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**THE UNITED STATES ARMY
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND AND
ITS ROLE IN THE ARMY'S WAR ON DRUGS**

BY

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Although today, the United States Army is a primary player in the Department of Defense's support the President's National Drug Control Strategy, for years the Army was plagued by a significant and tragic drug problem of its own. This paper is about that problem and the Army's quest to solve it. It examines the role of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) in the Army's counter-drug effort. It chronicles USACIDC's contributions to drug suppression throughout the Army worldwide. Although engaged in investigating illegal drugs for many years, this paper focuses on USACIDC's effort since becoming a major Army command (MACOM) in 1971 to the present. The review of twenty-two years of criminal investigations and drug suppression operations reveals an interesting and previously untold story of a small group of dedicated soldiers and their extraordinary contribution to the Army's "war on drugs." As the Army faces a decade of many challenges and great change, this study concludes with some thoughts concerning USACIDC's counter-drug role for the future.

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THE UNITED STATES ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND AND ITS ROLE IN THE ARMY'S WAR ON DRUGS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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United States Army

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PREFACE

Today, the United States Army is engaged in counter-drug operations as part of the Department of Defense commitment to America's "war on drugs." The Army's role in this, non-traditional military mission, has grown each year since the Secretary of Defense declared in September 1989 that *"detecting and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high-priority national security mission of the Department of Defense."*

In fact, the Army has been deeply involved in its own "war on drugs" for more than twenty-two years. Little is known of this battle outside the small group of warriors that, even today, continue the fight. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this relatively unknown story. The strategy and tactics of the fight, with its many engagements and victories are testaments to the dedicated soldiers who, for so many years, have been on the front lines.

The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command is the Army's sole agent for worldwide investigation of serious crimes committed by members of the Army or committed against the Army. CID special agents are responsible for investigating felony crime of Army interest, anywhere, anytime. USACIDC was established as a major Army Command on September 17, 1971.

This small, technical worldwide command of fewer than 2,000 soldiers and civilians is organized with headquarters in the Washington, D.C. area; four brigade level commands called regions; a U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory System and two field operating agencies - the Investigative Services Activity and the Crime Records Center.²

Inherent in its mission, has been drug suppression and the investigation of cases involving marihuana, narcotics, dangerous drugs, or other controlled substances. Drug suppression, as conducted by USACIDC, refers to law enforcement and police actions directly related to detection, monitoring, and interdiction of illicit drugs destined for consumption by members of the armed services, their families, and employees of the U.S. government. The Army's drug suppression operation is the topic of this paper.

This study examines the role of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command in the Army's counter-drug effort. It chronicles USACIDC's contribution to drug suppression worldwide. It offers some thoughts for future roles and missions of USACIDC in the continuing "war on drugs." Although Army CID has been investigating illegal drugs for many years, this study focuses on USACIDC since its formation as a major Army command (MACOM) in September 1971.

First, we take a historical look at events leading to the formation of the

Criminal Investigation Command. We focus on that aspect of USACIDC's mission dealing with illegal drugs and just how the Command postured itself to meet the challenge. We begin with a look at the Army in the decade of the 70's, a particularly turbulent and challenging time for our service around the world. Next, we move to the 1980's, and show the transition in the Army's counter-drug effort to meet the changing times. Finally, as we face the 1990's with a superbly trained and capable but much smaller Army, we look toward the future.

This study concludes by looking at how the Army and the Criminal Investigation Command are adjusting to keep pace with the drug problem challenging the Army in the decade of the 90's.

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION - A BRIEF HISTORY

Before World War I, the Army relied on private agencies, such as the Pinkerton Detective Agency, to investigate serious crime. Then, in 1917, the Military Police Corps was established to function as uniformed policemen servicing the American Expeditionary Forces in France.

The crime rate mounted, however, and the need for a detective element became apparent. Therefore, in November 1918, General John J. Pershing, commanding the Army Expeditionary Forces, directed his provost marshal to organize a criminal investigation division to investigate crimes committed against the Army in France.

The CID, as the division was called, was headed by a division chief, who was the Criminal Investigation Division's advisor to the Provost Marshal General on all matters pertaining to criminal investigations.

When the division was first formed, there was no central control of investigative efforts within the CID and investigators consisted of selected personnel from military police units within each command.

Between World War I and World War II, the Army returned to its former policy of relying on local civil law enforcement officials for investigating crime in the Army. But the growth of the Army, after the onset of World War II,

was paralleled by an expanding crime rate. Therefore, in January 1944, a Criminal Investigation Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office was established to provide staff supervision over criminal investigations, as well as to coordinate investigations between commands and set standards for investigations.³

The need to centralize the Army's investigative effort was made clear in 1964 in a study called "Project Security Shield."⁴ In 1965, steps were taken to centralize command and control of CID elements by organizing CID groups corresponding to Army areas in the United States. Later this concept was expanded to include Europe and Korea.

CID was reorganized in 1969 and became the U.S. Army CID Agency. Then, in March 1971, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird directed that centralization of Army CID be completed and a criminal investigation command be formed to have control over all CID activities worldwide.

The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command was established as a major Army command on September 17, 1971.⁵

Today, USACIDC retains the "D" in its acronym as a historical reminder of the first *Criminal Investigation Division* formed by General John J. Pershing during World War I in 1918.

THE ARMY'S WAR ON DRUGS

The Army of the 1970's - A Decade of Turbulence:

The decade of the 1970's began with a Nation and its' Army facing considerable turmoil and turbulence. It is important to reflect on the environment at the time.

In early 1970, there were about 1,430,000 Army personnel on active duty, manning a combat force of 18-2/3 division forces. Thirteen and two-thirds division forces were deployed overseas: 7-1/3 in Vietnam, 4-1/3 in Europe and two in Korea. In addition, a force of five active Army divisions was retained in the United States.⁶

At home, the Nation was facing myriad challenges. In early May, at Kent State University, students demonstrating against the war in Vietnam, attack and burn to the ground the ROTC building. Later, 100 National Guardsmen fire their rifles into a group of students killing four and wounding eleven. Within days, more than 100 colleges and universities across the nation shut down as thousands of students join a nationwide campus protest. On 9 May 1970, between 75,000 and 100,000 young people, mostly from college campuses, demonstrate peaceably in Washington, D.C. at the rear of a barricaded White House, demanding the withdrawal of US military forces from Vietnam and

other southeast Asian nations.⁷

As an institution, the Army was no less challenged. Still engaged in an unpopular war, the Army's integrity was questioned from incidents such as those involving a former Sergeant Major of the Army and a general officer accused of unethical conduct, and accusations of indiscriminate killing of Vietnamese civilians in combat.⁸ War crimes dominate the headlines. The Army accuses Captain Ernest Medina and four other soldiers of committing crimes at Song My in March 1968. The charges range from premeditated murder to rape and the "maiming" of a suspect under interrogation. Medina was the commander of Lieutenant William Calley and other soldiers who are charged with murder and other crimes at My Lai 4 in Song My village.⁹

209 fragging incidents caused the deaths of 34 men.

The Army, manned primarily by "draftees," is not a happy place.

Unrest and dissent in the ranks

become more prevalent. Fragging incidents - named after the fragmentation grenades used by soldiers against their officers - are on the rise. In 1970, 209 such incidents caused the deaths of thirty-four men, as compared to 1969 when ninety-six such incidents cost thirty-four men their lives.¹⁰ By the end of the year, the war in Vietnam is winding down for the US forces stationed there as President Nixon withdraws troops. Total US military forces troop strength is

down to about 280,000.¹¹ The Army is preparing for a massive reduction in the size of its force.

Nevertheless, under current manpower policy, "*Project 100,000*" requires taking in during fiscal year 1971 approximately 50,000 persons who are in Mental Group IV or who are substandard but correctable physically (69,000 in fiscal year 1970, approximately 11% of annual enlisted accessions in fiscal year 1971). Use of the Draft brings in many poorly motivated persons of marginal mental capability. Their court martial rates are more than double that of other accessions. There is no evidence that "*Project 100,000*" members are any more prone to drug abuse than any other groups. There is some evidence that inductees may be more prone to drug abuse than volunteers.¹²

In Europe, the Army faces the fact that it has been scrimping on our forces there -- principally because of the great demands of Vietnam. While necessary, it has nevertheless been at the expense of the quality of these forces.¹³ The general posture of the Army aggravates the problems of dissent, race, and drugs within.

