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**MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS:
DESERT SHIELD/STORM -
A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH**

BY

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MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS: DESERT SHIELD/STORM
A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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REDEPLOYMENT

In July 1990 the 759th Military Police Battalion of which I was the battalion commander, was preparing to redeploy to Fort Carson, Colorado, from Fort Amador, Panama. The battalion had deployed four months earlier to participate in Operation Promote Liberty, the effort to assist in rebuilding the Panamanian government after Operation Just Cause.

The battalion's mission was to provide law and order for Panama City, as well as role models and to assist in the training of the newly formed Panamanian National Police Department. The fact that only weeks before every member of the police force had been a member of Manuel Noriega's Panama Defense Force (PDF) had not made this an easy mission.

The normal preparation for redeployment was taking place, which included maintenance, cleaning and load planning. The Military Police had been in high demand over the past several years and as such, we felt it was important to redeploy to home station with our equipment. Therefore, we had ordered sufficient aircraft to move both personnel and equipment back to home station in an expeditious manner. Approximately two weeks prior to redeployment an officer from the FORSCOM (Forces Command) J3 called to inform us that the battalion's equipment would be redeployed by ship in an effort to cut costs.

Needless to say, this was not welcome news, as it meant our equipment would have to be driven to the opposite side of the isthmus, cleaned again, and loaded onto boats. Most importantly,

no one from the unit would be allowed to remain with the equipment on the return trip. Having had previous experience with the transport of military equipment by ship and rail, I was sure that the end result would be an increase in lost and damaged equipment. Likewise, the unit would be without its equipment for 30 to 60 days. The last personnel element of the battalion closed on Fort Carson on July 30, 1990. Since the unit's equipment was not scheduled to arrive back at home station for some time, the battalion was granted two weeks block leave.

PREDEPLOYMENT

THE ORDER

On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi Army invaded the neighboring country of Kuwait and by August 4th had declared it the 19th province of Iraq. A United States delegation led by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney landed in Jihhad, Saudi Arabia, on August 5th to brief King Fahd on a proposed plan for the United States to assist the Saudi military in the defense of their northern border, which the King readily accepted.

On August 8th the first troops began deployment to Saudi Arabia, and by August 9th, FORSCOM had refined the troop list enough to notify the 759th Military Police Battalion that we would be deploying to participate in Operation Desert Shield as subordinate unit of the 16th Military Police Brigade (ABN), XVIII Airborne Corps.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION EQUIPMENT (TOE)

The FORSCOM Provost Marshal and G-3 began requesting

availability dates for the battalion. Unfortunately, the majority of our equipment remained somewhere between Panama and Colorado, but no one was quite sure where. Numerous traces were placed through the Division Transportation Office (DTO) at Fort Carson which resulted in the discovery that our equipment was in a warehouse in New Orleans, Louisiana. In short, it had been misrouted after being off loaded from the ship.

Once the equipment was located it was loaded onto rail cars and eight days later, on September 12th, it arrived at Fort Carson. As expected, several pieces of equipment were missing or damaged. Somewhere between Panama and Colorado a forklift had driven its tines through the middle of two crates. One crate had contained generators of which two were destroyed; the other crate contained an entire company's Prescribed Load List (PLL). Many of the parts had been damaged or destroyed along with the cabinets used to store the parts.

A complete inventory was accomplished, and the required equipment replacement and repair procedures were instituted. A rail load date already had been established for September 21st, so time was limited. This placed serious constraints on what could be ordered that would arrive in time to be loaded. Fortunately, the 43rd CSG (Corps Support Group), our peacetime headquarters, also had been alerted for deployment with several elements scheduled for departure at a later date. This enabled equipment that came in after our load out to be loaded with the other units for later distribution in country.

A certain amount of equipment cross leveling from the division military police company, which had not been alerted for deployment, to the corps military police company was necessary. The drawback to this cross leveling is that the division company receives much of its support from the DISCOM and/or forward brigades and has limited organic equipment. The corps military police company, however, is designed to operate as a single entity and, as such, requires a higher density of equipment. As it was not known whether the 4th Infantry Division (MECH) would deploy at a later date, I considered it unwise to strip the division company of its limited resources.

