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A RAND NOTE

Glasnost and Soviet Foreign Policy

Lilita Dzirkals

January 1990

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PREFACE

This Note examines the beginnings of Gorbachev's *glasnost*, or openness, policy and its impact on Soviet foreign policy. It traces the gradual widening of Soviet public discussion of foreign and security policy issues and identifies the external and domestic factors driving this development. It covers the period from 1985 through October 1988, but occasional reference is also made to later events.

This research was done during 1988 as a staff development research project sponsored by The RAND Corporation, using its own funds. It is based entirely on open sources. Its findings should be of interest to researchers in Soviet political affairs and foreign policymaking.

SUMMARY

Glasnost—openness in making information public—has been a continually developing and expanding phenomenon in Soviet politics since Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. Initially limited to exposing corrupt officials, glasnost soon became an instrument for discrediting the conservative opposition to Gorbachev's new policies of *perestroika* (the process of social transformation) and new political thinking, policies designed to lift the USSR out of what Gorbachev termed a pre-crisis situation internationally and internally.

Internal solutions such as increased discipline proving to be inadequate, Gorbachev opted for a radical improvement of the USSR's international relations, above all by seeking to eliminate confrontation with the West. To redirect Soviet policy toward cooperation with the West, glasnost was widened to permit criticism in Soviet media by Soviet and Western spokesmen of heretofore unquestioned Soviet foreign and arms control policies. Concurrently, glasnost expanded into pressure for democratization of the Soviet political system. Foreign policy and arms control policymaking systems were structured to permit implementation of Gorbachev's new political thinking in these areas as well.

Far-reaching concessions in arms control negotiations, designed to meet Western demands and reduce the arms burden on the troubled Soviet economy, encountered resistance among the Soviet military and conservative elements. Glasnost was increased to permit blaming past Soviet leaders and their policies for the USSR's current difficulties. Among signs of an intensifying internal political power struggle, widening glasnost attracted favorable world attention. Traditional Soviet media controls appeared to tumble. In several prominent cases, domestic and foreign audiences were treated to wholesale indictments of Stalin's and more recent Soviet foreign policy, as responsible for endangering world peace.

These new ideas and new spokesmen stimulated demands in the media for broader participation in foreign policymaking. By the end of 1988, reformists ventured open criticisms of current foreign policies. National republics demanded more independence; and, especially in the Baltic, Popular Fronts and official leaders as well actively sought contact abroad with official representatives, public organizations, and media.

An escalating power struggle among the Soviet leadership guarantees continued glasnost, despite attempts to weaken it. Moreover, economic distress and glasnost-awakened political consciousness sustain continued ferment among Soviet social groups. The spectrum of organized forces seeking active participation in the Soviet political process is widening. Glasnost serves as a safety valve for the tensions accumulating throughout Soviet society and permits communication vital for political crisis management, a hallmark of Gorbachev's rule so far.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Reading Soviet media on foreign policy questions today is a stimulating experience, whether one looks at the Soviet Foreign Ministry journal *International Affairs* or publications of lesser organizations, such as the Znanie Society's *Argumenty i fakty*, the Soviet Peace Committee's *XX Century and Peace*, or Novosti's *Moscow News*. Especially in the last few years, any of these as well as the daily Soviet press have repeatedly surprised and provoked readers by publishing views that differ radically with those long upheld in official Soviet pronouncements. Soviet diplomatic activity around the world has also riveted attention, by practicing *glasnost*—openness in making information public—and seeking to amend what have now been openly acknowledged as past mistakes.

Barely three years ago, the Soviet press from *Pravda* to *International Affairs* still dutifully replicated identical routine formulations on the international issues of the day. The transformations wrought by *glasnost* in Soviet public discussion of foreign policy and security issues have been gradual but profound during the four years of Gorbachev's rule. This paper traces the widening of *glasnost* in this sensitive area and the interplay between Gorbachev's foreign and domestic policies that permitted *glasnost* to develop to its current remarkable extent.

The dramatic changes that Gorbachev introduced in the Soviet Union's relations with the West had political repercussions at home. To undermine opposition to the new course, *glasnost* was expanded beyond its original narrow purpose in combatting corruption to permit criticism of past Soviet leaderships and their foreign and domestic policies. Stepping up *glasnost*, in turn, resulted in a radically improved Soviet image and acceptance abroad. *Glasnost* escalated and by October 1988, the research cutoff date for this Note, the first open discussion of current foreign policy issues was taking place.

II. GORBACHEV ACCEDES TO POWER AND WARNS OF CRISIS

Thanks to glasnost, today we know that a key incentive for Mikhail Gorbachev's recasting of Moscow's foreign policy approach was the critical decline of the Soviet economy by the mid-1980s. But this was far from common knowledge four years ago, when, not long after his appointment as the top leader of the USSR in March 1985, Gorbachev declared that his country was in a "pre-crisis" situation. Gorbachev's predecessor, Chernenko, had alluded to contradictions and antagonisms in the Soviet polity, yet at the time, Gorbachev's frankness was as shocking as the realization it compelled at home and abroad of the seriousness of the internal and external problems confronting the regime.

Internationally, the USSR faced isolation because of its confrontational policies. At home, the unpopular and protracted war in Afghanistan intensified a widespread sense of distress among the Soviet populace, already hard-pressed because of accumulated social and economic problems. Soviet superpower status, ensured primarily by Soviet military might, was endangered because of Western advances in science and technology, which increasingly threatened Soviet ability to compete in military technology. The USSR's superpower image was fraying. The vaunted skills of its propagandists could not hide the inability of the Soviet Union to keep up with the high-tech age, and its backwardness was starkly apparent to everyone.

The political situation at home was seething under the phantom surface calm of pre-glasnost times. Throughout Central Asia, the Kremlin's control was palpably slipping away in a murky undertow of grand corruption, graft, and official make-believe that rendered tenuous the center's economic and political management of the region.

When the Gorbachev regime inherited this situation, it found that it would require difficult and radical solutions to put the Soviet house in order. There were deep-felt concerns among the elite and populace about the threat of war, and the military as well, that had to be addressed. Popular resentment of economic deprivation had intensified concerns about social justice and corruption, causing widespread alienation and cynicism. The economy critically needed shoring up, which called for costly investment and an infusion of Western technology and expertise. To do this, improved relations with the West were essential. Reduced East-West tensions would free Soviet economic resources being used in the arms race for civilian needs and modernization.

Thus, internal problems of the Soviet Union dictated a sharp turn in its foreign policy. But this did not come immediately. At first, Gorbachev espoused the same hardline foreign and military policies that his predecessors had pursued. The turn came later when he realized that the problems could not be solved by the internal solutions of increased discipline and pressure. Then Gorbachev boldly demonstrated a novel willingness to accommodate the West in arms control and professed a far-reaching cooperative attitude on many key international issues.¹ In early 1986, at the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev declared that Soviet foreign policy would be determined by their domestic policy, which now centered on restructuring the country's economic and political system.²

This Note shows that the reverse also proved to be true: Gorbachev's maneuvers abroad, aimed at reversing the bitter, confrontational relations Moscow had attained with all other world powers, influenced his domestic policy, especially in the opportunities glasnost provided for open criticism of established Soviet policies and views. Gorbachev's moves abroad affected the Soviet domestic political situation in very potent and largely unexpected ways. They brought multifaceted interaction with the West through visiting delegations and exchanges as well as tourism and contacts with emigré communities abroad. They increased divisions and altered political standings among the leadership and among various interest groups of the country as well, most conspicuously between the liberal, pro-reform intellectuals and the military. The ongoing Soviet power struggle has been fueled greatly by forces opposed to Gorbachev's conciliatory moves in foreign policy as well as by forces with their own more radical agendas in both domestic and foreign policy who have exploited the turmoil to advance their positions.

Much of the contention between these political forces has been visible to outside observers, thanks to the relaxation of controls over what can be openly stated in the Soviet media.

¹Notable exceptions were Central America, the Philippines, and Iran, where the Soviets continued to pursue policies seeking to profit from hostility toward the United States.

²When asked why so drastic a change from its confrontational policy abroad, some Gorbachev spokesmen answered unequivocally that the policy had nearly bankrupted the Soviet Union. Senior Soviet political commentator Fyodor Burlatsky put it this way:

It was impossible to continue with the crazy race for hegemony with the United States: They would issue a challenge and we would respond tit for tat. This all caused us to consume vast resources and to sacrifice many branches of scientific progress. Consequently, we are as much as 25 years behind the developed countries in technology (*L'Unita*, October 30, 1988, p. 2).

III. GORBACHEV'S SOLUTION TO CRISIS: GLASNOST

By introducing the policy of glasnost, Gorbachev dealt simultaneously with several problems facing him. The initial concept of glasnost was very limited, most likely to prevent the kinds of new problems the leadership had to tolerate later when glasnost unleashed pent-up grievances and resentments among the nationalities of the USSR. But implementing even the very limited version drew favorable Western attention, which did not escape the attention of those Soviets watchful for opportunities to improve relations with the West.

GORBACHEV FUELS GLASNOST TO DERAILED OPPOSITION

In March and June 1985, Gorbachev defined glasnost as providing the people more information about party affairs and exposing corrupt economic managers in the press. Glasnost was to be an instrument for fighting the entrenched bureaucracy (also known as the "braking mechanism"). At the April 1985 plenum, Gorbachev told party committees to practice glasnost and in their ideological work to "speak to people in the language of truth." Gorbachev cautioned that when people are told things that are contradicted by what they observe in reality, this creates a "serious political question." Initially, glasnost was not an invitation to a critical and public examination of Soviet history or Soviet foreign policy. It was introduced to facilitate reform and to galvanize the intelligentsia to help this effort. Gorbachev's glasnost actually continued in Andropov's footsteps, who in 1983 had started to expose in the press corruption among high-ranking officials. Moreover, Andropov made available some information on Politburo and Central Committee meetings and called for glasnost in nationality relations.¹

¹Already in 1981, at the time of the Polish crisis, Brezhnev had noted that glasnost was a means for improving relations between the people and the party. Thereupon his close aide Chernenko urged Soviet media to provide more information on national and local affairs. Chernenko decried the bureaucratic penchant for secrecy and praised the Tbilisi party committee for conducting press discussions of local issues. However, as General Secretary several years later, Chernenko, unlike his predecessor Andropov, did not speak out for glasnost. It was Chernenko's Politburo colleague Gorbachev who even then came out strongly for glasnost on several occasions.

