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THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER AND WAR TERMINATION:
ASSESSING THE BRIDGE FROM WAR TO PEACE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: C. L. Scovel III

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INTRODUCTION

Of the many tasks faced by the operational commander, the process of conceptualizing and bringing to fruition the conditions of successful war termination is among the most difficult. History indicates that the task is sometimes neglected, often misunderstood, and rarely executed satisfactorily. Doctrine, regrettably but perhaps understandably, provides little guidance.

This paper will attempt to assist the operational commander by suggesting a framework for his analysis of plans which will likely conclude a war. It postulates that because the military objectives achieved by the commander in the terminal phase of the war must so closely mesh with the strategic goals set by his policymaking superiors, the terminal phase of a campaign plan rises in importance to the level of a substrategy.¹ Accordingly, the commander may evaluate it using the same criteria as would a strategist in evaluating a strategy.

For our purposes, the war envisioned here is not the global conflict caused by a clash of superpowers, but rather the

¹ For purposes of this paper, I define "substrategy" as a hybrid between operational plan and strategy. In using it, I mean to suggest a design greater in importance than a typical operational plan but not as sweeping in scope as an overall strategy.

challenges identified by the National Military Strategy in the post-Cold War era: regional conflicts, both lesser and major, and low intensity conflicts.² Such wars will be limited in objective,³ and will end through some sort of negotiation process instead of unconditional surrender.⁴ Further, this paper assumes that in many, but not all, such conflicts, the United States will act with allies as part of a coalition. In using the terms "operational commander" or "commander," it refers to the officer operating at the operational level of war and charged with formulating a plan to conclude the combat phase of a conflict. It necessarily implies that such a plan may be distinguished from earlier phases of a campaign, which set the stage for the position in which the operational commander finds himself as combat ends.

Finally, the historical examples cited herein--the Franco-Prussian War and the Korean War--were selected to illustrate the most important of the analytical criteria, and serve only as vehicles to make clear the utility of those criteria for the commander. The facts surrounding the commander's plans for war-

² U.S. Dept. of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington: 1992), pp. 11, 15.

³ Stephen J. Cimbala, "The Endgame and War," Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, eds., Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 2.

⁴ Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 25.

termination in those conflicts are clear and historically "settled." The Persian Gulf War, while of obvious personal interest to many today, was not selected because its value as a lesson in war termination remains ambiguous and the subject of heated controversy.⁵ In short, war termination in the Gulf War is another story, and not the story of this paper.

⁵ See, e.g., U.S. News and World Report Staff, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1992), pp. 399-415; Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), pp. 175-176; H. Norman Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pp. 468-472.

CHAPTER I

WAR TERMINATION AND THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

The responsibilities of the operational commander are legion. He must analyze the strategic goals set by his superiors at the strategy- and policy-making level and shape a plan for a campaign which coordinates and sequences the results of individual tactical actions into a chain achieving those results.⁶ His thought process is to determine the enemy's centers of gravity and then to organize and focus his forces on vulnerabilities which attack them, directly or indirectly. This process necessarily involves "seeing the battlefield"--an assessment of enemy capabilities which extends to the boundaries of the theater and perhaps beyond it. He must decide when and where to give battle, or refuse it, by keeping uppermost in mind the strategic goals.⁷ A particular concern is the sustainment of forces so as to make possible their success.

This thumbnail sketch of the operational commander's tasks is incomplete unless it makes clear his fundamental responsibility. He must "weight" his thinking on the strategic

⁶ Stephen E. Runals, "A Different Approach," Military Review, October 1987, pp. 47-48.

⁷ U.S. Navy Dept., Campaigning, FMFM 1-1 (Washington: 1990), p. 7.

side so that he can fully understand the strategic goals set for him and then can plan a campaign which translates tactical actions into strategic victories using simultaneous and sequential operations. A vision or concept of the end-state is key.