MK 19's

In addition to the normal preparation for deployment the Force Modernization Office called asking if we wished to field the MK 19, a 40mm Grenade Machine Gun. This weapon effectively would triple the firepower of the companies. It could fire 60 rounds per minute with a maximum effective range of 2,212 meters.

Doctrinally, the MK 19 was developed to replace the M60 Machine Gun in corps military police companies. However, it is not a suitable weapon for fighting in built up areas. Still I agreed to field the weapon as long as we could retain the M60s as well. Since Fort Carson had no need for the additional M60s, they agreed.

The earliest available date for the mobile training team from Fort Benning, Georgia, was September 19th, which meant that weapons qualification fell on the same day we were scheduled for

rail loading. However, after two days of classroom instruction, we were able to pack all but ten weapons which were utilized for qualification. Those ten weapons subsequently were packed with E Company of the 52nd Engineer Company which deployed from Fort Carson at a later date and were delivered to us in country.

Soldier morale was noticeably enhanced by the fielding of the MK 19. It gave them the feeling that the Army thought they were important enough to give them the very best in equipment. The down side to fielding a new weapons system that close to a deployment was that there were only three days for hands on training leaving the soldiers less familiar with the system than they would have liked. We overcame much of the lack of familiarization with training once in country, though we could not fire the weapon because of the limited amount of available ammunition.

NON TOE EQUIPMENT

After preliminary contact with the 16th Military Police Brigade we learned that the battalion would be located in the most primitive of areas. So, planning for soldier welfare and comfort became a high priority. As there was no indication how long the tour would be, planning was based on a six month rotation.

The S-1, utilizing the morale support fund, purchased items directly related to entertainment. She also actively solicited local agencies to provide games, books and video tapes.

Through the post contracting officer, the battalion S-4 was

able to purchase a portable latrine system that provided for maximum sanitation with minimum equipment. This system later proved invaluable for our three-person teams that were located in very remote areas for up to 37 days. Based on the anticipated location of the battalion, the 4th Infantry Division (MECH) transferred a Mobile Kitchen Trailer (MKT) to the 984th Military Police Company. Again, this greatly enhanced our ability to provide hot sanitary food for the units. A TOE change was initiated to accommodate this transfer.

Personnel

Since the battalion recently had returned from the Panama deployment, many of the normal personnel problems did not exist to any great extent. The unit was at 100% strength with deployable personnel. However, since the division military police company had not deployed to Panama, there were many soldiers anxious to deploy to Saudi. Therefore, we were able to take care of personal problems simply by swapping out soldiers.

An immediate concern for me, personally, was whether or not the Department of the Army or some lower level agency would question the presence of women in combat support units, especially in key leadership positions. Indeed, I could envision an attempt to replace me as battalion commander, particularly since I had lived through the fiasco of females being deployed and redeployed during Urgent Fury. However, this did not happen. Certainly, Operation Just Cause had helped to solidify personnel policy concerning women. Or, perhaps just as in World

War II, it was realized that the overall mission could not be accomplished by men alone.

Other personnel problems involved TOE shortages. Over the years battalion headquarters had been downsized to the point that they did not have adequate personnel for a 24 hour operation in the S-3 section. Thus, additional personnel were added to ensure that capability. Additionally, the S-2 section, which normally was maintained at below TOE strength, was brought up to full strength.

Initial contact with the 16th Military Police Brigade established the fact that the battalion would consist of the 984th MP Company from Fort Carson, the 132nd MP Company, South Carolina National Guard, and the 210th and 211th MP Companies, North Carolina National Guard. The 210th and 211th had deployed 30 days before the battalion headquarters so there was no contact with those units prior to our arrival in country. The 132d MP Company was scheduled to deploy three to seven days after the battalion headquarters, so they at least had the opportunity to visit the battalion headquarters.

Capstone

The 759th Military Police Battalion had two Capstone missions, one involving a European scenario, the other involving Southwest Asia. We were capstone-aligned under two different Army Reserve Headquarters for these missions. The 984th MP Company was capstone-aligned with another active component battalion and brigade which also was deploying to Saudi.

However, for this deployment, the 984th deployed with and was assigned to the 759th, its peacetime headquarters. None of the National Guard companies were in our capstone trace; therefore, we had never had any prior contact with them.

