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


Research Report

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF TURKEY
IN THE 1990s

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1992

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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF TURKEY
IN THE 1990s

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULLFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1920's , at a time when a large part of Turkey was under foreign occupation , Ataturk created a system based on the supremacy of the national will and respect for human rights. The first constitution of the new Turkish state, adopted in 1921, was inspired by the thoughts on which the Western democracies were built.

After the Turkish war of liberation , a secular system was adopted, and far-reaching reforms were carried out to change the social structure. The Western legal system was adopted and Turkish woman were granted electoral rights. As a result of all these changes , Turkish society took on western characteristics.

Alongside these domestic developments, The Lausanne Peace Treaty settled the issues which had plagued the Ottoman Empire for centuries and enabled the young republic to take her place among the modern nations.

After World War II developments on the international scene led Turkey to bolster her relations with the western world, with which she shares common values and a democratic political regime. Thus , Turkey became a founding member of a number of European institutions such as the council of Europe. Determined to ensure her national security within the western alliance, Turkey joined NATO in 1952.

The demise of the Warsaw Pact has refocused Turkey's role from being the protector of NATO's southern flank to being a powerful and stable country in the Middle East and Europe. The Gulf crisis has provided an illuminating example of Turkey's geostrategic position as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, and between the Middle East and The United States. Turkey's expanding military and economic power might serve to strengthen its linchpin role.

The confluence of all these factors shapes a critical post-bellum role for Turkey. While the skeptic would point to the many economic, cultural and social problems that Turkey faces in the next decade, the realistic recognizes the increasing significance of the strategic dimensions of this geographically and culturally unique nation.

As well as these problems, Turkey has many international challenges. The domestic problems are economic, social, and cultural and they can be solved internally with or without external assistance. But the external or international problems which mostly are caused and created by foreign countries can be solved by the cooperation of the allies of Turkey. Therefore, this paper will focus on those important external problems of Turkey and will explain the prospects of Turkey in the 1990s.

If the Western countries, especially the U.S. want to have a powerful, stable, and peaceful nation in the region, they must

establish an equal and balanced cooperative, economic, military and social relationship with Turkey. This also will meet the strategical needs of the U.S. in the future.

CHAPTER II

TURKEY'S STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE

Turkey's strategic significance has been strongly reaffirmed by recent events in the Persian Gulf and in Europe and in the USSR.

Turkey is at an intersection between the East - West and North - South axes. Its important location on trade routes have historically rendered it strategically valuable. Due to the areas it controls, this importance will make itself increasingly felt.

Turkey, with its dominant location on the Black Sea, the Aegean, the Mediterranean and the Balkans, lies in an important region where different political and economic systems, religions and military treaties touch on three continents. Also the only railroad line between Europe and the Middle East passes through this land. (1)

An overview of the area shows that the main sea routes are channelled through the Suez Canal, the Gibraltar Straits and the Turkish Straits. Control of the Turkish Straits and also its location in a region from where it can control the Suez Canal and consequently the sea transportation of the Eastern Mediterranean enhances Turkey's strategic importance. (2)

Turkey's strategic importance, which was thought to have diminished due to the dramatic changes in Central and Eastern Europe and in the USSR, which began in 1989 and led to the

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, must now be better understood in the West in view of the Middle East concerns. Turkey's role during the recent crisis must be considered as a signal for the future. (3)

Furthermore, developments in the Balkans and the Caucasus also highlight Turkey's geopolitical importance. The nationalist and democratization movements which began with the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union, events in Yugoslavia and the new developments in these regions in the coming decade, will give Turkey more important geostrategic and geopolitical roles.

Also, the newly independent Turkish States in Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Georgia) want to establish political, and economical relations with Turkey, and vice versa. These relations will improve the Turkish economy and its geostrategic and geopolitical importance.

Thus, Turkey with its very close location to the focus of conflicts in the Mediterranean and with its gradually increasing economic and military potential is a significant power element in the Eastern Mediterranean. When the latest developments regarding the new perspective on increasingly important conventional forces are taken into consideration, Turkey, with its geographical proximity to the new Republics, will deserve further attention.

