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# Manpower for Reconstitution An Army View

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## ABSTRACT

The changes in the former Soviet Union have had a profound effect on the world and the government of the United States. The events have resulted in a significant reorientation in the way we look at the world. The prospects for war now seem remote and have caused extensive work in attempting to redefine the future threat to the United States. The fragile governments of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are struggling to establish a new form of government. If they are not successful a return to despotism or some form of autocratic government could occur.

The United States must be prepared to counter a threat from an emerging or resurgent militaristic form of government. President Bush has stated that a part of the National Security Strategy will be reconstitution. He emphasized that the process would be to counter a force that threatens our nation, our allies or our national interests.

The change in our National Security Strategy was developed to demonstrate to our allies the United States' resolve to counter aggression while simultaneously reducing our standing military forces. Reconstitution is the process that the United States would utilize to rebuild its military forces to pre-existing levels.

There are many challenges facing the Department of Defense and the United States Army in particular, in planning for reconstituting our forces. The timeliness of actions in response to early warning will dictate the options available to expand manpower strengths. We cannot afford to wait until the warning is received to plan and prepare for an effective response.

# MANPOWER FOR RECONSTITUTION

## The Army's View

### INTRODUCTION

At the moment war is declared there are so many things to do that it is wise to begin them several years in advance.

Napoleon<sup>1</sup>

Even as the United States builds down the armed forces by at least twenty-five percent over the next three to five years, a method to recapture this military power is being considered.<sup>2</sup> The process to regenerate the forces may be a procedure called reconstitution. Reconstitution is not a new concept at the unit level where it has been developed and practiced for years. However, reconstitution on a national level is new and includes refocusing the government, converting the national industrial base to military production, refurbishing moth-balled equipment, activating personnel recall, and planning multi-functional camps to conduct individual training and build new units.

Because reconstitution is both broad and diverse, this paper explores the definition, options, and alternatives that one military service, the United States Army, will have available to meet the manpower requirements of reconstitution. Additionally, to put the subject in context, a review of our nation's mobilization experiences in previous wars is included.

### The Reconstitution Concept

The concept of reconstitution provides a means by which the United States would rebuild forces to counter a threat by a resurgent/emergent global threat (REGT), such as that of the former Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> On August 2, 1990, President Bush announced the concept of reconstitution on a national level and provided insight into the reasons for the concept when he said:

Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of reconstitution of our forces. By the mid-90s, the time it would take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces--but to generate wholly new forces. This readiness to rebuild--made explicit in our defense policy--will be an important element in our ability to deter aggression.

This speech and its directive nature have been the impetus for planning measures by the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and others.

What this directive ultimately means is that reconstitution has now become a part of our national security strategy and an instrument of national policy. Reconstitution is one of the four basic elements of the national security strategy which are defined in the January 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff issue of "National Military Strategy of the United States" as:

**Strategic Deterrence.** The world is still an unstable place and one in which we could see the former Soviet Union, with its thousands of nuclear weapons, re-emerge and pose a threat to the United States. There also are a number of nations on the verge

of acquiring nuclear weapons that could threaten the United States. The number one priority for the United States is to maintain a credible deterrent which requires "a reliable warning system, modern nuclear forces, the capability and flexibility to support a spectrum of response options and a defensive system for global protection against limited strikes."<sup>4</sup>

**Forward Presence.** The forward deployment of forces has been the key to world peace. These forces have been a clear indication to our allies that America's commitment is credible. These forward deployed forces will be decreased in the future but will still ensure that we have a capability to respond to a regional crisis. By forward deploying forces, the United States maintains the ability to protect our national interest and joins our allies in maintaining peace.

**Crisis Response.** Our forces must maintain the capability to respond to a regional aggressor and to do so with limited time for warning or preparation. At the same time, the United States cannot deplete its forces to a level that when committed in one area while vulnerable in other areas.

**Force Reconstitution.** This process involves the forming, training and fielding of new military units. The process serves as a deterrent to militarization by a potential foe. The process entails drawing from stored equipment and using cadre units to prepare individuals and units. Manpower will be obtained from previously trained service members or re-institution of a draft. Lastly, there will be a need to surge and involve the industrial

base to produce the supplies and weapons necessary.

Reconstitution also involves retaining the edge in technology, doctrine, training, experience and innovation.

As plans are developed to achieve our national interests and objectives, consideration of the concept of reconstitution will take on special meaning. It is a part of the National Military Strategy of the United States. The effects will be felt by planners and leaders throughout the government due to the change in strategic direction from that established in policy and guidance during previous years. In earlier years the defense strategy that supported our national goals and objectives was very rigid, minutely defined and carefully planned. Our focus was on the ability to ensure national survival when the threat was easy to define and war seemed possible.

Some consider reconstitution and mobilization to be synonymous in both planning and execution. They allow that each of two processes may use strategies that may be different at specific points, but the overall actions and results may be the same. This confusion is partially affected by the lack of a precise definition of reconstitution, the lack of clarity of the Administration's position on this strategy, the need for a document containing a delineation of goals and responsibilities for reconstitution, and the dedication of funds to support the program.

Further review indicates that mobilization and reconstitution are not the same. While some aspects of each may

overlap or be complementary, they are separate actions. By definition reconstitution means to rebuild something back to its previous shape.<sup>5</sup> It is believed that is exactly what the intent is; at some time in the future, the United States will build back to a

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#### RECONSTITUTION

The ability to generate wholly new military forces beyond the active and reserve forces with the goal of establishing a credible defense faster than any potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense.

Source: FEMA, GMR Planning Guidance (Draft) (Wash, DC, 10 March 1992), 1-3.

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
predetermined force level after we have completed the downsizing of the current forces. A definition of mobilization would not include the aspect of a predetermined or limited size of force to be rebuilt, but would establish a series of goals over a period of time. At full mobilization the country's focus would be to prepare for unconstrained war in which all national assets would be dedicated to preparing for our country's survival, a situation this country has never experienced.

In a situation where forces were to be committed, the first phase of preparation would be to plan for the use of current active duty forces and then to commit the reserve forces. If a national level analysis determined that the forces would be insufficient to resolve the situation, then a reconstitution effort could be initiated. If the situation continued and the forces available were still insufficient and the nation's security was threatened, then a mobilization effort could be directed. This process of progressing from peace to war is based

on clearly defined authorities and requirements of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Our analysis of the process of progressing from the use of current forces to reconstitution to mobilization differs with some current experts, but we believe ours to be the correct analysis and progression for the military and the country.

The reconstitution strategy will be especially effective against a resurgent/emergent global threat (REGT), or any enemy, since it serves to balance power and as an action, counter action against its every move. It also serves the purpose of being a psychological piece of an overall strategy that keeps all potential enemies off balance. For an adversary there exists an element of the unknown when reviewing and evaluating U.S. strategy and especially the strategy of reconstitution. To determine the capability of the United States to reconstitute forces and the timing of such an endeavor will be extremely difficult. It is a strategy that is as overwhelming and unpredictable as the Strategic Defense Initiative. For the United States it provides a means to devote those resources deemed appropriate to this strategy without having to fully resource, implement or mobilize forces. It provides a clear assurance to our allies that we remain firm in our commitments. Finally, and most critically, if a REGT emerges, reconstitution provides the process that we will use to prepare forces not as they were several years ago, but with the most modern doctrine,

most technically proficient equipment and best trained personnel.<sup>6</sup>



Source: Alexander J. Krekich, "RECONSTITUTION, Strategy, Policy, Process," (presented at the War Resources Working Group Workshop by the Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, Joint Staff, 27-28 October 1991).