The battalion had not served previously with the 16th MP Brigade. Thus, it was unfamiliar with the brigade's standard operating procedures. The 16th MP Brigade Rear immediately sent their Field Standard Operating Procedures (FSOP) and other pertinent information so that we could conform to their reporting procedures. However, the failure of the Capstone system resulted in a steep learning curve at all levels.

Family Support

Since my assumption of command the battalion had deployed large elements on four separate occasions. Accordingly, battalion spouses had developed a strong core group responsible for family support. Others had learned to depend on the Family Support Group which we always tried to ensure had a good flow of correct information.

As I was a single commander, the executive officer's (XO) spouse previously had provided leadership for the Family Support Group. However, I had received a new XO while deployed to Panama. Major Jose Vazquez and his wife Nancy, arrived in the battalion about 30 days prior to our redeployment from Panama. Although new to the unit, she stepped in and did a superb job directing the efforts of the Family Support Group.

The importance of a strong Family Support Group, especially

during real world deployments, cannot be over emphasized. It provides a central information point that can be trusted if properly utilized.

Likewise, a good Family Support Group cannot be created after a deployment notification is received; rather, the lines of communication must be open and working on a daily basis. It is not easy to convince spouses to participate in family support meetings and "chains of concern" during training exercises because they do not feel the need. However, every spouse that does participate, learns to trusts the "chain of concern" before a major deployment.

My experience is that family support works best on a decentralized basis. Spouses, as well a soldiers, tend to trust the leadership of the squad, platoon, and company, far more than the battalion headquarters. It is not necessary that the spouses of the chain of command be in charge. However, it is important for every level of the chain of command not only to tacitly approve, but enthusiastically support, the organization and administration of the family support program.

Rear Detachment

During the Panama deployment Fort Carson had established a provisional battalion for the stay behind units in the 759th MP Battalion. This allowed the administration of justice, promotions, personnel administration, as well as the day-to-day activities, to carry on within the battalion. The Assistant Provost Marshall served as the battalion commander. It was an

efficient and effective system.

Unfortunately, the deployment order for Operation Desert Shield came with the instruction that no provisional battalions would be formed. Since all of the battalion headquarters in the 43d Corps Support Group other than the 4th Finance Battalion (Provisional), were deploying, the decision was made to form one large battalion of all of the units being left behind. This left a provisional battalion with a limited staff greatly overtaxed. To compound the problem, the battalion commander also had to fill the shoes of the group commander for garrison administration.

This organizational structure made it even more important to leave a strong rear detachment officer in charge. Fortunately, the garrison military police company commander was an extremely mature, disciplined, and dedicated young officer. I was able to alleviate many of the traditional personnel problems caused by stay behind personnel pending discharge by reassigning them directly to the garrison company. Since rear detachment OICs have no command authority, having a company commander in that position enabled him to exercise command and control over problem soldiers.

It is understandable that FORSCOM did not want a provisional battalion springing up for every battalion leaving behind 20 soldiers. However, the provisional battalion concept is an effective means of command and control when large elements of a battalion are being left behind.

DEPLOYMENT

Advance Party

On October 14, 1990, a ten member advance party departed for Daharan, Saudi Arabia, with the express mission of setting up an operational and logistical framework for the battalion's follow on elements and to make initial contact with the two military police companies already in country that would be assigned to the battalion.

When the advance party arrived at Nelis Air Force Base in New Jersey, one of the members fell ill and was left behind in the Fort Dix hospital. Fortunately, it was a minor problem involving medication which was resolved the next day. Thus, the entire party was on the ground and functioning by October 16th.

I had served with the 16th MP Brigade (Abn) at Fort Bragg a short 18 months prior, and had several personal contacts within the brigade including the brigade commander with whom I previously had served several times. This personal relationship greatly aided the advanced party in their mission.

Unit Deployment

On October 29, 1990, the 984th Military Police Company departed from Peterson Air Force Base aboard a commercial aircraft and arrived in country two days later. The unit initially was located in an area called Cement City, the central receiving point for incoming units.

Cement City was a large tent city with centralized feeding, bathing, and latrine facilities. Since many units moved in and


out daily, with no real controls, sanitation left a great deal to be desired. Having heard the horror stories about the disease and other problems associated with Cement City, the advanced party was directed to make necessary arrangements to move our units through as quickly as possible. The ultimate measure of success would be to not even pass through this location upon arrival.

