Changing Attitudes and Changing Latitudes: The Impact of Changes in the Strategic Environment on Tactical Doctrine

A Monograph by Major John P. Medve Armor

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Major John P. Medve

Title of Monograph: Changing Attitudes and Changing Latitudes: The Impact of Changes in the Strategic Environment on Tactical Doctrine

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ABSTRACT


This monograph examines the linkage between U.S. Army tactical doctrine and changes in the strategic environment. If change in the strategic environment as codified by policy is not understood by soldiers then there is a danger that the Army will produce a doctrine incompatible with the needs of the country. This monograph uses the rational actor model to establish the link between the two variables.

The monograph applies the model across three instances of U.S. Army tactical doctrinal change in the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Bush Administrations. The analysis reveals that the Army leadership made a conscious effort to translate the strategic policy of each Administration into a doctrine that would produce victory on the battlefield.

Finally, the study concludes by examining the future of doctrinal change in an era of strategic and operational uncertainty. It proposes that future change be guided by four criteria: relevance, achievability, acceptability, and adaptability.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Army is in the process of revising its warfighting doctrine for the seventh time since the end of World War II. FM 100-5, *Operations*, has evolved into the Army's keystone document. Doctrinal change is inevitable. It is critical for officers to understand the relationship between the variables that are the catalyst for such doctrinal change. Soldiers who understand the dynamics of change in the strategic environment and how they relate to tactical doctrine will be in a better position to assess, develop and employ doctrine. The thesis of this monograph is that there is a causal link between changes in the national security strategy and tactical doctrine. This link has not always been obvious to the observer.

The rational actor model will serve as the analytical tool to explore the relationship between change in the strategic environment and doctrine. This model analyzes the relationship between variables across three case studies: The Pentomic Era, Active-Defense, and the 1993 version of FM 100-5. The model posits that organizations are rational, unitary decisionmakers; each with specific goals and objectives. Organizations respond to changes in their environment and consider various courses of action. Enactment of each alternative course of action produces a series of consequences with respect to its goals and objectives. The organization evaluates the costs and
benefits associated with each course of action selecting the course of action that ranks highest with respect to its goals and objectives.

The rational actor model can be applied to the U.S. Army's response to changes in the strategic environment. In each case study a change in the strategic environment caused by either a new national policy or changes in the threat forced the leadership to analyze the new strategic environment and its relationship to current doctrine. The result of this analysis was a decision to change or modify the basic doctrine. The model suggests that the Army should have taken the course of action that rank highest in terms of its goals and objectives. The basic goal has been--and remains--to fight the nation's wars and win. Any adjustment in the tactical doctrine should, according to the model, maximize the Army's ability to meet this goal.

The criteria for evaluating evidence in each case study relate to the organizing concepts of the rational actor model. In each case the details of behavior, statements of Army leaders, and position papers are used to analyze if the doctrine chosen was linked to changes in the strategic environment.

The Army exists in a dynamic domestic and international environment. The leadership must assess every change in either setting with respect to the doctrine and initiate changes as required. Otherwise doctrine will
stagnate and the Army will be in danger of "getting it wrong" to paraphrase Michael Howard.

There have been many studies on the evolution of U.S. Army tactical doctrine. Most, except Sheehan 1988 and Long 1991, have been descriptive histories without a rigorous examination of causal linkages between variables that effect doctrinal change. Doughty in his 1979 Leavenworth Paper notes:

No single factor "drove" the development of Army doctrine, but changes in national security policy lay at the basis of the sweeping changes in the late 1950s, early 1960s and early 1970s. When the focus of national security policy shifted in these periods, profound changes occurred in the Army's doctrine, organization and equipment.1

Despite this statement Doughty does not offer an analysis of the relationship between changes in the geo-strategic environment, national security policy and changes in doctrine.

Sheehan explores the relationship between the functions of doctrine and changes in doctrine. A function of doctrine is a response to changes in national security strategy. Sheehan notes:

Changes in the national strategy are interpreted by the Army. Changes in operational doctrine, then, might represent nothing more than the changes in military strategy by successive administrations. This is the loyal bureaucrat view of doctrine-the domestic equivalent of the rational actor model of organizational behavior.2

Sheehan does not, however, examine the relationship between the two variables to any great extent. He does generalize that there is a positive relationship between the variables,
but notes that the relationship is not uniformly strong in the case studies he examined.

