Tactical Implications
For
Peacemaking In Ethnic Conflict

A Monograph
by
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Aviation

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ABSTRACT

TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEMAKING IN ETHNIC CONFLICT
by MAJ John M. Kelley, USA, 65 pages.

Ethnic conflict is emerging as the dominant threat to world peace in the post-World War II security environment. The scope and frequency of ethnic conflict threatens world stability and could infringe on U.S. vital interests. The U.S. and the UN are involved in peace restoration operations in 13 ethnic conflicts worldwide. The U.S. Army accomplished the peacemaking mission in the past and will be challenged with peacemaking in the future.

This monograph analyzes experiences from Operation Provide Comfort for tactical findings useful for formulating U.S. ground forces' peacemaking doctrine. The study begins by establishing the relevance of Operation Provide Comfort as a tool to examine peacemaking. The analysis uses "Operations Other than War" from the emerging doctrine in Field Manual 100-5, Operations to review the Kurdish-Iraqi ethnic conflict. Three trends emerged. First, unity of command is a means to achieve unity of effort; but unity of effort is achievable without unity of command. Second, units exhibited great versatility. Third, the Army does not need dedicated forces for peacemaking in ethnic conflict.

The study focuses on the emerging doctrinal principle of unity of effort and the tenet of versatility. Unity of effort and versatility are used to analyze six functional areas from Operation Provide Comfort. The six functions analyzed were: security, air operations, fire support, engineering, intelligence, and medical operations. The study found that Army forces thrived under the Operation Provide Comfort Coalition's unity of effort. The study concludes that the Army should further conventional forces versatility by adapting and modifying collateral activities already found in Special Forces doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The world remains a dangerous place with serious threats to important U.S. interests. Outside of Europe, America must possess forces able to respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they may occur. [forces]...in existence [and] ready to act...[with] speed and agility...forces that give us global reach...[troops that are] well-trained, tried, and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them...a new emphasis on flexibility and versatility...readiness must be our highest priority.¹

President George Bush

General Frederick M. Franks, the Army's Commander of Training and Doctrine (TRADOC), sharply defined the post-Cold War Army: "We will not have room for specialists. We must develop a team that plays both ways, a team that is scrappy and willing to perform many missions. A team that is versatile and agile." [sic]²

In light of this need to 'play both ways' there is a need to determine if there are specific tactics and doctrine which enhance tactical forces' unity of effort and versatility for peacemaking in ethnic conflict. Conventional soldiers find it awkward to work outside of their familiar doctrine and to work with allies. In this evolving era of local and regional conflict, the U.S. Army cannot afford separate forces for peacemaking, peacekeeping and conventional conflict as some suggest.³

There is an acute need to investigate complementary tactics to
foster the unity of effort and versatility of Army forces that find themselves responsible for peacemaking operations. These forces are often in isolated theaters and given little or conflicting guidance.4

**Organization**

This monograph has five sections. Section One introduces the tactical challenges of peacemaking in ethnic conflict. The second section establishes the relevance of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) as a tool to examine peacemaking using the emerging doctrine. This section reviews emerging doctrine from the August 1992 preliminary draft of *Field Manual 100-5*.

**Operations.** The examination will focus on the principle of unity of effort and the tenet of versatility. Additionally, this section provides background information on the recent Kurdish-Iraqi ethnic conflict and reviews the post-Persian Gulf War operations, emphasizing OPC.

The third section analyzes some tactical lessons learned from OPC. This section uses the emerging doctrine to find differences from conventional tactics.

The fourth section identifies tactical findings useful for formulating peacemaking doctrine for U.S. ground forces. The findings represent an effort to match the lessons of OPC with the emerging doctrine's principle of unity of effort and tenet of versatility.

Finally, the fifth section discusses doctrinal implications for
U.S. ground forces. The implications are suggestions for future study and approaches to future doctrine for peacemaking in ethnic conflict.

The Challenges

Ethnic conflict is emerging as the dominant threat to world peace in the post-World War II security environment.

Out of an estimated 164 disturbances of significant violence involving states between 1958 and May 1966, a mere 15 were military conflicts involving two or more states. The most significant violence after 1945 has found its causus belli [main cause of warfare] in ethnic, tribal, and racial disputes that have often exerted a spillover effect in international politics.5

There are as many as 862 recognized ethnic groups crowded into 179 countries.6 With only 9% of states considered ethnically pure, it appears that conflict is inevitable.7

The U.S. National Security Strategy says that stabilizing the free democracies in the world advances the U.S. national interest.8 The scope and frequency of ethnic conflicts threatens world stability and could infringe on U.S. vital national interests. The world has experienced a large increase in ethnic conflict since World War II. Ethnic conflicts manifest themselves as either local or regional confrontations versus global. Nevertheless, their disruptive impact upon the vital interests of the United States can be strong. The often brutal nature of ethnic conflict can inflame our sensibilities and contradict the basic U.S. value of human rights as defined in the
National Security Strategy. Recent conflicts between Lebanon and Israel threatened the U.S. interests to guarantee Israeli security. The Cambodian and Khmer Rouge conflict impinged both upon America's sensibilities in proliferating democracy and suppressing the genocidal Khmer Rouge. Recently, the Iraqi Ba'ath suppression of the Kurds contradicted the basic U.S. human rights values and evoked a strong American response.

Currently, the United States and United Nations are involved in peacekeeping operations in 13 ethnic conflicts around the globe. The U.S. and UN are assessing the need for peacemaking in several additional ethnic conflicts. The most recent involvements the UN has debated were in response to conflicts in Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Republic of Yugoslavia. As a result of UN discussions, the U.S. may become involved in peacemaking operations in each of these.

When directed, the U.S. Army must quickly execute peacemaking operations to stop the conflict on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. The alternative, as painfully discovered by the Reagan and Mitterand administrations, was the aborted 1983 peacemaking episode in Beirut where over 250 U.S. and French peacemakers were killed by terrorists. The United States may become involved in peacemaking operations to moderate ethnic conflict across a spectrum. The spectrum ranges from peacemaking to peacekeeping to
preventive peacekeeping. All these actions may have imbedded humanitarian assistance. This monograph will focus on the peacemaking mission. We must keep in mind that peacemaking is not an end but only a means to eventual conflict resolution.

The U.S. Army has faced the peacemaking mission in the past and will face it in the future. It is critical for the U.S. Army to rapidly evaluate and act, often with incomplete intelligence and scarce guidance, in ethnic conflict situations. It is critical to understand peacemaking before having to execute it so that Army forces can resolve peacemaking operations at the lowest level and on terms favorable to the United States. As the Army learned from Beirut, on-the-job training of peacemakers may waste lives and time and may lead to failure.

II. BACKGROUND

Operation Provide Comfort represented a new operational area for military and civilian organizations alike. Civilian agencies had the expertise and know how to conduct the relief effort, yet lacked the physical assets. Military forces had the physical assets, manpower, and organizational structure, yet lacked the doctrine and expertise required to plan and conduct a relief operation on this scale.