In the near future, Turkey is going to completely control one resource vital to its Middle East neighbors -- water. Through vast ongoing dam projects on the Euphrate (Tigris) and Farat (Euphrates) rivers, Turkey will gain control by 1980 of the key water resources that dramatically affect the economic and physical well being of (Syria and Iraq). (4)

Further, Turkey possesses some of the most significant military bases in NATO. The bases in Northern Turkey provide intelligence and a potential staging point for both logistical and / or strike operations in the Middle East. The military resources of Turkey itself are also very significant. Turkey possesses the largest combined armed forces in NATO. With a large population base, Turkey is able to contribute significant human resources to military endeavors. In addition to her regular forces, Turkey has a reserve force of six million. (5)

Currently Turkey, with its democratic, secular and parliamentary system, is a bastion of stability in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East triangle of uncertainties and instability. The direction, scope and speed of developments in these regions is difficult to predict.

However, it can be easily predicted that with its flourishing democratic, economic, political and military structure, Turkey will increase its geopolitical and geostrategic role as a source of stability and balance in the region during the coming years.

CHAPTER III

TURKISH FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

While recognizing Turkey's strategic and geopolitical importance, it is also necessary to evaluate the Turkish Foreign and Defence policy.

Turkey's foreign policy and its related defense policy are established on the basis of the dictum of the liberator of the nation and the founder of the Republic of Turkey, M. Kemal ATATURK "PEACE AT HOME, PEACE IN THE WORLD". (6)

Turkey, which sees its fundamental interest in this dictum, is one the founding members of the United Nations, and adheres to the principles of peaceful resolutions to disputes, friendly relations with its neighbors, and is loyal to its commitments. Turkey has no territorial claims over any piece of territory outside her present boundaries. She does to provide prosperity for her people in peace and freedom. (7) As a result of her unique geopolitical position, she has assumed a heavy responsibility in this turbulent part of the world, where she stands as a strong, stable and reliable country.

Following its unhappy saga of relations with the Middle East in the 1950s, Turkey has steadily developed a series of principles to define and underpin its more recent policy-making for the area. An understanding of these guiding principles makes it possible to comprehend and even to some extent predict Turkish

policy toward the region. Ankara has developed its relations towards the region in general with the following seven principles in mind.

1. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Middle Eastern States.

In any case, interference in the internal affairs of an Arab State would intensify broader Arab fears of Turkey assuming a neo-Ottoman policy towards the region. Such an action would of course also legitimize interference by Middle East states in the domestic affairs of Turkey. (8)

2. Non-interference in disputes between states in the area.

This applies in particular to intra-Arab relations. Turkish neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war indicated the principle's broader applicability and success beyond the realm of intra-Arab relations. (9)

3. The development of bilateral relations with all the states in the region.

Here the emphasis is on "bilateral" as well as "all". Obviously, The Turkish preference is for these to be developed on a basis of reciprocity and self-interest to ensure both balance and continuity. (10)

4. Continued fragmentation of the Arab state system.

Turkey's historical anxieties about the cohesion of the Arab League also point to the underlying interest of the Turkish State in the continued fragmentation of the Arab State system.

The division of the Arab world into a plethora of states has created an important arena of competition within it, serving to undermine its cohesion and so weakening Arab influence on the regional and international stage. (11)

5. The maximization of trade and economic relationships.

Since the oil price rises of 1973-74, the Middle East has offered rich economic pickings. The opportunities for Turkey were increased during the Iran-Iraq war because of its important location. The Turkish economy has benefited enormously from these developments. The maximization of this potential remains a key objective of the Turkish Government. (12)

6. The separation of the Middle East from Turkey's role within the Western alliance.

In 1950s, Turkey was regarded by the radical states of the Middle East as NATO's agent, one which saw the region through US eyes. Time and again Turkey sided with western states in disputes with regional entities, almost regardless of the issues at stake. More than three decades later Turkey is still trying to live down that chapter in its regional relations. (13)

7. Scrupulous balance in its approach to the Israel-Palestine question.

Turkey has felt that it must steer a careful path between the West and the Arab states with regard to Israel. The relations between Turkey and Israel are very important for the Arab states policies towards Turkey. (14)

In keeping with these principles, Turkey supports United Nations efforts in the solution of ongoing conflicts, instabilities and situations which endanger world peace.

Turkey believes that it secures its defence needs and contributes to the maintenance of the global balance by being a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, which is formed by western countries with which it shares similar concepts of freedom and democracy. Moreover, Turkey has actively participated in the CSCE and CSBM, and has signed the CFE Treaty despite the fact that its southeastern neighbors are not part of it. It has thereby accepted quantitative limits on five main weapon categories, tank, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, aircraft and helicopters. Believing in the need for an adequate deterrent force to promote peace, Turkey has accelerated its modernization activities in the armed forces.

