


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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA:
PROBLEMS, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES

by,

Timothy L. Watkins

Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:

22 February 1992³

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Approved for public release
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DTIC
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MAY 13 1993
S B D

93-10344



93 5 11 110

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A; APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable) C	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, R.I. 02841		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA: PROBLEMS, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES (UNCLASSIFIED)			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Commander Timothy L. Watkins, USN			
a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL	13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1993, February 22	15. PAGE COUNT 33
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	DOD news coverage policy, operational planning media impact, military-media relations
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The relationship between the U.S. military establishment and the media is examined with emphasis on current Department of Defense policy for news coverage of U.S. military operations. Events which influenced the relationship over the past two decades are described and evaluated in terms of their effect on military news coverage guidelines. The 1992 reformation of the Defense Department's military operations coverage policy is described in detail. Policy provisions examined to determine probable implications for the operational commander and his forces in the field. A conclusion is reached that military commanders and operational planners must take increased account of the media's impact on operations in light of recent policy changes. Public Affairs goals must be a major factor in the shaping of operational plans, regional public affairs systems, and personnel training programs.			
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 841-3414	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL C

Abstract of
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 PROBLEMS, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES**

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PREFACE

An abundance of books and articles have been written in recent years dealing with this subject. The author's intent in writing this paper is to address the aspects of the military-media relationship that have the most significance for operational commanders. While policy guidelines mandate media support, the task of determining how best to accommodate media rests with operational planners. The author sees a need within the military establishment not only to adhere to policy guidelines, but also to recognize more uniformly the legitimate and important role the media play during wartime and to understand the benefits the military derives from that role. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Commander John Woodhouse, USN for providing reference sources and invaluable guidance.

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THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA:
PROBLEMS, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Public sentiment is everything. With it, nothing can fail... Without it, nothing can succeed."

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

In the early morning darkness of Wednesday, December 9, 1992, United States Navy Sea, Land, and Air (SEAL) team elements came ashore near Mogadishu, Somalia. These units were tasked with checking the beach for hostile activity prior to the Marine amphibious landing that led off Operation RESTORE HOPE. As they waded ashore, The SEALs came under attack not by hostile Somalis, but by a large contingent of journalists eager to record the event on film. Glaring camera lights subjected the SEALs to night blindness and washed out their night vision devices. Swarming reporters hampered their movement. A short time later, arriving Marines met similar obstacles.

In Washington, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney expressed anger at the reporters' conduct, but later softened his criticism when he learned that the journalists had been invited to cover the landing and had done so within the limits imposed: A Pentagon press advisory requesting media to remain clear of the beach did not reach news organizations until after the operation had commenced.¹

Events on the Somali beachhead emphasize the continuing need to address a fundamental question: How can the military and the media perform their respective functions on the modern battlefield without undermining their independent objectives. The relationship between the military and the media is characterized by conflicting interests: some are innate, others are the product of enduring friction between the two groups. In the conduct of military operations, full disclosure may threaten operational security. The presence of large numbers of journalists and the requirement to provide them logistical support may divert critical assets from tactical use. Advanced communications technologies employed by the media complicate security review measures. The operational commander and his subordinates in the field, in dealing with these and other considerations regarding the media, must recognize the impact of the press while shaping operational plans.

The Department of Defense policy governing news coverage of U.S. military operations has evolved significantly during the past two decades. Restrictions of the press, generated largely in response to unfavorable coverage of the Vietnam conflict have, with some exceptions, been revoked. Current policy provides a more open operating environment for media representatives. The use of media pools as the primary vehicle for news gathering has, with some exceptions, been abandoned. The option to require military security review of

news copy prior to release has been retained in the policy, however coverage of the most recent U.S. military operations has been exempt from such procedures.² In introducing key policy changes, the Defense Department recognizes the power of the media to influence public opinion and therefore, its potential to promote public support. Operational commanders must understand this policy and ensure that operational plans and training programs address its requirements in a manner which: First, does not detract from mission accomplishment; second, allows the media to perform their function; and third, encourages subordinates to support the policy diligently and to deal openly and honestly with the press. Tailoring operational plans to meet these imperatives presents a huge challenge to operational planners. Many obstacles exist--perhaps none greater than the mutual enmity that exists between military officers and the press establishment.

CHAPTER II

ROOTS OF THE POLICY

"It's impossible to carry on a war with a free press."

