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**THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
AND
JAPANESE EXPANSIONISM
1902-1923**

**A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree**

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

**LEONARD S. KOSAKOWSKI, MAJ, USA
B.A., University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 1983**

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
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THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AND JAPANESE EXPANSIONISM 1902-1923 by MAJ Leonard S. Kosakowski, USA, 134 pages.

This study explains how Japan used the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to seek recognition among the world powers as an equal and territorial gains to satiate rapid gains in population and industrialization. Often referred to as the cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy during its lifespan (1902-1923), the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided Japan with an opportunity to achieve her national goals. This study discusses how the Alliance influenced Japan's decision to make war with Russia in 1904, annex Korea in 1910, pursue territorial gains during World War I, and eventually gain dominance in the Far East by the early 1920's.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What Japan has now to do is to keep perfectly quiet, to lull the suspicions that have arisen against her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her national power, watching and waiting for the opportunity which must one day surely come in the Orient.¹

Count Tadasu Hayashi
Jiji Shimpo
June 1895

In 1900 Japan sought recognition among the world powers as an equal and territorial gains to satiate rapid gains in population and industrialization. The most important single factor in the international relations in the Far East during that time was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The signing of the Alliance with Great Britain in 1902 provided Japan with an opportunity to achieve her national goals.

This thesis explains how Japan used the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1922) to achieve those goals. Specifically,

¹ A.M. Pooley, The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi (London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1915), 109.

the thesis discusses how the Alliance influenced Japan's decision to make war with Russia in 1904, annex Korea in 1910, pursue territorial gains during World War I, and eventually gain dominance in the Far East by the early 1920's.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance provides a snapshot of Japanese expansionism. This snapshot can serve as an excellent tool with which to explore the national and diplomatic goals of early 20th Century Japan. Analysis of the Alliance may also provide a good basis for comparing 20th Century Japanese-Western relations. These relations, dominated by diplomacy and warfare during the first half of the century, are now dominated by diplomacy and economics.²

LIMITATIONS/DELIMITATIONS

The research for this thesis is based upon open source literature published in or translated into English. This thesis is not a diplomatic history of Japan and, thus, all treaties or alliances with or concerning Japan are not addressed. Only those diplomatic agreements pertinent to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are included.

² R.P. Dua, Anglo-Japanese Relations During the First World War (New Delhi: S.Chand and Company, 1972), 60.

BACKGROUND

Japan's quest for empire commenced in earnest during the closing decades of the 19th Century. Japan consistently and brilliantly coordinated her national objectives and strategies. Late 19th Century Japanese foreign policy focused principally on (1) controlling the Korean Peninsula and (2) halting the rise of Russian expansion in China. Understanding both concerns to Japan is paramount in discussing the origins and effect of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.³

SINO-JAPANESE WAR

Japan's decisive and spectacular victory over China in 1894-1895 marked her meteoric rise as an up-and-coming world power. The victory awoke the European Powers to the level of Japan's military strength. The war marked the transition of the Far East question from a state of

³ James B. Crowley, Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 15-16.

quiescence to one of extreme activity that would last through the life of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The specifics of the military operations of the Sino-Japanese War are not appropriate for discussion in this thesis, but the outcomes are.⁴

The Sino-Japanese War marked the first time in Japan's modern history in which she resorted to war as an instrument of national policy. China's claim to Korea as a tributary and attempt to reassert Chinese hegemony over the Hermit Kingdom threatened Japan. Japan perceived Korea to be potentially a dagger pointed at her heart. An "independent" Korea was essential to Japanese national security.

Behind national security policies were strong economic reasons influencing Japan's concern over the control of Korea. Rapid increases in population and industrialization in the late 19th Century required Japanese statesmen to look for foreign markets and natural resources. Korea's geographical position, sparse population, and undeveloped resources suited Japan's needs.⁵

Japan's declaration of war on China on August 1, 1894, ended with victory and the signing of the Treaty of

⁴ Dua, 1-2.

⁵ Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 34-39.

Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. Japanese victory destroyed her bamboo barrier of seclusion and forced her into the currents of world affairs. The Treaty of Shimonoseki declared Chinese recognition of Korea as an independent state. It granted Japan war indemnities and territory - Formosa, the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria. Japanese newspapers and politicians were intoxicated with pride. Japan had won her first modern war. Or had she?*

Although victory against China provided Japan more territories and opportunities for expansion in Korea, it exposed her political weakness. This was a weakness the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to eventually remedy. Only six days after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki,

representatives of France, Germany, and Russia notified the Japanese government that possession of the Liaotung Peninsula would be a constant menace to the capital of China, could at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East.⁷

* M.V.A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), Vol 1 (Manchu Period), 18.

⁷ William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, 1951, 186, quoted in James B. Crowley, Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 16-17.

At the initiative of Nicholas II, the "Driebund" - Russia, Germany and France - demanded Japan retrocede the Liaotung Peninsula. By restraining Japan from acquiring the Peninsula, the Driebund, particularly Russia, attempted to guard their interests in the Far East. Expressing concern about Japan gaining a foothold on the continent upon conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, the Russian Foreign Minister Lobanov-Rostovskii said that if given the opportunity, Japan would spread like a "drop of oil on a sheet of blotting paper."⁸ The triple intervention against Japan exposed her isolation vis-a-vis the European Powers. Feeling the combined diplomatic weight of the European Powers, Japan conceded.

Although not pro-Japanese, Great Britain did not take part in the three-power intervention. Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Undersecretary, did not consider England's commercial interests threatened by the treaty and thought the intervention repugnant and unnecessary. This position played a significant role in the Japanese decision to sign the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance seven years later.⁹

⁸ Baron Ramon R. Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy (New York, 1922): 136, quoted in Chung-fu Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), 15.

⁹ Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1968), 26-33.

The intervention convinced many Japanese statesmen that if Japan wanted to take its place side by side with other nations of the world, it was not enough for her to meet them on the battlefield. She must also improve her national strength to meet her opponents at the diplomatic tables. Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Hayashi, clearly reflected Japan's humiliation:¹⁰

Our countrymen must be warned that the Treaty of Shimonoseki and its amendments by no means ends matters We must be prepared for many years to come to carry on warlike and peaceful measures for the assertion of our rights We must persistently suffer the insufferable and support the insupportable for the sake of what the future will have in store for us What Japan has now to do is to keep perfectly quiet, to lull the suspicions that have arisen against her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her national powers, watching and waiting for the opportunity which must one day surely come in the Orient. When that day arrives she will be able to follow her own course, not only to put meddling Powers in their places, but even, as necessity arises, meddling with the affairs of other Powers. Then truly she will be able to reap advantages for herself.¹¹

The Three Power Intervention transformed the history of Japan. It stymied Japan's entry into international

¹⁰ The Jiji Shimpo, founded in 1882 by Fukuzawa Yukichi, was an independent Japanese-language newspaper used by those who favored promoting British-Japanese relations.

¹¹ A.M. Pooley, The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, 109-13.

affairs and forced her to concentrate on building up her national strength. The Japanese populace and statesmen carried this burden of humiliation with them into the 20th Century. Russia had become more than just another European commercial power in the Far East, it had become a threat to the national security of the Land of the Rising Sun.¹²

After the Sino-Japanese War, Japan's population and industries grew rapidly. Her increasing population (Figure 1) placed high demands on food supplies. The nation turned from being a food exporter to a food importer.

**POPULATION TRENDS IN JAPAN
1872-1900¹³**

Year	Population (Unit 1,000)	Average Annual Increase (Unit 1,000)	Rate of Average Annual Increase (Per 1,000)
1872	34,806	-	5.1
1875	35,316	180.9	7.4
1880	36,649	266.6	7.9
1885	38,313	332.8	8.2
1890	39,902	317.8	8.2
1895	41,557	331.0	10.8
1900	43,847	458.0	12.3

Figure 1.

¹² Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 46-48.

¹³ Tokyo Nichi Nichi, April 28, 1936; cited in Ishii Ryoichi, Population Pressure and Economic Life in Japan (London: P.S. King and Son, 1937), 59.

Japan's industrial expansion demanded new sources of chemicals, metals, and minerals. The amount of commodities imported to fuel her advancing levels of industrialization continued to rise significantly (Figure 2). The acquisition and control of foreign markets to feed and fuel her growing economy became more essential to her national existence. Japan's growing dependence on external resources to feed her population and fuel her industrialization prompted more acute awareness of Russia's developing presence in China and Korea.

COMMODITIES IMPORTED BY JAPAN¹⁴

	Chemicals and Metals	Raw Materials	Foodstuffs	Other
1890	16.2%	21.8%	10.4%	51.6%
1895	18.6%	25.9%	11.7%	43.8%
1900	20.6%	31.3%	14.2%	33.9%

(Percentages shared by commodity groups)

Figure 2.

¹⁴ W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 126.

RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM

In 1896 China signed a secret treaty with Russia establishing a mutual defense alliance against further Japanese aggression. Chinese compensation to Russia for intervening in the Treaty of Shimonoseki on China's behalf included Russian leases of Port Arthur and Dairen and rights in the adjoining peninsulas of Shantung and Liaotung. Russia now obtained the same Port Arthur and Dairen that she had taken away from Japan via the Driebund. Russia justified its actions claiming that Japan's encroachment was a menace to peace. Russia, by securing a more prominent position in China, was merely providing stability for the area.¹⁵

Russia did not limit its "slice of the Chinese melon" to just simply occupying territory. China also agreed to allow Russia to build a railroad through Northern Manchuria. This railway would provide a strategic extension to the Trans-Siberian railroad under construction since 1891. The railway, known as the Chinese Eastern Railway, made available a route 568 miles shorter than the one running wholly within Russian territory. The railway

¹⁵ Victor A. Yakhontoff, Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East (New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1931), 45-46.

thus had great strategic and, therefore, military value.

Concurrently, Russia also secured the right to construct a railway north from Port Arthur and Talien to the Chinese Eastern Railway, running east and west across the northern part of Manchuria.

A great deal of Russophobia in Japan focused on Sino-Russian relations. In Japan, it was now widely believed that China had become a Russian puppet.¹⁶

Russia did not limit her interest in Asia to just China. As Russia consolidated her position in Manchuria, she simultaneously reached out to establish her hold on Korea. During the Sino-Japanese War, Korea had been under the protection of Japanese troops by a treaty of alliance signed at Seoul on 26 August 1894. Although the independence of Korea was recognized by parties to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan in practice acquired paramount influence there after the war.

In October 1895, the Korean Queen Min, was brutally murdered. A Japanese minister was implicated in the plot. In early 1896, Russia marines landed at Chemulpo (Inchon), marched on Seoul and influenced a coup d'tat. The Korean king dismissed pro-Japanese officials and appointed Russian advisors.

¹⁶ Westel W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), 155-56.

Russia now held the trump card in Korea. Japan felt threatened. Russia had acquired special rights and privileges in both China and Korea - the dagger thrust at Japan's heart. From a position of strength, Russia orchestrated a new protocol with Japan concerning the Korean Peninsula. The protocol forced Japan to relinquish her political and military dominance over Korea. The Nishi-Rosen Protocol, signed 25 April 1898 stated:

1. Japan and Russia confirm the sovereignty and complete independence of Korea, and agree to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of that country.

2. Japan and Russia, in the event Korea should request either Japan or Russia for counsel and assistance, shall not take any measure regarding the appointment of military instructors or financial advisers without having first arrived at a mutual understanding on the subject.

3. Recognizing Japan's predominant and developing commercial and industrial enterprises in Korea, the Imperial Russian Government agrees not to obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.²⁷

Lack of military power and political leverage prompted Japan to want to avoid any direct confrontation with the


²⁷ Ian H. Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Longman, 1985), 47.

Russians. Japan's Prime Minister Ito interpreted the protocol as a Russian pull-out. But it was nothing of the kind. Although Russia's primary Asian sphere of influence was in China, Russia did not completely discount the importance of Korea. Japan, previously the sole power in Korea, was now forced to share the peninsula with the Russians.

Japan interpreted the protocol as a green light to Japanese companies seeking commercial business development in Korea. By 1900 Japanese-Korean trade and the number of Japanese living in Korea increased. Japan acquired railway rights for the Seoul-Inchon and Seoul-Fusan rail lines.

Young Japanese statesmen argued Russia was not willing to give up Korea entirely, much less allow Japan to assume control over the entire Peninsula. They were right. By 1900, Russia, ignoring the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, sought to capitalize on Korea's goodwill towards Russia for services in the past. Russia attempted to obtain leases at Korea's best southern ports - Masampo, Mokpo, and Kojedo (Figure 3). Masampo, just west of Fusan, was of particular concern to Japan. Fusan marked the starting point of Japan's railway project in Japan. Russo-Japanese tensions rose again.^{1*}

^{1*} Ibid., 60-62.



Korea and Northeast Asia

Figure 3.1^a

^a I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 98.

As Japanese commercial activity in Korea increased, Russian presence in China expanded. Taking advantage of the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, Russia proceeded to occupy Manchuria. By the end of the year, Russian troops established control over the entire southern sector of Manchuria (Figure 4).²⁰

Foreign Possessions, Leases, and Spheres of Influence About 1900²¹



Figure 4.

²⁰ Chung-Fu Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), 70.

²¹ Meribeth E. Cameron, China, Japan and the Powers (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952), 292.

Japan demonstrated a new military strength while participating in the international force which suppressed the Boxers. But the ten-year armaments expansion program adopted in 1896 by the Japanese government had not yet reached fruition. Japan was still a secondary military power.²²

"Japan was not prepared to entertain an international solution to the problem [Korea]. Nor was she ready for a head-on clash with Russia."²³ Humiliated by the Triple Intervention in 1895 and threatened by Russian expansion in both China and Korea, Japan entered the 20th Century with tremendous military and diplomatic challenges.

A growing population and developing industrial economy could not wait long. Diplomatically isolated, Japan needed a powerful ally to gain leverage in the Far East to compliment her developing military power. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided her one.

²² J. Crowley, 19.

²³ C. Chang, 62.

Chapter II

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902)

This treaty [Anglo-Japanese Alliance] will sooner or later be the pretext for the inevitable war between Russia and Japan, not because it injures us [Russia] directly of itself, but because it constitutes for Japan a dangerous weapon which will allow her to provoke us without let-up.¹

Alexander M. Iswolsky
Russian Minister to Japan
February 1902

In 1900 Japan sought a political ally to strengthen her position in the Far East. Countering Russian expansion constituted her first priority. Russian expansion in the Far East convinced Prime Minister Taro Katsura that Russia would not stop with the occupation of Manchuria. Believing in the domino theory in the Far East, he wrote "[Russia] will inevitably extend into Korea and will not end until there is no room left for us."²

¹ George A. Lensen, ed., The D'Anethan Dispatches From Japan, 1894-1910 (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1967), 154.

² W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 77.

For Japan, the Korean issue was a matter of life and death. Japan needed a strong ally. That ally was to be Great Britain.

BRITISH INTERESTS THREATENED

Great Britain's primary interest in the Far East was China, not Korea. Those interests were principally commercial, not territorial. In 1900, British shares of China's total foreign trade exceeded seventy percent.³ English investment accounted for approximately thirty-three percent of all foreign investment in China (Figure 5).

