LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
TERMINATION OR CONTROL

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USAWC CLASS OF 1993

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA  17013-5050

93-10562
**Title:** LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: TERMINATION OR CONTROL (UNCLASSIFIED)

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**Type of Report:** STUDY PROJECT

**Date of Report:** 93 04 02

**Page Count:** 26

**Abstract:** See reverse for abstract

**Security Classification of This Page:** UNCLASSIFIED
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FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 2 April 1993   PAGES: 26   CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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This study is an analysis of the Low-Intensity Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, from a historic and social stand point, and it attempts to sort out the ways and means through which policymakers, both civilian and military, can deal with these conflicts which, far from being "low" in this part of the world, constitute a survival dilemma to most African nations.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: TERMINATION OR CONTROL

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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INTRODUCTION

African militaries, together with their developed allies, or sometimes by themselves, have spent the last three decades fighting endless wars both inside and at the borders of their territories. Triggered or backed by one of the two former blocs of the Cold War era, it seems today that these wars are going to last, or to recur, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of proxy wars in the Third World instigated by one bloc or the other. It is as if:

The decline in the frequency of Euro-centered, interstate war in the last 40 years has been more than matched by an increase in the number of intrastate wars waged in Asia and Africa as a consequence of the disintegration of European colonialism. . . . this remarkable shift in the pattern of war is attributable, in part, to the equally remarkable increase in the number of sovereign nations that now comprise the international system, most of them in what is now called the Third World.1

These wars of the "Third Kind," as Edward E. Rice puts it in his book, are termed "Low Intensity Conflicts" by the developed world, even though they may be "survival" to the nations in which they occur. The difference of applications, either low intensity conflict or survival struggle, relies on the relativity of things from one part of the world to the others, on the sizes of nations and armed forces engaged in them.

Whatever the term, these wars have one common denominator: Their clear tendency to last, recur, or radicalize: . . . because it takes two to make peace, but only one to make war, wars are undertakings from which extrication is peculiarly difficult.2

Of the entire Third World, Africa is the most troubled continent. It is so because the seeds of the current turmoil were sown in an other era, giving birth today to social unrest and wars. However, having the explanation of the fact should not lead to accepting it. Wars do occur and governments should
seek for the ways and means of terminating them, or at least of controlling their consequences for they will end sooner or later in the mutual exhaustion of the belligerents.

Internal upheavals or border disputes should be equally addressed, so as to bring about stability and allow development.

THE BACKGROUND

The African Tradition:

Present-day Africa comprises more than 50 states, which were all born with the end of colonialism, and no sooner than 1957. Before the Europeans came to Africa, this huge continent was composed of a multitude of small kingdoms most of the times at war one with the other. To take the example of West Africa, the only exceptions were the Empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai, which encompassed most of the current states of West Africa and dominated the whole region from the Atlantic Ocean to the current Republics of Niger and Nigeria. These empires, followed later on by the empires led by El-Hadj Omar and Samory Toure, were based on a core ethnic group which conquered its neighbors and extended its dominion to promote and secure trade:

Nevertheless, the empire's territorial administrations were limited in a number of ways. Except for the core ethnic groups, the central government interfered little in local social, religious, economic, or even political procedure. Imperial government imposed the minimum of order necessary for trade, provided a system of settling disputes between different subject peoples, collected taxes, and maintained roads.³

The only attempts to build multiethnic empires were may by El-Hadj Omar Tall and Samory Toure, who battled in the name of Islam. They were both defeated by the French colonizers, with the help of indigenous chiefdoms.

This is, maybe, the reason why ethnicism is still so vivid in most African countries, for, in most cases, the Europeans' presence in Africa and their
attempts to erase these peculiarities of ethnic groups lasted less than a century.

The European Colonization:

Defeated by the European colonizers, the African Empires or Kingdoms were integrated in entities called "territories" which foreshadowed the current independent states. For the first time, different groups were forced to live together, to abide by the same laws that were imposed onto them by foreigners. The frontiers of these territories were determined by bargaining over lines of meridian and parallel, taking no consideration of what their consequences would be on the peoples and resulting in arbitrary partition of Africa.