As the 984th arrived, they moved to Cement City only long enough to set up tents in our desert location and unload the ships, a total of three days. On 5 November when the Headquarters arrived, we moved directly to our desert location, as did all of our follow on units.

DESERT SHIELD

The Mission

The battalion headquarters arrived in country at 3:00 AM, November 5th and was at the base camp by 8:00 AM. The base camp was located about one hour north of the Daharan-Damamm enclave at a place called Guardian City. Guardian City was merely a fenced portion of a flood plain in the middle of the desert. The base was commanded by the commander of the 101st Support Group from Fort Campbell, Kentucky.



At 8:00 AM that morning I had my first meeting with the brigade commander who provided me with the battalion's mission once we were operational. We were to provide law enforcement and area security for an area running just north of the enclave to the southern boundary of Marine Central Command. Additionally, I was directed to attach one company to the 24th Division and another to the 101st Division. Both units being attached were National Guard companies which had been in country for several weeks.

National Guard

The brigade commander also informed me that the two National Guard company commanders had been in his office recently to say that they did not think they were capable of handling the mission of supporting the divisions. They did not believe that division support was a proper mission for a corps military police company, nor were they trained to accomplish it. The brigade commander indicated that he had dealt with the problem at the time, but thought it was something that I should know and on which I should quickly focus my attention. Additionally, he informed me that my last company would be arriving in two days.

I immediately set out to meet my new company commanders and assess the situation. The 210th MP Company was only about 10 miles from Guardian City, at King Faad Air Base, along with the 101st Division. The 211th MP Company, however, was located about 250 miles from Damamm with the 24th Division. In conjunction with selected members of the staff, I spent several days on the

road evaluating the training, maintenance and operational level of the two companies. Although both units had minor training deficiencies, they were performing quite well.

The majority of the units problems centered around personnel and pay issues; there was no system to integrate the Reserve Components into the active duty finance and personnel systems. These problems plagued us throughout the deployment and caused some morale problems within these units. Before another reservist is again called to active duty, there should be a program to integrate them into the SIDPERS and finance system.

On November 8th the 132nd MP Company arrived in country and was collocated with the 984th and the battalion headquarters. It was quite evident from the beginning that members of the 132nd did not want to be in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, there were discipline and morale problems almost immediately.

I was awakened their first night in country by the company commander announcing that his driver had lost his weapon. He had laid it down while shaving at 1 A.M. and then walked away leaving the weapon behind. Although the weapon was recovered a couple of hours later, the attitude of the company during the search was not one of cooperation and teamwork. Unit personnel did not understand why they had to be up in the middle of the night looking for the weapon. They felt that the person who lost it should be the only one involved in the search.

The company seemed to have little organization or leadership. The Command Sergeant Major (CSM) began counseling

and working with the First Sergeant while I worked with the company commander. The law and order mission was given to the 132nd as many of the guardsmen were law enforcement officers in their civilian occupations. I had hoped they would be successful at it, but it was quickly apparent that the leadership had no concept of how to establish an MP station, shifts, or patrol areas. They did not even have the capability to remote a radio to the MP station and utilize a alternate company frequency to monitor patrols.

The S-3 and the 132d training officer developed a training plan to bring the unit up to speed. It became necessary to monitor training very closely since even with the plan, the unit seemed unable to progress beyond individual training. Collective training seemed beyond their grasp. The soldiers and lower level NCOs seemed to progress quickly and appeared eager to learn; the leadership, however, was unable or unwilling to learn and progress.

This company was without an assigned peacetime battalion headquarters to supervise its training and had obviously been having difficulty. Hopefully, this conflict pointed out the weaknesses of the Capstone program. It is important for every reserve and national guard unit to be affiliated with an active unit somewhere in the chain of command. The active component unit could assist in the planning and training of the unit. But it must be more than one evaluator at summer camp; it must be a relationship that reaches into the unit's day-to-day operations.

Base Camp Operation

The Executive Officer took charge of the staff and began to set up the administration of the battalion and to oversee the local purchase authority of the S-4. The day-to-day operations rested in his hands.

The advanced party and the lead company had done an excellent job of setting up the shell of a base camp. However, there was still a great deal more to be accomplished to make the place liveable let alone comfortable. The Command Sergeant Major, CSM Forest Guess, took charge of the work details and began building a home for us. He made use of the many talents of the guardsmen in the areas of carpentry, electrical wiring, and even swimming pool maintenance-he showed us how to heat our shower water. Both the CSM and the XO worked very hard to ensure that everyone made the national guard companies feel like they were part of the battalion.