Major General Sidney Shachnow
Commander, JFK Special Warfare Center and School

This section reviews the emerging doctrine with a
discussion of unity of effort and versatility. The section then provides background information on the Kurdish-Iraqi ethnic conflict. The section ends by reviewing the post-Persian Gulf War operations, emphasizing OPC and highlighting examples of unity of effort and versatility. This detailed background sets the stage for the tactical analysis in section three.

Review of the emerging doctrine

The 1992 preliminary draft of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, delineates six principles of war for operations other than war. The six principles are: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, patience, restraint, and security. The principle of unity of effort has received much attention by Army doctrine developers because it is a significant departure from the traditional principle of unity of command.

The preliminary draft lists five tenets for Army operations. The five tenets were: initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility. Versatility is an addition to the successful warfighting doctrine of 1986. Versatility, as a tenet, has become the source of discussion and debate within the Army leadership.

Versatility and unity of effort were demonstrated in OPC. Therefore this new principle and new tenet deserve review to discover their potential applicability to future peacemaking.

Unity of effort

The draft FM 100-5 states that Army forces should, "seek
unity of effort toward every objective." The manual acknowledges that unity of command is preferable to unity of effort but that the special circumstances of operations other than war often preclude unity of command.

Command is:

authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.

When it refers to giving orders, it implies having jurisdiction over subordinates and the exercise of absolute authority.

In contrast, unity of effort is "coordination through cooperation and common interests--[unity of effort] is an essential complement to unity of command." Unity of effort is an end state, unity of command is a method. The purpose of unity of command is to achieve unity of effort. Where unity of command is practically impossible, unity of effort is possible.

Command arrangements in operations other than war are often "loosely defined, causing commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation rather than command authority to achieve objectives by unity of effort. They must consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic, and psychological." An example of unity of effort is when civilian agencies are responsible to ambassadors while
military personnel answer to military authorities as both coordinate toward a common goal.

Unity of effort may be the predominant consideration when establishing command relationships that require the cooperation of many groups, countries, or in operations other than war. Unity of effort transcends service and national parochialism. Historically, unity of effort was essential to warfare when unity of command could not be achieved.

The first modern example of unity of effort was orchestrated by the Duke of Marlborough at the Battle of Blenheim (August 13, 1704) during the War of the Spanish Succession. The Duke marched his combined British - Dutch Army south from present-day Belgium; he planned to fight the French before they joined forces with the Bavarians. Prince Eugene of Savoy was marching parallel with the Duke’s army as the Duke moved through Habsburg territory. The Duke advised Prince Eugene of his plan to defeat the French forces. During the heat of battle, the Duke asked the Prince to quickly fill a gap in the British flank. Prince Eugene complied, at risk to his own formation, and countered the French threat. The allies won a decisive victory and demonstrated the devastating effects of unity of effort without enjoying unity of command.

Another example of unity of effort was Washington's ability to operate in conjunction with the French allies during
the Fall campaign of 1781. The decisive action occurred when French Admiral de Grasse operated the French fleet for a few days on a collateral mission and defeated British Admiral Graves in Chesapeake Bay. Graves was convinced that he could not resupply or evacuate Cornwallis from the Yorktown peninsula. This enabled the French Army under General Rochambeau and the colonial army under Washington to storm Cornwallis' isolated redoubt at Yorktown.

There are numerous modern combat examples of unity of effort succeeding when unity of command was unachievable. During Desert Storm, there was unity of effort with the predominantly NATO-based allies and the Pan-Arabic forces.

Arguably, General Schwarzkopf did not exercise direct command over the Coalition. Nations varied in submitting to command relationships. They negotiated for specific missions. Some nations would not operate in a sector with Americans while other nations switched sectors. When a nation expressed concern over a mission it received, the mission was renegotiated at the highest levels. Yet, the Pan-Arab Coalition fought with unity of effort to enforce the UN mandate to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait.

**Versatility.**

Versatility refers to units which have organizational flexibility, the breadth of training and leaders with the mental agility to accomplish missions for which they have little previous training.
Versatility for units "refers to meet[ing] the diverse challenges they may face." This is the units' charter to be multifunctional, to accomplish a wide variety of missions. Taken literally, the term means to be "competent in many things; able to turn easily from one subject or occupation to another; ability to move freely, as on an axis, or in any direction." 

Unit versatility is important for four reasons. First, in an era of shrinking defense budgets the nation needs an Army that can perform across a spectrum of conflict. Second, while the U.S. moves toward a smaller Army, the commitments have not decreased. Third, the nation and the Army cannot afford a standing force dedicated to every type of contingency. Finally, commitment of Army forces to operations other than war is going to happen whether the Army mentally prepares for these operations or not.

Unit versatility was demonstrated by an air defense artillery battalion in the Gulf War when it reconfigured and performed as a transportation battalion. This may appear as a radically new employment doctrine. In reality, the example of this battalion's versatility to perform a transportation function reflects units reconfiguration into the famous 'Red Ball Express' during World War II.

Other forces exhibit similar versatility. British forces are
manned, resourced and trained for conventional mid-to-high intensity warfare. Yet, they exhibit the versatility for the demands of their pacification mission in Croatia. Thus, by virtue of training for a combat mission, forces often have a collateral capability to perform other activities with little or no additional training.

Kurdish - Iraqi ethnic conflict

There are three scourges on the earth: the rat, the locust, and the Kurd.31 old Arab proverb

The background of the Kurdish - Iraqi ethnic conflict predates Western regional influence. Tribal animosities existed between the Kurds and the Sunni and the Shi’a Muslims for centuries.32 The modern conflict emanates from the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) which broke-up the Ottoman Empire, denied establishment of Kurdistan, and established Iraq. Great Britain administered governance for Iraq.33 The Kurdish and Iraqi conflict simmered until 1932, while Iraq was under British colonial rule. After Iraqi independence, the Kurds revolted several times until they were brutally suppressed in 1945.34 Kurd leaders then went underground until a coup d’etat in 1958 destroyed the last traces of the British legacy. As the Kurds emerged from their self-imposed exile, the Ba’ath Party and its Government of Sunni Muslims suppressed them.
The Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq revolted in March of 1991, at the end of the Persian Gulf War. They erred in believing that the Pan-Arab Coalition would help them overthrow Saddam Hussein. Hussein brutally suppressed the revolts. When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688 on April 5th, 1991, an estimated 1,000 Kurds were perishing daily in their mountain enclaves on the Iraqi - Turkish border. President Bush initiated OPC.

Review of the post-Persian Gulf War and OPC

OPC evolved into three phases. OPC I was from 5 April to 15 July, 1991. The mission for OPC I was: to provide security, assess the problem, organize and deliver humanitarian aid, and assist the resettlement of the Kurdish refugees. The major headquarters created were: the Combined Task Force (CTF) commanded by LTG John M. Shalikashvili, JTF-A (in charge of refugee resettlement) commanded by BG Richard W. Potter, JTF-B (in charge of the security zone) commanded by MG Jay M. Garner, the Joint Air Forces Component Command (JFACC) commanded by BG James L. Hobson Jr., and the Combat Support Component commanded by BG Harold E. Burch.

