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Is Current US Army Rear Operations Doctrine Prepared to Counter A Guerrilla Threat In Rear Areas?

A Monograph by
Major Edward M. Sekerak
Ordnance

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
First Term AY 92-93

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Major Edward M. Sekerak

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[Signatures of Monograph Director, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, Director, Graduate Degree Program]

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ABSTRACT

IS CURRENT US ARMY REAR OPERATIONS DOCTRINE PREPARED TO COUNTER A GUERRILLA THREAT IN REAR AREAS? by Major Edward M. Sekerak, 49 pages.

This monograph examines whether or not current US Army doctrine is prepared to counter a guerrilla threat in rear areas. Guerrilla groups may comprise the most likely rear area threats in many regions around the world. Consequently, the US Army must be ready to identify and defeat such guerrilla threats in potential force projection missions.

In examining the research question, this study begins by exploring the characteristics of rear area guerrilla threats. Next, two historical examples—the Germans in the Soviet Union during World War II and the Soviets in Afghanistan—demonstrate the difficulties in countering guerrilla threats with inappropriate forces and doctrine. Finally, a hypothetical situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina assists in analyzing the ability of US Army rear operations doctrine to effectively respond to a guerrilla threat.

Overall, this monograph concludes that US Army rear operations is not presently prepared to counter guerrilla threats. Four recommendations result from the study. First, doctrinal manuals must move away from their overwhelming emphasis on the previous Soviet Union's conventional rear area threats. Second, rear operations doctrine must emphasize the importance of gathering intelligence and demonstrating initiative. Third, the US Army should modify the roles of reaction forces, response forces, and tactical combat forces to more effectively counter guerrilla threats in rear areas. Lastly, these US Army rear operations forces must be properly trained and equipped to successfully perform their anti-guerrilla missions.
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INTRODUCTION

... when [a line of communication] runs through hostile territory - the extent of its vulnerability where the population is in arms is obvious: one must treat the situation as if enemy forces were stationed all along the line. They may be in small numbers, lacking in depth and in capacity to follow through; but think what constant interference with the line at so many points along its length can mean!1

Clausewitz's concern about the possible interruption of an army's logistical support is even more critical today than in his time. Modern military forces require ever-increasing amounts of ammunition, fuel, food, maintenance, and other types of combat service support to be effective. To protect its critical sustainment effort from interference by potential enemies, the US Army developed a rear operations doctrine which emphasizes the protection of all rear activities.2 In essence, "Maintaining the capability of continuous sustainment of the force is the heart of rear operations."3

In identifying potential disruptions of logistics and other rear activities, US Army rear operations doctrine has concentrated on the threat from the Soviet Union during the previous four decades. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact within the past few years has virtually eliminated this potential enemy and radically changed the type of threat which the US Army must prepare against. However, current rear operations doctrine remains
focused on a Soviet-style rear threat and has not changed to date. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States shifted from a strategy of containment in Europe to a power projection strategy which will "advance and defend our vital interests whenever and wherever they are challenged." Few potential enemies possess the force structure and transportation assets necessary to insert significant numbers of conventional forces into rear areas. However, the US Army may deploy to locations with political, ethnic, and/or religious conditions which are conducive to the formation of guerrilla movements. Consequently, the US Army is likely to find itself in situations where irregular forces comprise the most likely rear area threat. This monograph seeks to answer the question: Is current US Army rear operations doctrine prepared to counter a guerrilla threat in rear areas?

To answer this research question, this study begins by examining the characteristics of potential guerrilla threats in rear areas. Next, two historical examples, the Germans in the Soviet Union during World War II and the Soviets in Afghanistan, illustrate the consequences of attempting to counter irregular forces with inadequate preparation and doctrine. Using lessons learned from the historical examples, a hypothetical example of US involvement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina assists in determining whether or not current US rear operations doctrine is prepared to counter guerrilla threats in rear areas.

ASSUMPTIONS AND CRITERIA

Several assumptions serve as a foundation in evaluating the evidence for this study. First, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States is the only true superpower. Although there are many regionally powerful countries who are continually striving to improve their military capabilities, no nation will be able to approach the conventional rear area threat posed by the former Soviet Union in the foreseeable future.

The second assumption is that the US Army will increasingly find itself in operations other than war, such as peacekeeping and peacemaking, which "require perseverance in the attainment of strategic aims." These types of operations do not lend themselves to the relatively quick and decisive victories obtained in Grenada, Panama, and Iraq. Although the US Army will ideally strive for quick and decisive victories, other types of operations, and possibly war itself, may stretch on for "weeks or months on end, among hostile populations, in areas threatened by terrorist attack, guerrilla warfare . . ."

The third and final assumption is that the Army will not significantly increase the numbers of forces
required for rear area protection in the near future. The reduced threat from the former Soviet Union and national fiscal problems are causing US military forces to substantially reduce in size.

In conducting the literature review to develop criteria for this study, one theme about countering irregular forces in rear areas becomes readily apparent. Military forces need to gather intelligence, by aggressively identifying and locating guerrilla groups, and demonstrate initiative, by attacking and pursuing those same guerrilla groups. For example, Otto Heilbrunn, in *Warfare In The Enemy's Rear*, developed a strategy to defeat guerrilla threats in which he identified intelligence and constant initiative as two of his main requisites for maintaining or reestablishing rear area security.9

FM 100-5, *Operations*, also recognizes the importance of intelligence and initiative in the conduct of rear operations. AirLand Battle doctrine is "based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to accomplish the mission."10 Initiative "implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations" and is not limited to any particular region of the battlefield."11 In addition to its emphasis on initiative, FM 100-5 states that establishing an accurate intelligence system is the most important activity in the rear.12 Given the
emphasis by both literary and doctrinal sources, intelligence and initiative serve as two helpful criteria to determine conclusions for this study.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA REAR THREATS**