But during 1985, *Pravda* still had to repeatedly exhort to Soviet journalists to criticize shortcomings; they felt too unsure to embark on the new course. Meanwhile, Gorbachev's concerns about bureaucratic intransigence and popular discontent were mounting. In March 1986, speaking to media representatives following the 27th Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress, he spoke of living in a "difficult and severe time" and reminded the press that it had the important task of watching "daily" over plans fulfillment. He invoked the "patriotism" of the Soviet people as a means to oppose the "intrigues" of "class opponents" busy sowing doubts about the feasibility of these plans. In equally staunch traditional Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, Gorbachev twice reiterated unwavering Soviet commitment to socialism while increasing democracy. He stressed equally emphatically that the press must attack bureaucratism and air social problems and people's views.

The pathbreaking aspects of Gorbachev's glasnost policy first became evident in theater plays critical of corruption and Stalinism. Yet, Gorbachev himself stoutly defended the Stalin period of Soviet history. In February 1986, he told the French Communist newspaper *L'Humanité* that "Stalinism" is a concept thought up by the enemies of communism and widely used to discredit the Soviet Union and socialism as a whole.² It was not until his October Revolution speech in November 1987 that Gorbachev condemned Stalin's repressions, specifically those of 1937-1941, as a crime that cannot be forgiven.

Gorbachev's stand on the Soviet Union's Stalinist past illustrates how his glasnost developed with the political situation in the country. As the political struggle between pro-reform and conservative forces intensified, glasnost intensified. Intended to discredit and undermine the conservatives, calls to discuss "blank spots" in Soviet history opened the way for passionate indictments of Stalin-era policies at home and abroad and disclosures of Stalinist repressions that while long discussed in Western literature, were until now taboo in the Soviet Union. The West reacted to this new frankness as a sign that Gorbachev was shedding the hardline policies of the past. This was soon reflected in Western public opinion polls that favored Gorbachev over Reagan as a man of peace.

²This statement of Gorbachev's was more recently resurrected by none other than Nina Andreyeva, author of the conservative broadside that sought to arrest the incipient democratization of Soviet politics (March 13, 1988, *Sovetskaja Russia*). In an interview with the Zagreb daily *Vjesnik* (October 30, 1988), she approvingly quoted Gorbachev's early anti-anti-Stalinist statement in support of her charge that nonsocialist elements are steering the needed perestroika on a "course of petty bourgeois degeneration and decay."

The Soviet Union opened up more to visiting delegations from the West: not only peace groups, but also Western government officials, who were given opportunities to speak directly to Soviet audiences through Soviet media. Yet, this was a gradual process, both because of resistance by the entrenched conservative elements and, not least, because of caution on the part of the glasnost designers themselves and the deeply ingrained wariness of Soviet journalists and authors.

Gorbachev's new ideas were developed by people experienced in international affairs. The recognized chief designer of glasnost, Secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev, had spent ten years as Soviet ambassador in Canada.³ Called home in 1983 to become director of the policy oriented Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Yakovlev was appointed chief of the Central Committee Propaganda Department in August 1985. In March 1986, Gorbachev placed him on the Party Secretariat, eventually to be in charge of propaganda, and by mid-1987 Yakovlev became a full Politburo member. Yakovlev's service in the West was complemented by his experience in working with Soviet intellectuals when acting head of the Central Committee Propaganda Department in the early 1970s. This was likely a factor in the Gorbachev team's choice to turn to the intelligentsia, the broader educated Soviet public, for new solutions and broadened political support. The everpresent mutual antipathies and resentments between creative intelligentsia and the military also recommended the choice of intellectuals as the spearhead in the antimilitarism campaign to be soon mounted. The creative intelligentsia was to galvanize the popular mood in favor of change. The scientific and academic intelligentsia was to provide ideas for solving the pre-crisis situation around. The media were to showcase this "creative quest" and thus buy time for the Gorbachev team to develop and implement real solutions. Underlying it all was the intention to create a new situation where the Soviets could get out of an arms race with the West they no longer could afford and instead generate Western interest in cooperation to avert the looming decline of the Soviet Union as a world power.

Initially it was Gorbachev's style that attracted favorable attention abroad rather than his glasnost. Gorbachev's first major exercise in international glasnost was his September 1985 interview with *TIME* Magazine. In contrast to his predecessors, Gorbachev was seen as more flexible and genuinely concerned about the worsening of

³Political commentator A. Bovin describes himself as the original advocate of glasnost who recommended it to Yakovlev (*Argumenty i fakty*, No. 11, March 18-24, 1989).

Soviet-U.S. relations. This was assessed as setting a "new style" in Kremlin public relations.

SOVIET MEDIA PRESENT WESTERN SPOKESMEN

The first sign that restrictions on discussing international affairs were loosening appeared on the eve of the Geneva summit of November 1985. Setting a new precedent, *Izvestiia* published an interview with President Reagan two weeks before the summit. Following the summit, another precedent was set when President Reagan delivered a New Year's message on the air. Also around this time, Soviet intellectuals first argued in a public forum that the Soviet press had to become more informative in order to counteract the influence of Western radio broadcasts on the Soviet public. One notable example was Yevgenii Yevtushenko's speech at the Russian Socialist Federative Socialist Republic writer's congress on December 23, 1985.⁴

Overall, throughout 1985, the Soviet press continued its anti-Western campaign. It had come increasingly to criticize Soviet shortcomings but balanced this with articles portraying conditions in the West as even worse. Those ready to proceed with more glasnost were hindered by Ligachev, who held the ideology portfolio (in addition to being in charge of party personnel). And Ligachev told the broadcasting media in December 1985: "All TV and radio programs should serve one aim—propaganda, the clarification and implementation of the policy of the party."

But international glasnost got a boost as early as January 18, 1986, when *Izvestiia's* influential political commentator A. Bovin complained that Soviet TV reports on international affairs were provincial, and he expressed hope that there would be live reports from Western capitals on the "burning issues of the day," and that U.S. officials would join Soviet officials in discussions on Soviet television. The next month (February 1986), Soviet television aired a very frank exchange by viewers in Seattle and Leningrad on such topics as Afghanistan, lack of freedom of speech in the Soviet Union, human rights violations, and so forth.

The 27th Party Congress in February 1986 widened glasnost. Democratization became its new byword. Gorbachev declared New Political Thinking to be the Soviet

⁴At one point, Yevtushenko asked "How long are we going to go on helping all those foreign broadcasters who happily concoct at least half their poisonous radio menus from things that we hide and hush up?" Vera Tolz, "The Soviet Press Under Gorbachev," RL 38/86, *Radio Liberty Research*, January 21, 1986, p. 6.

policy at home and abroad. He stressed the interdependence of the world's countries and reemphasized his commitment to nuclear disarmament, stating "it is no longer possible to win an arms race or nuclear war for that matter," for security is a political problem and cannot be ensured by military means. The Congress noted that acceleration of both economic and social development was a necessary condition for holding onto international Soviet positions.

In May, *Pravda* criticized the TV news program "Vremia" for showing only negative news about the West, such as demonstrations and protests, and failing to tell about the scientific and technological achievements in the West.

Also in May, disaster struck at Chernobyl. Soviet sincerity about glasnost was put to a severe test, which it failed to meet in the eyes of many at home and abroad. At the same time, reform proponents argued that the terrible accident proved the need for increased glasnost.

Literaturnaia gazeta's well-known political commentator Fyodor Burlatsky told a Japanese paper in early June that the Soviets were making progress in glasnost but acknowledged that occasionally they still failed at it. He accused the West of propagandizing Chernobyl. Soviet failure to quickly report the accident was due to a lack of "modern means": "[In the informational area] we lacked mobility." He acknowledged that "we needed to convey more opinions at home as well as Western views," but argued that now Soviets had "pluralism in reporting": *Izvestiia* had handled the story of the West German ambassador's protest and demand for damage compensation one way, while TASS had handled it more stridently, and Burlatsky noted that

our *Literaturnaia gazeta* may adopt a third method. An attempt for each medium to adopt its own style, or the democratization of reporting, is now in progress.⁵

The worldwide criticism of Soviet treatment of Chernobyl news had an effect on Soviet media policy. Following Chernobyl, Soviets started to provide quick and more detailed information on disasters and accidents, including the outbreak of fire on a Soviet nuclear submarine that eventually sank near Bermuda in 1986, and reached unprecedented openness with the coverage of the December 1988 earthquake in Armenia.

⁵*Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 6, 1986, p. 5.

A watershed media event occurred in July 1986, when two leading West European Social Democrats, David Owen and Egon Bahr, argued on Moscow TV with Georgiy Arbatov and Valentin Falin about arms control in Europe, about Soviet efforts to put a wedge between Europe and the United States, the war in Afghanistan, and other topics. Telebridges between U.S. and Soviet officials followed, despite objections raised by some Soviets and reported in the Soviet press. These frank discussions by Western spokesmen introduced the Soviet public to a wider variety of views on international issues and also raised highly sensitive issues in Soviet power politics, such as the SS-20 missiles and Afghanistan. Western observers immediately and correctly concluded that this new openness signaled future Soviet foreign policy changes. Domestically, it rallied public opinion in support of the forthcoming Soviet concessions.

IV. CONFLICT OVER POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND ARMS CONTROL: GLASNOST GAINS

RESTRUCTURING FOREIGN AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY

In early and mid-1986, the Foreign Ministry underwent extensive reorganization and top management changes. One innovation was to add an arms control department, headed by V. Karpov, a senior arms control negotiator. This weakened the military lobby's monopoly on disarmament expertise, as did the establishment of an arms control section in the Central Committee International Department.

At a closed meeting in the Foreign Ministry in May 1986, Gorbachev severely criticized past policies, rejecting the "Mr. Nyet" approach, and called for a cooperative attitude toward other world powers. He demanded new thinking in diplomacy and the discarding of past stereotypes and cliches, in order that Soviet diplomacy could "create the best possible foreign conditions for accelerating the socioeconomic development of Soviet society." He demanded correct analysis of "the real economic development" in the nonsocialist world and better forecasting of events.