The Nature of the Problem:

One problem of particular concern to the Army's leadership is the increase in drug offenses by

--40 percent of soldiers in the younger age groups have used illegal drugs, principally marijuana, at some time during their lives--

young soldiers who have been influenced before induction by the growing drug culture. This situation is not confined to Vietnam -- it exists throughout the Army. Surveys conducted suggest something like 40 percent of soldiers in the younger age groups have used illegal drugs, principally marihuana, at sometime during their lives -- not necessarily since entering the Army. In Vietnam, the percentage is somewhat higher.¹⁴ The Army is sure it has a problem but also recognizes that it does not yet have a solution. The Congress of the United States concludes that the serious and growing problem of drug abuse in the United States extends to the Armed Forces. In short, the Armed Forces drug problem stems from the country's drug problem. Drug abuse has grown radically in this country in the last few years, and particularly in the high school age group from where most of Armed Forces recruits and draftees are obtained.¹⁵

The abuse of marihuana in Southeast Asia is far greater than in the Armed Services as a whole but the abuse of hard narcotics and dangerous drugs is greater in CONUS and worldwide than in Vietnam. Drugs, particularly marihuana, are cheap and readily available in the Far East. Daily hardship, danger, boredom, and fatigue, aid in producing a climate in which drug abuse may flourish.¹⁶

The nature of the problem can be described as the necessity to eliminate

—the necessity to eliminate drug abuse in the Armed Forces in a national atmosphere in which drugs are illegal but readily available and not, unfortunately, universally condemned.

The Problem

drug abuse in the Armed Forces in a national atmosphere in which drugs are illegal but readily available not, unfortunately, universally condemned.¹⁷

The Defense Department compiles a summary of investigations of drug abuse cases which shows clearly an alarming increase of cases investigated in South Vietnam, in CONUS and worldwide. The incidence of drug abuse can be characterized as

very serious.¹⁸

Faced with a rapidly growing drug problem in the United States, the military first began to identify the scope of illegal drug use in the military in 1966. Then, as now, the

The Growing Drug Abuse Problem-Investigations			
	1968	1969	1970
<i>Marihuana:</i>			
Vietnam	2637	5590	6790
Europe	693	1253	2188
CONUS	3133	4457	6481
USARPAC	627	1099	1709
Other areas	237	339	323
World Wide Total:	7327	12738	17491
<i>Hard Narcotics</i>			
Vietnam	128	292	726
Europe	23	52	69
CONUS	286	542	1459
USARPAC	14	68	94
Other areas	9	7	14
World Wide Total:	460	951	2362
<i>Dangerous Drugs:</i>			
Vietnam	32	649	1070
Europe	8	30	144
CONUS	212	626	1328
USARPAC	37	107	319
Other areas	19	46	128
World Wide Total:	308	1458	2989

only consistently reliable trend indicators to the Department of Defense were the number of investigations of drug offenses conducted by the military investigative agencies. They are accurate figures of the number of investigations of reported drug offenses involving either use, possession, or sale of illicit drugs. They are a measure of the scope of the drug problem in the armed forces, and they reflect trends. The picture that they portray and the trends that they show are not comforting ones. Drug involvement in the armed forces has increased each year since 1965. This is true in the United States, in Vietnam, and worldwide. It is true concerning the hard narcotics, the dangerous drugs, and marihuana. In 1970 alone, total drug involvement in the armed forces more than doubled worldwide, since 1969.¹⁹ Many believe that the figures represent only the "tip of the iceberg."

Although involvement with marihuana constitutes by far the greatest number of cases investigated by the military departments in all areas of the world, that fact is of little consolation when the statistics show that the use of heroin and the other hard narcotics in the armed forces have been approximately doubling each year since 1967. Thus, the often quoted statement with respect to the experiential relationship between marihuana and heroin seems to be borne out - that where marihuana goes the hard drugs soon follow.²⁰

As the decade of the 1970's began, the Army was confronted with a very special problem in Vietnam - a large influx of highly potent, yet inexpensive heroin. In late 1969 opium refineries in the Burma-Thailand-Laos tri-border region, newly staffed by skilled master chemists from Hong Kong, began producing limited supplies of high-grade heroin for the tens of thousands of alienated GIs serving in South Vietnam. The U.S. military command began getting its first reports of serious heroin addiction among isolated units in early 1970. By September or October the epidemic was fully developed: seemingly unlimited quantities of heroin were available at every U.S. installation from the Mekong Delta in the south to the DMZ in the north.²¹ From 1 January to 18 October 1970, there were eighty-nine drug-related deaths in Vietnam. Twenty-five of these were confirmed by autopsy. The remaining sixty-four deaths, although unconfirmed, were highly suspected to have been drug related.²²

The sudden burst of heroin addiction among GI's in 1970 was the most important development in

From 1 January to 18 October 1970, there were a total of 89 drug-related deaths in Vietnam.

Southeast Asia's narcotics traffic since the region attained self-sufficiency in opium production in the late 1950s. Once large quantities of heroin became available to American GI's in Vietnam, heroin addiction spread like a plague. Previously nonexistent in South Vietnam, suddenly no.4 heroin was

everywhere: fourteen-year old girls were selling heroin at roadside stands on the main highway from Saigon to the U.S. Army base at Long Binh; Saigon street peddlers stuffed plastic vials of 95 percent pure heroin into the pockets of GI's as they strolled through

downtown Saigon; and

"mama-sans," or Vietnamese

barracks' maids, started

carrying a few vials to work


for sale to on-duty soldiers.²³ By mid 1971 U.S. Army medical officers were

estimating that about ten to 15 percent, or 25,000 to 37,000 of the lower-

ranking enlisted men serving in Vietnam were heroin users.²⁴

—about 10 to 15 percent, or 25,000 to 37,000 of the lower-ranking enlisted men serving in Vietnam were heroin users.

Although aggravated in Vietnam, the drug problem effecting the Army is



not confined to troops there. Returning soldiers bring their drug habit back to the United States and sometimes on to assignments in Europe. They are greeted by a society that is undergoing a change in attitudes toward drugs.

Despite some pronouncements to the contrary, marihuana is looked upon by many citizens as no more harmful than alcohol.

The Nation and the United States Army search for a solution.

The Response and the CID:

The Department of Defense, in response to the growing drug problem in the military, published DOD Directive 1300.11, entitled *Illegal or Improper Use of Drugs by Members of the Department of Defense*, on 23 October 1970. From this, the Army promulgated its policy describing its efforts and attitudes and its approach toward the handling of soldiers engaged in drug abuse.

It is the policy of the Department of the Army to prevent and eliminate drug abuse and to attempt to restore and rehabilitate members who evidence a desire and willingness to undergo such restoration. The illegal or improper use of drugs by a member of the Army may have a seriously damaging effect on his health and mind, may jeopardized his safety and the safety of others, and may lead to criminal prosecution and discharge under other than honorable conditions, and is altogether incompatible with military service or subsequent civilian pursuits. The Department of the Army acknowledges a particular responsibility for counseling and protecting its members who use or promote the use of drugs in an illegal or improper manner.

Appropriate disciplinary and administrative actions in cases of drug abuse will be dependent upon all the facts and circumstances of each case and will include consideration of whether the individual involved is a

drug experimenter, drug user, drug addict, supplier, or casual supplier.²⁵

From the outset, the question of how to handle drugs and drug users in the military is primarily being met with the law enforcement approach. In this approach, the Army CID is the primary action agency. This effort is aimed at reducing the supply of illicit drugs, at eliminating drug pushers and users where detected, and at providing a negative incentive for the use of drugs. Second priority is given to treatment and rehabilitation of those using drugs. The lowest priority is given to activities that would lead to reduced demand for drugs.²⁶

Nearly half the cases filed at the criminal investigative repository in calendar year 1970 are drug related. This compares to approximately 37 percent in 1969, 27 percent in 1968, and less than 5 percent in 1967.²⁷ CID resources worldwide remain under the local Provost Marshal and commander. The United States Army CID Agency (USACIDA), the predecessor to USACIDC, does not exercise centralized command and control over CID assets. This poses challenges in all of the areas of criminal investigation but particularly counter-narcotics investigations. With no centralized command and control, there is no central processor of criminal intelligence, a key ingredient to successful counter-drug efforts.

