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**PRINCIPLES OF
FUTURE ARMY FORCE
STRUCTURE DESIGN**

BY

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Minnesota Army National Guard

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The world is in the midst of a cataclysmic transformation caused by the demise of the Soviet Union as a world military power. The impact of this transformation is being felt around the globe. The impact on the United States, as the world's only remaining "superpower" transcends all elements of its society and institutions. The Army, one of America's oldest and proudest institutions, is struggling to posture itself to remain viable and relevant in the future. The principles under which it has been organized and structured during the Cold War era are no longer appropriate. While several ideas and concepts have been proposed for the Army's future force design, all are hybrids of the past and fail to recognize the magnitude of the change that is occurring. This study examines some of the issues surrounding the efforts to design an Army of the future. It is an attempt to understand the basis for the Army and to offer a set of principles under which a new paradigm should be constructed for use in designing the Army of the future. It also suggests ways Army leaders can restructure the Army into a true Total Army to meet these principles. It also offers ideas concerning incorporation of the Army National Guard as an integral and equal partner on the Total Army team.

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**PRINCIPLES OF FUTURE
ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE DESIGN**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

**Lieutenant Colonel Curtis L. Newcomb
Minnesota Army National Guard**

**COL David E. Shaver
Project Advisor**

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PRINCIPLES OF FUTURE ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE DESIGN

"We have entered a world radically transformed in the last four years."¹

President George W. Bush

Introduction

The most significant transformation is that the United States, and all of the nations of the world, are no longer threatened by fear of a world conflagration, possibly ignited by a small spark in some seemingly obscure location. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of Communism have, however, resulted in strife and turmoil in many parts of the world. Fortunately, there is no resultant entity capable of replacing the former Soviet Union as a formidable military power with an ideology advocating world dominance with coercion and military force as its primary instruments for exerting its will.

What is the impact of this transformation on the United States "...in an interdependent world in which our hope for peace and prosperity at home are increasingly linked to the success of our policies abroad?"² How should the world's only remaining "superpower" respond? What responsibility does the United States have in this "New World Order?" What size, type, and composition of military force should the United States construct to meet the challenges of the future - both known and unknown? The answers to these and many other questions are elusive. These answers, along with their resultant policies, will shape the future. The United States has the opportunity and, I believe obligation, to influence creation of the future of the world. It is the only nation, "...whose strength and leadership are essential to a stable and democratic world order."³ The United States Army, a unique American institution comprised of three (3) separate components, possessing both strength and leadership, is an essential element of the national power of the United States.

My thesis is that since the changes in the world are cataclysmic in nature and large in magnitude, since the United States' existing military force was developed and constructed to accomplish a mission that no longer exists, since priorities have shifted, we must use new principles and criteria to develop an Army force that will enable the United States to successfully meet the challenges of the future. The existing paradigm for construction of military forces must not only be shifted - it must be destroyed. In its place, a new paradigm that takes into account the transformations in the world order, the increasing international interdependence of nations, and changing priorities of the American people must be constructed. Merely modifying the old force is unacceptable in today's environment. This new Army force structure must provide the nation an Army possessing the capabilities required to successfully accomplish the missions across a broad spectrum. It must be capable of employment in response to a myriad of contingencies in joint and combined operations. The cost of maintaining the Army must be acceptable to the nation. In other words, citizens of the United States must realize a benefit they perceive as sufficient to justify a certain level of expenditure of national resources. My arguments incorporate the budgetary realities, as well as the evolving National Security Strategy, of the United States, potential future Army missions, contributions of the Reserve Components (focusing on the Army National Guard), and the implications of joint operations and coalitions to future Army operations. Full integration of the Army National Guard into all aspects of the Army is the common thread linking the elements of the future Army force paradigm.

The environment of the next century, shaped by monumental forces of change, will likely exhibit characteristics largely unimaginable today. This environment demands that a nation closely examine its strategies, institutions, and priorities. Due to the magnitude of the changes occurring today, the Army, as one of this nation's primary institutions, will remain viable and relevant only if it successfully adapts to the changes in the environment.

Future Force Structure Paradigm Principles

The Army must examine every aspect of its being. It can no longer hold on to ideals and precepts that, having served it well in the past, have no utility in the future. It must identify principles that are relevant to the future national and international environment and structure itself according to these principles. I believe the Army force of the future should be built upon these principles:

- The Army must be a true Total Army, inclusive of the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve;
- The Army must be flexible;
- The Army must be future oriented;
- The Army must be capabilities based.

These four principles embody the elements required to secure the Army's place in the future of our national defense policies and plans. Shaping and constructing the Army based on these principles will provide for its future viability and longevity by posturing it to be responsive to the American people and the Congress of the United States.

Background

The world's transformation transcends all aspects of its societies. Political, economic, social, and military realms of society throughout the world are experiencing monumental forces of change. Nation-states are being created, changed, and destroyed. Ethnic nationalism is prevalent in many parts of the world. Economies are being restructured and, in some cases, developing. New political alignments are forming while negotiations modify long-standing alliances. We live in an increasingly interdependent world. International geopolitical linkages of economies, social orders, political postures, and security arrangements seem to be the order of the day.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and Communism as a world-wide political and economic force precipitated these changes. Change is occurring at a rate and at an order

of magnitude far greater than was predictable, due to the cataclysmic rapidity of this collapse. The world was unprepared for these events. As a result, reactionary management of change is today's norm. Management of change, challenging in any circumstances, is particularly difficult when the scale is global and the events precipitating the need for change are large in magnitude, unanticipated, and have unpredictable outcomes.