Posen specifically examines the relationship between grand strategy and military doctrine. He asserts that military doctrine must be integrated with a nation's grand strategy and uses pre-World War II France as the basis for this conclusion. Moreover, he noted that organizations, if left to themselves, would not initiate change. He concludes that changes in the strategic environment plus direct intervention by civilian leaders led to changes in military doctrine. The lessons of history are clear; the penalty for a nation not synchronizing strategic policy with tactical doctrine was defeat in war.

The thrust of this monograph is to take Posen's thesis and examine the relationship between changes in the geo-strategic environment and the resultant impact on U.S. Army tactical doctrine. FM 100-5 will serve as the dependent variable and Michael Howard's "operational requirement" will serve as the independent variable. The "operational requirement" consists of two parts: the threat and the national military strategy. These variables are examined across the case studies to establish the relationship between strategic and doctrinal change. This monograph chronicles the evolution of the processes that develop both U.S. strategic policy and Army tactical doctrine. The outcome of each of these processes has a
profound impact on the U.S. ability to achieve its national security objectives and protect its vital interests. Yet the Army did not formally link national security strategy, national military strategy, and Army doctrine until 1992.
II. THE PENTOMIC ERA

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY

On January 20, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the Presidency of the United States. He had won on a promise to end the war in Korea and revive the economy. As a hero of World War II, the President commanded respect for his strategic acumen. He adopted the basic strategic policy goals of the Truman Administration—especially the containment of communism. The new Administration believed that a strong economy was the basis for a sound national security policy. Further, economic growth was the method of immunizing Europe from the communist disease. Meanwhile the United States' nuclear umbrella was the primary deterrent for preventing the spread of communism anywhere else on the globe. From 1945 to 1949 the United States had a monopoly on atomic weapons. The Administration, however, had to contend with the Soviet Union's possession of atomic weapons. The President thought he could work for the reduction of these weapons while using them as diplomatic leverage.

Several factors propelled U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as the centerpiece of national strategy. First, the U.S. had a significant advantage over the Soviet Union in the number and capabilities of atomic weapons. Second, the political climate of the times did not allow expansion of the defense budget. As the U.S. was increasing its international involvement to contain communism through
alliances the pressures on the political and economic front did not allow for an increase in the number of troops the Army felt it needed to meet the new agreement obligations.  

Eisenhower felt that a strong economy was the best security for the country. Therefore, "the combination of nuclear supremacy, overseas alliance systems, and covert action could in large measure offset the need for massive U.S. conventional forces." The use of nuclear forces played against Soviet weakness. These basic policy initiatives formed the "New Look." Eisenhower defended his policy:

When Ed Folliard of the *Washington Post* asked him about the subject, he replied, "'Now Look.' What do we mean? We mean this: We are not fighting with muzzle-loaders in any of the services." The kind of force he took across the Channel in 1944, Eisenhower said, "cannot possibly have any usefulness today whatsoever," because two small atomic bombs would have been enough to wipe out the beachhead. He said he had heard people calling for a bigger Army. "Now our most valued, our most costly asset is our young men," he asserted. "Let's don't use them anymore than we have to." He was maintaining a one million man Army, the largest peacetime Army in American history, and regarded calls for an even larger force as irresponsible.

In October 1953, the Eisenhower Administration formalized its proposals into policy. NSC-161/2 was the product of intense debate within the Administration. This document, approved by the President, outlined the policy of reconciling the nation's economic and military goals. Limited wars like Korea were no longer to be fought without the possible use of nuclear weapons. The services could
plan for both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, the increase in nuclear firepower would negate the need to increase military expenditures on large standing forces or new conventional weapons.\textsuperscript{10}

The policy outlined in NSC-162/2 was explained by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 25, 1954. Dulles stated:

So long as our basic policy concepts were unclear, our military leaders could not be selective in building our military power . . . But before military planning could be changed, the President and his advisers, as represented by the National Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions. This has been done. The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. Now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. That permits of a selection of military means rather than a multiplication of means. As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost.\textsuperscript{11}