In this speech, which was not published until August 1987, and then only in summary form in the Foreign Ministry's new publication *Vestnik*,¹ Gorbachev thus ordered the jettisoning of hardline ideological positions, which stood in the way of the warmer Soviet-West relations Gorbachev was seeking.

ARMS CONTROL CONCESSIONS AND RISING GLASNOST

At the June 16, 1986, Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev announced that Moscow had presented a new plan for strategic arms reductions at the Geneva talks. This had come on the heels of bitter Soviet denunciations, the harshest coming from then-President Andrei Gromyko, of President Reagan's May 27 decision to break out of the 1979 SALT treaty, unless the Soviets took "constructive steps" and adopted more cooperative arms control policies.² Within two days, Soviet negotiators at Geneva had

¹*Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, No. 1, August 5, 1987, pp. 4-6, summarized the speech by M. S. Gorbachev at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 23, 1986.

²"Gromyko Calls Reagan's Decision on the '79 Arms Pact a 'Blunder,'" *The New York Times*, June 3, 1986.

presented a new proposal on the ABM treaty, which suggested important Soviet concessions, including a 50 percent cut in offensive weapons, if the United States agreed to a 10- or 20-year ban on deploying space-based missile defenses. It appeared the plan intended to break the deadlock in negotiations, constituting the first real movement in the Geneva talks since their resumption in January 1985.³

To cultivate his image as a new type of Soviet leader and to undermine his conservative opposition, Gorbachev was also actively stoking glasnost at home, especially among the creative intelligentsia. In mid-1986, Cinematographers and Writers Unions' congresses saw reformists openly defy conservatives. At the Writers congress, Gorbachev's personal encouragement led to the unprecedented spectacle of sharp debates and contested elections. He met with leading writers the week before and urged them to be bold and help the cause of *perestroika* (the process of social transformation) at their congress. According to a samizdat report on the meeting, Gorbachev claimed the West was hostile to perestroika:

Our enemy has figured us out. They are not frightened of our nuclear might. They are not going to start a war. They are worried about one thing: if democracy develops among us, if that happens, then we will win.⁴

Gorbachev urged the writers to use glasnost; however, he also specified its limits. Perestroika needed glasnost as a substitute for the loyal opposition, because

we don't have an opposition [party]. How then can we monitor ourselves? Only through criticism and self-criticism. And most of all—through glasnost.⁵

At this time, Gorbachev specifically put criticism of the Soviet past outside glasnost limits:

If we start trying to deal with the past, we'll lose all our energy. It would be like hitting the people over the head. And we have to go forward. We'll sort out the past. We'll put everything in its place. But right now we have to direct our energy forward.⁶

³Robert Toth, "Reagan's SALT Stand May Not Affect Buildup," *Los Angeles Times*, June 8, 1986.

⁴Aaron Trehub, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL 399/86.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

Nevertheless, in congress speeches, not only present-day censorship but also Stalin-era repressions came under attack. This brought to an end the decade of silence imposed by the Brezhnevite policy of re-Stalinization. Other media exposés soon followed, blaming Stalinist methods and the Stalinist system as the roots of current Soviet problems.

Broadening glasnost accomplished key purposes of its architects, but at the same time its de-Stalinization aspects created new problems for the Gorbachev leadership. The criticism that traced the roots of the current crisis to Stalin-era abuses served well to head off a potential coalition of conservatives, neo-Stalinists, the military, and Russian nationalists that could seriously threaten Gorbachev's power.⁷ The active opposition that Gorbachev's conciliatory policy toward the United States and his concessions on arms control appeared to be encountering concerned American observers. They pointed to the arrest of American correspondent Daniloff in Moscow on August 30, 1986, and to earlier hints in Soviet media by military officials that "dangerous illusions" about the United States were threatening Soviet security.⁸ To allay concerns about Soviet intentions, Gorbachev spokesmen made statements that deviated sharply from ideological orthodoxy, such as that by *Kommunist* international observer V. Nekrasov (September 12, 1986, *New Times*):

In the nuclear age, the formula 'kto kogo' [who wins over who] is dead. It must be resolved once and for all that: 'nikto nikogo' [no one wins over no one].

⁷These concerns remain alive among Gorbachev's supporters. In the June 24, 1989, issue of *Sovetskaia kultura*, political scientist A. Migranyan and his interviewer agreed that Russian nationalist forces have merged with the Stalinists on a basis of Russian messianism and conservatism. A discussion of divisions among Soviet intellectuals also depicts one coalition as composed of conservative Russian nationalists and Party neo-Stalinists, who support Ligachev and Chebrikov and not Gorbachev. (John B. Dunlop, "Alla Latynina: A Self-Proclaimed Centrist Calls for Political Realignment," RL 275/89, *Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR*, June 23, 1989). See also Douglas Smith, "Moscow's 'Otechestvo': A Link Between Russian Nationalism and Conservative Opposition to Reform," RL 331/89, *Report on the USSR*, No. 30, July 28, 1989, pp. 6-9. He concludes that the new "Otechestvo" (Fatherland) society, founded in March 1989, is a "significant development in the current phenomenon of Russian nationalism. 'Otechestvo' embodies a unification of Russian nationalists with antireform conservatives from the Soviet military and the ranks of the neo-Stalinists."

⁸Stephen Cohen, *Los Angeles Times*, October 5, 1986.

MEDIA PRESENT CONFLICTING VIEWS

But as controls over what could be stated in open media loosened, spokesmen for groups with agendas differing from Gorbachev's used the new opportunity to advance their own purposes. As the bloody excesses of the Stalinist past unfolded with glasnost, it discredited not only the neo-Stalinist solutions, but also made an issue of Gorbachev's own policies in consolidating central control. Gorbachev needed historical glasnost to rehabilitate Bukharin (Stalin's rival who perished in the 1930s' purges) and criticize collectivization and thus ideologically legitimate his economic reforms. But removing the taboos on historical discussion also soon enabled the military, nationality groups such as, the Balts and the Caucasus peoples, and Russian nationalists as well to air pent-up grievances in ways that challenged the Gorbachev leadership in its effort to solidify central control. A new genre was developing of Aesopian polemics over the burning issues of the day. Pointed historical commentary, made by military writers and others recalled how Stalin, the all-powerful dictator, misguided Soviet defense and security policy on the eve of World War II and disastrously weakened Soviet defense by his purges of the military.⁹ A rare case where a military commander had refused to buckle under to Stalin's wishes was extolled in *Krasnaia Zvezda*. The commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces, Army General Ye. Ivanovsky, writing on the 90th anniversary of Marshal Rokossovsky, recalled that Rokossovsky firmly upheld his own views whether the higher authorities liked this or not. He noted that Rokossovsky had defended his strategic operation "Bagration" plans despite the fact that "Stalin was critical of them."¹⁰

Glasnost in foreign affairs and especially in arms control was boosted in August 1986, when *Moscow News*, until now the official news and propaganda weekly published

⁹*Ogonek* printed several such articles by I. Itskov and M. Babak in November 1986 (No. 48) on military novelist K. Simonov's conversations with the late Marshal Zhukov, and by V. Polikarpov in June 1987 (No. 26) on Fyodor Raskol'nikov's August 1939 open letter to Stalin. Polikarpov included statistics, recently compiled by Lt. Gen. A. Todorsky, on Soviet military leaders destroyed in the purges of World War II as proof that Raskol'nikov's accusations are valid. Simonov's "Notes to a Biography of G. K. Zhukov," were serialized in *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* during 1987; see especially No. 6, 1987, pp. 53-54. See also C. N. Donnelly, *The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev*, Soviet Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, December 1986, pp. 7-8.

¹⁰Army General Ye. Ivanovsky, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, December 21, 1986, translated in FBIS, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, February 5, 1987, p. V4.

in English by Novosti and the Union for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, got a new chief editor, Yegor Yakovlev.¹¹

At about the same time, V. Korotich took over as chief editor of *Ogonek*. Critical and controversial articles in *Ogonek* and especially the *Moscow News*, intensified the glasnost process and greatly increased Western awareness of it.

These publications signified the Gorbachev leadership's strong commitment to a course of change. *Moscow News*, moreover, quickly established itself as a source of information on the Gorbachev administration's impending diplomatic moves.

A good example here was the Bovin-Lebedev exchange of early 1987, which served as a symbolic start of the historic Soviet movement toward the signing of the INF treaty, the dismantling of their medium-range missile systems, the eventual exchange of Soviet and U.S. monitoring teams, and visits between U.S. and Soviet top defense officials.

In March 1987, in the *Moscow News*, top-ranking Soviet political commentator A. Bovin welcomed the new Soviet agreement to negotiate the removal and destruction of Euromissiles separately from SDI. Western observers were struck by Bovin's explicit criticism of the SS-20 deployments in Eastern Europe.

Bovin also blasted opponents of the new Soviet policy, who

equate consistency with immobility in politics [and lay down] ultimatums, the demands of 'all or nothing at all' [which] shackle thought. . . . All the necessary changes in position, the natural change in tactics, are viewed as a retreat in the presence of ultimatums. A really consistent policy geared at reaching specific goals rather than at slogans always tends to leave some space for maneuver. Learning this is also part of the reconstruction [perestroika] process.¹²

The next issue carried a reply to Bovin by General Yuri Lebedev, defending the deployments.

¹¹Former chief editor Gennady Gerasimov became chief of the new Information Administration of the Foreign Ministry and its press spokesman. This illustrates again that glasnost was practiced by talent already in place, that is, the professionals who had implemented the old thinking policy were now handling the new thinking as well. The cases of international affairs specialists G. Arbatov and Ye. Primakov illustrate this phenomenon even better.

¹²*Moscow News*, No. 10, March 15-22, 1987, p. 3.

Within the same month, the publicized exchange between writer Ales Adamovich and General Volkogonov broke out. In the *Moscow News*, Adamovich condemned nuclear war as immoral.¹³ At the Writers Union plenum in May 1987, General Volkogonov, then head of the Armed Forces' Main Political Administration, decried Adamovich's stand, warned against pacifism and criticism of the military, and called for continued vigilance against the proven aggressive forces abroad.¹⁴

During this same period, on Soviet television, Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher debated with Soviet journalists, and Soviet and West German experts, including former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, discussed foreign affairs.