Investment in China (1902)




Figure 5.⁴

(Per centage)

³ Times (London), 11, 26 January 1898.

⁴ W.G. Beasley, 133.

The outcome of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) had produced two problems for England. It challenged the supremacy of the British in China and brought England face to face with the problem of determining her policy in the event of the partition of China.

For more than a half a century England occupied a leading position in the councils of the Western Powers in China. There she had maintained a high prestige and had developed great commercial interests. The Sino-Japanese War and the diplomatic campaigns which accompanied and followed it turned the tables against Great Britain. Since then, China leaned more on the intervening Powers - Russia, France, and Germany - who were working more or less in harmony in the Far East.⁵

At the outset of the Sino-Japanese War, Great Britain had so obviously supported China with her hopes and convictions that Japan felt resentful. The first few weeks of the war convinced Britain that she had backed the wrong horse. The resultant political shifts were prompt and decisive.

This reversal in British policy was so obvious that it could not fail to attract attention. At first,

⁵ Chung-fu, Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1931), 54.

Japanese public opinion was distinctly anti-British. But by the end of the war it had changed to one of cordiality. Thus a foundation was laid upon which increasingly friendly relations were to be built.⁶

England, like Japan, feared Russia's growing influence in China. In 1898, Lord Salisbury, British Ambassador to Russia, stated that China was so weak that in all important matters she was constantly guided by the advice of a foreign power. Lord Salisbury believed Russia and England were constantly opposed, neutralizing each other's efforts much more frequently than the real antagonisms of their interests would justify. He predicted this condition was not likely to diminish, but increase.⁷

There was much furor in England over Russian designs in China. The public urged the British government to adopt a strong and definite policy. The British cabinet began to question the necessity of continuing her policy of "splendid isolation". Some favored a policy of alliance.⁸

⁶ Frank Williston, The End of British Isolation: The Origins of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1935), 34-60.

⁷ G.E. Hubbard, British Far Eastern Policy (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), 21.

⁸ Times (London) 31 January 1898; 14 May 1898.

Other factors in the world situation threatened to make the British position of political isolation and independence untenable. The Dual Alliance of France and Russia seemed designed from the first to pit the combined strength of its members against Great Britain wherever their paths might cross. A hegemonic power, England at the turn of the century was involved in confrontations in Africa, the Mediterranean, China, the Pacific, and Europe.

But the most serious threat to British trade during 1900 appeared in the Far East. The threatened partition of China and Russian expansion alarmed businessmen as well as diplomats. Great Britain needed an ally to counter this threat.

The other Western Powers had little to offer in countering Russia expansion. Britain leaned towards Japan to maintain the balance of European power in China. England's aim was threefold: protect British interests in China, fend off the strategic implications for European diplomacy of an imbalance of power in China, and maintain naval superiority in Asian waters.*

* Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance - The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1966), 174.

Russia's deployment of two battleships to the China Sea in 1901 enabled Russia to achieve naval superiority in the Far East. A memorandum of Lord Selborne (son-in-law of Prime Minister Salisbury) dated September 4, 1901, stated, "the standard of British naval strength was to maintain equality with the next two greatest naval powers combined. It was becoming impossible to do this in the Far East" (Figure 6).¹⁰ An alliance with Japan would allow Great Britain to maintain a decorum of naval superiority in the Far East.

**NAVAL STRENGTH OF THE FOUR MAJOR POWERS
IN THE FAR EAST
(1901)**

	JAPAN	BRITAIN	RUSSIA	FRANCE
Battleships	9	4	5	1
Cruisers	21	13	8	7
Destroyers	<u>16</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	46	24	19	9

Figure 6¹¹

¹⁰ Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, Alliance in Japanese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice University of Maryland, Ph.D., 1984), 103.

¹¹ Ibid., 103.

THE RISE OF JAPANESE NAVAL POWER

By 1901, Japanese naval power in the Far East had become a concern for England.¹² Japan's defense expenditures program (Figure 7) began to reach fruition .

JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
1870-1900
(in millions of dollars)




Figure 7.¹³

By 1882, the great naval dockyards of Yokosuka were laid out under French direction.¹⁴ But despite this

¹² Ibid., 98-99.

¹³ Ibid., 97.

¹⁴ Malcolm Kennedy, Some Aspects of Japan and Her Defence Forces (Kobe, Japan: J.L. Thompson & Co., 1928), 39-40.

initiative to internally develop her own navy, most of Japan's burgeoning fleet was still built in England. Gradually, Japan became the owner of an efficient navy, trained largely on British lines and composed, for the greater part, of English vessels (Figure 8).

**Japanese Capital Ship Development
(1878-1902)
(Selected Types)**

TYPE OF SHIP	YEAR BUILT	NUMBER	WHERE BUILT
BATTLESHIPS	1894	1	England
	1896	1	"
	1898	2	"
	1899	1	"
	1900	3	"
	1902	1	"
TOTAL		9	
ARMORED CRUISERS	1878	1	England
	1885	2	England/France
	1890	1	England
	1892	1	Japan
	1896	1	"
	1897	1	"
	1898	4	England
	1899	5	England/France
	1900	2	England
	1902	3	Japan/Italy
TOTAL		21	
DESTROYERS	1898	2	England
	1899	8	"
	1900	1	"
	1901	1	"
	1902	4	England/Japan
TOTAL		16	

Figure 8.¹⁵

¹⁵ J.C. Balet, Military Japan - The Japanese Army and Navy in 1910 (Yokohama, Japan: Kelly and Walsh, 1910), 182-193.

With the development of Japan's military well underway, the search for a strong diplomatic ally intensified. Count Hayashi, a leading advocate of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, stated:

Russia certainly intends to obtain a predominating position (in Asia) and in that case England's position in China might well become precarious. In this country all are agreed that the questions must finally be settled by the sword...If, however, England and Japan should make an alliance the problems of the Far East would be already settled... Japan, though she is young and inexperienced, is earnest and energetic. China is no longer the power of the Far East, nor is Japan yet.... The real power in the Far East is England. If England casts her lot with Japan, then she will more than ever be the Power of the Far East. England and Japan together can control China and ensure the maintenance of peace in the Far East.¹⁶

The right thing for Japan to do was to make an alliance with Great Britain. Such an alliance would counteract the machinations of the three intervening powers. At the turn of the century, Russo-Japanese relations were swinging back and forth like a pendulum, from amity to hostility. With interest in Korea, Manchuria and China proper, Russian and Japanese statesmen were repeatedly confronted with the choice of working with each other or against each other.

¹⁶ A.M. Pooley, The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1915), 114.

Some Japanese statesmen leaned towards Russo-Japanese collaboration. But Russian reluctance to come to terms with Japanese interests played into the hands of those who favored an alliance with Great Britain, Russia's major rival. An alliance with England would significantly increase Japan's ability to achieve victory when war with Russia came. Thus, the possibility of an Anglo-Japanese alliance elicited a hearty welcome from the entire Japanese nation.¹⁷

The development of Japan's military forces made her an attractive ally to Britain. Some British statesmen began to advocate an alliance with Japan. Sir Ellis Ashmead Bartlett, an eloquent advocate of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, spoke to the Commons:

I consider the rise of the Japanese power in the East has been very providential for this country. I do not know what our position would have been now if we had to face a combination of Russia and France, and possibly Germany as well, in the Far East. There is a very strong power growing up in Japan and by the help of Japan alone can we retain our position in the Northern Pacific...By using the power of Japan, they (the British Government) can, if we choose, control the whole Chinese question and the Northern Pacific.¹⁸

¹⁷ I.H. Nish, 216-17.

¹⁸ C. Chang, 63-64.

THE FIRST ALLIANCE CONCLUDED

It was the British awareness that Japan could play a significant role in the protection of her interests in India, in the Far East, and vis-a-vis Russia that England secretly concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For Japan, the Alliance put her in a position to avenge the Triple Intervention and relieve the loss inflicted upon her by the European Powers in 1895. The Alliance also gave diplomatic strength to Japan's expansionist interests in Korea.

British Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne and Japanese Minister to England Count Hayashi signed the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 30, 1902 (Appendix A). The treaty came into force immediately after its signature. It was published eleven days later in London and twelve days later in Tokyo.¹⁹

On February 12th, the New York Times reported the signing of the Alliance. The headlines read "A British Japanese Alliance Concluded - Its Object to Preserve the Integrity of China and Korea." An article stated the reason for the Alliance to be "the discovery that their

¹⁹ Ibid., 216.

[England's and Japan's] Far Eastern policies were identical." This resulted in "each party expressing its desire that their common policy finds expression in an international contract of binding validity."²⁰

The Alliance declared the governments of Japan and Great Britain desired to maintain the "status quo and general peace in the Extreme East," to uphold "the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea," and secure "equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations." The Alliance recognized that "Japan, in addition to the interests she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea."²¹

Article II contained the strength of the Alliance. It stated:

if either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests. . . should become involved in war with another Party, the other High Contracting Party will maintain strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its Ally.²²

²⁰ New York Times, 12 February, 1902.

²¹ Ibid., 216-17.

²² R.P. Dua, Anglo-Japanese Relations During the First World War (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1972), 44.

The Alliance was to remain in force for five years. In case either ally notified the other of its intention of terminating the treaty, it was to remain in force until a year after such notice of expiration was given. But, if the date of expiration should come at a time of war, the Alliance was to continue, "ipso facto", until peace should be concluded.²³

The Alliance put Japan in a position to avenge her losses and seek dominance of the Korean Peninsula. She knew she could not face Russia alone. Now, with the help of the Alliance, when war with Russia did come, other nations coming to the aid of Russia would also be confronted with England. The British and Japanese fleets together would be strong enough to dissuade the European Powers (except Russia) from making war with Japan.²⁴

Japan had always feared that a war with Russia would mean a conflict with the military forces of the great Dual (Franco-Russian) Alliance. With the signing of the Alliance, those fears subsided. New Japanese ambitions of revenge and expansion crested.

²³ C. Chang, 84.

²⁴ Ibid., 79

THE WORLD RESPONDS

Press reactions to news of the Alliance varied. Liberal English newspapers such as the Daily News gave prominent coverage to the criticism made by English liberals that the Alliance was unnecessary. The London Times unenthusiastically accepted it. Few English publications made an all-out assault on the new alliance. The Spectator, one of the leading weeklies at the time that had long supported rapprochement with Russia, reported general concern that closer relations with Japan would prevent the cherished improvement of Anglo-Russian relations and add to Britain's overseas liabilities.²⁵

Reactions in the Japanese press were supportive and hopeful. Both the Jiji Shimpō and Asahi Shimbun supported the Alliance. Articles in both of the papers stated that allying with such a super power as Great Britain gave much honor to Japan.

The Nippon, an independent nationalist newspaper, devoted an editorial to warning the Japanese people that

they should think of the alliance in terms not of honor but of national interest; unless Japan exerted herself and became self-reliant, the treaty of alliance would become purely nominal.²⁶

²⁵ G. Lensen, 155.

²⁶ I.H. Nish, 226.

In this statement, the press echoed the government's own exhortation that the people should not rest on their laurels but devote themselves to further efforts for the sake of national development.

The Japanese people favored the Alliance. The announcement of the Alliance gave rise to outbursts of enthusiasm. Not a dissentient word was heard. There were host dinners and public meetings throughout Japan at which politicians extolled the virtues of the twin island empires.

The Japanese position in the Far East was now underwritten. Most importantly, for the first time, an Asiatic power had entered as an equal into an alliance with a Western Power. Regardless of the price which might ultimately be demanded, the Alliance promised large dividends for Japan, and her people recognized the fact.²⁷

In the United States, the Alliance was hailed by both the press and people as a measure to secure the open door in China without involving the United States. The American press showed an amazing degree of unanimity in welcoming the Alliance. The New York Tribune, through cartoons, editorials, and lengthy news articles, gave their blessing to the new venture.

²⁷ Ibid., 227.

Count Hayashi declared that the most important clause in the Alliance was the recognition of the privileged position of Japan in Korea. The Korean government accepted it.²⁸ Korea hoped the Alliance would assist them in resisting "any insidious advances which might be made to them with the object of undermining their independence or obtaining concessions inconsistent with their interests."²⁹

For China, the Alliance held out the hope of blocking the Russian southward expansion. To some Chinese patriots, however, the cost threatened to overbalance the gain. If the Alliance presumed the assertion of British and Japanese spheres of influence, or even the simple acknowledgment that China was unable to fend for herself, Chinese sovereignty was gone.³⁰

The international diplomatic corps received the news of the Alliance with some surprise, if not with a great deal of astonishment. Germany and France displayed concern. Russia asked Germany and France to take a stand with her to neutralize the effects of the Alliance.³¹

²⁸ F. Williston, 240.

²⁹ G.P. Gooch, ed., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol 2 (The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Franco-British Entente), (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927), 129.

³⁰ F. Williston, 241.

³¹ Ibid., 230.

Russia was displeased with the Alliance. "So scrupulously had the secret of these negotiations been observed, that not even the Russian Legation in Tokyo had gotten wind of the bomb which burst so suddenly". Though the Russians pretended to affect calm, they could not help but consider the Alliance a diplomatic defeat and threat.³²

No one doubted that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, though affecting the appearance of an instrument of peace, was in fact a weapon aimed against Russia. Alexander Iswolsky, Russian Minister to Tokyo, clearly reflected the Russian view of the Alliance:

Russia cannot remain indifferent to this humiliation, and must without delay deal a striking blow before the eyes of the Japanese to nullify the psychological effect of the new treaty. Manchuria is ours. We shall complete its conquest in a slow and sure way and neither the Japanese Army allied to the remains of the English Army of the Transvaal nor any other Power will ever dislodge us from there. The blow that we will strike will be loud and brilliant and will only tend to abate the arrogance of the Japanese towards us and prove to them the absurdity of the treaty of alliance. . . . Whatever it may be, this treaty will sooner or later be the pretext for the inevitable war between Russia and Japan, not because it injures us directly of itself, but because it constitutes for Japan a dangerous weapon which will allow her to provoke us without let-up...and finally, at the end of our patience, exasperated, we shall accept the challenge.³³

³² I.H. Nish, 227.

³³ G. Lensen, 154-56.

Although some nations considered the Anglo-Japanese Alliance an instrument of peace and stability in the Far East, for Japan it was a weapon to pursue her expansionistic goals. The Alliance encouraged Japan to undertake saving Korea from Russia. Through the Alliance, Japan found new impetus and encouragement for expansion in Korea and China. Japan, now possessing the diplomatic leverage of the Alliance and formidable military power of her growing navy, was prepared to pursue her national goals with re-newed vigor and strength.

CHAPTER III

JAPAN ACHIEVES WORLD POWER STATUS

The real test of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not come until the time of the diplomatic negotiations which Japan had taken up directly with Russia in regard to Manchuria and Korea, and during the war that followed.¹

Chang Chung-Fu

I believe these little people will fight if they are crowded too far.²

John Hay

U.S. Secretary of State

1904

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided military assistance from Great Britain if Japan became involved in hostilities. It enabled Japan to challenge Russian expansion in Manchuria and Korea without fear of another Triple Intervention. The Alliance also reduced the importance of Russian naval power which had been growing in the Far East.³

¹ C. Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), 96.