Law and Order

The 132d MP Company assumed the law and order mission about five days after they arrived in country. Although the mission covered a fairly large area, there was limited activity. Since everyone was working very hard, they had little time for criminal activity. Traffic enforcement and accident investigation became the primary tasks of the patrols.

There were only two major incidents that required military police support. First, some members of the transportation unit at Guardian City attempted to make liquor with the fluid used to

clean the brake lines of trucks. Needless to say, they didn't get very high, but they did almost kill themselves. Six soldiers were rushed to the hospital in critical condition.

Unfortunately, the commander of the unit decided not to report it immediately to the Military Police. Instead, he felt that the unit could handle it. We did not received word until the next morning which made the investigation more difficult.

The other incident began with a scream coming from the water purification unit located about 150 meters from our Tactical Operation Center (TOC). Upon investigation we discover that a soldier had bent over a moving auger to engage a gear, had caught his shirt, and had been immediately jerked through the auger and killed. The scream was from another soldier who had witnessed the accident. Both of these incidents required initial investigation by the MPs before being turned over to the Criminal Investigation Division Command (CIDC).

Area Security

The 984th MP Company assumed the area security mission. It immediately set up patrol areas and began to contact the different bases and base cluster commanders. It quickly became evident that rear area operations training among the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units had been ignored. Not only did the units not understand how to call the military police for assistance if their base was attacked, but most units did not have the organic communications equipment necessary even to make such a call.

The battalion S-3 immediately began coordinating with units to simulate enemy attacks and military police support. Such exercises were excellent in detecting weaknesses not only in the supported units, but with the military police as well. Although the MPs practice area security a great deal, we seldom have the opportunity to practice it in conjunction with a real unit.

Saddam Hussein's call for attacks on the Western Infidels around the world served to heighten awareness about the possibility of terrorist attacks. The soldiers charged with area security took their mission very seriously and although there were no actual attacks, the military police, in conjunction with local authorities, were able to arrest several suspicious individuals who were watching different U.S. units and drawing diagrams of various locations.

Training

Each unit was responsible for developing an intense training program based on guidance from the brigade commander and myself and briefing the program within two weeks. Every attempt was made to ensure that everyone realized that this was preparation for the real thing and that success equalled survival.

By the week after Thanksgiving the training program was in full swing with each unit concentrating on the areas in which they were deficient. It was quite apparent that while the National Guard companies were well prepared in individual skills, the level of collective skills varied greatly. It also became apparent that the leadership of the company, ie, company

Khalid Military City (KKMC) early in order to provide security for the corps rear area. Additionally, the battalion would be responsible for convoy escorts from KKMC to Log Base Charlie once the air war began.

The 211th MP Company was to remain with the 24th Division. This left us short the personnel necessary to complete the mission so the brigade attached the 805th M P Company, a reserve unit from North Carolina, to the battalion.

Military Police doctrine calls for the corps military police battalion to provide a company to the divisions they support when necessary. However, there is no definitive set of circumstances or even suggestions as to what is appropriate use for those units. The divisions made excellent use of the corps company during Desert Shield by immediately incorporating them into their scheme of operation. The difficulty came when the battalion needed the company back for a corps mission. Naturally, the divisions were reluctant to return the companies. It ultimately came down to a fight between division commanders and the Military Police brigade commander. As such, there was no doubt who lost the battle.

Several times during Desert Shield/Storm when roads were secured by corps and theater military police, division commanders still wanted that additional company to assist in moving their divisions. As the corps military police become more heavily armed in the future, ie. MK 19s, I see division commanders fighting even harder to have that additional company permanently

with when and under what circumstances a corps company will go to the division and when it will be returned and incorporate those circumstances into the doctrine.

Military police companies are designed to operate independently and be mixed and matched with a battalion headquarters. Still, having a reserve company attached as we moved forward into our final positions prior to the beginning of the war certainly increased the stress level for all concerned. We had no idea about the level of discipline and training of the unit, yet we would have to immediately depend upon them to accomplish critical missions. Fortunately, the company was well trained and the commander was very serious about his responsibilities.