Doctrine is of only limited assistance to the commander in developing such a vision. The cornerstone of joint doctrine is silent on the subject of war termination.⁸ The U.S. Army's FM 100-5 instructs him generally to consider this question: "What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?"⁹ The U.S. Marine Corps in FMFM 1-1 elaborates, but better illuminates the concept only slightly:

Given the strategic aim as our destination, our next step is to determine the desired end state, the military conditions we must realize in order to reach that destination, those necessary conditions which we expect by their existence will provide us our established aim. . . . These conditions will vary with the nature of the conflict and need not always consist of the destruction of the enemy. In fact, the lethality of modern weapons may necessitate the adoption of limited aims . . .

In the main, the more general the conflict, the more predominant are the military factors, and the easier it is to translate aims into military terms. . . . But the more limited the aims of the conflict, the less predominantly military is the conduct of the war, and the more difficult it is to translate those aims into military conditions . . .

⁸ U.S. Dept. of Defense, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1 (Washington: 1991).

⁹ U.S. Army Dept., Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington: 1986), p. 10.

From the envisioned end state, we can develop the operational objectives which, taken in combination, will achieve those conditions. . . .¹⁰

Doctrine clearly tells the commander what he must do, but a glaring omission is the absence of guidance on how to do it. If his task is to create the military conditions which will assist in reaching the strategic goal, logic dictates that he must first fully understand the broad goals and the strategy (military, political, and economic) designed to achieve them. He should then focus specifically on what may be termed a substrategy for war termination, for only by fully grasping this substrategy can he design a campaign to bring it to fruition. This substrategy may be placed in the following context.

¹⁰ FMFM 1-1, pp. 34-35.

CHAPTER II

ANALYZING A PLAN FOR WAR TERMINATION

War is part of a process which takes place on a continuum of time and effort. A warfighting strategy, implemented by campaigns planned by operational commanders, is the plan by which the policymaker forces an enemy to do his will. As a war concludes, however, the policymaker must make the transition from warfighting to an environment in which war is not the means used to achieve policy goals. His warfighting strategy puts him at this point on the continuum, and a war-termination plan allows him to take the next step. It is the bridge which permits him to move from the realm of war to the realm of the absence of war--perhaps even to peace.

The commander devises the plans that permit a smooth ride over the bridge: how to approach it, how to steer a course over it, how to emerge from the far end of the bridge in the best position to move directly to his nation's peacetime goals. Only by careful study of the bridge of war-termination can he hope to construct the best navigation plan over it--his own war-termination substrategy. The following criteria provide a useful framework for his analysis: political effectiveness,

feasibility, cost effectiveness, appropriateness, consequences, and alternatives.¹¹

** Political effectiveness. Clausewitz undoubtedly would have agreed that just as "political purpose . . . [is] the supreme consideration in conducting [war],"¹² it should also dominate a substrategy to terminate war. The commander must ask, "Will my substrategy assist in achieving our objectives?" Those objectives are now perhaps multiple: the original policy objectives, military objectives developed in furtherance of the former, and ending the conflict.¹³

While political objectives shape both a warfighting strategy and its war-terminating offshoot, objectives may change during a war, influencing the strategies. Clausewitz instructed us that ". . . the political aim is [not] a tyrant. It must adapt itself to [war], a process which can radically change it . . ." ¹⁴ Adaptability on the part of the operational commander is key.

Two factors weigh heavily in determining the political effectiveness of a war-termination substrategy. First, the presence of any allies, with their own objectives and strategies,

¹¹ See Richard Megargee, "The Peloponnesian War as Strategic Prototype," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 30 November 1992.

¹² Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 87.

¹³ See Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 8.

¹⁴ Clausewitz, p. 87.

will influence the operational commander's assessment of his own substrategy's effectiveness. Second, his substrategy must meet whatever requirement the political objective imposes for duration of the peace. This war-free period may be short or long, but an operational commander must view critically a substrategy which makes another war likely before his nation and its forces are ready.

