie Ukraine to it by economic means or continuing calls for subordinating nuclear weapons to Russia followed by military-political union, i.e Russian hegemony. Therefore they want ironclad guarantees of military security under de-nuclearization. In addition, they greatly fear that the United States and Russia will decide non-nuclear Ukraine’s future without its participation. Kiev believes the United States only took Kiev seriously because it has nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately Kiev probably read past U.S. policy accurately. That policy, too, used arms control to achieve political aims of a continued Russian-based union and U.S. strategic superiority. U.S. policy focused wholly on personalities, Yeltsin and Gorbachev, and did not pay enough attention to the broader strategic issues of Russia’s and Soviet nationality policies and the organization of the state, whose resolution is basic to creating stability in the CIS and across Eastern Europe. As many have noted, the basic "nationality issue" is between Moscow and Kiev. In the context of acute mutual suspicion, the U.S. support for a unified post-Soviet
state has fed Ukraine's anxieties and fears about being left to Russia's mercies.\textsuperscript{11}

Additionally, the United States has sought unilateral military advantages in the conventional and nuclear disarmament talks. In effect we had a defense policy whose goal was strategic superiority as implemented through CFE and the START treaties, not a broader security policy. The CFE treaty broke up the force packages of Soviet military power which could, when combined, provide multiplier effects comparable to NATO packages which, as DESERT STORM showed, were left intact. And the breakup of the USSR into sovereign states accelerated that effect by further dividing former Soviet military assets. The START treaties compounded the U.S. quest for strategic superiority by compelling Russia to move toward U.S. force structure which precludes use of the ICBMs for preemptive first strikes—our greatest fear—and towards U.S. ideas of strategic stability. Given the breakup of conventional forces in Russia, for all practical purposes Russia is left essentially with a nuclear retaliatory posture because it will be unable to either threaten or reply to threats with conventional forces. The Treaties ratified those advantages, but neglected regional political problems, e.g. Russo-Ukrainian relations, that lie at the root of regional conflicts and excessively politicize and burden arms control with extravagant objectives.

Thus Washington offered relatively little, $175 million, to clean up and dismantle the missiles and buy Ukrainian plutonium on the open market. And, the Bush administration resisted giving security guarantees to Ukraine, thereby risking validation of Ukrainian arguments for keeping the weapons. Advocates for this hard-line policy argue that financial guarantees encourage other would-be nuclear states to blackmail the United States (or its allies).\textsuperscript{12} They, and many Russian analysts, argue that Ukraine wants the weapons for mainly psychological reasons, to get U.S. attention and be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{13} Only by keeping the weapons can it gain this "respect" since this is all the United States cares about.\textsuperscript{14} Unfortunately, the U.S. emphasis on nuclear issues tends to confirm that perception.
These assessments also downplay and minimize any threat Ukraine might feel from Russia and the missiles' deterrent value. U.S. officials warned Ukraine not to rely on a scrap of paper and urged Ukraine to join international organizations. They also told Ukraine that if it is attacked by a nuclear power (i.e. Russia) the United States will support immediate convocation of the Security Council as the NPT requires. Not surprisingly, Kiev refused this out of hand. Since then it is not clear what, if any, guarantees Washington later gave Kiev, although there was talk of such after the January 1993 meeting of Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasiuk with President Bush and President Kravchuk’s February 1993 meetings with British Prime Minister Major. But evidently Russia still refuses to give Ukraine credible guarantees.

Washington’s past failure to recognize Ukraine’s need for credible guarantees shows the error in pursuing dominance in strategic and conventional systems through arms control at the price of broader security questions. We have neither reassured Russia that we do not seek a broader hegemony nor Ukraine of our concern for its independence. Such reassurance would ease Russia’s difficulties in pursuing integration with Europe and help Ukraine decide to relinquish its strategic systems.

Perhaps most mistaken is U.S. continuing insistence that Russia alone is the key to the area and our dismissal of Ukraine’s importance and its real anxieties about Russian policy. These anxieties, it must be noted, are not confined to Ukraine alone, but are shared by virtually every East European state. While all these states realize that while Yeltsin’s regime is the most liberal one they can expect, its record has been too inconsistent for them to place any confidence in future Russian policy. Past history and strategic realities are too strong to be discounted. Accordingly, each of these states wants membership in the EC (European Community) and NATO, or at least tangible signs of Western interest in their continuing security and integrity, sooner rather than later, although they will take what they can get now. In this context, former Defense Secretary Cheney’s remarks favoring early membership at the December 1992 NATO Defense Ministers conference and recent conversations with Polish Defense Minister
Onyszkiewicz represent a beginning of wisdom.\textsuperscript{19} While security guarantees for Eastern Europe are not cost free for the Western alliance, the potential renuclearization of Eastern Europe will inevitably touch off a scramble by Eastern European states for such guarantees wherever they can get them. Although Ukraine has grounds for complaint about U.S. policies, that is not the whole story, nor are its policies faultless.