U.S. Army Vietnam:

In Vietnam, General Abrams, the Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), instructs his commanders, component commanders, and staff to treat drugs as a No. 1 problem. Additional CID forces are sent to the area. It is recognized that the U.S. military is carrying the load in the enforcement sphere. On 10 December 1970, MACV publishes a *Military Police Drug Suppression Program* directive that assigns responsibilities and furnishes guidance to US Armed Forces in the Republic of Vietnam to prevent and eliminate drug abuse. From this, a Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment (JNID) is formed together narcotics intelligence information and provide a coordinated investigative capability to eradicate large supply sources of narcotics, dangerous drugs and marihuana.²⁸ CID personnel are at the core of this effort.

In May 1971 the increasing CID work load in drug investigations was recognized by the Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam (USARV). He showed that the USARV criminal investigation program is being overwhelmed by the rapidly increasing NARCO traffic that currently constitutes 79 percent of the total case load. Further, the size of the problem is such that investigators are finding it impossible to provide responsive CID support to the command. Nearly 50 percent of these drug cases are walk-in cases involving

simple possession of marihuana and dangerous drugs. Almost all these stems from apprehensions by military police for other offenses, such as uniform violation, curfew violation, off-limits violations, etc. The USARV commander noted that approximately 30 percent of his CID capability is being expended on cases involving simple possession and use of marihuana and dangerous drugs. He thinks, these cases do not require the talents of trained criminal investigators except to process the evidence. So as to use the talents of his CID personnel better, he directs that the primary responsibility for investigating simple possession and use of marihuana and dangerous drugs be transferred to the military police. He wants the CID to concentrate on heroin and other narcotic cases. In justifying this action, the Commander, USARV notes that before July 1970, heroin cases constituted less than 5 percent of the USARV CID's case load; in less than one year it has risen to 30 percent and it continues to rise dramatically.²⁹ Later, the Army would incorporate this policy worldwide, as the drug problem continues to grow.

Army wide, over three-quarters of the cases investigated during calendar year 1970 were attributed to marihuana. Possession of marihuana constituted nearly 87 percent of the 1970 drug cases. Violations involving other drugs are increasing rapidly. Approximately 10 percent of the cases investigated during 1970 involved narcotics, such as opium, morphine, codeine, and heroin, and

another 13 percent involved drugs such as LSD, barbiturates, and amphetamines. Violations involving these so-called hard drugs are higher than they were for the preceding year by about 4 percent in each category, partly because of a shift in investigative effort and partly because of more abuse of these drugs.³⁰

In Vietnam during the same period, over 700 U.S. military members were investigated for involvement with hard narcotics. During the first quarter of 1971, over 3,600 Army personnel asked for help under amnesty programs to overcome their dependency on heroin. This illustrates the rate at which the use of hard narcotics is spreading in Vietnam.³¹

Beginning in January 1971, CID began gathering detailed information on a senior South Vietnamese commander's involvement in GI heroin traffic.³² This criminal intelligence proved valuable in tracking the depth and breadth of corrupt Vietnamese officials involved in illegal narcotics smuggling operations.

For the Army and the CID, one of the biggest breaks in the early war on drugs came in the summer of 1971. In their first major combined operation, CID agents together with narcotics agents from Thailand, South Vietnam and the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) cracked a major heroin ring supplying American soldiers in Vietnam. They seized 97 pounds of

pure heroin - one of the largest hauls ever in Asia - and 660 pounds of smoking opium. Sixty members of a ring supplying drugs to American soldiers in Vietnam were arrested. The cache, which had a wholesale value in Saigon of \$4 million, originated in Burma and Laos.³³

Although hailed in the press as a great victory for the Thieu government's war on drugs, these raids were actually something of a major embarrassment, since they partially exposed the Vietnamese Navy's involvement in drug smuggling.³⁴

During this same period, CID agents were actively developing information on drug smuggling operations from Vietnam to the United States. The U.S. Army CID Agency was beginning a collection effort to centrally manage criminal intelligence, analyze the information and disseminate it to CID elements in the field. Two methods initially uncovered and reported involved smuggling heroin back through the medical evacuation (MEDIVAC) and the Army Post Office (APO) systems. During March and April 1971, U.S. customs seized 248 pieces of mail containing narcotics in the army and air force postal systems. On April 5, 1971, U.S. customs officials in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, seized 7.7 kilograms of Double U-O Globe brand heroin in a package mailed from Bangkok, Thailand, through the U.S. military postal system. It had a retail value estimated at \$1.75 million.³⁵ In the case of

medical evacuation, patients being evacuated from overseas areas to CONUS pass the customs check without incident. In one case a patient successfully brought back one pound of heroin in a small flight bag issued by the Red Cross containing personal comfort items. Others were smuggling narcotics concealed in casts and under bandages. What customs inspector is going to examine closely such a hiding place? In the APOs, soldiers were using official Department of the Army (DA) mailing labels on packages containing drugs in the hopes of avoiding the scrutiny of customs inspectors. In another instance, a person stateside sends a package to an address in Vietnam, which may or may not be fictitious. An accomplice at the receiving APO or unit mail-room will open the package, remove all contents and insert marijuana, narcotics or dangerous drugs and return it to the original sender. US Customs normally does not open or inspect return-to-sender packages, unless it is noted that the weight upon return does not agree with the amount of postage paid.³⁶

Enter the CID Command:

The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) was activated on 17 September 1971. All CID elements throughout the world were absorbed into the USACIDC during the period 22 November 1971 and 5 March 1972. Units, spaces, personnel, and facilities transfers were effected

with few problems. Monies previously made available at local levels were transferred to the USACIDC on an incremental basis tied to the date upon which the assumption of command of each activity occurred.³⁷ The mission of USACIDC was established as follows:

Performs and exercises centralized command, authority, direction and control of Army criminal investigative (CID) activities worldwide; provides CID support to all U.S. Army elements on a geographic basis; performs such other functions as may be assigned by Headquarters, Department of the Army; and makes recommendation to higher, collateral and lower echelons regarding CID matters.³⁸

The formation of USACIDC had a significant impact on the Army's counter-drug effort. Perhaps most significant was the evolution of the criminal information program. Since 1971, this program had steadily expanded both in volume and in the type of reportable information handled. From a start of 276 criminal information reports received in 1972 the figure rose to over 1,000 in 1973. The qualitative successes are quite evident when reviewed in the light of only a few of the widespread illegal practices that have been uncovered because of the centrally managed collection effort. Some of these include:

- o The discovery of widespread recruiting malpractice.
- o The identification of the Army Mortuary System as a conduit used for

smuggling operations.

- o The continuing discovery of undesirables in club and mess systems and in other fraud-prone areas of operations.

- o Identification of criminal exploitation in "Project Transition."

- o The detection of large combines moving drugs and other prohibited items through Army channels.

These are a few of the successes that before the centralization of the criminal information effort would have been impossible to attain.³⁹

Centralization of CID activities had other benefits to the Army's counter-drug effort. Of monumental importance to the criminal investigative program is specialist training in the narcotics field that has been provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and its predecessor, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) during the 1971 - 1974 period. With drug investigations approaching 40 percent of all investigations each year, this training was critical. Before January

1973, only a hand-full of CID special agents and other personnel had

—in excess of 400 special agents and officer supervisors attended the two-week DEA course.

attended a recognized drug-training course. During 1973 more than 400 special agents and officer supervisors from CID units worldwide attended the two-week DEA course.⁴⁰

Changing Times:

Throughout 1972, the U.S. Army continues to withdraw soldiers from Vietnam as the war enters a new phase. By early 1973, total US combat forces in Vietnam are down to about 24,000. The Army is moving rapidly to a smaller Army in a zero-draft environment. In these turbulent times, however, the Army continues to be faced with challenges. Surveys show that the Army is perceived as having the poorest living conditions for single servicemen - a major deterrent to enlistment. American youth has rated the Army the lowest in potential for job satisfaction and the least likely to provide interesting and challenging work - another deterrent to enlistment. Because of the troubles of the past, the Secretary of the Army sets the goal to raise the respect and appreciation of our citizens for the Army. He insists that the Army's image and credibility must be improved as it shifts from war to peace, from a largely conscripted to a volunteer force, and from a rapidly expanded Army to a smaller, highly professional Army. The focus shifts from prosecuting the ground war in Vietnam to emphasizing increased readiness of U.S. Army units deployed in Europe and the CONUS-based NATO reinforcing units.⁴¹

