



AMERICAN SPIRIT
A Leadership Philosophy for U.S. Tactical Forces

A Monograph
by
Major William J. Wansley
Field Artillery



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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 91-92

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

92-32611



92 12 22 175

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 18/12/91	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE AMERICAN SPIRIT: A LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY FOR U. S. TACTICAL FORCES			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) WILLIAM J. WANSLEY, USA			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES ATTN: ATZL-SWV FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900 (913) 684-3437 AUTOVON 552-3437			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) THIS MONOGRAPH DEVELOPS AN INTEGRATED LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY FOR U.S. TACTICAL LEADERS. THE GOAL OF THIS PHILOSOPHY IS A CONSISTENT WAY OF THINKING FOR OUR TACTICAL LEADERS IN PEACETIME AS WELL AS IN WAR. THE PHILOSOPHY IS DEVELOPED THROUGH AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEMANDS ON OUR TACTICAL LEADERS IN THE RAPIDLY CHANGING PEACETIME ENVIRONMENT AND ACROSS THE ENVIRONMENT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY PROVIDES A CLIMATE AND CRITERIA FOR DECISION MAKING APPROPRIATE FOR AMERICA'S ARMY. THE MONOGRAPH RECOMMENDS THE ARMY ADOPT THE LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY AS AN ADDITION TO OUR LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE. THE PHILOSOPHY, TITLED "AMERICAN SPIRIT," WOULD SERVE TO PROVIDE A STABILIZING APPROACH TO PROBLEM SOLVING FOR OUR LEADERS FACING DRAMATIC CHANGE IN PEACETIME AND ON THE INCREASINGLY COMPLEX BATTLEFIELD OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY OPERATIONS.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP ENVIRONMENT			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 46	
AMERICAN SPIRIT ELECTRIFIED TRINITY ENVIRONMENT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: American Spirit: A Leadership Philosophy for U. S.
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Accepted this 31st day of December 1991

ABSTRACT

AMERICAN SPIRIT: A LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY FOR U. S. TACTICAL FORCES by Major William J. Wansley, USA, 46 pages.

This monograph develops an integrated leadership philosophy for U.S. tactical forces. The goal of this leadership philosophy is a consistent way of thinking for our tactical leaders in peacetime as well as in war. In this period of dramatic change, our Army is required to be trained and ready for military operations across the operational continuum. To meet this requirement, all of our leaders and soldiers must be trained to think out solutions to problems in a consistent and structured way. A leadership philosophy can provide the basis for such thinking. The leadership philosophy provides a climate and criteria for decision making appropriate for America's Army.

The monograph begins by reviewing historical, theoretical and doctrinal concepts of leadership. A section of the monograph establishes the importance of having an Army that can adapt to change in peacetime and develops elements of a climate and criteria for decision making in that environment. Three sections use the AirLand Battle tenets to develop a desirable climate and decision making criteria for the physical, cybernetic and moral domains of military operations. A final section summarizes the conclusions of the previous sections as a single integrated leadership philosophy appropriate for peacetime as well as war.

The monograph recommends the Army adopt the leadership philosophy developed throughout the paper as an addition to our leadership doctrine. The philosophy, titled *American Spirit*, would serve to provide a stabilizing approach to problem solving for our leaders facing dramatic change in peacetime and on the increasingly complex battlefield of contemporary military operations.

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Availability Codes	
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I. INTRODUCTION

At the time of this writing, the United States Army is probably one of the best trained, equipped and led armies of all time. Our recent participation in Operation Desert Storm demonstrated to the world the capabilities of our well trained, well equipped and all volunteer Army. The commanders of our forces in the Persian Gulf have confirmed our existing beliefs in the quality of our individual soldiers and in the dominance of leadership as a combat multiplier on the battlefield. As has been our history, when our Army was needed, we were there.

This is no time, however, to become complacent about the strengths and virtues of our Army. There is room for improvement and there will always be change. The pace of change in our world and our society is increasing at an exponential rate. Army doctrine, systems and force structure are constantly being challenged by the technological, economic, social and political changes, in the emergent new world order. The Army's very existence as a strategic force of sufficient size is threatened by economic and political priorities. To remain a versatile, deployable and lethal force on tomorrow's battlefield, the Army must meet the challenges of peacetime change while maintaining the basic military values which have served us so well in the past.

The nature of war on the modern battlefield is also challenging our Army. Clausewitz defines the nature of war in his paradoxical trinity: "composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone." He felt that these three dominant tendencies maintain a balance, "like an object suspended between three magnets."¹ But Clausewitz could not envision the dramatic "electrification" of this trinity by the contemporary effects of technology and the media.

The seemingly chaotic battlefield of the Napoleonic era, familiar to Clausewitz, has evolved to a battlefield of high-performance chaos. The more capability we gain with high-tech systems, the more friction and fog becomes evident. While we have a multitude of technological capabilities for gathering information about the enemy, we have also

increased our susceptibility to his sophisticated deception. The confidence and moral ascendancy we garner from our national political strength and will may be shaken, in an instant, by one weapon of mass destruction. The media now serves as an instantaneous "check and balance" on policy while also serving to heighten the emotions and corresponding will of the nation. Modern war can still be described by the trinity, but it is a much faster moving, more uncertain and morally demanding phenomenon than Clausewitz experienced—an "electrified trinity." Our task now, is to maintain a balance like an object suspended between three "electromagnets."

The second dominant tendency of the Clausewitz trinity concerns the commander and his army. The success of an army in this "realm of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam," Clausewitz continues, "depends on the particular character of the commander and the army."² The character of a commander is measured in his genius which reflects both the intellect and courage of the individual. The army's character is reflected in its warrior spirit.³ In modern war, the requirements for character in the commander and his army have also been electrified.

To maintain the balance of the trinity in modern war, our leadership must be more flexible and more creative than ever before to adapt to the corresponding increase in probability and chance. Our new contingency army may be deployed to any part of the world on short notice. This type of mission, by its nature, may not have detailed advance planning and may be against an unfamiliar threat force in unknown territory. The commander, and his army, must be flexible enough to deploy on short order, tailor organizations en route to the battlefield, and to fight upon arrival. Creativity under pressure, "genius" according to Clausewitz, has now become the expected norm rather than the exception on the battlefield.

The ability of an army to adapt to tactical situations on the battlefield and changes in our society depends largely on the organizational "way of thinking." Historically, armies base their approach to war during a specific era on a national paradigm evolving from national values and perceptions of future war. The United States is currently emerging from a paradigm based on the Soviet threat and its

containment. As we enter this new era marked by an increasing rate of change and increased uncertainty we must be conscious of our "way of thinking" which provides the bias for military decision making. The Army's current focus is provided by the Chief of Staff's vision and imperatives.

The Army's vision and imperatives are forthright and well understood. The Army of the future must be trained and ready to defend vital U.S. interests wherever they might be threatened. To maintain the trained and ready Army our country requires, we are called to adhere to the Army's fundamental imperatives: quality, doctrine, force mix, training, modernization and leader development.⁴ An aggressive leader development program serves to implement the Chief of Staff's vision and imperatives across the Army.

The leader development program is based on Army leadership doctrine. The doctrine provides a prescriptive guide to what a leader in our army should be, know and do. It addresses the characteristics expected of a leader in our army and techniques that may be used by leaders to provide purpose, direction and motivation. But, our doctrine does not currently provide an overarching leadership philosophy, a way of thinking, as a guiding inner light for all levels of the Army. What is missing is a simple, reasoned and consistent bias for decision making applicable to leaders on the front line in combat as well as during peacetime.

