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UNIFICATION AND COLLOCATION OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF OFFICER’S COURSE

BY

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### Unification and Collocation of the Army War College and the Command and General Staff Officer's Course (Unclassified)

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### Abstract

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UNIFICATION AND COLLOCATION OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF OFFICER'S COURSE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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The current Army drawdown and mandated budget cuts force examination of our paradigms in almost every area of defense. Only with a through look at the way we do business and why we do what we do will we achieve economies that allow us to maintain a trained and ready force in an era of shrinking resources. An obvious question that begs scrutiny is should we consolidate the Army War College (AWC) and the Command and General Staff College (CGSOC)? Do the obvious savings in faculty, library, school support and base operations that result from consolidation offset the advantages of the current geographical separation of the two schools? This study examines the historical evolution of senior officer education in the Army, the recommendations of the Panel on Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee, Navy and Air Force professional senior officer education, and recent Army studies in an attempt to determine if the unification of the AWC and the CGSOC under one command structure or if collocation of the schools would achieve cost savings without a degradation of the education officers' currently receive at those institutions. The author concludes that the Nation and Army are best served with an AWC that develops senior leaders prepared to operate at the strategic level in today’s world and a CGSOC that develops leaders prepared to operate in a joint tactical and operational environment. These colleges are ideally located separately at Carlisle and Leavenworth. The current command structure is sound; the AWC as a Field Operating Agency of the DCSOPS and the CGSOC subordinate to TRADOC.
INTRODUCTION

The current Army drawdown and mandated budget cuts force examination of our paradigms in almost every area of defense. Only with a thorough look at the way we do business and why we do what we do will we achieve economies that allow us to maintain a trained and ready force in an era of shrinking resources. As the post cold war drawdown continues past the levels established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his "base force", we are once again forced to examine the critical functions of the General Support Forces of the Army, and in particular, officer education. An obvious question that begs scrutiny is should we consolidate the Army War College (AWC) and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC)? Do the obvious savings in faculty, library, school support and base operations that result from consolidation offset the advantages of the current geographical separation of the two schools?

The question at hand is not a new one. The roles and functions of both schools, the requirement for an Army War College at all, and the collocation of both schools under one president or commandant has been the subject of debate and studies since the day Secretary of War, Elihu Root, recommended establishment of an Army War College in 1899.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF OFFICER EDUCATION

Elihu Root, Secretary of War at the turn of the century, was concerned about the capabilities of the Army, specifically how to restructure the force during the drawdown after the War with
Spain. Congress directed dissolution, no later than 1 July 1901, of the volunteer Army raised to fight the war, returning the Army to a regular force of 26,610. Root outlined the reforms he believed necessary to establish a viable fighting force, incorporating the lessons learned from the interwar years and lessons learned from the war in the "Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1899".

First among the reforms recommended by Secretary Root was the establishment of a war college. Although there is no doubt that he was concerned about the professional education of officers, the college proposed by Root had a far greater scope. The college was to be composed of the heads of the staff departments of the Army with duties to "direct the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire the information, devise the plans, and study the subjects above indicated, and to advise the Commander in Chief upon all questions of plans, armament, transportation, mobilization, and military preparation and movement." Root was proposing a war college that would double as a general staff.

For the previous 20 years Army reformers, such as Emory Upton, William T. Sherman and Philip H. Sheridan, to name a few, had been grappling with the formation of an officer education system. The Artillery School at Ft. Monroe, Va. led the way in the study of the Military Art, and served as the model for the formation of a "school of application for infantry and cavalry" at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas in 1881. In 1892 a Cavalry and
Artillery School was organized at Ft. Riley, Kansas. Although there was some study of Military Art and occasional papers published by the schools dealing with strategic issues, these schools were primarily concerned with preparing officers for company level duties; the application of tactics and drill.

War Department General Order Number 155, published 27 November 1901, was a monumental benchmark in the reform of Army officer professional education. The document directed the establishment of a progressive system of officer education. This progressive education included four levels: 1) "at each post an officers' school for elementary instruction in theory and practice", 2) a series of special service or branch schools, 3) the General Service and Staff College, which was to be located at Fort Leavenworth and replace the Infantry and Cavalry School, and 4) a War College for the most advanced instruction at Washington Barracks, Washington D.C.²

General Order 155 called for the establishment of a War College Board to exercise general supervision of all the Army schools and to establish the Army War College. Duties as the Army's General Staff and the establishment of lower level schools, however, consumed the Board. After the General Staff Act of 1903, establishing the same for the Army, the War College Board was dissolved. General Tasker H. Bliss, one of the original two instructors that helped establish the Naval War College in 1885 and a member of the War College Board was appointed President of the college. Work on senior officer
education finally began and in 1904 the first students to the new AWC were admitted.