**Ukrainian Demands and the START Treaties.**

The START II treaty offers important gains to a non-nuclear Ukraine's security. It compels both sides to move to submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) where the United States has a decided advantage, and destroys much of Russia's main nuclear system and the foundation of its strategic forces, the SST 18s. It also minimizes mobile missiles' future role which we have shunned. The benefits for Russia are reduced cost, reduced threat of nuclear attack from the West, and the prospect of future Anglo-French participation in subsequent negotiations. However, in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship, two other outcomes of the START treaties emerge. First, should Russia destroy the land-based systems that provide the most effective option for surprise strikes, the threat of preemptive or surprise strikes against Ukraine is greatly reduced. Second, should the Ukraine continue to hold onto its weapons, it would be politically isolated. Russia would have a large claim on the West for security against Ukraine. Therefore START II is clearly in Ukraine's interest, especially given its professed goal of integration with Europe. However, its insistence on a nuclear status and the ensuing failure of START I that would then occur will prevent Russian ratification of START I and II with the consequences noted above that are against Ukraine's best interests. It is a sign of Kiev's self-absorption and obsession with total security against Russia that its elites have failed to appreciate START's benefits.

Instead, influenced by unrealistic nationalist expectations of what is possible in international politics, Ukrainian officials demand guarantees that even the most supportive U.S. officials would find hard to offer, e.g., $1.5 billion as
compensation for destruction of nuclear weapons even though Russia is bearing those costs. \(^\text{20}\) (Evidently the earlier $175 million has not yet reached Ukraine.) \(^\text{21}\) Ukraine also wants control over any remaining nuclear weapons facilities on its soil and Russia's "clear-cut" admission that Ukraine owns the uranium and plutonium in its nuclear weapons. \(^\text{22}\) Most importantly, Kiev's Ambassador to the United States, Oleh Bilonus, states,

> We want a guarantee that the powers will never use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, never resort to conventional force or the threat of force, will abstain from economic pressure in a controversy and respect our territorial integrity and the inviolability of our borders. So far, the guarantees Moscow offers have not met our minimal demands. \(^\text{23}\)

Lastly, it wants these guarantees to be made "at the highest level" for defense against Russia once it yields the missiles. \(^\text{24}\) Kravchuk also lists borders, territories, actions via the U.N. or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and a series of unspecified guarantees of security, "if one is to take the legal, political, and military position." \(^\text{25}\)

It is impossible to assume or meaningfully realize these conditions. The NPT already guarantees that states attacked by a nuclear power can go to the Security Council against that attack, so Ukraine is protected and needs no special document. This is also true for the CSCE. So a security guarantee is a way to commit NATO or the United States to action, possibly nuclear war, against Russia, a war that destroys Ukraine in any case. Obviously, Ukraine cannot compel another state to enter what amounts to a mutual suicide pact, especially when NATO is not ready to extend itself into Poland let alone Ukraine. Here Kiev is using nuclear weapons for pure political goals beyond deterrence.

Kiev's financial demands also go beyond what Russia is getting to comply with START I and the money would go to a government that lags behind Russia in economic reform. That is impossible under current U.S. conditions. But Tarasiuk hints that Kiev wants a document giving Parliamentary nationalists
something to show as a guarantee against Russia and of Western interest in Ukraine.  

Ukrainian Objectives and Nuclear Weapons.

In Ukraine's political press one sees a vocal and growing trend to keep the nuclear card in response to Russian imperialist leanings to and be taken seriously. These come with calls for an ambitious policy in Europe, e.g. launching a regional community, association, or union, with Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and the new Baltic states, to equalize its status vis-a-vis Russia and counter Russia's disproportionate strength. Ukraine now aims to be this counter-weight with ideas of Baltic-Black Sea cooperation and collaboration with Poland. But, that is incompatible with a nuclear status because none of these states will surrender to nuclear blackmail or umbrellas by Ukraine, nor will they deliberately provoke Russia for the sake of uncertain Western or Ukrainian guarantees.

Ukraine's leaders also claim its continuing membership in the CIS is purely utilitarian and instrumental. Foreign Minister Zlenko reiterated recently that its membership is based first and foremost on economic reasons. Admitting that Ukraine's economy was "tied up" with Russia's and the CIS, he also stressed that Ukraine looks mainly westward because it would otherwise be cut off from economic ties that it seeks in Europe. The purpose of membership is to limit the considerable damage Russia can do to Ukraine. But while it is rational for Ukraine to counter Russia and diminish the CIS for its own interests, it is also clear that it cannot seek to integrate with Europe and counter Russia while threatening each one with nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, this is lost upon nationalists and pro-nuclear forces who urge Ukraine to create a geopolitical space and policy to compete successfully with Russia and the United States, ultimately to "control" Central and Eastern Europe by a "nuclear umbrella". They urge Ukraine to pursue a truly national policy and renounce neutrality and de-nuclearization. Though this is an extreme, even lunatic, view, by mid-1992
Philip Petersen found that a "surprisingly large number of Ukrainians" advocated denuclearizing only in the context of a general All-European arms reduction or as the price for NATO membership or guarantees of Ukrainian integrity.\textsuperscript{32}

In that context and environment, it is not surprising that the pro-nuclear views of Major General V.B. Tolubko, a relative of the former CINC of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and now a deputy in Ukraine's Parliament, should command considerable support. He concluded that modern conventional warfare means massive bombardment using high precision weapons, space-based and electronic guidance systems, and radio-electronic suppression of the enemy throughout the depth of his defense. Ukraine should have all these systems that could destroy any hardened targets, "missiles with no limitations as to range, strategic bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles, and, of course, sea-based strategic systems." Intercontinental data acquisition, surveillance, and strike systems could come later.\textsuperscript{33}