In the *Moscow News*, established Soviet international affairs commentators demanded more glasnost in Soviet reporting on international affairs. For example, in May 1987, F. Burlatsky published a hard-hitting article in *Sovetskaia kul' tura*, which was a total indictment of prevailing Soviet international journalistic practice. As long as the Soviet public lives in "this information isolation," especially about the Western technological revolution, he said, "we will be unable to effectively solve the problems of our economic development." Burlatsky charged that Soviet "international journalism lags behind the new thinking and the new policy implemented by our country's leadership." It still portrayed the "ruling circles in Western countries" as enemies instead of as partners or competitors. While

the country's leaders proclaim humanization of international relations and rejection of primitive stereotypes and the enemy concept, international journalism at times continues to sail the old waters and to row as diligently as ever toward the shores of confrontation.

Burlatsky then recommended specific ways in which Soviet international journalism had to change so that its content would be in tune with the policies pursued by the country's leadership.

¹³*Moscow News*, No. 10, March 15-22, 1987.

¹⁴*Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 19, May 6, 1987.

V. HIGH GLASNOST: CRITICISM OF FOREIGN POLICY PAST AND PRESENT

Progress on the INF treaty and the developments in U.S.-Soviet relations that it engendered raised glasnost in international and security matters to a new level.

During 1987 and into 1988, conflict over security policy appeared to develop within the reformist group itself. This was accompanied by an intensified glasnost. The central press, institute journals, and new as well as remodeled international affairs publications opened their pages to established and to new names, who stated their views on what had been wrong, was still wrong, and what should be done in Soviet foreign and security policy.

The intensifying discussion was partly fueled by Gorbachev's increased attention to Soviet policy in Europe. In Yugoslavia, in March 1988, he in effect renounced the Brezhnev doctrine by signing the joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of principles, which abjured any interference in other countries' internal affairs regardless of their "sociopolitical system, . . . associations with other states, or their geographical position."¹ In January, V. Zhurkin, director of the new Europe Institute, had blamed Soviet secrecy in foreign and military policy for playing into opponents' hands: it freed them to distort Soviet moves and thus create the impression of a Soviet military threat. Zhurkin asserted that glasnost in fact strengthened Soviet security.²

Tensions between moderate and radical reformers became obvious in their criticism of recent and even current Soviet policy. To some extent, the top leadership encouraged this criticism because it afforded flexibility in policy execution. A statement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in July 1987 suggests this: He told a gathering of Foreign Ministry personnel that now Soviet foreign policy required "increasing the creative element and readiness for the most unexpected turns."³

In July 1988, Shevardnadze stated that the recent 19th Party Conference now permitted open public discussion of foreign policy options.

¹*Pravda*, March 19, 1988.

²*Kommunist*, No. 1, January 1988.

³Moscow TASS in English, September 7, 1987, citing *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh del SSSR*, No. 3 (September 10), 1987.

Open—and often contentious—discussion of Soviet security had actually started somewhat earlier. For example, the director of the Academy of Sciences Europe Institute publicly dismissed the threat of war from the West. Civilian specialists on occasion were able to state views favoring nuclear deterrence in international affairs journals.⁴ A former Ambassador Plenipotentiary acknowledged that many past Soviet foreign policy mistakes had earned the USSR the "image of the enemy." Arguments for and against the commitment to class struggle in Soviet international policy resounded in the Soviet press, culminating in public differences between Shevardnadze and Ligachev on this point and the subsequent shakeup of Party and government leadership during the first days of October.⁵

Many in the Soviet military opposed the switch from "enemy" to "partner" relations with Western powers. At the top, however, Marshal Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff, championed glasnost. His meetings with his U.S. counterpart, Admiral Crowe, generated positive ratings for his competence and apparent interest in genuinely improving Soviet-U.S. mutual understanding in military matters. The Soviet press, however, let it be known that Akhromeyev's championing of glasnost did not meet with unequivocal approval among his colleagues.

At a General Staff meeting in summer 1988, Akhromeyev outlined the changes necessary to restructure the General Staff's approach to formulating military doctrine and threat assessments. He complained that in this restructuring it was especially difficult to overcome old stereotypes. He called on the General Staff to develop glasnost in every way, stressing that it was essential in military science, where, in the past, issues of military theory and force development had not received thorough discussion. He told them that free debates and clashes of opinion would prevent mistakes in the General

⁴A. Bovin and V. Lukin in MEIMO, No. 12, December 1987, pp. 50–62; N. Grachev, *International Affairs*, No. 3, March 1988, pp. 91–94.

⁵Thanks to glasnost, this controversy can be traced back to Bovin's attack on Central Committee official Georgiy Shakhnazarov for the latter's "world government" idea, which Bovin rejected as incompatible with class conflict and the contradiction between capitalism and socialism (*Pravda*, February 1, 1988). This happened only weeks before Shakhnazarov was appointed adviser to Gorbachev. (In his UN speech in December 1988, Gorbachev called for de-ideologization of relations between states.) Bovin nevertheless continued on subsequent occasions to reiterate his warning against dismissing the class struggle concept in foreign affairs. See, for example, his article "October and Peaceful Coexistence" in *Izvestiia*, November 6, 1988, p. 4, translated in *FBIS-SOV-88-217*, November 9, 1988, pp. 11–12. On Shevardnadze and Ligachev differences, see footnote 20 in this section.

Staff's state-level decisions. When dealing with major, long-term issues, Akhromeyev insisted, a respectful attitude toward nontraditional proposals must prevail, since such proposals often contain the optimum solution.⁶

Soviet journalists used Akhromeyev's visits with U.S. defense officials at Soviet military installations to lobby for loosening secrecy on military matters for the press. With bitter sarcasm, *Argumenty i Fakty*, in a lengthy article attacking "senseless" secrecy, told its readers that Akhromeyev had briefed U.S. Defense Secretary Carlucci on Soviet strategic arms and had shown him the "Blackjack" aircraft, but that such information remained unavailable to interested Soviet citizens.⁷

DASHICHEV CRITICIZES PAST SOVIET POLICY

In 1988, for the first time, Soviet foreign and security policy was openly criticized. In retrospect, the intensification of glasnost in this area can be seen as driven by the worsening Soviet budgetary crisis,⁸ which necessitated a revision of Soviet foreign policy goals. But glasnost here as in domestic affairs was also prompted by a spiritual crisis that compelled a reassessment of the values held by Soviet society and espoused in its foreign policy. Policy mistakes of the Brezhnev period were strongly criticized by Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev, an economist and chief of the foreign policy department of the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. His statements in the Soviet press as well as in Bonn and Tokyo media created keen interest because they suggested that Moscow recognized its policies had contributed to world tensions and was reformulating its foreign policy. Other prominent specialists voiced similar criticisms, such as Bovin and Bogomolov, director of Dashichev's institute. Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Kozyrev passionately indicted past Soviet foreign policy and advocated a policy of international balance of

⁶*Krasnaia zvezda*, August 13, 1988.

⁷S. Pestov, *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 33, August 13-19, 1988. S. Kondrashov made the same argument on a TV program in November 1988 (see p. 31 below).

⁸By late 1988, Soviet authorities publicly acknowledged a huge state budget deficit, officially projected at 100 billion rubles for the coming year. In August 1989, the official projection increased to 120 billion rubles (\$192 billion) for 1989. According to Gosplan (State Planning Committee) chairman Yuri Maslyukov, the Soviet national debt stands now at 312 billion rubles (\$500 billion). Academician Bogomolov stated that the Soviets have had "chronic" budget deficits "for a very long time" (*Argumenty i fakty*, January 1989).

interests between the Soviet Union and other countries.⁹ Also at this time, a forthcoming new edition of the ten-volume history of Soviet Union in World War II promised to acknowledge more fully Allied help to the USSR during the war.

In May, Dashichev condemned Soviet trespasses against the established East-West balance of power:

The hegemonic, great-power ambitions of Stalinism, which took root in our foreign policy, frequently posed a threat to the political balance between states, especially between those of East and West.¹⁰

Dashichev argued that the Brezhnev leadership made a strategic error and lost the opportunity to better Soviet international security during the early 1970s *coéte*, when it opted for military build-up and sought military parity with the United States and all opposing powers. It should have sought to reduce confrontation and prevent its opponents' military buildup. Dashichev blamed the "severe exacerbation of tension in Soviet-Western relations in the late seventies and early eighties," which he called a "crisis," squarely on the

miscalculations and incompetent approach of the Brezhnev leadership toward the resolution of foreign policy tasks.

Dashichev asserted that the crisis could have been avoided by efforts "to settle the fundamental political contradictions with the West," and particularly by Soviet policy

⁹Andrei V. Kozyrev, deputy chief, International Organizations Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Confidence and the Balance of Interests," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 10, October 1988, pp. 3-12. Kozyrev argued for abandoning the class struggle with the West and against exporting revolution or using Soviet military resources "outside the borders of the socialist community." In conclusion, Kozyrev advocated *glasnost* to reduce militarist influence because it is in Soviet security interests to have

maximum freedom of expression in all the countries with which we coexist. This is, after all, an indispensable condition for the rise of democratic and progressive forces and for a decrease in the sphere of influence of military-political circles.

As to the concept of international balance of interest, Gorbachev, in his November 4, 1987, October Revolution anniversary address to representatives of international Communist parties, referred to it ambiguously as the "Hegelian 'medium,' that balance of interests that will enable mankind to make a breakthrough to a different level which is a salvation for it."

¹⁰*Literaturnaia Gazeta*, May 18, 1988.

that would have recognized the influence that regional conflicts have on Soviet-West relationships. The Soviet leadership had not followed "true national state interests." Its pursuit of the arms race made Soviet foreign policy "exceptionally costly," to the tune of \$1 trillion between 1979 and 1985. He advocated that

to radically and irrevocably curb the arms race, it is necessary to fundamentally reorganize Soviet-Western political relations. Mere talks on military issues are not enough here. Ultimately the point is not what quantity of nuclear and other weapons each side possesses or how far the level of armaments should be reduced. The main problem is whether a political modus vivendi is attainable between the USSR and the Western powers, whether they can secure a high level of mutual trust. It is here, in the politico-ideological sphere, that the key to disarmament lies.

The USSR and the Western powers must renounce confrontation and "refrain from pressing the other side's sore points." The USSR has to get rid of "Stalinism" in theory and in practice.