Thus, the bastions of its defence policy are to maintain the peace necessary for freedom, support peaceful solutions to conflicts and measures to reduce tensions, deter and be prepared against threats to national security and interests. The elements of this policy are determination and will, Alliance solidarity and the Turkish Armed Forces.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEMS OF TURKEY

In this chapter, I will analyze some of Turkey's problems which show the difficulties Turkey has in becoming the member of the western alliance (NATO) and the EC while maintaining good relations with the Middle East countries.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

On 14 APRIL 1987, Turkey applied for full membership in the European Community (EC). This was an historic step and needs a closer and detailed analysis. The Turkish application for membership should be assessed against the background of the country's historical westernization efforts, and within the context of her multifaceted ties to Western European countries, principles, and institutions. This process has been determined by Turkey's geographic location and her guardianship of the heritage of Anatolian civilization. (15)

Turkey's bid to join the EC as a full member was preceded by an association agreement concluded in Ankara in 1963. The agreement is unique among those of its kind which the community later signed with other countries. This legal infrastructure, laying the basis for Turkey's entrance into the community, was further confirmed by a 1970 protocol which started the customs union process between the partners.

The EC commission's "opinion" of 14 December 1989 on the

Turkish application and vote by the EC council earlier this year comprises positive and constructive elements alongside serious shortcomings. Its contents may be summed up as follows:

Turkey's eligibility for eventual membership in the EC is beyond doubt. Reaffirming this is fundamental to her long-term relationship. The opinion notes the remarkable leap forward achieved by the Turkish economy, especially during the past decade. It points to the need for this progress to continue in order to enable Turkey to face up to the adjustment problems which membership will bring. (16)

On the political side, the commission's opinion draws attention to the fact that the community itself is undergoing major changes while the whole of Europe is in flux. It argues that it would be inappropriate for the Community to become involved in new accession negotiations at this stage. This observation is coupled with the claim that both the human rights situation and the "respect for identify of minorities" in Turkey have not yet reached a level required in a democracy, and a reference to the "negative effects" of both dispute between Turkey and Greece and the Cyprus question.

Pursuant to these observations and arguments, the opinion concludes with its belief that it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey "straightaway".

From the Turkish standpoint, the opinion reflects a static approach vis-a'-vis Turkey's dynamic structural, economic,

industrial, and social evolution, and it fails to present the country's overall posture in perspective. This creates a misleading impression of the rapidly narrowing differences between the EC and Turkey.(17) In other words, the current disparities alluded to in the opinion are not there to stay but are bound to disappear in time. Disparities of similar nature were also topical at the time the Community started accession negotiations with other Mediterranean countries-Greece, Spain and Portugal. Moreover, these same entrants were given the opportunity to complete their customs union procedures within the EC framework as full members participating in the decision-making bodies of the community. Therefore, the foremost shortcoming in the commission opinion emerges in its failure to set an approximate date for the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey.

Turkey is firmly determined to maintain this issue on the agenda and to require EC member countries to fix a time frame for such negotiations. A guarantee on the part of the Community that these talks begin as early as possible (starting from 1993). It will also help Turkey to perpetuate the current, strong momentum for adapting to Community norms across the political socioeconomic spectra of the country. The EC, by this opinion, sees Turkey's role as unimportant in European affairs, which is a big mistake. Turkey believes that the relations between Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus question, and minority problems have no

direct relevance on the membership of Turkey into the EC, but the EC has a different opinion.

Turkey expects that proposals by EC should be comprehensive, substantial and oriented towards laying the groundwork for her eventual full membership. Turkey has set her sights firmly on EC membership and has pursued policies consistent with her European ambitions for nearly seven decades. Apart from the economic benefits that the community will secure, Turkish membership will be an inspiration to moderate Islamic countries. The Turkish example will demonstrate that an Islamic nation can be built on modern, democratic and secular principles without losing her cultural heritage.

GREECE

Shaped largely by a common history and geography, Turkish-Greek relations have been characterized by a potential for both harmony and conflict.