² R. Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia (New York: The MacMillan Press, 1979), 53.

³ W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 78.

These improvements in Japan's continental position increased tension with Russia. During 1902 and 1903 Japan used this improved position to attempt to bring about the withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria and a settlement of Russo-Japanese disputes regarding Korea. These efforts, for the most part, failed. These failures precipitated war with Russia in 1904.⁴

PRELUDE TO WAR

During the Boxer crisis of 1900, rebel forces in Manchuria conducted hostilities against the Russians and compelled them to evacuate major population centers. By late 1900, Russia had deployed 175,000 troops to China to counter the Boxer threats. While re-occupying positions on the new railway system, Russia negotiated an agreement with China thus consolidating her position in Manchuria.

The signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in January 1902 prompted Russia to agree in April to evacuate her

⁴ I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance - The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1968), 247.

military forces from Manchuria in three six-month phases. Russia accomplished only the first phase. The second stage due in April 1903, however, did not take place. Simultaneously, the Russians obtained lumber concessions in northern Korea. Meanwhile, Russia continued to transport 7,000 troops a month to China over the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Many of these forces were deployed along the Russian-Korean border.⁵

March 1903 came and went without further withdrawals. Faced with this situation, the Japanese government feared, above all, complete Russia control of Manchuria. Control of Manchuria would enable Russia to place increasing pressure upon the Korean government and, as a result, weaken Japanese influence there. The Japanese "felt fortified to protest to the Russians." This protest represented a coming of age for Japan which had kept quiet prior to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.⁶

Despite the Russo-Chinese evacuation agreement, in 1903, the Russian navy continued concentrating her fleet at Port Arthur. This caused grave concern in Japan. The

⁵ Y. Amakawa, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902-1923: The Study of an Alliance Under the Balance of Power System, Claremont Graduate School, Ph.D., Modern History, 1977, 67.

⁶ I.H. Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy 1869-1942 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 69.

official history of the Japanese-Russian War, published by the General Staff at Tokyo, characterized Russia's fleet concentration as an "aim to scare Japan." Russian naval and artillery exercises by units stationed in Vladivostok clearly expressed this intent.⁷

Time was Russia's ally. Every year that passed enabled her to consolidate her position in China and strengthen her overall influence in Asia. Russia wanted control of Manchuria. China resisted. With the strength of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance behind her, Japan, in June 1903, entered into negotiations with Russia to try to clear up the situation in the Far East.

According to a secret communique sent from the British Minister in Tokyo to the Foreign Office in London in November 1903, the Japanese government favored an arrangement with Russia at almost any price. British Minister to Tokyo, Sir Claude M. MacDonald, stated in the communique Japan's reliance on the Alliance:

⁷ V. Yakhontoff, Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East (New York: Coward-McCann, 1931), 48.

he had been informed that the present perplexities of the Japanese Government, and the action of Russia in Manchuria and on the frontiers of Korea [sic] is the direct outcome of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. [Japan] made the Alliance because they foresaw that Russia would behave much as she has done, and that, alliance or no alliance, her advance towards Korea [sic] would continue and menace the peace of the Far East. Japan trusted the Alliance to help in keeping the peace; should they be disappointed in this hope, they doubtless thought that it would be useful to have a powerful friend upon whom they might rely in time of trouble to exercise a very benevolent neutrality.*

The Japanese government developed the following terms as the basis for Japan's approach to Russia. Japan and Russia agreed to:

1. To preserve the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry.
2. To mutually recognize the rights which they possess at present in Korea and Manchuria.
3. To mutually recognize their right of sending forces when they need to preserve their above-mentioned interests or to repel uprisings in these territories. Troops to be withdrawn immediately after the object of sending them has been achieved.
4. Furthermore, Russia was to recognize Japan's special right to advise and assist Korea in carrying out internal reforms.*

* G.P. Gooch, ed., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol 2, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Franco-British Entente", (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927), 214.

* I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 263.

Japan's new naval and diplomatic strength compelled Russia to negotiate. These protracted negotiations continued from August 1903 to February 1904. They resulted in Japan receiving a fairly free hand in Korea.

But Japan refused to recognize Russian dominance over Manchuria which St. Petersburg demanded. Japan offered only to recognize Russian rights along the railways in China. Japan insisted on preserving China's integrity.¹⁰

The general public in Japan became impatient with the government's failure to check Russian activities in Manchuria. Japan's leading newspapers, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, Jiji Shimpo, and Osaka Mainichi, demanded war with Russia. On June 10, 1903, seven distinguished professors from Tokyo's Imperial University presented a memorial to the premier demanding the government take decisive steps towards Russian expansion in Manchuria. They pointed out the inevitability of war.¹¹

¹⁰ J.K. Fairbank, East Asia - The Modern Transformation (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1965), vol 2, 479-80.

¹¹ T. Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1935), 140-41.

By December 1903, war seemed unavoidable.

They [Japanese Government] gave their permission for war preparations on 24 December[1903]. An imperial conference, convened on 12 January 1904, held that the Russian replies were unsatisfactory and not a basis for negotiation. . . . Yet all around opinion was deeply pessimistic that Japan's capacity for war was so inferior to Russia's, financially, militarily and navally. As in 1941, the strike could not be delayed; and it was vital to make the first strike.¹²

Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia on February 6, 1904. On the eighth, Japanese torpedo boats conducted a surprise night attack against the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. Japan declared war on February 10, 1904.¹³

WAR AND THE SECOND ALLIANCE

The British Government left no doubt it intended to maintain strict neutrality in the event of a Russo-Japanese war. Early in 1904 when Japan announced that negotiations with Russia were being broken off, Britain deliberately confirmed she would fulfil her obligations under the

¹² I.H. Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy 1869-1942, 71.

¹³ J.K. Fairbank, 480.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Exhausted from the Boer War, England was in no position to be involved in an East Asian war. England would try to prevent other powers from joining in the hostilities.¹⁴

Japan did not intend to invoke Britain's assistance as an ally. The British leaders realized Japan was determined to be guided by her own interests in resolving the dispute with Russia. Japan would not be swayed by an appeal in the name of the Alliance.

A declaration of neutrality did not necessarily imply Britain might not become involved in the struggle in defence of her own interests. Just as Japan in 1914 was to declare war on Germany to suit herself rather than to fulfil the provisions of the British Alliance, Britain might have found herself in circumstances where it might be necessary to enter the war.¹⁵

¹⁴ I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 283.

¹⁵ The Boer War, 1899-1902, caused 5,774 British killed and 22,829 wounded. British forces in the beginning of the war totaled not more than 25,000, but before the war ended, 500,000 British soldiers were in South Africa - drawn from empire resources around the world. Quoted from R. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 855.

So the war went on without the interference of other European Powers. The contest was between Russia and Japan. It was to be a showdown of force. The winner would gain dominance not only in China but probably Korea as well.

Japan's principal military objective was to land their armies in Korea and Manchuria and destroy Russian ground forces. The major threat to this objective was the Russian fleet in China. Thus, Japan's naval strategy for the war focused on neutralizing the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in order to "control the Yellow Sea and prevent any reinforcements coming from Vladivostok."¹⁶

Port Arthur was Russia's only year-round ice-free port on the Pacific Coast. Its capture would deprive the Russians of any winter naval base should they send their Baltic Fleet into the Pacific.

The Japanese knew the sole Russian supply line over land was the Trans-Siberian Railway - the 5,500-mile single-track line between Moscow and Port Arthur. A 100-mile gap in the line at Lake Baikal complicated Russian logistical difficulties. Despite Russia's tremendous

¹⁶ Noble Franklin, ed., Decisive Battles of the Twentieth Century: Land-Sea-Air (New York: David McKay Co., 1976), 1.

manpower (the over-all strength of her army was 4,500,000 men), east of Lake Baikal, Russia could only mobilize 83,000 field troops with 196 guns, plus some 50,000 garrison troops and railway guards.

Given command of the sea, Japan could quickly place 283,000 men and 870 guns on the Asian mainland. This force could soon be augmented by 400,000 trained reserves.¹⁷

The war began in earnest with Japanese attacks on Port Arthur following the first surprise assault on February 8th. The assault paralyzed the Russian fleet. Japan intentionally sunk a group of Russian vessels at the entrance to Port Arthur Bay (Figure 9). Russian ships essentially blockaded their own port.¹⁸

"The first phase of the war witnessed Japanese forces in the Yellow Sea destroying seven Russian battleships, six cruisers and twenty-nine destroyers."¹⁹ Japan lost only two battleships, two cruisers, and two destroyers.

¹⁷ R. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 920-26.

¹⁸ V. Yakhontoff, Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East (New York: Coward-McCann, 1931), 54.

¹⁹ N. Franklin, 1.




Figure 920

20 T. Cowen, The Russo-Japanese War - From the Outbreak of Hostilities to the Battle of Liaoyang (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), 344.

The situation became critical for Russia. Russian reinforcements sailed from the Baltic Sea to the Far East in October 1904. They did not arrive in Asia until May 1905. This period of time allowed Japan time to repair her ships and successfully continue her ground campaign in Manchuria.

In May [1904], Japanese forces transported to Korea crossed the Yalu River into Manchuria; others invested Port Arthur and occupied Dairen. Port Arthur finally surrendered in January 1905, after a long and costly siege. Meantime in a series of great land battles, the aggressive Japanese forced the defensive-minded Russians to withdraw north along their vital supply line, the railway, by constantly outflanking them. By March 1905, when a 17-day battle for Mukden ended again in Russian withdrawal, both sides were exhausted and the Russians were further embarrassed by widespread revolutionary disorders at home.²¹

In hope of regaining command of the sea, Russia sent most of her Baltic fleet, a collection of some forty-five vessels, halfway around the world to defeat the Japanese navy. Thanks to the driving energy and determination of Admiral Rozhestvensky, the fleet reached Asian waters in what was a marvel of supply and endurance. In May 1905, the long line of warships tried to make for Vladivostok and repairs. The Japanese fleet intercepted them in the Tsushima Straits (Figure 10).

²¹ J.K. Fairbank, 480.

Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905




Figure 10.²²

²² K. Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict - Its Causes and Issues (Westminster, England: Archibald Constable and Company, 1904), i.

The Japanese fleet scored an overwhelming victory (Figure 11) and sank all but three of the Russian ships. According to President T. Roosevelt, it was a victory more complete and overwhelming than those of Trafalgar or the Armada.²³ Russia now lost hope of support from the sea.

**BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA
CASUALTIES**

	Killed	Wounded or taken prisoner	Total
Japanese	117	583	700
Russian	4,830	5,917	10,747

Figure 11.

On May 31, 1905, Japan's Foreign Minister Komura formally asked President T. Roosevelt to assist in negotiating a settlement to the war. The Russians, troubled by political unrest and financial pressure, agreed to meet with the Japanese at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The peace conference began on August 9, 1905.

²³ N. Franklin, 5.

Japan payed a heavy price for her string of military victories against the Russians. In early 1905 the Japanese Army warned that it could not sustain the present rate of casualties much longer. Mounting international war debts greatly concerned the Japanese government.²⁴ The Japanese High Command in Manchuria estimated that at least a thousand million yen and a quarter of a million more soldiers would be needed if the war were to continue.²⁵

Reaching economic and military exhaustion, the Japanese government realized she must go to the peace conference in Portsmouth and try to negotiate from a position of strength. Remembering the Triple Intervention in 1895, Japan knew she could not afford to do otherwise.

²⁴ British and American loans to Japan provided the bulk of foreign loans to finance the war. Japan's foreign loans concluded during the war:
First - 10 million pounds (Brit) May 1904 UK, USA
Second- 12 million pounds (Brit) Nov 1904 UK, USA
Third - 30 million pounds (Brit) Apr 1905 UK, USA
Fourth- 30 million pounds (Brit) Jul 1905 UK, USA, Germany
Quoted in Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 288.

²⁵ Richard Storry, A History of Modern Japan (New York: Penguin Books, 1960), 142.

Japan did all she could to guarantee a strong position at the negotiating tables. To fortify her position at the peace conference and to provide for any contingency of Russia coming back in the near future, nothing could have been better for Japan than a new treaty with her old ally England.²⁶

England and Japan signed the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance in London on August 12, 1905, three days after the opening of the Portsmouth peace conference. As its aim was different from that of the Alliance of 1902, so were its terms (Appendix B).²⁷

Towards the end of the Russo-Japanese War, there was growing concern in England that the defeat of Russia in the East might divert her energy toward Central Asia and the northwestern frontier of the Indian Empire. Russia now threatened not British commercial interests in China, but possibly England's prize colony - India.

Russia, though having sustained great losses in the recent war, still appeared to be a serious threat to the Indian frontier. This danger seemed to be a hundred times

²⁶ W.G. Beasley, 84.

²⁷ C. Chang, 285-88.

more real if one considered the close relations between Russia and Germany at this time. The Kaiser's aim was to divert Russia's attention from Europe and to win her over by working together with Russia in Asia.

Members of the British House of Commons thought the extended Indian frontier as vulnerable as the frontier of any European Power. Russia had just completed the Trans-Siberian Railroad. During the last twelve months, she had also completed

a second great trunk line from Orenburg to Tashkend. . . . With two lines of railway completed, she could, in event of hostilities, be able to plant on our [India] frontier an army of considerably over 5000,000.²⁰

Great Britain proposed re-newing the Alliance to provide added protection for her prize colony. She also wanted to show continuing support for Japan in the war. Foreign Minister Baron Komura fully appreciated England's support. He, like many of Japan's statesmen, also valued the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had allowed Japan to carry on war with Russia alone without fear of being attacked by other countries. He made this feeling quite clear in a speech delivered at the banquet celebrating the third anniversary of the Alliance in February, 1905.²¹

²⁰ I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 303.

²¹ S. Hishida, Japan Among the Great Powers - A Survey of Her International Relations (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), 159-60.

Komura eagerly accepted the British proposal to extend the scope of the Alliance to India on a strict "quid pro quo" basis. Japan demonstrated tough bargaining during the negotiations. Britain's demands were only to be granted in return for her recognition of Japan's position in Korea. "Japanese protectorate of Corea [sic] after the war [Russo-Japanese War] was absolutely essential to the future peace of Japan."³⁰

Thus, the objects of the new Alliance, as declared in its preamble, were: (1) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India; (2) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring her independence and integrity and the principle of the "open door"; (3) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in Eastern Asia and India, and the defence of their special interests in those regions.³¹

The Alliance provided that if in the opinion of either of the High Contracting Parties, any of these rights and

³⁰ Ibid., 320.

³¹ C. Chang, 119.

interests were in jeopardy, the British and Japanese governments would communicate with each other to safeguard them. The Alliance went on to state that:

if either ally should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests in Eastern Asia and India, by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action on the part of a hostile Power or Powers, the other ally would make war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.²²

Most importantly to Japanese expansionist interests, the Alliance recognized Japan's special "interests" and "rights" regarding Korea. The Alliance made no reference to the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Korea. Great Britain now not only recognized Japan's paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, but also Japan's right to take necessary measures of guidance, control, and protection to safeguard and advance those interests.