However, the USSR remains interested in creating "favorable international conditions for socialist building." After 1945, the Soviet Union was the military guarantor of expanding socialism in the world. Now, the Soviet Union best serves world socialism development by concentrating "exclusively" on "economic, political, scientific, and cultural successes." Dashichev denied this would lead to Soviet "socialist isolationism." On the contrary, "socialist solidarity will become richer and acquire an organic nature." Dashichev concluded that since the 27th Party Congress, Soviet foreign policy rests on the premise that

the interests of saving human civilization from nuclear annihilation take precedence over any class, ideological, material, personal, and other interests.

In his June interview in *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, Dashichev reiterated and expanded his views even more forcefully, especially condemning the former practice of a few leaders making all foreign policy decisions. He praised the major changes instituted under Shevardnadze, ensuring that expert opinion is consulted. But Dashichev called for more public involvement, especially in hearings before permanent Supreme Soviet commissions on foreign affairs. In line with Gorbachev's glasnost limits, Dashichev stated that independent opinions would be welcome,

but within the framework of keen interest in strengthening the positions of socialism.

Of equal significance, Dashichev also reiterated his point that

after 1945, when imperialism was extremely weakened . . . military aid and even liberation wars were both justified in order to expand the framework of socialism and the anti-imperialist liberation. But the situation which prevailed in the seventies was very different from that in the postwar period. Nonetheless, we launched an offensive against imperialism's positions in the Third World in the mid-seventies. . . . And what came of all this? A sharp clash of political contradictions with the Western powers (and that was not all—even China opposed our actions in the Third World). Detente was derailed, and we came up against a new and unprecedented explosion of the arms race.¹¹

Dashichev rejected military parity as unnecessary and unaffordable. Instead, he advocated that the two systems "collaborate and cooperate in the most diverse spheres," for

the informational, scientific, economic, and cultural opening up of our country must constitute a tremendous leap in its development.

In July, *Der Spiegel* interviewed Dashichev and asked him if, in view of his principle of East-West balance, Soviet troops would withdraw from Eastern Europe, were an agreement to be reached and American troops removed from Europe. Dashichev noted the "deep roots" that socialism has gained in Eastern Europe, and that "one hardly need fear any danger to its basic foundations." He also noted that "every country has its own army." Yes, Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), following mutual agreement, if the "social systems" and "national peculiarities" of the different states are respected. But Dashichev did not consider withdrawal a possibility before the end of this century. At the same time, he emphasized:

We need all our strength for our domestic tasks, and this will take centuries. Therefore, we can build the common home of Europe only if hegemonism is finally liquidated.¹²

¹¹*Komsomol' skaia pravda*, June 19, 1988.

¹²"So stand der Wagen vor dem Pferd," *Der Spiegel*, July 4, 1988, pp. 123—127, translated in *FBIS-SOV-88-131*, July 8, 1988, pp. 18—21.

Some of Dashichev's views did not go unchallenged in Moscow. In a *Pravda* article in late August, V. Falin and L. Bezymenskiy contradicted his optimistic view on East-West relations and his blaming Stalin's hegemonistic policies for the Cold War. They defended Soviet policies and blamed the Cold War solely on the United States. Falin has since been appointed head of the Central Committee International Department, which traditionally has dealt with nonruling Communist parties, the Third World, and left-wing movements abroad. From this perspective, professing an anti-U.S. bias has advantages, especially in conjunction with recent recurrent Soviet claims that the underlying trend of global social development is the convergence of the different social systems. The related projection of an "intersecting" was stated by the new ideology secretary V. Medvedev upon his appointment.¹³

By thus appealing to the strong socialist parties of Europe and appearing to lean toward a European (or multilateral) versus a U.S. (or bilateral) approach in Soviet foreign policy, the Soviets can expect to stimulate competitive wooing of Moscow.

SOVIET OFFICIALS DISAGREE ON FOREIGN POLICY

While the controversy in Soviet media clearly serves to manipulate Western opinion, it also reflects both real disagreement over the course to follow and the use of foreign policy criticism as an instrument in the internal power struggle. Open disagreement on foreign policy is not wholesale: there is as yet no open full-scale dispute over current Soviet policies in the Far East or the Third World.¹⁴ Vigorous

¹³On October 5, Medvedev noted that other political and economic systems offer useful lessons, because all systems "will inevitably intersect." The convergence prediction has been stated at greater length in *Kommunist*, and in *XX Century and Peace*; in *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* deputy foreign minister Bessmertnykh said that,

invisible to the human eye, processes are taking place in the U.S. ruling elite whereby a new oligarchy is taking the reins of administration into its hands, and strange things are happening to the forms of private ownership.

But he also warned about "imperialist militarism" within the United States and NATO, which clings to the "policy of force" and wants to restore East-West cold war confrontation (No. 8, August 1988).

¹⁴In a meeting with workers at a Moscow machine-building plant in July 1988, Foreign Ministry's scientific coordination center head V. Shustov acknowledged that mistakes had also been made abroad during Gorbachev's administration. He noted that "to avoid damaging relations with partners or our own interests," not all of the mistakes

contention exists, however, over the issue that in order to dismantle the "Soviet threat" and the West's image of the USSR as "enemy," the Soviets first need to officially deny the West's threat to the USSR.

On several occasions the Soviet public has been given a glimpse of the mutual recriminations between foreign policy experts and key Foreign Ministry officials at a roundtable debate (reported in *Literaturnaia gazeta* on June 29, 1988). Foreign journalists took part in the discussion, as did the chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry planning division Lev Mendelevich, Academician Oleg Bogomolov, and Professor Nikolai Molchanov.

During an exchange with Bogomolov, Mendelevich maintained that while there were debates, there was no division between diplomacy and the military-industrial complex in the USSR. Bogomolov complained that the Foreign Ministry continues to monopolize foreign policy formulation.¹⁵ Mendelevich pointed out that Central Committee departments and the Defense Ministry, and lately also scientists, are involved in the process. In another exchange, Professor Molchanov disagreed with Mendelevich's assertion that in the past Soviet foreign policy had been sound at the time of the 20th Party Congress. Molchanov insisted that the 1956 invasion of Hungary still had to be fully explained to the world and that Khrushchev's policies ("we will bury you," "we will teach you a lesson") in general were utopian and adventurist. Molchanov insisted on open discussion of Soviet foreign policy as the cure to stop "deceiving ourselves, our own people, and the world around us. We must stop it." And he recalled Lenin's declaration of the "need to eradicate secret diplomacy and publish all treaties."¹⁶ In speaking about the Warsaw Pact defense burden, Bogomolov concluded that currently

could be discussed. But he noted that experience in relations with developing countries had not been adequately analyzed, especially the "enormous resources we spent on building gigantic enterprises" there (*Argumenty i fakty*, No. 29, July 16-22, 1988). *Izvestiia*, December 27, 1987, and *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, March 23, 1989, reported horror stories of ongoing waste and gross misapplication of Soviet efforts in North Korean and North Vietnamese assistance projects.

¹⁵Bogomolov was the first to publicly condemn the top clique decisionmaking process, which launched the military intervention in Afghanistan. He reported that his institute had opposed it (*Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 16, 1988).

¹⁶In January 1988, Foreign Ministry spokesman Boris Pyadishev commented on his plans for the Foreign Ministry journal *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*. As its new editor-in-chief, Pyadishev promised to publish discussions and differing viewpoints, because "the more glasnost spreads the less room is left for coverups. . . . Treaties will be better for it. . . . Decisions made behind closed doors prove to have grievous consequences."

the defense burden on our national income is 10–15 percent . . . an unprecedented expenditure. Of course, this takes place at the cost of reducing all domestic consumption in the country to a minimum.

Bogomolov worried that the Theses of the 19th Party Conference interpreted "defense sufficiency" as "parity at lower level": even if Soviet military spending were halved to 5–8 percent of national income,

it will still be a colossal burden for our economy, which will not allow us to breathe and will condemn us to continued laggardness.

Mendelevich countered that Soviet security has been under threat for many decades and still is:

We must always plan for the worst-case scenario. Therefore, there cannot, unfortunately, be any other approach.

He recalled that the Theses referred to "the militarist danger inherent in the nature of imperialism." But he denied that "defense sufficiency" had been interpreted to mean parity at lower levels,

only as equal security at lower levels. We do not need formal parity; we need reliable security.

When Italian Communist journalist G. Chiesa urged unilateral Soviet conventional arms reductions in Europe to influence West European leaders and public opinion, Bogomolov recalled Soviets had done so in the past:

I do not rule out the possibility of new steps of this kind. It seems to me that this would really consolidate the atmosphere of trust and would help lead talks on European problems out of deadlock.¹⁷

When Martin Walker of *The Guardian* said it was "dangerous" for people in Washington and London to seek a new opportunity for "overthrowing" socialism, Mendelevich took a strong stand on the permanence of Eastern Europe's socialist system:

¹⁷*Literaturnaia gazeta*, June 29, 1988.

Intelligent and seasoned representatives of West European countries' establishments . . . are inclined to view socialism in East Europe as something temporary. The Soviet Union will withdraw its troops at some time—and there will be no socialism. West European statesmen and politicians do not have the political courage to understand that the development of socialism in East Europe is a historical process and that they must take into account the will of the people and the right to choose.

Will our troops always be in Hungary? I do not think so. We will reduce our armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and then reduce them again, and the situation will become completely different. But socialism will remain socialism.¹⁸

This confident statement can also be read as a reassertion of Soviet claim to dominant influence in Eastern Europe. Mendelevich added that while the Soviets did not see a threat from West European countries, the presence of the North American powers' troops, especially those of the United States, represented a real threat of war on the continent, accidentally, or because of "despair" or "confused priorities."

On July 28, 1988, *Pravda* reported another frank and stimulating debate during the scientific-practical conference, "The 19th Party Conference: Implications for Foreign Policy and Diplomacy," held at the Foreign Ministry from July 25 through July 27. About 900 officials participated, 300 of them giving reports. Participants included officials from the Foreign Ministry, the CPSU Central Committee, the Academy of Sciences, the Defense Ministry, and the KGB, as well as many young diplomats and scientists.¹⁹

At the conference, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stressed "peaceful coexistence as the supreme universal principle of international relations" and rejected class struggle as its component. He asked that, in this context, amendments be made to Soviet foreign policy priorities, even including amendments of the USSR Constitution. In particular, Shevardnadze called for legislative oversight over "all departments concerned with military and military-industrial activity" and decisions involving use of military force abroad, defense planning, and defense budget. *Pravda* reported that the conference examined priorities "from the standpoint of the Soviet Union's national interests."²⁰

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹The October and November 1988 issues of *International Affairs* present summaries of the conference speeches.