Some colonizers made attempts to unify the various groups and erase their differences in a policy of assimilation, others used the same differences to "divide and rule." All in all, as long as they were the rulers, there were few sources of internal disunity or instability, because law and order were imposed by force to all groups. One successful example of unification was the policy of assimilation attempted by the French in Senegal, where the inhabitants were thought of as Senegalese rather than Wolof, Serer, or Jola:

With their elected deputy, their council-general, and their municipal councils, the Senegalese early crossed the barrier between tribalism, and nationalism, a result for which many African leaders had to work so ardently and patiently many decades later. . . . Paidherke created the "tirailleurs Senegalais," whereas Lugard called his force the Hausa Constabulary.  

The end result of this policy, which was to promote a "French" Senegalese, was favored by the "fundamental homogeneity of Senegal's main ethnic groups," noticed by the French on their arrival in Senegal.

Except for the unique case of Senegal, the tendency was everywhere else, and whatever the colonial power, "divided and rule." The British, applied in
West Africa the theories of Lord Lugard or indirect rule through existing indigenous authorities, while the French, in Chad for instance, relied on the animistic South to rule the Islamic North of the territory.

Post-independence Africa:

"Independence was flawed and African states are flawed."6 This quick survey of traditional and colonial Africa sheds a light on the various reasons of instability and wars in the continent. When, in the 1960s, more than 50 states gained independence, there were already the seeds of disunity, instability, and violence.

The new nation-states were purely nominal in most cases, because they were merely drawn from the colonial territories, where the colonizers, on the eve of independence, tried to foster a last-minute policy of unification. Unfortunately, it was too few and too late. As early as 1960, some states were already dealing with interstate wars or with intrastate dissidences. Violence erupted and spread all over, in what would be seen as a classical opposition between North and South of a same country, between forces pulling in contrary directions.

The first case of secession occurred in Zaire, former Belgian Congo, where the Province of Katanga decided to break away and proclaimed "total independence." It took the intervention of the United Nations and long efforts to keep the nation one. Over the years, rebellion would seal the fate of Zaire, where foreign troops, under the auspices of the U.N. or unilaterally, would intervene periodically to prevent the state of splitting into pieces. Chad, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Somalia are, years after accession to independence, fighting with strong and persistent "local patriotisms" which endanger their existence as nations. Even a country like Senegal, whose indigenous homogeneity was praised by many, is now facing
a ten-year-long rebellion in the Southern region of Casamance where the Jola population decided to fight the central power, on the ground that they have been politically and economically neglected, and socially deprived of their lands. When they are not fighting intrastate wars, most African nations are involved in border disputes, as if the frontiers inherited from the colonial powers and recognized by the Organization of African Unity and many other organizations as intangible, were not "easier to accept than a disputed 'natural frontier'."\(^7\)

All this post-independence turmoil is possible only because these "states are clearly new creations within whose frontiers local communities, arbitrarily drawn together have different parts . . . and "it is this mismatch of society and state which raised problems of civil conflict, promote quarrels with neighbors and provides an opening for foreign interference."\(^8\)

Whatever the case social unrest leading to rebellion, or border dispute jeopardizing the regional security, African leaders must the will and determination to address these issues in a more appropriate way, inasmuch as they put at stake their security and, consequently, their development. Moreover, it is too late to alter the map.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

Besides the fact that all insurgencies South of the Sahara have a regional or tribal origin, most of them have in common to be waged in rural areas—on the contrary of the Algerian Islamic terrorism, more preponderant in urban areas—and are likely to recur and radicalize over the years. And it is all these factors, put together with their consequences on domestic economies and policies for countries that are totally dependent on their agriculture, that make it so hard to deal with insurgencies in Africa.
The Ethnic Dimension and Its Connection with Politics:

As said before and as acknowledged worldwide, insurgencies in Africa are generally caused by ethnicism, that is to say the feeling that one ethnic group can have that it is not associated with the political, economic, and social life of the country. This feeling of being rejected leads the considered ethnic group to be "engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable groups because these groups are pursuing incompatible goals." The most violent form of this opposition is rebellion from the central power, in an attempt to secede. It happens when there is no positive response to the claims of the groups. In sub-Saharan Africa it may well be that, long after the conflict has been settled, the opposition group remains active through a political party or a group of interest, thus perpetuating the danger of national disunity.