Korea was now a protectorate of Japan. Japan's position in Korea was further strengthened by the Taft-Katsura Agreement which provided for U.S. recognition of Japan's suzerainty over Korea. Thus the stage was set for Japan's eventual annexation of Korea after the Russo-Japanese War.

²² Ibid., 119.

The new Alliance differed from its predecessor in that it was to last for ten years, not five. This was evidence of the growing friendship between the two allied nations, and of their confidence in each other.²²

The Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance deprived Russia of any hope of a war of revenge. For Britain, it added the Japanese naval and military strength to the defense of its interests in India and the Far East. Britain hoped that the Alliance, by discouraging Russian aggression in the Far East and India, would turn Russia's attention to Europe.

Although the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in London on August 12, 1905, it was not announced until September 27, after the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty. Japan and England delayed announcing the new Alliance due to fear by both parties that the renewed Alliance might exercise an injurious effect upon the peace negotiations or upon their powers in Europe. It is was not unlikely that:

²² Ibid., 124.

if the alliance were published immediately after it was signed, it would prejudice some of the issues involved and be regarded by Russia as an insult which would bring the peace talks to nought. Such a move might act to Japan's detriment in that her demands at the conference might be turned down on the grounds that her postwar security had already been assured by the alliance.²⁴

TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH

Japan gained more by the Treaty of Portsmouth than she had demanded prior to the war. Aided by the negotiating power and prowess of the United States, the treaty concluding the Russo-Japanese War was signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire on 5 September 1905.

The principal terms of the peace treaty, consisting of twelve articles, required Russia recognize Japan's "paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea" and engaged not to interfere with the Japanese measures of guidance, protection, and control, which might be undertaken in Korea.

Both powers engaged to evacuate Manchuria and to restore it to China, but Russia declared that she had in

²⁴ I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 335-36.

Manchuria no "territorial advantage" or "exclusive concessions" prejudicial to Chinese sovereignty and to the principle of equal opportunity. Japan obtained the south half of Sakhalin below fifty degrees of north latitude.

Russia agreed to grant Japanese subjects fishing rights along the "sea coasts of the Russian possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering Seas". Japan succeeded to the Russian leases of the Kwangtung province and the Russian railways south of Changchun.

The powers engaged not to obstruct any general measures, common to all countries, which China might take to develop her commerce and industry in Manchuria.

Finally, Russia agreed to pay Japan for the net cost of the maintaining Russian prisoners in Japan, the amount of which was later fixed at 20,000,000 yen.²⁵

The Russo-Japanese War had far reaching effects. The terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth and the new Alliance enabled Japan to become a world power in the true sense of the term. Japan was now with justice called "Imperial Japan" (Dai Nippon Teikoku). Possessing an empire

²⁵ S. Hishida, 156.

consisting of Formosa, acquired in 1895, and the Liaotung Peninsula, acquired in 1905, and shortly to acquire Korea, Japan was a full partner in the imperialist rivalries on the continent.²⁶

The war also established general peace in the Far East which had been menaced by Russian dominance. As a result of the war, Japan set her foot more firmly on the Asiatic continent by assuming a protectorate over Korea.²⁷

Secretary of State John Hay was correct when he said that "these little people [Japanese] will fight if they are crowded too far."²⁸ They were and they did. Baron Albert d'Anethan, Secretary of the Belgian Legation in Japan, noted after the conclusion of the war that:

The objective of the war, which Japan undertook to chase the Russians out of Manchuria and establish her protectorate in Korea, has been attained. Will the results of her victories be durable and is the maintenance of peace in the Far East assured for a long time?

In Korea, it does not seem that the difficulties which the creation of the new order may encounter will be apt to lead to foreign

²⁶ J. Hall, Japan - From Prehistoric to Modern Times (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1968). 307.

²⁷ In November 1905, following the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan negotiated a treaty with Korea which established a Japanese protectorate.

²⁸ R. Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia (New York: The MacMillan Press, 1979), 53.

complications. Under the wise and prudent direction Marquis Ito, order will be established, and it will be possible to develop the resources of the country, offering a large field of exploitation both to Japanese and foreigners, who will work harmoniously.²⁹

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905 and the Russo-Japanese War gave Japan the "green light" to proceed in the role as "protectorate" of Korea. As time would tell, Japan's vision for total control of the Korean Peninsula would soon come to fruition.

But as the war with Russia concluded, Japanese leaders realized that they had to continue to strengthen military ties with other powers and have them recognize Japan's exclusive right in Korea. It was for this purpose that Japan initiated negotiations with Britain to strengthen the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and establish more stable relations with other power who also had interests vested in the Far East.

²⁹ G. Lensen, The D'Anethan Dispatches From Japan, 1894-1910 (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1967), 219.

CHAPTER IV

ANNEXATION AND ENTENTE

A people which daydreams of the past, has no sense of raising itself anew and voluntarily falls into weakness, deserves to be reprimanded. . . .What Japan wants from Korea today is for her to alter completely the existing situation, guide her people to knowledge, to industry, bathe in the same pool of civilization as we, and join her strength with ours.¹

Ito Hirobumi
Japan's First Resident
General in Korea
January 12, 1909

Although the Russo-Japanese War reduced Russian power in the Far East, its army was still a formidable force. Japan's expansionist goals after the war were twofold. Japan targeted Korea for full membership in her developing colonial empire. Japan also attempted to strengthen military and diplomatic ties with other nations and have them recognize the "status quo" in the Far East. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance aided Japan's ability to achieve both of these goals.

¹ S. Lone, "The Japanese Annexation of Korea 1910: The Failure of East Asian Co-Prosperity". Modern Asian Studies, Vol 25, Part 1, 1991: 144.

JAPAN ACQUIRES THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The Russo-Japanese War was disastrous for Korea. In January 1904, Korea declared neutrality in the conflict. Ignoring the declaration, Japanese troops landed in Korea in February and occupied Seoul. During the war, Japan forced the Korean government to conclude agreements favorable to Japan's own designs. Their intention - convert Korea into a Japanese protectorate.²

The Korean Peninsula was more than just a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese, Korea was primarily a source of raw material and a colonial market for their industrial development (Figure 12). It was also a main source of rice for a growing Japanese population (Figure 13).

The Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1905) guaranteed Korea's independence and the absence of any aggressive intentions on the part of the signatories. Yet Britain recognized Japan's right to safeguard her interests if threatened by a disturbance there. The Alliance tilted the balance in the power struggle which had been going on in Korea since the end of the 19th Century.³

² A. Nahm, Korea - Tradition and Transformation (Seoul, Korea: Hollym Corporation, 1988), 207.

³ I.H. Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy 1869-1942 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 69.

**FOREIGN TRADE OF JAPAN WITH KOREA AND ALL COUNTRIES,
1895-1904: COMPARISON OF TREND**




Figure 12.⁴

**GENERAL TRENDS OF POPULATION IN JAPAN
1890-1910**

Year	Population (Unit 1,000)	Average Annual Increase (Unit 1,000)	Rate of Average Annual Increase (Per 1,000)
1890	39,902	317.8	8.2
1895	41,557	331.0	10.8
1900	43,847	458.0	12.3
1905	46,620	554.6	10.8
1910	49,184	512.8	12.3

Figure 13.⁵

⁴ W. Dong, Japanese Colonial Policy and Practice in Korea, 1905-1945: A Study in Assimilation. Georgetown University, Ph.D., Political Science, 1966, 61.

⁵ Ibid., 46.

Following the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan "negotiated" a treaty with Korea. While Japanese troops displayed their strength on the streets of Seoul and Japanese gendarmes mobilized to control excited Koreans outside the Korean Palace, Pak Che-sun, Korean foreign minister, put his signature to the treaty. Signed at the point of a sword, the treaty established the Korean peninsula as a Japanese protectorate.

The Koreans called it a "5-article agreement". The Japanese referred to it as a "Treaty of Protection." But contrary to Japan's desire to disguise the real intentions of the treaty, the "Treaty of Protection" said nothing about Japan protecting Korea.⁶

Article I of the November 17, 1905 agreement stated that the:

Government of Japan ... will hereafter have control and direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea, and the diplomatic and consular representatives of Japan will have the charge of the subjects and interests of Korea in foreign countries.⁷

⁶ I.H. Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy 1869-1942 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 209.

⁷ Ibid., 534.

Japan's Foreign Office in Tokyo immediately undertook the duties of administering all Korean external relations. She subsequently declared the "function of the foreign diplomatic representatives in Seoul to cease 'ipso facto.'" Japan now controlled all Korean foreign affairs.*

Article II established a Japanese Residency-General "primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and directing matters relating to [Korean] diplomatic affairs". Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), shortly after concluding the treaty, became Japan's first Resident-General in Korea. He served in that position from 1906-1909.*

Ito and other Japanese leaders believed that Japan's successes and sacrifices in two wars (Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese) gave her the right to control Korea. If Korean opposition could be muted and the people finally brought under control, then Japan might be able to retain ultimate control through the position of the Residency-General rather than a formal takeover of the country.

* I.H. Nish, ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I, Series E, (London: Her Britannic Majesty's Stationery Office, 1989,) 327.

* Ibid., 210.

Japan hoped to diminish native sympathy and retain control the of Korean people by emulating Britain's example of discreet civilian control in Egypt." But the Korean people were not as pliable as the Japanese expected.

Despite Japan's disbanding of the Korean army in 1907, army revolts broke out in many of the provinces. Resident-General Ito wielded complete control over all Japanese troops stationed on the peninsula. But Korean intellectuals continued to fan nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiments through newspapers and pamphlets.¹⁰

Some "50,000 insurgents in small groups of 100, 200, or 500, engaged in 2,820 military campaigns against the Japanese military and police between 1907 and 1909."¹¹ Official Japanese figures for the period July 1907 - October 1908 reported 452 Japanese soldiers and police killed or wounded. The death toll of Korean insurgents stood at 14,354.¹²

¹⁰ Japan's Residency-General was modeled after Britian's in Egypt, as were the policies of Ito. Essential to the British system was control of the monarch. Using the Korean emperor, Japan hoped to legitimize internal reforms while deflecting patriotic anger. (Quoted from S. Lone, 143-44.)

¹¹ S. Lone, 145.

¹² A. Nahm, 216.

By 1907, Japan forced a new agreement upon Korea that expanded the position she assumed as a result of the 1905 "Treaty of Protection." The new agreement, signed July 24, 1907, granted Japan's Resident-General virtually all powers from policy-making to executing both domestic and foreign government functions. Despite this new power, Japan still could not suppress the forces of Korean nationalism.

From the later part of December 1907, general insurrections occurred throughout the country.

On many occasions transportation and communication lines were severed by the liberations army, and guerrilla warfare was conducted in remote rural areas. The liberation activities concentrated on several aims: to wipe out the Japanese wherever they found them, to destroy Japanese military and police facilities, to assassinate pro-Japanese Korean officials, and to destroy all pro-Japanese political and social organizations.¹³

Japan had fought two wars over Korea. She was not about to let Korean nationalism prevent her from controlling the peninsula. The assassination of Resident-General Ito in 1909 by a young Korean patriot in Harbin (China) prompted a change in modus operandi. Ito had gone to Harbin to secure reaffirmation of Russia's acquiescence concerning Japanese annexation of Korea.

¹³ S. Lone, 152.

In 1910 General Terauchi, a critic of Ito's conciliatory policy and inability to control the Koreans, became the new Resident-General. Terauchi believed that Korea must be either absorbed or decimated. His views were expressed by the Japanese-controlled press in Seoul in these terms: "The present [situation] requires an iron hand rather than a gloved one to secure the lasting peace and order in this country [Korea]." Terauchi believed that "Japan had dealt with Korean malcontents in a lenient way" and the only way to "deal with those people [Koreans], was by stern and relentless methods."¹⁴

Arriving in Seoul in July 1910, Terauchi suspended the publication of anti-Japanese newspapers; suspended all public meetings; and put Japanese forces on twenty-four hour duty around the country. Japanese warships appeared in Korean ports. By the end of July the Japanese military and police forces were in complete control of the peninsula.

The New York Times reported the formal annexation of Korea by Japan on July 25, 1910. The article stated that

¹⁴ B. Choy, Korea - A History (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1971), 123.

¹⁵ New York Times, August 25, 1910.

Korea, that small country over whom Russia and Japan had fought, would cease to exist as an independent kingdom.¹⁴ Korea was but one pawn in the refocusing of Japanese power politics in the post-Russo-Japanese War period.

Both diplomacy and military power enabled Japan to successfully annex Korea in 1910. The post Russo-Japanese War period witnessed other significant victories for Japanese diplomacy. These victories included improved relations with Russia, France, and the United States. All contributed to international recognition of Japan's annexation of Korea. The diplomatic jockeying of these years prompted England and Japan to re-assess their Alliance. This re-assessment prompted a third revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

JAPAN'S ENTENTE SYSTEM AND THE THIRD ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

Changes in the Far East created by the conclusion of the First and Second Anglo-Japanese Alliances opened a new phase of the configuration of global international power. After the Russo-Japanese War and prior to Japan's annexation of Korea, both France and Britain came closer to neutrality, which eventually resulted in the Anglo-French

¹⁴ B. Choy, Korea - A History (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1971), 123.

¹⁵ New York Times, August 25, 1910.

entente of 1905. That agreement made it possible for Japan to have a rapprochement with France, who wanted Japan to enclose her main rival, Germany. In the event of war with Germany, the rear of Russia (a French ally) would be safer, while Japan needed to obtain foreign loans not only from Anglo-American Powers but also from France.¹⁶

After the Russo-Japanese War, pressure for conciliatory Russo-Japanese relations increased among Japanese leaders who had supported the concept of a Russo-Japanese understanding in 1902. When the French-Japanese entente was made, it stimulated negotiations for a Russo-Japanese entente. Ultimately a Russo-Japanese understanding was concluded in July 1907.

In essence, the entente between Japan and Russia recognized each other's spheres of interest in southern and northern Manchuria. This entente secured the approval of France, Great Britain, and even China. The entente left no doubt Japan and Russia regarded themselves in Mongolia to stay. They also delimited their spheres of interest in Mongolia: Outer Mongolia for Russia, Inner Mongolia for Japan.¹⁷

¹⁶ J. Tsuchiyama, Alliance in Japanese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, University of Maryland, Ph.D, Philosophy, 1984, 107.

¹⁷ Ibid., 108.

Thus, two powers participating in the Triple Intervention (Russia and France) at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, now came to Japan's side a decade later. Germany, on the other hand, became more isolated in both the Asian and European theaters. Figure 16 on the following page depicts the diplomatic machinations during this period.

By 1907, Russia had given up any thought of war of revenge against Japan. The European Powers had given up their territorial appetites in East Asia. They were still commercially interested in the Far East. But they were content to leave the military-naval ascendancy in Asia to the Japanese (Figure 14).^{1*}

^{1*} I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 365.

Japan's Entente System




Figure 14.¹⁹

¹⁹ J. Tsuchiyama, 110.

The United States also occupied a role in Japan's Entente System. Tension in U.S.- Japanese relations during 1906-1907 stemmed from anti-Japanese immigration laws in America and Japan's threat to the U.S. Open Door Policy in China. Roosevelt's sending of the "Great White Fleet" on a show-of-force world cruise in 1907 helped talk of war between the nations die down.