** Feasibility. The operational commander's question: "Is it probable that this war-termination substrategy can be successful?" This criterion is comprised of two aspects which are of vital importance to the commander as he evaluates a war-termination substrategy. First, are the proposed military objectives and the actions planned to accomplish them feasible, i.e., are they "do-able?" This aspect is straightforward and would be a part of the commander's assessment of any course of action for a campaign or operation. The second aspect is not so apparent: assuming an affirmative answer to the preceding question, will the enemy consent to end the war on the terms achieved by his substrategy? To answer this question, the commander must put himself in his opponent's shoes. He must determine whether the enemy is likely to cease combat when the commander executes his war-termination substrategy, for if he refuses--for whatever reason, rational or irrational--the substrategy will fail, necessitating either a different plan or continued combat.

** Cost-effectiveness. The operational commander must here ask, "Are the benefits of this war-termination substrategy worth the costs of manpower, resources, or potential objectives forgone?" He should keep in mind that costs and benefits may be quantifiable or amorphous: lives and resources expended during additional military operations; political prestige at home, credibility abroad.

** Appropriateness. Another concern of the operational commander should be the answer to this question: "Is each component (and the sum thereof) of a proposed war-termination substrategy appropriate in terms of domestic and international opinion?" The commander should exercise caution here. His task is to design a substrategy/campaign plan which ends the war with the United States on military terms most closely linked to its political objectives. He might like to avoid considering such factors as public opinion, in the belief that such a clearly "non-military" issue remains the exclusive responsibility of his political superiors, but such a belief would likely lead to dangerous tunnel-vision. The operational commander cannot divorce himself entirely from such "political" considerations, if for no other reason than because the war-termination substrategy which he presents to the National Command Authority for approval must demonstrate that it is in touch with political reality, or it will certainly be rejected and much time and energy will have been lost. People at home (and the press which both reports and shapes their opinion) will have a collective sense of what

constitutes a proper war-termination substrategy and, influenced by their emotions, often will not consent to ending a war unless they have tangible evidence of substantial victory. Other states will likewise have opinions. The operational commander must consider them all.

** Consequences. "What will happen if we succeed in concluding the war on the terms of this war-termination substrategy? What will happen if we fail to do so?" Here the operational commander must attempt to see into the future. He cannot focus exclusively on short-term consequences, however, but must use his intuition and experience to inquire also into long-term consequences. The scope of his inquiry must extend beyond the combatant states to include those noncombatant parties with diplomatic, economic, or military interests in the termination of the war. In many instances, if not most, balance-of-power considerations will be crucial.

** Alternatives. "By what other substrategies can this war be terminated?" The operational commander's final recommendation will likely be tailored to include what he considers to be the better features of the alternatives available.

CHAPTER III

A STUDY OF POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS:

PRUSSIAN WAR-TERMINATION SUBSTRATEGY IN THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

Prussia's war against France in 1870-1871 provides a textbook example of the difficulties of constructing a war-termination substrategy. It also illustrates the critical importance of the criterion of political effectiveness in evaluating alternative substrategies for war termination. This case shows not only that this criterion is most important when compared singly to the others, but also that it can subsume them so as to magnify its own import.

The immediate causes of the war are not important to our purpose here, for our focus is the war-termination substrategy on which Prussia finally settled in 1871. Of significance is the fact that this substrategy was not conceived by General Helmuth von Moltke, who served not only as Chief of the Prussian General Staff but also as the operational commander who constructed Prussia's campaign plans and advised the Kaiser on operational matters. Instead, for reasons outlined below, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the Kaiser's chief executive and formulator of strategy, assumed responsibility for war-termination substrategy. To understand this apparent deviation from what we would consider the optimum division of responsibilities--policy and strategy on

one hand, operations on the other--we must understand the course of Prussia's war.