OPC II occurred from 15 July to September, 1991. OPC II continued to provide security, humanitarian aid, and refugee resettlement. The headquarters of 4th Brigade, 3d (US) Infantry Division was the foundation for this Combined JTF.
Meanwhile, OPC Residual is ongoing. The task force performs the security and humanitarian aid functions at a much reduced scale.\textsuperscript{38}

OPC is sometimes incorrectly categorized as a humanitarian operation and not a peacemaking operation. While it is true that OPC began as a humanitarian mission, the mission quickly changed complexion. "Confronted with a stubborn, uncooperative former enemy, coalition forces conducted combat, peacemaking, and peacekeeping operations to ensure the success of their primary humanitarian mission."\textsuperscript{39}

Iraq did not invite and did not welcome the coalition military and civilian agencies into the region. OPC became a dangerous and belligerent situation with the potential of exploding into warfare. Throughout the operation, the Coalition sustained 12 casualties from mines and received enemy fire in 16 incidents, hitting one aircraft. The Iraqis suffered several casualties during a sharp fire fight with British forces.\textsuperscript{40}

Combat incidents were few. Force projection and force demonstrations convinced the Iraqis of the sanctity of the security zone. Providing security for OPC was complex and remained important well after transferring most relief efforts to the civilian agencies. The multifacted threat came, primarily, from the Iraqi Army. Additionally, numerous guerrilla groups from both sides operated along the Iraqi-Turkish border. Their intentions were often unclear. Due to
the heavily armed conventional and guerrilla threats, the Coalition remained vigilant and rehearsed war plans daily.

The U.S. peacemaking during OPC is often cited as a model for future operations. LTC John Cavanaugh, Advanced Operational Studies Fellow in the School of Advanced Military Studies, advocated that “OPC is the model that should be used for future NATO missions, as well as, future coalition efforts in which the United States may be involved.” Cavanaugh attributed to COL K. C. Brown, Special Assistant to GEN John Galvin, then Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander USEUCOM, that the emerging missions for NATO were to conduct combat operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Cavanaugh identified the environment in northern Iraq as very complex both politically and militarily. The military environment included multinational operations at the tactical level.

Strategic and operational modeling can use OPC for a future peacemaking paradigm. Cavanaugh found that “NATO was the unifier” for OPC. Most of the significant forces involved had a common NATO background. From this common point of departure, leaders could spend more energy adapting to the mission and less adapting to each other. The breadth of this common understanding allowed the CTF Commander to dispense with Memoranda of Understanding (MOU).
LTG Shalikashvili considered the MOUs limiting the initiative and motivation of other forces. He wanted to advance their contributions—not limit their roles.\textsuperscript{48}

Cavanaugh concluded that NATO forces have proven that they can come together in a new theater and meld from the strategic to the tactical level. "Provide Comfort proved that in addition to conducting combat operations military forces can also be peacemakers, peacekeepers, and simultaneously provide assistance to those in desperate need."\textsuperscript{49} Mission accomplishment and teamwork were the overriding concerns.\textsuperscript{50}

This section reviews how unity of effort and versatility contributed to the success achieved by the diverse forces supporting OPC. The section then reviews why this was, and is, the correct tactical doctrine for peacemaking.

An examination of OPC's tremendous accomplishments reveals that there was not unity of command among the 13 national militaries nor among the over 50 civilian volunteer agencies from more than 30 nations.\textsuperscript{51} Two reasons for the lack of unity of command were issues of national sovereignty that command relationships reflect and the need to act within national constitutional provisions regulating the use of force. This lack of unity of command was reflected in the different rules of engagement (ROE) and the military orders process employed by Coalition forces.

Initially, the ROE approved by JCS were classified secret,
which inhibited dissemination through the Coalition. As an example of the sovereignty that countries exercised over their militaries throughout OPC, all allies “operated under their own rules of engagement.” This complicated task organization, as an example, a Dutch “commander had to work first through his government and then through the British military to adopt the U.S. [ROE].”

Additionally, “coalition governments had the option to review all operation orders for their units before complying with the order.” Therefore, the supervisory structure for OPC was evolutionary. Each Coalition nation located a national headquarters in the CTF headquarters and “retained command and operational control of its forces.” The national headquarters reported all policy issues and execution to their governments. The decision on whether to put their forces under tactical control (TACON) of the CTF and the CTF’s subordinate functional organizations was a national decision.

Yet, through meticulous coordination and coalition building the U.S. OPC Commander, LTG John M. Shalikashvili, built unity of effort.

The civilian agencies had more disaster relief knowledge and experience than the military. The military forces had the physical assets and the command structure to efficiently accomplish the peacemaking and humanitarian relief mission.
“Officers unaccustomed to consensus arrangements between different organizations did not always perceive the eventual relationship [that] would evolve between the UN and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).” Slowly, military forces and the NGOs worked things out.\(^\text{58}\)

“Forces were thrown together. Coalition forces, NGOs and private and volunteer organizations (PVOs) arrived without notice.”\(^\text{59}\) The civilian groups each had a unique command structure and plans, which precluded a unified effort. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) formed committees to study problems during OPC. The UNHCR’s technique was unresponsive. On the other hand, the NGOs were amazed at the large airlift and communications capabilities that the military afforded. The civilians were invited and attended the OPC staff meetings and were amazed to discover that the military command and control fostered a visibly faster pace than the NGOs consensus model.\(^\text{60}\) Military commanders quickly gravitated to roles as coordinators between the military and the critical civilian relief efforts.\(^\text{61}\) When lives were on the line and decisions had to be made, “unity of command and effort [was] paramount.”\(^\text{62}\)

Organization of the theater took time due to the large number of diverse organizations involved, such as United Nations organizations, NGOs, PVOs, and Disaster Assistance.
Relief Teams (DART). Simply listing and categorizing contributors and understanding their capabilities took three weeks. Joint military-civilian efforts entail many problems, particularly at the tactical level. Thus, unity of effort was essential to get the most from scarce resources during OPC. The OPC senior leadership and the special qualities of the Special Forces (SF) and Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers were a major factor in conquering suspicion, establishing trust, and convincing the NGOs and PVOs to channel their efforts. An example of a solution maximizing unity of effort was to treat refugees, NGOs and PVOs diplomatically. Insisting that 'we are here to help and not to be in charge' fostered refugees' self-help and drew the most from the PVOs.

According to Army doctrine, the conventional combat goal of unity of command may be politically unacceptable. Army forces must adapt when necessary "to achieve unity of effort." This compels commanders to synchronize their efforts with coalition partners, alliance members, and civilian agencies to attain the desired end state. The Special Forces found that the quickest way to organize the refugees was to find and use the refugee's tribal organization. Using indigenous people also created the conditions that eased the militaries' transition out of Iraq.