The purpose of this monograph is to develop an integrated leadership philosophy appropriate for U.S. tactical forces, a leadership philosophy that represents both the American approach to conflict and the spirit of our national character. The goal of this leadership philosophy is a consistent way of thinking for our tactical leaders in peacetime as well as in war. A way of thinking is no more than a way to arrange information to make decisions.⁵ A leadership philosophy should provide a climate and criteria for decision making to support American military operations.

The philosophy developed in this monograph is not revolutionary. Students of our leadership and warfighting doctrine will not find many new concepts, but perhaps some new terms borrowed from business management theorists for current practices. The approach is to

structure a creative, yet stable, climate across the Army that will allow our passion for leadership to flourish. Several specific themes will also be identified as criteria for all tactical leaders in their daily decision making. To be useful, the philosophy must complement our warfighting doctrine.

AirLand Battle doctrine describes the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels.⁶ The four tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine; initiative, agility, depth and synchronization define our brand of maneuver warfare and, in some respects, represent our warfighting philosophy. The AirLand Battle tenets will be used in this monograph as a guide to develop the leadership philosophy. The tenets are not all necessary and sufficient to validate a dominant leadership theme, rather they serve to shape the leadership philosophy to compliment our way of war and military operations short of war. A brief review of these tenets will serve to describe the American way of war.

Initiative implies an offensive spirit setting or changing the terms of the battle. It requires the enemy to conform to our operational purpose and tempo while maintaining our own freedom of action. In the chaos of battle, initiative requires decentralized decision authority for rapid and decisive action. Surprise, concentration, speed, audacity and violence all characterize initiative in action.⁷ Initiative contributes to the agility of the force.

Agility is the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy. In the heat of battle, agility is as much a mental as a physical consideration. Our soldiers must be able to be decisive, in an environment of uncertainty, in order to maintain the momentum of the operation. Our ability to process information, think clearly, make rapid decisions and act without hesitation is key to agility.⁸ An agile force offers opportunity for action in depth.

Depth is the extension of operations in space, time and resources. Operations in depth serve to threaten the enemy's freedom of action, reduce his flexibility and upset his plans while protecting our own. Exploitation of depth requires imagination, boldness, foresight and decisiveness in our leaders.⁹ Operations in depth require the detail synchronization of our efforts.

Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. It includes the concentration of the physical, cybernetic and moral effects of fires and maneuver. In larger operations, the synchronization of individual battles will also contribute to the total collapse of the enemy's will to fight. Synchronization brings together the talents of our leaders and the capabilities of our systems to execute AirLand Battle doctrine.¹⁰

The Army's leadership challenge is now evolving outside the requirements of peacetime change and AirLand Battle doctrine. The AirLand Operations umbrella concept will require tactical forces to conduct operations in situations short of war. The tenets of AirLand Operations will still apply in these situations, however, operations must also remain consistent with the imperatives developed for low intensity conflict--primacy of the political element, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, perseverance, and the restricted use of force.¹¹ A leadership philosophy must also be applicable in situations short of war.

This monograph is structured to develop a leadership philosophy for peacetime change and for the environment of military operations. To provide a frame for the paper; historical, theoretical and doctrinal background material will be discussed. Leadership challenges for peacetime change will be developed as well as throughout the three domains of the environment of military operations. A final section will summarize the elements of a leadership climate, the dominant themes of a leadership philosophy and provide a recommendation for implementation.

The leadership challenge for our army begins with our preparation for war while at peace. Our senior leadership doctrine is clear on this point; "To master creative skills, those in senior positions cannot be satisfied with only routine solutions or subscribe solely to the concept of conventionality in peacetime and then expect to be creative in war."¹² Our doctrine calls for leaders to "recognize that the fast pace of combat allows little time to learn new skills, so they must develop units that can respond rapidly to changing situations. The way leaders train soldiers and organizations in peace is the way these organizations will fight in

war."¹³ A way of thinking for leaders in peacetime must be consistent with our way of thinking in the environment of military operations.

The environment of war is explained in detail by Jim Schneider, military theorist at the School of Advanced Military Studies, in his theoretical construct of the physical, cybernetic and moral domains of War.¹⁴ Our emerging doctrine, however, now calls for a variety of military operations short of war such as peacekeeping and nation assistance operations. Schneider's domains are no less applicable to these types operations where the differences between friend and foe may be as uncertain as the battlefield. For this monograph, I will use the following descriptions of the domains of military operations:

Environment of Military Operations

Physical Domain - Concerns the entire process of destruction: the effects of weapons and munitions, terrain, weather, logistics and other physical factors.

Cybernetic Domain - Concerns the processes of organization, command, control, communications, computers, information flow, and human systems.

Moral Domain - Concerns the disintegration and breakdown of will. Inspiring, sustaining and revitalizing trust and morale.¹⁵

The focus of the paper is on leadership within tactical forces, squad through corps level, where the nature of modern war and the environment of military operations are most demanding on unit leadership. This is not to suggest that this leadership philosophy is not essential for use at the other levels of war, a valid philosophy should provide a common direction for all members of the organization. This leadership philosophy should naturally flow from our own well developed leadership doctrine and support our warfighting doctrine.

This development of a leadership philosophy begins with a background review of historical examples, theoretical concepts and current leadership doctrine. The concept of a leadership philosophy is not new. The Germans, over time, developed *auftragstaktik* to meet the demands of commanding and controlling forces conducting maneuver

warfare on a chaotic battlefield. Many classical and contemporary military theorist have suggested a requirement for a similar leadership philosophy to support a doctrine of maneuver warfare. Our leadership and warfighting doctrine provide the requirement for such a philosophy.

II. BACKGROUND

Historical Perspective

The German and Prussian Armies provide an historical example of a warfighting leadership philosophy in their concept of *auftragstaktik*. Although many U.S. Army officers are familiar with the term *auftragstaktik*, the concept is not completely understood. Direct translation of the term has confused the "mission-type order" with the true overarching warfighting philosophy of the German Army.¹⁶

Auftragstaktik is a way of thinking encouraged at all levels of command. Richard Simpkin superbly points out in Race to the Swift that *auftragstaktik* is more than just "mission-type control" or orders; it is a concept that requires subordinates to "take immediate action in accordance with the commander's thinking in the" absence of a set task.¹⁷ John Nelsen, in his monograph on the subject, concludes that *auftragstaktik* "is an all-encompassing concept, holistically embracing the nature of war, character and leadership attributes, tactics, command and control, senior-subordinate relationships, and training and education."¹⁸

Auftragstaktik was the label eventually placed on the German solution to changing battlefield and command and control procedures needed to function on the WW II battlefield.¹⁹ The leadership philosophy evolved over time to support the speed and decisive nature of the German warfighting doctrine. Their organizations functioned in a decentralized mode allowing and encouraging innovation and decision making by individual tactical leaders. This approach to leadership allowed the Germans to, as we must now, "do more, with less."