He also asserts that for Ukraine "to be reckoned with," it also must retain nuclear weapons and appropriate delivery systems and not adhere to START I. In other words, we again encounter the political rationale for these weapons. Ukraine's military, political, and economic security are at stake, he claims. He favors using these systems as political leverage to get credits for technology and know-how to create and sustain Ukraine's independent economic base. Tolubko further argues concerning Russia's instability and fully recognizes the deterrent value of these systems. He justifies his position by citing the U.S.'s, France's, and the U.K.'s ongoing nuclear buildup,\textsuperscript{34} but ignores the pressure that they will come under to join nuclear reduction talks thanks to the START treaties. Nor does he realize that political security and political arguments must take priority over purely military ones. Neither he nor his supporters explain how Ukraine can get NATO guarantees, i.e. pledges to a mutual suicide pact, by threatening NATO with strategic systems if it refuses. Nor can he explain how nuclear Ukraine can obtain security or integration with Europe. For these reasons it is clear that Ukraine's effort to keep nuclear weapons is self-defeating and
will diminish Ukrainian and European security. Hence using nuclear weapons for political goals corrupts and diminishes arms control since those weapons actually would increase Ukraine's insecurity.

**Russian Security Policy and Ukraine.**

Even so, and even under Yeltsin's leadership in Russia, Kiev has good reasons for genuine alarm or concern about its security. Foremost among them, and perhaps the most deeply rooted and enduring, is many Russian elites' visceral and deep-seated belief that without Ukraine, Russia's very identity is imperiled and that Ukraine is nothing more than "Little Russia" (Malorossiia). Precisely because Russia's own identity is not yet resolved, Russia has neither defined a viable notion of a security community, enjoying common objectives, threats, and shared risks for itself or the CIS, nor created a nonimperial idea of the state. For many, even liberals, Ukraine's independence is worse than treachery; it strikes at the very concept, let alone existence, of a Russian state. Russian military and political figures conceded to Petersen that Russia consistently sought to include Ukraine in the CIS to remake it into a military-political union. Numerous Russian political and military elites continue to insist upon a military-political union run from Moscow, that would deny the Ukraine control over its own forces. Russian military leaders, writing for Western audiences, as well as in their own Draft Military Doctrine of May 1992, also insist on the CIS' military-political unity. The preamble to the Draft Doctrine states that it, "assumes cooperation with member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States in accomplishing joint defense tasks based on bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental treaties and agreements." Similarly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' draft treaty with Ukraine contains a clause providing for wartime stationing of Russian forces there. Any such union is bound to be authoritarian since it cannot compel Ukraine's voluntary assent and would thus have to rely on force.

Apart from the Russian right's ongoing belief that Ukrainian independence is illegitimate and anti-Russian, Russian defense policy and doctrine presents many reasons for alarm,
not only in the Ukraine. Political gridlock has prevented Russia from formulating a coherent and legitimate concept of Russia’s national interests. That gridlock goes back at least to the inconsistent Soviet policy during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. It reflects the continuing lack of consensus on national interest and overall security policy, and that Russia has not fully consummated a democratic revolution. One only need read any recent copy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) journal *International Affairs* to see the wildly disparate postures that are advanced in the MFA.

Therefore, Russian foreign and defense policy, like Chichikov’s Troika in *Dead Souls*, is out of control. Nobody knows where it is going, least of all Russian policymakers. Since they have given us scant reasons to believe that they can control that troika, until those policymakers decide the issue, we face a country that will be immobilized if left alone, or worse. Because Russia is too big to be left alone and ignored, if the West refuses to engage with Russia, it will then act unpredictably, even unstably. The impact of this gridlock is already visible in Russian politics. Yeltsin has surrendered much in defense and foreign policy to the Right in order to continue his economic reforms. The Right pocketed these concessions but insists on full reversion to state-directed policies at home and nationalistic ones abroad. Yeltsin suspended removal of Russian troops from the Baltic, linking it to the treatment of Russians in the Baltic and demanding continuing bases there as well as a repeal of Baltic legislation on citizenship. Russian sources admit that he did this at the urging of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and local military commanders. Since then he even asked the U.N. to grant Russia authority to police the ex-Soviet empire should ethnic conflicts break out there, a so called Russian “Monroe Doctrine.” Yeltsin also severely criticized the MFA for poor coordination with the MOD and for insufficient attention to Russians’ condition in the “near abroad.” That concern has become an MFA priority as recent policy shows.

These are ominous developments for Eastern Europe because of Russia’s desire to retain bases in the Baltic. Given the Russian Right’s open ambition to restore its hegemony
there, e.g. Yevgeny Ambartsumov’s idea of a "Monroe Doctrine" in the "Near Abroad," (now evidently taken up by Yeltsin) and the Draft Doctrine’s language, it is clear that raising the condition of Russians in neighboring states as an issue is intended to intimidate the Baltic states into compromising their sovereignty, a tactic that could be used in the Ukraine which has 11 million Russians. The Draft Doctrine fully and frankly states,

A violation of the rights of Russian citizens and of persons who identify themselves with Russia ethnically and culturally in the former USSR republics can be a serious source of conflicts. Russia will view the introduction of foreign troops on the territory of contiguous states as well as a buildup of army and naval force groupings at its borders as a direct military threat. In this case it reserves to itself the right to take steps necessary to guarantee its own security.