U.S. Army Europe:

Ironically, the pain of peace was felt most acutely not in the United States

but in Europe. As a result of our focus in Southeast Asia and our scrimping elsewhere, the Army in Europe was, a "bored and ignored" Army. It has purposely been bled dry to keep the U.S. war effort in Vietnam supplied with officers, experienced NCOs, materiel, and money. In some respects the 300,000-man American force in Germany was not an army but a modern day tragedy. Standards had collapsed; morale was a farce; and discipline in many units resembled something very close to anarchy.⁴²

As the drug epidemic facing the Army spread to Europe, hashish became as common in many units as cigarettes or Life Savers. An enterprising soldier could earn \$100,000 a year by driving to Munich once a month and buying wholesale a load of Peshawar black or Lebanese red, which Greek and Turkish hash merchants sold in planks three inches wide and a quarter inch thick. After returning to his unit and carving the planks into grams, suitable for retail sales, the entrepreneur could peddle each gram for \$1.25 to \$2.50. Some soldiers smoked more than a hundred grams a month, lighting up with the compulsive frequency of a three-pack-a-day Marlboro man.⁴³ In one artillery unit at Neu Ulm, for example, it was estimated that 50 to 80 percent of the sixteen hundred enlisted men were stoned on duty, and that half of them also used hard drugs.⁴⁴

Battalion commanders were faced with disciplinary headaches, especially drug addiction. One commander had seven heroin addicts whose arms were

peppered with needle tracks from wrists to biceps. Each had washed out of the brigade's drug rehabilitation program; each had four or five Article 15s on his record. After eliminating these seven from the service, this commander cashiered another fifty-one soldiers from the Army, nearly all for drug abuse.⁴⁵

Rising to the challenge, USACIDC published its first Drug Suppression Program as a CID Regulation in 1973. Before this time, there was little codification of USACIDC drug suppression activities in Europe. The effort to document the activities and obtain approval for them was begun in 1972 and was based on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). A policy was developed which enabled CID agents to operate in Europe against international drug traffickers. The policy required that CID have the prior approval of the U.S. Embassy, host country officials, and that a military connection be shown. The policy was written so that military connection did not have to be direct but could be presumed if it could be demonstrated that a portion of the drugs were destined for areas frequented by U.S. troops. CID was restricted from participating in arrest actions involving personnel not subject to the UCMJ. The CID agent was limited to providing criminal intelligence information to the host country police so they could make the arrest. After this policy received approval at the highest levels of government, CID Regulation 195-8, governing these activities was published.

The objective of USACIDC drug suppression operations is to support Army commanders by limiting the use or possession of illegal drugs by U.S. Forces personnel and by interdicting the supply of illegal drugs directed to such persons. Drug suppression operations in foreign countries are divided into three levels.

The objective of CID drug suppression operations is to support Army commanders by limiting the use or possession and interdicting the supply of illegal drugs.

Level one operations are those operations conducted only in overseas areas and using agents in a covert role. They are intended to identify high level traffickers of narcotics and dangerous drugs and to intercept controlled substances destined for resale and/or use by U.S. Forces personnel.

Level two operations are those drug suppression operations conducted by special agents assigned to local CID units and drug suppression team personnel operating in a semi-covert capacity with the mission of identifying traffickers, wholesale or retail, who operated on or close to installations or areas where U.S. Forces personnel are stationed and /or who sell directly to U.S. Forces personnel.

Level three operations are those drug suppression operations conducted

by special agents assigned to the local CID unit who operated in an overt manner investigating reported or detected controlled substance violations by Army and or other U.S. Forces personnel. Level three operations are also conducted by MP/MP investigators assigned to the provost marshal or security officer.⁴⁶

Compared with other parts of the world, the CID response to the growing drug problem in Europe was considered somewhat unique. Since the end of World War II, the CID has played a major role in criminal investigations. With the increase of drugs, the CID assumed a leadership role in drug suppression working closely with not only German Criminal Police but also with other police forces in Western European countries. Because of the multinational character of the drug problem, the CID in Europe is involved in international drug suppression.⁴⁷

Learning a lesson from its experience with USARV before its formation as a MACOM, the CID in Europe went on the offensive. The proactive drug suppression activities in Europe by USACIDC special agents began to produce results. Between June and September 1972, CID Agents, operating in *Level One Narcotics Suppression Teams*, were very successful. A partial sample of just some of those cases in which CID played a key role is outlined below.

- o Busted a German National trafficking opium and hashish to American

soldiers. Seized one kilogram of opium and 7.6 kilograms of hashish, valued at \$22,600.

- o Apprehended six soldiers and seized 5.5 kilograms of marihuana valued at \$4,400.

- o Apprehended one soldier and two British Nationals trafficking in hashish. Seized 3.6 kilograms of hashish valued at \$4,200.

- o Busted two German Nationals trafficking LSD to American service personnel. Seized 100,000 LSD tabs valued at \$360,000.

- o Busted one soldier and one U.S. National for trafficking in hashish to American Forces personnel. Seized 13 kilograms of hashish valued at \$14,600.

- o Arrested a German National trafficking LSD and hashish to American soldiers. Seized LSD and hashish valued at more that \$5,000.

- o Busted two Malaysian Nationals trafficking in morphine base to U.S. Forces personnel. Seized 250 grams of morphine base valued at \$4,800.

- o Identified three Dutch Nationals trafficking in heroin, morphine and LSD to American service personnel. Seized drugs valued at \$11,000.

- o Arrested one Greek National and two Yugoslavian Nationals trafficking in opium. Seized 10 kilograms of opium valued at \$142,000.

- o Busted a Chinese National trafficking heroin to American soldiers. Seized 65 grams of high quality heroin valued at \$3,100.

- o Caused arrest of three Ghana Nationals selling marihuana to U.S. Forces. Seized five kilograms of manicured marihuana valued at \$4,000.
- o Identified and caused arrest of a Canadian National selling hashish to American Forces personnel. Seized hashish valued at \$6,800.
- o Identified and caused arrest of eight German Nationals trafficking in hashish. Seized more than 41 kilograms of hashish valued at \$41,000.⁴⁸

Attacking the Problem Army-wide:

In early 1975, USACIDC reorganized its headquarters and formed an Illegal Drugs Division within its Operations Directorate. The Illegal Drugs Division was tasked with the mission of performing all staff functions pertaining to controlled substances to maximize the impact of the Army's worldwide drug suppression program. The Division receives and reviews all drug related Reports of Investigation (ROI), Crime Surveys (CS) and Criminal Information Reports (CIR). This review focuses on an analysis of the problems and trends and eases the distribution of valuable criminal information to field units and interested agencies. The key element of the process is the identification of modus operandi, organizations, and trafficking patterns, within the drug community.⁴⁹ This centralized collection and analysis of information are very useful in enhancing the worldwide drug suppression effort of CID.

The Army in CONUS:

USACIDC elements on the west coast of the United States developed a proactive program to help combat the drug problem. The Drug Information Analysis Team (DIAT) was formed at Presidio of San Francisco as an information gathering effort requiring interface between CID and the supported commander. The team conducts a 100 percent interview of all personnel assigned to a particular organization. The entire program is based on the premise that someone in the unit has knowledge of drug users or suppliers and that such information is available to a skilled interrogator.

Selection of the target unit is normally based upon a request for assistance from the supported commander. However, it may be because of existing criminal information previously collected on the unit or any specific problem areas in the units that are believed to be directly or indirectly traceable to drug abuse. DIAT is an information gathering effort to assist the commander recognize the scope of any drug abuse problem with which he might be faced and provide criminal investigators with intelligence to further prosecute the counter-drug effort. The culmination of the DIAT operations results in the names of frequent users, suppliers of drugs and amount and type of drugs. Later CID agents may use this data to target narcotics dealers. In fact, at Presidio of San Francisco alone, these missions resulted in the

identification of 70 frequent drug users and approximately 20 suppliers. The program met with similar success in Alaska and at Fort Lewis, Washington, where three significant drug busts were made as a direct result of information developed during the interviews. Additionally, this program proved valuable in developing and recruiting informants.⁵⁰

Fort Bragg: Two hundred drug dealers and over 1,500 drug abusers apprehended -- over \$1,100,000 worth of illegal drugs seized!