How does the German experience relate to the U.S. Army and AirLand Battle doctrine? Richard Simpkin believes that any Army intending to execute maneuver warfare must operate under the spirit of *auftragstaktik*, or what he calls "directive control".²⁰ He credits the U.S. Army for developing a modern version of maneuver warfare in AirLand Battle, but wonders if our officer and non-commissioned officer selection and training program is able to produce "creative thinkers" as leaders who can function under directive control.²¹

Simpkin is not the only military thinker to suggest the necessity of adopting an *auftragstaktik* type leadership philosophy for modern armies. Military theorists and thinkers including Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, General Robert E. Lee, General U.S. Grant, General George C. Marshall, General George S. Patton, LTG Walter F. Ulmer Jr. and others all eventually spoused decentralized control to encourage initiative in their subordinates.²² Some officers have implemented successful decentralized command philosophies, however, the Army has still not adopted a consistent leadership philosophy service-wide. In an uncertain environment, stability must be maintained by a consistent philosophy.

The desirability of an *auftragstaktik* type leadership philosophy is historically well supported and recognized. Our leadership doctrine directs and our operational doctrine requires initiative and decentralization at all levels. Although we have an excellent leadership doctrine for the development of leaders, we have yet to develop the requisite leadership philosophy to encourage decentralized operations. Such a leadership philosophy must draw from the character of a nation.

National Character

Colonel Ardant du Picq, the French moral theorist, identified the relationship between the nature of man, his national spirit and his army. "Man," he says, "is the fundamental instrument in battle." Quoting Marshal de Saxe, he continues; "The human heart is then the starting point in all matters pertaining to war." However, "[p]assions, instincts, among them the most powerful one of self-preservation, may be manifested in various ways according to the time, the place, the character and the temperament of the race."²³

According to du Picq, not all countries have a national character that supports a warrior spirit. In particular, he feels; "[t]here is no military spirit in a democratic society." He continued, "[t]he Italians are too civilized, too fine, too democratic in a certain sense of the word. The Spaniards are the same." However, du Picq does think that a democracy can have a strong fighting force if based on a "national feeling" or fusion of varying elements to make up a national "character."²⁴ "The French," although democratic, "are indeed worthy sons of their

fathers, the Gauls."²⁵ This national character, reflected by the fighting spirit of individual soldiers, should be considered in the organization, tactics, discipline and uniforms of an Army.²⁶

National values and the resulting national character provide the basis for an American version of *auftragstaktik*. Americans, by our nature, are individualistic, opportunistic, aggressive, community or team oriented and compassionate. We believe in defending our rights and the democratic rights of our friends and allies. But, we do not want to spend any more time or resources necessary to get the job done. Most importantly, we want to win. Americans want to be on the winning team and to be morally right as we crush our opponents. Our national character, as Clausewitz suggests, provides the warrior spirit of our leadership philosophy.

Our national character is truly a melting pot of national and religious values, philosophies, beliefs and practicalities. The strength of the American culture and character is the blending of the best of all ethnocentricities in our society. Regardless of the original sources of American character, we have strengths and weaknesses that are indicative of the American way of life and war. This character is evident in our leadership doctrine.

Leadership Doctrine

Our leadership doctrine recognizes the importance of American values and character in a leader. The values expected of American soldiers and leaders are courage, candor, competence and commitment. These values are reflected in the behavior of individuals. The character we expect from our soldiers and leaders is demonstrated through self-discipline, determination, initiative, compassion, and courage. Our leadership philosophy should reflect both our national values and the character of the American soldier. This character is also reflected in our warfighting doctrine.

Our warfighting doctrine considers leadership "the most essential element of combat power."²⁷ Leadership provides the purpose, direction and motivation for our forces. We have the best soldiers, doctrine, training and equipment ever fielded by an army. Our greatest challenge is providing the leadership necessary to respond the uncertain chaos on

and off the modern battlefield. If we are going to be a truly trained and ready force, we must be deployable and adaptable in very uncertain combat, and non-combat environments. Our leaders must be trained to take the initiative during peacetime through change and innovation.

III. PEACETIME CHANGE

Although the focus of our doctrine is on combat operations, our vision is for a trained and ready force in peacetime. We are now a peacetime contingency army and will be required to be prepared for operations short of war. A trained and ready force cannot wait until the outbreak of hostilities to develop the flexibility and creativity necessary on the modern battlefield. We must train as we intend to fight and fight as we have trained. The intellectual development required for peacetime change and innovation translates directly to the thought processes required for initiative in combat. Our leadership philosophy must contribute in peacetime to the development of essential character for war.

The American way of war is invariably shaped by the trends in our society and likely threats in peacetime and in war. Our force structure, equipment and doctrine are constantly changing to these realities. We have a coherent approach to force modernization and doctrine review and we demonstrated our ability to surge for five months in preparation for Desert Storm. But, we may not always have the luxury of a five month build-up for the next conflict. We need a systematic approach for change in "real-time."

The subject of peacetime change has often been discussed by respected military thinkers but with little effect on policy makers. Michael Howard, renowned British military author and translator of Clausewitz, identified the importance of peacetime change in his speech, "Military Science in an Age of Peace." In 1973 he provided this advice:

I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.

Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.

I talked earlier about the need for versatility, adaptability and flexibility in the Armed Services so as to absorb technological change. That must be extended to absorb political and social change as well. If they cannot provide it, all historical precedents suggest that the alternative is disappearance and defeat.²⁸

In 1982, General Donn A. Starry presented a speech to the Committee on a Theory of Combat at the Army War College calling for creative solutions to meet the future needs of an army facing constant change. General Starry admired the German Army's remarkable ability to change in the turbulent years 1933-1945. Based on the German solution, Starry listed seven specific requirements necessary for our army to effect change in a systematic manner. He described how the Army had adopted a similar framework to develop our last three versions of FM 100-5, but deduced we still lacked the "intellectual prowess" and "cultural commonality" that allowed the Germans "to change quickly--even under pressure."

Starry concluded that our process still "takes so long that not much ever happens."²⁹ In today's and tomorrow's worlds, we simply cannot afford the luxury of that kind of inefficiency. Since that speech in 1982, little has changed in the process while the entire environment in which we live has changed dramatically. We have not yet designed a systematic way of thinking about change to keep pace with the world around us. We need a better way to keep, as Michael Howard says, "from being too badly wrong."

Change is difficult in any large traditional organization, but the failure to change in our army could result in our failure in combat. Although short of combat, business leadership faces many of the same organizational challenges of the modern battlefield commander. Business consultant and author Tom Peters now advises corporations to develop philosophies in order to survive in an environment of increasing change.

In Tom Peters' book Thriving on Chaos, the prescription for success in today's uncertain environment is "revolution," a dramatic change in the way we think, the way we act, and in hundreds of years of American tradition. Peters' explanation of the choice of the title of his

book sets the stage well. Business is facing chaos and uncertainty, he says, capitalizing on fleeting opportunities will be the measure of success.³⁰ Besides, Peters asks in an educational video he recently produced concerning the necessity for rapid change, "what is the option?"³¹

The United States Army faces a similar situation but with more serious consequences. We have faced uncertainty and chaos on the battlefield ever since we fought for our freedom of British rule. We are now facing dramatic force reductions and other budget driven limitations to our potential combat power. If we are to break the "sine curve" of military preparedness following historical force reductions as described by General Sullivan, we must also "change hundreds of years of tradition." Peters suggests that we cannot make things better, or different, without change.³² The Army's vision for a trained and ready army will require the acceptance of change as a norm. Our prescription for success may not necessarily be a revolution, but it will require a new way of thinking. Besides, what is the option?