This statement can also be seen as an attempt by the MOD and General Staff to usurp the civilian leadership’s political role and decision-making prerogative to decide what is a casus belli. This threat assessment is not merely rhetoric to cover a humiliating retreat. Prominent military and civilian officials view the Baltic and other post-Soviet states as Russia’s sphere of influence which it must control and where it must retain access. Indeed, many generals and admirals accept the alarmist formulation of August 1992 by former Navy CINC Chernavin that not only was there still a threat, the CIS’ disintegration had caused it to increase.

Even the most liberal officials still see Russia exerting control over these states by its sheer economic weight and are determined to restrict Baltic freedom of action abroad. These considerations obviously apply to Ukraine and its 11 million Russians. The fact that such programs are advanced when the Russian army is short 960,000 men and is virtually unable to mount any sustained combat operation implies that the Draft Doctrine was intended as a long-term guide for when Russia has revived and can actualize its provisions. The fact that the military could get such policies approved and successfully misinform or disinform Yeltsin and later join with right-wingers to scuttle normalization of relations with Japan strongly
suggests that a) the military is not under effective civilian control, and b) is strongly politicized even as it is deeply divided and demoralized. That is a deeply dangerous combination, though some analysts welcome that politicization. General Aleksandr' Lebed's conducting of his own foreign policy in Moldova with the XIV Army to the virtually unanimous praise of Russia's government and Parliament only heightens concerns about civilian control over the armed forces.

Since Yeltsin and prominent Russian officials like ambassador to Washington, Vladimir Lukin, have raised the issue of territorial realignment by pressuring the Ukraine in the Crimea, and Yeltsin has publicly conceded having discussed a nuclear strike on the Ukraine, these facts and the more operational doctrinal points cited below give real grounds for Kiev's security concerns. After all, the framers of the Draft Doctrine announced that,

Russia proceeds from the assumption that its security is inseparable from that of the other Commonwealth states. The defense of Russia and of the Commonwealth as a whole can be ensured with greatest effectiveness by joint efforts of the CIS countries with centralized operational leadership of their collective defense. Given this, Russia's Armed Forces can be transferred partially or completely to the CIS Combined Armed Forces and be operationally subordinated to the Combined Arms Forces' Main Command.

Since Marshal Shaposhnikov tirelessly advocates transferring CIS nuclear forces to Russia, it is hard to see any distinction between his views, the Draft doctrine and the idea of a restored union.

Russia's Military Doctrine.

As of early 1993, it is not clear that a Draft Doctrine has been accepted either in original or revised form, or even if there will be any subsequent doctrine as the term was formerly used. But in February and March 1993 Yeltsin announced that a new doctrine would soon be published. And, from conversations with well-connected Russian analysts, it appears that the final version is basically similar to the May 1992 Draft Doctrine.
Therefore a prudent Ukrainian defense planner cannot ignore the fact that, in operational terms, there are at least four points in the Draft Doctrine that are alarming.

First, it renounces a defensive posture and adopts an offensive one. The 1990 "defensive doctrine" stated that the main wartime operational objective was to repel aggression; the new one's main objective is to "repel aggression and defeat the opponent." These mission goals strongly imply an offensive capability cloaked under "defensive doctrine." Presumably there are planners who believe that such a preemptive but limited theater offensive in operational terms can justly be called a strategically defensive operation. As such it is compatible with a "defensive doctrine" and "reasonable sufficiency," let alone the new doctrine. General Igor Rodionov, Director of the General Staff Academy, told an approving audience, including Defense Minister Grachev, "The Russian Armed Forces must be capable of conducting military operations of any nature and on any scale." Retired Colonel General A.A. Danilovich echoed this view abroad by calling for an offensive capability and stating that in combat, "policy must not be locked in by tactics." General M.A. Gareev, seconded this opinion.

This more open advocacy of offensive operations goes back at least to Soviet analyses of Operation DESERT STORM that led many military analysts seriously to consider that a defensive doctrine was misconceived and harmful. Russian forces had to be able to forestall devastating first strikes like those inflicted upon Iraq. Thus the new Draft Doctrine and these comments fit into a pre-coup trend that reflects a serious and continuing line of analysis in Soviet and now Russian military thinking.

Second, the Draft Doctrine suspiciously retreats from 1990s outright statement that Russia would never be the first to use nuclear weapons towards a posture that seems to call for nuclear first responses. But, as noted above, it is not clear how post-START force structures will mesh with this posture. Though the Draft Doctrine states that Russia will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, that statement is, in reality, greatly qualified and softens the categorical tone of 1990. The Draft
Doctrine takes a conventional strike on infrastructure as tantamount to a nuclear-first strike, implying a first-strike nuclear option and dismissing many U.S. notions of deterrence, strategic stability, and escalation control. Rodionov echoed this statement, demanding that Russia retain the right to use nuclear weapons, if need be, against conventional strikes and advised against too explicit a doctrinal statement about nuclear weapons. He rejects any advertisement of a defensive doctrine as harmful and worse and says that Russia should make no declarations other than that it has the systems and let others worry what that means. His view comes close to seeing nuclear weapons as weapons like any others. His idea, that nuclear weapons were becoming, for economic and military reasons, Russia's main armed force has also been accepted by the military leadership—which therefore should be very ambivalent about START's enforced reduction of those systems. And if Ukraine keeps its weapons it will not be ambivalent at all.