²⁰See *International Affairs*, October 1988, pp. 3–34 for Shevardnadze's speech. The definition of peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle had already been challenged by Gorbachev's advocacy of global interdependence. Controversy over this was present in the media since the end of 1987. In September 1988, shortly before his

As noted in the *Pravda* news release, Zhurkin and Bovin contributed to the discussion. Zhurkin left his post as deputy director of Arbatov's USA Institute to become director of the new Europe Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in November 1987. He is widely known for his landmark articles on "reasonable sufficiency," with D. Karaganov and A. Kortunov (*SShA: ekonomika, ideologia, politika*, December 1987, and *New Times*, October 14, 1987), and on Soviet security, again with Karaganov and Kortunov (*Kommunist*, January 1988).

At the conference's conclusion, celebrity participants, including Zhurkin, went on a media blitz to spread the new gospel about Soviet foreign policy. Within days, Army General Shabanov, another participant, talked to the *Washington Post* about cuts the Soviet Union had made in its military budget and intended to make in the future.

The following day, July 30, Zhurkin appeared with deputy foreign minister Petrovsky on political observer Valentin Zorin's Moscow TV program *Studio 9*. Zhurkin argued for redressing the prevailing Soviet policy's singular focus on the United States and for warming the relations between the USSR and Europe. He returned to his earlier theme of USSR unilateral conventional arms reductions as a way to accomplish this. In criticizing current Soviet policy, he had a sympathetic partner in moderator Zorin.

The pointed exchanges on this TV program revealed two things: (1) they excellently illustrate how far glasnost has come in criticizing prior security policies; (2) the protagonists represent disagreements within Gorbachev's own camp on security issues.²¹ Further details of the show illustrate these points.

Zorin started the televised discussion by noting:

One of the miscalculations in our foreign policies in years gone by was what I would describe as the extraordinary focus on the United States. In general, we thought that talks should only be held with the United States.

political demise, Ligachev confronted the issue head-on, reasserting that "international relations are particularly 'class' in nature, and this is of fundamental importance." Any other approach, he warned, "sows confusion among Soviet people and among our friends abroad." Ligachev was ousted as ideology secretary on October 4. See also footnote 5 in this section. An anti-militarist discussion of Soviet national interests and security appeared in *New Times* in November (Igor Malashenko, "Ideals and Interests," No. 45, November 1988, pp. 26-28).

²¹The program also stimulated an academic discussion of the different schools among Soviet defense intellectuals; their arguments about what theory is needed to deal with deep strategic arms cuts appeared in the MEIMO Institute journal, summer 1988. (A. Arbatov, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i mirovaia ekonomika*, Nos. 4 and 5, April and May, 1988). A professor from GDR joined the ongoing polemic in a later issue.

Europe was set aside, as were other regions. This one-sidedness cannot be denied. It should be said that in recent years, this has been clearly rectified.

But Zorin expressed concern about what is happening now:

Perhaps I'm wrong, but recently, very recently, symptoms of a return to the old imbalance have yet again recurred. We are again focusing our main attention on the U.S.

Deputy foreign minister Petrovsky sought to assure Zorin and the TV audience that, in fact, the USSR was currently

proceeding from the standpoint of constructive parallelism—the bilateral process of disarmament and the solving of other international questions, and multilateral relations.

Zhurkin disagreed with him and claimed that imbalances or priorities were apparent in current USSR foreign relations. He felt that

there were instances in our recent history when these leanings towards the U.S. took place. . . There were times when we failed to demonstrate sufficient activity toward Europe.

Zhurkin then criticized the ongoing Vienna conventional arms and troops reduction talks as still continuing to be of the "old type." He again proposed the alternative—unilateral reductions of Soviet tanks and troops in Europe:

Pertaining to Central Europe, we will now seek something new and dynamic. I feel there is an alternative path which differs from the one we are travelling, even though our current path is perfectly just, reasonable, well thought out and interesting. I think that one should think more daringly about more decisive initiatives in this sphere. For example, Europe is particularly concerned with our side's vast superiority in tanks. This is but one of the imbalances which exist in Europe. Why can't we give some thought and then take some decisive measures and unilaterally begin eliminating some of these imbalances? Can we not take some courageous steps in the sphere of certain reductions, say, in the number of armed forces we have abroad? . . . I believe this is an alternative that deserves further thought.

Petrovsky disagreed. Yet, Zhurkin came back, praising Soviet foreign policy of the last three years, but insisting that it should not preclude "unilateral steps."

Moderator Zorin started another discussion by stating that current Soviet disarmament policy was in error because it overly focused on SDI. He disapproved of this "rigidity." SDI was at best a remote prospect, and focusing on it obstructed solution of otherwise quickly solved problems.

I would like to express a doubt about the full validity of our official line, which links progress in disarmament in several directions with the problem of the SDI program. We very rigidly link the possibility of progress with whether or not the United States implements SDI. This rigid linkage, frankly speaking, causes certain doubts in my mind, because, even if the United States manages to create this system, it will be done sometime in the next century.

Zorin personally felt that SDI would not live beyond the Reagan presidency. However, he noted, Soviet policies are being conducted "as if [the SDI system] is already a proven fact." Linkage to SDI is a "rigidity."

Petrovsky retorted: "I totally disagree with you," and denied that the Soviets were being inflexible or linked everything to SDI.

Zhurkin then steered the discussion to defining the threat of war. He asserted that over the last two decades Soviet commentators, present company included, had

done our bit to overstate the threat of war against the Soviet Union. We have overstated this to such an extent that, at times, apocalyptic thoughts abounded on the pages of our press.

In truth, no nuclear war could have been launched on the Soviet Union because it possessed a retaliatory capacity and because the West was unprepared for such a war. It was another gross overestimate on the Soviet's part, similar to the Soviet anti-SDI campaign that had, in Zorin's view, "at times exceeded the bounds of reason." He concluded that even in light of Hitler's surprise attack on the USSR in June 1941, "threats must be evaluated rationally."

Petrovsky retorted that Zhurkin was being one-sided, and the two officials proceeded to argue about the lesson that Chernobyl had provided regarding the nuclear threat. As Petrovsky saw it: "While nuclear weapons exist, there is a threat they will be used." Zhurkin's conclusion differed:

I feel that if we were to talk in terms of threats to our security, then the real threat is that we will fall behind in economic and scientific and technical areas, that perhaps, at the very least, we will slide off the main path of

world progress in some specific areas of the economy, in science, and in technology. This, I feel, is the real threat.

Next, Zorin raised the issue of whether Soviets had "completely corrected the miscalculations" in having staked their fate on military measures rather than political options in ensuring Soviet security. Zhurkin felt that

the inertia of a military-technological reaction to the other side's moves continues.

He berated Soviet deployments of the SS-24 missile, noting that Soviets had long and loudly objected to the MX and the yet-undeployed Midgetman missiles. He explicitly drew attention to Soviet hypocrisy:

Forgive me for saying this: This missile [Midgetman] is very similar to the one we have already begun deploying. According to official figures, we already have more than a hundred of them.

When Petrovsky defended current Soviet policy as one that was proposing political solutions to security problems across the board, Zhurkin challenged him to support the proposed political means with

specific actions connected with a slowdown, and maybe even cutback, of the arms race in certain areas.

Zhurkin noted approvingly that Soviets were now doing much to make their relations with the world "more civilized." At the same time, lapses were still occurring.

For example, we do not make public the numerical strength of our armed forces. The civilized world is demanding this. The West says that we do not publish these figures because we have the largest armed forces in the world. They say that some five years ago, China had the largest number of men under arms, but that after they reduced their armed forces by a million, we took over first place.

Either we must admit this is true and explain this phenomenon, or we should reject these charges and prove their falseness. So, we still have these blind spots or taboos.

These complaints were soon addressed by the deputy chief of the General Staff, Col. Gen. M. Gareyev. In an interview in *Argumenty i Fakty* (No. 39, September 24-30,

1988), he stated that the Defense Ministry would release information on the combat makeup, strength, and technical equipment of the Soviet armed forces to further stabilize East-West relations through exchanges of needed information.²²

Pressure continued to be exerted on the military in the open media. In *Pravda*, October 17, 1988, academician G. Arbatov held up the Foreign Ministry as a paragon for the Defense Ministry when he wrote:

I think this [July 1988 Foreign Ministry] conference was an unprecedented event in the development of glasnost in foreign policy. It will be an important milestone in the awakening of foreign policy thought and the development of debates on important foreign policy issues. One would like to hope that a similar event will take place at the Defense Ministry.

In light of the data being furnished to Americans, Arbatov, as well as Soviet journalists, lobbied for curtailing secrecy and making Soviet military data accessible to Soviet international affairs experts:

Glasnost must be extended not only to domestic affairs, but also to foreign affairs, including military matters and disarmament. Why has what we tell the American negotiators been kept secret as a rule, even from the experts who are charged with explaining and defending the Soviet position? Why do delegations of the U.S. Congress regularly attend talks, but not delegations of the USSR Supreme Soviet?

And Arbatov chimed in on Shevardnadze's earlier call for oversight of the defense establishment:

Would it perhaps be useful for the Supreme Soviet also to set up a commission on defense questions?