Likewise, the commercial truck system established to support OPC facilitated handing over the relief mission to the
UNHCR and NGOs, which avoided transferring military trucks. This exhibited versatility by using the civilian trucks rather than by deploying additional Coalition transportation units. But more than that, using the civilian trucks and the available transportation infrastructure exemplified the Coalition's commitment to unity of effort. The Coalition ensured interruption in the transportation network would not occur when the militaries turned the entire relief effort over to the UNHCR.

Providing security for and coordinating actions amongst the UN organizations, NVOs, and PVOs was a huge task. Coordinating actions is not a euphemism for command. Coordination is a legitimate concern which ensures visibility over the entire theater with the scarce resources that governments provided and private organizations donated. Meticulous coordination also fostered military forces' versatility both in northern and southern Iraq.

The First Brigade of the Third (US) Armored Division showed its versatility immediately after it finished fighting in the Persian Gulf War near Sawfan, in southern Iraq. The brigade provided security, selected a refugee site, supervised and built the camp, provided refugees sustenance and medical aid, evacuated the refugees, and, closed the camp - all within 45 days. Within this effort, an armor battalion selected the
site and guarded the refugee camp. Military police representing several different headquarters augmented camp security and patrolled without an established ROE. A main support battalion and the surgeon's office reestablished an Iraqi medical clinic. A chemical company showed versatility in setting up a supply point for the refugees.

Additionally, the chemical unit, an engineer company, and a mortar platoon repaired a water pump which provided 110,000 gallons of water to the Iraqi city of Sawfan. The brigade also began coordination with the UN to turn over the camp, but this proved unnecessary. Commanders decided to allow those refugees who wanted to return to Iraq to do so and the remaining 8,375 were flown to a UN camp in Rahfa, Saudi Arabia. The versatile achievement of running the camp, registering the refugees, and operating a departure airlift control group (DACG) less than 24 days after combat was outstanding.

In both northern and southern Iraq, "the civilian agencies that were part of the Coalition had far better understanding of humanitarian assistance operations than did the military forces." The military officers showed remarkable tactical versatility using this technical advice to further the disaster relief. Units showed versatility by using the press to portray the Kurd's story. In the past, the media was often the only weapon
peacemakers had. The unrestrained press had complete access to the OPC forward areas. This access was fully supported by the OPC commander. The press and their reports increased security and were a potential weapon. "The presence of the press enhanced the security of the forward areas and put pressure on the Iraqis as the plight and tragedy of the refugees became evident to the world." The weapon of world opinion set OPC into motion and had the potential of opening another war front, if the Iraqi Army provoked the Coalition. The unrestricted and widespread assistance provided to the press created a powerful ally that would only have grown in strength had the Iraqis attacked the Coalition.

The security threat to the Coalition and NGOs was multifaceted during OPC. Some threats were hostile to some Coalition nations and benign to other member nations. Some threats alternated from active to passive. The Iraqi forces' mission was to deny the Kurd's control of the region. The Coalition's mission was to save the Kurds. These missions were diametrically opposed. The Coalition's soldiers provided security while accomplishing their mission. The soldier's discipline, training, and versatility overcame the security threats and were responsible for OPC's success.

The tactical applicability of military forces' versatility in future ethnic conflict peacemaking is clear. OPC should,
perhaps once and for all, demonstrate that well trained combat soldiers can rise to virtually any task. Contrary to the views of detractors81, the professional, disciplined soldiers at OPC proved that nations or the UN, do not need specifically trained forces for peacemaking. Such division of labor is not desirable, as noted by General Franks’ opening comment in this monograph.82

MAJ Chris Baggott, in his monograph, said that professional, disciplined, and versatile soldiers are crucial to the linkage between operational end state and regional stability. Baggot found ambiguity in the melding of military operations and political events. Therefore, Baggott concluded:

The military purist will challenge that there is neither a requirement nor a need for the military practitioner to concern himself with anything other than combat. Unfortunately, this perspective is ill-advised in view of the contemporary role of U.S. military forces. More often than not, military rules of engagement will require soldiers to carry out these two ostensible paradoxical missions. One mission executed as combatant, the other as peacemaker. ...civil-military and combat operations [are] occurring concurrently rather than in sequence indicates that the individual soldier can often become both warrior and statesman.83

Experiences in the Dominican Republic (1965)84, Grenada (1982) and Panama (1989) demonstrate that combat forces can rapidly change to peacemakers. “The significance of this is really enormous.”85 U.S. planners historically sequentially phase an operation into components: for example, alert, deploy,
combat, peacemaking, nation building and redeployment. All three experiences revealed, these components are accomplished simultaneously and not in succession.86

The argument that we must not have dedicated forces for peacemaking is the central argument of this paper. The Army cannot afford to exclude a division or corps from its conventional force structure by dedicating it to a particular spectrum of conflict. Figures from OPC show that the U.S. would have had to dedicate a division and its associated support structure to the OPC mission. The maximum personnel strength during OPC was 20,000 uniformed military (of which 11,000 were U.S. forces). This does not account for the vast range of capabilities that the Coalition forces contributed.

OPC is just one peacemaking case. Consider MG Lewis MacKenzie's, former UN commander in Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina, estimate that pacification of the Balkans might require one million men.87 In this situation, the U.S. would muster the reserves and train the total Army for peacemaking.

Not all peacemaking, especially in ethnic conflict, is as relatively short duration as OPC. For twenty-two years the British have committed a third of their direct combat forces to peacemaking or training for peacemaking in Northern Ireland.88 If the U.S. were to do the same, it would have to dedicate one Army corps and one Marine division just to
peacemaking. This inquiry into separate forces for peacemaking should dispel any serious thoughts about establishing specialist peacemaking forces. U.S. forces cannot become specialists but must become versatile in the post-Cold War world.

This brief review discussed the U.S. Army’s emerging doctrinal principle of unity of effort and the tenet of versatility. Looking back over the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict led us to examine the Persian Gulf War’s aftermath, OPC. The review of OPC focused on tactical forces’ use of unity of effort and versatility. The review revealed that specialist peacemaking forces were unwarranted. Now the analysis examines if and how military forces apply unity of effort and versatility to solve tactical problems.

III. Analysis

Little, if any, doctrine exists for this type of operation. Since this will most likely not be an aberration, but may become the kind of operation military forces will find themselves involved in more frequently in the future, the lessons learned and the tested ideas that were successful and unsuccessful are worth recounting and analyzing. These lessons touch every level...

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An analysis of peacemaking’s tactical aspects of security, air operations, fire support, engineering, intelligence, and
medical operations follow. These areas are important components of peacemaking in general, and OPC, specifically. OPC tactics are analyzed using the principle of unity of effort and the tenet of versatility. The procedures used in each of the tactical areas are outlined below.

**Security**

OPC security tactics emphasized using 'just enough' force versus using overwhelming force. Four force options were available. They ranged from decisive to proportionate. In choosing proportionate force, OPC commanders chose not to create the perception of heavy handedness. OPC leaders had to find and maintain a minimum acceptable risk level. Bringing in overwhelming force and equipment would have degraded the relief effort. It was a zero sum game.