GENERAL WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN, 1862

As the words of General Sherman testify, hostility between the military and the press is not a recent development. Friction has tainted the relationship during popular and unpopular conflicts alike. A degree of enmity was present even during World War II, when cooperation between soldier and reporter was at a peak. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the subject in his book, Crusade in Europe, published in 1948:

"Complete wartime coordination and perfect cooperation can never be achieved between the press and military authorities. For the commander secrecy is a defensive weapon; to the press it is anathema. ... Some commanders resent the presence of this body of non-combatants."³

If attitudes regarding the media among many military commanders are the product of diverging interests between the two establishments, they are formed to an equal degree by the personal experiences of military leaders. For many in today's military, these experiences took place in Vietnam.

Vietnam

News coverage of the Vietnam conflict was wide-open. Few restrictions were applied to reporters in the ground rules established by the Defense Department. Correspondents were

free to go wherever they wished and often were provided military transportation. Reporters frequently accompanied units deploying into the field and carried news cameras to record the action and to tape interviews with soldiers. News copy and film were exempt from military security review; news agencies were allowed to censor themselves in keeping with security provisions in the ground rules.

The unfavorable character of news coverage that evolved during the Vietnam conflict resulted partly from the disparity in opinion of the war's progress between the junior commanders in the field and senior military officers. Higher-ranking commanders tended to describe military operations in terms of positive results achieved while junior combat soldiers more often spoke of futility and frustration. Media support for the war gradually evaporated as reporters came to believe that they were being misled.⁴ Additionally, failure on the part of officials in Washington and South Vietnam to define clear objectives in the war created a sense of aimlessness that exacerbated the declining state of relations with the media. By 1975, when the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam, mutual hostility was firmly established throughout both the press and the military establishment. Many military people saw the media as a traitorous element who had "lost Vietnam". The media industry was suspicious and disdainful of anything connected with the military.⁵

Grenada

In October, 1983 a U.S.-led combined task force occupied the Caribbean island of Grenada in response to a Cuban-backed military buildup which threatened security in the region and endangered the lives of the island's inhabitants. News agencies were denied access to the island until the third day of the operation, when a pool of 15 correspondents was flown to Grenada, having been selected from a press contingent of over 400 waiting in Barbados. By this time however, the bulk of Cuban resistance had ended and the opportunity to cover the operation had been lost.

The media establishment was outraged. Television news programs, newspapers, and periodicals thrashed the Reagan Administration and the Pentagon for disregarding the First Amendment to the Constitution and denying the public's "right to know". Administration officials defended the exclusion of the media as a necessary safety measure; that turning loose a large number of journalists on the battlefield would have disrupted tactical movements and have posed a danger to troops and reporters.⁶ Press exclusion was not without recent precedent: In 1982, Great Britain had prevailed in the Falklands War while keeping media from the scene of battle and while maintaining popular support at home.⁷

In the midst of media protests, public opinion polls overwhelmingly supported the decision to exclude reporters from the operation.⁸ Despite this, the Defense Department

took action on the news establishment's complaints. A panel of military experts and experienced journalists was convened in an effort to improve military-media relations and to formulate a fair and effective news coverage policy.

The Sidle Commission.

Created by direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Military-Media Relations Panel met in February, 1984. The commission was chaired by Major General Winant Sidle, U.S. Army (Retired), former Army Chief of Information. The news establishment was represented by six highly regarded members of the trade, all with wartime reporting experience or extensive background in military-media relations. Military panelists included senior public affairs representatives from the Joint Staff and all four military services, as well as a representative from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). The panel considered a series of key concerns in news coverage of military operations-- constitutional and legal issues, "right to know" versus "need to know", logic/common sense aspects of coverage policy, and practical issues in deployment of the press in wartime. The findings of the commission were delivered in a report declaring agreement on key principles: First, that it is essential that the news media be allowed to cover U.S. military operations to the maximum extent possible consistent with operational security and the safety of U.S. Forces. Second, that the public's right to know does not encompass

matters of genuine national security. Third, that the National Command Authority may deny access to the press in cases where published information would present a clear and present danger to military operations. Fourth, that the public has the right to receive accurate, non-biased information. Fifth, that early exposure of operational forces to unlimited numbers of journalists is not required in order to keep public informed. Access may be limited to pools containing representatives of organizations with the widest audience. Sixth, that since no legal recourse exists to enforce government news coverage policy, the media must police themselves in adhering to policy provisions.⁹

The findings of the Sidle Commission led to the establishment of the National Media Pool in 1985. Sponsored by the Department of Defense, the pool consists of 12 to 16 Washington-based journalists representing major print and broadcast news agencies. The purpose of the pool is to ensure media access to the earliest stages of U.S. military operations. Conceptually, once the tactical situation in a given operation has stabilized, the pool is to be disbanded in favor of independent coverage. Additionally, the pool provides a means for coverage of military actions taking place within an area or situation in which a large-scale media presence would hamper operations or pose a danger to U.S. forces.¹⁰

The Arabian Gulf and Panama.