Prussia's war-termination substrategy was rooted in the political objective of making Prussia the leader of a united Germany, no longer vulnerable to the Great Powers which had dominated Europe. The war with France was to be another "limited war," like those against Denmark and Austria, in which warfighting flowed seamlessly into war-termination. Quick, decisive military victories were followed by demands on a shocked opponent for settlement to achieve limited objectives. Neither capitulation nor conquest of large territories was sought. By isolating the enemy diplomatically, avoiding Great Power involvement, controlling civil-military relations so that the limited nature of the war did not escalate, and restricting their objectives (both political and military) so that they did not appear to threaten stability, Bismarck and Moltke were able to terminate each war with the enemy bloodied but not revengeful.

With the objective of Prussian hegemony in a united Germany, Bismarck set out to bring the South German states into the fold. The vehicle was to be a limited war with their powerful neighbor, France.¹⁵ At first, the war followed the usual pattern, with Moltke planning and executing brilliant operations in which a French army at Sedan was captured and another at Metz was besieged. The limited war "script" called for war-termination

¹⁵ R. R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 524.

negotiations to begin, but chance and uncertainty intervened. Napoleon III himself had surrendered at Sedan and, with some members of a Republican government preaching *la guerre a outrance*, Bismarck had no one with whom to negotiate.

Most importance for our purposes was the dissolution of customary civil-military relations¹⁶ and the decision by Moltke to advocate a war-termination substrategy which jeopardized all that Prussia had won in her three limited wars--and her very existence itself. When his early victories did not produce negotiations, Moltke had besieged Paris. With the fall of Paris imminent, Moltke devised a plan to launch southward German armies freed from the Paris siege and to crush opposition throughout France.¹⁷ On 8 January 1871 he told the Prussian Crown Prince, "We must fight this nation of liars to the very end! Then we can dictate whatever peace we like." When the Prince inquired as to the political implications of his plan, Moltke replied: "I am concerned only with military matters."¹⁸ Alarmed and exasperated, Bismarck quickly moved to secure the Kaiser's designation as the authority solely responsible for correspondence with the French. The siege of Paris permitted moderates to surface within the French government, and Bismarck

¹⁶ Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 204-206.

¹⁷ Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (London: Routledge, 1961), p. 436.

¹⁸ Ibid.

quickly concluded negotiations resulting in an armistice and, later, general peace terms.

Moltke's plan and his remarks to the Crown Prince demonstrate why Bismarck assumed control of war-termination substrategy. Moltke appeared to have lost sight of the political objective of the war, which was not to eliminate the nation of France but rather to solidify the position of Germany--the criterion of political effectiveness. Moltke's failure on this critical criterion led directly to failures on others. If his war-termination substrategy had been adopted, any chance of a negotiated peace with any authority in France would have disappeared--the criterion of feasibility.¹⁹ With the French fighting for their very existence as a people, German casualties would have skyrocketed--the criterion of cost effectiveness. With France on the verge of elimination as a Great Power and perhaps as a nation, international public outcry might have caused other Great Powers with diplomatic and military interests in preserving France as a force in the European balance of power to intervene against Germany--the criterion of appropriateness.²⁰ And for generations after victory, the embittered French would have sought revenge--the criterion of consequences.²¹

¹⁹ Howard, p. 437.

²⁰ Craig, p. 208.

²¹ Howard, p. 449.

CHAPTER IV

A STUDY OF FEASIBILITY:

AMERICAN WAR-TERMINATION SUBSTRATEGY IN THE KOREAN WAR

The Korean War can serve as a laboratory within which one might examine any number of aspects of the subject of war termination. For our purposes, however, we will examine the criterion of the feasibility of a war-termination substrategy, and specifically that substrategy developed (or acquiesced to) by the commander of United States forces in Korea, Lieutenant General James Van Fleet, and his superior, General Matthew B. Ridgway, in May-June 1951.