Dangers of Rural Insurgencies:

It is generally admitted that insurgencies prosper more easily in rural areas than in cities. Rural areas are where they can find the popular support, the logistic and the sanctuary that they need to operate.

On the other hand, when the level of violence is very high in these areas, on which the country depends for its economy, the state is running the considerable risk of rural exodus with its damaging consequences on the national economy.

Causes of Recurrence:

In "Wars of the Third Kind," Edward E. Rice states:

If the problems that gave rise to them are fundamental, causes that have been defeated or suppressed are likely to reemerge; and by passing through a cycle of suppression and reemergence, such cause are likely to be radicalized.

Siding with him, one can say that leaders of insurgencies, having learned the hard way, have a natural tendency to become more radical both in the fightings
and negotiations, paving the way to any kind of escalation and protracted conflicts.

In sum, one can say that Third World nations, particularly sub-Saharan states, because of their endemic economic problems and their profound ethnic and religious cleavages, are the least apt to deal with insurgencies with significant political, economic, and military means. That is why this issue demands a greater priority in the agenda of international fora, to help these nations settle their crises.

THE RESPONSE TO THE THREATS

It is obvious, therefore, that the response to low-intensity conflict in sub-Saharan Africa requires the attention of both African leaders and the World Community in the sense that these wars of the "Third Kind" are a danger for all. However, only a sound national policy, through judicious choices, politically and militarily, can guarantee success, before any allied assistance. G. Clemenceau said: "War is too important a matter to be left to generals." It may be added that civil war is too sensitive a matter to be left in the hands of the only military.

National Strategy in Low-Intensity Conflict:

It is the duty of the political leader to decide on the national strategy to be applied in an insurgency. It is also its responsibility to issue clear guidance which can be translated into military objectives. The key to this process is the development of three critical pieces of guidance:

- A clear statement by the political authorities of the desired situation in the post-hostility and settlement phase—a vision of what the area should 'look like' following the hostilities;

- A clear set of political objectives that when achieved will allow the above vision to become reality; and
A set military objectives that will, when achieved allow/cause the above to happen.10

In most cases in sub-Saharan Africa, the "desired situation" after the conflict is to keep the nation state one and prevent any breakaway state, or, in case of a border dispute, avoid the alteration of current frontiers according to the OAU Charter. The "political objectives" would be the necessary steps to be taken administratively, economically, and socially to eradicate the causes of the insurgency. These steps should be carried out through the "conflict continuum," that is to say during peacetime, wartime, and post-wartime. Finally, the military objectives would be to deny to the insurgents the freedom of movement without which they cannot operate. "The military side does have some priority in time for the reason that, without a modicum of security, other government efforts will almost certainly fail to have the intended effect."11

Once the objectives are clearly defined and the coordination between the complementary elements of power established, the strategic planner will have to watch out for the best moment to terminate the conflict, throughout its different phases. Bruce B. G. Clarke enumerates six phases in a conflict:

- Dispute: When two groups' objectives are not compatible;
- Pre-hostilities: When there is introduction or threat of military force;
- Hostilities: When armed conflict is occurring;
- Post-hostilities: When the fighting is suspended;
- Dispute: When military option has been discarded; and
- Settlement: Rarely achieved in conflicts.

In his design, the author relates each phase to a way of terminating the dispute or conflict. A key role of the planner will be to look for turning
points throughout the process, in order to bring the opponent to negotiate, even though "civil wars . . . and anticolonial wars . . ., however, seem less amenable to negotiated settlement." It is very important to know when to start negotiating, -- and Clausewitz puts it:

Since war is not an act of senseless passion, but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.

According to Goodman and Bogart, what Clausewitz refers to are the indicators on the battlefield and outside that show that one of the belligerents is having doubts on the "initial estimates" of the cost and duration of the war, which may start bargaining over the settlement of the conflict. For them, these turning points are:

- "Stalemates," such as neither party can continue its strategy and tactics;
- "Resources constraints" reducing the means of the belligerents;
- "External political and economic pressures" from allies or neighbors concerned with their security; and
- "Internal political pressures and changes" altering public support and leading to negotiation.