A few weeks after the fleet left Tokyo, U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root and Kogoro Takahara, the Japanese ambassador in Washington, by an exchange of notes, agreed to a set of principles. The 1908 Root-Takahara Agreement declared the U.S. and Japan to be "firmly resolved to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other" in the Pacific area."²⁰

By 1911, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could no longer be looked upon as an instrument of anti-Russian policies. "Indeed after 1905 it was Japan who was more likely to alter the balance of power in the far east than Russia, and when this took place, something of the common interest, written into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was lost."²¹

²⁰ W. Malloy, ed., Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers 1776-1909, Document No. 357, 61st Congress, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1910, 1045-6.

²¹ I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 372.

In the Anglo-Japanese Alliances of 1902 and 1905, the hypothetical enemy was Russia. By 1911, this was no longer clear in the prevailing international context. The Anglo-Russian entente of 1907 and Russo-Japanese treaty of 1907 had largely removed the Russian menace. One result of these treaties was:

that the doctrine of spheres of influence was strengthened while the principle of equal commercial opportunity was weakened. Japan, particularly, expanded its economic and political influence in Korea and Manchuria, damaging American and European commercial interests.²²

"Another crucial factor that cast doubt on the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was Japanese-American relations, which had been so strained by immigration and Manchurian problems."²³ Some had forecast war between Japan and the United States during the years 1906-1909. The British public was concerned that their country might get involved in an unwanted war. Such developments made the public leery about the wisdom of continuing the Alliance with Japan. The popularity of the Alliance further declined with Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910.²⁴

²² Y. Amakawa, 108.

²³ Ibid., 109.

²⁴ Ibid., 109.

The Japanese feared the British government might want to terminate the Alliance in 1915. Thus it was Japan that first proposed a renewal of the Alliance. The governments of Japan and Great Britain both concluded that the Alliance could still serve their objectives. But the Alliance needed to be revised to accommodate the changes which had taken place since 1905.²⁵

Reflecting upon the continuing importance of the Alliance, the British Committee of Imperial Defence reported in May 1911, that:

So long as the Japanese Alliance remains operative not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable possibilities to be provided against, but the British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Pacific are superior to the forces in those waters maintained by any reasonably probable combination of naval Powers.²⁶

This British concern about security in the Far East fitted nicely into Japan's seeking international recognition for her acts of colonization. The revision in 1911 was to some extent accepted by the Japanese in order to:

²⁵ I.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline - A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-23 (London: The Athlone Press, 1972), 47-51.

²⁶ Ibid., 61.

firstly, get British recognition of her (Japan's) annexation of Korea. The Japanese who have a tidy mentality wanted to get international support (as they already had from Russia) [sic] for their act of colonization. [Secondly] There was little prospect of getting Britain to take up arms on Japan's behalf against America under the alliance. Since this was not practical politics, it was better for Japan to bow before Britain's wishes and let her conclude some agreement with the United States. Thirdly, there was fear of Japan's isolation. The Japanese were distant observers of the tensions between Britain and Germany and do not seem to have been greatly worried by them.²⁷

Japan and Great Britain concluded the third Anglo-Japanese Alliance on July 13, 1911 (Appendix C). Its language was very similar to that of the 1905 Alliance with a few revisions. The most important change was contained in Article IV which read:

Should either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall impose on such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitration treaty is in force.²⁸

This provision confirmed that America should be excluded from the purview of the Alliance. There were no special

²⁷ Ibid., 49.

²⁸ I.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline, 67.

provisions concerning Korea and the Indian border as the Korean annexation of 1910 and Anglo-Russian entente of 1907 made them unnecessary.²⁹ As in 1905 the attack of any one power automatically drew both allies for common action, and the Alliance was extended for another ten years until 1921.³⁰

For Japan, the new Alliance met its main objective, the extension of the duration of the Alliance and recognition of its annexation of Korea. Now, in 1911, with its army in East Asia and its navy in the Pacific, Japan was undoubtedly the strongest power in the Far East. The Japanese Empire now controlled Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Port Arthur, the southern half of Sakhalin Island, and influenced a large portion of Manchuria (Figure 15).

Japan's economic penetration in parts of Asia and her colonies was undertaken from a military point of view. Developing strategic minerals and basic raw materials such as bauxite, nickel, crude rubber, lead, crude oil, iron ores, tin, salt, and zinc greatly strengthened her national and military power.³¹

²⁹ Ibid., 66-68.

THE FAR EAST AROUND 1910




Figure 15.³²

³² R.I. Moore, ed., Atlas of World History (New York: Rand McNally & Company, 1987), 73.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had, thus far served Japan well in accomplishing her expansionistic goals. At the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, Japan found herself the mistress of the Far East, with no European rivals. The Japanese cabinet greatly valued the importance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a tool in accomplishing their expansionist aims. A Japanese cabinet message, dated April 17, 1912, stated that:

The alliance [Anglo-Japanese Alliance] is the crux of the Japanese government's foreign policy and is an object which it will always unflinchingly uphold. It will be our policy not only to stress and preserve the alliance but hereafter to strengthen the foundations of the alliance more and more and work towards the preservation of peace in the far east and support for our imperial interests.³³

The Jiji Shimpo claimed that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance enabled Japan to annex Korea in 1910. The revision to the Alliance in 1911 gave it a new and longer life. With the storm of war brewing in Europe, the Alliance would serve as an excellent catapult upon which Japan could continue to launch her expansionist desires.

³³ Kato Takaaki, preface to Matsumoto Tadao, Nisshi shinkosho ni yoru teikoku no riken, Tokyo, 1941 (Quoted in I.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline, 83).

CHAPTER V

JAPAN AND THE GREAT WAR

Great Britain and Japan are of the opinion that it is necessary for each to take action to protect the general interest in the Far East, contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific beyond the China seas nor in Asiatic waters westward of the China seas, nor in foreign territories except those of German occupation on the Continent of Asia.

New York Times
August 17, 1914

Today we have come to know the real Japan - is frankly opportunistic, not to say selfish, with a very exaggerated opinion of her role in the universe.¹

Sir Conyngham Greene
British Ambassador to Japan
September 26, 1916

World War I permitted Japan to expand both her economic and political empire, and brought unprecedented prosperity to the land. Japan went to the peace conference at Versailles in 1919 as a military and industrial power and received official recognition as one of the "Big Five" of the new international order.

¹ I.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline - A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-23 (London: The Athlone Press, 1972), 193.

Dwarfed by the European theater of operation, Japan's role in the Great War was small. But the gains Japan achieved as a result of the "War to end all wars" were significant. The Rising Sun's WWI military operations, economic growth and political successes at the peace table gave Japan a taste of world power that whet her, as yet, unsatisfied appetite. It was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Japan used as a pretext for entering the war.

JAPAN ENTERS THE WAR

On August 4, 1914, when Britain declared war on Germany, Japan communicated to Britain that it would observe strict neutrality toward the war. But if in the event of an attack on British colonies in China, Japan would support Britain if called upon. This was merely the announcement of the Japanese obligation under the mutual Alliance.²

On August 7, 1914, the British government formally requested Japan dispatch its fleet to hunt out and if possible, seize armed German merchant ships. Seizing

² G.P. Gooch, ed., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1927), Vol IX, 637.

this chance to enter the war, Japanese leaders contemplated several objectives:

[first] forcing Germany out of Shantung in order to avenge its interests there, thereby avenging itself against Germany for the Triple Intervention [Russo-Japanese War 1895]; [second] placing China wholly under Japanese influence; and [third] occupying German islands in the Pacific.³

Japan's Foreign Minister demanded Japan's invention in the Great War for two primary reasons - (1) to maintain amicable relations with Britain as an ally, and (2) to utilize the opportunity for raising Japan's position in the international arena by removing German bases from the Far East. The Japanese cabinet agreed with his view.

On August 9th, the Japanese government informed Britain that it would "take every possible means for the destruction of power of Germany that might inflict damage on the interests of Japan and Britain in East Asia." The British were alarmed by this offer since they asked Japan only for help in destroying German armed cruisers. Britain, suspicious of Japanese intentions, asked Japan postpone its declaration of war.⁴

³ Y. Amakawa, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902-1923: The Study of an Alliance under the Balance of Power System (Clairemont College, Ph.D., 1977), 122.

⁴ Ibid., 122.

But Japan insisted. A diplomatic communique from the Japanese government to Great Britain clearly indicated Japan's position and reliance upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in justifying their action. The communique, dated August 9, 1914, stated:

Once a belligerent Power, Japan cannot restrict her action only to destruction of hostile armed merchant cruisers, but it will become necessary for her to resort to all and every possible means for attainment of the object common to the two allied Powers as far as the Chinese waters are concerned, namely the destruction of the power of Germany to inflict damage upon the interests of Japan and Great Britain in Eastern Asia. Besides, as the employment of some of the Japanese warships for the destruction of German armed merchant ships may be regarded as an act limited in scope and dictated by the temporary convenience of Great Britain, the Imperial Government are of the opinion that they should base their participation in the war on the broad grounds stated in the Agreement of Alliance [Anglo-Japanese Alliance].⁹

On August 11th, Britain gave in to Japanese intentions and recognized Japan's participation in the war, but restricted the sphere of Japanese operations to the Eastern China Sea and German leased territory on mainland China. The New

⁹ I.H.Nish, Alliance in Decline, 120.

York Times, in an article entitled "Japan's Limited Action", reported on August 17, 1914 that:

the British official news bureau issued the following statement tonight: "Great Britain and Japan, having been in communications with each other, are of the opinion that it is necessary for each to take action to protect the general interests in the Far East, contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping especially in view the independence and integrity of China as provided for in that agreement. It is understood that the actions of Japan will not extend to the Pacific beyond the China seas, except as may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor in Asiatic waters westward of the China seas, nor in foreign territories except territory in German occupation in the Continent of Asia.

The announcement carried in the New York Times was made unilaterally by England without consulting Japan. Japan in fact refused any limitations on the scope of its operations in the war. Japan was prepared to act on its own and ready to challenge anyone who got in the way of her interests - even Great Britain.

By 1914, Japan was in fact the major naval power in the Far East. The British, based upon the protection of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, had reduced their naval disposition in the Far East (Figure 16).

DISPOSITION OF BRITISH BATTLESHIPS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Far East</u>	<u>Mediterranean</u>	<u>Home Waters</u>
1903	5	14	16
1914	0	6	33

Figure 16.*

The course of events to come proved that all of the assurances and pledges which Japan gave were to be violated, rather than kept. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance proved to be the vehicle upon which Japan launched her expansionist operations during the war.

On August 15, the Empire of Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany which would expire on 23 August. No reply having been received by this date, Japan declared war on Germany. She demanded the evacuation of Tsingtao, the disarming of the warships there and the handing over of the territory to Japan for final reversion to China. Japan stated that she could not guarantee the safety of British shipping if Germany continued to occupy Tsingtao. England agreed to the Japanese occupation of Tsingtao on the condition that it be subsequently returned to China. It

* R.P. Dua, Anglo-Japanese Relations During the First World War (New Delhi: S. Chand and Company, 1972), 89.

was clear that Japan was going to war because it was to its advantage to do so.⁷

At the onset of the Great War, popular Japanese sympathy rested with the Allies. It was the Kaiser who started the cry of the "yellow peril" which had deeply hurt Japanese pride. Moreover, the Japanese were looking for an opportunity to flex their military muscle to gain a more significant foothold in China.⁸

Japan also continued to feel the pressure of the European's increasing presence on the Chinese mainland. Although she had was successful in gaining successions from the Russians in 1905, Japan sought territory in China to satiate her growing economy and population. Japan's population experienced a net increase of six million in the previous ten years. By the beginning of the Great War, Japan had ceased to be self-sufficient in food supplies.⁹ It was not just her population that was growing.

At the turn of the century, in Russia, the Petersburg Gazette reported the strength of the Japanese army to be 509,960 personnel. The navy, numbering 35,355 officers and men in 1902, included four battleships, six first-class cruisers,

7. Francis A. March, History of the World War, vol.1 (New York: Leslie-Judge Company, 1918), 171.

8. Ibid., 173.

9. Richard Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia 1894-1943 (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1979), 100.

six armored cruisers, and a large and efficient flotilla of torpedo boat destroyers.¹⁰ As Japan entered the war against Germany in August 1914, she had an army of a million men, and a navy double the size of that which she owned at the turn of the century. Japan was now at least twice as strong as when she began the war with Russia (1904).¹¹

JAPAN SEIZES GERMAN TERRITORIES IN CHINA AND MICRONESIA

On August 27th, the Japanese forces, led by General Kamio, took possession of islands at the mouth of the Kiaochow Harbor using one division and a naval squadron (Figure 17). Using these points as bases, they swept the surrounding areas for mines. Mines injured only one vessel.

The Japanese landed troops on September 2nd at the northern tip of the Tsingtao peninsula thus successfully cutting off the German fortress from the mainland. By September 13th, after bombing the Kiaochow wireless station, electric power station, and the German ships in the harbor, the Japanese captured the Kiaochow railway

¹⁰ Esther Singleton, Japan (New York: Dodd, Meade and Brown and Company, 1964), 368-69.

¹¹ F. March, History of the World War, vol 1, 174.

station placing them twenty-two miles from Tsingtao.¹²

The Germans had taken great pride in Tsingtao, and had made every effort to make it a model colony as well as an impregnable fortress. There were hardly more than five thousand soldiers in the fortress. By landing additional soldiers on the coast just northeast of Tsingtao on September 18th, General Kamio captured the highground overlooking the inner forts .

Using this ground to emplace their guns, the Japanese forces, now augmented by a small contingent of British forces, advanced on Tsingtao. By October 31, after many exchanges of bombardments by the opposing forces, the German fort was silenced. On November 6th, Admiral Waldeck, the German Governor of Tsingtao, raised the white flag and signed the terms of capitulation. "Germany's prize colony on the continent of Asia had fallen."¹³

Concurrent with military operations directed against Tsingtao, Japan launched forces against the German-held territories in the Pacific Ocean. On October 3, 1914, one Japanese squadron occupied Jaluit, the seat of government

¹². Ibid., 174-178.

¹³. B.H. Liddel Hart, The Real War 1914-1918 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), 80.




Figure 17.¹⁴

of the Marshall Islands and the German commercial headquarters in the central Pacific.

Japan subsequently occupied the Carolines (subdivided into the Palau, Yap, Truk, and Ponape Groups), and the Marianas - except Guam, which had become American property in 1898 (Figure 18). The effort had been swift, bloodless, and easy.¹⁵

Except for the initial landings on Jaluit, Japan gave little publicity to its occupation of the other island groups in Micronesia. The Japanese navy made it plain that it did not welcome any other ships into Micronesia.¹⁶

¹⁴ I.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline, 114.

¹⁵ Kenneth S. Latourette, A Short History of the Far East (London: MacMillan, 1969), 539.

¹⁶ Mark R. Peattie, Nanyo - The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 44.




Figure 18.¹⁷

¹⁷ Mark R. Peattie, ed., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 58.