Until the First World War the purpose of the War College would remain "to make practical application of knowledge already acquired, not to impart instruction". Although now technically separated from the Army Staff, this support function of the AWC remained. The faculty of the college doubled as Army Staff officers.

Progress in curriculum development at the school continued during these years. However, the creation of war or contingency plans for the Army Staff continued as the focus. The students played a role in contingency planning for Santa Domingo in 1904, the deployment to Cuba in 1906, and plans in the event of war with Japan in 1907.

The National Defense Act of 1916 prohibited the use of War College students for General Staff work. This was an effort by Congress to limit the number of officers serving on the General Staff. This had a substantial effect on academic development of the War College. Although the College lost instructors to the General Staff, the Act served to focus the College as an institution of senior officer education. War would interrupt any further development. Once war was declared on Germany in 1917 classes were suspended and in 1918 the War College Division became the War Plans Division of the General Staff.

General Pershing, disappointed with U.S. officer's ability to perform General Staff functions, opened a General Staff
College in France for officers reporting to the American Expeditionary Force.\(^5\) Wartime deficiencies and post-war analysis of the problems, once again, highlighted an inadequate officer professional education system. Secretary of War Baker, in the "Annual Report of the War Department for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1919 found:

> It has been specially apparent that General Staff officers for duty with the War Department and for larger expeditionary forces should have broader knowledge, not only of their purely military duties, but also a full comprehension of all agencies, governmental as well as industrial, necessarily involved in a nation at war.\(^6\)

As a consequence of the past experience and the requirements of a new global power, the General Staff College was formed at Fort Leavenworth to educate selected officers in preparation "for duty as General Staff officers with tactical units and for higher tactical command."\(^7\) The Army War College would reopen in Washington D.C. as the General Staff College with a focus as earlier outlined by Baker.

In 1920 Army Chief of Staff, General John J. Pershing, convened a board to review officer education. This board was an attempt to economize as the Army resources, both personnel and budget, began to shrink rapidly. The accepted recommendations of that board, presided over by General Edward McGlachlin, then Commandant of the AWC, established the missions of the two schools which remained until the next world war.\(^8\)
The new Command and General Staff School was to "provide a one year course instructing in command and general staff duties from reinforced brigade through army corps level". The General Staff School, renamed the Army War College in 1921 was to focus on strategy, tactics and logistics of the field army. Although there were curriculum modifications over the years, the schools generally maintained this focus. In 1940, as a result of pre-war mobilization requirements, once again the Army War College suspended classes.

WORLD WAR II AND THE REBIRTH OF SENIOR LEVEL EDUCATION

World War II and events shortly thereafter, were to have a significant impact on post-war senior officer education. Three key factors contribute to the course that has brought us to where we are today. The first was the lessons learned from the war itself, the second was the National Security Act of 1947, and the third was the emergence of the United States as a super power.

World War II confirmed that the nature of warfare at the theater and operational level of war was conducted as a joint effort. This implied that the commander at the operational level and above required an education that allowed him to prudently employ forces of all the services in a synergistic effort to prosecute campaigns. This was obvious to senior commanders. It was so apparent that General Eisenhower agreed with General Marshall, just prior to following him as the Chief of Staff, that
if a proposed Army and Navy War College was firmly established there was no need to reopen the Army War College.

On 23 November 1945, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eisenhower commissioned a War Department Military Education Board to review post war officer education. He appointed General Leonard T. Gerow, then Commandant of the Command and General Staff School, as president. The result of the "Gerow Board" was a recommendation to establish a "National Security University" consisting of five colleges. At the top of the military education system was the National War College. The influence of these three factors are obvious in the recommendations of the board. Although the National Security Act was yet to be passed, debate on the reorganization of the War Department and Navy Department was on-going in Congress at the time.

The Board recommended objectives for the National War College. These were to "develop commanders for the highest echelons of the Armed Forces (Joint Chiefs of Staff, War and Navy Departments, and Theaters) and key staff officers qualified to serve on their staffs; to qualify officers for participation in the formulating of national policy; and to foster the understanding and coordination between the Armed Forces and other agencies which are essential to a National War effort." The scope of the instruction recommended by the board is also inciteful. The course was to include instruction on "grand strategy and war planning, foreign and domestic policies of all nations and their effect on world stability, causes and
prevention of war, the economic and social resources of nations and their relationship to war potential, joint policies and joint doctrines, mobilization and demobilization, policies for operating with allies, trend of future wars and their implications and Armed Forces responsibilities after cessation of active hostilities". 12

The nature of warfare at the operational level and above dictated a joint school with a focus on national policy. On 4 February 1946 the War, Navy, and State Department announced the formation of the National War College, with classes to begin that fall. General Eisenhower offered the former Army War College site, currently home of the Army and Navy Staff College, permanently to the school. Obviously he had no intent of reopening the Army War College. The National War College was to serve as the capstone course in an officer's career regardless of service.