Peter Drucker, a sociologist and business school professor, equates the environment facing our society to the environment of uncertainty faced by military commanders.³³ In response to this environment, he claims American society is already evolving into a change based way of thinking. America, according to Drucker, is an "entrepreneurial society" attempting to deal with the challenges and opportunities presented by continuous change in an uncertain world.³⁴ According to Drucker, Americans are predisposed to innovation and change and have been since our founding fathers declared independence. Innovation and entrepreneurship are American strengths and key to our international leadership role. Not surprisingly, Drucker claims two of his four strategies for entrepreneurs came from two different anonymous Civil War Confederate generals.³⁵

Entrepreneurial theory, as presented by French economist J. B. Say (1800) and German economist Joseph Schumpeter (1911), provides a useful guide to innovation in peacetime and in war. "Entrepreneurs see change as the norm and as healthy." They do not usually bring about change by themselves, but always search for change, respond to it, and exploit it as an opportunity.³⁶ Taking advantage of opportunities

of chance, however, can be risky business, but can be managed. The key to success is purposeful innovation encouraged through a systematic process.

Another sociologist and business author, John Naisbitt, called for immediate change in all American organizations in his book Re-Inventing the Corporation. Naisbitt claims that corporations, or any organization, that clings to old structures and outdated philosophies will soon be extinct in the information age.³⁷ New ideas, he feels, do not cause change. Change will only take place in the face of changing values and economic necessity.³⁸ Our armed forces now meet these criteria for change on a daily basis.

In 1988 Stephen Peter Rosen, a Navy Senior Research Fellow, published an enlightening article on military innovation. He considered the differences between peacetime and wartime innovation. He found that while the U. S. has accomplished rapid and effective changes to our doctrine and equipment after problems were identified in wartime, our peacetime process of change is much too slow and has not always produced successful products for the next war. He concludes that unless the current process of peacetime innovation is given serious attention by policy makers, we are destined to face the costly path of military innovation in wartime.³⁹

Peacetime change in our tactical forces must remain focused on remaining a trained and ready force. We must, as General Sullivan says: "be creative, but not too creative." General Sullivan wants leaders to "generate excitement" and "find creative solutions to our own problems," but, not neglect the basics upon which our Army is founded. While corporations focus on improving the bottom line by becoming more competitive in an uncertain environment, we must remain focused on force readiness vis-a-vis current and potential threats. Our approach to change and innovation cannot be haphazard, it must be purposeful and focused.

The challenges of managing change in the Army are significant. To ensure that our doctrine is not "too badly wrong" and that we can "get it right quickly when the moment arrives," we must start thinking logically about systematic change. A leadership philosophy should guide our leaders and soldiers in that direction.

Ideas for change and innovation are best drawn from the people operating the systems of the organization, at all levels. People cannot be supervised into innovation, they must bring the spirit with them.⁴⁰ They must be provided an environment and leadership philosophy that encourages change. Our leadership philosophy must encourage rationale and productive change and innovation at all levels.

Developing an environment for change and innovation requires creative leadership and opportunities for personal growth. Inter-disciplinary education of our soldiers and officers will enhance their creativity skills and assist in stretching the creative envelope for new solutions. The personal growth of individuals within an organization encourages shared responsibility and contribution. The link between creativity and growth is provided by caring leadership.

Developing the "intellectual prowess" in our forces, General Starry suggests is necessary for systematic change, requires education and experience. This education may not necessarily be gained through traditional classroom instruction. We need to encourage habits of *intellectual flexibility* and continuous learning in the work place. John Naisbitt believes we need to learn new skills to cope with our new environment; thinking, learning and creating (TLC).⁴¹ TLC, to be discussed in more detail at a later point, encourages learning how to think and create. Our ability to innovate and evaluate new ideas requires a structured, yet creative, thinking process based on education and experience. Thinking, based on education and experience is called intuition.

The evaluation of new ideas in military science cannot be limited to analytical techniques, intuition can play a major role. As General Starry and Peter Rosen have suggested, the current analytical process is too slow and produces limited results. John Naisbitt has found that analytical techniques tend towards reductionism in the evaluation of a new idea. He feels intuition can be more efficient; "a holistic thinker does better with complex problems faster and more efficiently."⁴² In the business world, intuition is now considered a leaders most powerful tool.⁴³

Intuition is more than just a best guess, it is a common sense approach to problem solving based on previous knowledge and critical

assessments. An idea that makes sense, Naisbitt feels, should immediately be tested in a realistic environment. Usually, the test will be complete before the number crunching produces a quantitative assessment of the new idea's possible utility. An increased recognition of intuition as a credible source for change can increase the Army's rate of change. The rate of change in an Army, according to Rosen, may be critical to success on today's battlefield.

A rapidly changing environment requires a faster process of systematic change. Tom Peters says that if an organization is not substantially reorganizing every six to twelve months, we are probably not up with the times.⁴⁴ This may be too fast for the Army, but he also suggests that realistically reducing change decision cycles 75-90% is necessary just to keep up with the competition. Although this rate of change seems improbable and certainly chaos producing, Peters claims an organization can implement thousands of incremental changes daily while maintaining stability if everyone accepts change as the norm.⁴⁵ A rapidly changing organization must have a stable vision and a widely accepted process for systematic change.

The Army's requirement for efficiency in peacetime change provides the first elements of the leadership climate and dominant themes for an American leadership philosophy. Stability can only be maintained in a rapidly changing organization by a powerful vision. The Army's vision provides the common direction for all activities while allowing minor corrections en route. Changes to our Army, within the vision, must be systematic and purposeful. All levels of the Army must recognize the importance of change to the survival of the organization and willingly accept change as the norm. Most importantly, all soldiers must accept responsibility for finding creative and realistic solutions to problems they face.

Creativity is an essential ingredient for change in peacetime and in war. We must develop an organizational climate that fosters creative thinking through personal growth and education. John Naisbitt suggests this climate can be developed through "alignment" of individual and organizational values and goals. A soldier provided the opportunity to serve and grow in a new position of responsibility will correspondingly serve to improve the capability of the organization.

The limits of a soldier's contribution to a unit are set by latitude provided by his leadership. Authority for change must be commensurate with the responsibilities of the mission assigned. Information necessary to assess likely changes must be available to all levels and shared across units. Finally, changes for the better must not only be tolerated, but encouraged and rewarded as significant contributions to a unit's combat power potential.

This section of the monograph has developed a leadership approach to peacetime change. If we do indeed train as we fight, this same approach should apply to wartime innovation. The essential elements of a leadership climate for change and innovation include vision, systematic change, alignment and decentralization. The dominant leadership themes for change are creativity, information and responsibility sharing, and speed. The next three sections will further develop the elements of a leadership climate and dominant leadership themes across the three domains of environment of military operations.

IV. THE PHYSICAL DOMAIN

The physical domain of the battlefield involves the all aspects of the battlefield that are susceptible to destruction or affect the destruction process. Included are the effects of weapons and munitions, terrain and weather, logistics and facilities.⁴⁶ Clausewitz considered the destruction of the enemy's fighting force one of the means to the end.⁴⁷ However, the direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must be given "dominant consideration."⁴⁸ The greatest victory, he reasoned, is one gained quickly.⁴⁹ This section of the monograph will develop elements of a leadership climate and dominant themes for gaining victory in the physical domain.