The process described by Dulles included the leaders of the Army who had initially resisted the Eisenhower policy. General Ridgeway, Chief of Staff of the Army, fought the reductions intended for the Army in the budget proposals. The Army leadership recognized that the debate over strategy was over and the struggle to structure the Army to fight and win on the nuclear battlefield was just beginning.
ARMY DOCTRINE IN AN ERA OF MASSIVE RETALIATION

The advent of the nuclear battlefield combined with the resolve of the Eisenhower Administration's "New Look" compelled the Army to review its structure and doctrine. The leadership of the Army was not comfortable with the implications of the "New Look." The reality was that nuclear weapons were perceived as revolutionizing the battlefield and current doctrine did not address the complexity of the new battlefield. The Army looked inward as it grappled with the problems presented by the "New Look" policy. General Ridgeway directed several studies on the doctrine and organization of the Army in the nuclear era. The Atomic Test Field Army (ATFA-1) and the Pentomic Atomic and Non-Atomic (PENTANA) studies examined the nuclear battlefield in detail, the proposed organizations and tactics that would allow the U.S. Army to fight and win the next war. The conclusions of these studies noted that the nuclear battlefield required dispersion of units, increased mobility, increased firepower, and good communications. These conclusions lead to the development of the Pentomic Division. The division was organized to fight on the nuclear and non-nuclear battlefield. It consisted of five battle groups organized as a combined arms team and capable of independent operations. The doctrine writers assumed the division would have increased firepower as a result of the tactical nuclear weapons. Most Army leaders acknowledged
the need for the Army to be prepared to fight in both a nuclear and non-nuclear environment; however, the fiscal constraints of the "New Look" forced them to focus on the nuclear environment. The result was a doctrine oriented on the least likely type of warfare.

The construct of the doctrine for the Pentomic Division was Eurocentric in nature. The Army leadership assumed that the doctrine and organization developed for success on the nuclear battlefield with the Soviet Union also would be successful in any other environment. The primary focus in the development of this concept was the force structure of the Pentomic Division. The doctrine for fighting the force structure was developed in its wake.

Maxwell Taylor, the new Army Chief of Staff, ordered the adoption of the PENTANA study conclusions after some revisions. In a 1957 speech to Army school commandants he linked his decision to the requirement by the Eisenhower Administration to cut the size of the army in light of the "New Look" policy. The Pentomic Division was smaller than the current organization would be successful on the battlefield through its mobility, dispersion, and added nuclear firepower. Taylor noted in a 1955 article that:

In the offensive, men and equipment must move from dispersed positions with great speed to the focal point of the attack . . . Attacking forces must be able to seize an objective without inviting disaster from enemy atomic attacks. Once an objective is seized, attacking forces must be capable of rapid dispersion to avoid a counter-blow.16
Thus the decision by Taylor to adopt the new doctrine and organization was directly related to the change in national military policy.

The linkage between the Eisenhower "New Look" policy and the development of the Pentomic doctrine is consistent with the rational actor model. The model predicts that the Army should find a doctrine that is consistent with respect to its goals and objectives. As noted above the primary objective of the Army is to fight and win the nation's wars. The doctrinal changes developed during the Eisenhower Administration were an effort to insure that the Army kept its ability to meet this objective within a strategic context that required the organization to reduce manpower. The leadership of the Army believed it had adopted a doctrine and organization that accomplished this end.

The options were limited by the fiscal constraints imposed by the Eisenhower Administration. The Army leadership could only work within this framework and therefore could not advocate larger forces. The result was a focus on a more robust organization through the use of nuclear firepower and a faith in the ability of commanders to command and control more units through the use of new communications technology. The adoption of the Pentomic warfighting concept was an effort to link strategy and doctrine.