Initial deployments of the National Media Pool took place in conjunction with U.S. joint military exercises. In these first tests, the pool functioned with gradually increasing efficiency. Military commanders and pool journalists overcame minor logistical difficulties and appeared to be satisfied that pool coverage would be effective in an actual deployment.¹¹

The first real-world activation of the National Media Pool took place in 1987, when it was deployed to cover U.S. Navy tanker escort operations in the Arabian Gulf. Unfortunately, all did not go well for the pool members in the Gulf. Throughout the operation, pool reporters expressed strong dissatisfaction with the way the pool was managed. The journalists charged that they were kept isolated from events and that escort officers were more concerned with advancing the "company line" than they were in providing access to the action.¹²

In December, 1989, the National Media Pool was deployed to cover the U.S. intervention in Panama, Operation JUST CAUSE. Once again, pool management was an issue. The media pool reached Panama during the early stages of the operation but were held at Howard Air Force Base until well into the second day of action, when the most newsworthy events of the operation had already taken place. Pool members were further enraged when they discovered that they were kept isolated

while large numbers of their non-pooled colleagues reached Panama independently, in time to observe Panamanian resistance. Military commanders in the field were equally displeased -- The massive influx of independent journalists completely overwhelmed military transportation and communications capacities. Some officers complained that journalists' constant demands to be taken into areas of active fighting ran contrary to a commander's obligation to maximize troop safety.¹³ Certain events tended to support such concerns--At one point during the fighting, when a group of CBS journalists was held captive by Panamanian forces, the president of CBS made repeated demands that they be rescued by U.S. military forces.¹⁴

Despite the many problems, military planners viewed the Panama experience as evidence of shortcomings in the administration of the media pool concept, not as a flaw in the concept itself. The media pool reporting concept remained the foundation of military news coverage policy and would be raised to an even higher level of use during an upcoming conflict with Iraq--and with the press.

The Gulf War.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990 precipitated the largest commitment of U.S. military power since the Vietnam War. The mobilization of the international news media was proportionately immense. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, more than 1600 broadcast journalists,

technicians, and print reporters were admitted to the operating theater and accredited to cover coalition operations.¹ The daunting size of the press contingent posed an unprecedented logistics problem for military commanders. Operational security concerns focused on real-time broadcast capabilities and their potential to transmit restricted information worldwide. Additionally, military planners had to consider the desires of Saudi Arabian leaders, who objected to the prospect of a massive western media force roaming unchecked across the country.¹⁵

General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, addressed concerns about the press by imposing strict limits on media activities. Open access to operations was restricted; ground rules required journalists to operate in representative pools and to share all stories and footage with the entire media corps. Joint Information Bureaus (JIBs) were established throughout the area of operations to coordinate media activities and to perform security review functions. A Command Joint Information Bureau was attached to U.S. Central Command Headquarters at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to provide press briefing assets for senior officials and to liaison with host nation public affairs representatives. Another major information bureau was established at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia to serve as the theater

¹ This figure is disputed by the American Society of News Editors (ASNE), which estimates the number of reporters in the theater did not exceed 1259. Source: ASNE Bulletin, May/June 1991.

media coordination authority. Sub-joint Information Bureaus were set up throughout the area of operations to support localized media activities and to perform secondary security review functions. Media pools were accompanied in the field by escort officers who provided military expertise and performed on-scene primary security review of news copy and videotape.

The media establishment's reaction to press restrictions during Gulf War operations was predictably negative and generated protest from all quarters of the trade. Walter Cronkite, the former CBS news anchor and elder statesman of television broadcast journalism, voiced his disapproval in a strongly-worded editorial that included a not-so-subtle threat of media retaliation:

"With an arrogance foreign to the democratic system, the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia is trampling on the American people's right to know. ... The fact that the military apparently feels there is something to hide can only lead eventually to a breakdown in home-front confidence and the very echoes from Vietnam that the Pentagon fears most."¹⁶

The media establishment, to its credit, did not make good on such threats and was perhaps precluded from doing so by the brevity and overwhelming success of the coalition's military operations. Had the conflict not been resolved so quickly or successfully, media opposition to press restraints would likely have resulted in a considerable amount of negative coverage.