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Against this backdrop of Japan's military victories, political forces in Tokyo were preparing to further colonize the Chinese mainland. In the first half of 1915, the central theme in Japan's diplomacy was her relations with China. The so-called Twenty-One Demands crisis that developed was a major turning point in international relations in East Asia.

In August of 1914, Okuma, the Premier of Japan, emphatically had declared that his government had "no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything they now possess." Less than six months later, Japan presented China with a set of twenty-one demands which sought to bring all that vast land under Japanese control and within the orbit of the Japanese empire.

The effect of these demands, if granted in full, would have reduced China to a protectorate of Japan. The Twenty-One Demands, issued to China on January 18, 1915, consisted of twenty-one articles arranged in five groups. The first four demands concerned Japan's major:

areas of interest in China at the outbreak of World War I -- Shantung, South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Hanyeping Company in Central China, and Fukien. A fifth group of "wishes" called for placing Japanese political, military and economic "advisers" [sic] in China's central government and demanded that China purchase Japanese arms and munitions, allow Japanese churches to own land in China and accept other demands.¹⁸

The first four groups were Japan's attempts not only to strengthen its position in south Manchuria but also to extend its influence into Shantung, Inner Mongolia, and Fukien. The last group would give Japan control over China itself.

After four months of diplomatic efforts to gain support for her position, China succumbed to the economic and military strength of Japan. The world was at war, and to China's dismay, no imperial power came to her rescue. Britain, in 1915, was in no position to quarrel with Japan over China. China was in no position to contend with the 50,000 Japanese troops put on alert in Manchuria and Shantung.¹⁹

¹⁸ Craig J. Canning, The Japanese Occupation of Shantung During World War I, Stanford University, Ph.D., 1975, 67.

¹⁹ Y. Amakawa, 126-7.

China assented to some but not all of the demands. Most important of the demands was China's agreement to any disposition which Japan might arrange with regards to Germany's former rights in Shantung. China also agreed to the extension of Japan's lease on the Port of Arthur and Dairen, and the transforming of the Hanyeping Company, the largest iron works in China, into a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise. Japan decidedly used her military leverage and China's political weakness to strengthen her foothold on the mainland.²⁰

The crisis caused by the Twenty-One Demands was a watershed in international relations in East Asia. The demands were:

an odd departure from the cautious diplomacy which had previously characterized Japan As a result, Britain lost confidence in her ally, Japan, whose action was often compared with Germany's action in invading Belgium.²¹

Since Japan strengthened its position in China via the Twenty-One Demands, one of Japan's primary concerns evolved around the preservation and full recognition of her rights

²⁰. Latourette, 461-463.

²¹ Y. Amakawa, 127.

and interests in China. This concern displayed itself at the end of the war during the Paris Peace Conference and Treaty of Versailles. But Japan paid a terrible price for the Twenty-One Demands. Japan, still a partner in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, never stood lower in Britain's estimation.

Prior to the war, and indeed for many years before, there was a tendency to look upon Japan as a model of all the international virtues....In England they were extolled as the best and most devoted of Allies. . . Today we have come to know that Japan - the real Japan - is a frankly opportunistic, not to say selfish, country, of very moderate importance compared with the giants of the Great War, but with a very exaggerated opinion of her role in the universe.²²

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE SECRET AGREEMENT

As war raged on in Europe during 1915 and 1916, Japan sat back in the shadows of her earlier victories consolidating her new holdings. But in early 1917, the Germans intensified pressure on the Allies through a renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare. Britain was gravely concerned about the deadly German submarine campaign. In January 1917, England requested Japanese naval assistance in the Mediterranean against the Germans.

²² I.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline, 193.

Japan had previously turned down such requests from Britain on the grounds that its naval fleet was mainly for self-defense. But this time the Japanese did not reject it and agreed to provide the assistance on the condition that the British would support Japan's claim in Shantung and its rights to the German islands north of the equator at the peace conference. The British government replied stating:

His Majesty's Government accede with pleasure to the request of the Japanese government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands North of Equator on occasion of Peace Conference, it being understood that Japanese Government will, in eventual peace settlement, treat in same spirit Great Britain's claims to German Islands South of Equator.²³

Japan subsequently obtained secret assurances from France and Russia of their support at the peace table of her claim to the former German holdings in Shantung. In return, Japan sent a destroyer squadron to the Mediterranean to help the Allies.

One of Japan's most important contributions to the cause of the Allies was her assistance in convoying to Europe the Anzac troops, and it was because of the approach of her fleet that the German raiding squadron in the South Pacific was driven to the point near the Falkland Islands

²³ Ibid., 134.

where it was destroyed by Admiral Cradock's British cruisers.²⁴

Even the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, concluded on November 2, 1917, by an exchange of notes between Japan and the United States, helped Japan consolidate her position in the Far East. The United States formally recognized the special interest of Japan in China arising out of geographical propinquity - a concession which tended to extend the liberty of action which Japan had already acquired as a result of the war.

This naval support guaranteed Japan the protection of her interests at the future peace conference at Versailles. Japan, as it turned out, paid a very small price for a large, but controversial gain.²⁵

THE SIBERIAN INTERVENTION

Another turning point for Japan in the Great War occurred in 1917. The Russian Revolution took Russia out of the war in 1917 and created disorder in Russia's East Asian territories. Japan attempted to take advantage of the disorder. It was calculated that in 1914, seventy-nine percent (79%) percent of all Japanese investments in Manchuria were in the South Manchurian Railway and

²⁴. F. March, vol 1, 180.

²⁵. K. Latourette, 463.

sixty-nine (69%) percent of all Japanese investments in China before the First World War were in Manchuria.

For Japan the situation in Russia was not a matter of whether or not to intervene in order to stop the revolution, but rather how to best exploit the upheaval for the further extension of its influence into northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia. The United States and the Allies feared Japan was on the verge of another expansionist move into Vladivostok and Siberia (Figure 19).

The United States, concerned with Japanese intentions, agreed with the Allies to "invite" Japan to undertake a joint armed intervention, provided she would not provide more than 7,000 troops and that operations would be limited to the Vladivostok area. Japanese, American, British, and French troops landed in Vladivostok in August and September 1918. But Japan sent more than her promised quota.

In the last year of the war Japan once more came prominently in the public eye in connection with the effort made by the Allies to protect the Russian Bolshevik vast stores of ammunition which had been landed in ports of Eastern Siberia. Japan was compelled to land troops to do this and to preserve order in localities where her citizens were in danger....75,000 Japanese troops, working in conjunction with European and




Figure 19.

American forces, succeeded in their object and throughout the latter period of the war kept Eastern Siberia friendly to the Allied cause.²⁶

Although bound by an understanding with America stipulating equality in the number of troops participating in the intervention, Japan violated the agreement and dispatched ten times as many soldiers as did the United States. Though Japan declared her willingness to withdraw her soldiers from Siberia, she did not do so until the United States pressured her at the Washington Conference after the Great War.

Japanese activities in Siberia and the Russian Maritime Provinces continued long after the Allied troops were withdrawn at the beginning of 1920. The avowed reason for continued occupation was the protection of Japanese subjects and property. But it may be conjectured that there was a great unwillingness on the part of the Japanese military authority to withdraw before some success had been obtained for the maintenance of military prestige.²⁷

²⁶. Conrad Schirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese Civilizations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1978), 494.

The Japanese had never returned empty-handed from any previous expedition. It was significant that immediately after the acceptance of the Japanese Command's terms of withdrawal by the delegates of Eastern Siberia, on April 4, 1920, "incidents" occurred in the Maritime Provinces, Vladivostok, Habarovsk which became pretexts for continued occupation.²⁷

PROSPERITY AT HOME

World War I not only permitted Japan to expand territorially, but also provided her with unprecedented economic prosperity. The war in Europe cut off the cotton mills of England and the factories of continental Europe from the markets of Asia. Japanese business men took full advantage of this golden opportunity and made deep inroads into rich markets previously monopolized by the Europeans. Old industries expanded and new ones grew up as exports surged (Figures 21 and 22). Japan sent enormous quantities of guns, ammunition, military stores, hospital and Red Cross supplies into Russia.²⁸

²⁷ R.P. Dua, 199.

²⁸ Ibid., 199.

²⁹ F. March, vol 1, 180.

Before the Russian Revolution, the total value of those supplies had reached \$250,000,000. Japan also shipped to both England and France vast quantities of flour, beans, peas, and other supplies. Japan also made great loans- to Russia \$60,000,000; to Great Britain \$50,000,000. She became a great workshop.

Japan tripled her amount of trade recorded from 1914-1918. Flourishing trade and shipbuilding stimulated various fields of export. In 1919, transportation earned 845 per cent of its 1914 total, mining 1,734 per cent, electrical industries 1,487 per cent, chemical industries 1,711 per cent and machines industries 1,143 per cent. Japan had an income of 1,400 million yen besides trade. A total of 2,800 million yen flowed in during the war.

In 1914, Japan's debt had been 1,100 million yen, by the end of the war, her credit was 2,800 million yen. Japan earned enough foreign credit to change her status from a debtor to a creditor nation. With economic strength, military conquests, and political agreements under their arms, Japanese delegates ventured to Versailles well prepared to negotiate from a powerful position to ensure Japan's entitlements to the spoils of war.²²

²². United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Japan- Its Land, People, and Culture (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1964), 80.

Japanese losses suffered during the entire war were light when compared to those of the other Allied powers (Figure 21). Out of a total mobilized force of roughly 800,000 personnel, Japan suffered 300 military battle deaths and 907 military wounded. Of the total death and wounded for all of the participating nations in WWI, Japan's share comprised less than one percent (1%). Japan's war gains dwarfed her losses on the battlefields.³³

ALLIED COST OF THE WAR

ALLIES	TOTAL FORCE MOBILIZED	MILITARY BATTLE DEATHS	MILITARY WOUNDED	CIVILIAN DEAD
France	8,410,000	1,357,800	4,266,000	40,000
England	8,904,467	908,371	2,090,212	30,633
Russia	12,000,000	1,700,000	4,950,000	2,000,000
Italy	5,615,000	462,391	953,886	*
U.S.	4,355,000	50,585	205,690	*
Belgium	267,000	13,715	44,686	30,000
Serbia	707,000	45,000	133,148	650,000
Rumania	750,000	335,706	120,000	275,000
Greece	230,000	5,000	21,000	132,000
Portugal	100,000	7,222	13,751	*
Japan	800,000	300	907	*

Note: An asterisk (*) item indicates there are no reliable figures or relatively small loss.

Figure 21.³⁴

³³. R. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), 990.

³⁴. Ibid., 990.

VICTORY AT VERSAILLES

The Peace Conference held its first session in Paris on January 18, 1919. Representing Japan were Marquis Saionji, President of the Council of Ministers, Baron Makino, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Viscount China, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Emperor of Japan, (London), Mr. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan (Paris), and Mr. J. Ijuin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan (Rome).³⁵

After establishing more than fifty commissions, which held among them 1,642 sessions, the Peace Conference ended on June 28, 1919, at 3:45 PM. The Great War officially ended.³⁶

The most widely criticized assignment of German territory was Shantung. Directly counter to the recommendations of the territorial commission, the Big Four awarded China's Shantung Province to Japan as its protectorate. The Japanese had watched as the Allies tore

³⁵. F. March, vol 1, 183.

³⁶. F. March, vol 7, 33.

off chunks of defeated Germany. Japan wanted its share. Although the sympathies of the delegates to the conference were with China, the Japanese pushed their case unrelentingly. The Japanese threatened to return home if the final outcome of the conference did not satisfy their demands. Wilson gave way reluctantly. "The Japanese, after all, were abominably crowded in their little islands."²⁷

Article 127 of the treaty stated "The native inhabitants of the former German overseas possessions shall be entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising authority over those territories." Articles 156, 157, and 158, addressed Japan's rights and privileges pertaining to Shandong. Interesting enough, these articles comprised a section all into themselves. They were entitled "Shandong", and were separate from the section of the treaty entitled "China". "Germany renounces, in favor of Japan, all her rights, title and privilege - particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow railways, mines and submarine cable - which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung."²⁸

²⁷. Page Smith, America Enters the World - A People's History of the Progressive Era and World War I, vol 7, (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 698.

²⁸. F. March, vol 7, 110.

The young American intellectual, Charles Seymour, wrote that the Japanese were enigmatic as Mona Lisa. The Japanese had good reason to wear their Mona Lisa smiles. The territorial holdings she gained as a result of the Great War were obtained at a very small cost. But themselves seeking portions of former German overseas possessions, the European Allies were in no position to thwart Tokyo.³⁹

In Secretary of State Lansing's opinion, the "cards that Japan played so skillfully in securing Shantung Province were, first the agreement to withdraw its demand for an amendment to the Covenant denouncing racial equality (an amendment especially awkward for the United States) and the threat to abstain from joining the League of Nations."⁴⁰

WWI brought about an end to the age of uninhibited imperialism. Japan, however, entered the post-war era in quite a different mood. The country had not suffered from military action, nor had it been drawn into the grip of national hatreds which had so affected the countries of Europe. Japan had done well at the expense of Germany and the other Western powers, improving its world trade

³⁹. P. Smith, 651.

⁴⁰. P. Smith, 698.

position and acquiring new strategic territories in China and the Pacific (Figure 22). Politically, Japan became the outstanding nation of Asia. The Japanese were the first Oriental nation to win admission to the hitherto exclusive circle at the great powers of the Occident. Japan's efforts of expansion through the application of armed force were successful and were a temptation to further imperialism.

But Japan's great successes during the war were regarded with suspicion by other nations. Her entry into the war via the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and subsequent military campaigns were based on self-interest. In statements published during the war, Japan made it clear that she considered that her involvement stemmed from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But Japan's misuse of the Alliance caused a great deal of distrust in England.

At the end of the war, the Jiji Shimpo suggested that the time was ripe for an extension of the Alliance. But British government officials, who had spoken sceptically of the Alliance in 1917 advised that:




Figure 22.41

⁴¹ M. Peattie, ed., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 53.

the proposed League of Nations will . . . create a new situation in regard to the question of Alliances, and enable [Britain] to merge the Anglo-Japanese Alliance - which I venture to think has lived its day and done its great work - in such a League. This new solution would make it easy for us [Britain] to give our old friend - the Alliance [Anglo-Japanese Alliance] - a decent burial without hurting Japanese susceptibilities.⁴²

The events of the Great War changed the character of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. From being a diplomatic instrument "imposing precisely defined obligations, it came to be regarded as a symbol."⁴³ During the war, both parties evoked the word "Alliance" when they wanted something - even if it was not something relevant. Japan had used the Alliance to gain leverage in the Far East. Instead of being a diplomatic friend, Japan was becoming a threat in Asia. A threat not only to Great Britain but also the United States.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to be short lived after the Great War. Japanese expansionism had gotten out of control. Limiting the momentum and control of the Japanese Empire became a diplomatic and military necessity for the Western Powers.

⁴² I. H. Nish, Alliance in Decline, 261-62.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 262.