The reconstitution process is envisioned to be most appropriate to one of two scenarios which are distinguished by their direct relationship to time. The first setting gives the United States a two-year lead time before war is initiated and is

called "prompt response." This strategy focuses on the near term preparedness by rebuilding units to support the base force. The critical constraints on reconstitution will be the time requirements to train mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers, organize and train units, and most importantly to change and energize the industrial base to renew production of military systems. A two-year warning would allow for only limited reconstitution of units with existing active and reserve component personnel and equipment resources. The second scenario proposes that the United States will have a five-year lead time before war is initiated and is called "deliberate rearmament." This strategy allows us the options to incrementally and flexibly move through predetermined stages to complete the rebuilding process. A five-year warning would allow the rebuilding of units with existing personnel and supplies as well as provide the time to expand the training base and rejuvenate the industrial base.<sup>7</sup>

In order to complete reconstitution, numerous departments and agencies of the federal government will have to be involved. The task will be monumental and comparable to our mobilization efforts at the outset of World War II. The major players in developing the plans for reconstitution will include: the National Security Council (NSC), the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Military Services, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Labor, the Directors of the Selective Service System, and the Office of Personnel Management.<sup>8,9</sup> Developing plans on a

national scale is an enormous task and suggests reasons for defining and narrowing the focus of the project.

Why is reconstitution needed and why has it taken so long to develop the concepts, roles, goals and responsibilities? To answer these questions, we need to start by reviewing the changes in the world in the last two years.

The single most important event affecting our national security strategy has been the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the associated reduction and virtual elimination of a conventional and nuclear threat to the survival of the United States. The conventional military threat that the United States and its NATO allies have faced has been changing dramatically:

- o With the end of the Warsaw Pact, the 6 Eastern European members withdrew 1.2 million men, 50 divisions, and more than 2,100 combat aircraft from the Soviet order of battle.

- o Former Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and troop withdrawals in Germany and Poland will be completed by 1994.

- o Under the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement (CFE), the Former Soviet states will destroy 11,700 tanks; 12,000 armored vehicles; 19,300 artillery pieces; perhaps as many as 750 helicopters; and nearly 400 combat aircraft.

o Ground forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) will be reduced from 134 in 1990 to less than 80 divisions.<sup>10</sup>

It will be difficult for the CIS to rapidly rebuild its forces to the Cold War levels. Increased resistance to the conscription of young men, declining budgets, deteriorating economies, dissension with domestic policies, and ethnic disputes are but a few examples of the obstacles that the CIS face. It is believed that the CIS will adhere to CFE as well as Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and that its armed forces will continue to shrink.<sup>11</sup> However, more hard-line leadership and policies may reappear if the new governments are unable to solve problems of hunger and internal political, economic, and social unrest.

These changes in the world order did not come without a dedication to peace by the free nations of the world. While the United States is presented with opportunities, it is also provided with many challenges. The fragile governments of the previously communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States are confronted with the challenges of changing the governmental and economic systems simultaneously. They have accepted this challenge and are working to establish new systems in their countries. Their willingness and enthusiasm to solve the major problems that they will confront may not be enough. If we are to take advantage of this situation, we must dedicate ourselves and our government to

assist in solving the associated problems. The ability to influence the outcome of these nations will hinge on our strength politically, economically and militarily. Our government has developed a national military strategy that will change over the next few years. However, there are always potential foes in our world and it would be imprudent to completely stand down our conventional forces even if all threats were eliminated. The times are still uncertain, and we must be ready. As previously mentioned, President Bush announced a change in our National Security Strategy on 2 August 1990 when he added reconstitution as a fourth pillar of our national defense.<sup>12</sup> This was the same day, on the other side of the world, that Iraq invaded Kuwait. The results of the Iraqi action delayed the development of the concept of reconstitution as this nation became involved in the international effort to liberate Kuwait.

Today it seems safe to say that although the United States must hedge against a possible Soviet reversal to global confrontation as well as challenges to our security from others, we will not be able to expend the same level of national resources on defense. As a result, the characteristics of our future forces likely include:

- o Smaller active and ready reserve forces
- o Less forward-basing and greater strategic mobility
- o Continuing weapons performance advantage
- o Substantial nuclear capability

- o Chemical and biological defense capabilities
- o Greater dependence on mobilization<sup>13</sup>

The changes in the world order afford the opportunity to develop concepts and programs that are for future implementation if required. The degree of implementation of the concept of reconstitution will depend on a mandate and the resources to support such a massive program. Our country's history in this century is filled with examples of our failure to be adequately prepared. Our leaders are cognizant of our past shortcomings and are providing the direction to ensure success in the future.

## DISCUSSION

### U. S. Manpower Mobilization Experience

The need to quickly react to aggression or threats of war and mobilize a sizable military force is not new to the United States. All of our wars from the Revolutionary War to the Vietnam conflict have required some form of mobilization, registration or draft. It is also interesting to note that many of the mobilization problems of the Revolutionary War were still being encountered during the Vietnam build up. To appreciate our current national strategy, a review of this nation's experiences, successes and failures in preparing for war is important.

When the Revolutionary War first started, the military forces consisted of only the local militia or Minutemen. General Washington asked Congress to provide an Army. The Congress in turn asked the States to raise units. The States tried a series of inducements to encourage enlistment in the new army. The inducements most used included lump sums of money or grants of land.<sup>16</sup> This process met with minimal success as the volunteers were not adequately paid or properly supplied and most had families that needed their support just to survive in a hostile land. The result was an army whose ranks were continuously depleted by desertions and whose military success seemed unlikely. This country's birth and attainment of its freedom cannot be attributed to popular support of a national mobilization effort.

When the South seceded from the Union, President Lincoln

issued calls for volunteers to join the Union militia. These efforts to raise an army failed in spite of several inducements. The President then sought help from the Congress to raise an army. On March 3, 1863, the Congress answered the President's appeals by providing the authority to conduct this country's first draft. The year before, the Confederate States had passed a conscription bill for white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Both of these systems proved ineffective as draftees made up a very small percentage of the total fighting force on either side. However, for the first time the federal government had assumed the responsibility of raising an army, a role previously reserved for the States.<sup>15</sup>

Before the Twentieth Century the United States had been concerned with internal peace and development and less involved with the problems of the outside world. The need to mobilize the nation seemed remote. The industrial revolution brought the rest of the world and its problems within the sight and grasp of this country. When the civilized world of central Europe went to war, it evolved to an unresolvable stalemate; this country then became committed and was the pivotal nation that tilted the scales to ultimately achieve peace. It was this experience that produced this country's first standards, policies, and procedures to mobilize the nation, raise an army and prepare for war. In the Twentieth Century this country has been committed to two world wars and two prolonged conflicts which have required some form of mobilization of the nation to support these efforts.

The mobilization efforts of the United States in World War I were a great success in meeting the needs of an unsophisticated force consisting primarily of infantry divisions. The training and outfitting of these men and units took six months on the average.<sup>16</sup> In 1916 the armed forces of the United States totaled a little more than 320,000.<sup>17</sup> By December 1918, less than two years later, the force had been enlarged to over 4,800,000. The country had been able to register forty-eight percent of its total male population.<sup>18</sup> The speed of the mobilization and subsequent demobilization for the United States Army is depicted in Table 1.