The second factor in shaping the requirements for senior level education is the result of the National Security Act of 1947. In recognizing the joint nature of warfare and reacting to lessons learned from the war, Congress enacted legislation that established the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with formulating strategic plans. Perhaps the more significant portion of this legislation impacting on officer education was the establishment of the National Security Council. This act formalized the importance of the close coordination of national foreign policy with national military policy. Military policy as an instrument
of national policy was certainly nothing new. The formalization of the coordinating effort into one body and the establishment of the position of National Security Advisor to the President, however, gave military leaders a forum in which they were not only able, but expected, to help shape national security objectives. This Act recognized the role and importance of military leaders in formulating national strategy.

The final event from this period that shapes today’s officer education is the emergence of the United States as a world super power. The post war commitments we assumed in Europe and the Far East, followed closely by the Cold War and the Containment Policy, forced the forward deployment of military forces outside the country in great numbers. The policy itself implied a large commitment to regional stability and development of Third World nations. This was a clear mandate for Army leaders that the ability to employ forces at the tactical and operational level was not sufficient. Critical to commanders was a clear understanding of national security strategy and objectives and an understanding of actions required to meet those objectives.

RISE OF THE NEW ARMY WAR COLLEGE

In 1946 CGSC returned from a war shortened curriculum to a full 40 week course. The scope of the instruction however, gained appreciably from the prewar days. As a result of the new senior level schooling arrangements, with no Army specific war college, the school was tasked to "instruct on the employment of
all field forces within the framework of the army group. Moreover, it was to prepare officers for duty as commanders and staff officers at the division and higher levels." The school year was divided into two phases, a special 10 week course added to instruct on the duties and responsibilities of staff officers serving on the highest level staffs, and the school was renamed the Command and General Staff College.

Whether this increased load was a result of a perceived gap between the tactical and strategic level instruction of the prewar CGSC and the newly formed National War College or a recognition of the rapid increase in the level of responsibility assumed by many officers during mobilization and war is unknown. It hardly seems plausible, however, that the Commandant of CGSC, General Gerow, would recommend establishment of a joint senior service school, outline the mission, scope and objectives for that institution and then return to Kansas leaving a gap in the education of officers between those two institutions.

There was a general consensus among the Army staff, however, that the current educational system was still inadequate. It was agreed that instruction for duty at the War Department, theater and zone of the interior levels should be separated from tactical level of operations. General Wade Haislap, head of the Chief of Staff's Advisory Group, was directed by Eisenhower to conducted a study and concluded a gap did exist, and recommended the reopening of the AWC. Eisenhower took no action and the
problem was passed to General Bradley when he assumed duties as the Chief of Staff of the Army in February 1948.

The Army, however, had a greater problem with senior level schooling than the curriculum. The total number of Army officers attending National War College each year was only thirty. That was a third the size of the AWC classes of the 1930's and horribly inadequate to meet the numbers required to serve on the new joint staff, Department of the Army, and theater commands. Request for additional slots at the school were turned down; the National War College was already operating at capacity and physically could not expand. In 1948 the Army staff recommended reopening the AWC to alleviate this problem.

Bradley, like Eisenhower was reluctant to proceed and directed the convening of another board in 1949. The "Eddy Board", named in honor of its President, then Commandant at CGSC, General Manton S. Eddy, was tasked to study the entire officer education system. The report was completed just prior to the departure of General Bradley and the decision left to General J. Lawton Collins, new Army Chief of Staff. The "Eddy Board recommended the immediate reopening of the AWC and reaffirmed the progressive nature of education for officers. The fourth and final level, was not specifically the AWC, but called an advanced course of the Command and General Staff College. Though there was reluctance to use the name Army War College, the course was proposed to fill the gap between CGSC and NWC. It was also recognized that the number of attenders to the NWC was unlikely
to increase and this new course would serve as the pinnacle of education for the majority of officers.

General Collins acted quickly. He approved the recommendations of the board with modifications which changed the entire focus of the college. The school was a reestablished Army War College, that would serve as the apex of the Army education system, and the officers attending were accredited with equal status as those attending the National War College.14

Leavenworth served as a convenient location to house the first class until selection of a permanent site, establishment of a library, and assignment of a faculty could occur.15 After much debate, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania was designated the site, with temporary lodging directed at Fort Leavenworth. After 10 years without a service specific senior service college, the Army War College reopened in August 1950.

**ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TODAY**

Officer professional education in the Army today remains progressive and sequential. An officer attends his branch basic course and advanced course as a company grade officer. Between the 6th and 9th year of service an officer attends the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) for training in staff procedures and duties at battalion through division. Approximately 50 percent of any year group are selected by a centralized board to attend intermediate schooling between their 10th and 16th year of service. The Army intermediate school is
the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The CGSOC mission is to develop leaders who will train and fight units at the tactical and operational levels. The school educates and trains officers for duty on staffs or as commanders at levels of brigade through corps. The major areas of concentration are tactics and logistics at the division and corps level. The concentration is on the bridging of tactics and strategy, specifically that of the operational art. Approximately 20 percent of the course curriculum is strategy related instruction. Considerable time is dedicated to military history, leadership, and the human dimension of war.

The Army War College, located at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, is a Field Operating Agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and is the Army senior level college; the capstone course for the development of an officer. Officers are centrally selected for attendance between the 16th and 23d year of service and are in the rank of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel. The course prepares officers for service in senior command and staff positions in Army, joint, and combined organizations. The effort is directed at building on an appreciation of the operational art, and the strategic concept within which the armed forces and coalition partners will operate in peace, transition to war, war, and conflict termination. The academic focus of the course is on the development of national security strategy, the national military strategy and theater level operations.
SISTER SERVICES' OFFICER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

Both other service have their intermediate and senior professional military education institutions collocated and consolidated. The Navy has a markedly different philosophy about military education. The College of Naval Warfare (senior) and College of Naval Command and Staff (intermediate) are collocated at Newport, Rhode Island. Very few Navy officers, approximately 8 percent, attend both an intermediate and senior level school. The mission statement of the two schools is identical. The curriculum of the two schools differs only during the short operations course where each school has the appropriate level of focus. The faculty is consolidated; the faculty teaches both courses. The House Armed Services Committee Panel on Military Education, in their 1987 study, found the strategy course more sharply focused than the other services, however, it was focused strictly on military strategy, not national security strategy.

In essence, the Navy does not have two schools, rather one school with the student body grouped by grade with limited time spent on the operational art, focused at the appropriate level. Whether the Navy's blurring of the two schools into one is a result of the collocation or as a result of their philosophy that experience with the fleet is the only professional military education required is unknown. For the Army to examine the Navy example for collocation however, is superfluous.

The Air Force also collocates it two schools at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Panel on Military Education found
serious problems at both schools. These include a "lack of focus", "poor quality", "emphasis clearly not on warfighting and supporting" and an overwhelming desire by Air Force officers to attend another service or the joint intermediate and senior schools. This raises the question as to the value of Maxwell as an example of accrued advantages of the issues at hand.  

Both schools of both sister services are unified under one command and report directly to the service chief or service staff. Doctrine development in both services is divorced from the command responsible for education. The Air Force does have their doctrine center, the Center for Aerospace Research, Doctrine and Education, located at Maxwell, but they remain separate from the schools. The Air Force schools devote little time to Air Force doctrine. As the Panel points out, "the school may be missing a magnificent opportunity to teach the use of air power in the full range of possible contingencies from the tactical to the strategic levels."

NEW PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZATION

Several events make a reaffirmation of the current system timely. The first is a result of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 and the subsequent "Skelton Committee" report. The second is a result of the current Defense Department cutbacks. The effects of the drawdown are being felt even as the institutions are asked to justify their existence to internal study groups tasked to find ways to economize. More disturbing though, are
the effects of Army personnel and budget policy decisions that threatened turmoil and degradation of the ongoing education. Therefore, the question raised in this paper is relevant.

With each review of the Army officer education system since the turn of the century, coupled with studies conducted prior to each reopening of the AWC, the debate over the functions and mission of the school revolved around two philosophical arguments. The argument arises in attempting to determine just what skills, capabilities, and knowledge are required of senior Army officers? In large measure, it is the resolution of this argument that has dictated the location of the school.

Colonel Harry Ball, in his book Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College, describes these two camps of thought. One he labels the "traditional" school which says "the senior military officer must remain within strict professional boundaries and not dwell on matters not primarily United States Army affairs." The other school of thought says a senior officer must appreciate the political, economic, and social context within which the military is employed. To those of the traditional school of thought, collocation of the schools, or abolishment of the AWC with a second year added for all students at the CGSOC, are viable solutions. To those of the other, broader based school, geographical separation of the two schools is desirable, and the AWC must be located close enough to the national seat of power to accrue obvious benefits, but "sufficiently removed to eschew its interference."
Another factor with impact on the location of the two schools is command and control of the officer educational system. Although officer education is progressive, it is not combined under one command responsible for education.

The Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for Army doctrine and training. For officers this includes the ROTC program, OCS, the branch basic and advanced schools, CAS3, and the Command and General Staff College. He does not however, control the Army War College or the U.S. Military Academy. This is often seen as a bit incongruous and so stated by past TRADOC Commanders.