If strategic planners can seize these opportunities and at the same time reassess the situation and remodel their objectives, it is likely that the end-state of the conflict will be very close to their initial expectations.

The Manwaring Paradigm:

The importance of a sound national strategy, decentralized in its implementation, together with judicious use of all the factors contributing to dealing with insurgencies, are fundamental for the end-state awaited. In this field, the "synchronization of resources" advocated by Bruce B. G. Clarke,
relates to the "specific combination of factors" developed by Max C. Manwaring in "limited War and Conflict Control," and the overall result depends on "the interoperability and interdependence of the various dimensions in limited war." We are convinced that the combination of his four postulates, each of them maximized to its best, produces a very efficient way to deal with insurgencies and lead to defeating at least the armed segment of the rebellion:

"Postulate One: Understanding a particular environment and its center of gravity":

Leaders and commanders must understand the environment in which an insurgency unfolds. They must understand the ways and means used by the insurgents, whose leaders are always highly educated and trained, to achieve their goals. They must be convinced c. the ultimate political nature of limited war and develop a preparation, before and during the confrontation, that will allow them to attack the center of gravity of the rebellion. For Manwaring, "Security is the insurgent center of gravity" because it "provides time, protects vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and, most importantly gives the insurgent the freedom to exercise initiative." As said above, if the government forces are able to reduce the freedom of action, it will ipso facto limit the capability of the insurgents and their effectiveness.

"Postulate Two: Creating the Intelligence Organization and intelligence effort necessary to deal with the insurgency":

To be able to understand "the dynamics of an insurgency" and thus be able to remove the threats that it poses on a society, it takes a very high "intelligence capability" which is not automatically available. This capability has to be built or strengthened, both at the national and operational tactical levels (brigade and battalion).
This capability should concentrate on human sources, rather than rely on technology, using the interrogation of "prisoners, defectors, informers, and ordinary citizens," to be able of "penetrating and building a complete intelligence picture of the insurgent infrastructure," which is "the predominant goal of the overall intelligence organization."16

"Postulate Three: Fostering the military/police capability required to achieve the political ends of the conflict":

In most countries where an insurgency occur, the police force, which is primarily designed to deal with any social unrest, is not trained to face the insurgent. The lack of competence of the police force sets the armed forces as the last resort, though they have been specifically trained to oppose an external enemy with conventional means and methods. This is also true of African Armed Forces. It is why an adequate "training and material assistance," together with "systemic changes" in the considered armed forces are necessary to help them get rid of their deficiencies and become efficient in dealing with the insurgency. Then, it will be easy, not only to attack the insurgent's center of gravity, and eventually defeat it but also to contribute to the "achievement of political, psychological, and moral objectives," as defined by the political leader.17

"Postulate Four: The establishment of the appropriate organization and objectives for the 'War':"

An overall organization must be established to coordinate and provide clear guidance to the different elements of national power involved in the resolution of the crises, as well as set the necessary political and military objectives for the struggle. Such an organization, because it provides:

- unity of command;
- unity of effort; and
o guidance, all along the process, is capital to the success of the operations.

In sum, we can say that each insurgency is unique and unfolds in a unique environment as well. However, some general lessons must be learned if the incumbent government wants to settle the crisis:

- The medium to unleash political grievances must exist in each political hierarch, an essential step in nipping LIC in the bud. The most effective steps in countering LIC were those that were taken during early, latent, and incipient phases of conflict;
- Political will is a prerequisite to countering or settling LIC conflicts. More often than not a lack of political initiative results in the conflicts, becoming a lingering sore in the political entity of a nation; and
- By its nature, combating LIC dictates coordination of political, social, economic, and military aspects. An apex body at national level must exist to coordinate such effort in the midterm and long-term perspective.18

The Diplomatic Battle:

In most low-intensity conflicts, the insurgents find support in a neighboring country or alliance with a major power. These foreign countries provide the assistance without which the insurgency could not be. This assistance covers the following aspects:

- a safe sanctuary across the border;
- training to the techniques of insurgency, both politically and militarily;
- equipment; and
- financing, etc. . . .