CHAPTER VI

END OF THE ALLIANCE

The world is now controlled by Britain and the United States. As far as the Far East is concerned they cannot exclude Japan. Both [Great Britain and U.S.] will try to woo us. Japan's security rests upon the co-operation between these three nations. Taking advantage of the present situation, we must adopt the proper measures to achieve our goals.¹

Prime Minister Hara

The Washington Conference changed the entire picture in the Far East. Japan consented to the abolition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the firm belief that happy relations between Japan, Great Britain, U.S. and China might be brought about. This desirable issue did not eventuate.²

Yoshida Shigeru
Japanese Embassy, London

The Far East after WWI was different from what it had been - particularly in terms of the military and political balance of forces. The defeat of Germany and the success of the Bolshevik revolution shattered the prewar balance among

¹ Hara Keiichiro, Hara Takashi Nikki (Hara's Diary), vol. VIII (Tokyo, 1950), 250. Quoted in Ian H. Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919-1952, (Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 6.

² J.W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath - Yoshida Shigeru And the Japanese Experience 1878-1954 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 132.

the imperial powers almost beyond recognition. As a result, the pre-war alliance system, particularly the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was out of alignment with emerging reality.

By the end of the war, Japan had firmly entrenched itself in Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, Shantung, Mongolia, eastern Siberia, and the former German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. Britain could no longer boast of its naval predominance. A weakened France could not compete as a major power in the Far East. Russia, now almost totally absorbed in domestic problems, reduced its involvement in the Far East. Germany was driven out of Asia.

It was Japan and the United States that emerged from the Great War in a much stronger economic and military position than prior to the war. Yet, at the Paris Peace Conference, the United States had clearly demonstrated opposition to Japanese continental expansion.³

³ Yoshiaki Amakawa, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902-1923: The Study of an Alliance Under the Balance of Power Sytem, Ph.D., Claremont College, 1977, 148-9.

After the Peace Conference, Japan and the United States looked suspiciously upon each other. These suspicions became a major source of tension in the Far East. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which the U.S. government regarded as the cause of Britain's toleration of Japan's aggressive policies, further complicated U.S.-Japanese relations.

The post-WWI triangular rivalry among Japan, the United States, and Great Britain found expression in costly naval building programs. Confronted with American hostility towards Japan's expansionistic policies in East Asia and the tremendous wartime growth of the American Navy, Japan decided on a major expansion of its naval forces. Between 1917 and 1921, the Japanese naval budget tripled. Even sharper increases were forecast for future years. Japan's plan clearly threatened to set off an arms race with Britain and the United States.*

In 1921, Britain announced that its naval program would keep the Royal Navy equal to any other; the United States, on the other hand, considered plans for building

* James Crowley, Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 38.

ten additional battleships and six battle-cruisers - plans which had been suspended during the war.

This explosive naval arms race had an ominous implication in view of the unresolved issues in East Asia and the Pacific. It was further complicated by the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. There was substantial concern on the part of many governments over the prospect of an intense rivalry between Japan and the United States developing into war. Such a conflict would inevitably involve Britain under its Alliance obligation with Japan.⁹

It was in these circumstances that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, due to expire on July 21, 1921, came up for renewal consideration in Japan and Great Britain. Consequently, the U.S. sought the demise of the Alliance.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

"A SUMMARY"

It was at this time that the United States Congress urged for agreement with Japan and Britain for a reduction of naval armaments. The United States took the initiative

⁹ Y. Amakawa, 150.

to arrange a conference to discuss disarmament in connection with Far Eastern and Pacific problems. Countries invited included Japan, France, Great Britain, Italy, China, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Among the participants, only Japan exhibited mixed feelings about the conference.

Everyone invited to the conference entered it willingly except Japan. Why so?

Japanese troops controlled three main outlets of Siberia. They dominated Peking [Beijing] from vantage points in Manchuria and Shantung. Her traders had monopolized some of the richest resources of Asia. Japan had never been closer to realizing the dream of hegemony over Asia than in 1921. All that the Japanese hierarchy asked of the Western world was to be let alone. But now, as a bolt from a clear sky, came the summons to Washington. Little wonder that the Japanese press was full of lamentations.*

The Japanese political and military machine knew it could not refuse to participate in the conference. Some Japanese politicians perceived that such a refusal would be an open confession of her ambitions in the Orient. Failure to participate in the Washington Conference would brand

* Raymond L. Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: Russell and Russell, 1922), 148-9.

Japan as an outcast from the society of nations which she had only recently joined. Thus, Japan was present at the opening of the Conference in Washington D.C.

The eleventh of November, 1921, was the first officially proclaimed Armistice Day in the United States. It was also the opening day of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament. U.S. Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes opened the conference. Attendees expected the inaugural session to proceed no farther than the usual exchange of diplomatic formalities. Instead, the conference began with one of the "most startling proposals ever heard in the opening speech of an international meeting."⁷

"His speech was not great merely because of its audacity, but because of its utter disregard for diplomatic furtiveness, and its sincerity."⁸

Competition in armaments, the Secretary announced emphatically, must cease immediately. The world was tired of rhetoric and excuses; it wanted a practical program for easing its burdens and it wanted that program begun now. Therefore, the

⁷ Thomas L. Powers, The United States Army and the Washington Conference 1921-1922, Ph.D., The University of Richmond, 1969, 176.

⁸ Buell, 152.

conference should, without further ado, bend its efforts toward the adoption of such a plan. There was only one way to end an arms race, and that was simply to end it. There could be no better time than the present.*

Secretary Hughes had gained the attention of his audience. There had been rumors that the U. S. might make a major policy statement; this was it. Hughes continued. He presented a specific proposition to enact just a plan as he had described:

First, all existing programs for building capital ships -- the top-of-the-line monsters which were the day's ultimate weapon -- would be abandoned immediately. Nations would then agree to undertake no new construction in that field for a period of ten years. Finally, and incredibly, naval arms would be reduced still further by the scrapping of some battleships already afloat. Pursuing the plan down to the last detail, Hughes proposed that the United States scrap thirty of its vessels; Britain twenty-three; and Japan, seventeen. Lest there be any misunderstanding or excuse for the delay, the Secretary listed, by name, those ships intended for doom.¹⁰

Following the explosive opening speech, the conference participants launched into its agenda (Figure 23).

The major accomplishments of the conference were written into the Four, Five, and Nine-Power treaties, which "confirmed a new pattern of international relations that the Great War had shaped."¹¹

* T. Powers, 177.

¹⁰ Ibid., 178.

The official agenda of the Washington Conference included two major areas of discussion - the limitation of armaments and questions pertaining to the Pacific and the Far East:

1. Limitation of Naval Armament, under which shall be discussed, (a) limitations, (b) extent, (c) fulfillment.
2. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.
3. Limitation of land armament.
4. Questions relating to China. First, principles to be applied; second, application. (a) territorial integrity; (b) administrative integrity; (c) open door - equality of commercial and industrial opportunity; (d) concessions, monopolies or economic privileges; (e) development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern Railways; (f) preferential railroad rates; and (g) status of existing commitments.
5. Siberia (similar headings).
6. Mandated Islands Electrical Communications in the Pacific.¹²

¹¹ Y. Amakawa, 153.

¹² Buell, 150-1.

The Four-Power Treaty of December 13, 1921 (Appendix D), was a mutual recognition by France, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States of the "status quo" in their respective Pacific possessions. It contained a clause stipulating signatories exhaust every form of mutual consultation before taking arms against one another. Further, all four would meet and discuss appropriate action if an outside power should threaten any of those Pacific possessions. Finally, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911 was abrogated.

The final clause was particularly applauded by the United States. The Alliance had long been a fearful spectre for the Americans. Now, with the demise of the Alliance, it seemed to guarantee that if a war with Japan came, England would now fight with the United States - not Imperial Japan.

Signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1921, agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" and "to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China."¹³

¹³ Ibid., 405.

The signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty agreed to maintain the principle of the "open door" and refrain from creating "spheres of influence." In spite of this, the treaty tacitly recognized Japan's position in Manchuria and acknowledged unequal treaty rights in China.¹⁴

Two other issues were of special importance - Shantung and the Twenty-One Demands. The former was settled by a bilateral agreement between Japan and China, in which Japan agreed to restore China's full sovereignty in Shantung. China in turn recognized Japan's economic privileges there. Accordingly, Japan withdrew its troops from Shantung while China made the territory available for foreign trade.¹⁵

Other issues affecting the relations of the U.S. and Japan were discussed. The two most important issues was the Japanese expeditionary force still in eastern Siberia and Yap Island. The first was resolved by Japan's withdrawal from the area in late 1922. The second was successfully settled by a Japanese-American treaty in which Japan recognized equal radio, cable, and residential rights for American citizens

¹⁴ Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After - A Historical Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1928), 366.

¹⁵ Amakawa. 155.

The Five-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922 (Appendix E), specifically addressed arms limitation and Pacific fortifications. The Five-Power Treaty contained the heart of Secretary Hughes' intentions. The Treaty called for a suspension of naval construction and the scrapping of battleships in order to bring existing levels of armament down. The Treaty stipulated that the five nations (Japan, Great Britain, U.S., France, and Italy) would maintain a set ratio of tonnage among themselves, with Britain and the United States allotted five tons for every three of Japan and every 1.75 tons for France and Italy (5:3:1.75 ratio).¹⁶

The Washington Conference came to a close in February 1922. Professor Iriye sums up the conference in his book The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction:

The Washington Conference was an attempt on the part of the major countries involved in the area, except the Soviet Union, to come together and work out a structure of international relations to transform the diplomacy of imperialism. The resulting "Washington Conference system" was a compromise

¹⁶ Ibid., 157.

¹⁷ Iriye Akira, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 17. Quoted in Y. Amakawa, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902-1923: The Study of an Alliance under the Balance of Power System, Claremont College, Ph.D., 1977, 138.

between the traditionalist concept, based on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and the Sino-American insistence on a new order, looking to the abolition of spheres of influence and ultimate restoration of sovereignty to China. In the Pacific the polarity was between Japanese expansion and American expansion, either case involving an armament race. It was primarily because of the Pacific question that the Asian issue was settled by the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This was a price the Japanese government decided to pay in order to avoid a costly naval armament race with the United States.¹⁷

IMPACT OF THE CONFERENCE

The Four-Power Treaty abrogated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Oddly enough, the Alliance was not even on the agenda of the open conference. It was dealt with mainly in private, often uncharted, conversations between the plenipotentiaries themselves. Great Britain decided to throw its weight to the American desire to end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. To do otherwise would have greatly upset America - now Britain's great ally. British officials at the conference attempted to soften the blow for their old allies:

¹⁶ Ibid., 157.

¹⁷ Iriye Akira, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 17. Quoted in Y. Amakawa, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902-1923: The Study of an Alliance under the Balance of Power System, Claremont College, Ph.D., 1977, 138.

When two nations have been united in that fiery ordeal (war), they cannot at the end of it take off their hats one of the other and politely part as two strangers. . . . Something more, something closer, unites them than mere words of the treaty; and, as it were, gratuitously and without cause to tear up the written contract, although it serves no longer any valid or effective purpose, may lead to misunderstandings in one nation just as much as the maintenance of that treaty has led to misunderstandings in another. . . . The only way out of this impasse was that we should annul, merge, destroy, as it were, this ancient and outworn and necessary agreement [Anglo-Japanese Alliance], and replace it with something new, something effective, which should embrace all the Powers [Four-Power Treaty] concerned in the vast area of the Pacific.^{1*}

Great Britain yielded to American insistence that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be dissolved in favor of a multinational agreement on the grounds that the Alliance was directed against the United States especially after the disappearance of the German and Russian threat. The Japanese, on the other hand, wanted to avoid any war with the United States, which was superior to their country economically as well as militarily. Hence, British and Japanese leaders realized that they would have to compromise the Alliance in order to induce cooperation from the United States.

^{1*} Nish, Alliance in Decline, 376.

Japan grieved over the passing of the Alliance. Many Japanese leaders felt betrayed by Great Britain. Lack of Anglo-Japanese consultation, Professor Ian H. Nish maintains, "seemed to confirm that there was not much goodwill left in the Alliance."¹⁹ Japan became more convinced of a long-suspected "Anglo-American collusion or conspiracy. . . a convenient myth for those Japanese who were in time to come to focus upon it the sense of grievances that was aroused by the conference."²⁰

"At any rate you gave the Alliance a splendid funeral", so a cynical Japanese is supposed to have spoken to a British observer at the Washington Conference.²¹ But another observer at the conference provided a less cheery view of the demise of the Alliance:

It was a forlorn funeral. It was as if only a few members of the wake followed the coffin, with three or four lanterns dimly lit, treading a narrow country lane on a lonely winter night. A strong and healthy evergreen tree, which had symbolized peace in the orient for over twenty years, had been felled, crumbling without any resistance when swept by a cold blast of wind.²²

¹⁹ Ibid., 382.

²⁰ Ibid., 397.

²¹ Ibid., 383.

²² I. Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 8.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance formally came to an end on August 17, 1923, with the ratification of the Four-Power Treaty.

The Washington Conference forced Japan to adopt a new diplomatic approach to her continental interests. Japan could no longer rely upon the security of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, nor could it pursue politically expansionistic policies in China or Manchuria. Instead, Japan's diplomacy after 1922 was based on the principle of cooperation with the Anglo-American nations. Implicit in this approach was the conviction that it afforded the best means of protecting the empire and Japan's existing treaty rights on the Asian continent.²³

Japan accepted the armament formulas of the Washington Conference due to a change in the orientation of Japanese foreign policy in the 1920's. One of Japan's tools for military expansionism, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, was now a part of diplomatic history. Consequently, Japan substituted economic expansionism for militaristic expansionism. Japan would limit territorial expansion but would strive for economic expansion in all directions.

²³ James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy - National Security and Foreign Policy 1930-1938 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), 30.

The feeling was that the country [Japan] had bitten more than it could chew, and that territorial imperialism had proved to be costly and apt to rouse bitter enemies and armament rivalries abroad. It would be far better to concentrate on peaceful penetration of the world's markets for goods and capital. The ever increasing surplus population, the awareness of which never abated after the war [WWI], could be settled overseas through emigration rather than outright colonization. Such was the thinking that provided the psychological and intellectual underpinning for Japan's acceptance of the Washington Conference.²⁴

In 1922 Japan's Prime Minister, Takahashi Korekiyo, said,

The war taught us that it is impossible to undertake national expansion through the use of force.²⁵

As time would tell, however, the new diplomatic system based on the Washington Conference formula proved to be less stable than the old regime of imperialist politics. The three major powers (Japan, England, and the United States) successfully re-defined their power positions and spheres of predominance. But the systemic momentum was not enough to consolidate a new stable order in Asia. Only a few short years later, Japanese military expansionism would again rear its ugly head in Asia.

²⁴ Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia (New Jersey: Prentic-Hall, Inc., 1974), 18.

²⁵ Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 1922. Quoted in A. Iriye The Cold War in Asia, 18.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

There has been one outstanding instrument which for twenty years not only protected the aggressions of the Japanese military machine from the interference of outside powers, but morally encouraged them. This instrument was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.¹

Raymond L. Buell
1922

The Anglo-Japanese alliance had been a not insignificant factor for two decades.²

Ian H. Nish
1972

Preceding chapters discussed the influence of the Alliance on Japan's decision to make war with Russia in 1904, annex Korea in 1910, pursue territorial gains during World War I, and eventually gain dominance in the Far East by the early 1920's. This chapter summarizes and analyzes the overall effect of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on Japanese expansionism from 1902-1923 (Appendix F).