At the end of January 1989, in another glasnost first, the Soviets did release data on the troops and weapons of the Warsaw Pact alliance. They delayed releasing figures on their military budget, however, claiming that correct calculations can only be made upon completion of price and currency adjustments. In the meantime, the Soviet press continued publishing insistent demands by media and academic spokesmen to publish the

²²High-level military contacts with Western military representatives continue: In March 1989, a Norwegian Storting Military Committee delegation, accompanied by Scandinavian journalists, visited the Kola Peninsula and toured Soviet weaponry at this key naval base.

data. Academician Goldansky scornfully noted that the disarray in prices does not prevent calculations in other economic sectors and warned that

these bureaucratic games are not only laughable. They are dangerous in the current period when confidence must become a behavior norm.²³

Complaints that the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry are too slow in easing restrictions on reporting have been repeatedly voiced by prominent liberal international affairs commentators. *Izvestiia's* A. Bovin and S. Kondrashov have been in the forefront. In November, a television program examined the status of international journalism under perestroika. While acknowledging that progress was being made on the difficult problem of freeing Soviet journalists from having to represent the Soviet official position in their statements, Bovin nevertheless criticized the Foreign Ministry for being overly restrictive in socialist countries, such as Romania, and in Third World countries, such as Iran, Libya, and Iraq. He was supported by Kondrashov and another senior commentator, Middle East specialist I. Belyayev of *Literaturnaia gazeta*.²⁴

Kondrashov also decried the fact that, already restricted in coverage because of newsprint shortage, newspapers have to surrender so much space to official statements. He complained about restrictions on military reporting and pointed out that without information on Soviet military expenditures, it is impossible to seriously discuss restructuring.

On the same program, Ya. Zasursky, the dean of Moscow State University's journalism faculty, noted that a Soviet journalist has to do time-consuming research in a library, while elsewhere in the world computer databases provide people with instant

²³*Argumenty i fakty*, No. 9, March 4-10, 1989.

²⁴*Repercussions* program, Moscow Television Service, November 1, 1988, translated in *FBIS, Soviet Union: Daily Report*, November 3, 1989, pp. 2-11. Impatience with official restrictions on Bloc reporting has been voiced on other occasions. In March 1989, a Tokyo paper cited the international affairs reporter of *Argumenty i fakty*, V. Boytenko, who questioned: "How on earth can the socialist community be so fragile as to be destroyed by one article?" He described the new Soviet generation of people as a "totally different species of young people. . . . They have courage. If we do not want to become like the old generation, we, the journalists of the younger generation, should have courage like them" (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 5, 1989). Glasnost on Bloc developments is making headway: A TASS report shows that *Sovetskaia Rossiia* and *Rude Pravo* have published reciprocally critical opinions, but in both cases clearly stated that the opinions were those of the writers, and not the editorial office (*Sovetskaia Rossiia*, March 5, 1989).

access to *The New York Times* and *Pravda* as well. Soviet journalists do not have access to the latest international information. Zasursky indicated he was encountering problems in getting the needed computer equipment. The dean also supported Kondrashov in urging that regular news conferences by top Soviet leaders be instituted, where reporters could question them directly on current issues. This would improve Soviet journalists' interviews of foreign leaders.

The television program was featured around viewers' questions, and, from replies of the participants, current concern with public opinion was obvious. G. Gerasimov, the chief spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, stressed that the Ministry is "taking account of public opinion and studying public attitudes to the Foreign Ministry." Belyayev declared he favored writing frankly about all difficult issues, "so that when some sort of catastrophe breaks, if it does, then our public opinion might be prepared for it."

The need to introduce computer technology and establish a "unified information service in the country" was advocated by the new TASS general director Leonid Kravchenko as part of his election program. He noted that TASS already has an "electronic bank of information, containing more than a half million various pieces of information and facts." He recommended putting this bank at the disposal of all Soviet editorial offices down to the rayon or district level. While costs may forbid computers for journalists, Kravchenko felt editorial offices should be equipped with computer monitors to begin to approach current world practice. He noted that lagging behind the world level in "electronics, information science, and computer culture is tragic." Kravchenko also disclosed that TASS and the CPSU Central Committee ideological department had jointly embarked on preparing recommendations for higher level approval that would enable the Soviet media to cope with the problems of timely coverage during a news explosion while using obsolete communications technology.²⁵

"Dogmatization of the 'military balance philosophy'" and its dire consequences for the Soviet economy and foreign political relations was condemned in November by Dr. Daniil Proektor, Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation member. It is incompatible with the goal of "post-industrialization" modernization of the Soviet economy, outlined by Politburo member Yakovlev in Riga last August. Proektor noted that "politics, not saber-rattling" had in the last three years attained foreign policy successes "without parallel in the previous 30 years." He called for a "broad domestic

²⁵Report on interview with Leonid Kravchenko, by Gennadiy Bocharov, in *Literaturnaiia gazeta*, No. 11, March 15, 1989, p. 10; translated in *FBIS, Soviet Union: Daily Report*, March 21, 1989, pp. 55-59.

and international debate" on past and present security policy issues to devise criteria for security. Archives must be opened to permit reevaluating past policies "from a moral standpoint." Proektor expressed disapproval of "our political thinkers who talk about balance of interests," because they do not answer the question, balance of interests for what purpose? He advocated an "intellectual policy . . . collaboration between progressive thought and thinking people."²⁶

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONALITY DEMANDS

Intellectuals, publicists, and journalists have been critical in moving along the Soviet Union's glasnost revolution. Some of them clearly went beyond what the political directors of the "revolution from above" envisioned. With their exposés of past and recent evils, they have changed the popular mood from morose submission to the regime to bold assertiveness and demandingness for true information and attention to the nation's problems. Especially in the national republics, intellectuals' freedom of expression under glasnost has generated mass support for righting historical wrongs, which involve foreign policy and security issues. Demands for national independence have been openly voiced in Armenia, Georgia, and the Baltic republics. In the Caucasus, nationality unrest led to bloodshed and stationing of troops to enforce curfew. The Balts have successfully evaded violent clashes and a military clampdown. They have continued to use glasnost to advance demands for greater economic and political independence and less restricted contacts with foreign countries.

Nationalist ferment in the Baltic states has fostered active outreach to the West by republic officials, the newly formed Popular Fronts, and other groups, eager to resume the Balts' historic ties with Western Europe. Mass demonstrations during the summer of 1988, led to leadership changes in all three republics and to demands by the Baltic governments for regional economic sovereignty with regard to Moscow and the establishment of free economic zones to facilitate foreign trade relations. Popular Fronts and informal groups have been more demanding for relaxing Moscow's restrictions on

²⁶*Literaturnaia gazeta*, November 9, 1988, p. 14. Proektor is also military historian with the Moscow International Relations Research Institute and author of a book published in Hungary in 1985, which reputedly "summed up in a united philosophical system the Soviet leadership's new tenets about international security" (Budapest Television Service, March 20, 1988, as translated in *FBIS, Soviet Union: Daily Report*, March 22, 1988, p. 6).

the republics' foreign contacts. Because glasnost on Stalinist foreign policy, the Baltic media and the Russian-language press published texts of the secret protocols of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet treaties, which apportioned spheres of interest in Eastern Europe for both powers, and historic data on the planning and execution of the Soviet military takeover of the Baltic states in 1940.

On occasion, the Kremlin and, on a regular basis, the Soviet central press make clear their resentment of the Balts' assertiveness. The escalating confrontation between the republic authorities and the center reached a peak in November 1988, with Estonia's unsuccessful challenge to Gorbachev's revision of the Soviet constitution precluding republican sovereignty. In February 1989, the Balts provoked new displeasure when their governments and Popular Front leaderships held meetings with a visiting delegation from the European Parliament, in which the Europeans reaffirmed Western refusal to recognize the USSR's 1940 annexation of the Baltic states.²⁷

On the whole, the Balts' demands have been supported by reformers in Moscow, who see the Baltic republics as a testing ground for perestroika that would eventually be applied to the rest of the country.

²⁷An article condemning the meetings appeared in the March 11, 1989, *Pravda*, penned by its longtime specialist in vitriol, Yuriy Zhukov. He criticized both the Europeans and the Baltic "comrades" for "hampering international cooperation."

VI. CONCLUSION: THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS OF GLASNOST

Glasnost is the hallmark of a changed Soviet approach to international security. It has given the Soviet Union a new and positive image, while undoing the old, forbidding image of a closed and secret society. The policy of glasnost seeks to stimulate dialogue internationally in the hopes that the Soviet will be accepted and trusted as international partners. It serves as palpable evidence that to an important degree Moscow indeed practices the new political thinking proclaimed by Gorbachev.

Glasnost is both talk and action. Soviet spokesmen now reject the "enemy" image of the West and speak of "partners" instead. They acknowledge the necessity to honor the vital interests of other states, and some prominent Soviets renounce the class struggle. Some openly blame Stalinist and subsequent Soviet foreign policy for bringing about the "Cold War" and the arms race. Political solutions are allegedly to be sought for all conflicts between states, and nuclear war has been renounced as a means of policy. The Soviets have even consented in principle to mutual disclosure of some key military data (although in practice they have thus far remained reticent in many areas).

Glasnost extends beyond what appears in the media: Soviets have cut down on human rights abuses; they permit Jewish emigration, return visits by emigrés, and much freer travel by Soviet citizens to the West. Glasnost means actions that prove Soviet willingness to meet Western concerns halfway, such as the Marshal Akhromeyev-Commander Crowe and defense chiefs' Carlucci and Yazov exchange visits in 1988. More recently, the Soviets have proposed cooperation between the CIA and the KGB in problem areas such as international terrorism.

There are many more such positive changes in Soviet international behavior. At the same time, however, ill will has not altogether disappeared from their international policy. Continued hostility toward the United States remained implied in Soviet propaganda broadcasts to Iran. To improve their position in Teheran at the West's expense, the Soviets moved quickly to exploit Iran's anti-U.S. turn during the Rushdie incident. This, plus the sale of fighter-bombers to Libya's Qadaffi and the protracted failure to comply fully with Gorbachev's promise to stop military aid to Nicaragua, have all served to keep the West on guard about Moscow's new thinking. Clearly, qualifications are needed in areas of Soviet policy that have not changed, especially since the dazzling glow of glasnost intends to focus attention completely on the new policies.

The Soviets will likely continue promoting cooperation in many areas of interest to the West and adjust to the requirements of openness this entails. Their gains here far outweigh the costs, because such cooperative efforts very effectively undo the Soviets' "enemy" image. Changing this image is crucial for Gorbachev's success in radically improving Moscow's relations with the rest of the world, and this is necessary for the USSR's economic and technological revival.