Greece claims that Turkey does not recognize the status quo in the Aegean and that she threatens to invade the Eastern Aegean islands under Greek sovereignty. Turkey is a staunch supporter of the status quo in the Aegean, established by international treaties, which provide for the demilitarization of the Aegean islands off the Turkish coast; a six mile limit on the territorial waters and, by definition the airspace above it; a continental shelf yet to be delimited through bilateral negotiations and in accordance with the principle of equity, the free use of the international airspace and the high seas in the Aegean. (18)

Greece endangers the status quo in the Aegean by unlawful militarizing the Eastern Aegean islands, claiming a right to a 10 mile airspace and disrupting the negotiation process for the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. Greece also prevents the full implementation of the Rogers Agreement, which enabled her return to the military integrated structure of NATO. She is also creating obstacles to NATO exercises in the Aegean by using all means including blackmail.

Greece walked out of NATO exercises and now she is attempting to urge the allies not to hold exercises in this region. All such attempts are directed towards closing the Aegean to Turkey. Contrary to what one might be tempted to think, Turkey does not question the fact that the Eastern Aegean islands in dispute belong to Greece. But Turkey can not overlook the fact that these islands were placed in demilitarized status in recognition of Turkey's security interests. Turkey can not allow the Aegean to be transformed into a Greek lake on the basis of unilateral Greek claims and in total disregard of Turkey's legitimate rights and interests.

For example; The Greek claims that it has a right to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean, from the present six miles, to twelve miles. Actually Greece possesses 43.5% of the Aegean sea as her territorial waters. Turkey has 7.5% with the extension to 12 miles, Greece will possess 71.5% of the sea, while Turkey's share will be 8.8% the international waters, now at present 49%,

would shrink to 19.7% such an extension of the territorial waters by Greece will result in Greece practically acquiring the entire Aegean. (Annex-1)(19)

However, Turkey as a coastal state, has equal and vital security rights and interests in the same region. Therefore, it is evident that the extension of territorial waters beyond 6 miles in the Aegean would have inequitable implications and would constitute an abuse of rights.

As a result, all the problems in the Aegean have resulted from Greek actions and policies designed to turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek Lake.

CYPRUS

Cyprus is an island which lies at the entrance of the Gulf of Iskenderun, the innermost corner of the north-eastern Mediterranean. It is large enough for any hostile power to deploy sufficient military force for sustained air, naval or amphibious operations against Turkey.

It is close enough to allow an enemy to launch a substantial surprise attack on Turkey.

Historically, Cyprus was under the sovereignty of Turks and the Ottoman Empire for more than three hundred and fifty years. Before World War I, it was granted to the British Empire for a certain period in order to allow British control of the East Mediterranean. But, later the island was not returned to the Turks and has stayed under British administration. It was

declared a crown colony in 1925. In 1960, The Republic of Cyprus was founded by international agreements as a bi-national state. The Treaties that created this "functional federation" had been signed by the leader of the two co-founder partners, the Turkish Cypriot and The Greek Cypriot people, as well as by the three guarantor countries. (Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom)(20)

The partnership state has been deliberately destroyed by Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders who never renounced their aim to put an end to the independence of Cyprus by annexing it, in its entirety to Greece.

After 1963, The Greek Cypriots organized terrorist groups (i.e. EOKA) to intimidate and kill Turkish Cypriots. Nicos Sampson, the notorious leader of the EOKA terrorist organization, who became the president of Cyprus after the coup of 15 July 1974. They prepared a massacre plan against Turks and started to apply it. (21)(22)

In 20 July 1974, The Turkish Peace Operation was a consequence of and reaction to a Greekled coup on Cyprus which aimed at annexing the island to the Greek mainland (ENOSIS). Turkey fulfilled her rights and commitments according to the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 signed also by Greece and the UK. Turkey intervened to protect the Turkish Cypriots and to preserve the independence of Cyprus and to bring a definite end to the Greek Cypriot cruelties perpetrated against the Turkish Cypriots.

After intervention, The US Congress imposed an embargo on arms transfers to Turkey on the grounds that the use of American military equipment by the Turks during its intervention on Cyprus was a violation of US law regarding the use of US military equipment transferred to foreign countries.

Today, there are two independent states in Cyprus: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and The Greek Republic of Southern Cyprus.