The instability much of the world is experiencing could be considered a natural outgrowth of unanticipated change. If the United States, with all of its national assets, could not predict the events that have occurred and did not prepare for them, certainly smaller, poorer, less-developed nations were even more unprepared. As a result, some long-standing institutions are becoming less relevant while others are being constructed or becoming increasingly important. While people around the globe are learning to view the world and their position within it differently than they have in the past, the future is obscured for everyone. There are many more questions than answers. It seems clear, however, that these changes require military leaders and strategists view the role of the military and its contributions to society differently than in the past. At the same time, some long-standing principles remain valid.

Military strategists throughout history have recognized the limitations of the military as well as its connectivity with society. Carl Von Clausewitz describes a "trinity" - the people, the military, and the government - that must be in balance for a strategy to be effective.⁴ Sun Tzu describes five (5) fundamental factors of war that must be considered when developing a military strategy: politics, weather, terrain, the commander, and doctrine.⁵ Both of these well-known strategists concur that the military is an integral element of national power connected to a nation's societies and institutions. It reflects and supports the will of the citizenry and the government's overarching security strategy. An effective military strategy, including its supporting force structure, is, therefore, a dependent product. It must be developed in concert with a myriad of factors and policies.

Force structures must support relevant policies and recognize their inherent limiting factors and influences. The Army is constitutionally linked to the government. Its linkage to the people, however, is less certain. The Army National Guard provides the broadest linkage between the Army and the American people.

The Army and the Constitution

Historically, the United States reshapes its military after every war. This reshaping is a response to domestic and international changes that occur upon termination of a war. When contemplating the nature of this military reshaping, it is useful to examine the Constitution of the United States to attempt to understand the intent of our founding fathers. The Constitution is the basis for America's values and its institutions. The very existence of a military force springs from the concepts and principles expressed in the Constitution.

The Constitution clearly places the responsibility for the defense of the United States on its Congress. Toward this end, the Constitution empowers the Congress to "provide and maintain a Navy;" and to "raise and support Armies." It draws a definite distinction between the two services. It restricts the Congress from appropriating monies supporting the Army for a period in excess of two (2) years. The language in the Constitution describes a degree of permanency to the Navy; while describing the Army as less permanent, more transitory, and linked to a specific purpose. The Constitution also provides Congress the authority to organize a Militia and call forth the Militia to execute the laws of the United States.⁶ The Constitution designates the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the states when it is called into federal service.⁷

The Constitution also charges Congress with responsibility for the defense of the United States.⁸ This combination of powers and responsibilities, coupled with its fiscal powers links the Army inextricably to the Congress and the American people.⁹

The Constitution clearly describes the Army as an Army of the people, raised and supported by the people's representatives - Congress. The Constitution does not mandate that the Congress maintain a standing Army of any size. This important distinction makes the Army susceptible to structural, organizational, and dimensional turbulence. In essence, the Army owes its very existence to the collective body of citizens of the United States and their Congress.

While the Army must recognize and respect Congress' legitimate constitutional role in determining its future, it does not have to, and should not, merely acquiesce and accept the results of Congressional action. Nor should it wait for Congress to act and subsequently react to their decisions. While recognizing Congress' legitimate role, mandated by the Constitution, in determining the size and composition of the Army, Army leaders must proactively lead the way throughout the process.

Army leaders must provide leadership to Congress by:

- Developing and articulating a vision for the future Army;
- Developing and implementing a strategy to "sell" this vision to Congress and the American people;
- Influencing Congressional action through negotiation and consensus building.

Congress' responsibility to provide for the defense and well-being of the United States is broad in context. The strength of a nation, a component of which is its national security posture, incorporates such elements as political stability, economic posture, and global alliances, among others, to deter aggression against its existence. Congress must consider and evaluate the relative strength and importance of all of the components of national security and commit resources to each in accordance with its judgment of relative importance and need. Thus, constant competition for resources among the various components contributing to its national security is inevitable. This competition becomes more intense when national or international dynamics result in significant modification of the status quo, such as has occurred with the ending of the Cold War.

Historical View of Army Reshaping

Examining the reshaping of the Army during the periods between World Wars I and II and between World War II and the Korean Conflict provides an historical perspective on the process. The Regular Army was reduced to an authorized strength of 137,500 personnel after World War I. In contrast, the War Department urged Congress to establish a Regular Army with a permanent authorized strength of nearly 600,000. The Congress and the American populace rejected this proposal. The Army National Guard had an authorized strength of 436,000. The Army, due to military reshaping, released approximately 3,250,000 soldiers in the first nine (9) months after demobilization.¹⁰

After World War II, the Regular Army reduced from 8,000,000 soldiers and 89 divisions in 1945 to 591,000 soldiers and 10 divisions in 1950. The Army National Guard maintained a strength of 325,000.¹¹ This was once again smaller than the War Department and the Army leadership desired.

During both periods the Army suffered from partially manned units, lack of modern equipment, lack of adequate training resources, and the absence of a cohesive organizational structure and stationing. Mobilization for World War II and the Korean Conflict was difficult and lengthy. The Army's degraded readiness posture during these periods can be only partially attributed to its level of manning. Numerous other resources required to maintain a high state of readiness were absent. Planners involved in reshaping the Army today must be cognizant of all of the aspects of readiness. The size of the Army alone does not determine its readiness. Said another way, a larger Regular Army does not guarantee the American people a more ready, more effective, and more relevant Army.