In the ongoing rebellion in Casamance, South of Senegal, we have been able to establish the numerous connections between the insurgents and the Bissau-Guinean government. Besides the ethnic interconnections across the borders, which is already a precious help to the rebellion, an insurgency can find on a
foreign soil a deliberate support to its cause, based on the nature of the
diplomatic relations between the two countries. In the case of Bissau-Guinea
and Senegal, the dispute over the maritime border played a major role in the
support given to the Senegalese rebellion by Bissau.

It is the responsibility of the incumbent government to do its level best
to dissociate the rebellion with its backers, using its own economic,
political, and above all diplomatic elements of power. The world body and the
regional organizations must learn of the facts and they must use all their
influence to bring the backing country to stop its assistance to the
insurgency. Such organizations as the United Nations, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) are internationally recognized fora capable of exerting political,
economic, or even military pressure on countries related to them, in
compliance with their respective charters.

Today, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War
era, such an action is quite feasible, inasmuch as there is no more
competition between the former bloc and no more need for the proxy wars that
so frequently disrupted the Third World scenery.

Regional stabilities in developing countries demand that insurgencies be
isolated and dealt with rapidly, if we do not want them to spread across the
borders. The tendency should be to internal unification and regional
integration, and not to breakaway states which are doomed to failure, in a
world where economic power is to be found in sizable entities.

Through these concentric circles of solidarity constituted by the
regional, continental, and international organizations, a nation facing any
kind of insurgency should be able to develop its "ability to reduce outside
support to the enemy" as Max G. Manwaring puts it. If the insurgency gets
more diplomatic support than the government, then there is no doubt that it is going to win in the long-term, because of the legitimacy related to the diplomatic recognition.

The Role of the Armed Forces:

The outcome of insurgent conflicts often depends on the political reliability, behavior, and capabilities of the defending government’s ground forces. In fact, the defending government’s army frequently constitutes the ultimate barrier to an insurgent takeover.\(^{19}\)

Even during the initial phases of an insurgency, the armed forces of a nation are of the greatest importance for the civilian power, because of the help that they can provide in dealing with bombs, training, and testing of new techniques in which military expertise is needed. However, the armed forces, especially the army, should be confided with the task of maintaining all the internal order and security only if it becomes obvious that the government is no more in a position to handle the situation and that the country is facing civil war. In this case, the mandate must be clear-cut and the role sufficiently explained, by the civilian authorities, and the army—or armed forces—should withdraw as soon as the level of violence has sufficiently decreased to enable the police and the gendarmerie forces to operate efficiently.

The ground forces main role in a Low-Intensity Conflict is to defeat the hostile forces. But they also have to allow the activities of nonmilitary components of counterinsurgencies by providing enough security for the administrative, political, and economic authorities to be present in the area.

Finally, they must bring back confidence among the populace by protecting them from the insurgents and proving that they can defeat any hostile force. However, there are some dangers related to giving to the armed forces the major role in a counterinsurgency. First of all, such an option can trigger
an escalation in violence detrimental to the resolution of the crisis and likely to serve the goals of the insurgency. During the French war in Algeria, the best recruiter for the Front of National Liberation (FNL) was the blind repression exerted by the French military against the local populace.

Second, counterinsurgency tasks require considerable strength, which are as many military experts derived from their original duty. Finally, the civilian power runs the risk of being too dependent on the military presence, thus putting aside the necessary tasks that must accompany the ground force activities.

In sum, the armed forces of a nation, especially in the Third World, where they "constitute the best-organized government entity in the country and the only one that has a permanent presence in most rural areas," must be competent and prove their professionalism. Moreover, they should remain professionals, lest they should indulge in politics, which means that the "armed forces as a whole are seriously degraded."21

Settlement of Border Disputes:

The settlement of border disputes, which constitute another source of instability in sub-Saharan Africa, is a main concern for the World Community, the continental organization as well as the regional and subregional entities.

Since 1960, the United Nations have been present in the Continent, in an attempt to settle the border disputes stemming from the arbitrary frontiers left to African countries by the former colonial powers. In 1963, the newly created Organization of African Unity was instrumental in settling the dispute between Morocco and Algeria. Ever since, there has been a proliferation of subregional and regional organizations which, through peaceful means, have contributed to the settling of disputes among their member states.
Complying with the Charter of the OAU, which underlines the intangible character of the borders inherited from the colonial powers, these organizations want to keep the map of Africa as it is and not give way to changes that might endanger the stability of their region.