The American way of war has always been considered to be physical in nature. Our national industrial capacity to wage war, beginning with the Civil War, has allowed us to conduct massive attrition based campaigns to destroy the enemy forces and his logistical support while minimizing the loss of personnel. Since WW II our advantage in advanced technologies has reinforced our emphasis on materiel. We prefer to use overwhelming firepower to destroy the enemy without undue risk to the force.

While Americans prefer to use firepower rather than risk lives, we desire to limit unnecessary destruction and to avoid prolonged conflict. Our national values, reinforced by national and international law, prohibit unwarranted killing of enemy soldiers and destruction of non-military facilities and infrastructure. This paradox of firepower versus minimum essential destruction requires our leadership to focus effects of combat power on the enemy with minimum collateral damage. Political concerns and economic efficiency do influence our conduct of war. Rather than maximizing the effects of combat systems, American commanders now attempt to optimize effects of weapons on the enemy without unwarranted destruction infrastructure and civilian population or wasting of resources.

Our continuing advances in high technology weapon systems compliment our national values and AirLand Battle tenets. In Operation Desert Storm we demonstrated the remarkable speed of our weapons platforms and accuracy of our firepower. Although out numbered in total

combat systems, we were able to paralyze the enemy with lightning strikes and overwhelm him with massive combat power at the decisive points. The American way of war is now characterized by high speed maneuver and precision munitions. Taking advantage of our capabilities, however, requires an increased emphasis on initiative on the part of leaders.

Initiative in the physical domain is gained through creativity and offensive spirit. A leader must set the terms of the battle by taking the battle to the enemy and not waiting to react. A creative leader understands the capabilities of the enemy, his strengths and weaknesses, and develops courses of action to strike at the most decisive point. While the enemy is responding, a creative leader seeks opportunities of chance to exploit and further unhinge the enemy's plan of action. Exploitation must be conducted with an offensive spirit.

The offensive spirit of a leader, described by Clausewitz as boldness, comes from the character of a nation and familiarity with war.⁵⁰ Although our national defense policy is defensive in nature, our strategy is offensive once military force has been committed. The President's National Security Strategy, which reflects our national character, clearly states our desire to enter a conflict with "overwhelming force" to impose our will on the enemy in the shortest possible time and while minimizing casualties.⁵¹ Translating our national character into offensive action requires experience.

Familiarity with war can be gained through combat experience and realistic training. Clausewitz, again, provides sanguine advice on the importance of combat experience and training in developing a leader's ability to function physically on the battlefield. He believes only combat experience can provide the "lubricant" to reduce the friction of combat. Realizing, even in his time, that not all leaders will have exposure to war, he provides the following guidance:

No general can accustom an army to war. Peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the real thing; but even they can give an army an advantage over others whose training is confined to routine, mechanical drill. To plan maneuvers so that some elements of friction are involved, which will train officers' judgement, common sense, and

resolution is far more worthwhile than inexperienced people might think.⁵²

Fortunately, the U.S. Army places a great deal of emphasis on realistic training at the military training centers, but we can do more at home. The use of published standards and conditions for individual and collective training are very useful in developing soldier and leader confidence at the crawl and walk phases of training. Having achieved success at those levels, soldiers and leaders should be required to operate under conditions of friction. Uncertain intelligence, demanding obstacles and losses in key personnel and equipment can all be easily introduced into daily training. Only by training and performing under these conditions can we consider training to be at the run level. Training also contributes to agility.

Agility requires speed and decisiveness. Our Army has developed most of our combat systems to provide the speed necessary to execute AirLand Battle doctrine. Using that physical speed to concentrate combat power at the decisive point requires leaders who understand the effects of shock, surprise and momentum and the corresponding degradation of the enemy's effects. They must be thinking speed in everything they do. Leaders in combat need to accept the Tom Peters approach to business for the uncertain environment of combat: "Speed is Life."⁵³

To apply an understanding of speed on the battlefield a leader must be decisive. The uncertain nature of war seldom allows perfect information about the enemy. A leader must have the character to make the best judgement with the information available and act decisively. The momentum gained from continuous speed will likely overcome the fog and friction of the battlefield. The decision to press the attack or change directions is based on knowledge and creative ability.

Operations in depth require leaders to consider and take advantage of the available time, space and resources on the battlefield. Deep operations, by their nature, are risky and fluid. These operations require our leaders to demonstrate imagination, boldness, foresight, and decisiveness. To be executed properly, operations in depth must be synchronized.

Synchronization is the harmonization of all available resources at the decisive point and time. The synchronization of high speed maneuver, devastating artillery and precision guided air support in the physical domain requires both an understanding of the nature of the battlefield and our doctrine. Our leadership philosophy should focus leaders on the development of this understanding. The leadership skills necessary for understanding include both military science and military art.

According to Clausewitz, the translation of knowledge, the science of war, into capability requires creative ability, the art of war.⁵⁴ Our leadership development programs serve to develop the knowledge of our leaders in the areas of doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. Creative ability may be natural in some leaders, but must be developed in others. Creativity on the battlefield is demonstrated through intuitive decision making. To this end, our leadership philosophy must encourage the development of John Naisbitt's new lifelong skills of thinking, learning and creating.

The physical domain is probably the area of combat most understandable to American forces. Historically, our emphasis on materiel, especially firepower, has served us well in defeating enemies with relatively fewer casualties. Since WWII we have been able to maintain a relative technological advantage in systems development, reinforcing our confidence in and reliance on hardware to provide combat power. But, times have changed. The rapid changes in technology have caused corresponding changes in tactics, techniques and procedures.

The ability to provide purpose, motivation and direction on today's battlefield demands more of our leaders than ever before. It is not enough for leaders to be competent in their specific tactics, techniques and procedures. Our leaders must be clear thinkers, quick learners and efficient creators to fight on the modern battlefield.

This section of the monograph has developed the requirements for leadership in the physical domain. Two elements of a leadership climate that will contribute to the development of the skills necessary in our leaders; thinking, learning and creating, and realistic and demanding training. Dominant leadership themes for the execution of AirLand

Battle doctrine in the physical domain are **speed, boldness and intuition**. Control of the physical aspects of the battlefield is the focus of the cybernetic domain.

V. THE CYBERNETIC DOMAIN

The cybernetic domain concerns the processes of organization, command, control, communications, computers, information flow and human systems on the battlefield. Organization includes the design and type manning of military units. Command, control and communications (C³) involves command relationships, methods of controlling subordinate units and the hardware used to communicate between units. Information flow includes process of flowing intelligence, friendly unit data, general administrative information, media, and a soldier's inter-personal communication needs. Human systems process information for assessments and decisions based on intellect and personality.

In this section, the monograph will develop the elements of a leadership climate and dominant themes for the cybernetic domain. The focus within the cybernetic domain at the tactical level is on methods of command and control, information, organization and the leaders intellect. Readers may note many parallels between the leadership requirements for peacetime change and the cybernetic domain, both are information and creativity dependent.

Cybernetics has long been a concern of military thinkers, though not previously described by this term. The processes that direct and control forces in battle are discussed by most classical military theorists. Sun Tzu considered command and doctrine, which includes organization and control, two of his five fundamental factors of war.⁵⁵ Clausewitz relies on the "genius" of a commander to provide these same processes.⁵⁶ With the development of the telegraph and the operational level of war during the 1800s, the processes of organizing, commanding and controlling troops became much more complex.