THE KURDS

The Kurds of southeast Turkey are the most traditionally structured social group in the whole country. The Kurdish areas of southeast Turkey remain the most backward in terms of economic development in the Republic. But, even with the financial difficulties of the Turkish Government, the eastern part received most of Turkey's total investments. Eastern part of Turkey has 20% of total population. But, for years, 40% of total annual investments is made in this area. During the 1930s and 1940s, railway lines were built joining Western Anatolia to the Eastern provinces. From the economic standpoint, the eastern provinces' access was opened to the Mediterranean and to Turkish and foreign markets, and with the building of a network of roads, especially between 1950 and 1961, they contributed to the prosperity of the country. (23) In the 1980s and 1990s, the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP : Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi) was formulated to achieve the economic development in the region. GAP is a \$20

billion integrated venture which will provide for the construction of 11 dams and 17 hydroelectric power plants. The assumption is that the creation of an advanced agricultural and utilities infrastructure will lead to both greater employment opportunities and greater prosperity for the 1.5 million people in the proposed catchment area. (24)

These activities show that the Turkish government tries to solve the problem both economically and socially. Yet, the Kurdish population has always been a source of ambivalence towards the modern Turkish State. This is true although Turkish Kurdish notables were elected to parliament or even became ministers.

Historically, especially after the foundation of the new Turkish Republic, the Kurds have revolted many times. The current insurgency is led by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), an organization which has grown out of this dual tradition of Kurdish nationalism and neo-Marxism. The main tactics of the PKK have been to proclaim armed struggle against Turkish "colonialism" and the Kurdish "feudalism" which supports it. It has sanctuary in parts of Syria and the "no man's land" of northern Iraq and Iran, in addition to Lebanon, where its main training bases are located. The PKK began its insurgency campaign in August 1984. Its operations have consisted of small groups of PKK activists primarily engaged in hit-and-run raids directed mainly against soft targets, both human and material. The majority of their victims have been Kurdish employees of the state.

in either the military or the civilian sector, such as school teachers, engineers or their families. Recently, they killed many innocent people including babies and children. Their aim has been to terrorize the population into severing its links with the Turkish State. By late spring 1990, the estimated total casualties for those killed was 5,000.

Today, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, is living in Syria. Syria supports the PKK by supplying bases, weapons and training. Some European Countries have supported PKK ideologically. Also, it is surprising that The Turkish Armed Forces captured some American made weapons from the PKK in southeastern Turkey.

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Turkish-American relations is not a problem for Turkey. But, in my opinion, it is necessary to explain briefly Turkey's relations with the US, with which Turkey maintains close ties of friendship in the same NATO alliance. Because, these relations have a major influence on Turkey's relations with other countries, especially with the EC.

Turkey sees the US as inseparable from Europe from both a political and a security perspective. Western Europe, of which Turkey is a part, shares the same democratic goals and ideals as the United States. It is clear that continued American presence in Europe is essential for the maintenance of both peaceful order and stability during this transition.

On the bilateral level, I am happy to note that Turkish-American ties continue to expand satisfactorily. A considerable increase has been recorded in recent years in the volume of trade between the two countries, and there is no doubt about harmonious military relations. Efforts are underway in exports to the US. I believe that success in this field will provide a new impetus in furthering the Turkish-American partnership bringing greater substance to it. Moreover, there are still a number of potential areas for economic and commercial cooperation and further possibilities of joint ventures between two countries that are as yet unexplored.

On the other hand, the Turkish government and people are distressed over the efforts by some in the US to inject elements that are totally alien and irrelevant to bilateral relations. First, there is the Greek-American lobby's harmful efforts to influence the Congress arbitrarily by linking Greek aid levels to Turkish aid levels in an inflexible seven-to-ten ratio. (25) Turkey's contribution to Western defense should determine the level of security assistance and not the demands of third parties and certain pressure groups. Secondly, there are attempts to draw a linkage between the Cyprus question and military assistance. Attaching conditions to an issue have always been counterproductive not only to mutual interests but also to the Cyprus question itself. Thirdly, Armenian activities have been directed at the US Congress with the aim of distorting and defaming

Turkish history, legitimizing and encouraging murder by Armenian terrorists, and preparing the ground for territorial claims of American fanatics. I feel that it is imperative that all of the above should be resisted vigorously.

Turkish-American relations have a promising future. In this respect, much will depend on the wisdom, imagination and determination to be displayed on both sides; perhaps more so on the US side, since it wields the means of a superpower.

WATER DISPUTE

In the Middle East, in recent years, water has become the problem of securing adequate supplies of water for personal consumption, irrigation and power generation. With the depletion of underground aquifers and the growing salinity and pollution of existing supplies, water has become an increasingly scarce strategic resource in the region. And Turkey finds itself in a strategically strong position as the only country in the Middle East which enjoys abundant ground water resources.