In that prospect, a few African nations, among which Morocco and Senegal, dispatched troops in Zaire in 1928, to help preserve the unity of the country and prevent the secession of the Katanga Province.

In 1981, the OAU was able to raise and send to Chad a Pan-African Force composed of contingents from Nigeria, Zaire, and Senegal, to help this country settle its internal disputes that have been plaguing its unity since independence.

More recently, under the auspices of the ECOWAS, a regional force was deployed in Liberia in 1989. Part of its mission of this force was to maintain the unity of Liberia, part was to stop the fighting at the borders with neighboring countries.

Sub-Saharan countries have a tendency to regroup in economic entities in which they share the same interests. Such regrouping should be used in the settlement of disputes between nations, through peaceful means, and, if possible, before any outbreak of violence. If violence does occur, member states should be able to dispatch troops between the belligerents and work out an agreement to the best interests of the parties to the conflict.

THE INSURGENCY IN CASAMANCE AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE

When the rebellion burst out in 1982 in Casamance, it was a real surprise to the Senegalese government, if one considers the political and economic efforts made at that time to develop this region. Nevertheless, new steps were taken for more reforms designed to end the rebellion, and troops were deployed to secure the region:
Concessions to the Rebellion:

- Politically and Administratively, more autonomy was granted to the region, through more decentralization, so as to reduce the feeling that the northerners were the rulers. This feeling is deeply rooted in the hearts of the Jolas, who are separated from the rest of the country by the Republic of the Gambia. As a matter of fact, the current insurgency is merely the reflection of the civil unrest which characterized this region during the colonial days. It is generally admitted that the Jolas are reluctant to any form of central power because of their traditional social organization, the delimitation of land plots and the distribution of natural resources, which were at the origin of most conflicts between totally independent rural communities.

- Economically, more investments were made in the region. New industrial units were built and a bridge was completed over the River Casamance, so as to eliminate the geographical isolation in which the region had been held for so long. Despite these efforts, the rebellion went on, fueled by the Bissau-Guineans and requiring more attention and resources from the central government.

Assessment of the Situation in Casamance:

Permanently, concessions have been made by the government to settle the crisis. Most of these were perceived by the insurgency as signs of weakness to be exploited by the rebellion. Today, if we apply the Manwaring Paradigm to the insurgency in Casamance, we realize that the Senegalese has handled it in a fairly good manner, acknowledged by most international organizations.

- Environment and center of gravity:

The Senegalese authorities know perfectly well, by now, why and how the rebellion started and understand that the support provided so far by the
Guinean government to the insurgents, together with the social organization of the Jolas, constitute the center of gravity of the rebellion and allow it to operate in security from one country to the other. Insurgents can always operate in the national territory, with the protection of their families and of the organization, and they can find a safe heaven in Bissau-Guinea in case of a counterinsurgency operation. This is why the government made tremendous efforts, despite its border dispute with Bissau-Guinea, to cut the support it provided to the rebellion. Officially there is no more relations between the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MDFC) and the Guinean government. However, cross-border relations between people of the same ethnic group make it difficult for the Senegalese government to deal with the insurgency.

- Intelligence organization:

  The outbreak of violence came as a surprise to all the agencies that were just carrying out normal duty activities when it occurred. Later, intelligence became the weak point in dealing with the rebellion, insomuch it was very difficult to infiltrate the movement. This difficulty lies in the traditional organization of the Jola society, which allows no intruder into their secret endeavors. It took a new organization of the services and new methods of investigation to get more information on the movement and its leaders and to be in a position to counter them.

- Military/police capability:

  The initial surprise of the police forces and their limited capability to counter the threat were compensated by the use of the armed forces, the competence of which helped reestablish order and security. They also helped train security forces in new techniques and methods, as well as they allow the administration to continue its activities. In the field of operations, they
were successful to put into jeopardy the movement and its leaders by a sound occupation of the terrain. So far, they have maintained violence in the area at an acceptable level, and have never exerted their right to pursuit in Bissau-Guinea, though it was easy for them to do so.