Task Force LEOPARD

The importance of criminal information in counter-drug operations was proved at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 1976. Task Force LEOPARD was formed to control the

illegal drug traffic at Fort Bragg and in the surrounding communities.

LEOPARD is an acronym for Law Enforcement Operations and Activities to Reduce Drugs. The task force, composed of military police, CID Special Agents, and military intelligence analysts, work in close cooperation with civilian law enforcement agencies to stem the flow of drugs to soldiers and their family members in the area. The result of this collaboration: over \$1,100,000 worth of illegal drugs -- seized! Two hundred illegal drug dealers and over 1,500 drug abusers were apprehended through the work of LEOPARD.⁵¹

Joint Drug Suppression Teams:

Due in part to the success of operations like Task Force LEOPARD, CID developed the concept of joint drug suppression teams (DST) in 1977.

Composed of CID special agents and Military Police Investigators, the DST's operated at installation level, both home and abroad, to stem the flow of drugs destined for soldiers. They were level II and III drug suppression operations, which pooled the resources of the local provost marshal and CID commander, enabling an enhanced and more focused counter-drug effort to take place.

In the spring of 1979, the Commanding General of USACIDC, Major General Paul M. Timmerberg, stressed the command's responsibility to plan and carry out Army drug suppression activities worldwide. Working hand-in-hand with provost marshals and military police commanders, the USACIDC increased the number of joint drug suppression teams from 46 in September 1978 to 62 in January 1979. During the same period, personnel dedicated to drug suppression rose by 15 special agents and 56 MP/MP Investigators. Additionally, Department of the Army increased USACIDC's funds to combat drugs. Major General Timmerberg stressed that CID must continue its aggressive war against drug traffickers.⁵²

Back in Europe, a joint German-American drug suppression effort, known as operation HUBCAP-Narco 79, resulted in the apprehension of more

than 170 drug offenders and the confiscation of more than \$1.5 million worth of illicit drugs. Criminal information clearly suggested that American soldiers could easily purchase drugs from local and third country nationals dealers in Frankfurt, both for resale and for personal use. Military drug dealers from as far away as Heilbronn, Kassel, and Kaiserslautern obtained their supplies of heroin, sometimes in multiple ounce quantities, from local or third country national sources in Frankfurt.

Operation

170 drug offenders arrested - more than \$1.5 million worth of drugs seized.

HUBCAP-Narco
79 was conceived

HUBCAP-Narco 79

to intensify the existing cooperative German-American drug suppression efforts of both the German Police and CID drug suppression elements by increasing the strengths and activities of both organizations for a 60-day period. The operation was to be an extension of the already productive drug suppression investigative operations. This would make it possible to use information developed during the ongoing drug traffic suppression activities and to follow up other leads concerning major traffickers that were developed before the end of the operations.

The principle objective of the operation, to penetrate the middle and

upper levels of the local and third country national drug traffic hierarchy, was clearly achieved.

Of the 76 locals or third country national heroin traffickers apprehended, 18 commonly dealt in quantities of 30 to 60 grams of heroin, 25 routinely dealt in quantities over 60 grams, and four dealt in kilogram sales of heroin.⁵³

Meanwhile, down the road in Kaiserslautern, a two-man DST comprised of a CID special agent and military police investigator, was credited with the apprehension of three international heroin traffickers. Their efforts resulted in the seizure of approximately 1.5 kilograms of heroin bound for military personnel. This heroin was had a street value in Germany of \$1.5 million.⁵⁴

As a result of the drug problem in Europe, the military services again came under congressional scrutiny during the summer of 1978. The Chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control together with the Chairman of the Task Force on Drug Abuse in the Military visited many locations in Germany in an attempt to make a firsthand assessment of the drug problem in Germany. Several members of the committee left Europe with the impression that drug abuse in the military was so widespread that the Army's ability to accomplish its mission had been seriously impaired. They recognized, however, that the Army was very much aware of the problem and was working hard to suppress the availability of drugs. Further, that Army law

enforcement has an extremely viable program ongoing but required additional resources to accomplish the task at hand.

Drug Suppression Survey Program:

While the need for additional men, money and equipment seemed evident, when DOD asked how much they needed, CID wasn't sure, as the Army's drug abuse problem had not yet been quantified. To solve this challenge, CID developed the Drug Suppression Survey Program.

Implemented throughout the command worldwide, the objective of the Drug Suppression Survey Program is to provide the USACIDC commander, subordinate CID commanders and supported installation/community commanders with reliable information upon which to base their drug suppression goals and management decisions. As a result, the supported commander and his CID team was able to know just how big of a problem they faced. Spurred by Congressional interest, this program was directly responsible for additional manpower, money and covert vehicles being applied to the Army's war on drugs. USACIDC gained a 51-space increase to its special agent endstrength within the first two years of the program.

The Drug Suppression Survey Program has become the heart of CID's total drug suppression effort. It channeled the command's experience and

information developed in drug investigations, worldwide, whether from proactive Level I operations in Europe, to the APO mail program, to simply reactive investigations, into usable and quantifiable data.⁵⁵

Drug Suppression Operations Center:

By the end of the decade, drug suppression operations in Europe were again the "top priority" of the CID Command. A new Drug Suppression Operations Center (DSOC) was opened in Mannheim. The Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army was the Director and Commander, Second Region, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command was the Deputy Director. The Army in Europe was getting serious about fighting the drug menace.

Between 1973 and 1975, CID drug suppression operations caused a significant reduction in the drug problem in Germany. Having achieved some success, authorities began breathing a bit easier and the pace of operations slowed. As might be expected, GI drug use statistics, after a decline since 1975, sharply increased, which spurred the all-out effort. This new effort was a more concentrated and ambitious version of the operations begun in 1973.

The key to this operation was coordination. The Drug Suppression Operations Center was manned by representatives from USACIDC, the provost

marshal's office, Military Police customs, as well as representatives from major Army, Navy and Air Force Commands in Europe. The center maintained close ties with the German criminal police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

The number of joint drug suppression teams, comprised of CID special agents and Military Police investigators, rose to 32 throughout Europe. CID had more than 65 special agents dedicated to the joint DST's.

In a three month period, these teams spent \$57,000.00 in contingency funds. The result, over \$8,000,000.00 worth of drugs were seized. Stated another way, for every \$1 spent, \$140.00 worth of controlled substances were seized.⁵⁶

When the Drug Suppression Operations Center began operations, information and statistics were being logged by hand. Computerization had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, by analyzing the drug abuse data uncovered, DSOC was able to get a clearer picture of developing trends, such as changes in trafficking routes, new smuggling methods, new types of drugs and changes in locations of smugglers and dealers.

The Results:

The decade of the 1970's saw a rapid rise in the drug problem within the

Army. The formation of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command allowed the energy of that organization to be focused in combating this threat to the readiness of the United States Army. While automation had not become readily available during most of this decade, USACIDC was able, at least in part, to quantify the results of the Army's war on drugs.

In the first nine years as a MACOM, USACIDC conducted nearly 56,000 criminal investigations concerning marihuana abuse. Most of these cases involved trafficking, as the military police assumed responsibility for

investigating simple use and possession early in the decade. More than 18,500 criminal investigations were conducted involving use,

Between 1971 and 1979, USACIDC conducted nearly 56,000 investigations involving marihuana and more than 18,500 involving other narcotics and dangerous drugs.

possession and sale of heroin and opiates and nearly 17,600 investigations involving other dangerous drugs. Ironically, only 84 cases involving cocaine were investigated during these nine years and 83 of them were in 1979.⁵⁷

In fiscal year 1976, the first year for which good figures are available, CID worldwide seized illegal drugs with an estimated street value of nearly \$3.5 million. In only one year, the value of drugs seized rose nearly five hundred percent, with seizures totally more than \$18.1 million in fiscal year

1977.⁵⁸

Between 1977 and 1979, CID agents seized illegal drugs valued in excess of \$235 million.