Table 1. United States Army 1916 to 1922				
Year	Total Army	Regular	Na Guard	Reserve
1916	244,483	107,641	132,194	4,648
1917	629,863	250,357	314,581	64,925
1918	2,246,103	741,084	445,678	1,059,341
11 Nov '18	3,673,888	3,673,888	-----	-----
1919	931,422	836,882	37,210	57,330
1920	363,540	200,367	56,090	107,083
1921	407,920	227,374	113,640	66,906
1922	373,597	146,069	159,658	150,914

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 222.

The successes of the United States Army to prepare and move units overseas were achieved in part by the construction of sixteen camps and sixteen cantonments for inducting and training the new recruits. The cadres used to form the training units and deploying units came from the regular army. However, the regular army numbers were not sufficient both to train and staff the units.<sup>19</sup>

The Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, was passed by Congress to provide the process for mobilizing the nation and to build an army to deploy overseas. The law was much stricter than in the past as there were few exemptions and almost everyone regardless of mental acuity or physical attributes was deemed fit to serve in some capacity. Additionally, the system did not allow substitutions, and the young men selected were required to serve. At the time there was much criticism of the new law, but at least the draft riots that had occurred in the Civil War were avoided.<sup>20</sup>

As an aggressive Germany began its adventurous military activity in the late 1930s, President Roosevelt expressed his concern for the nation's lack of military preparedness and our need to begin a military revitalization. Unfortunately, the majority of Americans wanted to remain isolated from a war that was not theirs. With the fall of France, the Congress passed a

draft bill; it was the first such bill to be enacted during peacetime in the United States.<sup>21</sup> The bill provided for another mobilization effort, and its success is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. United States Military 1940-1947				
Year	Grand Tot	Tot Army	Navy	Marines
1940	458,365	269,023	160,997	28,345
1941	1,801,101	1,462,315	284,427	54,359
1942	3,858,791	3,075,608	640,570	142,613
1943	9,044,745	6,994,472	1,741,750	308,523
1944	11,451,719	7,994,750	2,981,365	475,604
1945	12,123,455	8,267,958	3,380,817	474,680
1946	3,030,088	1,891,011	983,398	155,679
1947	1,582,999	991,285	498,661	93,053

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 211.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, war was declared on the Axis Powers. The recently enacted draft bill was amended to extend enlistments from six months to the duration of the war plus six months. As in other wars there were numerous conscientious objectors, but they were utilized in other than

combat jobs. The significant difference in this war from previous wars was the universal support of the war effort. Most Americans genuinely believed that a danger to national survival existed and that the Germans and Japanese must be defeated.<sup>22</sup>

The United States was involved in the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Vietnam conflict (1956-1973) in which a draft and registration were enacted.<sup>23</sup> A national call to service was not issued by the President or the government during these conflicts. The Korean War resulted in Congress passing the Universal Military Training and Service Act which required all men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six to register. However, the Korean War was much smaller in scale than World War II and only a limited number of draftees were actually called. The time between the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict saw registration conducted on several occasions.

The Vietnam conflict was an extremely difficult time for the United States and was compounded by a draft that was full of loop holes, deferments, and inconsistent procedures. The political debates of the Vietnam conflict caused significant problems for the services and are much too extensive for this analysis. The lessons learned have been documented to preclude an recurrence and the processes for a politically acceptable registration and a draft were now firmly established.

## The Process of Building Army Units

The many alternatives of precisely how the process of building units will be completed, as well as who will have responsibility, must be determined. The ultimate rationale for reconstitution is to build a force in time to successfully prepare and win in a global or multi-regional confrontation. The process will require the active involvement of a number of government agencies to develop plans to conduct the building of new units.

The elements of reconstitution involve designating facilities, identifying training cadre, developing training plans, identifying unit cadre, identifying fillers, and issuing unit equipment and supplies. Alternatives and solutions for unit cadre and fillers will be discussed later in this paper. A brief discussion of the other elements is as follows:

**Designing facilities.** Adequate training facilities and ranges are the primary issues to be solved. As current, existing facilities are approved for closure, a review should be conducted to determine the feasibility of which ones could be used to train and prepare new units. These facilities could be placed in a caretaker status and designated for future use when reconstitution may be directed.

**Identifying training cadre.** Currently, the proposal is to designate two cadre divisions from the National Guard to assume the training mission.<sup>24</sup> These training divisions have not been identified nor have the specifics of how this process will occur

been established. The mission to train units for war may not be adequately accomplished by a National Guard unit, but the process could be tested to identify the flaws. As units are formed and equipment issued, it will become clear that the training must be in sufficient detail for the unit not only to be technical proficient but to conduct the maintenance and service of technologically advanced weapons. The involvement of the base force units that may not be deploying in training individuals and units seems to be a possible solution. Certainly the Army service school system must be able to surge to assist in individual and advanced training for new service members. This process requires much work to develop plans that provide for a surge capability in individual and unit training.


**Developing training plans.** A significant effort will be required to identify the requirements for reconstitution and the type of training that will be needed. A majority of this effort can be accomplished by the Army's existing training infrastructure in developing plans based on existing curriculum at current service schools. The actual timeliness to accomplish the training and bring the fillers together with unit cadre to form units will require detailed review. Assigning a proponent agency, such as the Army's Training and Doctrine Command to accomplish this task is the first step in developing the process.

**Issuing equipment and supplies.** This process will require drawing from moth-balled equipment, distributing increased quantities of current items, identifying shortages in equipment

and supplies, and directing the activities of a surging industrial base. This process has almost endless logistical activities that require plan development.

The Base Force

The concept of the Base Force is defined in the National Military Strategy of the United States and is the basis for the defense of this country and its national interests. The base force must be able to deter aggression, maintain a forward presence, respond to regional crises, and if necessary rebuild a force that can win against a first-class aggressor. The chart below depicts how the base force supports our national strategy and how our forces are accessed if needed.




Source: National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1992), 17.

The base force will be responsible to train and be capable to deploy to a variety of regions of the world. The training will be highly diverse and include exercises with allies and joint operations. Those forces that are forward deployed will be primarily focused on the region in which they are deployed. However, their missions will include the ability to further deploy from a forward deployed location.

The forces will be a part of plans developed by regional CINCs as they review the potential for conflict in their region. These plans will not be constrained by current location of forces but will include the best use of available forces to meet regional conflicts. The only constraint will be the United States' ability to be committed to a regional conflict but still have forces available to deter aggression in other regions. Our ability to respond to two regional conflicts simultaneously will require well-developed plans and alliances.

The base force is divided "into four conceptual force packages and four supporting capabilities." Looking at the forces in this manner does not established command lines, but provides a method to review force options for the world. This process accounts for the base force being a much smaller future force.

The following chart depicts the base force framework:



Source: National Military Strategy of the United States  
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1992), 19.