Organization and objectives for the "war":

After the rebellion reached a new dimension with the direct confrontation between Senegalese and Guinean Armed Forces in 1990, an interagencies organization was set up in Casamance. A retired general was appointed as the governor of the region, and this new fact was perceived by the insurgency as a provocation that they had to challenge. Whether it was a sound decision or not, the presence of a military at the head of the local government triggered an escalation in the activities of the insurgents, which lead to bloody confrontations with the armed forces, the police, and the gendarmerie. At the same time, "external, political, and economic pressures" were exerted on Bissau-Guinea so as to stop its assistance to the rebellion, and "internal changes," such as new rules of land allocations and more local autonomy, were made in an attempt to alter public support, lift the law of silence which prevailed among the local populace and start negotiation with the leaders. All this led to the weakening of the movement, which asked for a truce in April 1991. On 31 May 1991, an agreement was signed between the government and the MFDC under the auspices and with the arbitration of the Bissau-Guinean government. Later the movement split into two fronts: A North Front which engaged into further negotiations with the government in view of post-hostility activities, and a South Front which denounced the agreement and resumed the struggle for a total independence, which seems to be their ultimate objective. The Senegalese government will have to isolate the South
Front more and more, not only from Bissau-Guinea, but also from the local populace, in order to bring it to join the negotiation table.

**SOME BASIC RULES**

The experience gained from the most recent Low-Intensity Conflict operations leads to the following basic rules:

**Will to Fight Insurgency:**

The democratically elected government must make a clear-cut statement as to its will to fight the insurgency within the laws of the country and must show its political determination. Any weakness in this field could endanger the whole policy of the government.

**Flexible Response:**

The response, whatever the case, should be proportionate to the threat. A tendency to a generalized and blind repression could endanger the individual rights, as well as result in dictatorship. Such a policy can only pave the way to a successful insurgency, in the sense that it gives a legitimacy to the insurgents.

**Action of the Media:**

Political propaganda and defamation should be countered by official statements on the objectives and policies of the government. In this prospect, the media have a major role to play and a tribute to pay to the democratic government thanks to which they exist and can operate. Their responsibility is to denounce any savage action by the insurgents and to point out to the public, with objectivity, all reforms and steps undertaken by the government, tending to settle the crisis.
CONCLUSION

Low-Intensity Conflict appears to be the main threat to the Third World, especially to sub-Saharan Africa. There are various reasons to the emergence of what can termed as civil unrest, to use a general definition. Part of them have been addressed all along this survey. Some recommendations have been made that can help deal with this form of violence spreading all over developing countries. However, it would be naive and dangerous to believe that one can eradicate and totally suppress an insurgency, even when the converging actions of the different elements of national power have contributed to remove the threat posed on a nation.

In fact, the survival of sympathizers is the price that we pay to live in a democracy. The survivors of rebellions are the guarantors that the same causes will not have the same effects and that there will be no reason why a segment of nation will rebel against the central authority through violent ways.

Let us come to the conclusion that there are very few cases, if at all, where Low-Intensity Conflicts ended in total termination.

. . . the outcomes of these kinds of conflicts are not determined exclusively or primarily by the results of the battlefield clashes. Instead, winning these wars depends on prewar preparation for the struggle to control a society and its political system on a comprehensive basis.22

In this painful endeavor, the key word is not termination. It is rather control over the political, economic, psychological, and military aspects of an insurgency.
ENDNOTES


2 Edward E. Rice, Wars of the Third Kind, 1.

3 William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation, 5.


5 Ibid., 97.

6 Dennis Austin, Africa Repartitioned?, Conflict Studies 193, 3.

7 Ibid., 1.

8 Ibid., 1, 2.

9 Bruce B. G. Clarke, Conflict Termination: A Rational Model, 3.

10 Ibid., V, VI.


12 Allan E. Goodman and Sandra Clemens Bogart, Making Peace: The United States and Conflict Resolution, 1.

13 Cimbala and Dunn, 62.

14 Ibid., 64.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 68.

17 Ibid., 71.


20 Ibid., 10.

21 Blaufarb and Tanham, 21.

22 Cimbala and Dunn, 7.
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Thompson, Virginia, and Richard Adloff.  Conflict in Chad, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981.