Numerous parallels exist between the two (s) previous post-war periods and the current post-war period. As the focus of the American people and their elected representatives turned inward, America became concerned with improving its domestic climate by committing resources to long-standing internal problems. Global readjustment occurred. International relationships changed. New power structures emerged. In many

ways, a period of American retrenchment followed the termination of each war. Congress discharged its responsibilities by reallocating fiscal resources away from the Army to other components of national defense such as the domestic economy, infrastructure enhancement, and social programs.

Future Challenges

The challenge Army leaders face in designing the force of the future is to determine the type and level of capabilities required to meet the future defense needs of the United States. General Gordon R. Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, when asked recently to define the kinds of contingencies the Army should be prepared for in the future, replied, "That's really impossible to predict."¹² While predicting the future is admittedly difficult and risky, it is integral to defining the future Army. If the Army's most senior leaders are to develop and define a vision for the future Army, they must employ their experience, knowledge, and professional judgment creatively to forecast the Army's future requirements. Absent a clear definition of future Army requirements, there is no justification for the Army .

Maintaining the United States Army as a capable force, prepared to successfully execute its assigned missions, is the overriding imperative. Today's debate over the size, roles and missions, composition, and organization of the Army is analogous to the debates that likely occurred during preceding post-war periods. Perhaps lessons learned from the previous periods can be applied today to help shape a formidable and ready post-war Army. It must not be plagued with personnel and equipment shortages. It must compliment the other military services in capability while maintaining and honing its unique qualities and capabilities.

The emergent strength of the Army National Guard both compounds the challenges associated with redesigning the Army and provides a uniquely superior opportunity for the Army to successfully meet future mission requirements. The Army National Guard is a sizable force, relatively well trained and resourced. It has a broad-

based constituency and enjoys solid societal and political support. It has actively and successfully resisted large reductions in its authorized strength, aggressively seeking an expanded role and new missions. The Army of tomorrow must recognize the capabilities and strengths of the Army National Guard. It must incorporate the Army National Guard into a true Total Army in a manner that takes into account the advantages and strengths of the Army National Guard and recognizes budgetary realities. COL David E. Shaver, of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute asserts that the Total Army must "...close ranks' quickly, before budget 'market share' is lost.¹³ Doing so is a significant and necessary step toward changing the force design paradigm. The Defense Budget has been shrinking for several years. President Clinton, on 17 February 1992, proposed an economic plan that would reduce defense spending through 1998 by \$60 billion more than President Bush's Base Force Plan.¹⁴ The competition for resources among the services will increase as the amount of available resources diminishes. Fractures within the Total Army community can only exacerbate the Army's challenge to obtain an acceptable share of the available resources.

A rapid scan of today's national and international climate provides some indication of what the future military requirements may be. The Soviet Union's collapse leaves no real strategic threat to the survival of the United States. The United States has successfully negotiated nuclear arms reduction treaties with Russia. While the process is not complete, significant progress has been made in reducing the strategic nuclear threat to the United States. Consequently, the United States has no need to develop and maintain a large strategic defense force.

Demand for participation by forces of the United States in peacekeeping and domestic or humanitarian support operations seems to be increasing. United States forces are currently employed in such diverse areas as Africa, Southwest Asia, and Europe. The forces are expected to perform a variety of missions other than actual combat missions. The Army's organizational structure is multi-functional and well-suited for these diverse

missions. It is supported by strong leaders throughout the chain of command leading highly skilled, high quality people.

The Army is particularly well-equipped to accomplish diverse missions. It is tactically inobile, possesses the capability to sustain itself for extended periods, has a variety of equipment integral to its organizations, and has the capability to tailor its forces to provide the best mix of capabilities for a specific mission and situation. These basic attributes can and must be enhanced. The Reserve Components, when viewed as an integral and equal part of the total Army, significantly increase the Army's value. They economically provide additional skills, flexibility, and capability to the Total Army force.

Although a shift towards military operations other than combat appears to be the most likely future operational scenario, America will always have a requirement to maintain a strong combat force. National pride and prestige alone will ensure the United States maintains a strong and ready armed force. The debate over the next few years will concern the composition, mix (by type and component), and size of this force.

The American people's investment in their military is decreasing. Their priorities have shifted to domestic programs designed to fix long-standing problems that have occurred and lingered during the Cold War period. The National Security Strategy of the United States indicates that strengthening of the domestic economy is a top national security priority.¹⁵ The military services, collectively and individually, will have fewer resources available. Competition for these resources will likely become intense. An optimistic person would likely believe that reason will eventually prevail and defense resources will be distributed in a manner consistent with sound management principles. A pessimist might anticipate using a process dictated by service parochialism and politics to distribute the scarce resources. In either case, the resources available to defense will continue to decrease while the demand for them increases.