### Existing Manpower Alternatives

In order to examine the Army's ability to respond to the manpower requirements of reconstitution, we must begin with those resources which are already available. The structure of our armed forces is based upon the DoD Total Force Policy which recognizes that several elements contribute to national defense. Those elements include: DoD contractors, host nation support, civilian work force, the active and reserve component military, and retirees.<sup>25</sup>

**DoD Contractors.** The role of Department of Defense contractors was reaffirmed during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Their contributions, both in the CONUS and the theater of operations, were essential in areas such as communications-electronics, maintenance, and supply. Technical representatives provided maintenance and repair assistance for the Army's tactical communications system and its helicopter fleet. The extent to which they will be able to supplement or replace units and personnel may reduce reconstitution requirements. These resources will continue to be needed, and contracts will be written to ensure continued support during wartime operations.

**Host nation support.** Host nation support also proved vital to the success of our operations in Southwest Asia. Should the United States be required to reconstitute our forces in response to a future threat, the success with which we are able to negotiate host nation support will influence skill requirements.

This will be particularly true in port operations and transportation. Our diplomatic agreements will continue to need to address this issue.

**Civilian Work Force.** It is estimated that by FY 1997, the DoD will need to hire 320,000 additional civilian personnel to resume administrative, logistical, and training support to military forces at 1989-levels. This requirement is not viewed as a problem given the size of the nation's work force.<sup>26</sup> However, such growth may come at a time of concurrent recruitment for military service and a resurgent industrial complex.

**Active Component Military.** The active component provides the base force for reconstitution. It represents the best trained and most readily available manpower in the early stages of reconstitution. This manpower resource will be crucial to the strategies that are developed. The Army's active component strength is projected to decline from 782,000 in FY 1989 to 536,000 by end FY 1995.<sup>27</sup>

**Reserve Component Military.** The reserve component military manpower is divided into three categories: The Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower to augment the active component and consists of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The Selected Reserve is comprised of units, individual mobilization augmentees (IMA), and those members who have not completed sufficient military training to be awarded a military skill designation. For reconstitution requirements the

Selected Reserve is generally not an available pool of manpower because its members are already associated with Active, Reserve, or National Guard units. The use of these reservists to fill reconstitution requirements would impair the readiness of the units to which they were assigned or projected.

The IRR, as well as the Inactive National Guard (ING), constitutes a significant pool of previously trained manpower. Individuals in the IRR or ING have served in the active force or the Selected Reserve. Those who have been released within the last twelve months are referred to as RT-12s and are assumed to be fully trained and immediately available upon call-up for use as individual replacements. The remaining IRR are considered trained, but because of skill degradation require evaluation to determine whether they are qualified to be assigned to units or required to return to the training base.<sup>28</sup> The majority of these reservists have a remaining service obligation; however, others have volunteered to remain beyond their statutory obligation.

Effective 23 November 1983, Title 10 U.S.C. 651 was amended to extend the initial service obligation from six to eight years.<sup>29</sup> As a result of this amendment, the size of the IRR grew during the years 1989 to 1991 (see Table 3). The size of this pool is directly related to the size of the active force since the majority of its members served their initial tour on active duty and are fulfilling their remaining service obligation (RSO) in the IRR. As the active force levels decline, there will

be a corresponding, although somewhat delayed, decline in the size of the IRR strength.

The Standby Reserve is a very small number (about six hundred) of officers and enlisted individuals with or without a service obligation. They maintain their military affiliation but require certification as available before they can be recalled.<sup>30</sup>

The Retired Reserve is composed of retired Reserve officers and enlisted personnel. Their service may have been active duty or a combination of active and reserve military service.

**Regular Army Retirees.** These include Regular Army officers and enlisted personnel who have completed twenty or more years of active military service and are retired with pay. This represents a large group of physically fit, trained, and experienced manpower. While vigor and skill degradation are factors, this group can be used in a variety of capacities such as duties in base support, training centers and schools, non-deploying headquarters, or meeting civilian shortfalls.


When taken collectively these manpower resources represent a sizable source of personnel for reconstitution (Table 3). The lengthening of the RSO and the downsizing of the active military strength with the concurrent transfer of soldiers to the Reserves portray a fairly level manpower resource. However, by the late 1990s a steeper decline in strength will occur as reserve obligations end and the active and troop program unit (TPU) levels are no longer sustained at the earlier levels.

Table 3. Army Strength Projections (in thousands)				
Category	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93
Active Military	750.6	702.2	660.2	618.2
Active	(732.4)			
Reserve	( 18.2)			
Select Reserve TPU	721.9	762.0	682.2	610.0
IRR	284.2	413.5	433.2	458.4
Inactive NG	11.0	10.5	10.5	10.5
AD Retirees <60yrs	195.9	189.1	188.3	187.2
Other Ret Res <60	31.2	33.4	34.2	34.6
IMA	14.2	14.0	11.4	10.9
Totals	2,009.0	2,124.7	2,020.0	1,929.8

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Manpower Requirements Report FY 1992, prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Health Affairs, and Reserve Affairs (February 1991), III-4, III-52, III-53, III-77.

**Civil Sector.** Those personnel in the civil sector without any military affiliation could be recruited through voluntary programs or the draft. The projected eighteen- to twenty-four-year old population is split nearly even between males and females. The population was 26.9 million in July 1988 and is

projected to dip to a low of 23.9 million in 1996. This decline in the eligible male population has been a concern to Army personnel planners and has influenced the Army's accessioning strategy since the late 1990s. However, the male population is projected to recover to 26.75 million by the year 2004 (Chart 4) with slow but steady growth thereafter.



Source: G. Spencer, Projections of the Population of the United States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1988 to 2080 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,

Series P-25, No. 1018) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 39-71.

While quality of recruits should remain high during this decade, rapid manpower reconstitution efforts particularly during the period of the projected dip in the eighteen- to twenty-four-year old population could be impaired. In order to recruit sufficient volunteers, the Army would possibly need to reduce its entrance standards or rely more upon females. Eighty-six percent of enlisted military occupational specialties, ninety-one percent of warrant officer specialties and ninety-six percent of commissioned officer specialties are open to women in the Army. The female content in the Army has increased to approximately 11.2 percent in recent years in response to a change in women in the labor force and to offset a projected decline in eligible males.<sup>31</sup> Currently fifty-nine percent of the active Army's requirements are open to females, and the reserve component units are somewhat higher due to their higher proportion of combat support and service support units.

## Manpower Shortfalls and Potential Resources

**Manpower Shortages.** Wartime manpower requirements are based upon estimated requirements to fight a specified scenario. For many years DoD has used a worldwide war scenario which had a European conflict as its primary component. With the changing world environment, such a scenario is no longer particularly plausible. The national defense strategy now assumes a two-regional conflict scenario. The forces required for such concurrent conflicts are continuing to be refined. However, given the capabilities of the Army at the end of FY 1989, that force structure is presently the best data available for analysis.

Since no known major threat has been projected, let's assume that the Army would reach its programmed FY 1997 manpower levels prior to beginning any reconstitution efforts. In reconstituting to the FY 1989 manpower, skill, and grade levels, there will undoubtedly be changes that will modify those requirements. How different they may look will be driven by actions such as:

**Force modernization initiatives.** The fielding of new equipment and systems will reduce or eliminate requirements in some skills, generate new or different skills, or perhaps both.

**Grade restructuring.** This is a continuous process which produces changes within specific skills. It can be driven by technological changes, budget, and so forth.

**Doctrinal changes.** Doctrine is dynamic, and the future battlefield may revise manpower requirements to support the new war fighting concepts.

**Arms control initiatives.** This can result in the reduction or elimination of certain capabilities and their supporting manpower.