The Army War College is a Field Operating Agency of the Army Staff. As seen earlier, the AWC association with the Army Staff began very early in its history; initially it was the Army Staff! At that time the War College Board was charged with supervising all Army officer education.

During the early days of the third reopening of the AWC in 1950, responsibility for supervision of the school rested with Army Field Forces and later with its successor, Continental Army Command. These commands also exercised supervision of CGSC. In 1960, General Lemnitzer, Army Chief of Staff, directed that the War College be placed under the direct supervision of the Department of the Army staff, the command relationship it retains today. This separation appears to be the result of the inability of the CONARC staff to properly support, assist or give guidance.
to the college rather than any philosophical differences about the focus of the institution. 22

Although the philosophical differences in the purpose of the institution seem far more important in the collocation discussion, command and control of the institution has continued to surface as an issue. This has been particularly true of recent studies.

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

A Panel on Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee was appointed on 13 November 1987 as a result of the Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The primary objective of the Goldwater - Nichols Act was to strengthen the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the authority of Unified Combatant Commanders in an effort to improve advice to national decision makers and improve the ability of the armed forces to prosecute joint campaigns. Integral to the objective of the Act was ensuring that quality officers were assigned to joint staffs. In Title IV, "Joint Officer Personnel Policy", Congress established the experience and education required for service on these staffs. The Panel on Military Education was formed and assigned two tasks. First, they were to review DOD plans for educating joint specialty officers and second, to assess the ability of the current professional education system to develop "military strategists, joint warfighters, and tacticians." 23
At the conclusion of an exhaustive study the Panel made several recommendations to the DOD on both the requirements and methods for qualifying officers for joint duty, and numerous recommendations on how to restructure the professional military education system of the individual services. The result is recommendations that closely parallel the recommendations of the Gerow Board in 1946. In fact, the Panel Report states they believed their recommendations were "in conformity with the hard-gained insights and wisdom of the American World War II military leaders." Unfortunately, the Panel did not address those same issues that forced the Army and those same World War II military leaders to reopen the Army War College in 1950. A review of some of the specific recommendations is germane.

The Panel recommended the establishment of a "professional military education (PME) framework for DOD schools that specifies and reflects the primary educational objectives at each PME level." Once again, the Army progressive system of officer education was validated. The specific recommendations were that the focus of intermediate level schooling should rest with employment of Combined Arms and the Joint Operational Art while the senior service schools focus on National Military Strategy. The Panel recommended that the National War College convert to a "National Center for Strategic Studies" (NCSS). This school would focus on National Security Strategy and attendees would be specially selected graduates of their respective senior service school.
In drawing the distinction between National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, the Panel used the definitions found in JCS Publication 1.02.

National Military Strategy. The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.

National Security Strategy. The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.

The current focus of the Army War College encompasses both National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. The recommendation to allow senior officers to dedicate two years to the study of strategy is commendable. This solution, however, does not allow for proper running of the Army.

The problem with the proposed NCSS that immediately surfaces is the problem of 1949; insufficient slots allocated to the Army to fill the number of Army billets on the Joint, Army, and Unified staffs. Positions on those staffs require an understanding of National Security Strategy and Policy formulation and the process of translating that into National Military Strategy and Policy. It is difficult to separate the two in the formulation process and execution of either is difficult without a firm grasp of the other. Limiting the study of National Security Strategy to a very few select officers attending the NCSS would leave the Army ill prepared to fulfil
its responsibility in the National Security Strategy and Policy formulation process.

Army requirements for the graduates of the intermediate and senior service schools is difficult to comprehend. The Panel found the Army had "difficulty justifying quantitatively through a position-by-position requirement process the large number of officers it sends to CGSOC in-residence. Numbers in school are apparently driven by tradition, size of faculty, and a general impression that more is better."²⁶

As a result of the Panel's comments and the impending loss of the Armed Forces Staff College as a MEL 4 producing school, the Army dutifully commissioned a MEL-4 study followed by a MEL-1 study to determine actual requirements. The methodology of both studies however, make the results inadequate to address the issue of collocation or unification of the command structures of the schools. Both studies derived a list of descriptors that characterized the graduates of the respective schools. These descriptors were then sent to the field for evaluation against those skills required for specific positions that existed in units. These descriptors focused on the current curriculum of the schools and not specifically on descriptors of what the Panel thought was the correct focus of that institution. Consequently, results of the MEL-1 study show a requirement for 69.7 percent of the authorizations for colonel to possess a MEL-1 education, yet no distinction is made between those officers requiring skills in National Security Strategy formulation and those merely requiring
skills in National Military Strategy formulation. Intuitive from the MEL-1 study however, is the fact that the current NWC slots allocated to the Army do not meet the Army requirements for leaders with a firm grounding in National Security Strategy and Policy formulation. As in 1949, the Army War College is required, not merely as a gap filler between CGSOC and the proposed NCSS, but as a school that serves as the apex of Army education, involved in producing a sufficient number of leaders with a broad understanding of not only National Military Strategy, but National Security Strategy as well.