Few countries presently possess the conventional force structure to counter the United States military when properly committed. Given the availability of national intelligence assets and the attainment of air superiority by US forces expected in most situations, many potential enemies will not be able to readily insert sizable conventional forces into rear areas undetected or unopposed. What type of rear area threats would an adversary most likely employ against the United States when conventional forces are not a viable option? Samuel Huntington in *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* provides one possible answer:

Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places. Guerrilla warfare is the weapon of the weak. . . . it is employed only when and where the possibilities of regular warfare have been foreclosed.13

History is replete with many examples in which a numerically or organizationally inferior opponent employed guerrilla warfare in rear areas against a stronger foe. Conquered groups used irregular tactics to threaten Alexander's lines of communication (LOCs) with Macedonia. Robert Rogers and Francis Marion were two early Americans who specialized in guerrilla
tactics behind enemy lines during the French & Indian War and the American War for Independence, respectively. After the defeat of their conventional forces, the South African Boer partisans targeted British rear areas from 1900 to 1902. During and after World War II, guerrilla movements arose in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, China, Korea, Malaya, Algeria, Vietnam, and many other countries.

This trend of guerrilla warfare exhibits no signs of abating. Current world events indicate that the likelihood of irregular warfare may actually increase in the future. In a recent article in Military Review, Donald Vought observed:

The breakdown of social control mechanisms in those states moving from totalitarian or authoritarian systems to whatever political forms they eventually develop has unleashed ethnic and religious intercommunal violence, as well as a phenomenal increase in criminal activity in Eastern Europe, parts of Africa and parts of Latin America . . . Economic migration leading to a resurgence of ultranationalism and xenophobia has increased intercommunal violence in Western Europe, the Middle East, West Africa, and East Asia.14

Guerrilla groups are more likely to develop in areas where there are favorable geographic conditions, potential for unity of the movement, and local community support. The environment can help partisans by providing safe bases in regions with difficult terrain, or offering sanctuaries in sympathetic countries which are close to guerrilla areas of operation. The most effective irregular movements
occur in regions where religious, ethnic, and/or political characteristics serve to unify the guerrillas against a common enemy and thereby reduce rivalries within the movement. No irregular movement can survive without community support and security. Guerrillas require the supplies, ability to blend in with average people, and everyday intelligence that only the local populace can provide.15

Guerrillas display certain characteristics in their operations and tactics which contribute to their success. Partisan forces generally operate in rear areas where support units are not as well prepared, trained, or equipped as combat forces. Since they are normally native to the region, guerrillas are intimately familiar with their area of operations. If the local community supports the irregular movement, then the partisans can move undetected and the enemy's whereabouts will always be known. With this superior intelligence, guerrillas can achieve surprise during the conduct of their raids and ambushes. They will usually conduct violent attacks and seek quick decisions.

Guerrillas also have several limiting factors which adversely affect their operations. Partisans often have little or no formal military which can lead to their elimination in encounters with conventional forces. They must remain dispersed so they do not
present an identifiable target and are therefore rarely able to decisively mass their forces. They will not normally "materialize as a concrete body, otherwise the enemy can direct sufficient force at its core, crush it, and take many prisoners."

Given time to organize and the opportunity to operate without an aggressive response, guerrillas can significantly disrupt rear operations. The Germans in the Soviet Union and the Soviets in Afghanistan provide pertinent examples of what can happen when a force does not adequately prepare for a rear area partisan threat.

**GERMAN REAR OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II**

During World War II, Soviet partisans attempted to completely disrupt German rear activities and lines of communications (LOCs). The Germans' use of proactive rear operations forces against guerrilla groups assisted in maintaining sustainment required for combat units.

In planning the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation BARRBAROSSA), the German Army High Command (OKH) was well aware that Soviet military doctrine emphasized operations in enemy rear areas by both regular and irregular forces. Although some German Army officers considered the difficulties in protecting logistics units and securing LOCs, Hitler's belief in a short operation precluded the development
of sufficient rear operations security forces and doctrine.18

The German rear security doctrine primarily consisted of self-defense by rear service units and the employment of separate security battalions to guard installations, depots, and LOCs.18 For Operation BARBAROSSA, the OKH assigned an additional three security divisions to each of the German army groups for rear area reconnaissance, response, and security missions.19 The security battalions and divisions appeared robust on paper. However, the German Army improperly manned, equipped, and trained these security forces for their varied rear area missions.20

Following their invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the Germans experienced minimal disruption to their logistics for the first six months of their campaign. The primary rear area threats were bypassed Soviet troop units or groups of stragglers who haphazardly struck at targets of opportunity while trying to rejoin their own forces. German rear service units and security forces performed well against these limited rear threats.21

Soviet partisan groups began to form during this initial period, but were poorly equipped and poorly led. They primarily concentrated on their own survival and generally avoided confrontations with German forces. Occupied with guarding rear activities and
responding against the limited conventional threats, German security forces could not adequately patrol rear areas to obtain information about the growing guerrilla threat.23

By late 1941, partisan groups were growing in strength and increasing their operations against German rear area targets. The rise of partisan warfare was primarily attributable to three causes. First, the Soviet government made a concentrated effort to initiate and build up a guerrilla movement.24 Second, the German government's harsh occupation policy turned the local population against the Germans and increased support for the partisans.25 Finally, the German security forces, while effective in protecting logistical installations and transportation routes against minor threats, were ill-prepared to identify and counter the growing partisan organization.

The German rear security forces were simply unable to aggressively patrol their respective areas, collect intelligence on guerrilla activities, and display any initiative in destroying partisan bands while still relatively weak. For instance, the army groups' security divisions could do little more than provide limited guard and response forces because they often covered areas in excess of 10,000 square miles and lacked adequate mobility.26 Many occupied regions of the Soviet Union contained swamps, forests, and
mountains. Such areas provided excellent hiding places for guerrilla bands to organize and train beyond the limited reach of the German security forces.