The contemporary science and practice of cybernetics in America has evolved from Paul Revere and signal lamps to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). The desired product of any cybernetic process is knowledge. The raw material for the process is information. The raw material is processed by the systems, either materiel or human, which sort, organize and assess data to produce knowledge. Our

modern Army has become as dependent on information as the rest of our society.

In 1982, sociologist John Naisbitt claimed that America was becoming an information society: "We are drowning in information and starved for knowledge." In 1990, Naisbitt concludes that the growth of information has only quickened.⁵⁷ The bottlenecks in our cybernetic processes remain in the processing and flowing of information. Knowledge, generated from processed information, has become the most important tool on the modern battlefield.

Although the American army is still focuses on the physical domain of war, the cybernetic domain may now be the most critical domain on the battlefield. How we intent to control subordinate leaders and organizations directly impacts on our structure and training and in the end, our ability to accomplish the mission. Included in the cybernetic domain is the soldier's basic need for information as described by S. L. A. Marshall.

S. L. A. Marshall explains the importance of information in the generation of combat power in Men against Fire. He claims: "What we need in battle is more and better fire."⁵⁸ Key to his argument for improving fire is the information relayed by "communications" and "contact."⁵⁹ "Information," he believes, "is the soul of morale and the balancing force in successful tactics." While the U. S. Army exerts a great deal of effort in providing materiel and subsistence to our soldiers, Marshall continues, "we have not found the means to assure an abundant flow of that most vital of all combat commodities—information."⁶⁰

The American approach to the cybernetic domain should take advantage of our superior management information system (MIS) technologies and the innovative character of American soldiers. But, the information needed by our soldiers is very basic and sometimes personal in nature. John Naisbitt was thinking along these lines when he coined the phrase "high-tech/high-touch" as one of the trends of our society for the 1990s.⁶¹ Information systems are useless to its users without consideration of the final application of the knowledge provided. Too much or the wrong type of information contributes to the fog and friction

on the battlefield. Our goal should be to provide appropriate knowledge to our soldiers and leaders.

Leaders taking the initiative on the battlefield require the latitude to take decisive action within the commander's intent. Richard Simpkin insists that the degree of control over a commander must match the theory of war practiced by an Army.⁶² A decentralized method of control, Simpkin calls directive control, "is fundamental to the successful implementation of manoeuvre theory."⁶³ AirLand Battle doctrine calls for decentralized control, but our Army has not yet established the conditions for initiative to flourish.

"The real basis of directive control," claims Simpkin, "is an unbroken chain of trust and mutual respect running from the controlling operational commander to the tank or section commander." He describes this relationship as "the vertical counterpart of team spirit." Professional trust and mutual respect flow from a common aim or vision, reinforced by a common understanding of doctrine and supported by a common philosophy. Only in this environment, can "the members themselves reading the instantaneous local situation and reacting to it in accordance with their understanding of the aim and plan."⁶⁴ Our leadership philosophy must contribute to trust and mutual respect if we are to expect directive control to work.

Agility on the battlefield is also related to the command and control structure of an organization. A tactical leader desiring to press the fight with speed and boldness must have a flexible command system. Martin van Creveld, in Command in War, believes "it is vital, in other words, for the structure and modus operandi of any command system to be adapted to the measure of uncertainty involved in the performance of the task at hand."⁶⁵ Uncertainty is directly related to the availability of information.

Van Creveld feels there are two options for a military organization faced with less information available than is needed to perform an assigned task. "One is to increase its information-processing capability, the other to design the organization, and indeed the task itself, in such a way as to enable it to operate on the basis of less information."⁶⁶ Agility on the modern battlefield requires leaders to be creative in the design of their organizations and, formal and informal information systems.

Operations in depth require leaders who can operate without continuous guidance and information. In deep operations, time and space separate a subordinate unit from its higher command. Command, control and communications systems may be ineffective for extended periods. Our methods of command and control must allow subordinate leaders the freedom "to modify the task set him without referring back, if he is satisfied that further pursuit of that aim would not represent the best use of his resources in furtherance of his superior's intention."⁶⁷ Deep operations cannot be effective without synchronization.

Synchronization is the most challenging creative task for our leaders on the modern battlefield. Our leaders must be able to visualize the battlefield, understand the capabilities of their systems and synchronize the effects of our systems on the enemy. Dynamic synchronization, that done on the move, requires intuitive decision making. Clausewitz would call this ability "coup d'oeil."

The coup d'oeil, or "inward eye" of a commander "refers to the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection." Only through coup d'oeil can a commander make "rapid and accurate decisions" based on an evaluation of time and space on the battlefield. Clausewitz felt that a commander must have "an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth."⁶⁸ Our leadership philosophy must guide the development of our leaders intellect and their intuition to this level.

AirLand Battle doctrine recognizes that command and control of American tactical forces should be decentralized, but that is not enough. The nature maneuver warfare requires bold, creative and decisive action at all levels, including the actions of a light infantry squad leader. The prospect of military operations short of war increased the likelihood of small unit activities in isolation. The quality and training of our leaders now allows us to push authority down to the lowest level with confidence, but we must develop a better understanding of commander's intent if we expect our subordinate leaders to do the right thing at the right time.

General William DePuy concludes a recent article on command and control with a similar theme:

There is no mystery why the tactical and operational creativity of a commander towers over his other qualities. The complexity and diversity of modern military forces, the enormous combat power that is inherent within them, the potential for creative initiative, which resides in the hierarchy of subordinate leaders, and all professional reservoirs of doctrine and training can only be mobilized and focused upon the enemy in victorious action through the medium of a unifying commander's concept--the tool of doctrine--the triumph of a disciplined professional mind over fear, fog and friction of war.⁶⁹

A climate for creative initiative is encouraged by an organization that values the concept of thinking, learning and creating (TLC). John Naisbitt's concept of TLC is focused on making work fun and satisfying, not demeaning to the human spirit.⁷⁰ Thinking skills help to arrange information for rapid decisions. Learning skills allow individuals to adapt and change to new situations.⁷¹ Creating is the natural outcome of thinking about opportunities presented by change. One might ask if TLC really has any relevance to the Army. I submit we already place more emphasis on the education and training of our leaders to make decisions than perhaps any other profession. We must now provide the climate for and train leaders to stretch their creative envelopes to keep pace with the demands of the modern battlefield.

Leadership requirements in the cybernetic domain of combat have evolved in parallel with our integration of high technology systems. As our society has become information based, so has our Army. Our leadership focus in the cybernetic domain should be to provide the structure, method of control and knowledge for our leaders to make the right decisions. The elements of a leadership climate relative to this domain are: professional trust and respect, decentralization, commander's intent and TLC. The dominant themes of leadership are: user focused information, information sharing, intuition and creativity.

The cybernetic domain concerns the control of forces on the battlefield and the information necessary for leaders to make decisions. Soldiers and leaders must, however, first have the will to fight. Will cannot be directly controlled, but leaders can provide a climate and

information that will contribute to the maintenance of self-discipline and courage in battle. These are the concerns of the moral domain.

VI. THE MORAL DOMAIN

The moral domain of the battlefield concerns the disintegration of and breakdown of will. "Will," as described by military theorist Jim Schneider, "is the engine of all action" on the battlefield. An army may be destroyed by fires and disorganized in its activities, but not defeated as long as it retains the will to fight. "Morale," continues Schneider, "can be viewed as the magnitude of will within the army."⁷² The challenge for our leadership is sustaining and revitalizing morale in the environment of military operations. The ambiguity of peacetime and contingency operations requires even greater consideration of the moral demands on leadership.