It is clear that close management of media activities played a key role in the military's successful public affairs program during the Gulf War, but the most effective tactic, and the one most likely to endure in future operations, was skillful use of high-level press briefings. These briefings were transmitted "live" almost daily from the Pentagon and from Saudi Arabia and allowed senior officials to describe operational events and policy directly to a worldwide audience, effectively bypassing media interpretation. These briefings were articulate and detailed, often accompanied by video footage from weapons or platform cameras. Military briefing officers were poised and candid; models of cool professionalism. By contrast, journalists who participated in the briefings often came across as an arrogant and disorderly mob, often asking questions that displayed a perceptible lack of basic military knowledge or which dealt with areas of obvious operational sensitivity. As these sessions may have contributed to a loss of media credibility, they also greatly enhanced the credibility of the military: Senior military commanders avoided the mistake of their Vietnam counterparts by ensuring actions taken in the field matched statements made in the briefings. The military did exactly what it said it would do--by promptly eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait through decisive use of highly technical, superior military power.

By war's end, the military had prevailed not only in the battle of arms against Iraq, but also in the battle of wills

with the media. Public opinion, by an 83 percent majority, approved of the press restrictions that were imposed.¹⁷ Top officials in the Bush administration hailed media policy in the Gulf War as a "model for the future". The media establishment was determined to see the model changed.

CHAPTER III

A NEW POLICY

"Acceptance by government of a dissident press is a measure of the maturity of a nation."

JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS

In April 1991, executives from 15 major news organizations co-wrote a letter to Defense Secretary Richard Cheney expressing strong disapproval of media restrictions imposed during the Gulf War and requesting a meeting to discuss their misgivings. An excerpt from the letter summarizes their concerns:

"Our sense is that virtually all major news organizations agree that the flow of information to the public was blocked, impeded or diminished by the policies and practices of the Department of Defense. Pools did not work. Stories and pictures were late or lost. Access to the men and women in the field was interfered with by a needless system of military escorts and copy review. These conditions meant we could not tell the public the full story of those who fought the nation's battle."¹⁸

The letter opened an extensive dialogue between the Defense Department and the media industry. Over an eight-month period, five signatories of the letter met with Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Pete Williams in an effort to reconcile media concerns with Defense Department policy. Media representatives entered the negotiations with a ten-point set of guidelines they felt

should govern future news coverage. This list was eventually used as a working model for the group. Each of the ten points was debated and, with the exception of one, was either accepted outright by Mr. Williams or modified in some way so as to be acceptable to the Defense Department.

On 21 May 1992, a new Department of Defense policy for media coverage of U.S. military operations was announced. The nine-point policy statement is a modified version of the original media-proposed guidelines. The text of the policy statement follows:¹⁹ (*Italicized phrases indicate departures from the original media-proposed text.*)

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principle means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity -- within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. *News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced correspondents to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.*

5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. *Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.*

6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. *Consistent with its capabilities, the military will provide public affairs officers with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.*

9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing Department of Defense National Media Pool system.

A proposed tenth provision banning military security review of news material was rejected by the Defense Department on grounds that such reviews may be necessary to preclude inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that would jeopardize troop safety or mission success. A review system would be imposed only in situations when operational security was a concern.²⁰

CHAPTER IV

MAKING THE NEW POLICY WORK

"No battles are won with headlines, although I appreciate that wars are conducted by public opinion."

GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Many military professionals are likely to view the reformed news coverage policy as a giant step backward in the military's relationship with the media. They point to their ascendancy over the press in the Gulf War and say, "This is the way it should be done." In doing so, the military runs the risk of "preparing to fight the last war" and makes faulty assumptions based on past events, discounting the uncertainties of what is to come. The uncertain nature of future contingencies is a central theme in the National Military Strategy. Another DESERT STORM-style conflict may occur and the U.S. may attain a quick and decisive victory. It is difficult for the media to criticize such success. The National Military Strategy, however, reflects a higher likelihood of involvement in low intensity conflicts, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance.²¹ Participation in some of these actions may require long-term commitment of U.S. military forces. U.S. involvement may arouse controversy at home. Given these factors, the National

Command Authority is determined that maintaining a military news coverage policy that alienates the media establishment is not in the nation's best interests.