The House Panel, as part of its charter, made observations on specific schools. While addressing Army schools, the Panel highlighted the geographic separation of the AWC and the CGSC and the separate command structure controlling the schools. The separation "places the schools at a disadvantage, especially in operating costs, compared to the Air Force and Navy schools, which are both located on single installations. Among the significant advantages of locating both schools together are shared libraries, printing plants, and installation support structure."

In making their observations about Army schools, the House Panel on Military Education used the Air Force and Navy school systems as examples of how to gain efficiency through collocation and consolidation under one command. Perhaps though, problems the Panel found with the institutions of our sister services
present excellent arguments for why the Army should not collocate and consolidate.

In highlighting the complications of the command and control arrangement, the Panel points out that in both other services the intermediate and senior service school report directly to the service chief. Also highlighted however, is the unique role Leavenworth plays in doctrine development. Internal studies directed by the Army in an effort to find economies as resources shrink, addressed both the collocation and command and control issues.

The Panel, in its report, enjoins the Army to "structure its school system to best suit its needs and assure high quality in its education ... review the rationale for separate geographic locations and command chains to ensure that this ... is worth the high cost in funds, facilities and faculty manpower." The Panel, in its investigation of the other services, validates the Army’s separation of schools and command chains and justifies their subjective evaluation of the "high costs in funds, facilities and faculty manpower."

**RECENT ARMY STUDIES**

On 15 May 1990 the Project Vanguard Study Group, a 60 person force, was tasked to "identify the functional requirements of the General Support Forces... to develop alternative concepts and policies and organizations that are more effective and provide additional costs savings." On 27 July 1990 the
Project Vanguard General Officer Working Group briefing on "Vision and Initiatives" was presented. At that time one of the initiatives was a restructuring of TRADOC. This restructuring called for the establishment of an Army Center for Professional Development with unification and collocation of CGSC, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), the AWC, and the Army Material College. Conspicuously absent in the briefing was information on savings and personnel reductions that could accrued as a result of the consolidation.30 Every other recommended initiative reflected savings in money, military manpower and civilian manpower, by year, through 1997.

However, cost analysis of collocation of the two schools was available. The Vanguard study group estimated a one time cost to close Carlisle Barracks of $10 million. This included the movement of military and civilian personnel and equipment to Fort Leavenworth ($3.7M), preparation of facilities at Leavenworth ($500K), movement of tenant activities ($3.0M), transfer of regional support missions ($300K), and base closure costs ($10.0M). Potential annual savings totaled $11.9 million. This included annual savings from closing the installation ($10.1M) and annual savings from a reduction of the AWC program ($1.8M) which reflected a 50 percent savings in support costs.31

In 1990 the AWC conducted their own analysis of the move. In the AWC analysis they found the Vanguard Study Group had based their analysis on two faulty assumptions; first, that the closure of the AWC resulted in no caretaker expenses at Carlisle to
protect government equipment, and secondly that the study had based the mission costs of the school on civilian pay costs alone. The school’s analysis of requirements for a caretaker cost ($3.5M annually), base operating costs for the AWC and tenants at a new location ($5.8M which assumed a 50 percent reduction of current costs), and housing costs for AWC and tenants at a new location ($1.8M) made any savings negligible.\textsuperscript{32}

The savings accrued by consolidation of the schools in the Vanguard Study must have been negligible as the savings accrued as a result of the collocation never appear in the General Officer Working Group Briefing, nor the Vanguard Final Report. Yet the Vanguard Final Report still recommended the realignment of professional education by forming a Center for Professional Development. The Center would "provide oversight over all warfighting and management schools", be subordinate to the TRADOC Commander, and consist of the AWC, CGSC, Judge Advocate General School, Army Management College and a proposed Army Training Center. However, "physical collocation of schools" is not required for successful implementation, nor do any cost savings accrued by a move appear in the final report.\textsuperscript{33} In other words, the improved effectiveness and efficiency was to be found in fixing the command and control structure of the schools.

In June 1990, TRADOC was tasked to review the most effective and efficient command and control structure for Army training and educational institutions not currently assigned to TRADOC. Not surprisingly, one recommendation of the study was the transfer of
the AWC to TRADOC and the establishment of a "Land Power University via consolidation of AWC and the CGSC." The advantages that accrue are listed in the study, but once again they are intuitive, not quantitative; "synergism from combined faculty and strategists", "shared facilities, faculties and libraries", and "development and use of a single wargaming facility". No disadvantages or costs savings are listed.