The most important water resources in southeastern Turkey are the river valleys of Firat (Euphrates) and Dicle (Tigris). Both rivers rise in Turkey. In 1980, a master plan was produced which linked a number of hydraulic projects, thus paving the way for the large-scale integrated approach of the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP). The first stage of GAP contains 13 projects which will be developed on the Firat and Dicle rivers. The first stage will cost \$12 billion, and will result in the

irrigation of approximately 1.6 million hectares and the generation of 7.513 mw of hydroelectric power. (26)

Concern among the other two riparian states as to the scale of GAP led to the formation of a trilateral technical committee in 1980. The agreement by Turkey to take part in such talks indicated that it does not simply regard the Euphrates (Firat) as a Turkish river but recognizes that Syria and Iraq also have riparian interests in it. Later, in 1987, according to the bilateral accord between Turkey and Syria, Turkey undertook to release a minimum of 500 cubic meter per second across the Syrian border.

The dam projects are central to the Turkish Government's initiative to improve the national economy, and in particular to boost economic activity in the rural south and east and thereby alleviate the Kurdish problem. Turkey must use and develop its water resources but accepts Syria and Iraq's rights to water. It is clear that Syria wants more water than it needs. At present, Syria irrigates only about 200,000 hectares of land with Euphrates (Firat) water, but with increasing population demands for food, Syria wants three or four times more water, than is now available. (27)

Iraq has a broader plan to irrigate the larger areas and wants more water than it needs. Turkey has dams on the Firat, but not yet on the Dicle. However, Iraq diverts water by canal from the Dicle to the Firat. Additionally, Syria controls the amount

of water released to Iraq, through its dams and irrigation projects.

Consequently, both countries object to Turkey's national water resources development, rather than agreeing on reasonable and negotiated flow.

CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF TURKEY

First of all, Turkey needs to survive as a free and independent nation with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. She has no territorial claims over any piece of territory outside her present boundaries and only strives to provide prosperity for her people in peace and freedom.

Turkey seeks to deter any aggression that could threaten her security, repel or defeat military attacks, and end any conflicts on terms favorable to Turkey.

Turkey needs a healthy and growing economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors.

Turkey tries to establish and maintain healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with her allies and friendly nations.

By supporting Western Europe's efforts toward greater economy and political unity, Turkey wants to become a full member of the EC.

To have a stable and secure nation is one of the objectives of Turkey. For this, Turkey strives to;

- maintain stable regional military balances,
- promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes,
- support aid, trade and investment policies that promote

economic development, social, and political progress.

Additionally, Turkey wants to see positive behavior from her allies on specific matters.

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Turkey wants to improve relations with the US both economically and militarily. Therefore, the harmful efforts of the Greek-American lobby on the US Congress must be eliminated.

(28)

The attempts to draw a linkage between the Cyprus question and military assistance must be abandoned by the US Congress and the US government. Because these two issues are completely different from each other and must be thought separately. (29)

Turkey also seeks the American assistance and support for its full EC membership. Turkey's dependence on the US covers the whole spectrum from economic to military matters therefore some restrictions on Turkish export goods especially on textiles must be removed.

THE RELATIONS WITH EC

The full EC membership demand of Turkey is a matter of urgency and top priority on the Turkish side that such cooperation materializes as soon as possible. Turkey expects that proposals by EC should be, comprehensive, substantial and oriented towards laying the groundwork for her eventual full membership (30). Comprehensive and substantial cooperation should have a content proportionate to the eventual goal of full membership. The cooperation between Turkey and EC must be

adequately flexible and adaptable.

TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTES AND CYPRUS ISSUE

Turkey delicately prefers to view its relationship with Greece in a positive and constructive frame of mind. Turkey is willing and prepared for a comprehensive dialogue with Greece. Turkey sincerely desires, therefore, to resolve all the issues that affect its relationship. Turkey's view and wish is that it would again be possible to resume a dialogue with Greece. Turkey is destined to live as neighbours and maintains that both countries have much to gain from cooperation. (31)

As for the question of Cyprus, it is a dispute between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots; it is not a Turkish-Greek problem. The finding of the solution is also the task of the two peoples of the island. Of course, both Turkey and Greece, along with Great Britain, continue to have solemn responsibilities as guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey does favor a settlement on Cyprus, and it will support a solution which the Turkish Cypriot people find acceptable in accordance with their free will and their right to determine their own political status as one of the two equal parties in Cyprus. (32)