The situation in which Van Fleet found himself was the sort of attractive "brier patch" in which every operational commander hopes to find himself someday. After assuming command of the Eighth U.S. Army (which also gave him control of the Republic of Korea [ROK] Army) on 14 April 1951, in the aftermath of the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur by President Harry Truman, Van Fleet quickly beat back two offensives by the Communists. The second, in mid-May, was a major effort involving 21 Chinese and nine North Korean divisions. Vastly superior U.S. and United Nations (UN) artillery and air power stopped this attack in a matter of days, after which Van Fleet turned to the offensive himself. By mid-June, he had secured a line mostly north of the 38th parallel, the pre-war demarcation between North

and South Korea. He then proposed an Inchon-like amphibious assault on Wonsan on the east coast which he planned to combine with another northward push from the parallel to bag the bulk of enemy forces in central Korea. Ridgway, who had succeeded MacArthur in Tokyo, rejected the proposal. On 23 June, the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations hinted that negotiations for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel were now possible. Talks began shortly thereafter at Kaesong and moved later to Panmunjom, but the war continued until 27 July 1953, at the cost of more than 12,000 additional American lives.²²

The issue which concerns us is the decision by Van Fleet and Ridgway not to pursue a war-termination substrategy involving continued offensive operations north of the 38th parallel. With the see-saw swings in policy apparently settling on an early end to the war by a return to the status quo ante bellum, i.e., a division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel, instead of uniting the two Koreas under ROK rule, military strategy succeeded in securing the South under U.S./UN protection. The problem was how to ensure that the enemy entered the ensuing negotiations with a bona fide desire to end the war at that time instead of prolonging the discussions as he did.

Van Fleet instinctively sought to press the offensive. He knew in June that the entire North Korean Army was largely

²² James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1988), pp. 137-138.

destroyed and that Chinese forces were fast crumbling as U.S. and UN forces advanced behind overwhelming artillery, air, and naval gunfire support. Huge numbers of prisoners were taken. Chinese lines of communication to the Yalu had long since been severed and their sustainment ability was nonexistent. Although he later claimed that he asserted his desire to continue the attack in the belief that it would strengthen the UN position at the inevitable ceasefire negotiations, no evidence exists that he indeed did so.²³ In denying Van Fleet's initial request to continue the northward thrust, Ridgway obeyed prior directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President, and wrote in his memoirs, "The seizure of the land between the truce line and the Yalu would have merely meant the seizure of more real estate."²⁴ Thus did the operational commander and his immediate superior settle on a war-termination substrategy which relinquished the initiative, lifted military pressure on the enemy, and removed the factor of time ("end the war quickly or you will lose all your forces and territory") from Chinese calculations as they entered negotiations.

The criterion for evaluating a war-termination substrategy which best fits the decision of Van Fleet and Ridgway is "feasibility." This criterion, as defined for our purposes,

²³ Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: MacMillan, 1973), p. 93.

²⁴ Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 219.

includes not only the question of whether the commander's proposed military objectives and the actions planned to accomplish them are "do-able," but also the question of whether the enemy will consent to end the war on the terms achieved by the substrategy. The substrategy employed easily passed the first test, but relied on chance and rationalization to pass the second. Clearly a more effective substrategy would have been to continue Van Fleet's northward drive, if not to the Yalu then perhaps to the narrow neck of the peninsula north of Pyongyang, so as to maintain the pressure of time and uncertainty on the Chinese.

Some might criticize the use of the "feasibility" criterion in analyzing Van Fleet's and Ridgway's war-termination substrategy on the grounds that those officers were merely following policy and that, with the example of MacArthur's relief fresh in mind, they might have been reluctant to question it. The latter point is useful in placing these events in historical context, but the former point is without merit. In light of the costly stalemate that developed in Korea, and later the failure in Vietnam, operational commanders must question policy and strategy when they believe they are ill-conceived.²⁵ Others might question this criterion because in forcing the commander to assess whether the enemy is likely to end the war as envisioned

²⁵ See Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1981), p. 53.

in his substrategy, it assumes the enemy will decide and act rationally.²⁶ True enough--but we must start somewhere, and assuming the enemy is capable of rational thought provides a stronger basis for rational thought on our part than does the contrary assumption. Finally, some would point out that the stronger contender--the U.S., in this case--might conclude that it can achieve its political objectives without negotiations by creating a military *fait accompli*.²⁷ Again, true enough--but in the context of Korea, unlikely given U.S. fears of Chinese and Soviet reaction.