Another course of action for reorganization, though not mentioned in recent Army studies, is to consolidate the AWC and CGSOC and place them subordinate to the Army Staff. This would approximate what the Congressional Panel on Military Education found in the Air Force and Navy during their 1987 study. This would serve to divorce the training of officers from officer education; training being instruction on tactics, techniques and procedures. The advantages of this structure is it allows the development of strategic leaders and strategists to begin at the intermediate level.

At the operational and strategic level the ability to exercise strategic leadership is required. A strategic leader formulates and espouses a vision and builds a consensus to achieve that vision. Any Joint and, particularly any Combined, Operation is an exercise in consensus building for the strategic leader. Although education in the operational art is the focus of CGSOC, strategic leadership is not. There is a marked difference in the leadership skills required by a battalion or brigade commander and the strategic leadership that a CINC,
corps, and occasionally a division commander must exercise. Combining the schools under the Army Staff would aid this development. The result is better qualified strategic leaders and strategists to serve on these same level staffs for which we currently educate AWC students.

The disadvantages however, almost make this solution ludicrous. TRADOC, as the doctrine developer, relies heavily on CGSOC for development. Separating the CGSOC from TRADOC places an increased burden on TRADOC that would result increased personnel requirements and would serve to separate the doctrine developers from the doctrine teachers. Additionally CGSOC serves to bridge the gap between tactical and the operational art. Divorcing the two at this level with an exclusive concentration on the operational art at CGSOC would create a gap between the current branch advanced courses and the intermediate school - a gap that would be difficult for advance courses to overcome.

CONCLUSION

There are advantages of consolidation of the command structure. The command reorganization most widely espoused today would place the AWC under the command of TRADOC. The Congressional Panel on Military Education, Project Vanguard, and the TRADOC study recommend this course of action. The result is one commander responsible for all officer professional development. Improved coordination of the curriculum of the schools, elimination of redundancy in the curriculums, and a
central direction for the schools will also result. TRADOC, as doctrine developer, could ensure no doctrinal breaks occur in the curriculums. Improved strategy and doctrine development and promulgation would result.

Another advantage of this course of action is the potential improvement of installation support for the AWC. Carlisle Barracks is a TRADOC installation. Placing the AWC in TRADOC ensures the TRADOC Commander has a vested interest in properly supporting the AWC. Although no serious problems with installation support have surfaced, competition for increasingly scarce resources heightens anxiety.

The disadvantages, however, make change at this point counterproductive. The disadvantages under various reorganization schemes are: distancing the AWC from national institutions and the Army and Joint Staff through the layering of headquarters, loss of focus on national security and national military strategy, and the potential divorce of the doctrine development system from the education system.

Disadvantages of this scheme have been voiced repeatedly over the past 30 years, each time with the concurrence of the senior Army leadership. The AWC is an institution focused at the national level, tasked as the Army's center for independent strategic thought and the development of future strategic leaders. Placing the school under a Deputy CG, TRADOC, as recommended in Project Vanguard adds at least two command layers between the Army Staff and the AWC. As an institution tasked
with strategic education, the focus of the school is necessarily outward; the focus is the national institutions, DOD, Joint, Army, and the Unified Command staffs, all with which the AWC maintains daily contact. The focus of the CGSOC is inward; the execution of tactics and the operational art required to fight the Army and win on the battlefield.

The command structure for officer education is not broken. The headquarters that control the institutions, the Army Staff and TRADOC, have the same general focus as that of the respective school they administer; the Army Staff is concerned with National Strategy and TRADOC with tactics and the Operational Art. The current command relationship facilitates the separation between the operational art and National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy and helps each school maintain the proper focus.

It is difficult to divorce the command relationship issue from a collocation issue without command change. We can assume that Fort Leavenworth is the installation of choice when discussing collocation; space at Carlisle Barracks is prohibitive. Advantages most often pointed to are intuitive guesses at imagined quantitative savings; savings accrued through consolidation of facilities, libraries and faculties. Qualitative improvements in the faculty are also assumed.

Sharing faculties would allow students increased exposure to subject matter experts. This would assist the early development of strategic leaders as discussed earlier. It would also allow
the structuring of electives which would allow officers at the CGSOC with foreign area specialties to take advantage of the AWC Department of National Security and Strategy in furthering their education. Electives could be structured for CGSOC students that were enroute to service with the Joint, Army or Unified Commanders Staffs to provide a strategic perspective. Likewise, more detailed study of the operational art required by AWC students could be consolidated with CGSOC. An institution (or university with two separate colleges) of this size may also help to attract nationally renowned educators from other institutions.

The disadvantages with the collocation are many. They include distancing the AWC strategic center from the National Capitol Region, the blurring of the two curriculums over time and the diluting of the focus of the two schools. Another disadvantage is the potential loss of the current academic environment at Carlisle.