PEACE PIPELINE

With existing water resources being depleted in the Arab world at a time when demand is rising exponentially. Turkey wants to help solve the water problem of the Arab nations and sees commercial possibilities in its own abundance of groundwater. (33)

The scheme drawn up for the transportation of the water involved the construction of pipelines between the water abundant region of eastern Turkey and potential recipient countries in the Gulf and Levant. The cost of the pipelines is likely over \$11 billion. With this pipeline, Turkey guarantees to export 6 million unpolluted, good quality and drinkable water a day to the Arab world. (Annex -2)

The Turks have dressed the whole scheme up by calling it "The Peace Pipeline". The notion behind this is that by the end of this century pressure on water resources will be acute in the region. Conflicts may erupt as states seek to expand and secure their own supplies.

Turkey wants to help the stabilization of the region and to end the conflicts in the area. Therefore, Turkey needs the assistance and the contributions of the Arab countries for this pipeline project and consequently for permanent peace in the region.

THE KURDS AND TERRORISM

It is very clear that neither the Kurds nor the PKK want to establish an independent state in the area. Because, the chance of living in an independent state in the region is almost impossible. This situation shows that the objective of terrorist action is to risk Turkey's stabilization. Unfortunately, the terrorist actions against Turkey are supported and financed by some foreign countries. Therefore, Turkey demands that;

- The terrorist actions against Turkey must be condemned by the US and other European and Arab countries.

- Syria must deport all members and the leader of PKK from its land and abandon support for the Kurdish terrorists.

- Germany must not allow and support the PKK nor its organization in its country.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Turkey with its dominant location on the Black Sea, the Aegean, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans lies in an important region where different political and economic systems, religions and military treaties touch on three continents.

Turkey, in its unique geopolitical location, maintains the second largest armed forces in NATO of over 800,000 personnel. The Turkish Armed Forces are renowned for the strength of their military traditions, training and discipline.

Turkey is a genuinely peaceful country as set in M. Kemal Ataturk's dictum, "Peace at home, peace in the world". Her foreign policy has been based on accepted principles of international law. She has no territorial claims over any piece of territory outside her present boundaries and only strives to provide prosperity for her people in peace and freedom.

Turkey desires to maintain friendly relations with all her neighbors. She wishes to maintain stable ties of good-neighborly intercourse and to increase economic exchanges.

Turkey has some problems, such as, Kurdish terrorism, the relations with Greece, Cyprus, the relations with EC, and using her water resources. She wants to figure out these problems with the assistance of her allies. She wants to become a part of Europe and the full member of EC. Although the Turkish-American

ties continue satisfactorily, it has wanted to conduct these talks especially economically. Turkey also wants the EC to support it on all political areas. There are still a number of potential areas for economic and commercial cooperation and further possibilities of joint ventures between two countries that are as yet unexplored.

In the near future, it is very clear that Turkey will become a significant pillar of the European economic, defence, and social structure.

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ANNEX-1 (CONT)

THE SITUATION THAT WILL ARISE IN THE AEGEAN SEA IF
TERRITORIAL WATERS ARE EXTENDED TO 12 MILES



ANNEX-2

TURKEY'S PEACE PIPELINE SCHEME

WESTERN PIPELINE		GULF PIPELINE	
Location	Assumed water delivered (cu m/day)	Location	Assumed water delivered (cu m/day)
TURKEY	300,000	KUWAIT	600,000
SYRIA		SAUDI ARABIA	
Aleppo	300,000	Jubail	200,000
Hama	100,000	Dammam	200,000
Homs	100,000	Al Khobar	200,000
Damascus	600,000	Hufuf	200,000
	1,100,000		800,000
		Bahrain	
		Manama	200,000
Jordan		Qatar	
Amman	600,000	Doha	100,000
Saudi Arabia		UAE	
Tabuk	100,000	Abu Dhabi	280,000
Medina	300,000	Dubai	160,000
Yanbu	100,000	Sharjah/Ajman	120,000
Jeddah	500,000	Umm Al Quaiwain	
Mecca	500,000	Ras Al Khaimah/ Fujairah	40,000
	1,500,000		600,000
		Oman	
		Muscat	200,000
Total	3,500,000	Total	2,500,000

Source: Erol MANISALI (ed.), Turkey's Place in the Middle East,
p. 70