Given an initial opportunity to thrive, partisan strength rose from virtually nothing in the summer of 1941 to approximately 30,000 at the end of 1941, and over 150,000 by the summer of 1942.27 Guerrillas became increasingly bold in their attacks against German rear operations. They ambushed truck convoys, mined rails to destroy supply trains, blew up bridges, assassinated German military leaders and Soviet sympathizers, and performed clandestine missions to support Soviet conventional forces.

Toward the end of 1941, the Germans realized that their doctrinal employment of security forces in protection and response roles was not an effective means to counter the growing partisan threat.28 The partisans were becoming well organized and achieving increasing successes in their rear area attacks. The German Army groups independently developed methods for security posts along railroads and highways, increased use of conventional reaction forces, and conducted large scale anti-guerrilla offensives. These measures achieved mixed results in protecting rear activities and were largely ineffective in destroying partisan bands. Additionally, such operations caused a considerable drain of German Army units which were
desperately needed along the Eastern front. Finally grasping the need for some sort of standardized anti-partisan organization to gain the initiative, the OKH issued special instructions at the end of August 1942 which mandated that:

Every Commander of an Army Rear Area, every Security Division, and every other Division employed in areas endangered by bands, must immediately organize Jagdkommandos.

Jagdkommandos (commando hunters) were platoon or company sized units armed with light automatic weapons, supplied with mobile communications equipment, and specially trained in anti-guerrilla tactics. Jagdkommandos were exempt from guard duties, work details, and anything else which interfered with their direct action against partisans. They were able to acquire detailed intelligence about their specific area of operations (AO) and demonstrate initiative against guerrilla groups by remaining in the same region for extended periods, emphasizing speed and security, and fighting as the guerrillas did themselves.

The Jagdkommandos were the most effective anti-guerrilla effort employed by the Germans. Penetrating into areas previously accessible only to the Soviet partisans, the Jagdkommandos fought against smaller-sized partisan bands and coordinated with conventional forces to attack larger guerrilla forces. They persistently hunted guerrilla groups, interfered with the partisans abilities to regroup, and never allowed
them a chance to rest. As the Jagdkommandos became more experienced, it became progressively easier to find the partisan bands, drive them from their bases, keep them constantly on the move, and deny the guerrillas opportunities to strike at rear activities.

The Germans realized too late that rear operations forces must be able to obtain intelligence and seize the initiative against guerrilla groups. Unfortunately for the Germans, the deteriorating front line situation severely limited the number of personnel available for Jagdkommando units. Driven out of the Soviet Union by mid-1944, the Germans ran out of time before their proactive anti-partisan efforts had an adequate opportunity to significantly reduce the Soviet guerrilla rear area threat. Despite observing the Germans' problems in protecting rear operations against a widespread partisan threat, the Soviets would have similar difficulties in countering rear area guerrilla threats several decades later during their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

SOVIET REAR OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Logistical support and rear area security became major concerns for Soviet commanders during the war in Afghanistan. Soviet logistics activities, installations, and LOCs suffered extensive attacks by the Afghan resistance from their initial invasion in 1979 until the majority of troops were withdrawn in
1989. Initially unprepared to counter a guerrilla enemy, the Soviets aggressively sought to develop effective strategy and tactics to both protect their sustainment effort and fight the counterinsurgency war.

The Soviet problems in protecting their logistical support were due to several reasons. First, the Soviets did not give significant thought to potential logistical difficulties because they believed that their involvement in Afghanistan would be relatively short. Within six months of their December 1979 invasion, the Soviets realized that Afghanistan would be a long term operation and they began to build up their military infrastructure.

Second, the Soviets overestimated the fighting ability of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Armed Forces. Originally intending to assist the DRA Army against the rebels, the Soviets assumed the primary warfighter role by 1981. The inefficiency of the DRA caused the Soviets to assume this role.

The third factor contributing to their rear operations dilemma was that the Soviets inadequately assessed the impact of terrain and Afghanistan's primitive transportation system on logistics operations. Rugged sharp-peaked mountains comprise the eastern and central regions, giving way to plateaus and deserts in the western and southern areas. Because of the rugged terrain, no usable rail network existed and
few usable roads were available. Most roads were easily susceptible to ambushes because the difficult terrain caused convoys to move slowly and the surrounding countryside offered many concealed positions for the rebels.

Fourth and perhaps most importantly, the Soviets severely underestimated the strength and vitality of the resistance movement. Despite a history of territorial problems in the region dating back to the mid-1800s and the presence of 5000-7700 advisors who led DRA Army units against rebel forces prior to the invasion, the Soviets did not understand the guerrilla nature of their enemy. Afghanistan's harsh environment greatly contributed to the rugged individualism of the people and "has led to a society that was framed for resistance, but one that is very hard for anyone to organize." The resistance was extremely decentralized and consisted of numerous groups. These groups were in turn loosely organized collections of 10-30 man tribal bands who usually operated on a regional basis. Command hierarchies had little control over these small rebel bands because local commanders were often reluctant to recognize any higher authority. Targeting and timing of attacks displayed no particular logic and were therefore unpredictable. The personality and
ability of each local commander directly determined the effectiveness of the small guerrilla bands. The mujahideen (fighters for the faith) adopted hit and run style guerrilla tactics because they did not possess the necessary firepower, manpower, mobility, and staying power to successfully fight against the conventional DRA and Soviet forces. Rebel groups quickly learned to hide in the rugged terrain as the Soviet armored units passed by, then reemerge to attack isolated forces and support vehicles. The mujahideen attacked logistical objectives such as fuel pipelines, supply depots, ammunition storage sites, industrial works, and supply convoys to strike at inadequately defended targets and to obtain supplies.

Initially, the Soviets tried to counter mujahideen attacks in their rear areas by using their existing rear security doctrine. Regimental, divisional, and army echelons were doctrinally responsible for the security of their rear service units. All rear service units were capable of conducting limited self-defense to delay attacks until assistance arrived from their parent unit.