The focus of the development of leadership requirements for the moral domain is on courage. Courage on the battlefield comes from a soldier's self-confidence, self-discipline, trust in his comrades and a sense of individual responsibility. Soldiers fight for their comrades and when they feel that they can make a difference. Maintenance of courage will be of special interest for soldiers facing unique rules of engagement in operations short of war. Our leaders must not only be aware of the factors that influence a soldier's will, but provide the leadership necessary to enhance that will. The basis of will is the character and courage of the individual.

The will of an army emanates from the character and courage of its soldiers. Lord Moran, an English doctor who studied the effects of fear on soldiers for Winston Churchill, relates the courage of soldiers directly to character: "My faith is that the martial spirit of a race is in a measure a crucial test of its virility, and that a man of character in peace is a man of courage in war."⁷³ Lord Moran also equates courage to will power, "whereof no man has an unlimited stock; and when in war is used up, he is finished. A man's courage is his capital and he is always spending."⁷⁴

Lord Moran felt the self-discipline of soldiers in a specific army was key to the maintenance of courage in battle. The Germans, he found, spent the years between wars inculcating the minds of the German people the prized qualities of the soldier. In a democracy, he continued, we cannot be prepared "in the German sense for war." But,

we can be prepared to fight evil "when the Christian virtues flourish" where the character of a free people is ready to resist aggression.⁷⁶ S. L. A. Marshall provides an American perspective on discipline and courage in battle.

In Men against Fire, Marshall builds a case for discipline in battle based on a philosophy of command consistent with greater freedom of professional thought.⁷⁶ He rejects the philosophy of German General Hans von Seeckt that: "A true military discipline stems not from knowledge but from habit." This approach, Marshall feels, suggests action by soldiers in fear of the consequences of disobedience. Americans need a more enlightened view of discipline based on knowledge and understanding. "Understanding of the essentials of combat moral incentive, which, together with the degree of physical hardening and technical knowledge sufficient to insure that muscle and brain will respond to the will, constitutes the true discipline of the combat forces of the (American) Army."⁷⁷

Marshall's prescription for a commander preparing his soldiers to face the shock of combat focuses on the development of disciplined, "thinking bayonets." He sites these guidelines:

- (1) Diligence in the care of men.
- (2) Administration of all organizational affairs such as punishments and promotions according to a standard of resolute justice.
- (3) Military bearing.
- (4) A basic understanding of the simple fact that soldiers wish to think of themselves as soldiers and that all military information is nourishing to their spirits and their lives.
- (5) Courage, creative intelligence, and physical fitness.
- (6) Innate respect for the dignity of the position and the work of other men.⁷⁸

Marshall claims the American way of fighting seeks initiative in our men—an aggressive will. "We want men who can think and act. These two aims are the complementary halves of an enlightened battle discipline."⁷⁹

Once in battle, soldiers fight for their comrades. In answering the question of why men fight, S. L. A. Marshall concluded: "Battle morale

comes from unity more than from all else and it will rise or fall in the measure that unity is felt by the ranks."⁸⁰ Sustainment of a soldier's will is provided through leadership that builds morale and unit cohesion.

In the moral domain, an American philosophy of leadership should contribute to the development of self-confidence and self-discipline in our soldiers and, encourage mutual trust and cohesion in units. Although the AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, agility, depth and synchronization focus our combat power at the decisive point, leadership must provide the climate that develops the character and sustains the courage of our soldiers through the decisive point and beyond.

Initiative on the battlefield comes from soldiers and leaders who are willing to take decisive action in the face of danger. On the modern, distributed battlefield, S. L. A. Marshall claims; "the quality of the initiative in the individual has become the most praised of the military virtues."⁸¹ The test of fitness for a leader, he continues, "is the ability to think clearly in the face of unexpected contingency or opportunity. Improvisation is the essence of initiative in all combat, just as initiative is the outward showing of the power of decision."⁸² Initiative in combat, the measure of courage, requires leaders who can think and act quickly.

Thinking and acting quickly is also key to agility on the battlefield. Marshall again provides insight; "The mechanisms of the new warfare do not set their own efficiency rate in battle. They are ever at the mercy of the training methods which stimulate the soldier to express his intelligence and spirit." Marshall feels this training must emphasize the rapidly changing nature of the battlefield; "It is universally recognized that as the means of war change, so must the intelligence of man be quickened to keep pace with the changes."⁸³

Operations in depth challenge a leader's ability to maintain the tactical cohesion of a unit necessary for the maintenance of will. We may be able to train our soldiers to take the initiative in a division frontal attack with the mutual support of hundreds of other well trained soldiers. But on the non-linear battlefield, uncertainty and isolation become the norm. Marshall, in his studies, found that isolated soldiers often do nothing; "Some fail to act mainly because they are puzzled what to do and their leaders do not tell them; others are wholly unnerved and can

neither think nor move in sensible relation to the situation."⁸⁴ It is in these situations where the role of leadership is most critical.

The demonstration of leadership, by any individual in a unit, can turn the tide of the battle. "Orders not given by the leadership furthers the demoralization and immobility of the line." One commanding voice displaying confidence and authority can rejuvenate faltering courage of the unit as a whole. The failure of our leadership to recognize these points of weakness and their unwillingness to act decisively, says Marshall, is all too common.⁸⁵ This too, according to Marshall, can be corrected through tough and realistic training of our leaders and soldiers.

The synchronization of the battlefield requires parallel initiative across the battlefield operating systems. AirLand Battle doctrine requires multiple operations over extended distances all focusing at the decisive point. The failure of a fire and support element or the artillery to provide supporting fires in a timely fashion will contribute to the disintegration of the will of the assaulting force. The sustainment of mutually supporting initiative requires formal and informal communication and information flow.

Marshall claims that "speech in combat is as vital as fire." A leader, he states, must not only be able to think out a tactical situation in the heat of battle, he must also be able to communicate his thoughts to produce unity of action. While speech alone may have been sufficient in WW II, communication on today's extended battlefield relies on our electronic systems. Synchronization today requires leaders to creatively think out both formal and informal communications plans to facilitate the integration of all battlefield operating systems and to sustain the courage of the soldiers operating these systems.

Our leadership philosophy must contribute to the development of self-discipline, self-confidence and individual responsibility. Marshall explains that our soldiers and leaders need a new philosophy of discipline in western armies, one that encourages individual responsibility. "We have to continue to grapple with the problem of how to free the mind of man, how to enlarge his appreciation of his personal worth as a unit in battle, how to stimulate him to express his individual power within limits which are for the good of all."⁸⁶ The challenge presented here by S.L.A. Marshall in 1947 is the goal of the current

management concept of alignment.⁸⁷ Alignment results from the congruence of personal and organizational growth.

The concept of alignment, introduced by contemporary business leaders, focuses the growth of individuals within the goals of the organization. The continuous growth of soldiers contributes to their self-confidence and self-worth. When this growth is in line with goals of the organization, the unit as a whole benefits. A unit growing together not only improves performance, but also becomes more cohesive and hardened to the effects of enemy in combat.

Unit cohesion is developed through personnel policies, inter-personal communication and alignment. Personnel policies contribute to stability within an organization and a sense of fairness in personnel matters. Personal communications and contact on the battlefield help to reduce the inevitable feelings of battlefield isolation. The cohesive unit provides its own protection from the effects of the enemy.