The Coalition’s security tactics are analyzed for unity of effort. JTF-B had the mission of establishing and protecting a security zone for the Kurds in northern Iraq. General Garner initially borrowed the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s staff and quickly amassed a division’s worth of combat power comprised of militaries from eight countries. Combined force structure pervaded at all military echelons from the CTF, to the Marine Expeditionary Unit (which unified the efforts of marines from three nations), joint and combined aviation and engineer brigades, and even included an American anti-tank platoon assigned to the French infantry battalion. Despite
this loose structure, the coalition maintained remarkable unity of effort. In this task organization, security “was a complex task and continued well after the humanitarian tasks were passed to civilian relief agencies.” The only notable room for improvement was to tighten the joint and combined forces temporary site security. The combined support bases in Turkey were not immune from security threats such as the Dev Sol terrorist group. Dev Sol, a leftist Turkish group, killed one American and inflicted other casualties during the Gulf War.

OPC security managers exhibited versatility by using the local Kurds and by realigning defensive sectors. The Special Forces soldiers saw and used the displaced civilians as an asset while the conventional soldier’s thought of them initially as a threat. Some conventional units eventually used the Kurds to assist with providing security. Versatility in security operations initially was slow but eventually extended to include paying the Kurds for assisting with the security system. The Kurds welcomed security procedures during OPC, but in other situations, the opposite may be true. Each situation must be handled on its own merits with mission success as the overriding concern.

The defensive sectors were established with multinational headquarters. This versatility allowed the “JTF-B commander to integrate the coalition forces and take advantage of the
Another security tactic with versatility for peacemaking was realigning the security force sectors. Tactical and security concerns initially drove sector alignment. But after humanitarian relief issues became dominant, the sectors were realigned to facilitate that mission. The realignment assisted the UNHCR's coordination with relief agencies.

**Air operations**

OPC air operations tactics had varied success in unifying the air support effort. Yet, teamwork came first and service identity was second throughout OPC. This teamwork was especially evident in air operations.

OPC air operations tactics immediately emphasized massive airdrop of supplies verses the habitual transition from air superiority to close air support. The transition was unnecessary due to the ongoing enforcement of the air exclusion zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq. Initially, air operations were very decentralized. Later, air operations were much more centralized. Many cargo helicopter missions, however, reverted to a more responsive decentralized mode.

The JFACC, BG Hobson, rapidly reimplemented the Air Tasking Order (ATO) from Incirlik, Turkey by building on the precedent established during PROVEN FORCE, the northern air operation of the Gulf War. During PROVEN FORCE and DESERT
STORM, the ATO was very successful at prioritizing missions, coordinating airspace, assisting in fratricide prevention, and coordinating combat search and rescue. Yet, the ATO system was not without flaws.

The OPC ATO managed the airflow of four U.S. services and nine allies. The JFACC ‘was responsible for planning, coordinating, allocating and tasking all tactical air in the force.’ The JFACC was also responsible for air delivery of supplies, had ‘jurisdiction over Army cargo helicopters’ and cargo helicopters of other nations. The OPC ATO called for requests 48 hours in advance. This was a departure from the usual combat practice of 24 hour requests.

U.S. Army aviation complied with the order, but because of their [aviation users] inability to forecast two days ahead (and because higher-ups were allocating shortages), the troops did not always get what they felt they needed, when they needed it.

The 48-hour planning cycle ATO proved inflexible for some missions as Incirlik was too far removed from the supported units to field changes. Centralized management of the cargo helicopters in theater, while good in concept, was difficult to execute. Decentralization was eventually used for the cargo helicopters by assigning them support by block times or general missions. The Marine Helicopter Squadron most often worked for JTF-B and thus was exempt from the ATO’s taskings. As more helicopters arrived in theater, the JTFs had
plenty of support.\textsuperscript{110}

OPC air supporters also had varied success with versatility executing missions. Ground forces met challenges to their versatility through airdrop responsiveness (or lack of it) and by modifying conventional doctrinal employment techniques.

Flexible response and versatility began with the first 27 tons airdropped for refugees 36 hours after the issuance of UN Resolution 688.\textsuperscript{111} The huge airdrop system was effective at helping to save lives. Yet, there was room for improving the airdrop responsiveness. In one instance, it took the 10th Special Forces Group Commander four days to stop the airdrops in favor of a more efficient helicopter delivery system.\textsuperscript{112}

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) prevailed in the development of joint doctrine by maintaining operational control of their unique air-ground team, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). COL Jones, Commander of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, was told to break up the MAGTF and have helicopter squadron HMM-264 support JTF-A. He quickly dispatched the helicopter squadron on the extended mission. In addition to breaking up the MAGTF, the USMC's 24th MEU greatly extended its conventional 50 to 100 mile inland tether from the fleet. The USMC helicopter squadron: "displaced itself 450 miles inland, set up its base, and [began] its humanitarian mission with 23 helicopters in support of
The teamwork and versatility exhibited by the Marines and the support that soon followed when the squadron was subsequently assigned to JTF-B and then back to the 24th MEU, was unparalleled. Service loyalties and, in some cases, current doctrine were subordinated to ensure mission accomplishment.

Marine, Army, and Air Force units from three different joint headquarters worked well together setting up, running, and maintaining two airfields in Iraq. A common aviation language and international flight procedures enhanced working together even when the services procedurally use different methods to accomplish similar tasks.

**Fire support**

OPC fire support tactics emphasized using 'just enough' firepower to accomplish the mission verses overwhelming firepower. An example of this difference was highlighted by the United Kingdom tentatively banning her artillerymen from entering Iraq. This created potential firepower gaps that LTG Shalikashvili planned to fill with air power until he and Major General Robin Ross, Commander of United Kingdom Forces, were able to convince the British government that their artillery had a role in OPC. The overriding concern in this environment was that it is better to “have and not need than to need and not have.”

OPC fire support tactics demonstrated the principle of
unity of effort through fire support coordinators. U.S. Navy Air Ground Liaison Companies (ANGLICO) performed multifaceted roles enhancing the Coalition's unity of effort. The ANGLICOs were vital in performing the indirect fire coordination since each country had differing methods for directing fire support. In addition to their traditional role of controlling air and fire support, they provided the CTF and JTFs with vital liaison teams. This unique use of the ANGLICOs, and their extensive communications capabilities greatly facilitated OPC operations far beyond the fire support function.\textsuperscript{118}

The versatility of OPC fire support units determined whether the Coalition would have adequate support in the event of combat. The Coalition's artillery organization was half that which normally supports an infantry division. It consisted primarily of light artillery. The artillery and armor deficient Coalition exhibited versatility by depending on air power as its major source of indirect fire. While this is institutionalized in the USMC, it was a unique experience for the U.S. Army and the eight Coalition Armies.\textsuperscript{119}

**Engineering**

OPC engineer tactics emphasized sustainment engineering, culturally sensitive construction engineering, unexploded munition avoidance, and combat engineering.\textsuperscript{120} This was a daunting mission in the 250 x 80 kilometer sector. Scarce
engineers stretched their capability to the limit.