Viewing this situation in economic terms indicates this reduction in supply, coupled with increased demand, should lead to increase price. This is analogous to a free

market system. When more people are seeking fewer goods the price of the goods increases. The services that pay the price by abandoning antiquated concepts, parochial positions, and increasing inter-service cooperation will likely receive a greater share of the defense resources. This "price increase" associated with increased competition for fewer defense resources could be healthy for the country. The result will be better cooperation and true sharing of responsibility among the services, elimination of duplicate capabilities, an increase in the ability of each service to operate in concert with other services in the joint arena, and increased productivity by the military. For example, if the Army desires to be resourced for specific national security missions, it may well have to be willing to share portions of the responsibility with one or more of the other services. Each service will, necessarily, provide to the national defense of the United States only those capabilities that are unique to that service or those capabilities that it is best able to provide. Increased cooperation and sharing among the services will likely be a forced result of increased demand and competition for fewer defense resources. This phenomena should, in the end, prove to be beneficial to the American military and the country. The American military of the future will undoubtedly be smaller, more homogeneous, functionally unique, and designed for maximum cost-effectiveness

As previously alluded to, Army leaders must forecast the future international environment and the Army's role in that environment. Some basic assumptions must be made to provide a consistent operational and planning base. The military is but one element of national power to be used within the framework of an overall national strategy designed to advance and protect the interests of the United States. The military will logically be resourced according to its relative importance compared to the other elements of power - political, economic.¹⁶

Future challenges to America's global interests may well be largely economic. There appears to be no armed force in the world capable of attacking and defeating the United States. Therefore, the military threat to the security of the United States is

reduced significantly. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States stands alone as the world's only superpower. The combination of political, economic, and military power possessed by the United States is unsurpassed in the world. Since a nation's ability to influence other countries depends on its ability to select and exercise the proper element of its power in the proper degree at the proper time, the United States is uniquely capable of peacefully influencing world events.

Mr. Charles Taylor, Futurist with the U.S. Army War College, suggests the United States will become less reliant on "...strategies of military force as power..." and more reliant on "...strategies of economic influence as power." ¹⁷ The Army has an opportunity for relative growth in an era where the nation's economic power overshadows its military power as a means of exerting international influence. The Army can seize this opportunity by becoming a critical element of the nation's economic power. The Army's senior leaders should aggressively seek and obtain roles and missions that contribute directly to the economic well-being and building of wealth within the United States. Capitalizing on the capabilities of the Army National Guard strengthens the Army and broadens its capability.

Paradigm Shifts

The United States Navy recognizes the need to shift its force structure design paradigm. The Navy is moving from a "...Cold War, open ocean, blue water naval strategy to a regional, littoral, and expeditionary focus."¹⁸ The Navy is restructuring into a "...fundamentally different Naval Force."¹⁹ Furthermore, it labels this force as a "new" force. This concept recognizes the dynamics of today's environment. It links world geopolitical changes and military force structure. It is an example of the forward thinking, visionary, and proactive leadership required of senior military leaders.

The Army has not made a comparable paradigm shift. The Army's current "Base Force," which we are all familiar with, is essentially a smaller version of the Cold War era force. It maintains the division as its basic formation, merely reducing the number of

organizations and soldiers. It fails to recognize the cost-effectiveness of Reserve Component units. It reduces both Active and Reserve units by an equal percentage. It fails to achieve cost savings by shifting missions to the Reserve Components, nor does it account for the disappearance of Cold War era missions that are no longer applicable.

Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Les Aspin, while serving as the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, indicated the annual operating of an Army National Guard division is approximately 25% of the cost of a like Active Duty division.²⁰ In light of the reduced direct military threat to the security of the United States, and the increasing probability the Army will be missioned for operations other than combat, the cost-effectiveness of Army National Guard combat units should be a primary force structure influence.

Secretary Aspin also offered suggestions for the future Army force structure. His model, while recognizing the cost-effectiveness of the Army National Guard, also maintains the division as the basic combat formation. Like the Base Force, it does not significantly alter the basic composition of the Army. His suggested force is largely a smaller Cold War era force with minimal shifting of responsibility to the Army National Guard.

Let's examine more closely the elements of the future Army force design paradigm. The common thread that links all of these elements is the strength and capabilities of the Reserve components. The Army National Guard is key because it provides the primary Reserve Component combat force capability.

The Army Must be a True Total Army, Inclusive of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve.

While numerous force design options exist, the final product must be a true Total Army. The Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve should be equal and integral pieces melded into a cohesive whole to synergistically maximize the

capabilities of the Total Army. This precept applies to all aspects of force design and operational decision making.

Positive, decisive leadership by the Army's most senior leaders is the key to forming a true Total Army. The Army will become a cohesive Total Army when its most senior leaders view it as such and make it so. Statements by senior Army leaders, which are "AC-parochial," imply that a separation of their responsibility toward the various components exists in their view and impedes the process of integrating the Army's components into a Total Army.²¹

United States' national deficit reduction programs will likely be on-going for several years. The Army of the Future will certainly reflect the effects of this process.²² The most dramatic impact of deficit reduction actions will be on personnel. The Army of the future will be smaller. Personnel costs comprise nearly 50% of the Army budget today.²³ Due to the size of the personnel account, continued budget reductions must, necessarily, include a reduction in personnel as an integral part of the reduction program.

As the total Army becomes smaller - has fewer personnel - adjustments must be made in the relationship between the various components. The National Guard budget today accounts for less than 5% of the Department of Defense budget. As stated previously, the annual cost of manning, equipping, sustaining, and training an Army National Guard unit is approximately 25% of the annual cost of a like Active Component unit. Army leaders recognize the reality of these ratios and embrace efforts to fully integrate all components into a single, effective, and relevant Total Army. Personnel costs alone serve as a mandate for complete inclusion of the various components into one.