**Shortage skills.** Even though requirements may exist, historically under-strength skills will create an even greater shortfall between FY 1989 and 1997 levels.

Using the illustration of reconstituting FY 1997 forces to FY 1989 levels, the grade requirements by active duty component (AD) and Selected Reserve (both ARNG and USAR units) are defined for officers and warrant officers (WO) (Table 4), as well as for enlisted soldiers (Table 5).

Table 4. Army Officer/WO Reconstitution Requirements							
	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC	COL	WO	TOTAL
AD	4560	8948	5302	3321	1547	4449	28127
ARNG	5405	5654	2913	1245	502	4702	20421
USAR	2862	4804	3286	1628	448	1520	14548
TOTAL	12827	19406	11501	6194	2497	10671	63096

Source: Audrey J. Reeg, "Manpower for Reconstitution" (Tab G of memorandum prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, 10 December 1991).

Table 5. Army Enlisted Reconstitution Requirements						
	PVT	SPC	SGT	SSG	SFC-CSM	TOTAL
AD	45827	60979	41501	30584	26629	205520
ARNG	29677	37505	24121	13312	10952	115567
USAR	14410	22108	14855	11793	11731	74897
TOTAL	89914	120592	80477	55689	49312	395984

Source: Audrey J. Reeg, "Manpower for Reconstitution" (Tab G of memorandum prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, 10 December 1991).

In addition to the requirement for 459,080 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers to return to FY 1989 force levels, an additional requirement for "fillers" must be included. Due to funding constraints, units' authorized manning levels are frequently not at one hundred percent of wartime requirements. Once the decision is made to fill units to their wartime required strength levels, such as was the case during Operation Desert Shield, then an additional manpower demand for "fillers" is created. The estimated number of fillers needed for the programmed FY 1997 combined active and Selected Reserve force structure would be:

Table 6. FY 1997 Army Filler Requirement	
Officer/WO	11,492
Enlisted	83,700
Total	95,192

Source: Audrey J. Reeg, "Manpower for Reconstitution" (Tab A of memorandum prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, 10 December 1991).

If then in FY 1997 the Army were to need to respond to two potential regional conflicts, an estimated 554,272 additional personnel would be required to return to FY 1989 force levels. While it would appear that the requirements could be met by the IRR, retirees, and a modest increase in recruiting, other factors should be considered. There are four key elements to effective reconstitution planning and execution. These elements are inextricably related:

- o Warning time
- o Decisive leadership
- o Understanding of requirements
- o Awareness of capability


The first three will be discussed in greater detail in the Manpower Options' section. With the rapid reductions in the Army's structure, an awareness of capability particularly in recruiting and training will be essential to planning. The Army

can no longer afford the large recruiting capability that has been successful in sustaining its 780,000 man force. Reductions in the number of recruiting stations and recruiters will hamper the Army's ability to respond quickly to any significant increase in accessioning mission. Likewise, the Army is reducing the size and number of its training centers for individual training. A massive influx of untrained or pre-trained personnel would require a lead time for the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command to effectively respond. Also, unit collective training from squad to division or corps would place additional demands of time and resources on the training base.

### Reconstitution and the Mobilization Process

The legal authorities in place for mobilization actions are likewise applicable to reconstitution. The differences between the two can best be described in the degree or size of any military manpower expansion, time frames involved, and the sources of the manpower.

Reconstitution can be viewed as a capability to expand our forces using various means to include the options along the spectrum of manpower mobilization. While the spectrum of mobilization represents degrees to which forces are built, it does not follow that such a build up must occur in a prescribed sequence. Depending upon the nature of the crisis and lead times involved, the appropriate option may be anywhere along the spectrum. This mobilization spectrum is as follows:<sup>32</sup>



In order to reconstitute our forces, one or more of these options may be implemented. The options are defined as follows:<sup>33</sup>

**200K Call-up.** This option constitutes a Presidential ordering of Selected Reserve units and individuals to active duty. Up to 200,000 personnel from all Services may be called up for ninety days with authority to extend the period an additional

ninety days. On November 5, 1990, Congress authorized a substitution in the wording of Title 10 U.S.C. 673b to authorize the call-up for Desert Shield to be for a period of 180 days with a 180-day extension.

**Partial Mobilization.** This option expands the Active Armed Forces to meet a national emergency involving an external threat to national security. Under Title 10 U.S.C. 673a partial mobilization may be initiated by Presidential Proclamation or congressional action. This option can provide up to one million Ready Reservists and military retirees for all military Services' requirements for a period of twenty-four months.

**Full Mobilization.** This expansion is by congressional action under Title 10 U.S.C. 672 and mobilizes all reserve component units, all individual reservists, and retired military personnel. There are no numerical or time limitations.

**Total Mobilization.** This expansion is also by congressional action under Title 10 U.S.C. 671a and authorizes the establishment of additional units beyond the approved force structure level. There are no numerical or time limitations. However, the period of active service is extended for the duration of any war and for six months thereafter.

Perhaps the most significant difference between mobilization and reconstitution is the time frame involved. You mobilize resources over a short period of time, such as through the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR). Reconstitution can take longer.<sup>34</sup> The legislation for mobilization is primarily

concerned with an immediate response to a threat. Until the Congress declares full mobilization, the manpower options limit calling personnel to active duty for more than either 180 days or two years. Reconstitution is viewed as a two- (prompt response) to five-year (deliberate rearmament) strategy. Therefore, a considerable portion of the manpower would have to be achieved through other measures than currently exist under mobilization.

In addition to the time frames involved, two other distinctive differences between mobilization and reconstitution deal with the sources of manpower and the size of a build up. In the mobilization process, existing reserve component units are activated. These are units which are already in the base force to meet various contingencies. Under reconstitution the emphasis will be on the creation of wholly new units to meet a threat or crisis beyond the capability of the base force. Additionally, when we refer to reconstitution we are planning to return to a pre-established and generally previously held force level. In mobilization the level of build up is theoretically limited only by our national resources.

Prior to a declaration of a national emergency (partial mobilization or greater) only reserve component volunteers, Regular Retirees, Reserve Retirees with more than twenty years of active service, and Selected Reserves may be called to active duty. At the determination of the Secretary of the Army, military retirees may be recalled to active duty whenever required. The timing of these actions would depend upon the

urgency and expected duration of the threat. These authorities would likely not satisfy most reconstitution requirements. The 200K call-up would be parceled out to all Services, and the Army's portion would likely be comprised primarily of activated Reserve units. Therefore, few individuals (IRR, retirees, volunteers) would be available to build new units.

With the exception of retirees, all other groups of individuals can only be kept on active duty for 180 days. In order to access the pre-trained manpower pool for more than a 180-day period, a declaration of a national emergency is required. This action would as a minimum provide one million Reservists (Ready Reserve and IRR) for up to two years.