To assist the rear service units, the Soviets organized conventional elements of the motorized rifle (MR) divisions to guard logistics installations and provide protection for convoys. Special procedures developed for convoy protection included assigning MR
companies to escort logistics vehicles, using engineer
elements to clear routes, establishing a system of
security posts manned by MR troops, and clearing wide
areas along routes near potential ambush sites with
fire support assets. Additionally, convoys only
traveled during daylight hours under the overhead
protection of helicopters.40

The Soviet rear service units and MR security
forces had many difficulties and were not particularly
effective in protecting logistics activities and
LOCs.41 Mujahideen forces were adaptable enough to
maintain the initiative and continually disrupt
logistics without major difficulty.42 Although the
use of MRD soldiers in security missions eventually
proved to be of some merit, this practice limited the
availability of forces which the Soviets could employ
in their major counter-guerrilla offensives.

As the Soviets assumed greater operational
responsibilities from the DRA Army, they tried to use
DRA Army units and local militias for rear protection
in a type of host nation support role. The DRA Army
proved itself equally inept at providing rear security
as it had been in combatting the rebels.43 Likewise,
militias were of questionable benefit in guarding rear
activities. Many DRA Army and militia security forces
either surrendered themselves and their protected
supplies to local mujahideen forces instead of
fighting, or they remained in place and provided supplies to the resistance on a periodic basis.\textsuperscript{44}

The Soviets analyzed their tactical shortcomings and began to realize that guarding rear service units and reacting to guerrilla attacks with primarily conventional units was not working. The mujahideen, who were essentially a light infantry force operating in difficult terrain, controlled the countryside and operated freely from their bases. Soviet rear service units and the MR security forces did not venture away from the immediate vicinities of the logistics activities which they were trying to protect. Hence, they could not collect much intelligence about the mujahideen. Without viable intelligence, the Soviets were unable to gain the initiative against the rebels in rear areas.\textsuperscript{45} Lieutenant Colonel Ali Ahmad Jalali, a mujahideen commander, accurately described the Soviet deficiencies:

The lack of troop patrols and the absence of tactical reconnaissance and security elements... was exploited by the mujahideen... The inexperienced Soviet troops would not dismount and resort to close combat. Firepower could not produce results because it was not exploited by attack at close quarters. The mujahideen, short of weapons, often defeated totally mechanized Soviet forces, unable to operate effectively in the rugged and close terrain where the guerrillas moved.\textsuperscript{46}

Concluding that proactive measures were required to combat the rebels, the Soviets developed a counterinsurgency strategy which emphasized small unit
actions and dismounted tactics. The Soviets formed counterinsurgency forces from airborne, air assault/airmobile, reconnaissance, and spetznaz (special purpose forces) units.

These newly formed counterinsurgency forces emphasized decentralized and independent operations to aggressively locate, engage, and destroy the mujahideen. As their experience developed, counterinsurgency forces conducted increasingly effective reconnaissance, sabotage, raid, and ambush missions. Feeling the increasing pressure of the Soviets' counterinsurgency forces, the mujahideen spent time moving and searching for new hiding places, which diminished their opportunities for attacks in rear areas.47

The development and employment of their counterinsurgency forces allowed the Soviets to acquire intelligence on the rebel groups and gradually gain the initiative. Correspondingly, the Soviets became somewhat more successful protecting their logistics and LOCs. The Soviets departed Afghanistan in 1979 before these anti-guerrilla forces had a reasonable opportunity to show their full impact on rear security operations.

CURRENT REAR OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

The rear security doctrine of the Germans and the Soviets developed in anticipation of their respective
potential rear area threats, and evolved to counter the threats which they actually faced. Similarly, the US Army formulated its rear operations doctrine in response to the most likely threat which, until recently, was the Soviet Union in a European scenario.

Soviet emphasis on conducting deep operations to disrupt an enemy's rear activities dated back to the 1920s. As a fundamental aspect of Soviet warfighting, deep operations sought to simultaneously strike the entire depth of an enemy's defenses to "develop tactical success into operational success."

Resulting from their vigorous post-World War II emphasis on technology and specialized forces, the Soviets fielded a wide array of military forces which were capable of operating in an enemy's rear area. Their primary specialized forces for deep operations included airborne, heliborne, amphibious, and spetznaz units. Additionally, conventional reconnaissance units, combined arms operational maneuver groups (OMGs), and MR battalions capable of conducting airmobile operations also threatened rear areas. Not only did the Soviets have the requisite doctrine and appropriate forces to disrupt rear activities, but they also had numerous helicopters and aircraft capable of inserting these forces wherever needed into the enemy's rear.
Since the Soviet Union had this multi-faceted potential to strike targets and seize objects throughout rear areas, the US Army devised a rear operations doctrine which could respond to this variety of threats. FM 100-5 provides the foundation for rear operations.\(^5\) To preclude diversion of assets needed for close and deep operations, FM 100-5 states that "units involved in rear operations must be equipped and trained to protect themselves against all but the most serious threats, using both passive and active measures."\(^5\) FM 90-14, Rear Battle, further delineates rear operations doctrine into threat levels for planning rear security responses.\(^5\)

Threat level I consists of activity by enemy controlled agents, sabotage by enemy sympathizers, or terrorist exploits. In this level, small numbers of the enemy may conduct arson, assassination of key personnel, theft of supplies, or sabotage to disrupt rear activities. Actions might be random and unpredictable, or under the explicit control of an organized movement.

Level II threat operations include diversionary and sabotage operations, raids, ambushes, and reconnaissance by either conventional or unconventional forces. Such forces can be inserted through various means by land, sea, and air into rear areas.
and control facilities and logistics activities are likely targets.

Battalion-sized or larger units conducting heliborne, airborne, amphibious, conventional ground force, and infiltration operations comprise Level III threats. Typically, Level III forces undertake large scale raids, seize key terrain for linkup with advancing forces, destroy critical logistical facilities, and interrupt transportation systems by capturing airfields or ports.