USACIDC's aggressive

counter-drug effort started to really pay off. The estimated street value

of the drugs seized by CID worldwide in 1978, rose from more than \$ 47.5 million to over \$168.7 million in 1979. The seizures of heroin alone nearly doubled in this one year period from more than 41 kilograms to over 75 kilograms. In this same period, CID seized more than 3,558 kilograms of marihuana in a variety of forms in 1978, and in 1979, seizures rose to 4,542 kilograms.⁵⁹

CID special agents assigned to level one narcotic suppression teams operating throughout Europe continued to focus their attention on international traffickers. Their objective, to interdict the source of illegal drugs destined for use by U.S. Forces. This small group of CID soldiers, never more than a dozen men, continued to work aggressively with host nation authorities particularly in Germany and the Netherlands. Since their work most often involved Third Country Nationals rather than American soldiers, it was documented on Criminal Intelligence and later Criminal Information Report. Unlike the standard CID Report of Investigation (ROI), most of the information contained in CIRs was routinely purged after five years. Nevertheless, these

level one activities were very successful. Between 1976 and 1979, this handful of dedicated CID special agents working level one in Europe, were directly responsible for the seizure of 93.2 kilograms of heroin, 7.7 kilograms of cocaine, 5.9 kilograms of morphine, and 2 kilograms of opium. In addition, they seized 26,848 kilograms of hashish, 38 kilograms of marihuana in the leaf form and more than 1,000 liters of hashish oil. Further, they seized over 49,000 units of LSD and over 62,000 doses of Amphetamine. All these amounts were over and above the dollar amounts and quantities seized reported for other CID activities worldwide.⁶⁰ These activities played a significant role in interdicting and reducing the supply of illegal drugs available to American Forces serving in Europe.

The 1980's - The Battle Continues:

The Army had endured much pain and turmoil during the seventies. As we moved into the new decade we had put a number of crucial factors behind us. First, the nation was finally out of an unpopular war in Vietnam. Much of the environmental agitation and discontent had passed with our withdrawal. Second, we had moved completely away from a conscripted army to an all volunteer army. This new army was one with both rising standards and a growing sense of professionalism. Finally, by now the Army understood the

drug problem facing it a little better. It refocused its priorities to combat the problem while striving toward a "drug free" Army. The Army's Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) had a solid foundation and the widespread use of urinalysis testing for illegal drug use, brought another weapon into the campaign against drugs. Commanders and entire military communities - not just the law enforcement and investigative agencies got into the battle. Nevertheless, the Army was still plagued with a significant drug problem.

The Drug Threat Assessment Report:

Information derived from Drug Suppression Survey Program data prepared by CID units worldwide, facilitated USACIDC's publication of comprehensive Worldwide Drug Threat Assessment Reports for the Army.

These annual threat assessments, among other things, focused on an analysis of the specific drug problem facing the Army in various regions of the world. Reflecting data submitted through the various Drug Suppression Survey Program reports together with information developed through criminal investigations throughout the world, this document allowed for forecasts and projections for the near term future and recommendations to counter the threat. It became an invaluable tool in focusing everyone's effort to meet the

challenge.

During the next ten years, USACIDC conducted nearly 41,000 criminal investigations involving the illegal use, possession and sale of narcotics and dangerous drugs.⁶¹ As in the seventies, marihuana remained the drug of choice within the Army. More than 60 percent of all drug investigations involved marihuana. A disturbing trend however, began in 1980 with cocaine making a significant

appearance on the scene. The number of investigations

Nearly 24 percent of the almost 172,000 criminal investigations conducted by CID between 1980 and 1989, involved drugs.

centering around cocaine went from 332 in 1980 steadily upward each year

when it

reached an

all-time

high of


6,792 in

1989.

During this

period,

cocaine



became the second most frequently abused drug in the military with over 22 percent of drug criminal investigations involving cocaine. This trend mirrored, once again, what was happening in the American society. Near the latter part of the decade it would surpass marihuana as the drug of choice among soldiers. If there was any good news it was that heroin cases were significantly down and overall represented only four percent of the total investigative workload.⁶²

Around the Army, a number of successful drug suppression operations were worthy of note.

In May 1982, at Fort Irwin, California a 74-day CID drug suppression operation, code named "Tumbleweed," culminated with the arrest of 36 street level drug pushers. As part of a larger joint operation with the FBI and the San Bernadino County Sheriff's Office, a combined total of 105 street level drug dealers, supplying soldiers, were identified and apprehended.⁶³

Meanwhile in Hawaii, CID special agents were engaged in Operation Green Harvest, a special operation to locate and eradicate illegally grown marihuana in isolated regions of the local military training area. In four operations in 1982, agents recovered more than 500 pounds of high-grade marihuana with an estimated street value of \$2.3 million.⁶⁴

Between January 1980 and December 1985, USACIDC estimated that its agents worldwide seized drugs with an estimated street value of more than \$

1.3 billion. This included 421 kilograms of heroin, 185 kilograms of cocaine,

8,670 kilograms of hashish and

*CID seized drugs valued
in excess of \$1.3 billion
between 1980 & 1985.*

15,768 kilograms of marihuana.⁶⁵

At Fort Stewart, Georgia, the

Drug Suppression Team worked

four months during the spring and summer of 1986, to break up an illegal marihuana growing operation on the installation. The benefits of the long hours working on the case - the arrest of two civilian drug traffickers and the seizure of more than 500 marihuana plants, nearly 23 kilograms of marihuana, with an estimated street value of over \$204,000.00. A month later another smaller growing operation was put out of business with nearly \$25,000 00 worth of marihuana seized.⁶⁶

In December 1986, at the

U.S. Army Yuma Proving

Ground, CID agents teamed up

*Over \$90 million in Cocaine
was stashed by smugglers
on the U.S. Army base.*

with agents from the U.S. Customs Service, FBI, and Drug Enforcement Administration to break up a smuggling ring and recover over \$90 million in pure "raw" cocaine that had been stashed on the Army base. The 604.5 kilograms of cocaine had an estimated street value when cut of approximately \$113.4 million.⁶⁷

In Korea, methamphetamine, popularly known as "crank," was becoming the most widely abused substance among members of the U.S. Forces. Its popularity stems from its availability and low price. Often used to enhance energy, crank is a stimulant with many of the same effects of cocaine, such as euphoria, excitement, increased alertness, loss of appetite and insomnia.

In April 1987, after an eleven month period of gathering intelligence, the CID Drug Suppression Team in Taegu, Korea, together with the Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs raided and shut down an illegal laboratory manufacturing methamphetamine. Approximately 11.7 kilograms of methamphetamine, with an estimated street value of \$12 million, were seized in the drug raid. A total of 38 Korean nationals were apprehended because of this investigation.⁶⁸ Just eight months later, the same team of drug investigators closed down another illicit methamphetamine laboratory, this time seizing 47 kilograms of illegal drugs. As a result of this joint operation, 13 Korean Nationals were apprehended and confined by Korean authorities for possession, use, sale, manufacture and smuggling of methamphetamine. The value on the street of the illegal drugs seized - in excess of \$50 million.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, in Germany, Level 1, DST was busy as always. After having a "source" infiltrate a major hashish smuggling organization, CID agents together with officers of the Bundeskriminalamt, the German Federal

Police, interdicted a shipment of 900 kilograms of hashish from Lebanon to West Germany. Besides the seizure of the hashish, the operation resulted in the arrest of nine traffickers from Jordan, West Germany, Lebanon and Great Britain. The estimated street value of the confiscated drugs is \$19.1 million.⁷⁰

In April 1988, the Fort Sam Houston joint Drug Suppression Team conducted a month long investigation that led to the seizure of \$4 million in drugs and the arrest of five people, including three Army nursing students. The DST was responsible for infiltrating an illegal drug ring that was running its own modern methamphetamine laboratory just off post. Working with the local Alamo City Task Force, the team was successful in closing down this operation supplying methamphetamine to soldiers at Fort Sam Houston.⁷¹

USACIDC drug suppression teams remained proactive army-wide throughout the decade. Perhaps one of the finest examples of capability occurred during a month long investigation in October 1989, in Germany. Six members of the Level 1, DST working with their counterparts in the German police seized illegal drugs with a total estimated street value in excess of \$118.2 million. Their joint investigation netted them 84 kilograms of heroin, one kilogram of cocaine, 11.5 kilograms of hashish and two kilograms of amphetamines. The dedicated efforts of these CID agents working under cover were formally recognized by the presentation of individual Army

Commendation Medals by the Deputy Commander in Chief, USAREUR and Seventh Army.⁷²

The 1980s in Summary:

In the six years between 1984 and 1989, USACIDC was responsible for arresting nearly 22,500 drug traffickers and completing more than 24,000 drug investigations. During the same period, at least 54 soldiers needlessly lost their lives in drug related deaths. By the end of 1988, cocaine replaces marihuana as the number one drug of choice of soldiers. In July 1988, USACIDC changed its policy and directed that reports of investigation be initiated on soldiers with cocaine and opiate positive urinalysis tests results from the command directed urinalysis program.