For instance, an article on the history of Russia's first SLBM system ends with an editorial stating that, "But we believe that there are generous lessons to be learned from future history. And one of them is that in those days, the state would not allow anyone to conduct a dialogue with it from a position of strength." Gareev again seconded this view,

Russia considers that, under conditions of the maintenance of excessive nuclear and conventional arms and the refusal of individual states to pledge that they will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons or military force, it is necessary to prepare our armed forces to resolve missions to repel aggression under any variant of the unleashing and conduct of war.

These statements strongly suggest a doctrine of first use and massive retaliation. Under its terms, a non-nuclear Ukraine, tied to a Russia that struck first, would be devastated by forces and actions that it did not control. De Gaulle rejected this for France and that prospect unnerved the Soviet bloc in 1984.

In many ways the nuclear issue is the most complex one in this equation. For now Ukraine is ahead on the infrastructure
for conventional operations despite the long-term goals enunciated in Russia's doctrine because the best forces and equipment were stationed in Ukraine and Belarus after the CFE Treaty in 1990. No one anticipated that Russia's border with Ukraine would become its first echelon of defense or that Ukraine would have a head start in conventional systems. Hence, Russia's greatest immediate fear is any conventional or nuclear Ukrainian strike backed up by nuclear weapons that would deter a Russian counterblow.⁷⁴

At the same time, Russia's long-term goals, stated in its Draft Doctrine, would reverse that situation because the government has pledged itself to try to implement the doctrine's provisions. What now deters Ukraine is the paradox that any attack on Russia by nuclear Ukraine immediately invites Russia to call the United States, NATO, and European security organizations to intervene for Russia. Thus nuclear weapons make Ukraine triply vulnerable. It is vulnerable 1) to a Russian preemptive strike and/or 2) Western intervention to prevent it from reaching the nuclear threshold or to deter Russia, that lacks usable conventional deterrents, from so doing. 3) Alternatively the West could intervene to prevent Russian nuclear retaliation by making a nuclear threat from NATO or the United States or by promising military support from either one of those forces. In either case the United States and/or NATO would have to guarantee regional security because Ukraine's atomic weapons make it vulnerable. That is NATO's worst nightmare and therefore unlikely. Finally, the West believes that Ukraine can be effectively ensured against nuclear attack by renouncing its strategic systems and signing the NPT which provides for effective escalatory responses for states subjected to a nuclear attack. It is also unlikely that in a crisis preceding use of force or in the event of such a strike that the CSCE and North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) would not act. But this is not enough for Ukraine, which feels fundamentally threatened by Russia and wants total security.

Under present conditions, nuclear forces are equally essential to Russia's defense because its conventional forces are utterly incapable for now and the foreseeable future of any large-scale conventional operation. This fact and the lowering
of the nuclear threshold in Europe due to the CFE and START treaties make nuclear scenarios more likely, especially for Russia. The importance of Russia's nuclear weapons and the threat to use them if it is conventionally attacked also emerges in an article by the respected military columnist, Pavel Felgengauer. His article cogently states the reasons why limited or other nuclear war scenarios could actually become real ones for Russia. He based his article on conversations with and speeches by Kokoshin, therefore his reports must be taken seriously as an indicator of high-level Russian military thinking and policy on nuclear issues.

Felgengauer noted that nuclear missile forces are essentially Russia's sole effective guarantee of strategic independence, thus serving political aims. Russia's nuclear weapons cannot deter local conflicts in the North Caucasus but they do deter foreign intervention there. They also deter plans to send foreign peacekeeping forces to the former USSR where they might infringe on Russian interests. Lastly, the nuclear umbrella ensures the security and integrity of Russian and CIS signatories of the June 1992 Tashkent accord on collective security.

But nuclear deterrence prevents war only as long as there is a serious belief that nuclear weapons will be used if all else fails. But the end of the cold war has made vague the formerly precisely defined threshold of nuclear casus belli. There is a growing chance that medium-sized or small non-nuclear powers will challenge a nuclear state which will have no option other than a "limited" nuclear strike. He doubts that Russia will only retaliate, especially given its doctrine and the public panic that might break out if a nuclear target is attacked or weapon used.

But Russia has no real choice. Since Gorbachev, the relative cheapness of nuclear weapons and their reliability make them the basis of Russian security. The danger lies in nuclear disarmament and advances in conventional weapons technology. When there were over 600,000 combat-ready nuclear warheads, "limited" nuclear war seemed quite unreal. Now, as nuclear warheads go off operational readiness, the probability of limited nuclear war also grows. As the danger of
global nuclear catastrophe fades, effective deterrence ebbs. Atomic weapons become not so much a means of preventing war, but very powerful and effective weapons, according to Rodionov.\textsuperscript{75}

The General Staff view of the danger in the race to disarm was given in 1992 by then First Deputy Chief of Staff, now Chief of Staff, Colonel General Kolesnikov. He claimed that the breakup of the USSR had rallied NATO, and the West would exploit the issue of international control over nuclear weapons directly to intervene because the revival of Russia or the CIS as a great military power is not in NATO's or U.S. interest. He, too, expected the West to use nuclear weapons for political purposes beyond deterrence.\textsuperscript{76} Given the possible scenarios we have noted and the contradiction between START's acceptance of minimum nuclear deterrence and the Russian General Staff's rejection of it in favor of parity as stated in the Draft Doctrine, it seems the General Staff sees "limited" nuclear wars as quite possible.\textsuperscript{77} Precisely because Russian military policy and thinking is in such flux on these crucial points, a nuclear Ukraine would tip the balance to those calling for nuclear strike options and forces, against Ukraine's putative aims.