¹ Raymond L. Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: Russell and Russell, 1922), 103.

² Ian H. Nish, Alliance in Decline - A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-1923 (London: The Athlone Press, 1972), 397.

The first Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) evolved from Japanese-perceived threats of Russian encroachment in Manchuria and later, Korea. Under the first Alliance, Great Britain and Japan agreed to protect their respective interests as well as to maintain the status quo in the Far East. Britain, a status quo power in the Far East, concerned itself with protecting its large trade with China. Japan, an up and coming power, desired to place Korea in the Japanese sphere of influence.

The Alliance accomplished this for Japan. The Alliance conferred status, recognition of her aspirations in the Far East, and the cooperation of the largest naval power in the world on the evolving Japanese Empire. Saving her from isolation, the first Alliance raised Japan's world status and made the Land of the Rising Sun better prepared for the conflict with Russia in 1904.

The second Anglo-Japanese (1905), signed during the Russo-Japanese War, pledged to keep peace in the Far East and maintain the integrity of and opportunity in China. Stronger than the first Alliance, the second Alliance stated that the intervention of any third power against a contracting party drew the other into the conflict.

The scope of the second Alliance expanded to include Japanese protection of British interests in India in

exchange for British recognition of Japan's "paramount interest" in Korea. The second Alliance, coupled with Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, set tremendous political and military changes in motion.

The Russo-Japanese War resulted in the ascendancy of Japan in East Asia. After 1905, it was Japan, not Russia, who was the likely candidate to alter the balance of power in the Far East. The weakening of Russia drove France closer to Britain, bringing about the formation of an entente vis-a-vis Germany in 1904. The war also provided Great Britain with a chance to patch up its differences with Russia over colonial policies. England was subsequently able to concentrate on the German menace in Europe. The second Alliance helped Japan lay the foundation for continental expansion by recognizing its hegemony in Korea. Upon concluding the second Alliance, Japan regarded southern Manchuria vital to the defense of Korea.

By 1907 Russia had given up thoughts of avenging their defeat at the hands of Japan. Other powers gave up their territorial appetites in Asia. "Not that they lost interest in China; they continued to be commercially active

there. But they were content to leave the military-naval ascendancy in the Far East to the Japanese, while they concentrated in Europe."³

Following the 1910 annexation of Korea, the third Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1911) implied British acquiescence in Japan's aggressive policy. Japanese expansionism did not overly concern England as long as Japan limited its activities to Korea and southern Manchuria. World War I caused England to face its worst fears - a Japan taking advantage of a power vacuum in the Far East.

When WWI broke out, England initially discouraged Japan from taking part in the war. Japan, however, quickly used the situation to her advantage. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was Japan's pretext for entering the war. Japan's seizing of German possessions in China and the Pacific and presenting the Twenty-One Demands to China radically altered the "status quo" the Alliance was designed to maintain.

Although disappointed with Japanese expansionism, England could not terminate the Alliance during WWI. After the Treaty of Versailles and fulfillment of the "secret agreements",

³ I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 365-6.

England found the opportunity to end the Alliance at the Washington Conference. The acknowledged purpose of the Alliance had been to restrain Russia and Germany. After WWI, these countries ceased to be dangerous for either Japan or England. During the war, the Alliance had muzzled England's protests against Japanese militarism. Abrogation of the Alliance in the 1920's removed the muzzle.

World War I radically changed the prewar balance of power in the Far East. Japan and the United States were now the leading powers in the Far East and Pacific regions. The two powers regarded each other as rivals. The United States considered the Anglo-Japanese Alliance directed against them and as a reason for British leniency toward Japanese expansionism. Strong U.S.-British diplomatic ties and British desire for more U.S. cooperation allowed the Americans to pursue and achieve the demise of the Alliance at the Washington Conference.

The Washington Conference not only ended the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it gave the United States parity with the strongest navy in the world, Great Britain's. But it did not solve the arms race in naval ship construction. After the conference, Japan began building cruisers to counter limitations placed on the construction of capital ships.

In retrospect, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a product of change in the international system which began sometime in the 1890's. Many Western Powers at that time were curious to see if Japan was going to be a bubble or a nugget. Would Japan's development be short-lived and quickly burst or would it gradually grow and bring power to the island nation. Due in large part to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan turned out to be a nugget. The Alliance became the cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy for the first twenty years of the 20th Century.

From the Japanese standpoint, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance took advantage of Britain's hegemony in East Asia and obtained diplomatic and economic advantages in both Korea and China. Afterward, Japan constructed a complex entente system including France, Russia, and the United States, based upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

An alliance has never been negotiated for the advancement of science, for the encouragement of thought, or for mutual blandishment. But it has always been framed with a view to war. By its very nature an alliance is aimed at some outside power or group of powers who threaten or may threaten the "interests" of the parties who have framed it. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was no exception to this rule.⁴

⁴ R. Buell, 103-4.

Was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance defensive or offensive in character? According to Professor Ian H. Nish, a prolific author on the subject of the Alliance, "there is no scientific way of classifying treaties by analyzing their terms, these descriptions [offensive and defensive] are purely subjective and have no precise meaning."⁸ Professor Nish also believes that few responsible statesmen would admit that an alliance into which their country has entered, is offensive. The initial Anglo-Japanese Alliance certainly appears to have been defensive in nature.

While the labels "offensive" or "defensive" may not be the best terms to use to describe the Alliance, one cannot avoid comparing Japanese expansionism in the early part of the 20th Century with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The first part of the 20th Century witnessed tremendous growth in Japan's economy (Figure 23), and military expenditures (Figure 24). Investigators of history cannot separate the "cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy" from Japanese expansionistic pursuits in the first part of the 20th Century.

⁸ Ibid., 374.

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EXPANSION




Figure 23.*

* The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, The Sino-Japanese Conflict and Financial Resources (Tokyo: Kenkyusha Press, 1937), 1.

JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
1890-1910
(in millions of dollars)




Figure 24.7

The life of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923) provided a basic framework of the international system in Asia. The Alliance also provided a diplomatic framework for Japanese expansionism. Japanese attacks on German territories in China and the South Pacific, compounded by the 21-Demands, confirmed the intentions of the Empire.

⁷ Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, Alliance in Japanese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, University of Maryland, Ph.D., 1984, Philosophy, 97.

During the life of the Alliance, Japan acquired

Korea, Formosa and Saghalin [sic] new territory to the extent of nearly 100,000 sq. miles or roughly speaking one-half of the original area of her [Japan] Island Empire, not to mention the immense regions in Manchuria and Mongolia over which she exercises practically all the rights of sovereignty.*

Despite these territorial gains by Japan, some historians claim the Alliance was a moderating agent on Japan. It had provided the power of England to help reduce or subdue Japanese ambitions. In time, with Japanese ambitions of expansionism fully unveiled, the Alliance evolved into a liability rather than an asset for the British.

The abrogation of the Alliance was perhaps a mixed blessing. According to Professor Nish, the ending of the Alliance "opened up the possibility of a fresh approach in east Asia, unfettered by inelastic relationships from the past".⁹ Only in this way, "could they [the Western Powers] for the future improve the international order in east Asia, in which the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been a not insignificant factor for two decades".¹⁰

* I. Nish, Alliance in Decline, 393.

⁹ Ibid., 397.

¹⁰ Ibid., 397.

But the prevailing optimism of a "fresh approach" in east Asia after the abrogation of the Alliance proved to ill-founded. By the early 1930's Japan's imperial forces once again commenced expansionistic operations in Manchuria. This time, it would take more than a mere Alliance to influence control over Japan's ambitions and ever growing economic and military power.

APPENDIX A

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1902

The governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the Extreme East, being more over specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

ARTICLE II

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interest as described above, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

ARTICLE III

If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE IV

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

ARTICLE V

Whenever, in opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

ARTICLE VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before expiration of the said five year the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance, shall, "ipso facto", continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 30th of January 1902.

(L.S.) LANSLOWNE (L.S.) HAYASHI

APPENDIX B

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1905

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th of January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object: (a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India. (b) The preservation of the common interest of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China. (c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions.

ARTICLE I

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE II

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, whenever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognises the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

ARTICLE IV

Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognises her rights to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

ARTICLE V

The high contracting parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

ARTICLE VII

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by naval and military authorities of the contracting parties, who will from time to time consult with one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

ARTICLE VIII

The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date. In case neither of the high contracting parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding of the high contracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance, "ipso facto", continue until peace is concluded.

APPENDIX C

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1911

The Government of Japan and the Government of Great Britain having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of August 12, 1905, and believing that the revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same objective as the said Agreement, namely: A. - The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India. B. - The preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China. C. - The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defence of their special interests in those regions:

ARTICLE I

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights and interests.

ARTICLE II

If by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either of the High Contracting Parties should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its Ally and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

Should either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall impose on such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitration treaty is in force.

ARTICLE V

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in circumstances entered into the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the military and naval authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and frankly upon all questions of mutual interests.

ARTICLE VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expirations the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the Alliance shall, "ipso facto", continue until peace is concluded.

APPENDIX D

FOUR POWERS TREATY, 1921

The United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan, with a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the regions of the Pacific Ocean, have determined to conclude a Treaty to this effect and have appointed Plenipotentiaries: (Names omitted.)

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

I

The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific questions and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II

If the said right are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

III

This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve month's notice.

IV

This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate. The Government of the United States will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the "proces-verbal" of the deposit of ratifications. The present Treaty, in French and in English, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the Signatory Powers.

In faith whereof the above names Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the thirteenth day of December, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-one.

(Signatures omitted)

APPENDIX E

FIVE POWERS TREATY, 1922

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan; Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of the general peace, and to reduce the burdens of competition in armament; Have resolved, with a view to accomplishing these purpose, to conclude a treaty to limit their respective naval armament, and to that end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries; (Here follows a list of delegates). Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I

General Provisions Relating To The Limitation Of Naval Armament

ARTICLE I

The Contracting Powers agree to limit their respective naval armament as provided in the present Treaty.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Powers may retain respectively the capital ships which are specified in chapter ii, Part. On the coming into force of the present Treaty, but subject to the following provisions of this Article, all other capital ships, built or building, of the United States, British Empire and Japan shall be disposed of as prescribed in chapter ii, Part 2. In addition to the capital ships specified in chapter ii, Part 1, the United States may complete and retain two ships of the West Virginia class now under construction. On the completion of these two ships, the North Dakota and the Delaware shall be disposed of as prescribed in chapter ii, Part 2. The British Empire, in accordance with the replacement table in chapter ii, Part, may construct two new capital ships not exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement each. On the completion of the said two ships the Thunderer, King George V, Ajax, and Centurion shall be disposed of as prescribed in chapter ii, Part 2.

ARTICLE III

Subject to the provisions of Article II, the Contracting Powers shall abandon their respective capital-ship building programs, and no new capital ships shall be constructed or acquired by any of the Contracting Powers except replacement tonnage which may be constructed or acquired as specified in chapter ii, Part 3. Ships which are replaced in accordance with chapter ii, Part 3, shall be disposed of as prescribed in Part 2 of that chapter.

ARTICLE IV

The total capital-ship replacement tonnage of each of the contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for the British Empire 525,000 (533,400 metric tons); for France 175,000 tons (177,800); for Italy 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Japan 315,000 tons (320,040 metric tons).

ARTICLE V

No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers.

ARTICLE VI

No capital ship of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a caliber in excess of 16 inches (406 millimeters).

ARTICLE VII

The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for the British Empire 135,000 (137,160 metric tons); for France 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Italy 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Japan 81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons).

ARTICLE VIII

The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be effected only as prescribed in chapter ii, Part 3, provided, however, shall aircraft tonnage in existence or building on November 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, and may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article VII, without regard to its age.

ARTICLE IX

No carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers. However, any of the Contracting Powers may, provided that its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not thereby exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 metric tons) standard displacement, and in order to effect economy any of the Contracting Powers may use for this purpose any tow of their ships, whether constructed or in course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped under the provisions of Article II. The armament of any aircraft carriers exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be in accordance with the requirements of Article X, except that the total number of guns to be carried in case any of such guns be of a caliber exceeding 6 inches (152 millimeters), except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimeters), shall not exceed eight.

ARTICLE X

No aircraft carrier of any of the Contracting Powers shall carry a gun with a caliber in excess of 8 inches (203 millimeters). Without prejudice to the provision of Article IX, if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimeters) in caliber the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimeters), shall not exceed ten. If alternately the armament contains no guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimeters) in caliber, the number of guns is not limited. In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimeters) is not limited.

ARTICLE XI

No vessel of war exceeding 10,000 (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the Contracting Powers. Vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under government control for fighting purposes, which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities otherwise than as fighting ships, shall not be within the limitations of this Article.

ARTICLE XII

No vessel of war of any of the Contracting Powers, hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a caliber in excess of 8 inches (203 millimeters).

ARTICLE XIII

Except as provided in Article IX, no ship designated in the present Treaty to be scrapped may be reconverted into a vessel of war.

ARTICLE XIV

No preparation shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks or the mounting of guns not exceeding 6-inch (152 millimeters) caliber.

ARTICLE XV

No vessel of war constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers for a non-Contracting Power shall exceed the limitations as to displacement and armament prescribed by the present Treaty for vessels of a similar type which may be constructed by or for any of the Contracting Powers; provided, however, that the displacement for aircraft carriers constructed for a non-Contracting Power shall in no case exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement.

ARTICLE XVI

If the construction of any vessel of war for a non-Contracting Power is undertaken within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers, such Power shall promptly inform the other Contracting Powers of the date of the signing of the contract and the date on which the keel of the ship is laid; and shall also communicate to them the particulars relating to the ship prescribed in chapter ii, Part 3, Section I (b), (4) and (5).

ARTICLE XVII

In the event of a Contracting Power being engaged in war, such Power shall not use as a vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power, or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

ARTICLE XVIII

Each of the Contracting Powers undertakes not to dispose by gift, sale or any mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the Navy of any foreign Power.

ARTICLE XIX

The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

1. The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;

2. Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand.

3. The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provision implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.

ARTICLE XX

The rules for determining tonnage displacement prescribed in chapter ii, Part 4, shall apply to the ships of each of the Contracting Powers.

(SOURCE: Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1928), 365-69.)

APPENDIX F

CHRONOLOGY

	1868	Meiji Restoration
	1890's	Russian expansionism in the Far East
	1893	Russia-France Entente
	1894-5	Sino-Japanese War
	1895	Triple Intervention
	1900	Boxer Rebellion
FIRST ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE	1902	
	1904	England-France Entente
	1904-5	Russo-Japanese War
SECOND ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE	1905	
	1907	Russia-Japan Entente
	1907	Russia-England Entente
	1908	U.S.-Japan Entente
	1910	Japan annexes Korea
THIRD ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE	1911	
	1914	Japan enters WWI
	1914	Japan takes Shantung
	1915	Japan occupies Micronesia
	1915	Twenty-one Demands
	1917	Japan invades Siberia
	1919	Treaty of Versailles
	1921-2	Washington Conference
END OF THE ALLIANCE	1923	Ratification of the Four Powers Treaty

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