In reacting to the different threat levels, FY 90-14 provides a graduated response system which identifies three specially-designated forces to defeat tactical rear area threats with the minimum force necessary: base defense reaction forces, response forces, and tactical combat forces (TCFs). The principles of unity of effort, economy of force, and responsiveness are the basis for securing rear operations with these three forces.

Reaction forces are an essential part of the unit base defense system. The base defense system encompasses unit self-protection measures and is the cornerstone for the security of rear operations. Wherever possible, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units group together in positions with defined defensive perimeters and controlled access called bases. Bases which are geographically close
form base clusters to enhance security. Generally, the
base and base cluster commanders are the senior unit
commanders within their geographic areas. For example
within a brigade support area (BSA), the maneuver/fire
support battalion field trains and forward support
battalion's (FSB's) individual companies each form
bases. These bases join to form a base cluster under
the control of a base cluster commander, who is
normally the FSB commander. 55

Base and base clusters are responsible to defeat
Level I threats and defend against Level II/III attacks
until outside assistance arrives. To accomplish this
mission, base and base cluster commanders must
establish operations centers, train personnel in self-
defense techniques, man defensive perimeters, establish
listening posts/observation posts (LP/OPs), and
organize reaction forces. Commanders form these
reaction forces from organic personnel, weapons, and
equipment within their base defense.

Reaction forces have three primary missions.
First and most importantly, reaction forces augment
base defenses by being available to "immediately attack
any [penetrations of the defensive perimeter] that
occur." 54 Next, base reaction forces can provide
mutual support to threatened bases in the base cluster
when outside assistance is unavailable. Finally, some
manuals briefly mention patrolling as a reaction force
mission. However, this latter mission seems contradictory with the former two missions. If reaction forces are patrolling away from the base, then they may not be readily available to rapidly react to problems within their defensive perimeter or assist another base.

When enemy forces are beyond the capabilities of base defensive actions, base or base cluster commanders request assistance from response forces. Response forces are responsible to defeat Level II threats by "react[ing] swiftly to threat incursions in the rear area." Military police (MP) units usually comprise these response forces. Augmentation by fire support assets can provide additional combat power.

Although their response force role is important, the MP's area reconnaissance and surveillance mission may be even more critical. Rear area commanders primarily rely on MPs for most of the rear area's intelligence-gathering responsibilities. To obtain information and intelligence about possible threats, rear area commanders have numerous potential sources such as counterintelligence teams, ground surveillance radars, special forces detachments, inflight reports from aircraft, remotely monitored sensors, host nation units, or civilian police. However, many of these sources may not be usable or effective due to limited availability, unsuitability in difficult terrain, prior
commitment to close and deep operations, and/or local population considerations. Depending upon the circumstances, MP area patrolling might be the only available source to thoroughly cover a rear AO and locate enemy forces.

The ability of MPs to effectively perform response force and patrolling missions seems questionable given their current employment considerations and other mission requirements. MPs usually assign squads to rear AOs which include bases and base clusters. These squads originate from the one divisional MP company and the MP brigade at corps, and "are responsible for executing MP missions within their assigned areas."

In addition to the aforementioned response force and patrolling activities, MP missions also include other rear area security duties, battlefield circulation control, prisoner of war handling, and law and order responsibilities. Although higher echelons may provide MPs to lower echelons for augmentation, MPs are not resourced to perform all their "combat military police missions at the same time on a sustained basis." Chemical, engineer, reconstituting, transiting, and host nation units may provide backup or alternate response forces if MPs are committed to other missions or unavailable in sufficient numbers.

If response forces are unable to defeat an enemy force, they must delay and maintain contact with the
threat until a TCF arrives. The TCF is a combined arms organization consisting of a headquarters capable of planning and coordinating tactical operations; infantry, armor, aviation, and/or cavalry maneuver units; and fire support augmentation. TCFs are task organized to defeat Level III threats based upon METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available) considerations. As a minimum, divisional TCFs are battalion-sized and corps TCFs are brigade-sized units.6

A TCF may be a unit specially designated for rear operations, a maneuver unit transiting the area, a portion of the reserve force, or a unit received from the next higher echelon. Generally, commanders do not commit TCFs to rear operations indefinitely. A TCF "has a 'be prepared' mission to respond to threats in the rear area. A TCF, once committed to rear operations, is OPCON to the rear command until the threat is defeated, then released to parent unit control."65

**HYPOTHETICAL US ARMY INVOLVEMENT IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

With the exception of patrolling by reaction forces, US Army rear operations doctrine clearly describes the missions and responsibilities for reaction forces, response forces, and TCFs against Soviet-style threats. However, the Soviet Union is
gone and no longer constitutes a serious menace to the United States. Currently, many areas around the world are in turmoil with guerrilla groups fighting against governments and one another. Should the United States become involved in such situations, how the US Army's specially-designated rear operations forces would actually perform against a guerrilla threat remains unknown.

A hypothetical situation in which the US Army must encounter an irregular rear area threat provides a means to analyze the doctrinal employment considerations for these rear operations forces and provides the basis for recommendations to current doctrine. Bosnia-Herzegovina (herein after referred to as Bosnia) is one of several countries currently in turmoil with political, ethnic, religious, and geographical conditions conducive for guerrilla warfare and thereby serves as a useful illustrative situation.

Bosnia's mixed population consists primarily of Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats. These different groups have a long history of political, ethnic, and religious disputes which were kept under control by the strict reign of President Tito. Upon Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia began to break apart and the different groups once again began to confront each other.
Immediately after Bosnia declared its independence from Yugoslavia on 6 April 1992, nationalist militia groups formed and began fighting for control of different regions of the country. Current estimates indicate the armed presence of over 150,000 persons organized into different ethnic militias. Additionally, the Croatian Army (200,000 soldiers, 350 tanks, and 400 artillery pieces) and the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian People's Army (138,000 active soldiers, 400,000 reserve soldiers, 1850 tanks, and 2000 artillery pieces) have been openly assisting their respective ethnically-aligned militias in Bosnian territory.