The third possible threat to Ukraine from Russia's doctrine is the vision of future war as a melange of cold war and DESERT STORM tactics set in a smaller theater. While the Draft Doctrine concedes there may be local wars along the CIS' and Russia's borders, it focuses on large-scale conventional action.\textsuperscript{78} Gareev, too, reflects this traditional outlook. Recent local wars induce doubt that peacekeeping or relatively small forces, like U.N. forces in Bosnia, can concentrate sufficient men and materiel decisively to accomplish their missions rapidly. These will likely be protracted wars unless overwhelming forces are introduced early into the theater. The entire military structure must then be optimized to fight large-scale aggression.\textsuperscript{79} It is doubly ironic that in the same article he laments that Russian military thought is still firmly oriented to large-scale theater-strategic conventional operations.\textsuperscript{80} This focus on missions training and force structures equipped to fight protracted, large-scale wars
inevitably leads to a demand for the old mobilization and military-economic policy. The call to restore a new version of that military economy oriented to high-tech precision weapons and the notion that local wars will become theater conventional ones that could likely become protracted or nuclear, if not both, introduces strenuous, if not impossible, long-term requirements, which cannot now be met, into military planning. Those requirements must impose comparable ones upon Ukraine who may then be forced into greater force expansion, if not total mobilization, especially in lieu of a nuclear deterrent.

The fourth doctrinal point that raises concern is the stress on preemption, the critical, and perhaps decisive importance of the initial period of a war, and the possibility of decisive victory at this stage simply by decapitating the enemy's C3I or infrastructure as in DESERT STORM. Given the absence of any effective EW system or ABM defense in any potential war with Ukraine because of the comparatively small distances and flight times involved, decisive victory could be obtained against either side through just such a preemptive first strike, even non-nuclear. Certainly either state need only strike selected key targets like nuclear reactors, C3I or any key infrastructural installations. The draft doctrine spells this out by giving two threat variants. The first one essentially replicates the Soviet view of DESERT STORM and also throws in the prospect of attacks against key nuclear installations and forces. This will be followed by air-land battles of intense maneuver and fire throughout the depth of the theater as in Iraq in 1991 or in Moscow's earlier European invasion strategy.

The second variant occurs after the current or analogous periods of large-scale force reduction in the most powerful states. This scenario represents one major thrust of threat assessment based on the model of 1933 or 1935-41, a period Soviet and Russian analysts called "creeping up to war" (Vpolzanie v Voinu). In this period the economy will be shifted to a war-footing and there will be a full-scale deployment of armed forces and establishment of operational-strategic reserves. In that event warfare may unfold
simultaneously in all spheres, and will acquire great scope immediately.\footnote{86}

If these were not bad enough, other Russian writings about future war are even more demanding. DESERT STORM confirmed Ogarkov's and others' predictions of a scientific-technical revolution in warfare. For some years before 1991, Soviet military authors refined their writing about future war to include new threats from space-based, space traversing, electronic, high-tech systems; third-generation nuclear weapons; energy directed weapons; and so on.\footnote{67} This literature argued that such weapons could, owing to the virtual absence of warning time, decide a war in a matter of hours, or preclude the need for ground operations because the infrastructure or C\textsuperscript{3}I of a society will already have been in ruins. Iraq exemplifies the present and future of such warfare.\footnote{88}

Russia's new military-technical program is oriented toward achieving a world standard in these new high-tech areas and builds upon previous Soviet R\&D and military forecasting.\footnote{89} Thus, it is quite conceivable that protracted political tension and conflict with Ukraine over strategic systems could cause a future preemptive strike using future or existing weapons against either state's atomic installations, weapons, and C\textsuperscript{3}I. Or a prolonged "creeping up to war" could lead to a total war using all means at hand including these futuristic systems.

If their conflict is unreconciled and these be the outlines of future war, nuclear Ukraine and Russia could only be militarized societies bristling with national enmities, ruled by authoritarian-patriotic leaderships. Both states would be oriented towards war and rival regional diplomatic-political blocs. Indeed, this is already happening.\footnote{90} Paradoxically, the effort to politicize arms control now raises the specter that wholly new, non-nuclear weapons could be the instruments of a new arms race or cold war in Europe because of the failure to resolve fundamental political issues of Ukraine's relationship to Russia. Until and unless that political issue is settled, both states will insist on having nuclear systems to defend their sovereignty and integrity and deter the other.
The Need for and Outlines of a Political Resolution.