Upon a Presidential 200K call-up, the Secretary of Defense can also invoke "stop loss" for military personnel on active duty. This authority, which was used during Desert Shield, suspends voluntary and involuntary separations from active service. Since "stop loss" is linked by law to the involuntary call to active duty of Reservists, under reconstitution any action to stabilize the active force and prevent further losses prior to the initiation of any mobilization options would require legislative change.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to the recall of prior service personnel, involuntary induction (or the draft) is another option available to meet reconstitution requirements. In order to do so, Congressional action to repeal Section 17c of the military Selective Service Act would be required. Under current law every

male citizen of the United States and every other male residing in the United States must register within thirty days of their eighteenth birthday. After registration, each person shall keep the Selective Service System informed of his current address.<sup>36</sup> Between the passage of the Selective Training and Service Act on September 16, 1940, and its end on June 30, 1973, fifteen million men were drafted. With the exception of 1947, men were drafted into military service during each year to include World War II, Korea, and the Vietnam conflict.<sup>37</sup> In September 1990 the Selective Service System had over 14.2 million registrants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six; of course, a large number of these young men would likely be disqualified for military service if drafted.<sup>38</sup>

Regardless whether non-prior service volunteers or draftees are used for reconstitution, adequate time must be provided in order to bring them on active duty. It will take time to expand the recruiting force and to activate the Selective Service System. Lead times must also be included for training since Title 10 U.S.C. 671 requires that soldiers be given twelve weeks of training prior to overseas deployment.

### Manpower Options For Reconstitution

There are a number of options for expanding the manpower levels for reconstitution. Some require changes to the law, while the military services can establish others. Much depends on the projected threat, and how much response time should be available.

Planning considerations should include:

- o When will the forces be needed?
- o How can the pre-trained manpower pool be increased?
- o Where will the mid-level leaders come from?
- o Is the plan affordable?

**When will the forces be needed?** The amount of intelligence warning time during the Cold War was estimated to be fifteen to thirty days in Europe. It was estimated that it would take that amount of time for the Soviets to move their forces and mass them for an offensive attack from the Warsaw Pact countries. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the former Soviet forces are returning to the Commonwealth of Independent States. It will be neither easy nor quick for the CIS to mount any sort of a westward offensive for some time to come. It is believed that any deliberate planning actions such as increases in industrial production of war materials, changes in intelligence gathering activity, and shifts in manpower will be noticed.

Can we realistically expect to have five years warning to prepare? President Reagan was able to rearm the military in the 1980s against the monolith of communism, but that was primarily

through weapons systems not manpower. To reverse our military strength reductions will be a major political challenge, especially if the threat is not imminent. Five years would extend beyond a President's term of office and beyond two Congressional terms. Even if the need for deliberate rearmament were recognized, action from the Congress would move slowly to enact required legislation and provide increased funding.

Estimates of when we might need to reconstitute our forces have been evolving. When the President included reconstitution in his August 1990 speech, it was viewed as a capability the U.S. needed to have ready in order to deter any thoughts of hostile aggression, particularly by the Soviet Union. In the ensuing months, the time frame shifted to a two- to five-year window for such a manpower buildup. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the urgency for a reconstitution capability has stretched to the point that some believe it would take more than five years for a REGT to develop.

When, or if, a REGT will next threaten the security and interests of this nation cannot be predicted at this time. Certainly, the world's political changes are occurring rapidly. No one predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989. The enormity of changes since then have been staggering. However, the Persian Gulf War is an example of how quickly and unexpectedly American military forces can become committed to a hostile area.

**How can the size of the pre-trained manpower pool be increased?** In addition to having sufficient lead time, the size of the available manpower resources is another major factor in reconstitution planning. Whether or not there is a need for the available manpower to be pre-trained is contingent upon when the forces will be required. In a prompt response scenario, the more qualified the available manpower resources are, the quicker forces can be reconstituted. In deliberate rearmament there will be sufficient time to train junior officer and enlisted soldiers. However, if planning is based upon a five-year lead time and we find it necessary to reconstitute within two years, then we will have erred on the wrong end. To ensure success in reconstituting forces to meet an emerging threat, measures should be taken in peace to be better prepared for war.

There are a number of options that could be undertaken to increase the size of the Army's pre-trained manpower pool.

Options which should be considered include:

- o Lengthen the Military Service Obligation
- o Expand the Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps
- o Increase the number of two- and three-year enlistments
- o Increase the manning levels in critical skills

**Option 1: Lengthen the Military Service Obligation.** If the U.S. does not get a five-year warning time for reconstitution to initiate deliberate rearmament, then what can be done now to increase our timeliness to respond and win without another Task Force Smith? While the service obligation was increased from six

to eight years in 1983, serious consideration should be given to lengthening it once again--this time to ten years. By doing so now, the IRR would begin to benefit by the change as early as the year 2001. This would be based upon a change for individuals who enlist beginning in 1993 and beyond. A key here would be that the manpower is pre-trained and represents a relatively inexpensive means of increasing the pool for reconstitution or mobilization.

**Option 2: Expand the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC).** JROTC is another program which should be re-examined. Title 10 U.S.C. 2031 directs the military departments to establish and maintain JROTC units at not more than 1600 public and private secondary educational institutions. In 1986 the schools with the Army JROTC program had 136,502 cadets in the student enrollment of 1,194,854.<sup>39</sup>

The program is up to three years in duration with facilities provided by the institutions. The Army provides the text materials, equipment, and uniforms as well as establishes the standards. While active duty officers and noncommissioned officers can be detailed as instructors, military retirees may also perform these duties. These retirees are entitled to receive their retired pay and an additional amount not to exceed the difference between that pay and the active duty pay and allowances which they would receive if ordered to active duty. One half of that additional amount is paid by the Army. With the reductions in the Army manpower, there would be an increase in

the number of retirements as well as available equipment and uniforms that could be used for increases in this program. The Army recognizes the training JROTC provides in advancing newly enlisted soldiers in rank. An expansion of this program would assist in the pre-training of potential enlistees, stimulate a greater propensity for military service, and do so at relatively low costs. Consideration might also be given to hiring officers and noncommissioned officers who separate under the Voluntary Special Incentive. These men and women have been trainers of soldiers and possess the experience and leadership needed for the JROTC program.

**Option 3: Increase the number of two- and three-year enlistments.** In the 1980s the Army began to lengthen the periods of initial enlistments from two-, three-, and four-year enlistments to three-, four-, and six-year enlistments. This was done for a number of reasons to include to reduce the impact of the dip in eligible males in the early to mid-1990s, maximize accession and training costs, and increase unit cohesion. While it has been effective, it has also served to reduce the number of soldiers leaving active military service and entering the IRR. With the size of the Army decreasing, the impact of the smaller, male enlistment eligible population is likewise decreased. Further, with a smaller portion of the Army to be forward deployed, soldiers will remain on station longer with their units thereby improving unit cohesion. A return to shorter initial enlistments would provide more soldiers for the IRR as many would

leave active duty for college and other career goals. While there would be an increase in accession and training costs, there would also be the benefit of a better trained Ready Reserve because of the collective training experience that these soldiers would take with them from active duty; this would be a major improvement over the 179-day Active Duty for Training period Selected Reservists now receive. Shorter enlistments would also provide the Army more flexibility as skill requirements change to keep the force aligned by reducing skill overages and shortages.

**Option 4: Increase the manning levels in critical skills.**

The manning of the force is often referred to as a "zero sum game." That is, because of mandated end-strengths, if the Army wants to overman in one place, it does so at the expense of another. However, the maintenance of critical skills could be problematic for reconstitution. Many highly skilled specialties require long training times, some up to a year or more. Frequently, the training programs for these skills are constrained by equipment and facilities making surge impossible.