Since about 1985, drug abuse within the Army appeared to be decreasing when compared to trends in civilian communities of comparable size. CID's concern is that this trend could easily be reversed if the efforts of Army law enforcement agencies and the Army Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program were not maintained. It was predicted that enhancement of these efforts should result in further reductions of drug abuse within the Army.

Outside the area of enforcement, the U.S. Army Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) has been successful in working

with commanders at all echelons in helping reduce the demand for illicit controlled substances. Still, in FY88, ADAPCP identified 14,369 marihuana and 7,155 cocaine abusers through urinalysis testing.⁷³

As the decade of the eighties comes to an end - the news is mixed. Like the number of criminal investigations, ADAPCP is an important gauge in measuring drug abuse in the military. The rate of positive test results for use of marihuana is down significantly

from 4.6 per 100 tests in 1986 to about .99 per 100 by the end of FY 90. The rate of cocaine positives

More than 14,000 marihuana and 7,000 cocaine abusers are identified through urinalysis testing in FY88.

increased slightly from 1986 through 1988 and dropped to about .53 positive results per 100 tests by the end of 1990. The decreasing rate of positive tests tends to indicate that drug abuse among soldiers is decreasing. However, criminal intelligence within the Army, reports from federal, state and local police agencies and the continuing number of CID drug investigations, although also on the decline, tend to indicate an enduring drug problem despite the reported success of the urinalysis program. In FY 90, the ADAPCP still identified almost 14,000 marihuana and cocaine abusers through urinalysis testing.⁷⁴

The 1990s - Army Future:

In its 1991, Worldwide Drug Threat Assessment, USACIDC concludes that drug abuse and drug trafficking are, and will continue to be, major problems for the U.S. Army. During 1990, CID element worldwide seized 295.8 kilograms of cocaine; 453.6 kilograms of marijuana; 278.2 kilograms of hashish; 129.4 kilograms of heroin; and 32.8 kilograms of all other controlled substances and dangerous drugs. In addition, a total of 2,846 (840 military and 2006 civilians) drug traffickers were titled as subjects in CID drug reports of investigation during the year.⁷⁵ The Commanding General of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command reiterates his position that "*Counterdrugs are a priority mission of this command.*"

CID agents remain aggressive in their pursuit of drug dealers. In a joint German-American operation, using two sophisticated OH-58D helicopters and their military crews to assist in surveillance, agents put together a complex operation that led to the arrest of a drug dealer and ultimately to the dismantling of an illegal trafficking operation. In the end, 135 subjects (62 of whom were soldiers) were identified and \$3,895,673 in illicit drugs confiscated.⁷⁶

At a speech at Fort Hood, Texas, Secretary of the Army Michael P.W. Stone noted that, concerning the drug problem in America, the Army is keeping its own house in order as a matter of first priority. Army drug abuse

has dropped precipitously over the last decade and current usage rates are below five percent. The Army's comprehensive education program, combined with vigorous, uncompromising enforcement of the law, has resulted in a basically drug-free Army.⁷⁷

While efforts at demand reduction within the Army appear successful, the vast amounts of money to be made in dealing with illegal drugs captured other soldier's interests as if they were addicted to the product. In Panama, soldiers were paid "big bucks" to help smuggling cocaine back to the United States using the Army mail system. One staff sergeant was paid more than \$113,000 by a Columbian drug dealer for mailing two duffle bags, each containing 30 kilograms of cocaine, to his girlfriends house in Florida, and later handing it over to another Columbian drug dealer. After being found out, the soldier worked with a joint task force from CID, DEA and the U.S. Attorney's office, who after a two month long investigation broke up a major international drug smuggling ring importing cocaine to the United States from Panama. In addition to two Army staff sergeants, eighteen Columbian and Panamanian civilian traffickers were indicted for cocaine smuggling and more than 180 kilograms of cocaine seized.⁷⁸

Also in Panama, the Army, Navy and Air Force realized that many individual smuggling investigations involved many of the same people, and the

same mode of operation. Informally, the three organizations began working together on drug investigations. On 1 October 1991, the three military criminal investigative organizations agreed to and organized the Panama Jack Task Force. The mission of the task force - to identify and deter military personnel that smuggle illegal drugs, mostly cocaine, into the United States. In addition, the task force targets DOD systems such as the military postal system, POV shipments, household goods shipment and the Military Airlift Command, all of which are routinely used by drug smugglers as a conduit for moving cocaine into the United States. During its relatively short tenure, the Panama Jack Task Force conducted twenty investigations that resulted in the seizure of 523 kilograms of cocaine with a wholesale street value in Miami of \$10.6 million and 2.7 kilograms of heroin valued at \$270 thousand. The task force has titled for smuggling, a total of 72 civilians, 19 Army soldiers and two Navy sailors as subjects of these investigations. Civilians identified include Americans in Panama, Columbian and Panamanian Nationals operating in Panama and Americans in the United States.⁷⁹

The Situation Today:

Today, the Department of Defense prides itself on maintaining a highly effective program for combating the illegal use of drugs among military

members, their families, and defense contractors. Recent surveys and other data have shown decisively that DOD is keeping its own house in order. Illegal drug use among members of the armed forces continues to decline.⁸⁰

Throughout the decade of the 1980's, and as recently reflected during the 1992 Worldwide Survey of Substance Abuse and Health Behaviors Among Military Personnel, we have developed what is essentially a drug-free uniformed military force. Reported drug use is at an all time low of 3.4 percent among servicemen and women worldwide. This represents an 88 percent reduction in reported drug use since 1980.⁸¹

In the Army, serious crime of all types is at its lowest rate for the twenty-two years covered by this study. Crimes against people, property and drugs have been on a downward glide path for several years. The period from the mid-1980s to 1991 is marked by a substantial decrease in drug use by our soldiers. Besides aggressive and proactive drug suppression and command emphasis on the urinalysis program, this is due in part, to the high quality of American men and women who are serving their country today. They are simply, the best qualified soldiers the volunteer Army has known. All of the indicators, whether indiscipline rates, criminal investigations, positive urinalysis results etc., would suggest that the vast majority of soldiers today, are indeed "just saying no" to drugs.

As the force continues to downsize, the competition to stay is fierce. Only the very best can remain. Identification as a drug abuser or trafficker is sure to end a soldier's chances. The challenge to the Army however, is not to be lulled into a false sense of security. For, as long as the drug problem remains significant in the American society, as it does today, the Army must still do battle in its own "war on drugs."

During 1992, USACIDC conducted a total of 2908 drug investigations worldwide. This is 30 percent fewer than the total number of drug cases initiated just two years before in 1990. Of those cases, approximately 52 percent were generated through urinalysis testing. Of the drug cases initiated, 1059 or 36 percent, involved drug distribution cases.⁸² The significant downsizing, presently underway, may account for some of the decline. This is further supported by urinalysis testing results. The U.S. Army Drug and Alcohol Operations Agency reported that urinalysis testing of 994,578 specimens during FY92, resulted in an overall positive rate of only 0.78 % for marihuana (7,798 specimens) and 0.50 % for cocaine (4,816).⁸³ Those identified as drug abusers will, most certainly, be eliminated from the service thereby easing the pain of downsizing on the many drug free soldiers desiring to continue their service.

In the first three years of this decade, drug investigations still account for

nearly 26 percent of the total case load of USACIDC. That is nearly 9,700 drug cases in the past three years. Is there still reason for the Army to be concerned? You be the judge.