²⁶ William O. Staudenmaier, "Conflict Termination in the Nuclear Era," Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, eds., Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 18.

²⁷ Michael I. Handel, War Termination--A Critical Survey (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1978), p. 37.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS:

LESSONS--AND A CAUTION--FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

The approach suggested here as a means for the operational commander to analyze his responsibilities for war termination are premised on the belief that too often the commander focuses on how to fight his war to the exclusion of how to end it. The former is certainly his primary responsibility, but he cannot ignore the latter. As we have seen, given the dearth of guidance in doctrinal publications on the subject of war termination, this inattention is not surprising. The commander who seeks to sharpen his skills in the operational art--linking tactical actions to the accomplishment of strategic objectives--might wish to consider the following.

1. As the final campaign ends and actual combat ceases, the military objectives identified and achieved are most closely linked to the objectives of the policymaker and strategist. Accordingly, special attention should be devoted to the final phase of the campaign, or better yet, a separate "war termination phase" might be created.

2. Because a final campaign is so closely linked to overall strategy, war-termination plans rise to the level of a substrategy and can be analyzed using the same criteria as the

strategy itself: political effectiveness, feasibility, acceptability, appropriateness, consequences, and alternatives. Of these, the most important are political effectiveness and feasibility.

a. Political effectiveness is the foundation of a war-termination substrategy. It is the yardstick against which all courses of action for ending the military phase of a war must be measured. It requires clear articulation of objectives by the policymaker and strategist and thorough understanding of them by the operational commander. Its use will help prevent the commander from planning to terminate a war by the accomplishment of military objectives, or using military means, which would subvert the nature of the war and the political reasons for its being fought. E.g., Moltke's war-termination proposal in 1871, which would have converted a limited war against France, fought as a vehicle for German unification, into a total war of annihilation.

b. Feasibility leads the commander to assess whether his war-termination substrategy is "do-able"--and whether his enemy will accede to it. A point to remember is that a substrategy which lacks "compellance" or pressure is likely to leave the enemy with little incentive to end the war. E.g., failure to press the UN attack in Korea in June 1951.

3. In devising a war-termination substrategy, the commander should keep in mind that if true negotiations are imminent (as opposed to dictated terms) his substrategy must result in the

seizure of objectives which might be used in the bargaining process. E.g., far from being "merely . . . the seizure of more real estate," as Ridgway claimed, the seizure of territory north of the 38th parallel in mid-1951 would have given U.S. negotiators a stronger position at the bargaining table--because that territory might then have been relinquished for other concessions. (The cost of that seizure in terms of lives, time, etc., is subject to analysis using another factor: acceptability.)

4. Insist on clear, frequent communication with policymakers and strategists.²⁸ The risk of micromanagement must be accepted if one is to ensure the necessary close linkage between strategic and operational objectives for war termination. The benefit is that objectives can be meshed while obstacles to effective negotiation can be anticipated and addressed.

The caution: The criteria suggested here represent an "ideal model" for analyzing war-termination substrategy. They necessarily assume that the operational commander knows his leaders' political objectives, that he has available all information necessary to assess the potential for continued combat, and that he can identify and weigh costs and benefits.²⁹ They also imply (for some) that a precise war-termination

²⁸ Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 85.

²⁹ Michael I. Handel, War Termination--A Critical Survey (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1978), p. 29.

substrategy should (or even can) be conceived by a commander before he initiates operational planning.³⁰ While acknowledging at least the partial truth of these observations, we can recognize this rational approach as a useful starting point in analyzing an operational commander's war-termination efforts. Each case will present different facts and pitfalls, but the commander must find a way to lock up his opponent on his terms--or else run the risk that battles won may yet result in a war lost.

³⁰ Gregory F. Treverton, "Ending Major Coalition Wars," Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, eds., Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 93.

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