Many critical skills are low density in numbers and have historically been short in the Army inventory. They could be managed at 110 percent or over with little affect on the Army overall, particularly if traded off from high density, short training time specialties. By managing these skills at higher levels of fill, the Army would be better able to reconstitute new units requiring these specialties. This over-manning would require additional incentives to attract more soldiers to these

highly technical specialties. Many of the Army's current critical skill shortages such as air crew, medical, electronic technicians, linguists, engineers, and intelligence would remain critical to any reconstitution effort.<sup>40</sup>

**Where will the mid-career force come from for reconstituted units?** Perhaps the most important element of a new unit is its cadre. These officers and noncommissioned officers form the nucleus of a unit. They become the commanders, staff, first sergeants, platoon leaders/sergeants, and other leaders within the unit. These cadres require a long lead time to develop. For example, it takes fifteen years to train a battalion commander.<sup>41</sup> Also, it takes approximately ten years to develop a first-rate noncommissioned officer.<sup>42</sup>

Even if the base of pre-trained manpower is expanded, the question of greater significance is whether there will be sufficient mid-careerists? The IRR has traditionally been comprised primarily of individuals with less than six, and now eight total years of military service. Of the 337,982 individuals in the IRR in March 1992 (see Table 7), sixty-six percent of the IRR officer strength is composed of junior officers (lieutenants/captains) and ninety-five percent of the enlisted strength is junior enlisted (SGT and below). Consequently, most officers are lieutenants and captains, and enlisted soldiers are sergeants (SGT) and below. This leaves an obvious shortfall in staff sergeants, sergeants first class, master/first sergeants, majors, and lieutenant colonels.

Table 7. Army IRR Strengths (March 1992)			
Officer/WO		Enlisted	
COL	1731	CSM/SGM	781
LTC	6274	1SG/MSG	2239
MAJ	10648	SFC	4303
CPT	18660	SSG	7840
LT	17196	SGT	30189
WO	3882	SPC-PV1	234239
Total	58391	Total	279591

Source: Al Milbert, Mobilization Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, telephone conversation with author, 22 April 1992.

Aggregate numbers such as those in Table 7 mask the mid-grade problem. When compared against the reconstitution requirements in Table 4, it would appear that there is not an officer problem. The total numbers of majors and lieutenant colonels are nearly the same. What it does not tell you is how well do the specialties match. Undoubtedly, there are many mismatches. On the enlisted side in Table 5, the differences even in aggregate numbers are significant. In terms of total non-commissioned officers in the ranks of sergeant (SGT) through

command sergeant major (CSM), there is a shortfall in the IRR strength versus the reconstitution requirements. Of a total shortage of 140,000, 50,000 are at sergeant, 48,000 at staff sergeant, and 42,000 at sergeant first class through command sergeant major. Again, grade and skill mismatches for those in the IRR versus requirements will likely occur frequently. In addition to the shortfalls of the IRR against reconstitution requirements, you also need to include the over 95,000 filler requirements at all grades and skills.

A comparison was made between the FY 1989 force structure and the Army of 1997. The active component and Army Reserve reconstitution and filler requirements were compared against the IRR for skill matches only. This comparison highlighted the shortages even more when compared against skill matches. Even without applying a grade criteria, the shortfall after applying the IRR to the requirements was 10,044 officers, 6,774 warrant officers, and 116,656 enlisted soldiers. Additionally, taking any remaining IRR assets and applying them against National Guard requirements, the data showed virtually no IRR assets remaining to meet the 6,544 warrant officer and 152,310 enlisted soldier needs. This was after applying more than ten thousand inactive National Guard (ING) assets against the warrant officer and enlisted reconstitution requirements.<sup>43</sup>

As the Army builds down to its FY 1997 levels, the present force will continue to be senior in experience over the next few years. However, the Army will not be able to keep a force too

senior--too rich in career soldiers. It is too expensive to maintain an over-graded force and the type of work these individuals would be doing would be below their capabilities and experience thereby creating a loss of personal and professional satisfaction. Furthermore, the likelihood of public and Congressional criticism of wide-scale sustainment of an over-graded force is high.

This build-down effort would provide some near term relief to the problem of sufficient mid-careerists in a non-active duty manpower source. Congress enacted legislation in Title 10 U.S.C. 1174a and 1175 which provides two alternative incentive programs to encourage early separation while requiring affiliation with the Ready Reserve of a Reserve component. To be eligible for these programs, the individual will have to have served on active duty for more than six years before December 5, 1991, and will have completed his/her initial term of enlistment or initial period of obligated service prior to separation.

The Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) provides annual payments to separatees for twice the number of years of active duty the individual served, provided the individual continues to serve in a Reserve component for the duration of the payments. For example, a staff sergeant with ten years active military service would be obligated to remain in the Ready Reserve for twenty years after separation upon accepting the VSI; if he were to be separated from the Ready Reserve before the end of the

twenty-year period, then the annual VSI payments would be discontinued.

The Special Separation Benefit (SSB) provides a lump sum payment upon separation. Under the SSB program an individual agrees to serve in the Ready Reserve for a period of not less than three years following his separation from active duty. If that individual has a service obligation remaining under Title 10 U.S.C. 651 at the time of separation from active duty, the three-year obligation under SSB would not begin until the day following the day that individual completes his obligation under that law.

Under VSI, including SSB, there are initial estimates that 6,200 officers and 17,000 enlisted soldiers will request voluntary separation.<sup>44</sup> These individuals will greatly assist in meeting cadre requirements for reconstitution over the next five to ten years. However, beyond that point while the VSI recipients will still be obligated, a significant degradation will have occurred in their skills and knowledge, and they will require refresher training or perhaps retraining if their skills are no longer applicable to existing equipment and doctrine. Under current legislation the Army cannot conduct the VSI and SSB programs after September 30, 1995.

Other options merit closer examination as a means of providing cadre resources for reconstitution.

**Option 1: Cadre Divisions.** The Army has proposed establishing two cadre divisions within the Reserve components to help with reconstitution. The details about what these cadre

divisions will look like in size, grades, and skills remain to be determined. In order for these cadre divisions to expand to full strength and attain combat readiness, training programs will be key. The proficiency of the cadre will need to be maintained in their ability to accomplish individual and collective tasks. However, two divisions hardly seems adequate to reconstitute to FY 89 levels when the Army had eighteen active component and ten National Guard divisions, versus the twelve and possibly eight, respectively, it will have in FY 1997. They will likely represent the cadre for a force of not more than 30,000 - 35,000 men.

**Option 2: Develop a temporary promotion system.** The objective of a reconstitution capability is, first, to deter any potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States, and if deterrence fails, to provide a global war fighting capability.<sup>45</sup> If deterrence is successful, then the political response will be to draw down the military forces once again. A decision to reduce the forces could occur at any time during the reconstitution phase, e.g., one month, six months, one year, two years, etc.

Just as wholly new units are formed under reconstitution, these units would be inactivated from the force structure upon initiation of a draw down. In reducing the forces all ranks would be affected. During a two- to five-year reconstitution period, few new enlisted soldiers would be above the rank of sergeant. The major impact would be in the mid-career ranks.

While there will have been a need for large numbers of these leaders to become cadre for the newly forming units, once again we will be unable to afford to keep them on active duty.

Therefore, many of those noncommissioned officers who were on active duty at the beginning of the reconstitution phase could find their careers ended early in a build down.