To date, this war has resulted in over 50,000 dead, 25,000 wounded, 30,000 missing, 2 million homeless, over 400,000 international refugees, and 60,000 interned in Serbian and Croatian detention camps. Presently, Serbian forces dominate over two thirds of Bosnia and Croatian troops control most of the rest. The Bosnian political leadership governs only a few rural and urban enclaves.

Covering an area of approximately 20,000 square miles, Bosnia is almost entirely mountainous and half-covered by forests. The transportation network through this rugged terrain is extremely limited. Bosnia is almost completely encircled by other countries and has no sea ports of its own. The only remaining major
airport under Bosnian control is in the capital city of Sarajevo. There are few railroads and a limited major road network. The majority of roads are secondary routes between the numerous small villages. The present United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces, consisting primarily of Canadian and French troops, have recently tried to move convoys along routes and have been frequently impeded by small bands from the different nationalist groups.

Hypothetically, the US Army could deploy to Bosnia if the US government deemed its national interests at risk in the region. In such a situation, US Army forces would likely be part of a UN peacemaking force or allied with European forces under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU). Potential missions include forcing Serbian and Croatian military forces to withdraw from Bosnia, restoring the Bosnian border, and keeping the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian conventional forces separated. Given the size of the region and the scope of the mission, US Army forces would probably deploy with no less than one corps consisting of several airborne, air assault, light, and/or heavy divisions.

After deployment, US Army forces would move within their assigned sectors to cause Serbian and Croatian military units to withdraw to their respective borders. During this phase of the operation, bypassed or
isolated Serbian or Croatian units would likely comprise the most dangerous rear area threats.
Presumably, the US Army's three specially-designated rear operations forces (base defense reaction forces, MP response forces, and TCFs) would be able to perform their missions to detect, delay, and if necessary destroy these conventional threats in accordance with prescribed doctrine.

The Bosnian Serb and Croat irregular militias constitute an additional rear area threat. The militias would either fight with their ethnically-aligned conventional forces or displace into the country's rugged interior to consolidate their strength. The militia forces in the former category are an active rear area threat which US Army rear operations forces should defeat in the same manner as the conventional Serbian and Croatian military units.

However, the Bosnian ethnic militias in the latter category will not present themselves as a significant rear area threat at this time. These militia forces may be somewhat disorganized following the actions of the UN or WEU military forces. They will initially avoid contact with US forces and remain in hiding while they consolidate, train, and prepare for future operations. The militias have effectively become guerrilla groups who will use this uninterrupted time to develop into a viable rear area threat. Since the
militia groups in hiding will probably base themselves in isolated areas and not be directly threatening logistics activities, rear operations forces are not likely to concern themselves with these hiding militia forces.

Base defense reaction forces are extremely limited in their abilities to collect intelligence and exhibit initiative against the growing guerrilla threat. Reaction forces will primarily remain within their bases and be ready to respond to attacks against the defensive perimeter. Base and base cluster commanders will not likely allow reaction forces to patrol away from base defenses unless those commanders are willing to formulate other reaction forces from organic personnel and equipment, or assume the risk of having no reaction force potentially available for an indeterminate period.

As in any situation, the limited numbers of MPs will be precariously balancing their multitude of missions. As bases and base clusters need assistance defeating enemies, response force missions become their highest priority. When not performing their response force duties to react to rear area attacks, the need to control the limited road network and the expected high numbers of prisoners, stragglers, and refugees would certainly demand much of the MPs attention. Thus, MPs will probably not be able to give much...
emphasis to their area reconnaissance and surveillance mission, which is critical in locating the evolving partisan groups.

TCFs would probably provide no assistance in searching for guerrilla groups. As be prepared forces, TCF units are normally busy performing other missions until required for Level III threats. Since the growing guerrilla bands would not usually form a threat large enough to initiate the response of a TCF during this formulative period, commanders would not likely request the employment of TCFs into rear areas.

Once the combined militaries forced the Serbian and Croatian military forces out of Bosnia and restored the Bosnian border, the US Army would settle into border duty until political resolutions allow the withdrawal of all military forces. Serbian and Croatian conventional military forces should not be a significant threat during this stage of the operation because few of their isolated units would likely remain undetected and unchallenged in Bosnia. Once the combined peacemaking forces have achieved air superiority and secured the Bosnian border, Serbia and Croatia will not be able to easily insert conventional forces into rear areas unobserved.

The major concern in the rear area becomes the irregular militia forces for several reasons. First, the militias who went into hiding have had an
opportunity to reorganize and train. Next, Bosnian Serbs and Croats who were not originally part of any militia may view the peacemaking forces as invading or occupying armies who do not belong in Bosnia. These previously uncommitted people may support and/or join the militia forces. Finally, the growing partisan forces will need weapons and supplies because they are isolated from their former suppliers. Guerrilla groups will fulfill some of their needs from the peacemaking forces by stealing, ambushing, and raiding. The guerrilla militias will use hit and run tactics, and not present themselves as conventional targets for any length of time.

Doctrinal considerations will probably continue to limit the employment of US Army rear operations forces in effectively locating and defeating the militias. Reaction forces will continue to perform their base defense duties.

Rear area commanders will increasingly call upon MPs to react against guerrilla attacks by forming response forces and to protect rear activities by conducting security guard missions. Unfortunately, the increased response force and security guard missions will further preclude the MPs from patrolling rear areas to gather intelligence and seek the initiative against the guerrillas.

TCFs may try to respond to some of the more
serious guerrilla attacks, however the irregular militias would not regularly form groups large enough to necessitate permanent TCF employment. Even if large guerrilla groups did form for occasional missions, these groups would not remain together long and rapidly disperse. TCFs would routinely return to their other duties once the Level III sized threat was either defeated or dissipated into smaller size elements.