Debate within the armed forces about the suitability or acceptability of the media policy is moot. The military is accountable to its civilian leadership to make the policy work. Each provision of the policy merits close examination by military leaders and operational planners. A clear understanding of the policy is essential in order to anticipate logistics and security planning requirements. Military commanders must also recognize the degree of latitude they retain in dealing with the media under the new policy.

News Media Access to Military Operations.

From the point of view of military professionals, the most significant change in media coverage policy deals with press access to military activities. Open and independent media access will be standard in coverage of military operations. The Gulf War model for managing media activities --the long-term press pool, is rejected. The use of media pools in future operations will be limited to early stages of deployment and to situations when remote location or space constraints dictate a clear need to control the size of the media contingent. This may be disappointing news to military commanders who favor the use of press pools as a measure to reduce media logistics burdens during combat, but benefits of the provision should not be overlooked: Under any pool

system, the military is required to provide logistic support to the media. Under conditions of open coverage, logistic support is to be provided *whenever feasible*. The field commander has the option to withhold transportation and communications assets from media as the tactical situation warrants. Admittedly, a prudent field commander is not inclined to alienate reporters, and may not often face this type of situation, but if such a circumstance does arise, he or she is free to exercise personal judgement.

The news coverage policy also recognizes the possible need to limit media access to special operations forces due to the sensitive nature of their activities. This is a key feature of the policy in light of the pivotal role special operations forces are likely to play in operations short of war.

Operational Security.

Security considerations under conditions of open news coverage warrant increased attention. Unauthorized release of operationally sensitive information, while always a possibility, is more likely to occur when media access is less restricted. In response to this hazard, media coverage ground rules may include a requirement for military security review of news copy. Additionally, electromagnetic operational security may require limiting media use of communications systems in some situations. For military people, security reviews and electronic emissions controls should be regarded

as secondary measures. The primary responsibility for ensuring operational security is shared by each member of every unit. Military people must be trained to recognize information that should not be released. The importance of operational security is emphasized in training programs throughout our armed forces, but in preparing to operate in close contact with reporters, security awareness must become an absolute; training directives and programs at every level of all five services need to address this.

Operational Planning.

Public affairs aspects of operational planning must assume increased importance if plans are to anticipate the effect of the media in future operations. The Navy SEALs on the beach in Somalia would have had a much improved chance of carrying out their mission had a special operations press restriction been imposed. In fairness to U.S. Central Command planners, the fiasco probably resulted more from a desire to generate favorable publicity than from lack of planning. This illustrates an important point; accommodation of the media must not be allowed to supersede mission requirements. Operational planners must achieve a balance between these factors--no easy task.

The current joint planning instruction, Joint Publication 5-03.2, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, directs the unified and specified commanders to ensure that public affairs planning is conducted concurrently during

both deliberate and crisis planning environments.²² The publication specifies two points in the planning process when public affairs factors are to be considered: First, a public affairs staff estimate is included in the information package used to formulate the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. Second, a public affairs annex to the operation plan (Annex F) is developed to support the selected course of action. Public affairs annexes summarize the operational situation, state public affairs goals, specify assumptions, assign tasks, and provide detailed guidance in all anticipated areas of concern.

Public affairs plans for the most recent U.S. military operations, Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, are extremely detailed and clearly reflect a high degree of concern for maintaining an active public affairs strategy. While development of these plans is a critical part of the planning process, the most active public affairs involvement should take place prior to selection of a course of action. Public affairs and media relations issues directly affect other areas of planning; operations, communications, and logistics estimates must be considered alongside the public affairs estimate in evaluating alternative courses of action. Marine Brigadier General James M. Mead, who commanded U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983, published an article in 1987 promoting a more active public affairs planning role. An excerpt outlines his reasoning:

"The possibility of potential media coverage should be consciously considered in both the "estimate of the Situation" and the evaluation of alternative courses of action. The commander and his PAO should consider the impact of possible media coverage on the unit's ability to attain surprise, maintain security, or conduct deception operations."²³

Plan Execution.