DESERT STORM

THE AIR CAMPAIGN

The battalion headquarters and four companies arrived at our base camp location just outside of KKMC on January 8, 1991. We quickly set up camp and began operations. The 984th was assigned the mission of security for the corps rear area. Five UH1 helicopters were attached to the company in order to increase its mobility. The 132d was assigned the mission of providing communications checkpoints from KKMC to Log Base Charlie in order to track convoys and to provide additional security for the convoys during movement. The 210th and 805th were to provide the actual escorts for the convoys. Having been assigned their missions, each company was to provide a brief back of their plan

of operation within 48 hours.

Convoy Escorts

Certainly the most difficult mission was providing convoy escorts as there was no real timetable for movement. After the first night of the air war convoys moved as soon as they were loaded and lined up. This required extremely close coordination with the Corps Support Command (COSCOM). Additionally, the transportation units being escorted often did not have organic communications equipment. This, coupled with the limited number of military police vehicles available for each convoy, posed serious security problems as there was no way for the convoy commander to communicate an emergency to the escort. Luckily, there were adequate hand held radios available through the brigade headquarters. Although such equipment was of little value for a tactical scenario over extended distances, they worked extremely well for communications between the lead and trail vehicles of the convoy and the military police. A short briefing on how and when to utilize the radios prior to each convoy departure alleviated most of the problems.

Communications problems in the CSS units is continuous both in a base camp configuration and during movement. A solution to the problem might be that as the Army draws down, we transfer communications equipment from combat units standing down to the CSS units and adjust their TOEs accordingly. This should solve the problem with minimal cost.

Rear Area Security

XVIII Airborne Corps rear area now stretched from Rafa to KKMC, a distance of 160 miles. With only one company dedicated to the defense of that sector, it was impossible to have the same close coordination with each base cluster as we had in the Dhahran area. The COSCOM Commander acted as the Rear Area Commander and his operations center coordinated any support necessary.

Timely ground response to the majority of the units in the rear area would have been impossible because of the long distances involved. However, the five UH1 helicopters attached to the battalion assisted in providing a quick response within the Corps AOR.

Although the helicopters were equipped with M60 gun mounts, the unit decided to develop new technology. With the assistance of the pilots and crews, we mounted two MK 19s on a platform inside the aircraft. This required bolting a wooden platform inside the aircraft and then bolting the tripods onto the platform. It was necessary to test for stress both to the aircraft and to the platform, as well as balance the load.

In a very short time the guns were mounted and ready for test firing. The MPs and pilots quickly discovered that although the gunner could fire the weapon, they could not aim it quickly enough to provide any degree of accuracy. Further testing resulted in the gunner holding the weapon in a fixed position and the crew chief directing the pilot, as to the direction of

flight. The gunner could adjust fire up and down and together with the pilot became accurate enough to knock down rows of 55 gallon drums on the firing range.

The other difficulty was reloading the weapon. Since the MK 19 tripod was fixed to the edge of the aircraft door frame, it required the assistant gunner to literally lean out the door while holding a 60 pound ammunition can and place it in the feed box. Again, it became necessary to enlist the pilot's assistance. He would slightly bank the aircraft thus tilting the gun up; this allowed the assistant gunner to replace the empty ammunition can with a minimum of difficulty.

Mounting the two MK 19s in the aircraft significantly enhanced the firepower of the platoons if they were ever required to enter a hot landing zone. It also provided additional protection for the aircraft while in flight. The crews were so impressed with the system that they convinced the aviation brigade commander to attempt to commandeer some MK 19s for their own use.

Communications Check Points

Although this mission required less than two platoons, it was perhaps the least attractive of the missions. It required three-person MP teams to locate within radio range of each other for the length of the convoy route, approximately 110 miles. The checkpoints were to provide the location of each convoy as it passed their location. This allowed us to track the progress of each convoy and provide additional security for both the convoy

and the MP escorts.

This was the first opportunity to test the concept of the three-person team and their ability to survive on their own for a period of time. It also was a test of the 132d MP Company's ability to perform a mission in a tactical environment. It quickly became apparent that the platoons had the mentality of "gut out the mission, it will be over in a weekend or two weeks." The company headquarters simply was satisfied to send the platoons out on the mission and then forget them. They made no provisions for the rotation of personnel or any effort to care for them. There was a sense of equality within the unit; everyone was on a first name basis and this appeared to contribute to an "every man for himself" attitude.