Engineer tactics used during OPC enhanced unity of effort. The 18th Engineer Brigade deployed to OPC with only one of its habitually associated battalions. In theater, the 18th Brigade reorganized with battalions, companies and detachments from three services and three allied countries. The 18th also coordinated the actions of a Dutch medical company. Additionally, this joint and combined brigade unified the theater engineering effort for troop engineer units from six nation's armies, JTF-A, JTF-E, and the JFACC.

Joint sustainment engineering created a C-130 capable airstrip from the remnants of the Sirsenk Airfield. The U.S. cratered the airfield during the Gulf War. A Navy Seabee detachment and an Army heavy earth moving platoon used organic and captured Iraqi equipment to repair the landing strip in six days.

Culturally sensitive construction engineering unified the effort to return the Kurds from the mountains to their homes. The brigade worked with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and civil affairs to design culturally acceptable refugee camps. Coordination with the UNHCR and the tribal leaders ensured that the Kurds would accept and use the camps after completion of the projects. Engineers used the UN's published camp construction guidance. The engineers facilitated the eventual camp turn-over to the UN by using the
UN's guidance. Five construction guidelines said that the camps needed to be: "adaptable to Kurdish lifestyle, easily taken over by civilian relief agencies, temporary in nature, economical and easily constructed." While on the surface this may appear simple -- it is not. Using the Kurd's family and tribal organization as a basis for camp construction sped the resettlement of the Kurds and, ultimately, sped the turnover of the camps to civilian agencies.

The unity of effort required to protect all personnel from over 3 million pounds of unexploded ordnance was huge. EOD soldiers from the UK, Netherlands, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Army, combined with civil affairs soldiers, to perform the mission. This successful mission exhibited tremendous unity in protecting human lives.

The engineers were a unifying force in the preparation for combat operations. The brigade created a task force from units from three nations under TACON of the brigade operations officer. This task force was in support of the 24th MEU and the 3d Battalion, 325th (US) Infantry in event of an Iraqi Army attack. This task organization supported the maneuver forces of several nations subordinate to the MEU. The engineer task force worked with the organic engineers of the MEU and the 3d Battalion, 325th (US) Infantry. These nondoctrinal support relationships bonded the security zone defense.
Versatility in sustainment engineering occurred at the Sirsenk Airfield. The Seabee’s and Army engineers who repaired the airfield used captured Iraqi equipment to augment their construction mission. The engineers demonstrated their versatility by adapting several different pieces of seemingly unrelated construction equipment for engineering projects.

The engineers exhibited great versatility in culturally sensitive construction engineering by extending the engineer effort to civil assistance projects. The engineers opted for effectiveness over efficiency when dealing with the Kurds. The construction of latrines and camps initially encountered severe opposition from the Kurds due to cultural considerations. Well intentioned staff engineers in displaced headquarters at Incirlik, Turkey and EUCOM, Germany did not know that the Kurds would use the facilities only if they were in family and tribal configurations. For example, the Kurds would only use private latrines and they had to be positioned so the user’s back would not be to the east. Otherwise, the Kurds caused themselves sanitation problems by defecating on the ground. This departure from engineering efficiency was key to the Kurds acceptance of the camps.

Life support infrastructure needed repair in order for the Kurds to reinhabit in their communities. Major electrical
projects restored power to a city of 250,00, restored power to the hospital in Zahok, and provided power to run water wells for seven cities. Additionally, engineers sunk the first 250 foot water well in northern Iraq. It provided clean water to Deralok. The engineer's versatility was evident as they adapted from military works to public works in this critical peacemaking mission. All evidence verifies that the engineering works were technologically simple so that the Kurds could sustain them after the military engineers departed.

OPC combat engineering plans and operations used captured Iraqi mines in defense of the Coalition's forces. The engineers showed versatility by using numerous techniques of field expedient combat engineering. These adaptations were necessary as there were no U.S. or Coalition mines in theater.

Engineers demonstrated that they can quickly task organize and tailor for four diverse missions. The engineers were multifunctional and quickly moved from one mission to another. They stretched across a huge theater, supported a multinational Coalition and still maintained their focus on mission accomplishment.

**Intelligence**

OPC intelligence tactics strongly emphasized political, cultural and social intelligence versus conventional tactical intelligence. Major emphasis was placed on HUMINT collection. Peacemaking and the resultant humanitarian
assistance required an immediate provision for cultural intelligence. The essential elements of information (EEI) became: leaders and military organizations of the Kurds and the northern Iraqi Army, history of the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict, Kurdish political and tribal structure, and Kurdish lifestyle habits. This EEI was critical for CTF decision making.\textsuperscript{132}

Initially, there was little unity of effort in intelligence collection and dissemination. One of the keys to dealing with the refugees was to assess their situation. This could only be done on site with the Kurdish leaders.\textsuperscript{133} This HUMINT allowed the CTF to formulate plans and actions to ease the Kurds suffering and to eventually relocate them to refugee camps, and ultimately, back to their homes.

Earlier and more accurate intelligence assessments ranging from weather, security, medical, to logistics would have gone even further to unify the peacemaking and humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{134} As an example, some units deployed with winter clothing and equipment when temperatures reached 106 degrees Fahrenheit in June. Since the initial assessments were disjointed, the initial reactions were also uncoordinated. In some places there were excess supplies while other areas were wanting. Assessment efforts needed representation from many functional areas such as security, medical and logistics.

HUMINT was critical to the security and to the relief effort
in both southern and northern Iraq. During the refugee stabilization around Safwan, the 1st Brigade, 3d (US) Armored Division counterintelligence teams worked with Anti-Saddam groups to identify Pro-Saddam groups and Iraqi security agents. This information prevented infiltration into the refugee camp. During OPC, Kurdish HUMINT sources were very informative. The sources furthered camp and town security. Natives assisted on guard posts, identified personnel coming into the camps, and unified the security and relief efforts.

OPC tactical intelligence versatility answered the commanders EEI from a wider variety of sources than normally used. The major intelligence need early in OPC was determining the size, location and status of the refugees. HUMINT was critical to understanding the situation. It was no surprise that Navy SEALs were the best intelligence source for JFT-B. The CTF and JTFs needed to get collectors on the ground earlier for assessments to increase humanitarian relief response. “National intelligence collection systems were invaluable in providing...intelligence against Iraqi military targets but were less effective in providing information on refugees or small Iraqi ground units. HUMINT, news video, and tactical reporting by air and ground units”...provided most of the EEI for the commander.

Language capability is a critical HUMINT tool. The language capability of U.S. forces will probably never be as
great as commanders would like. Anticipating this prior to deployment, a civil affairs officer asked an American university professor to develop a language test that would identify Kurdish interpreters.\textsuperscript{139} Identifying and using these interpreters was critical to the HUMINT intelligence gathering. The Kurdish interpreters significantly contributed to security and several other functions. This versatile tool assisted commanders in broadening their intelligence collection and in their liaison with the Kurdish leaders.