The synchronization of strategy and doctrine in the Eisenhower era had profound effects on the Army. The new
doctrine provided justification for the expanding interest in nuclear technology and the use of that technology on the battlefield. Yet, the Eisenhower Administration had no plans to expand the Army's budget to take advantage of these developments. Further, the doctrine's focus on mobility and increased command and control depended on the acquisition of new systems that enhanced these capabilities. Again the strategic and fiscal constraint imposed by the Administration did not provide an ability to obtain these systems. As a result the Army adopted a doctrine and organization and applied it to the current force. Commanders in the field did not like the new organization and found that they were unable to meet its expectations. The Pentomic concept was dropped in 1962 when the Kennedy Administration adopted a flexible response strategy. Ironically, it was Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy's military advisor, who ushered out the organization and doctrine he had initiated as Chief of Staff of the Army.
III. THE ACTIVE DEFENSE

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY

The United States Army adopted the Active Defense in the wake of the war in Vietnam and a strategic reassessment on the part of the Nixon Administration. The major policy aim of the nation was reaffirmed as the containment of communism. The nation, however, needed to match ends to means. The Nixon Administration, soon after taking office, endeavored to reassess the implications of the Kennedy-Johnson strategy of "Flexible Response." "Flexible Response" required the armed services to prepare for a two and a half war scenario. Unfortunately, the services never had the conventional forces required to deal with war simultaneously with the Soviet Union, China, and a regional contingency. The Nixon Administration strove to deal with the resource imbalance. The solution was revealed in the Administration's first foreign policy report to Congress on February 18, 1970. The report outlined what came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. The major aspects of this doctrine were:

The United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.
In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when required and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower and its own defense.\textsuperscript{17}

The Nixon Doctrine attempted to reconcile ends and means. Henry Kissinger noted that:

it harmonized doctrine and capability. We had never generated the forces our two-and-one-half-war doctrine required; the gap between our declaratory and our actual policy was bound to create confusion in the minds of potential aggressors and to raise grave risks if we attempted to apply it. There was no realistic prospect that the Chinese and the Soviets would move against us at the same time. But if there were a joint assault by China and the Soviet Union, we would be faced with a threat to the global equilibrium; to pretend that in these circumstances we would contain our response to a conventional war in two widely separated areas would multiply our dangers.\textsuperscript{18}

The national strategy focused the military strategy on one and a half wars. The President outlined the rationale in his 1970 report to congress:

In an effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the "1 1/2 war" strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.\textsuperscript{19}

Thus, the Army could turn its attention from the war in Vietnam to a reassessment of doctrine. The focus of this reassessment would be on the European battlefield. The realities of the balance of NATO and Soviet forces were such that many military leaders doubted if the United States could accomplish the mission of winning one war much less an
additional regional contingency. The Army leadership needed to link doctrine to the national strategy.

THE ARMY RESPONDS TO THE NEW STRATEGY

The Vietnam War absorbed a tremendous amount of intellectual energy from the Army and "emerging from one of the most traumatic periods of its history."20 The leadership had to contend with the specter of Warsaw Pact forces that had dramatically improved while the United States fought the war in Vietnam. A Soviet attack on Western Europe was perceived as the most dangerous threat the United States could face. The Army leadership decided to focus the organization's intellectual energies on developing a doctrine that would provide success on the European battlefield.21

The driving force in the development of the Active Defense was General DePuy. He was the first commander of the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and made doctrine his first priority. The Nixon Doctrine provided the Army leadership with a clear policy signal that the defense of Europe within the NATO alliance system was the centerpiece of their national security strategy. DePuy was able to focus the energies of his doctrine writing team toward one battlefield. He was influenced in the development of the Active Defense by the Yom Kipper War, the dynamics of TRADOC's battle scenarios, and the interaction with the German Army and the U.S. Air Force.22
DePuy's efforts were seen by the Army as a shared endeavor. He insured this by encouraging participation in the doctrine writing process. Yet he was careful to provide the framework for the discussion of the new doctrine to guide the discussion. The process of writing the doctrine became almost as important as the document itself. DePuy organized a commander's conference to outline the concepts of the new manual. He encouraged his commander's to rewrite portions of the manual with which they disagreed. Further, he coordinated with the German Army and the U.S. Air Force. DePuy understood the Army needed the Air Force's support for the doctrine in Washington and on the battlefield. He also made an effort to develop a doctrine that was supported by NATO. He was dismayed later by the German rejection of Active Defense. DePuy's efforts show a leader focused on the political and warfighting realities of the time. The interaction of these players and the focus on the European battlefield provided a concrete measure for the doctrine writers. The 1976 version of FM 100-5 is a document constructed within relative strategic and operational certainty. This made it easier for the Army leadership to link strategy and doctrine.