Only with strong direction from the CSM did the 1st Sgt and the company headquarters begin to think of ways to provide hot meals to the soldiers, relieve them for showers, provide personal hygiene items, and deliver their mail.

The communications checkpoints were a manpower intensive operation. It was necessary to place a checkpoint every 10 to 12 miles as the unit was utilizing RT 524 radios that were over 30 years old. This is an age old problem for the Military Police Corps. Doctrine calls for operations over extended areas using communications equipment designed to operate over very limited distances. Perhaps equipment modernization will alleviate the problem.

Movement To Final Assembly Areas

On February 8th the battalion began its movement to our final assembly area, which was about 3 miles north of Rafa, and 8 miles south of the Iraqi border. In the days preceding movement the companies had done a complete technical inspection of all equipment, had test fired all weapons and had received a final mass intelligence update.

Since some of the HHD 2 1/2-ton trucks needed some additional maintenance, I decided that the assault command post (CP) and two companies would move forward to Rafa. The remainder of the headquarters and one company would move to the half way point. This allowed last minute direct support maintenance to be accomplished as well as saved several hundred miles of travel for the S-4 and his fleet as they brought supplies forward from Log Base Bravo (KKMC) to Rafa. Additionally, the 210th MP Company was returned to the 101st Airborne Division.

The battalion was scheduled to operate in the area of the 6th Light French Division who's headquarters also was located just north of Rafha. As soon as the battalion TOC was operational and secure, the brigade commander and myself went to introduce ourselves to the French division commander and began the process of coordination. One can only imagine the look of surprise on the division commander's face as well as on his staff when a female battalion commander walked inside of their TOC. Interestingly enough, after the initial surprise the commander and his chief of staff and operations officer sat down with us

and began serious planning. There was never any indication that they had any difficulty dealing with me as a female; they accepted me as a professional officer and went about the mission at hand.

Although we were never under the operational control of the French, we worked very closely with them throughout the ground campaign. Additionally, they provided logistical support to us on many occasions, never once questioning if they would be repaid by the United States. They were of the opinion that this was war and they would do whatever was necessary to prosecute it.

THE GROUND WAR

The Plan

The plan called for the ground campaign to be kicked off by the 6th Light French Division accompanied by a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division crossing the border at 4:00 A.M. on February 24th. They were to seize the Al Salman Air Base and the surrounding area. They would be followed by the remainder of the 82nd which was tasked with clearing any pockets of resistance bypassed by the French. The 503d Military Police Battalion (ABN) was next in line. Its mission was to pick up prisoners of war captured by the French and the 82d. We were next in the que with the mission of securing the road from the border north to Al Salman and then east to the 24th Infantry Division's western boundary.

We carefully coordinated the handoff between the French and the 82nd and the subsequent handoff to us. Additionally, the

French were to provide daylight fire support for us. The Air Force was to provide night fire support with C130 Specter Gun Ships. The French were unable to provide night time fire support as they lacked the capability to fly at night. There were only two Specters available for all of XVIII Airborne Corps so we did not anticipate that support would be available in a timely manner.


In order to overcome the language barrier and incompatible communications equipment we exchanged liaison teams with the French Circulation Control Company. This enabled us to remain in constant contact with the Division TOC.

Execution

A platoon of the 82nd MP Company and two of my teams crossed the border 24 hours prior to G-Day and set up operations at the Line of Departure (LD).

The evening prior to G-Day we lined up vehicles and made last minute checks to ensure that every soldier was prepared to accomplish the mission the next day. Although we were not scheduled to cross the LD until H+24, we moved to the border at H+14 based on the progress the French were making. At H+17 we received the order to move. This put us in front of the two brigades of the 82nd that were supposed to clear the pockets of resistance left by the 6th Light Division.

Our movement was slowed considerably as we were forced to clear a complex of bunkers that extended from the LD to our final position, a distance of approximately 150 miles. The bunkers



were about 3-5 km off the roadway and the ground in between was littered with antipersonnel mines. Fortunately, they were small enough that the worst damage was the loss of a tire or two.