Eventually, the Coalition forces exhibited the skills necessary to identify and track numerous different threats. The threats ranged from several terrorists groups to the Iraqi Army. The threats operated 360 degrees around the Coalition and throughout the theater in both Turkey and Iraq.

Medical

OPC medical tactics incorporated numerous private relief organizations. This situation created highly centralized medical planning and execution. Conventional medical units have little or no interface with relief organizations. They both routinely operate as decentralized organizations.\textsuperscript{140}

Coordination of many diverse units and agencies initially slowed the medical unity of effort. Italian, French, and British, noted for operating excellent medical facilities, contributed to OPC. But even with these excellent facilities, coordination of
the numerous civilian volunteer groups was troublesome. The NGOs and PVOs arrived and set up without coordinating with UNHCR, or any OPC task force or any other medical agency. For example, a central coordinator was needed to recommend and convince individual agencies that all the medical facilities in the theater should set out in proportion to the suffering Kurds. The medical volunteers should not concentrate in one location. By offering the medical volunteers transportation only to where they could maximize the relief effort, the JTFs contributed to unifying the medical effort.

Often up to four sources were simultaneously directing or demanding resources from a medical unit. When medical units command and control was unable to keep up with competing demands on their services, their command and control was integrated with a civil affairs or task force headquarters. This unifying effort demonstrated versatility for civil affairs and task forces to exercise supervision over medical units to help establish priorities.

Initially the medical units were decentralized to support units. However, it became necessary to “centralize the effort under an overall medical plan.” Many problems developed due to the diverse medical organizations, their capabilities, and nationalities. Likewise, implementing a theater medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) system proved difficult. The medical units improved their coordination and unified their efforts.
Tactical medical units demonstrated versatility by providing preventive medicine before therapeutic medicine. Also, medical units and relief workers focused on sanitation and not vaccination and treatment. Learning to work through and enhance the local medical system, regardless of how primitive, assisted the Kurds far more in the long term than if medical practitioners imported a U.S. system. The Kurds must care for themselves after the Coalition departed.

Medical units responded to disaster relief medicine by learning from UN, civilian, and CA professionals who were attached to the conventional medical unit. Reestablishing the Kurdish medical infrastructure was critical for the Kurds survival.

The analysis reveals that unity of effort is strongest when there is greater lead time to anticipate requirements and capabilities. This especially applies when the capabilities of different military forces and the diverse capabilities and knowledge of the civilian agencies. The tenet of versatility applied to the countless challenges faced by military forces during OPC. Institutionalizing versatility as a tenet will make Army forces think in broader terms when they assess their capability for collateral activities in operations other than war.

IV. Conclusions
Operation Provide Comfort was conducted using current doctrine, adjusted to meet the requirements on the ground. The success of the operation can be directly attributed to the flexibility of the commanders and individual soldiers who found solutions to problems with or without guidance. Doctrine, or at a minimum, published guidance must be formulated to support future operations.148

JFK Special Warfare Center Lessons Learned

The evidence indicates that the emerging doctrine in FM 100-5 (Draft) is adequate for the U.S. Army's unity of effort and versatility for peacemaking in ethnic conflict. The evidence shows that conventional forces were slow to apply the principle of unity of effort, especially when confronted with NVOs and PVOs. Conversely, ground forces exhibited a healthy versatility. The research showed that different forces demonstrated markedly different levels of versatility. The codification of the principle of unity of effort and the tenet of versatility in the new FM 100-5 should improve ground forces contributions to future peacemaking in ethnic conflict.

The evidence suggests that function specific peacemaking doctrine needs improvement. For example, across some functional areas soldiers were slow to anticipate peacemaking mission requirements and slow to implement appropriate action. Peacemaking doctrine should also conform, as much as possible, to the guidance provided by the UN.149 These steps will improve the tactical forces versatility and focus their unity of effort.
The doctrine should address handling civilians. The peacemaking doctrine should distinguish between handling civilians in peacemaking operations and the often imbedded humanitarian operation, which often follows peacemaking. Peacemaking doctrine should distinguish between purely military operations and those which require collaboration with other nations and/or civilian agencies. The doctrine should also address early coordination with the UN, NGOs, and PVOs to enhance theater security and the military’s support of the UN’s lead in post peacemaking relief efforts.

This monograph does not advocate creating a dedicated peacemaking force. Rather, our approach should acknowledge the need to create doctrine for soldiers to draw upon when challenged with peacemaking.

The TACON mission deserves a much broader emphasis in the doctrine than its brief introduction in a few joint publications. TACON will be the standard: “method for employing coalition forces...into the 21st century.” Army soldiers from detachment to CTF found themselves working with forces that were still commanded and controlled by their sovereign nation. Commanders in coalitions must work for unity of effort to effectively accomplish their mission.

The doctrine must recognize that military forces in peacemaking operations should focus on setting the conditions
for refugees to establish sustainable infrastructure. On several occasions, Kurds moved from Iraq facilities to military ones. The military facilities would depart with the military forces, afterward leaving the Kurds without life support infrastructure.

Doctrine and procedures for collaboration of military and civilian medical units is needed for application to peacemaking and imbedded humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{151} When centralizing the medical support and emplacing a responsive MEDEVAC system, many complexities arose due the multitude of medical facilities in the OPC theater.

Medical officers also found a need for formalizing disaster relief doctrine and formalizing training. Preventive medicine precedes treatment in peacemaking that has a large imbedded humanitarian aid mission. A retooled medical doctrine will also have positive collateral effects upon future disaster assistance relief and non-combatant evacuation missions.

V. Implications for U.S. Doctrine

For one thing, it is evident that the U.S. military could be much better prepared for what the President called for at Aspen in August 1990: "well-trained, tried, and tested--ready to perform every mission we ask of them..."\textsuperscript{152}

LTG (Ret) John M. Cushman

One of the first implications for U.S. Army peacemaking doctrine is that it is not necessary to prepare disciplined, well-
trained combat soldiers for peacemaking. If combat soldiers have the requisite professionalism and discipline they will excel in peacemaking. Poorly trained combat soldiers are ill-disciplined and inadequate for peacemaking. The smaller, post-Cold War Army must remain as well disciplined, and perhaps even better trained, than its predecessor. The Army does not require special peacemaking units or dedicating valuable training time to this collateral activity.

The tactical formations of the Army must be able to function in an atmosphere where mission accomplishment supersedes traditional chain of authority and service affiliations. During OPC, neither the Army’s MG Garner nor the USMC’s COL Jones knew or cared if they were OPCON, TACON or in direct support to LTG Shalikashvili. The soldier and Marine did what was asked of them to accomplish the CTF’s mission.

Clearly, Army forces can not train for every possible contingency in which they may find themselves employed. The challenge is to find a better way to doctrinalize and categorize a units’ collateral capabilities to perform in operations short of war. Partial answers may be found in the U.S. Army’s Special Forces (SF) doctrine.

Several soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group said that working the mount in refugee sites was like doing ‘foreign internal defense or unconventional warfare without guns’.
The implication was clear -- that the SF soldiers had done something like this before. Likewise, the soldiers of the Desert Storm air defense battalion, which was converted to a transportation battalion, discovered that they had driven trucks before. The air defenders also realized that they previously performed many other functional tasks which enabled them to succeed in their new mission.