The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was designed to orchestrate the Army's components to win the first battle of the next war. The manual stated this premise in the first chapter:
We cannot know when or where the U.S. Army will again be ordered into battle, but we must assume the enemy we face will possess weapons generally as effective as our own. And we must calculate that he will have them in greater numbers than we will be able to deploy... The United States could find itself in a short intense war—the outcome of which may be dictated by the results of initial combat. This circumstance is unprecedented: We are an Army historically unprepared for its first battle. We are accustomed to victory wrought with the weight of material and population brought to bear after the onset of hostilities. Today the U.S. Army must above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war. 26

The major portions of the manual concentrated examining defense as the stronger form of war. It was an attrition based doctrine that emphasized the importance of force ratios. The manual emphasized firepower to the detriment of maneuver. The increased lethality of weapons systems, according to the new doctrine, provided a means to overcome maneuver and was the key ingredient to combat power. The 1976 version of 100-5 was oriented primarily on the technical and tactical level of war. It was a how-to-fight manual of tactics, techniques, and procedures based on the European theater of war. 25

The Active Defense was revolutionary in that no other manual published by the U.S. Army had favored the defense over the use of the offense as a key to victory. The defensive battle envisioned by Depuy and his doctrine writers outlined a battlefield with a covering force, main battle area, and rear area. The mission of the covering force was to trade space for time. The main battle area would use the time to concentrate combat power at the
decisive point of the enemy's attack. The rear area was dedicated to maintaining the force to insure the commander had the necessary resources to conduct his defense. The battle that took place would be the first of the war and in the mind of the Army leadership would be the key to winning.

The focus on the first battle was a result of the realities of mobilization. The Army would not be able to count on a sufficient warning time to build up the force. The perception was that the next war would be a "come as you are" war. Second, the desire to win the first battle would hopefully influence domestic support. The leadership was still smarting over the intellectual and physical effects of Vietnam on the Army.

THE LINKAGE BETWEEN STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

The application of the rational actor model to the Active Defense case study shows that there was a linkage between the strategic policy of the Nixon Administration and the tactical doctrine developed by the Army. The one and a half war scenario sent the Army leadership a clear statement of the nation's strategic priorities. The objective of the Army was to develop a doctrine that would allow it to fight and win on the European battlefield. DePuy was confident that he understood the nature of the future battlefield. His personal direction of the doctrinal process indicated that he knew what he wanted as a product and was not above writing portions of the manual himself to get his points across. The final conference at Fort A.P. Hill consisted of
DePuy, Gorman, and Starry. They revised the final draft of the manual. Thus, it was elements of the Army leadership that limited the range of options examined in developing the new doctrine. Yet, the doctrine was developed within a framework established by the Nixon Administration. The development of the Active Defense was a departure for the Army in that the doctrinal process and final product were designed to drive future force structure and procurement decisions. This effort was aimed at tailoring means to ends. The importance of this linkage between strategy and doctrine cannot be overstated. The efforts of DePuy and his doctrine writers started a doctrinal renaissance that continues today. Similarly, the Nixon Administration began the process that formalized the development of national security strategy. This case study reveals the beginning of the formal linkage of these two processes by the Army leadership.
IV. ARMY OPERATIONS, 199327

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY

On January 20, 1989 George Bush assumed the presidency from Ronald Reagan. The Reagan years had been characterized by an increase in defense spending to offset the gains of the Soviet Union in conventional and nuclear forces. The stated objectives of the Reagan Administration centered around the containment of communism while seeking better relations with the Soviet Union. The latter part of the Reagan presidency saw a dramatic improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. Both the Reagan and Bush Administrations retained the one and a half war planning policy. The Army continued to use this as a guide in their doctrine and force planning.