Full integration of the process for assigning missions to the components is an essential element of this principle. The key parameters for mission assignment between the components should be capability and cost. Some National Guard leaders favor a process whereby missions are first assigned to the Army National Guard and only assigned to the Active Component if a compelling case is made demonstrating the Army National

Guard is incapable of executing the mission satisfactorily. While I do not entirely support this idea, the concept has merit.

Active Component forces should consist of only those forces required to execute the most likely military operational scenarios supporting our National Security Strategy. These forces would, of course, encompass a force of largely combat organizations with their requisite combat support and combat service support entities capable of rapidly deploying anywhere on the globe. This would provide the President the capability to respond quickly and efficiently with military power to an international crisis that threatens U.S. interests. The Active Component force should also possess the capability to execute humanitarian and other peacetime engagement missions that are deemed most likely to occur. This approach recognizes both economic and capability aspects of force structure design.

For example, the Active Army would consist of those combat forces, with their supporting forces, required for "forward presence" and "crisis response." It would also have forces required to execute other, non-combat oriented missions. These forces would be primarily combat support and combat service support forces. The Army National Guard should consist of largely combat forces. These forces would be essentially a "contingency response" force. They would be combat oriented, employed in contingencies that are beyond the scope of the Active Army's capabilities. The Army's combat organizational structure, coupled with creative training management, enables these Army National Guard units to prepare to respond to and execute effectively domestic assistance missions. Placing a larger proportion of the combat forces in the Army National Guard enables the nation to respond with military power to larger, less likely contingencies at a more affordable cost. President Clinton advocates increased use of Reserve Component forces in regional contingencies.²⁵ This structure supports that concept. It also focuses the Army National Guard on more specific missions while making it an integral component of the nation's defense structure.

The current "Roundout" and "Roundup" concept should be eliminated. Both Active Army and Army National Guard forces should stand alone. The Army National Guard must accept responsibility for accomplishment of its assigned missions. Its value to the nation, as well as many of its other unique capabilities, is diminished when its forces are merely supplementary. There is little likelihood organizational cohesion and interoperability between Active Component units and their "Roundout" or "Roundup" units can be attained. Therefore, combat capability and readiness is diminished.

Army missions must also be integrated with the United States' National Security Strategy. The January 1993 edition of the National Security Strategy of the United States asserts the United States has "...neither the desire nor the ability to be the world's 'policeman.'"²⁶ The distance between isolationism, as was prevalent in United States policy after World War I, and being the world's "policeman" is substantial. The application of military force in the future as an instrument of national power will certainly be considered judiciously.²⁷ Contingencies will arise, especially peacekeeping-related contingencies, where the application of military force is appropriate. While the United States has other forces capable of responding more rapidly than the Army in most cases, a strong land force is necessary to provide sustaining capabilities and depth to a military operation. The Army will be able to provide this strong land force, trained and ready, only by fully integrating the Reserve Components and the Active Component into an effective, cohesive Total Army team.

In addition to force structure and missions, resources must be allocated to all organizations commensurate with the mission. The old "First to Fight, First to be Resourced" concept is no longer valid. This concept had some merit when virtually all planning was oriented toward a specific threat in a specific theater. Plans were developed sequencing units into the combat theater. It was logical and relatively easy to allocate resources in the same sequence. This procedure recognized that units slated to become

engaged in armed combat the earliest should have the most modern, most lethal equipment.

Since there is no one specific discernible military threat to the security of the United States in the world today, it is no longer logical to follow this procedure. Many suggest a new relationship between national security and national defense will be necessary.²⁸ Assuming the Active and Reserve Components are integrated into a cohesive Total Army; further assuming each unit and organization is assigned a specific mission; further assuming many of the missions are different than those of the past, it is imperative that each unit be resourced in a manner and to an extent that provides it an opportunity to successfully accomplish its assigned mission(s). This could result in Reserve Component units having different and more modern equipment than some Active Component units.

The Army National Guard, missioned specifically and resourced commensurately, can be trained and ready when called upon. It must be recognized, however, that a Reserve Component force, by its very nature, should be less trained at a specific moment in time than a comparable Active Component unit. This is the reason the Active Army's greatest capability contribution is those units determined as most likely to be deployed and employed rapidly. A certain amount of Army National Guard unit post-mobilization training time must, of course, be factored into contingency plans. All leaders must develop and implement plans and actions to minimize the time required. Specific missioning, adequate resourcing, and the commitment of Army National Guard leaders and soldiers to fully embrace their responsibilities provides the opportunity to enhance pre-mobilization training and readiness and reduce post-mobilization training time requirements.

The on-going debate between the Active component and the Army National Guard regarding the size of each component is not only detrimental to the Total Army, it is irrelevant and could have been avoided. In the Defense Authorization Act of 1990, Congress directed the Department of Defense to conduct a Total Force Policy study. The

results of the study and subsequent budget submissions were not acceptable to Congress. As a result, Congress authorized and appropriated funds supporting Reserve Component manning levels significantly in excess of those the Administration had included in the budget submission.²⁹ Congress then mandated completion of another study, funded by the Department of Defense, and conducted by a Non-Department of Defense organization.³⁰ This study was conducted by RAND Corporation's National Defense Research Institute. The Institute is a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, Contract No. MDA903-90-C-004.