Russia's inconsistent military programs and policies under Yeltsin's beleaguered leadership call into question Russian aims vis-a-vis Ukraine. The unpredictability of Russian policy, especially under a right-wing, or economically, technologically, and militarily revived leadership, leads Ukraine to safeguard its independence by deterring Russian adventures and by security integration with the West. This is not just the anxiety of an excessively hysterical Ukraine. Gareev almost openly threatened the government with a military patriotic backed explosion of popular unrest.91

Russia's and Ukraine's policies also express the classic security dilemma of states who, in pursuing security, by those very policies, foster the very threat perceptions among their neighbors that they seek to reduce.92 In Russia's case there is even a greater inherent dilemma in its military posture on key issues. Gorbachev's innovations, reasonable sufficiency, defensive doctrine, no nuclear first strike, and an end to empire, introduced under largely civilian prompting, led to a situation where the recommended military operations are almost totally unfeasible or would necessarily lead to a nuclear first strike. If protracted conventional war and nuclear first strikes and preemptive strikes are ruled out, modern war, as shown by DESERT STORM, could well prevent Russia from making any conventional or strategic second strike. Gorbachev's guidelines for recommended strategic missions were "operationally naive." 93 Yet, the reformers and Gorbachev were politically and economically right. Moscow simply could not afford either its armed forces or its offensive and preemptive posture for protracted theater war, either conventional and/or nuclear. To resolve this dilemma there had to be a full-fledged renunciation of the hostility to the West, of empire, and of unilateralism: a recognition of the end of empire and superpower status, and acceptance of subordination and inclusion in the Western alliance, largely on its terms.

On the other hand, Ukraine's nuclear arms are useful for deterrence, but only by sustaining a reciprocal threat relationship with Russia, which now sees those systems as its
greatest, and most indefensible immediate military threat. Accordingly, failure to remove Ukraine’s missiles puts pressure on Russia to consider preemptive strikes and arm itself still more with newer "counter-deterrent systems," perhaps in space. That arms race will arrest demilitarization and democracy in Eastern Europe and Russia and show that arms control as a substitute for politics merely opens the way to new races in new, more utilitarian, weapons systems.

Politically, too, both states will then continue as they have to build rival security blocs or coalitions. Ukraine is forging ties with Poland and hopes for entry into the Vishegrad system of East European cooperation. It and the Baltic states are also discussing a Baltic-Black Sea system that is as yet undefined, but would clearly function as an anti-Russian cordon sanitaire. For its part, Russia has virtually taken over Belarus’ owing to the latter’s economic dependence on Russia and inability to defend itself. That blocks a Baltic-Black Sea grouping and puts pressure on Poland from both Kaliningrad and Belarus’. Belarus’ has indicated that it will maintain Russian troops there until 1999 and is giving up its strategic systems. But a nuclear Ukraine will terrify all its neighbors and create a chain reaction that will not spare Central and Western Europe. All of Europe will be under the shadow of that race. Thus a cold war in Europe from which NATO members cannot stand aloof will take shape. Nor will the United States be spared. Merely by possessing these systems Ukraine can target all of NATO and itself will become a NATO target. If Russia were to change its stated policy and adhere to the treaties, it could plausibly then demand NATO protection against nuclear attack from Ukraine. NATO would find it almost impossible to evade answering that request and further isolate Ukraine. That is not a happy prospect for NATO but it could be forced to adopt it.

For these reasons (and leaving aside Ukraine’s economic burdens and the impact of its weapons on the global NPT regime), we need a comprehensive political answer to both states’ need for security and denuclearization. This answer must address Russo-Ukrainian tension and provide a durable framework for overcoming it. Both sides’ sovereignty and
integrity must be duly guaranteed against nuclear attack through European security institutions as well as through the NPT and U.N. In this sense diplomacy, the political answer, will have established a mutually acceptable baseline upon which the two states can then build their relationship. This approach derives from Senators Nunn’s and Lugar’s bipartisan approach to compensate Ukraine’s expenses and buy its plutonium in return for its renouncing nuclear weapons and accepting protection from nuclear attack under the NPT, but goes further to face the underlying political issues.96

Plainly stated, if the United States wants these treaties and to avoid the dangers from failure to ratify them, it must pay for that outcome not only in cash but in a security guarantee. Although a guarantee of both states through European institutions against a nuclear attack, beyond the NPT, might not satisfy the most nationalistic Ukrainian or Russian politicians, it probably would suffice to win both states’ assent to the treaties, providing that adequate funding for the costs of adherence is also included. Since both states are members of the NACC affiliated with NATO, threats to either one from the other can be discussed there as well as in the CSCE and the U.N. Such a U.S. and/or NATO initiative has several advantages for the United States apart from passage of the START treaties and restraint of nuclear proliferation.

A mutual guarantee through those agencies can shape a new and legitimate security system that hedges against the CIS’ and/or Russia’s turn back towards imperialism and aggression and offers positive inducements to Russia to continue reforms and integrate with Europe. This guarantee will show that Russia can win defense and security benefits from those policies and also reassures Russia’s neighbors about their security. Also, such action will stimulate the economic growth the region so desperately needs. A denuclearized or denuclearizing Europe based on peaceful conflict resolution, democracy, and legitimacy offers the CIS a chance to become a truly functional and legitimate security community.

This approach will likely strengthen Russian reformers as it provides a model for conflict resolution and imposes a truly
strategic course of action upon the United States and its allies as in 1948. This line of action would combine economic, military, and political instruments, as called for by Senators Nunn and Lugar regarding the Ukraine. Due to its alliance nature this strategy could also foster multilateral action to help move European security organizations from the past stress on collective defense towards future collective security.