The collapse of the Soviet Union mandated a reassessment of United States' strategic policy. The Bush Administration before the collapse of the Soviet Union had managed to negotiate reductions in nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe to levels not imaginable several years before. The cornerstone of strategic planning had been the containment of communism. The collapse of communism altered the dynamic of policy formulation and required a new construct for a "New World Order." The Bush Administration attempted to grapple with this new international dynamic by evolutionary rather than revolutionary means. The elements of the national strategy consisted of four priorities: deterrence, strong alliances, forward defense, and force
projection. Deterrence consisted of "persuading potential adversaries that the cost of aggression, either nuclear or conventional would exceed any possible gain." These elements formed the pillar of strategic planning in the Bush Administration.

Strong alliances allowed the United States "to combine our economic and military strength, thus lessening the burden of any one country." Forward defense provided the capability "for early, direct defense against aggression and serve as a visible reminder of our commitment to the common effort." Finally, force projection was necessary because of the global interests of the United States and the need to maintain "ready forces in the United States - d the means to move them to reinforce our forward units forward deployed or to project power into areas where we have no permanent presence." These elements formed the pillar of strategic planning in the Bush Administration.

The strategy relied on the full range of conventional military capabilities that included "properly equipped and well trained general purpose and special operations forces." The future held smaller active forces, "more global in their orientation, and having a degree of agility, readiness and sustainability appropriate to the demands of likely conflicts." The uncertainty of future threats was pushing the Administration toward a less defined strategy. The certainty of a known enemy was gone. Strategy and doctrine would have to change to meet the times.
The 1992 National Military Strategy took the National Security Strategy and provided the framework for the development of doctrine. The document recognized the profound changes in the world and sought to address them. The strategy outlined the global interests of the United States and the realities of each region. The strategy also addressed the domestic needs of the nation and its impact on military strategy:

The momentous changes in the international environment are occurring during a period of US budget and trade deficits and urgent domestic needs. This military strategy, which places a premium on efficiency without compromising effectiveness, is designed to be implemented within a significantly reduced defense budget.34

The strategy identified strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution as the foundations and principles of military strategy. Further, it outlined readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, technological superiority, and decisive force as the strategic principles that built upon the strategic principles of military strategy.35 The document also diagramed four military packages that were designed to meet the nation's global commitments. The document concluded with the observation that OPERATION DESERT STORM had validated many of the strategic assumptions outlined in the strategy. The future was full of uncertainty and therefore caution was the most prudent course in planning military strategy.36
THE ARMY FORGES A POST-COLD WAR TACTICAL DOCTRINE

The Army is still in the process of developing the tactical doctrine that responds to the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. The process of assessing and developing a new doctrine began in earnest with the publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond*. General Frederick Franks, Commanding General of TRADOC, noted that dramatic changes in strategic realities required a reassessment of doctrine. He underscored the importance of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 as "an interim framework for shaping the discussion we must now pursue." General Franks went on to outline the thrust of the doctrinal process. He emphasized that the new doctrine must balance both continuity and change. Further, he focused the debate on joint, combined, and interagency operations, expanding the operational continuum, and finding a balance in war fighting. These areas provide much of the newness to Army Operations, 1993.

General Franks assembled a team of doctrine writers at the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in 1991. These writers were charged with understanding the dynamics of the doctrinal process and addressing the major points he outlined in a precis to senior leaders. The framework these writers used centered on the senior Army leadership consensus that: the 1986 version of FM 100-5 required revision; warfighting should remain the central focus; the
1986 tactical constructs were a solid point of departure; the manual needed to expand to address mobilization and deployment, Army operations across the continuum and levels of war, conflict termination and post-conflict activities; finally the manual needed to emphasize the joint and combined nature of future operations.41

General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, in a February 1992, article in Military Review sought to build on General Franks's comments by outlining his vision of the doctrinal process. He reaffirmed the central role of doctrine as the key to maintaining a warfighting edge over potential enemies and as the engine of change for any restructuring of the Army.42 General Sullivan also stated his conviction that changes in the international system have "been fundamental and rapid" and the underlying assumptions of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 were no longer valid.43 Significantly, he linked the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and emerging joint doctrine to the development of Army tactical doctrine.44 This was the first time that a Chief of Staff of the Army had linked these documents to the process of doctrinal change. He went on to explain that the new doctrine must be balanced, adaptable, and realistic. These were characteristics that could not have been applied to the Pentomic doctrine.