The proximity of the AWC to Washington, D.C. help the AWC maintain a focus on strategic, joint, and combined issues. Interface with the DOD, DA, Joint, Army and other government departments and agencies occur daily. The guest speaker program at Carlisle is robust, focused on national issues and in large measure successful simply due to the time and distance factor between Carlisle and Washington. Moving to Leavenworth would jeopardize this program.

Other than the obvious disadvantages accrued from distancing the school from the Capitol and the Pentagon, locating the senior
officers attending the AWC with the majors attending CGSOC and the captains attending CAS3 raise other risks. The first, and inevitable problem, will draw former battalion commanders and future brigade commanders attending AWC into discussion, training, and after action review of tactical problems and perhaps the over focus of the senior students on tactics and the operational art. It may conversely serve to draw some CGSOC students further into topics of national security, diluting the focus on the operational art.

The other risk is the potential to further isolate current Army intellectual endeavors from the other services, the Joint Staff, and the national civilian leadership. Collocating the schools, with a combined faculty, would also risk a blurring of the curriculums over time.

Another concern of collocation is the loss of the educational atmosphere that has been created at Carlisle. To maintain the current focus of the AWC we must continue to foster the current atmosphere created at Carlisle. It is an andragogical model of education; set in an informal atmosphere, with students and faculty on a first name basis, courses conducted by seminar, with a great amount of free time for the student to dedicate to research and writing. This informal atmosphere is an atmosphere to which most officers arriving at the AWC from other positions in the Army are unaccustomed. The mere presence of 1200 captains and majors, many of whom were recent subordinates, on the same installation would be detrimental to this informal atmosphere.
Many of the problems that arose in 1950 while the AWC was temporarily relocated at Fort Leavenworth would resurface. These included a feeling that a small elite was given privileges not accorded other students on post and that the mere presence of those students on the same installation served to degrade the status of the CGSOC.

Given these arguments, the advantages of geographical separation of the AWC and CGSOC outweigh the disadvantages. Any quantitative savings appear to be minimal and should not serve as justification to raise the issue. The degradation in focus and quality of the schools that would result make the move inappropriate. The location of the AWC is ideal given the focus of the institution.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Nation and Army are best served with an AWC that develops senior leaders prepared to operate at the strategic level in today's world and a CGSOC that develops leaders prepared to operate in a joint tactical and operational environment. These colleges are ideally located separately at Carlisle and Leavenworth. The current command structure is sound; the AWC operating as a Field Operating Agency of the DCSOPS and CGSC subordinate to TRADOC.

Congressional review followed by mandated change, coupled with internal Army studies to justify separate institutions and command structures have placed great pressure on our highest
institutions of officer professional military education. Internal Army personnel and budget policies have served to exacerbate the problem.

One of the most important requirements for a first class educational institution is a quality faculty. Army personnel policy, a result of the current drawdown, has resulted in turmoil of the faculty of both institutions. At the AWC in FY92 alone, 32 percent of the active military faculty retired as a result of the Selective Early Retirement Board (SERB) or retired in lieu of appearing before the SERB. Coupled with scheduled Permanent Change of Station (PCS), 50 percent of the faculty turned over this year. The impact on the CGSC is as devastating. Of the 440 faculty members authorized at CGSC, 53 percent retired for the same reasons or conducted a PCS move. Additionally, in FY92 CGSC lost 50 faculty slots as a result of the drawdown without any decrease in the student load.

As bleak as this situation may appear, we cannot let the exigencies of budget and personnel reductions resolve this question for us. Looming deeper budget cuts and continuation of current personnel policy raise the potential for further degradation of the education at both schools as we "salami slice" or "peel the onion a layer at a time" our way through the force reduction.

The answer to maintaining excellence is not collocation. The next paradigm to examine may be who should be faculty, how do we access faculty, and how do we protect these educators when
they choose to leave what has become the traditional tract to success in the Army to educate tomorrow's leaders?
ENDNOTES

1War Department, Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1899, Vol. 1 (Washington, 1899), 49.

2War Department, General Orders, No. 155, (Washington, 27 November 1901), 1.


5Ball, 149.

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11War Department, Report of the War Department Military Education Board on Educational Systems for Officers of the Army (Gerow Board), (Washington: 5 February 1946), 29.

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19Ibid., 188.

20Ball, 258.

21Ibid.

22Ball, 349.


24Ibid., 9.

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26Ibid., 181.

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31LTC Thomas W. McCormick, Executive Officer to the Commandant, U.S. Army War College, Interview by the author, 8 February 1993, Carlisle, PA.

32Ibid.


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38 Major M. A. Speenberg, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Army War College, Interview by author, 5 November 1992, Carlisle, PA.

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