POWER STRUGGLE SUSTAINS GLASNOST

On the other hand, such openness is a less welcome result when it also permits Gorbachev's political rivals to reach out and seek to influence Western opinion in their favor. Thus, several years ago, Ligachev took advantage of an interview with the French press to depict himself as the No. 2 man in the Politburo. Deposed former Politburo member Yeltsin, a persistent critic of how perestroika is being implemented and now the leader of a parliamentary opposition group, frequently gives interviews to Western newsmen, where he publicizes his criticisms and reform solutions. The recent glasnost *pièces de résistance* of Marshal Akhromeyev testifying before the U.S. Congress and dour Marshal Yazov holding discussions with Margaret Thatcher demonstrate Gorbachev's consummate glasnost skill—and simultaneously these events empower the Soviet military in the new international exchange.

Splinter elements with their own agendas are a glasnost headache. They have taken advantage of new opportunities to reach out to the West, for example, Baltic reformers received European Parliament visitors to the area; contacts were expanded with emigré communities of various nationalities in the West, including Baltic and Russian;¹ and Orthodox and Catholic church leaders increased contacts with their counterparts abroad. Thus, international relations have already become an area of activity for an unprecedented variety of politically active and competing Soviet groups.

Much of this represents the unintended consequences of Gorbachev's glasnost policy. Originally instituted to facilitate the struggle against corruption, it was subsequently expanded to favorably influence elite and public opinion abroad. The intended expansion of glasnost occurred when Gorbachev confronted the need to recast

¹Baltic outreach to Western public opinion has steadily escalated since the writing of this paper, culminating in the August 23, 1989, two-million strong human chain demonstration on the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact anniversary.

Soviet foreign policy aims in accordance with the critical economic and political situation.

The early instances of glasnost in international relations created alarm and confusion among the entrenched Soviet party, military, and economic bureaucracy elites. Their resistance to Gorbachev's new course was met with increased glasnost, evidently intended to educate them to accept the necessity and correctness of Gorbachev's new domestic and foreign policies. The established controls over Soviet media were subjected to frequent change as proponents and opponents of perestroika and glasnost contended. More glasnost than was intended by its top architects slipped through: various strata of Soviet society poured out their pent-up grievances into the open media, astonishing the world and also the Soviet leadership with their boldness and candor. The initial limited removal of media restraints led to their extensive collapse and opened the media to a broadening political discourse.

Spreading glasnost placed the Soviet policy process on a new level: It legitimates the possibility of different but valid opinions. Glasnost lets the media reflect the Soviet political ferment and permits glimpses of the ongoing power struggle when intra-leadership squabbles surface in media. While seasoned public relations talents depict the extraordinary happenings as "pluralism" and a deliberate and confident campaign of "new thinking" by an innovative Gorbachev administration, many long-lived Potemkin villages of Soviet propaganda are being demolished. Abroad, glasnost greatly improved the soviet regime's image. At home, the image has been undermined to the point where questions about the regime's legitimacy are raised in the media. Disclosures of Stalinist horrors and Brezhnevite incompetence and corruption provided scapegoats for past mistakes. But glasnost is catching up with Gorbachev: Media criticism is starting to reach him and his policies, too, including complaints about foreign policy decisionmaking. By permitting criticism, glasnost opens the door to new ways in which the Soviet leadership will have to handle internal disagreements over foreign policy.

Albeit to a limited extent, glasnost makes it possible to argue openly in the Soviet Union about alternative security policy and to voice dissatisfaction with concrete decisions already taken by the leadership. The acting leadership has become publicly accountable, while its opponents now have the quite real prospect of future political gain, should the opportunity arise to claim "I told you so" later. Efforts to gut glasnost run up against politics, which keeps glasnost alive.

Glasnost provides a critical opportunity for rival views to be published and lessens misrepresentation or distortion. Glasnost also affords an escape valve for potentially explosive tensions and antagonisms. Open discussion in the reformers' camp has been lively and very informative. Arguments deal in specifics, including areas of arms control, and examine available policy options, for example, in economic modernization. And it was the reformers who first complained that foreign policy decisionmaking remains in the hands of too narrow a group.

Even when disagreements with Gorbachev's policies really stem from differences over domestic policy and rivalry for political power, their airing does not necessarily prove Gorbachev's weakness. Rather, it may generate new support for Gorbachev on contentious issues, if only to keep less desirable leaders from gaining power. Glasnost overwhelmingly activates and widens elite and public support for Gorbachev's foreign policy moves, both at home and abroad.

It is open to question whether or not Gorbachev's concept of "socialist pluralism," in the sense of people seeking the same, "socialist," goals but differing on how to get there, corresponds to Soviet political reality. The conservatives and the reformers appear to have radically different concepts of "socialism," politically and economically. Hence, their foreign policy goals might also differ. Economic realities may compel general agreement on policies toward the West. But contention persists over policy toward developments in Bloc countries and to some degree toward the Third World.

Conservative leaders have not personally used glasnost to promote foreign policy views opposed to Gorbachev's. Politburo members Chebrikov and Ligachev occasionally inveigh against Western secret services and for the class struggle, respectively. Top military leaders have expressed their uneasiness about unilateral disarmament measures. But the stalwart conservatives, former leaders now outside Gorbachev's administration, such as Gromyko, Grishin, or Romanov, have not been heard in the media, either opposing today's policies or defending the Brezhnev era's foreign and defense policies.

This is not to deny that conservative opinion defending or advocating Stalin or Brezhnev era policies has appeared in the media, and prominently. Some of these conservative positions have been endorsed by Gorbachev spokesmen as well: For example, last summer V. Falin (head of the Central Committee International Department) and L. Bezymensky reaffirmed that the West and the United States, not Stalin's policies,

were responsible for the Cold War; and deputy foreign minister Bessmertnykh talks of "imperialist militarism" seeking to restore Cold War confrontation.

GLASNOST—A GORBACHEV ADVANTAGE

It is clear that Gorbachev's decisionmaking process includes consultation and compromise, that is, decisions are based on a consensus. For example, in early 1989, hardline views on the contentious foreign policy issue of class struggle and world revolution were prominently reasserted in central media by several senior Soviet political commentators, after both concepts had been rejected by Gorbachev in his December 1988 UN speech. This event suggested that the Kremlin could conceivably return to the hardline options of its foreign policy, were Gorbachev to lose the support of his Politburo comrades for his "New Thinking" policy. The airing of such disagreements in the media also suggested that the conservatives were stepping up their attacks on Gorbachev. For the Western observer, glasnost in cases such as these presents a dilemma: Are the statements genuine expressions of differing views held by different leaders, or are they a new means to influence Western policy choices, that is, implying that the West had better cooperate with Gorbachev so that he can keep his (meaner) rivals at bay. Either way, glasnost on policy disagreements among the leaders prepares audiences for eventual policy adjustments that Gorbachev may have to make to remain in power. That goal doubtless is first on Gorbachev's agenda, and political flexibility has been his way to ensure staying in power.

Soviet liberals' use of glasnost inevitably led to the radicalization of Soviet public opinion. In their impact on the Soviet public's consciousness, conservative and military warnings about the West's continued hostile designs on the USSR pale before the passionately argued indictments of past Soviet foreign policy that reformist Soviet commentators regularly publish in the central press. Such glasnost was slow in coming, but once there, it widened the floodgates. Even more radical foreign policy views, deriving from a sweeping indictment of all preceding Soviet regimes, appear in publications from the Baltic republics and the Soviet Peace Committee, notably the latter's *Vek XX i mir (XX Century and Peace)*. Discrediting past shibboleths and jettisoning "enemy" stereotypes, all these exposés cut educated Soviet public opinion from its moorings in Marxist-Leninist *Weltanschauung*. This enlarges Gorbachev's support for opening up to the West and the rest of the world in general. The Soviet

Union's conservative elements have much power, but their opponents' skill in shaping public opinion—and alienating it from the conservatives' traditional positions on issues—bodes well for continued domestic pressures on Soviet leadership to pursue a "liberal" foreign policy. Established, prominent journalists and the younger generation of media professionals demonstrate the militant spirit of a crusading Fourth Estate. Their insistent advocacy of radically revising the Soviet approach to international relations magnifies the influence of those elements among the political leadership who are committed to joining the USSR to the modern world.

Glasnost on internal disagreements provides Gorbachev with advantages at home and abroad when implementing the radical turnabout in Soviet foreign policy that Moscow hopes will help overcome the country's crisis. Externally, in addition to boosting the Soviet Union's image as a responsible and modern world power by permitting the expression of differing views on foreign affairs, Moscow gains the flexibility to appeal to various group interests in the West and elsewhere. Rejecting the rigid, dogmatic "Nyet" policy eliminates the costs of needlessly antagonizing foreign capitals. At the same time, respecting the time-tested appeal of revolutionary doctrines can secure entry and approval among important and politically useful leftist elements abroad. In this manner, the pluralism of Western—and global—political and economic power can be matched and wooed by a quasi-pluralistic and opportunity-sensitive Soviet foreign policy.

Gorbachev and his foreign minister Shevardnadze have committed Soviet foreign policy to the pursuit, not of world revolution, but of the national interests of the Soviet state, which they accuse past leaders of neglecting. The process of defining these interests is continuing. Glasnost permits observing the give-and-take among the contending parties and their views. The forums for expressing these views are multiplying in the Soviet Union, as are the periodicals of different agencies and institutions that regularly report on their activities and views.

Given the ebb and flow of the Soviet political struggle, the momentum of glasnost appears inexhaustible, as long as the emerging Soviet body politic can rebuff attempts to clamp down on the free-wheeling Soviet media. Hence, we must brace ourselves for more heady stuff in the future. As official restrictions are loosened, and as the Soviets are compelled to turn to solving their accumulated and now openly acknowledged problems at home and abroad, glasnost will become part of the everyday business of managing the country's affairs.

Glasnost and "pluralism" have revolutionized Soviet political life. New forces have struggled to emerge, and as a result, the course of Gorbachev's leadership has been much more stormy and risky compared with his predecessors'. As taboos are knocked down in the progress of glasnost, the political climate inside the Soviet Union itself has changed. As *The New York Times* wisely observed after the unprecedented Soviet elections this spring, "Democratic uprisings have a way of generating their own momentum." Cracking down on glasnost carries the risk of further eroding popular tolerance of the Communist regime. Whether under Gorbachev or another leader, the ruling power now has to prove to its politically alive subjects that it indeed "knows best" what will be good for them. Soviet leadership will have to consider more and more the different views held by its various supporters and base its policies on consensus. The payoff of this new thinking may well be the ultimate security for any regime: political and economic conditions enabling it to stay in power.