The process of developing the new doctrine continued through the summer of 1992. Several conferences with senior Army leaders kept them up to date on developments. Primary
topics included the linkage of the doctrine to the National Security Strategy and the impact of technology on doctrine. These affairs were designed to insure the Army organized a consensus around the emerging doctrine. In September 1992, the doctrine writers completed and published the preliminary draft of FM 100-5, *Army Operations*.

The preliminary draft of FM 100-5 had several major changes from the 1986 version. The most significant was a statement of the Army's roles and missions and the establishment of a linkage between national strategy and doctrine. The draft also added versatility as a fifth tenet of Army Operations. Versatility was seen as an essential characteristic given the uncertainty of the strategic and operational environment in today's world. The lesson senior leaders drew from other doctrinal efforts was not to allow the doctrine to become unidimensional.

The new version of FM 100-5 developed the concept of force projection and integrated it throughout the manual. This concept addressed those requirements necessary for the Army to meet its strategic responsibilities to the nation. Additionally, the manual expanded the doctrine to deal with operations other than war. This addition showed that the Army was coming to grips with the fact that many of its future operations will be of this nature. The process of doctrinal change has not run its course for the 1993 version of FM 100-5.
The final product is scheduled for worldwide distribution in the spring of 1993. The process and product to date, however, allow for an analysis based on the rational actor model. The linkage between the 1991 National Security Strategy and 1992 National Military Strategy to the preliminary draft is consistent with the rational actor model. The Army's goal of winning the nation's wars has remained constant. The doctrine outlined in the new version of FM 100-5 attempts to develop a realistic, adaptable, and affordable method of executing Army operations. This new doctrine attempts to work within a changed strategic environment of regional threats, continental based forces, and fiscal reality. The doctrine is the Army's attempt to define itself as a strategic force capable of meeting the challenges of the National Military Strategy and delivering decisive victory on the battlefield. The preliminary draft clearly links strategy to tactical doctrine.
V. CONCLUSIONS

This monograph has examined three case studies of doctrinal change since World War II. It examined these case studies to analyze the relationship between changes in the strategic environment and the impact on U.S. Army tactical doctrine. The study applied the rational actor model to analyze the causal relationship between the strategy and the tactical doctrine. All three case studies show that changing doctrine has significant consequences for the Army. A doctrine not linked to strategy is fatally flawed.

The rational actor model provided a rigorous analytical tool with which to analyze the respective case studies. In all three cases the goals and objectives of the Army as an organization remained constant—to develop a doctrine and ultimately a force structure that can fight and win the nation's wars. All three case studies reveal that the senior leadership of the Army takes this goal seriously and endeavors to develop tactical doctrine within a changed strategic framework to meet this obligation. The model also shows the need for an explicit and understood national strategy. The Army leadership can only make the linkage between doctrine and strategy if the strategy is understood.

The conclusion one can draw from the Pentomic era is that the leadership focused on developing a force structure then a tactical doctrine for an environment the civilian leadership never envisioned. The EisenhowerAdministration never believed the threat of massive retaliation would ever
be exercised. The Army never understood the intent of the Eisenhower strategy was to use the deterrent value of nuclear weapons to offset the need for a large Army. Thus, the Army got it only partly right. The synchronization of strategy and doctrine led to the development of a force structure and doctrine unsupported by fiscal constraints. The Army developed a force structure and doctrine units in the field could not execute.

The 1976 version of FM 100-5 also focused on the goal of winning the nation’s war. In this instance the Army was provided a solid framework and focus with which to work. The Army leadership, led by General DePuy, focused on the tactical aspects of defeating the Soviet Union on the European battlefield. The problem with this version was the extreme focus on how to win in a specific theater of war not how to think about warfighting across a variety of theaters. The success of this version centers on the use of doctrine as the rationale for changes in force structure and equipment procurement. This case study reveals the beginning of the formalization of strategy and Army doctrine processes.