The Department of Defense, despite obvious signals from Congress that a severe reduction of Reserve Component strength was unacceptable, continued to project and budget for significant reductions. The Department of Defense, in fact, budgeted for 154,280 fewer Army Reserve Component personnel than Congress authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993.³¹ Congress has expressed its intent to maintain a sizable Reserve Component in the Army clearly through legislation and language in committee reports. The Department of Defense and the Department of the Army have chosen to persist along the path of significant reductions despite these clear statements of Congressional intent. A long-standing and acrimonious debate among the components of the Army is the result. The effects of this debate are all negative. Force Structure changes within the Army have been executed in piecemeal fashion, Reserve Component units, particularly in the Army National Guard, have been placed in a state of prolonged uncertainty regarding their future. The Army continues to program units for deactivation, downsizing, or other actions with no degree of certainty the programmed changes will occur. Consequently, many of these units have difficulty meeting combat readiness since resources are linked to programmed force structure changes; morale is degraded due to the uncertainty of the future; and planning for the programmed changes, in the unlikely event they occur, is difficult to execute.

The Army's ability to manage further budget reductions is restricted by its self-imposed mismatch between budgeted and Congressionally funded Reserve Component end strength. The Army is faced with a situation where it will be required to reduce its budget, while simultaneously allocating more money than it programmed to maintain the Reserve Component end strength mandated by Congress. In effect, the Army must now reduce its budget to accommodate additional reductions in its Total Obligation Authority, while simultaneously reducing its budget in other areas to accommodate the increased Reserve Component end strength. The net effect is that the Army will experience greater effective reductions than would otherwise be necessary, while its capability to manage the process has been reduced. This only exacerbates the situation between the Components and has a detrimental impact on overall Army morale and readiness.

The Army's failure to fully integrate the Reserve Components into the Total Army effectively is detrimental to the Total Army. The Army failed to thoroughly address the substantial cost savings that could be realized by shifting missions to the Reserve Components.³² The entire Army has become mired in the quagmire of internal squabbling. The results of this failure can be catastrophic to the Total Army. This condition must be rectified. If it is not rectified, the Army's budget problems will become more difficult to manage over time and will likely necessitate more severe reductions in personnel, operation and maintenance funding, and procurement funding than would have been necessary.

The Army of the Future Must be Flexible

The Army must be able to respond quickly to changes in the world environment, missions, and to technological advances. It must be capable of engaging on multiple fronts across the entire spectrum of conflict. COL David E. Shaver, in his pamphlet, Justifying the Army, offers four models to size, mission, and resource the force. These models provide a framework for constructing a flexible Army capable of responding effectively to a multitude of contingencies. COL Shaver's models are "...designed to be

interactive, rather than mutually exclusive,..."³³ Army leaders and planners, thinking in this plane, will likely develop an integrated force capable of changing in response to a variety of unpredictable stimuli.

The Army must be able to execute a variety of missions, in a variety of geographical locations, with a variety of partners.³⁴ Joint and Coalition operations are rapidly becoming the norm. President Clinton, offers that "...coalition operations will often be important for political legitimacy."³⁵ Both types of operations require the Army to be structurally flexible and capable of providing complimentary forces. In other words, the Army must be able to modify its organization for specific contingencies and offer capabilities not provided by its joint or coalition partners. Routine force tailoring will be required. The Army should be able to rapidly assemble, deploy, and employ a force with the required mix of capabilities.

The current Division structure, the Army's basic combat organizational structure, is archaic and not relevant in the future. Mr. Charles Taylor, in his study of world futures, assumes general or large-scale war between now and 2010 is unlikely.³⁶ This assumption appears reasonable. The nations of the world that possess relatively large militaries do not possess the range of military power - land, sea, and air - the United States possesses. It is also difficult to predict circumstances where it would be advantageous for any nation to become militarily adventuresome. Consequently, the need for large formations, such as divisions, is, at a minimum, reduced. Smaller formations that are, more flexible, easily tailored, and more rapidly deployed are more appropriate.

These smaller units, perhaps roughly equivalent to the current Separate Brigade or Regiment, must be organized to be self-supporting for a pre-determined period of time. They could be tailored to meet mission requirements with forces from all of the Total Army components. The concept is, of course, predicated on the successful integration of all of the Total Army components into a cohesive, mutually supportive configuration.

The Army National Guard is well-suited to enhancing the Army's overall flexibility. A smaller basic organizational formation in the Army National Guard has the advantage of geographic integrity. They can be located within a single state. Collective training opportunities are greater. Training costs are minimized. Command and control is simplified. Unit cohesiveness is enhanced. Smaller, more cohesive, better trained Army National Guard units are more ready, able to mobilize and deploy quicker, and integrate into Active Army commands easier.

The Army must have the inherent flexibility to assimilate technological advances. Weapon systems will likely become smaller and lighter. Technology will enhance battlefield management. Manpower requirements will reduce as technological advancements provide more automated, more compact, and more lethal weapons systems and more efficient electronic battlefield management systems. A smaller, more streamlined basic formation can obviously accommodate changes pursuant to technological advancements more readily. The Army of the future requires technologically advanced equipment to maintain its stature as a credible fighting force and its capability to deploy to a variety of geographical locations, accept a variety of missions, and execute joint and coalition operations. It must be structured to effectively integrate new equipment into its doctrine, tactics, and operations.

Technological advancements and reduced structural size should be viewed as coincident actions. As previously discussed, budgetary realities will force the Army to reduce in size. Technology can compensate for these reductions. It can provide a smaller Army the capability to operate with the same or greater effectiveness as a larger, less technical force. The challenge for the Army is to shatter its long-standing paradigm of using the division as its basic formation and restructure in smaller, more flexible configurations. Smaller formations integrate new weapon systems relatively easily and efficiently.