As in every aspect of war, success or failure on the public affairs front is determined, finally at the tactical level. Reporters are more inclined to write favorably when their needs have been well met by their military hosts. During the ground offensive in the Gulf War, newspaper columns and television news broadcasts were filled with very favorable accounts of the U.S. Marine thrust into Kuwait. Stories and footage covering the Army's massive "end run" were far less prevalent. The Marines received top billing because they did a better job accommodating journalists at the front and getting their stories transported to sub-JIBs for release.²⁴

Operational commanders play a central role in making sure their subordinates in the field have the means, and the will, to support the media and to carry out the public affairs plan. First, operational commanders need to make public affairs a priority within their own staff. Second, operational commanders must emphasize to subordinate commanders the importance of an active public affairs program in military operations and direct that each unit make adequate provisions to accommodate the media when deployed. Finally, operational commanders must mandate a program that addresses training requirements for unit public affairs officers. Collateral duty

unit public affairs officers most often will act as the primary military liaison with the press during operations under conditions of open coverage. These officers must be familiar with the public affairs support structure in the area of operations and be proficient in performing military security review of news material in order to function effectively.

Operational-level guidance for building effective theater public affairs mechanisms and fostering productive media relationships is being developed by the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff. Joint Publication 1-07, Doctrine for Public Affairs Support of Joint Operations, is scheduled to be published in 1994.²⁵

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

In the uncertainty of a rapidly changing world, this certainty remains: Whenever our nation's armed forces are called to action, our nation's press establishment will be on hand to record events. U.S. Government policy regulating media activities during military operations directs that reporters shall have open access to U.S. military actions in most situations. U.S. military operations are today, and will be in the future, conducted under the scrutiny of a worldwide audience. Revolutionary advancements in communications technology enable the news media to transmit reports instantaneously to every corner of the globe. The presence on the battlefield of these capabilities, and of the journalists who employ them, presents a significant challenge to operational planners and military commanders.

The military-media relationship is, by nature, adversarial. While the military is obligated to guard certain information in the interest of operational security and troop safety, the press is obligated to provide the American people with complete and accurate accounts of the military's actions. Military leaders at all levels must recognize the legitimate role the press plays in warfare and consider its effects when planning operations. Mission success remains the ultimate operational imperative, but the strategic importance of

maintaining public support cannot be overstated. The media establishment communicates the words and images that are the determinant of public opinion. By providing the press the means to perform its function, operational commanders acquire the opportunity to promote public support and to display the determination, pride, and professionalism of their forces. Through careful planning that anticipates the presence of the media in an operational scenario and makes provisions to accommodate them, operational commander's take the most important step in ensuring that the medias' appearance on the battlefield does not detract from mission success.

NOTES

1. Michael B. Gordon, "T.V. Army on the Beach Took U.S. by Surprise," The New York Times, 10 December 1992, p. A-18.

2. Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, Annex F to OPORD 001: Operation RESTORE HOPE--Public Affairs,. Unclassified message 06 2246Z DEC 92, p. 2.

and,

Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, Public Affairs Plan for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, Unclassified message 071930 JAN 93. p. 2.

3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), p. 299.

4. Peter Andrews, "The Media and the Military," American Heritage, July/August 1991, p. 82.

5. Fred Kaplan, "Government, not Media, lost Vietnam, Army says," The Boston Globe, 31 August 1989, pp. 4, 12.

6. Winant Sidle, "The Public's Right to Know," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1985, p. 37.

7. Rueven Frank, "The Newsreel Theater of the Absurd," Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 September 1991, p. 733.

8. Sidle, p. 37.

9. Ibid, p. 43.

10. Bernard E. Trainor, "The Military and the Media: A Troubled Embrace," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol. XX, No. 4, December 1990, pp. 9-10.

11. Ibid., p. 10.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. James F. Pontuso, "Combat and the Media: The Right to Know versus the Right to Win," Strategic Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Winter 1990. p. 52.

15. John M. Shotwell, "The Fourth Estate as a Force Multiplier," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991, p. 75.

16. Walter Cronkite, "What is there to Hide?" Newsweek, 25 February 1991, p. 43.

17. Brent Baker, "Last one in the Pool...", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August, 1991. p. 71.

18. Letter from Media Executives to Richard Cheney, 29 April 1991.

19. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release, No. 241-92, 21 May 1992.

20. Ibid.

21. Office of the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington: 1992), p. 6.

22. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Joint Publication 5-03.2 (Washington: 1992), p. III-365.

23. James M. Mead, "The MAU Meets the Press," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1987, p. 20.

24. Shotwell, pp. 77-78.

25. Telephone conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Geier, Office of the Joint Staff- Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), Washington, DC, 11 February 1992.

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