Why would career soldiers be affected in this manner? Since the IRR would not be able to meet many of the mid-career requirements, the active duty manpower will likely provide a large portion of the cadre for new units. In order to do this, accelerated promotions will have to occur in order to have sufficient leaders in the right ranks for all active units.

In order to ensure a place for these soldiers following a decision to reverse the build up, a dual promotion system could be a solution. The Army had such a system for its officers following World War II until Title 10 U.S.C. 3442 was repealed in 1980. That two-step promotion meant two separate selections. One was for temporary grade under the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 and was the initial change of insignia and increase in pay grade. The second was a permanent promotion under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and sometimes had a significant impact on the career expectation of officers.<sup>46</sup> The system allowed the Army to appoint regular and reserve commissioned officers in a temporary grade that was equal to or higher than their regular or reserve grade. Since its initial intent was for use during war, these temporary promotions were valid for six

months after conflict termination. If such a system of temporary promotions were set in place to be activated during reconstitution, it would enable those regular Army officer and enlisted soldiers promoted to fill vacancies in newly forming units to revert back to a "permanent grade."

A dual promotion system would require both a permanent and a temporary rank and date of rank. The soldiers' permanent rank and date of rank would initially be that which they held upon initiation of the dual system. They would then compete for temporary promotions to meet the total force requirements as authorizations increased during reconstitution. Permanent promotions would continue concurrently to satisfy the smaller base force requirements. Once the threat was eliminated either peaceably or by war, those reservists called to active duty would be discharged, and the dual promotion system terminated. Those regular Army soldiers who received temporary promotions would revert back to their permanent grade. Since the permanent promotion system would be running concurrent with the temporary promotions, some soldiers would have been promoted in their permanent rank and would retain that rank rather than reverting back to their pre-reconstitution period rank.

By establishing a dual system, the Army would have the mid-career soldiers when they needed them without paying for them prior to reconstitution. Conversely, with the build down the Army would continue to be able to retain the active force that it had prior to reconstitution without a heavy senior grade

imbalance. Such a plan would require legislation, and it might be argued that with the VSI/SSB there is no need for the law at this time. However, there are no guarantees as to the composition by skill and grade of the future Ready Reserve. This plan could be enacted for use only upon a decision to reconstitute. It would result in modifications to the personnel promotion and record keeping system; however, with sufficient lead time the system could be adapted to accommodate these promotions.

Is the plan affordable? With the end to the Cold War and a continuing recessionary period in the United States, the American people are looking for the "peace dividend." Manpower comprises forty-one percent of the Army's 1992 budget.<sup>47</sup> Thus any actions developed and implemented now to support reconstitution need to be affordable. Key to the expansion of the base force is an adequate pre-trained pool of manpower and a means to satisfy the mid-grade requirements. The Army cannot limit itself to the IRR; it needs to develop other low cost options which will develop a pre-trained pool available for expansion.

The downsizing of the active duty forces and the reserve component units will create an influx to the IRR. Coupled with the eight-year military service obligation, these actions will keep the IRR strength at current levels through the remainder of this century. However, if current IRR levels will be inadequate in 1996 to reconstitute our forces, then actions must be taken now to ensure those levels do not decline further. Greater

attention will also be required in monitoring critical skills in the IRR to ensure they will be available in the numbers needed.

The solution to the mid-grade requirement will not be simple. Obviously, the Army will not be able to afford to over-man all of its mid-grade requirements, even at the expense of under-manning in the junior ranks. It would be too costly and could not be justified. Lead time will once again be critical. It takes time to train and develop leaders. The more warning time we have and the more willing the national leadership is to initiate reconstitution measures as early as possible, the more the Army will be able to increase its mid-grade strength incrementally. Cadre units will help but will have to be limited to the reserve components to keep the costs down. Planning will have to provide a means to rapidly grow and/or promote mid-grade leaders. It will also need to address how to reduce their numbers when the national response has been successful; this will be especially true for those careerists who were on active duty at the time reconstitution commenced.

## CONCLUSIONS

While reconstitution is a part of the United States' National Military Strategy, it remains a concept without sufficient definition, funding, or adequate emphasis. Downsizing the Services without viable reconstitution plans will mean forces which may not be able to ensure the protection of U.S. policy and interests at home and abroad. Action is needed now in order that reconstitution can be properly planned, tested, and evaluated.

To date, planning has been based upon the assumption that the military would reconstitute wholly new units to resume the forces held at the end of FY 1989. Aspects that should be considered in planning include:

- o Adequate warning time will be essential. This lead time will be critical to obtaining the political decisions needed, in bringing manpower on active duty, expanding the training base to accept the surge, equipping the new units, and conducting unit level training.

- o The eighteen- to twenty-six-year old male population in the U.S. will be adequate to meet reconstitution requirements.

- o The Army will need over 550,000 additional military personnel and over 100,000 civilian personnel to resume a 1989 force level.

- o Existing mobilization legislation will not provide personnel for new units during the first three

to four years of a five-year rearmament. It is unlikely that a national emergency would be declared with sufficient lead time. Therefore, Congress would have to approve and resource higher strength levels for the initial years of reconstitution.

- o The Army must pro-actively maintain an available pool of pre-trained manpower to meet future threats regardless of warning time. The IRR and retirees will be the primary sources with a strength of over 500,000; however, significant grade and skill mismatches will occur.

- o Mid-grade leaders will be the Achilles heel for manpower planning. Time to grow leaders will be needed; even if the Army decides to promote and move soldiers to new units, time will be needed to train and develop cohesive units.

- o The VSI and SSB programs will provide a nucleus of mid-grade leaders for the IRR, but more will be needed. As the century ends, greater periods of time will be required to retrain and refresh these personnel.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are submitted for consideration in planning for reconstitution:

- o More emphasis is needed from the Executive branch to develop this strategy actively within all relevant departments and agencies.
- o Legislation is required to fund full-time planning across all Federal agencies.
- o Consideration should be given to extending the military service obligation from eight to ten years in order to ensure the health of the IRR.
- o A dual promotion system for both officers and enlisted personnel should be enacted, and the procedures put in place, for implementation in the event of reconstitution.
- o Where possible, critical skills should be maintained above authorized levels in the active and reserve components even at the expense of other skill strength levels.
- o A study should be made of the costs of expanding the JROTC programs in our nation's high schools, and legislation modified to resource additional school programs.
- o An increase in the percentage of two- and three-year enlistments is needed in order to expand the pre-trained manpower base.

This review of reconstitution has explored its definition, along with a brief history of manpower mobilization, and has presented several options and alternatives that the Army should consider in addressing the manpower issues. The United States has historically neither maintained a sufficiently large standing peacetime Army nor reacted quickly to preparing for a threat. The concept of reconstitution offers alternatives to ensure military preparedness. With the demise of the Soviet threat, the need to maintain a large standing force seems remote. However, the re-emergence of a force that would threaten this nation's security is a real possibility. The time available to prepare for such a threat is projected to be two to five years, hence, the rationale for the concept of reconstitution.

The Army must have an active plan and initiatives in place to meet the manpower needs of reconstituting a force. Alternatives available to the Army include: lengthen military service obligations, expand the JROTC program, decrease the duration of enlistments, increase the manning of critical skills, and develop a dual-promotion system. The programs all come with a cost and it may be difficult to secure Congressional support. However, these actions will help to ensure available manpower to complete the requirements to build wholly new units. As Napoleon said, "...it is wise to begin...several years in advance."<sup>48</sup>

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