The doctrinal 'collateral activities' of the Special Forces offer a model for the Army's tactical force doctrine writers. Doctrinally, the SF only do five missions; unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism. Training for these five missions yields the capability to do seven collateral activities. The collateral activities have little, if anything, to do with the SF's warfighting missions. It is prudent to amplify that the SF only train on these collateral missions after the mission is received. This often means that there is little or no time to train on a collateral activity. There is a lesson here for the conventional tactical forces to broaden and institutionalize their versatility in the range and depth of their possible missions.

The idea of developing the concept of 'collateral activities' to tactical forces requires further research. Clearly, the intent is not to turn the Army's conventional forces into Special Forces. Rather, the intent is to help the Army identify collateral activities that align with a type of conventional unit.
This could be very helpful in deciding which conventional units receive what missions for operations in other than war. After all, whether the conventional Army forces are prepared or not, they were called upon for collateral activities in the past and will be called upon for these activities in the future. Indoctrinating conventional units’ collateral activities will give commanders a cybernetic edge by enhancing their versatility and, ultimately, their warfighting focus.

The imminent publication of FM 100-5, Operations will drive the redevelopment of related subordinate doctrines. This is an excellent opportunity to study and integrate the peacemaking doctrine. The Army may not enjoy this opportunity to integrate our doctrines and incorporate peacemaking doctrine for a long time.

The principle of unity of command and the tenet of versatility in FM 100-5, Operations are valid and useful for the tactical force. The Army should expedite integrating this principle and tenet into its peacemaking doctrine. Lastly, the Army should study which collateral activities the service should indoctrinate in its tactical forces doctrine.

This monograph’s conclusions and implications are viewed through the single lens of OPC. OPC involved very little combat and a great deal of humanitarian aid. The characteristics of other peacemaking missions’ may differ significantly. Thus, the
The applicability of these conclusions may vary greatly in another peacemaking context. Carefully screening the findings and implications guided an effort to analyze functions which may have a broad applicability for peacemaking in ethnic conflict. The usefulness of the findings and implications may not be the derived conclusions themselves. Rather, they should guide the peacemaker as to what to think about and offer suggestions as to how to think about the discussed topics. Clearly, the Army can not and should not publish peacemaking doctrine covering the 862 ethnic groups in 179 countries. But there is a need to publish doctrine and a guide for the tactical commander on an approach to peacemaking. The principle of unity of effort and the tenet of versatility are a tremendous start.
ENDNOTES


6 Said and Simmons, 17.

7 Said and Simmons, 10.


J. S. Bremmer and J. M. Snell, "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping", Canadian Defence Quarterly, Ottawa (August 1992): 7. Due to their unique world posture such as not being a super power, not having a colonial past and having no territorial ambitions since they are the world's largest nation; the Canadian's have distinguished history in conflict resolution. The Canadian's useful hierarchy begins with peacemaking. Peacemaking is a broad term which has military and diplomatic meanings. It can occur simultaneously with peacekeeping or it can be conducted to establish the conditions for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is the concept of truce monitoring expanded to include a wide range of socio-economic functions. Preventative peacekeeping occurs when a deterrent force deploys to a threatened nation at the consent of one of the parties in a dispute in order to prevent a crisis. Humanitarian assistance is conducted at the consent of one state to assist refugees or displaced civilians with reestablishing their immediate life support infrastructure.


ENDNOTES


18FM 100-5, (October 1992): 5-5.


21FM 100-5, (October 1992): 5-5.


29Webster’s New World Dictionary, Cleveland, New World Publishing Company (1964): 1620.

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33 Otis, 61-65.


36 Cushman, 80-82.


42 Cushman, 85.
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43Cavanaugh, 34.

44Cavanaugh, 1.

45Cavanaugh, 35.

46Cavanaugh, 35.


49Cavanaugh, 38.

50Cushman, 83.

51OPC AAR, 1.

52OPC AAR, 9.

53JFKSWCS, 165.


55Goff, 17.

56OPC AAR, 10.

57Goff, 10-11.

58Rudd, 269.
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59Rudd, 240.

60Rudd, 269.

61JFKSWCS, 111.

62JFKSWCS, 8.

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64JFKSWCS, 9-10.

65JFKSWCS, 110.

66JFKSWCS, 186.


68Perry, 35.

69JFKSWCS, 187.

70JFKSWCS, 188.

71Rudd, 267.


73CALL, 24.

74CALL, 23-24.

75CALL, 25.

76Rudd, 7.

77Rudd, 269.
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78Rudd, 240.

79OPC AAR, 16-17.

80JFKSWCS, 118.

81Perry, 34-35.

82Franks, 4.


85Baggott, 42-43.

86Major (P) James Moon, Student of Advanced Military Studies, FT Leavenworth, KS, Command and General Staff College, October, 1992; related the experience of an Infantry Brigade he was assigned to during Operation Just Cause in Panama, 1989. In the portion of Panama that this Brigade occupied, the fighting was over two and one half weeks before the fighting was completed in the theater. Immediately the Brigade began civil military affairs work; for example, the Brigade Fire Support Officer was charged with clearing inoperative cars from the city streets.


88MAJ Joe Miller, Student of Advanced Military Studies, FT Leavenworth, KS, Command and General Staff College, November, 1992, classroom discussion of his unpublished
monograph using Northern Ireland as a case study analyzing tactical peacemaking doctrine.

89OPC AAR, 2.

90Perry, 36.


92OPC AAR, 8.

93Rudd, 254.


95Rudd, 257.

96OPC AAR, 6.

97JFKSWCS, 123.

98OPC AAR, 7.

99JFKSWCS, 119.

100JFKSWCS, 48.

101JFKSWCS, 119.

102Goff, 22.


104Cushman, 82.

105CALL, 12.
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106 OPC AAR, 8.
107 Rudd, 253.
108 OPC AAR, 8.
109 Cushman, 82-85.
110 Rudd, 252-253.
111 Goff, 7.
112 Rudd, 252.
113 Jones, 100-101.
114 Rudd, 268.
115 Rudd, 258.
116 Goff, 19-20.
117 JFKSWCS, 11.
118 JFKSWCS, 142.
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120 OPC AAR, 16.


122 Windsor, 6.

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124 Windsor, 7.
125 Windsor, 7.
126 Windsor, 6.
127 JFKSWCS, 28, 45, 46.
128 CALL, 22-23.
129 Windsor, 3 and 6.
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131 Perry, 37-39. And see, CALL, p. 22.
132 OPC AAR, 12.
133 JFKSWSC, 177.
134 JFKSWSC, 23.
135 CALL 22.
136 JFKSWCS, 119-120.
137 JFKSWCS, 131.


139 JFKSWCS, 141.
140 CALL, 8.
141 JFKSWCS 59, 113, and Rudd, 264.
142 CALL, 8.
143 CALL, 8.
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