Smaller formations also provide planners employment flexibility, especially when combat forces are augmented with integral support forces, all under a single commander. They can readily assimilate new technologies. Training and deployment can be conducted by fully integrated units to build cohesion and teamwork and enhance coordination. These forces can be integrated into a larger tailored force to meet specific requirements and missions. Thus, the Total Army will possess the flexibility to respond to a variety of missions, creatively mix force capabilities, and maintain its technological edge.

The Army Must be Future Oriented

The future environment "...very likely will demand discarding old traditions and beliefs..."³⁷ The Army must look to the future for technology. It must also recognize and plan for likely future scenarios in its doctrine, training, force structure, and manning. The Army must never again find itself in the position it is in today where it is encountering great difficulty in defining and creating its future. It is in a completely reactionary mode; attempting to respond to a myriad of conflicting pressures and stimuli.

The Army of the future must recognize the need for change and embrace the opportunities for change. It is an old truism that if an organization continues to take the same actions in the same manner, it will attain the same results. The Army of the late 1980s was an outstanding Army. It was highly proficient and proved itself several times in extremely challenging circumstances. The problem today, is the Army of the 80s is no longer relevant in the global environment. Situations change, requirements change, politics change. Collective Security arrangements are being debated within the United Nations.³⁸ Congressional leaders are proposing new missions for the Army. Societal and demographic changes impact on the Army. The current controversy over the proposal to allow openly homosexual individuals to serve in the Army is an avoidable, destabilizing influence on the organization. The Army's most senior leaders must anticipate these monumental changes and proactively address them. They must develop and articulate a clear, viable vision of the future Army and act aggressively to attain the desired outcome .

Unproductive debates between the Reserve and Active Components over such issues as end strength, force structure, and missions must be avoided in the future. Army leaders must find ways to reconcile differences of opinion within the Total Army before organizations such as the United States Congress become compelled to enter the debate. It will then be able to respond positively to the dynamics of the future.

A portion of the Total Army, perhaps in the Reserve Components, should be continually experimenting with futuristic concepts. Doctrinal changes, tactical employment of forces, support operations, organizational structure and manning, are but a few of the areas to be addressed. This on-going experimentation could be viewed as an extension of the Army's research and development program. In essence, the Army must be proactively experimenting with ways to create its own future.

A tremendous opportunity exists today for the Army to proactively create its own future. This opportunity is in the area of missions. Congressional leaders, such as Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has proposed a myriad of new, and somewhat revolutionary, missions for the Army. The Army should embrace the concept behind their ideas. Granted, some of these ideas are basically inconsistent with traditional Army missions. Nevertheless, they represent the thinking of people who are very influential in military matters within the Congress. Perhaps they recognize the will of the American people and seek to open a dialogue about reshaping the Army to maintain its relevance and viability. Since the future is so difficult to accurately predict, Army leaders must be open to new ideas, new concepts, new roles, and new missions.

The Army National Guard enhances the Army's preparedness for the future. It can train for and respond effectively to new and forecasted missions that are not immediate. It can also serve as the Army's test bed for development of new tactics, techniques, and doctrine. Thus, the Active Army will be more stable, experience less turmoil, and maintain its rapid response capabilities.

The Army Must be Capabilities Based

The Army of the future must be based on requirements to provide a specified set of capabilities. With no discernible threat to American security and world-wide peace, the threat-based planning and force structure scenarios used during the Cold War era are no longer applicable. American policy makers, along with senior military leaders, must determine the military capabilities required and desired for the United States military. As part of the Total Force, the Total Army must provide the capabilities that are required of it and those for which it is uniquely qualified to provide. On a larger scale, the entire United States Armed Force must be structured, sized, equipped, manned, trained, and otherwise resourced to provide the capabilities determined by our civilian leaders.

The Army of the future must provide a base of capabilities that an operational commander can select from when tailoring a joint force to accomplish a specific mission. Given the improbability of large scale war in the foreseeable future, it can be assumed military operations will be smaller in scale, narrower in scope, and shorter in time. The Army must be prepared to rapidly provide the appropriate force possessing the required capabilities. President Clinton describes the battlefield of the future as being "...dominated by maneuver, speed, and out-thinking the enemy."³⁹ Perhaps the greatest capability the Army possesses is battlefield agility. Restructuring the Army into smaller units, thus creating a complimentary force capable of effective interaction with the other services and other country's forces, provides the agility required on future battlefields. While I have suggested brigades as the basic combat formation, others maintain smaller divisions, i.e. a maximum of six (6) maneuver battalions, might be best. The important point is that the Army of the future must organize into smaller fighting entities to provide maximum agility on the battlefield and maximum capability to complement other forces in joint and combined operations.⁴⁰

A well led, well trained, adequately resourced Army National Guard enhances and increases the Total Army's capabilities. It provides those capabilities required under scenarios that are possible but less likely. It economically provides the Total Army an expanded capability base. The Army will not only remain relevant in the future, but also provide our nation a package of capabilities essential for maintaining its stature among the community of nations and protective of its interests both domestically and internationally.