Guaranteeing non-nuclear Ukraine and Russia against nuclear attack could provide a significant step towards a durable security order in Eastern Europe where none currently exists. It also would give NATO a new military-political mission and allow the new East European security system, pivoted on the NACC, to take shape over time as mutual confidence grows. At the same time this would maintain the U.S. presence as a major player through NATO, economic aid, and the CSCE. The initiative could likely command bipartisan congressional support as it is built on the Nunn-Lugar proposals. Finally, this package balances power and interests in Eastern Europe as it promotes a free and integral Europe. Naturally guaranteeing both states against a nuclear attack means fundamentally revising NATO's membership and purpose. However, NATO has lost its original rationale and must rapidly find a viable one for continuing in the future. This new system could be it. The nuclear guarantees could be coupled with provisions for suspending a party to the NACC and any subsequent treaty if it commits conventional or nuclear aggression to restrain Russian or Ukrainian adventurism while including both states in the nuclear umbrella. There are signs, as well, that Germany, too, is displaying an interest in states like Hungary and Poland accelerating their drive to membership of the EC and NATO. Naturally such expansion of NATO membership will only increase the pressure on NATO to find a new rationale and purpose and to defuse a potential new war and nuclear arms race in Eastern Europe.

Treating Ukrainian and East European anxieties about Russia as tantrums while focusing exclusively on Yeltsin and favoring a reunified Russia is not a strategically viable policy for NATO. Any revived military-political union based on Russia must be anti-democratic due to its inescapably imperial
aspect. Therefore Yeltsin's recent offer to guarantee Ukraine against both nuclear and conventional wars if it gave up its weapons is only an adroit move to take the immediate pressure to act off President Clinton.° But it does not move European security forward.

That offer is only a tactic because that guarantee is already included in the NPT should Ukraine renounce its nuclear systems and sign the NPT. The Security Council's members had pledged not to strike first at non-nuclear signatories of the treaty. In addition, such a guarantee, as Yeltsin proposed, in itself constitutes a basis for the military-political union whereby Russia assumes control over Ukraine's nuclear and conventional destiny in wartime without consultation from Kiev. There is no sign that Ukraine will agree to allow Russia or the CIS to restore that former military-political union or to endow the CIS with international legal political status. And Ukraine has publicized its dissatisfaction with Moscow's posture. Any regional security arrangement must start from the fact, then, that the CIS is not a viable security connection, nor can Ukraine be subordinated to Russia, militarily or politically. That merely revives the problem of a Russian empire.

Therefore there must be a U.S. initiative. Europe's overall balance of power must be built on durable regional balances lest the need for nuclear systems on all sides grow in a frightened and anxious Europe. Both excessive disdain for any side's concerns and support for the other fosters greater authoritarian nationalism in both states, and confirms nationalists' preference for autarchic and nuclear defense policies. We serve neither democracy nor our national interest by supporting Russia against Ukraine, or vice versa—quite the reverse. The exclusive pursuit of a unilateral U.S. military hegemony which aggravates rather than alleviates the underlying political and strategic rivalries in Eastern Europe will not bring arms control or peace. Nor is it prudent that we pursue arms control in order to preserve a union in the old Soviet state as Arbatov hopes. We may get one of the parties to reduce their nuclear weapons, but we will have forfeited the chance to secure a more general European and perhaps global security and non-proliferation. Meanwhile, new, comparably
lethal, high-tech and third generation nuclear weapons await R&D in both Russian and U.S labs. Clearly arms control cannot replace politics or become a means for a new Russian empire.

Russo-Ukrainian relations are the fundamental test of Russia’s aspirations and of the CIS’ viability as a security community. Historically, it was acquiring Ukraine that integrated Russia into Europe both politically and culturally. But it was that acquisition that confirmed and necessitated an autocratic and imperial Russia under both Tsars and Soviets. Today again, Ukraine is Russia’s true window on Europe and can either separate Europe and Russia or be a medium of East-West exchange. Though their bilateral relationship is decidedly strained and stands at a crossroads, we have a new opportunity to shape that relationship and help make it a cornerstone of European security that benefits all sides, not a source of enduring national enmity. While the START treaties’ and European security’s future now resides in Kiev, the means to influence Kiev about that future resides in Washington and Moscow.

ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., pp. 344-345.


10. Blank, pp. 605-608 and the citations there.


14. Schmemann, "Ukraine Finds Nuclear Arms...".


21. Ibid.


34. Ibid.


42. See in particular, the September 1992 issue of International Affairs.


52. Laird, p. 21.


55. Ibid.


58. Draft Doctrine, p. 3.

Sergei Rogov of the USA Institute (ISKRAIN), Alexandria, VA, March 8, 1993.

60. Draft Doctrine, pp. 3-5.


64. Danilevich, p. 531.


69. Ibid., p. 6.


75. "More on Kokoshin Rezhitsa Remarks...", p. 11.


82. Blank, New Strategists, p. 375.

83. Draft Doctrine, p. 3.

84. Ibid.


86. Draft Doctrine, p. 3.


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99. Foran, Ukraine: Barrier to Nuclear Peace.


103. Seely, p. 3.

104. Petersen, p. 344.

105. Ibid., pp. 344-345.


107. Petersen, pp. 344-345.