Personnel policies in an organization help to shape the command climate and foster cohesion. A soldier is far more willing to fight for an unit that has treated him fairly and provided for his needs. S. L. A. Marshall discouraged "wet nurse" treatment of soldiers while emphasizing the importance of caring leadership. Loyalty, discipline and commitment can only be developed in a unit that continuously takes care of soldiers.

Inter-personal communications and contact on the battlefield prevent the feelings of isolation and increase understanding. Marshall also believed the single most critical activity on the battlefield is the verbal sharing of information and feelings between soldiers. Just hearing another soldier talk on either flank of one's position contributes to the will to fight. The sharing of information about the enemy and the situation increases the soldier's understanding and his personal responsibility in the fight. Soldiers, especially American, want to know what is going on and what piece of the action is their responsibility. Common understanding within the unit facilitates operations and reinforces unit cohesion.

A commander must ensure a two-way, horizontal and vertical, flow of information throughout the unit. Leaders must be able to convince soldiers of their importance of their mission and be willing to listen to

their personal needs. S. L. A. Marshall felt that a commander "could do no better than concentrate his attention on his men," to guarantee the success of an operation. "Thinking bayonets" do not come from uninformed soldiers.⁸⁸

Intelligent and aggressive leadership is crucial to the moral domain. Soldiers and junior leaders want and need senior leadership to direct them in combat. A leader must demonstrate consistent character in his beliefs and actions on the battlefield. He must be able to think intelligently and creatively, and be able to convincingly persuade his subordinates of the wisdom and importance of their actions.

Leadership in the moral domain concerns the motivation of soldiers and maintenance of morale. Anthony Kelleet superbly defines this challenge for leaders in Combat Motivation: "When soldiers are pinned down by enemy fire and are confused and uncertain, they will follow a lead in any direction (backward as well as forward); thus, panic is highly contagious." He concludes; "In this circumstance the force of example is strongest." Kelleet argues that leaders must be decisive and persuasive to convince soldier to follow.⁸⁹ Lord Moran also divides leadership into a man's ability to think out what he wants to do and his ability to persuade others to do it.⁹⁰ Leadership strength in the moral domain emanates from a leader who encourages trust through his intellect and persuasive skills.

Soldiers, in the face of combat, follow leaders they trust. Trust is developed through demonstrated competence on the part of the leader and an unconstrained flow of information.⁹¹ Soldiers feel more comfortable in difficult situations when they understand the tactical situation and knowing their leader will not casually waste their lives. An American leader must have the military skills to lead men into battle and be able to think through the consequences of his actions. The conviction and communication of his decisions and orders bears directly on the soldiers willingness to enter battle.

Our leadership philosophy must contribute to the sustainment of courage by building on our soldier's character and discipline. Elements of a leadership climate for the moral domain are: **professional trust and respect, tough and demanding training, unit cohesion and alignment.**

The dominant themes of the leadership are: trust, individual responsibility and communication.

VII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION

A new world order is not a fact; it is an aspiration--and an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed--to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us.

George Bush
National Security Strategy, 1991

So begins the President's National Security Strategy. The new world order may not be a fact, but it is a part of the new realities. We are living in a period which may well be considered a crossroad in the evolution of our society. But then again, we may not. If sociologist Peter Drucker's assertion is correct, as has been his record, perception is the dominant theme of today's society. The perception of concern to us is one of invincible American military might in an era of peace. The new world order has set the stage has been set for another Task Force Smith.

Our challenge is clear, General Sullivan has announced, as did his predecessor General Vuono, "there will be no more Task Force Smith's." The challenge goes beyond the protection of the Defense Department budget, that is not in our lane. Our challenge is not to be "too badly wrong" when called to defend our nation and "to get it right quickly when the moment arrives." Our kinder and gentler nation may not, in two years time, be able to conduct another Desert Storm. We must start now to shape a new way of thinking for our tactical forces. The purpose of this monograph has been to develop this way of thinking--a leadership philosophy.

A leadership philosophy can work. The German leadership philosophy of *auftragstaktik* is a model of a successful approach to the development of common thinking within an Army. *Auftragstaktik* was based on the warrior spirit of the German people and complimented German maneuver warfare tactics. Our American leadership philosophy should similarly be based on our national character and spirit, and compliment AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations doctrine. But, it must also be more broadly construed to consider peacetime, civil-military, and other contingency operations.

An appropriate label for an American leadership philosophy for tactical forces is *American Spirit*. The philosophy is based on American values and character, filtered through the modern military environment, and reflects the new realities of our ever-changing peacetime Army. The label allows for the easy communication of the concept to our forces and hopefully generate excitement.

The goal of *American Spirit* is to provide a consistent way of thinking for the leadership of our tactical forces in peacetime as well as in war. *American Spirit* is a holistic, but not necessarily new, way of thinking for both junior and senior tactical leaders. Some leaders have been applying this approach with great success for many years. This is an effort to shape a way of thinking to facilitate stability and growth in a period of uncertainty and limited resources, not a school solution for the leadership of our tactical forces.

The philosophy of *American Spirit* is expressed through elements of a leadership climate and dominant leadership themes. The leadership climate provides concepts for the structuring of an atmosphere that will allow our leadership strengths to flourish. We have excellent leadership doctrine, but it cannot be practiced without a supportive atmosphere. *American Spirit* will help to shape that atmosphere.

The dominant themes provide criteria for leaders to use in daily decision making to help focus our efforts in congruence with AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations doctrine. They complement, not replace, the warfighting tenets of initiative, agility, depth and synchronization. Neither the leadership climate nor the dominant themes are all inclusive, rather they are intended to release the reservoir of potential leadership in our forces to establish a stable equilibrium of change and growth in our combat potential.

AMERICAN SPIRIT

LEADERSHIP CLIMATE:

- ☆ VISION
- ☆ SYSTEMATIC CHANGE
- ☆ ALIGNMENT
- ☆ DECENTRALIZATION
- ☆ THINKING, LEARNING, CREATING
- ☆ REALISTIC AND DEMANDING TRAINING
- ☆ PROFESSIONAL TRUST AND RESPECT
- ☆ COMMANDER'S INTENT
- ☆ UNIT COHESION

DOMINANT THEMES:

- ☆ CREATIVITY
- ☆ SPEED
- ☆ INFORMATION AND RESPONSIBILITY SHARING
- ☆ BOLDNESS
- ☆ INTUITION
- ☆ USER FOCUSED INFORMATION

American Spirit is not a panacea to all of the challenges facing the Army today or in the near future. It is not going to ensure the success of a single military operation or make the current draw-down any easier to take. *American Spirit*, rather, offers a way of thinking for all of the leadership of our Army that will improve our ability to operate on the chaotic battlefield and in a ever-changing peacetime environment by providing a single integrated philosophy to guide all decision making. A leadership philosophy has worked well for the Germans in the past and is working for American business today, it will work for us today and in the future. Besides, what is the option?

I recommend *American Spirit* be adopted as the leadership philosophy for the U.S. Army. The philosophy, including practical and useful explanations of the elements of leadership climate and dominant themes, should be included in the introduction of all current leadership doctrine. The philosophy compliments the basic as well as senior

leadership doctrine and provides an additional focus on the challenges facing our leaders in peacetime as well as in combat.

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