Without any effective interference in their isolated areas, the guerrilla forces would continue to grow in size, expertise, and boldness. During these latter stages, increasingly larger partisan groups would attack targets throughout the rear area and begin to seek combat with conventional units. Surpassing the abilities of the reaction and response forces, commanders would have to rely on TCFs to combat these larger partisan forces. Countering this mature guerrilla rear area threat would probably require additional front line combat units conducting large-scale sweeps through threatened areas. When committed in rear areas for such anti-partisan counteroffensives, these combat forces are no longer available for their border duties, which might allow Serbian and Croatian conventional forces to infiltrate personnel and supplies to their allied Bosnian militias.

This hypothetical situation concentrated on the abilities of reaction forces, response forces, and TCFs
to locate and pursue guerrilla rear area threats. Although this example did not address all the types of counterinsurgency operations which the US Army would likely employ in such a situation, it nevertheless demonstrates the inability of rear operations forces to gather intelligence and exhibit initiative early against guerrilla threats, while those threats are relatively weak.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The hypothetical example illustrated that much of the ability of US rear operations forces to respond to guerrilla threats is reactive in nature. Given a chance to organize, the Bosnian militias became strong and posed a serious threat to rear operations. While a reactive approach may be adequate in addressing conventional threats, this type of method is inherently inappropriate and dangerous in countering guerrilla forces because of one fundamental difference: the threat's ability to grow stronger.

Guerrilla rear area threats will grow stronger if left alone. The guerrilla groups can take whatever time they deem necessary to build up and train their forces prior to conducting attacks against rear activities. As discussed in the two historical and the hypothetical Bosnian example, guerrilla groups become more formidable and destructive when rear operations forces wait to identify and defeat guerrilla forces.
Rear operations forces must be proactive against guerrilla forces while they are relatively weak and prevent their strength from increasing. However, US rear operations doctrine is primarily reactive and treats conventional and guerrilla rear area threats in the same manner. The Bosnian example reveals that the US Army's three specially-designated rear operations forces would likely allow potential guerrilla threats a sufficient opportunity to grow and organize in US Army rear areas. Consequently, current US Army rear operations doctrine is not prepared to counter a guerrilla threat in rear areas. The doctrinal employment considerations for the base defense reaction forces, MP response forces, and TCFs are more reminiscent of the Germans' and Soviets' ineffective conventional attempts at rear protection than their more successful anti-partisan patrolling efforts. The US forces available for rear security operations simply do not possess the abilities to gather intelligence and demonstrate initiative, which are necessary to locate, attack, and pursue irregular forces.

Several changes and refinements to current rear operations doctrine would improve the US Army's abilities to counter guerrilla threats. First, doctrinal manuals must move away from the overwhelming emphasis on Soviet-style threats. Although the current and future FM 100-5 manuals mention guerrilla actions
as possible rear threats, the primary rear operations manuals (FM 71-100-1, FM 90-14, and FM 100-15-1) do not include the possibility of guerrilla groups at all. Updated manuals will initiate thinking about how to proactively deal with an irregular enemy in rear areas.

Second, rear operations doctrine must emphatically embrace the principles of effectively gathering intelligence and demonstrating initiative wherever partisan threats exist. Unity of effort, economy of force, and responsiveness are important considerations. However, the two historical examples and the hypothetical involvement in Bosnia decisively show that guerrilla forces must either be eliminated early, or at least kept on the move and not allowed to organize. The longer rear operations forces wait to detect and disrupt guerrilla operations, then the more powerful and threatening partisan forces become. Doctrine must stress the need for rear operations forces to vigorously identify and pursue guerrilla groups as early as possible. Such a proactive philosophy actually encompasses economy of force because the initial employment of a few guerrilla-hunter units will save numerous combat forces from later commitment to rear areas.

Third, the US Army should modify the roles and responsibilities of rear operations forces at all levels as follows:
1. Establish patrolling responsibilities for base defense reaction forces. When enemy conventional forces are not apt to be major rear area threats and conditions are conducive for the rise of guerrilla groups, base and base cluster commanders should give reaction forces primary patrolling responsibilities within base clusters and around isolated bases. In such situations, rear commanders can afford to accept more risk of their defensive perimeters and move the reaction forces outside the bases. By patrolling, the reaction forces can collect intelligence and take some initiative from guerrilla groups, thereby making it more difficult for guerrilla groups to operate freely in rear areas.

2. Eliminate response force duties and redefine patrolling responsibilities for MPs. If guerrilla groups are the most likely rear area threat and reaction forces are patrolling around bases and base clusters, then there is no longer a pressing need for MP response forces. The MP squads which form response forces do not provide rear area commanders with significantly more combat power than that which is available in the base defensive perimeters and reaction forces. Relieved of their response force duties, the limited numbers of MPs can better patrol in areas not covered by base or base cluster reaction forces.
3. Most importantly, use dedicated TCFs to patrol early. Wherever potential irregular threats may develop, rear commanders cannot afford to wait until guerrilla groups have evolved into Level III threats before employing TCFs. Commanders must be willing to use TCFs prior to large scale guerrilla attacks in rear areas, commit them to conduct patrolling in isolated areas not covered by reaction forces or MP patrols, and plan for TCFs to attack guerrilla groups which have begun to organize. Used as a permanent and dedicated force early, TCFs can gain the initiative against guerrilla groups by rapidly responding after reaction forces and MP patrols locate guerrilla bases, vigorously fighting to disrupt guerrilla activities, and relentlessly pursuing guerrillas away from their bases. TCFs must be capable of conducting small unit, semi-independent patrols as part of their anti-guerrilla operations.

Lastly, the US Army must provide organizational guidance, appropriate weapons and communications equipment, and tough training to all rear operations forces. Rear operations forces conducting anti-guerrilla patrolling missions cannot be adhoc elements rapidly thrown together and haphazardly trained. The historical examples have shown that anti-guerrilla forces need some sort of standardized structure, correct equipment, and intensive training.
These recommendations allow US rear operations forces greater potential to identify and eliminate guerrilla threats in rear areas. Since guerrilla groups only grow stronger with time, the US Army forces presently available for rear operations must aggressively gather intelligence and exhibit initiative to successfully counter partisan forces early in any situation. US Army rear operations forces must be proactive against guerrilla groups and should never forget that:

Security cannot be achieved if the security forces always keep to the roads and consider the protection of the [lines of] communications and installations as their only job. They must prevent the enemy from building up his forces in the rear, and he will often attempt to do this in remote parts of the country, far away from the towns, main roads and railways.\textsuperscript{17}
NOTES


4. Numerous exercises conducted at the US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, National Training Center, Tactical Commanders Development Course, and other training centers primarily use a notional "Krasnovian" opposing force, which has deep operations forces similar to those of the former Soviet Union.