Although this discussion focuses on the Army, it is important to realize the Army cannot adopt this principle unilaterally. All of the services must develop their specific force with complimentary capabilities among all of the services. When tailoring forces, support forces require a certain degree of commonalty to adequately accommodate units from multiple services. Essentially, an infrastructure of common support systems must be developed within the entire military. Examination of a common support structure amongst the services is beyond the scope of this paper. It seems to be, however, an integral ingredient to developing a high quality cost effective United States military force.

A flexible, technologically advanced Army, providing the capabilities required for the mission, assumes an important role in maintaining our nation's security. The Army has unique qualities not found in any other service. The Army National Guard provides unique capabilities which, effectively integrated with the Active Army into a Total Army, assures the Army's future viability. The Total Army must capitalize on its strengths to compliment the strengths found in the other branches of the armed forces. It can ill afford capabilities that are redundant with those of other services. It is unlikely redundancy will be tolerated by the American people and the Congress as budgetary pressures increase, international conflicts become more regionally localized, and domestic economic concerns heighten. Moving decisively to eliminate redundancy between it and other services and developing the unique capabilities it can offer to a commander, enhances the relevance of the Army.

Summary

The road to Army reform is paved with uncertainty. Pitfalls, disguised as universal change and emergent contingencies, are difficult to anticipate and lurk around every bend. Nevertheless, the United States Army must accept the risks inherent with reform. A.M. Rosenthal cautions that the reshaping of the United States military "...could open new ways for America to strengthen itself..." or "...could also turn out to be the greatest misjudgment since the U.S. disarmed after World War II."⁴¹ Mr. Rosenthal's warning deserves to be heeded.

Today's environment, with its intrinsic uncertainty, also provides an opportunity for the Army to determine its own destiny. To do so, it must create a totally new paradigm to reshape itself into an effective and viable force poised to successfully perform the vast array of missions it may receive. A central element and common thread through the principles of this new paradigm is full integration of the Reserve components, particularly the Army National Guard, and the Active Army into a truly Total Army.

The principles that formed the Cold War era Army force structure paradigm are not applicable today. New principles must be applied to form a new paradigm. These principles are:

- The Army must be a Total Army, inclusive of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve;
- The Army must be flexible;
- The Army must be future oriented;
- The Army must be capabilities based.

An Army designed and built from the "bottom up" on these principles, coupled with continuing accession of high quality soldiers and demanding training, will be a formidable force. It will possess the capabilities required to support the strategies and policies of our national leaders across the entire spectrum of military engagement. It will also be able to

successfully respond to future technological advances, budgetary constraints, as well as contingencies resulting from national and international dynamics.

Visionary and proactive leadership by the Army's most senior leaders is the essential ingredient to build the future Army force. A clear vision of the Army's future missions, requirements, and capabilities must be developed and articulated. The Army's leaders must also develop a strategy to implement this vision and execute the strategy proactively and aggressively.

Complete inclusion of the Active Army, Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve into a true Total Army is the most significant principle of the future Army force structure paradigm. The concept of citizen-soldier has existed since the founding of this country. As many have suggested, it must once again become the cornerstone of future national defense policy and Army force structure.⁴² A series of specific actions to integrate the Army's components into a cohesive whole have been suggested by others.⁴³ The first, and most important step, however, is a commitment to this principle by the Army's most senior leaders. They have the power and authority to terminate the acrimonious debate between the components over roles, missions, and resources. They also possess the experience and ability to formulate and articulate a clear vision of the Army of the future - its organization, purpose, roles, missions, and composition.

Army leaders have the opportunity today to create the Army of tomorrow. To do so most effectively, they must embrace the Army National Guard as an equal partner in the Total Army. A strong, well led, well trained, adequately resourced Army National Guard enhances the Total Army's capabilities, and does so economically. A capabilities based, future oriented, and flexible Total Army, inclusive of the Army National Guard, solidifies the Army of the future as a viable, relevant force. It will be capable of successfully accomplishing missions domestically and internationally.

Paradigm changes require attitude and perception changes. Given the magnitude and nature of global change, coupled with the domestic response to them, the Army has

no choice in the matter. It must willingly and aggressively examine its very being, traditions, doctrine, and organizational principles. It must discard those that are no longer applicable and substitute new ones to form a new force structure paradigm. Other services are (or at least are appearing to) redefine their organization, purpose, and missions. The Army must do likewise or be left behind in the quest for decreasing national military resources and, perhaps most importantly, in the eyes of the American people.

In essence, the Army will remain a viable and relevant military institution if it is led by visionary, futuristic leaders, provides capabilities that capitalize on its unique strengths and compliment the capabilities of the other services, has a firm linkage to the American people, and is able to assimilate societal, geopolitical, and technological change. The Reserve Components, particularly the Army National Guard, must be an equal partner on the Total Army team.

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⁶The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8.

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⁸Ibid. , Article I, Section 8.

⁹Ibid. , Article I, Section 8 and Section 9

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¹²General Gordon R. Sullivan, "U.S. Army 1993: Power Projected, Contingency Oriented," interview by L. James Binder, Army, April 1993, 20.

¹³Colonel David E. Shaver, Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992) , 1.

¹⁴Rick Maze and Tom Donnelly, "Getting Cut, Getting Taxed," Army Times, 1 March 1993, p. 3.

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- ²⁵Governor Bill Clinton, "National Security," ROA National Security Report (October 1992): 36.
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- ³²General Accounting Office, Army Force Structure: Future Reserve Roles Shaped by New Strategy, Base Force Mandates, and Gulf War (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992), 25.
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