In the 22 years since its formation, the Criminal Investigation Command has made, to say the very least, a

Nearly 26 percent of CID's total caseload between 1990 and 1992 still involve drugs.

substantial and invaluable contribution to the Army's own war on drugs.

Thousands of kilograms of illicit drugs, valued at literally several billion dollars on the illegal market have been interdicted. These seizures represents vast quantities of drugs removed from availability to American soldiers and their families. Likewise, thousands of drug traffickers have been identified and taken out of circulation. Many more thousands of drug abusing soldiers have been identified and processed through the military justice system. In short, CID has contributed immeasurably to Army readiness. These many years of dedicated effort have, most certainly, helped to make the Army a safer and better place to live, work, and soldier.

CIDC's FUTURE COUNTER-DRUG ROLE

Like the remainder of the Army today, the Criminal Investigation Command has been adjusting to the significant effects of downsizing of the military force. Only two years ago, the Command had a total authorized military and civilian strength of 2198, including 1209 operational special agents. In this short time, CIDC sustained a 26 percent overall reduction in authorized manpower.

Today, the Command is staffed by a total of 1642 personnel including 900 warrant officer, enlisted and civilian special agents to accomplish its overall investigative mission Army-wide. Each quarter the number of personnel dedicated exclusively to drug suppression goes down. As of the end of First Quarter, FY 93, the combined CID special agent, MP investigator and military police strength of Drug Suppression Teams worldwide is down to 232 of which only 63 are CID special agents.

The last worldwide drug threat assessment was published on 2 December 1991 and, as of 1 October 1992, the Level 1 Drug Suppression Team in Germany went out of business after more than twenty years of successful drug interdiction. Similarly, due to substantial force reductions in USAREUR, the Drug Suppression Operations Center in Germany shut down its operation.

Today at the headquarters, a single warrant officer staffs the Counternarcotics Branch of the Operations Directorate. His job, to coordinate the Command's worldwide drug suppression operation.

While this paper has focused exclusively on the CIDC's drug suppression mission, it is important to remember that the counter-drug role is but one small part of the Command's general investigative mission. In fact, over the last thirteen years, drug investigations have accounted for an average of about 24 percent or one quarter of the total investigative case load.

As the nature of the drug problem facing the Army changes, so too the Command's priorities must adjust and adapt to serve commanders better. As resources continue to diminish, as most certainly they will, it is essential that CIDC adjust its focus to accomplish its total investigative mission for the Army.

In an effort to focus on the future, a number of leaders serving with CIDC, both past and present, were asked for their thoughts. As part of this project, CIDC Region Commanders, their senior warrant officer special agent Drug Coordinators along with key leaders at Headquarters, USACIDC were contacted. They were asked for their thoughts regarding the Command's role in drug enforcement in the past, present and in the future. The questions that they were asked to consider are attached as an appendix to this study. All tolled, nearly twenty senior CID personnel with literally hundreds of years of

collective experience provided input. What follows, is a synopsis of their responses that lead to some recommendations for the future.

All of those contacted believe that the Criminal Investigation Command is indeed, the lead agency in Army drug enforcement and that its focus is correctly within the service rather than external from it. All of them, but particularly those with many years in CIDC and those serving as special agents, believe that over the years the drug suppression effort has been extremely successful and truly contributed to enhancing Army readiness and the wellness that the service enjoys today. They do however, note that the changing times have brought with them significant changes in emphasis. Some agents are experiencing difficulty in adapting to this change. Virtually everyone recognizes the impact of downsizing and the need for adaptation to a smaller, less resourced force. They see the emphasis on drug suppression - generally a proactive investigative activity - to be a casualty of the diminished resources that are available today. Virtually everyone expressed concern and a belief that a significant drug problem continues to exist in the Army. They note that we are a reflection of our society and America remains plagued by drugs. Because of these realities, those responding did not see an expansion of CIDC's role in counter-drug operations without additional dedicated resources. In fact, they cautioned of trying to take on added missions, or doing more with less, as often

is done by the Army.

Only a couple of those contacted suggested a need to amend current law, Posse Comitatus in particular, to allow CID more latitude in accomplishing its drug suppression mission. Most felt that existing law did not hinder investigative operations. There was generally consensus that the Nation's counter-drug effort needs a balanced approach between drug interdiction, a law enforcement function, and demand reduction. The scales tipped slightly in favor of demand reduction as the only long term solution to this country's problem.

As far as supporting the Army's effort in support of the National Drug Control Strategy, several respondents believe that CIDC could contribute the most by staffing and managing the Joint Task Forces like JTF 6. At the very least, CID could assign special agents as liaison officers to provide leadership and coordination working with the various civilian drug law enforcement agency (DLEA) / military task forces operating nationwide. Since CID agents are both soldiers and law enforcement officers they would serve as ideal go-betweens among the various members of the task forces. Also an important contribution, one which represents an economy of force, is training. Examples cited include the effort by the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) to offer exportable training packages and mobile training teams to DLEAs. While not assigned to USACIDC, the nucleus of this program is comprised of personnel

trained and accredited as Army criminal investigators who have previously served with USACIDC.

Criminal investigations, by their very nature are reactive, as they are conducted in response to an illegal act. Typically, violent crimes and property crimes fit comfortably into this category. The simple use and possession of drugs also fit into this category very neatly. Once a problem grows in scope and magnitude like the Army's drug problem did in the 1970's, investigative activities must shift to being proactive. By developing criminal intelligence, investigators go on the offensive and pursue criminals by making cases against them. Remember, urinalysis does nothing to stop drug traffickers and if you don't look, you don't find. This is the nature of the Army's drug suppression program conceived in response to the growing problem at the time. Times most certainly have changed. The drug problem within has changed in scope and dimension - although it is still here, to be sure. The Army's emphasis and the CID's approach to the problem are undergoing modification based on the stark realities of diminishing resources.

It is highly unlikely that CIDC will, absent a crisis, get a reprieve from the diminishing resources that go with downsizing the Army. Consequently, the current focus appears not only appropriate and realistic but also the only way to go. CID does not have the personnel resources to employ in an

expanded role. In fact virtually everyone asked mentioned that priorities were being adjusted because of the effects of downsizing. As the criminal investigative agency for the Army, CIDC's focus, correctly, is to support the Army from within. Unless USACIDC is provided additional resources, both people and money, its role in the future will remain basically the same; to provide criminal investigative support to the United States Army. Outside of its investigative mission for the Army, CIDC does not appear to be a major player in overall DOD support to the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

The Criminal Investigation Command proved itself effective in interdicting drugs in the Army. Also, it proved its value and ability in joint operations such as the Panama Jack Task Force. If chartered and resourced, USACIDC could, on behalf of the Department of Defense, contribute significantly to joint anti-drug operations with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. In the future, the role of the Criminal Investigation Command in deterring the flow of illegal drugs may present the greatest challenge to the organization.

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Questionnaire

1. What do you envision USACIDC's role in fighting the drug problem? Today? In the future?
2. Is USACIDC putting forth full effort in the area? Is there more that we should do?
3. How do you see the drawdown of the Army effecting USACIDC's counterdrug effort?
4. Has USACIDC's drug suppression effort made a difference to our Army? - To our Nation's counterdrug effort? How?
5. Please give any specific examples of CID successes in drug suppression operations. (who, what, when, where, how and how much)
6. Should CID's focus concerning drug suppression change? Has it already changed? Where should the CID's counterdrug effort be focused now? In the future?
7. Should laws (like Posse Comitatus) and regulations be changed or relaxed to allow CID more operational latitude in counterdrug operations?
8. Where should the Nation's counterdrug effort be focused; source interdiction or demand reduction? What role do you see USACIDC playing in either?
9. Today, the Army plays a significant supporting role in the overall National Drug Control Strategy and counterdrug effort. How do you see USACIDC contributing to this national "war on drugs?" Should it be a supporting role or an operational one? Please provide some specific examples: ie. liaison officers; instructors; covert / overt operatives etc.
10. Should the Army play a larger role in the overall "war on drugs?" Where should USACIDC fit in?
11. *These questions are meant only to stimulate your thinking. I would appreciate any additional comments to help tell USACIDC's story or issues for consideration in the future.*