The current revision of FM 100-5 again focuses on the goal of developing a doctrine that will guide the Army to victory on the battlefield. The challenge for the doctrine writers was the development of doctrine in an uncertain strategic and operational environment. The benefit these doctrine writers have is that the process of articulating
national strategy and national military strategy has been formalized. This formalization of the policy process provides clearer guidance for those involved in the doctrinal process than at any time in our nation's history. The importance of this evolution is that the clear linkage between strategy and doctrine has been established as part of the doctrine writing process.

The uncertainty of the strategic and operational environment has focused the Army leadership on versatility as a key tenet for the Army. The preliminary draft defines versatility as "the ability to shift focus, to tailor forces, and to move from one mission to another rapidly and efficiently. It implies a capacity to be multifunctional, to operate across regions throughout the full range of military operations, and to perform at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels." The preliminary draft clearly synchronizes strategy and tactical doctrine.

The conclusion that is evident across all three case studies is the unmistakable linkage between the national security strategy, national military strategy, and tactical doctrine. In the earlier case studies the linkage is muted by the absence of formal documents. However, there is little doubt that the Army was influenced no less by the policy statements of Eisenhower, Dulles, and Nixon than by the National Security Strategy published by the Bush Administration. These strategic policies provided a framework for the Army as an organization to work within
while developing doctrine. Therefore, the first step toward "not getting it too wrong" is clearly taken by the nation's civilian leadership when they develop national security strategy. The strategy must provide guidance for the development of the national military strategy. The combination of these strategies are the foundations on which doctrine rests.

The Army exists in a dynamic international and domestic political system. Further, uncertainty at the strategic and operational level requires a thorough understanding of the factors driving change at any particular time. The Army must structure its doctrinal process to meet the challenges presented by this type of an environment. The process created by the TRADOC commander and the efforts by the officers working on the 1993 version of FM 100-5 are steps in the right direction.

The current revision of Army Operations is envisioned as a first iteration. The second iteration is scheduled for 1997 and could encompass greater changes, depending on the strategic environment. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the TRADOC Commander are the key players in the process. They are the ones who must ensure that alterations in the base document add value to the doctrine. Each of these senior leaders is responsible for building a consensus within the Army for the doctrine and for assembling a capable and thoughtful team of doctrine writers who can
analyze suggested changes with a sense of history and vision for the future.

The criteria for future doctrinal changes in an uncertain world should be relevance, achievability, acceptability, and adaptability. The senior leadership should constantly review the doctrine to see if it is relevant to the current threat and to national interests. Second, achievability means the doctrine should reflect an ability to match ends and means. The Pentomic doctrine clearly did not meet this test. Third, acceptability means the soldiers and citizens of the country have to see the doctrine as reflecting the values of the United States. Lastly, the doctrine must be adaptable. The constructs within the doctrine must be general enough to allow soldiers to see alternatives, but concrete enough to provide a framework on how to think about peace, crisis, or war. The key to ameliorating the effects of changes to the strategic environment on tactical doctrine is constant vigilance. Yet it remains to be seen if the Army will be able to organize itself into a versatile force capable of executing its doctrine.
ENDNOTES


7Record, 16.

8Record, 16.


11as quoted in Weigley, 404.

12Doughty, p. 16.


15Sheehan, 140.


18 Kissinger, 221.

19 Nixon, 129.


21 Herbert, 6.


23 Romjue, 5.


25 Long, 30-41.

26 Herbert, 92.

27 This manual is still under development as of this writing. The preliminary draft published in September 1992 provides enough substance for analysis and will serve as the base document for this case study.


29 Bush, 23.

30 Bush, 23.

31 Bush, 23.

32 Bush, 25.

33 Bush, 25.

35Powell, 8.
36Powell, 27.
38Frederick M. Franks, "After the OPFOR, the Medina Ain't Nothin'!" Army, Vol. 41 10(October 1991): 74.
39Franks, 75.
40Franks, 76-7.
41Briefing slide from "FM 100-5 Today's Journey" by LTC Michael R. Rampy.
43Sullivan, 6.
44Sullivan, 6.
45Author's interview with General Frederick Franks, 4 November 1992.
46Franks interview.
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