6. Throughout this paper, the author uses the words guerrillas, partisans, rebels, irregulars, militias, and bands interchangeably to refer to local groups of militant people operating behind an army's front lines.


8. Ibid., 4-2.


11. Ibid., 15.

12. Ibid., 39.


16. Clausewitz, 481.

17. L.M. Sorochenko, "Incomplete Operations," Soviet Union Military History Journal (January 1989), 38-39. The Soviets conducted their first airborne drop of a small force into a simulated "enemy rear" on 2 August 1930. By May 1941, the Soviets were "organizing five airborne corps with over 8000 men in each."; US Army, DA PAM 20-240, Rear Area Security in Russia, The Soviet Second Front Behind German Lines (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 1951), 4. The OKH knew beforehand that the Soviets intended to use partisan warfare in defense of their country. Prior to Operation BARBAROSSA, German intelligence obtained information about the Russian War Academy's war games which involved the use of partisan forces.


21. US Army, DA PAM 20-244, The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August 1956), 12-14. For example, each security division consisted of one alert regiment made up of line infantry units, two reserve regiments, and artillery battalion, and a motorized police battalion. The German Army staffed large portions of the security battalions and divisions with men from older age groups, inexperienced reservists, or new new recruits who had minimal training. Many of their weapons were from captured stocks and hence nonstandard to the German Army. Additionally, much of their other equipment was either missing or nonoperable.


23. US Army, DA PAM 20-244 (1956), 50 & 54.


26. US Army, DA PAM 20-230, Russian Combat Methods in World War II (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, November 1950), 108. The German 707th Security Division serves as an extreme, although not unique, example. This one security division was responsible to guard and patrol a 40,000 square mile area near Minsk, which was larger than the size of Austria.


29. Ibid., p. 120; Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 73; US Army, DA PAM 20-244 (1956), 121-122.

30. Dixon and Heilbrunn, 126.


35. Ibid., 3-18 & 59.

36. Isby, 12.

37. Amstutz, 94.

38. McMichael, 27.

39. US Army, FM 100-2-2, The Soviet Army, Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 16 July 1984), 14-1. All levels of the Soviet Army are responsible for the security of rear areas by locating rear service units near combat units for protection; employing guards,
sentries, and patrols with organic personnel and equipment; and temporarily assigning combat troops to security missions (usually second echelon units).


41. Amstutz, 169. Approximately 40 percent of the Soviet Union's original Soviet invasion forces were comprised of Central Asian Soviet soldiers who had many ethnic and religious commonalities with the Afghan people. Many Central Asian soldiers fraternized with the mujahideen, refused to fight, dropped supplies off vehicles, and even provided information about Soviet operations to the mujahideen. Realizing their mistake in deploying Central Asian soldiers to Afghanistan, the Soviets quickly and quietly replaced them with soldiers from other areas of the Soviet Union; McMichael, 11.

The majority of the Soviet ground forces were lower readiness forces which were not fully manned, equipped, or trained.

42. McMichael, 55-61.

43. Isby, 81. Personnel problems plagued the DRA forces throughout the war. Desertions and casualties had reduced the DRA Army from approximately 80,000 in 1978 to less than 20,000 by the end of 1980. Large numbers of the conscripted replacements were unwilling to fight against the mujahideen and even cooperated with the resistance whenever possible.

44. Ibid., 91; McMichael, 49-50.

45. Turbiville, 41; McMichael, 65.

46. Isby, 28.

47. McMichael, 66-71.


49. Ibid., 1-49.


51. Ibid., 21.

52. US Army, FM 90-14, Rear Battle (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 10 June 1985), 1-3 to 1-6. Some of the terminology in FM 90-14 has become outdated since its publication, such as the phrase
"rear battle" itself for example. Although more current manuals exist to provide explanatory information for different echelons, FM 90-14 remains as the cornerstone of rear operations and its discussion of rear security measures is still applicable. Primary supplemental rear operations manuals used for this study include FM 71-100-1 and FM 100-15-1. (See bibliography for complete information.)

53. Ibid., 2-3, 3-19, & 3-20.
54. Ibid., 2-4 to 2-3.
56. FM 71-100-1, A-19.
57. Ibid., A-20; US Army, FM 100-15-1, Corps Operations, Tactics and Techniques (Unedited Coordinating Draft) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1 April 1991), A-45. Both manuals list the word "patrolling" under a "reaction forces" heading in a table detailing base defense elements without any description of how reaction forces can simultaneously perform their reaction and patrolling missions. FM 90-14 makes no mention of patrolling as a reaction force responsibility; while FM 63-20 (5-13) separates the responsibilities for bases to form reaction forces and "establish patrols when required."
58. FM 71-100-1, A-25.
59. FM 90-14, 3-24.
60. Ibid., 3-31.
64. FM 71-100-1, A-25; FM 100-15-1, A-54.
65. FM 71-100-1, A-26; FM 100-15-1, A-55.

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66. Intended solely for argumentative purposes, the use of Bosnia as a hypothetical example is strictly conjectural and does not portray any desires or plans for actual US Army involvement.


68. Ibid., 79 & 94.


70. National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, August 1991), 3-4. One national interest seemingly affected by the current turmoil in Bosnia is "A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish." The United States could become involved in this affair because our national objectives state that "we seek to: maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance; . . . promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress; [and] aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion . . . ."

71. Ramet, 97.

72. Heilbrunn, 194.
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