Ten hours after beginning our movement we reached the location we had chosen for the battalion headquarters. The companies covered their respective areas of the roadway. Just as we arrived a sandstorm began; visibility was reduced to approximately 5 to 10 feet, and all movement stopped for about 4 hours until the storm ceased.

Needless to say, the storm destroyed the movement time tables for follow on units; the 82nd was on the road and the fuel trucks for the 24th ID (MECH) needed to get through. It became essential to create a four lane road. We put nonessential traffic on the dirt shoulders of the road with fuel and supply

trucks allocated to the main road. By assigning three lanes going east and one lane going west, we were able to clear the roads in less than 6 hours.

Although we were collocated with a movement control team, there was no prioritization after the first 36 hours. This caused the military police numerous problems at key intersections throughout the remainder of the 100 hours as well as during the redeployment phase. Movement of this magnitude requires a clear set of priorities, and a strict enforcement of the same. This does not just happen; it requires practice.

Securing the roadway turned out to be a monumental task as the Iraqis would leave their bunkers during daylight hours and melt into the desert only to return to them at night. They did this primarily because they had left food, clothing and other supplies in the bunkers. This required the military police to clear the bunkers at dawn every day and every day we took more prisoners.

The forward combat units were taking such large numbers of prisoners that the military police battalion tasked with the enemy prisoner of war mission simply was overwhelmed. This left the prisoners in the rear areas as a last priority which resulted in a manpower intensive requirement to guard them.

Post Hostilities

A cease fire was declared after just 100 hours, and then began, perhaps, the most intensive phase of the entire operation for the 759th. Upon cessation of hostilities, our portion of the

roadway was extended another 60 miles, which stretched our already thin assets even more. Additionally, we were facing an overwhelming refugee problem. As if by magic hundreds of Bedouins began to appear seeking food and fuel. Indeed, it became a constant struggle for all of the units to retain their perimeter integrity.

Throughout this period we sought assistance from Civil Affairs personnel but to no avail. There appeared to be no plan for providing assistance to refugees, to obtain language support, or to treat wounded Kurdish refugees. Individual units provided what support they could, and the hospital accepted all wounded personnel. With the assistance of our combat medics the wounded were treated. Excess food was distributed by individual units while transportation units provided fuel.

It readily became apparent that XVIII Airborne Corps had not developed any plan for post-hostility activities. We did not plan to be an occupation army; therefore, we had not considered how to address the problems encountered in Iraq until our forces were redeployed. This lack of planning really surfaced after XVIII Airborne Corps redeployed to the port area. Thousands of Iraqi refugees crossed the border into the small town of Rafa, forcing CENTCOM to deploy a battalion of military police from VII Corps to handle the problem.

This situation necessitated not only the deployment of troops to maintain order, but also an entire support structure in order to care for the refugees. It also was necessary to utilize

international organizations to repatriate the refugees. All of these problems could have been alleviated with prior planning about how to deal with refugees immediately upon the cessation of hostilities.

Movement To Port

Thirty-seven days after we crossed the border into Iraq, the 759th received orders to redeploy to the port area. We were the last unit to be moved out of the corps sector. As such, we had the mission to police all roads for equipment that had been left behind. Additionally, we were responsible for monitoring the movement on the southern route through Riyadh back to Daharan. MP teams would be located at each refuel stop to report each convoy as it passed through the point. Because of the long distances involved, it was necessary for the brigade to cross level radio-teletype equipment from the other battalions.

Redeployment

Redeployment for the battalion was relatively simple as the unit had done it several times in the past 18 months. All National Guard and Reserve units were redeployed first and finally, the long awaited day came for the 759th Military Police Battalion to return to Fort Carson, Colorado.

CONCLUSION

Overall, Military Police doctrine worked adequately. With only minor changes with respect to the attachment of corps military police companies to divisions, it will continue to serve us well in the future. Communications equipment continues to be

a problem and one that will not be resolved in the near future with the precipitous decline in the defense budget. The key to success in the future is as it has been in the past-good soldiers and good training. Without a doubt, military police need to maintain close affiliation with combat service support units that they will be supporting in the future.

I cannot say enough in the way of praise for the men and women of the 759th Military Police Battalion. Every member of the organization, with only minor exception, gave more than 100% effort everyday. Every soldier that deployed with the unit returned to Fort Carson after a tremendously successful operation. That is the true measure of success-to bring everyone home alive.